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Grounds publishedDecided 29 Apr 2021

Court of Appeal

Beh Chew Boo v Public Prosecutor

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[2021] SGCA 44Case no. Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] It is well-established that, pursuant to Art 35(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“Constitution”) and s 11 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), the Public Prosecutor has a very wide discretion in the initiation, conduct, and discontinuance of criminal prosecutions. However, it is equally well-established that the courts retain the ultimate control over the management and conduct of court proceedings, including criminal proceedings, and the responsibility to ensure that this is done in a fair and efficient manner. The interaction between these two principles may sometimes give rise to the need to explore the extent to which the court is permitted and, indeed, required to control the conduct of criminal prosecutions in the interest of fairness and justice.

  3. [2] The present case required us to consider this issue in the light of the Prosecution’s intention to revive and then proceed with charges that had been withdrawn. Mr Beh Chew Boo (“Mr Beh”) was charged with five charges of drug importation. These charges concerned various types of drugs. The Prosecution initially stood down four of the charges (which were all non-capital charges (“Non-Capital Charges”)) and proceeded with and then obtained a conviction before the High Court on one capital charge of drug importation under s 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). Mr Beh was accordingly sentenced to death. The practice of standing down charges is commonly observed especially when the Prosecution proceeds only with a capital charge. By doing so, the accused person can focus on his defence to the capital charge without having to also defend himself against the other charges at the same time. Following his conviction, with the leave of the High Court, the four Non-Capital Charges were withdrawn on the application of the Prosecution. In the meantime, Mr Beh appealed against his conviction on the capital charge in CA/CCA 1/2020 (“CCA 1”). The Prosecution did not, in the course of resisting the appeal, take issue with any of the interlocutory rulings the High Court Judge had made. This Court unanimously acquitted Mr Beh of the capital charge. After we delivered our verdict, the Prosecution informed the Court that it wished to reinstate and proceed with a trial of the Non-Capital Charges. The Defence objected to this on the grounds of double jeopardy, res judicata, and abuse of process.

  4. [3] After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions, we decided that the Prosecution should not be allowed to reinstate and proceed with the withdrawn Non-Capital Charges because we considered that this would amount to an abuse of the process of court. The crux of the abuse lay not in any ulterior or improper motive in pursuing the prosecution of the Non-Capital Charges, but in the continuation of criminal prosecutions that could result in a collateral attack against at least some of this Court’s findings in CCA 1 and in the fact that the Prosecution was seeking in effect to reopen a key finding of fact we had made in coming to our verdict in CCA 1, based on evidence it could have produced at the original trial but chose not to. We now explain our decision.

  5. Procedural history

  6. Charges

  7. [4] Mr Beh faced five charges of unauthorised importation of controlled drugs. Although this concerned a single incident on 26 October 2016 at about 5.20am at Woodlands Checkpoint, there were five charges because different drugs were found in the motorcycle that Mr Beh was riding that day (collectively, “the Charges”). The Prosecution proceeded on only the first charge of importation of 102 packets of crystalline substance containing not less than 499.97g of methamphetamine (“the Ice”), which carried the death penalty (“the Capital Charge”). The Ice was found in a blue plastic bag that was hidden in the storage compartment of the motorcycle. Mr Beh had borrowed the motorcycle from its owner and had ridden it into Singapore with a female pillion rider.

  8. [5] The four remaining Non-Capital Charges did not carry the death penalty and were stood down at the commencement of trial. While the Prosecution stated broadly in its written submissions filed for these proceedings that the Non-Capital Charges related to the unauthorised importation of 1650 tablets, it appeared from our review of the record of proceedings that the Non-Capital Charges involved 1270 tablets, though of course nothing turns on this for the purposes of these proceedings. These 1270 tablets, which contained a mix of Class A and Class C controlled drugs, were from six different exhibits that were all found in the same blue plastic bag that also contained the Ice. These six exhibits were marked as “A1A” (150 beige tablets), “A1D1” (100 pink tablets), “A1D4A” (100 beige tablets), “A1A4A” (230 orange tablets), “A1A4B” (230 orange tablets), “A1A4C” (230 orange tablets), and “A1A4D” (230 orange tablets). The Non-Capital Charges were framed as follows.

  9. Charge

  10. Unauthorised importation of the following drugs:

  11. 2nd Charge

  12. • 150 beige tablets (Exhibit A1A) found to contain ethylone, a Class A controlled drug;

  13. • 100 pink tablets (Exhibit A1D1) of which at least 90% contained ethylone; and

  14. • 100 beige tablets (Exhibit A1D4A) of which at least 90% contained ethylone

  15. 3rd Charge

  16. • 150 beige tablets (Exhibit A1A) containing not less than 0.47g of ketamine, a Class A controlled drug; and

  17. • 100 beige tablets (Exhibit A1D4A) of which at least 90% contained ketamine

  18. 4th Charge

  19. • 150 beige tablets (Exhibit A1A) found to contain 5-methoxy-MiPT or its methoxy positional isomer in the 6-membered ring, which are Class A controlled drugs;

  20. • 100 pink tablets (Exhibit A1D1) of which at least 90% contained 5-methoxy-MiPT or its methoxy positional isomer in the 6-membered ring; and

  21. • 100 beige tablets (Exhibit A1D4A) of which at least 90% contained 5-methoxy-MiPT or its methoxy positional isomer in the 6-membered ring

  22. 5th Charge

  23. • 920 orange tablets (Exhibits A1A4A– A1A4D) of which at least 90% contained nimetazepam, a Class C controlled drug

  24. High Court Trial

  25. [6] Mr Beh was convicted on the Capital Charge in the High Court on 20 January 2020 and sentenced to death on 24 January 2020. The Prosecution then applied to withdraw the Non-Capital Charges under s 147(1) of the CPC, which the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) granted. Section 147 of the CPC provides:

  26. The Court of Appeal’s findings

  27. [8] On 13 October 2020, Mr Beh’s conviction was overturned on appeal on the basis that he had rebutted the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA: see Beh Chew Boo v Public Prosecutor [2020] 2 SLR 1375 (the “first CA Judgment”). The key findings and observations made by the Court in the first CA Judgment that were relevant to the present case were as follows.

  28. (a) Mr Beh’s defence was that he did not know that the blue plastic bag was in the motorcycle (see the first CA Judgment at [13]). While such a claim is sometimes dismissed where it is found to be incredible as a bare denial, we were satisfied that Mr Beh’s account was not inherently incredible. There were several unique features in this case, including the following:

  29. (i) the motorcycle belonged to Mr Lew Shyang Huei (“Mr Lew”);

  30. (ii) Mr Beh claimed that he borrowed the motorcycle from Mr Lew for his trip to Singapore;

  31. (iii) by the time of the trial, Mr Lew had been arrested in an unrelated matter and was in police custody in Singapore and his DNA was found on the drug exhibits in this case;

  32. (iv) Mr Beh’s DNA was not found on any of the drug exhibits;

  33. (v) Mr Beh’s positions in his statements and in his oral evidence were consistent in that he maintained all along that he was unaware of the presence of the blue plastic bag in the motorcycle, and that, as the motorcycle belonged to Mr Lew, the investigating authorities should ask Mr Lew about the drugs (see the first CA Judgment at [64]–[70]).

  34. (b) In all the circumstances, we were satisfied that the evidential burden had shifted to the Prosecution.

  35. (c) The Prosecution should therefore have applied to call Mr Lew to testify especially after the Defence had decided not to call him as a witness. This was especially so since, as we have noted above, Mr Lew was in custody in Singapore during Mr Beh’s trial (see the first CA Judgment at [71]–[75]).

  36. (d) The Prosecution, by deciding not to call Mr Lew, failed to discharge its evidential burden. We therefore found that Mr Beh had rebutted the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA.

  37. (e) Separately, after Mr Beh testified but before he was cross-examined by the Prosecution, Mr Beh’s counsel, Mr Wong Siew Hong (“Mr Wong”), objected to the Prosecution’s intended examination of Mr Beh in respect of certain text messages. These messages had been extracted from Mr Beh’s mobile phone and were reflected in a forensic examination report that had been adduced in evidence as part of the Prosecution’s case (see the first CA Judgment at [22]). The Judge allowed the Prosecution to cross-examine Mr Beh on some of the text messages, but either disallowed or limited the scope of the Prosecution’s cross-examination on the remaining messages (see the first CA Judgment at [24]). This Court observed in the first CA Judgment that it would have been more appropriate for a trial court to rule on such objections as and when they were taken in the course of cross-examination, rather than pre-emptively by broadly disallowing specific areas of cross-examination. Several of the messages that the Prosecution were not permitted to examine Mr Beh on could have been relevant to the trial. However, the Judge’s rulings on the text messages were not the subject of the submissions on appeal. This Court therefore did not make any findings on this issue (see the first CA Judgment at [56]–[62]).

  38. [9] The foregoing points will prove relevant and material to the question of abuse of process, as we explain further below.

  39. The Prosecution’s intention to proceed with the Non-Capital Charges

  40. [10] Shortly after the Court acquitted Mr Beh of the Capital Charge on 13 October 2020, the Prosecution informed the Court that it may wish to proceed with the Non-Capital Charges. The Defence reserved its position pending the finalisation of the Prosecution’s position. The Court directed the Prosecution to communicate its decision on the Non-Capital Charges to the Court and to Defence counsel within three days from 13 October 2020.

  41. [11] On 14 October 2020, the Prosecution informed the Defence counsel, Mr Wong, that it intended to proceed with the trial of the Non-Capital Charges in the State Courts, as these charges were not triable only by the High Court. The Prosecution also conveyed a certain offer in relation to the Non-Capital Charges to Mr Wong.

  42. The parties’ submissions

  43. [13] Mr Beh submitted that a trial of the Non-Capital Charges should not be permitted because the drugs in both the Capital and Non-Capital Charges were found in the same plastic bag. If Mr Beh had rebutted the presumption of possession in respect of the methamphetamine, which was in that plastic bag, it must follow that he had similarly rebutted the presumption of possession in respect of the other drugs in the Non-Capital Charges. On this basis, Mr Beh made the following alternative submissions.

  44. (a) Mr Beh may not be tried for the Non-Capital Charges because this was proscribed by s 244(1) of the CPC which barred a fresh trial even for a different offence if that arose from the same facts as the Capital Charge.

  45. (b) The trial of the Non-Capital Charges would infringe Mr Beh’s rights against double jeopardy under Art 11(2) of the Constitution.

  46. (c) Mr Beh was entitled to raise the plea of autrefois acquit.

  47. (d) Having successfully rebutted the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA in respect of the Capital Charge, the issue of his knowledge of the existence of the drugs and possession of the same in the Non-Capital Charges could not be reopened by reason of the doctrine of res judicata.

  48. (e) The proposed trial of the Non-Capital Charges was an abuse of process as it was in effect a backdoor attempt to retry a critical finding of fact that had been made in respect of the Capital Charge.

  49. (f) The proposed trial of the Non-Capital Charges was otherwise unfair, oppressive and an abuse of process.

  50. [14] In response, the Prosecution made the following submissions.

  51. (a) Proceeding on the Non-Capital Charges would offend neither the prohibition against double jeopardy under Art 11(2) of the Constitution nor the prohibition under s 244(1) of the CPC because the Non-Capital Charges were distinct offences from the Capital Charge. Section 244(2) of the CPC also provides that a person acquitted of any offence may afterwards be tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him in the former trial under s 134 of the CPC. The common law doctrines of autrefois acquit and convict have been codified in Art 11(2) of the Constitution and s 244(1) of the CPC, and cannot be relied upon as a separate principle of general application.

  52. (b) The Prosecution also noted that the relevant res judicata doctrine raised by Mr Beh in fact related to the principle of issue estoppel. The Prosecution submitted that this doctrine should not apply to criminal proceedings in Singapore. Even if it did, the doctrine would not bar the Prosecution from tendering evidence, in a subsequent trial on the Non-Capital Charges, on Mr Beh’s knowledge of the other drugs, since such evidence had not been adduced in the earlier trial of the Capital Charge.

  53. (c) Prosecuting Mr Beh on the Non-Capital Charges could not be construed as an abuse of prosecutorial power or an abuse of the judicial process.

  54. Issues

  55. [15] We had to determine the following issues in deciding whether the Prosecution should be permitted to proceed with a trial of the Non-Capital Charges.

  56. (a) Would proceeding with the Non-Capital Charges offend the rule against double jeopardy under Art 11(2) of the Constitution, s 244(1) of the CPC and/or the common law?

  57. (b) Did issue estoppel prevent a trial of the Non-Capital Charges?

  58. (c) Would proceeding with the Non-Capital Charges amount to an abuse of process?

  59. [16] For reasons that will be evident below, we did not think that there was a point on double jeopardy in this case because the requirements of the double jeopardy rule are strict, and the doctrine does not preclude a reinstatement of withdrawn charges following the acquittal of a distinct charge. We also considered it unnecessary to reach a conclusion on the controversial issue of whether issue estoppel should apply to criminal proceedings. The key concern was whether permitting a trial of the Non-Capital Charges would amount to an abuse of process, and it is this issue which we will focus our attention on. However, we will first briefly address the issues of double jeopardy and issue estoppel.

  60. Double Jeopardy

  61. [17] Mr Beh’s first three arguments – made in reliance on Art 11(2) of the Constitution, s 244(1) of the CPC, and the common law doctrine of autrefois acquit – were commonly premised on the double jeopardy rule.

  62. [18] Art 11 of the Constitution provides:

  63. [19] Section 244 of the CPC provides:

  64. [20] Section 244(1) of the CPC consists of two limbs: a person who has been tried and convicted or acquitted of an offence shall not be liable, while the conviction or acquittal remains in force, to be tried again (a) for the “same offence” (“first limb”); (b) nor on the same facts for any other offence which could have been pursued under ss 138–140 (“second limb”). As the first limb is identical in effect to Art 11(2) of the Constitution, we do not need to consider it separately.

  65. [21] There were thus three distinct issues arising from Mr Beh’s double jeopardy arguments.

  66. (a) First, were the Non-Capital and Capital Charges the “same offence” within the meaning of Art 11(2) of the Constitution and/or the first limb of s 244(1) of the CPC such that a trial of the Non-Capital Charges was prohibited?

  67. (b) Second, would proceeding with the Non-Capital Charges amount to trying Mr Beh “on the same facts for any other offence” within the meaning of the second limb of s 244(1) of the CPC?

  68. (c) Third, did the common law doctrine of autrefois acquit apply to bar the Prosecution from proceeding with a trial of the Non-Capital Charges?

  69. Retrial for the “same offence” within the first limb of s 244(1) of the CPC and Art 11(2) of the Constitution

  70. [22] In respect of both s 244(1) of the CPC and Art 11(2) of the Constitution, Mr Beh argued that the Non-Capital and Capital Charges entailed the “same offence” because they pertained to the same section of the MDA and the particulars of the charges were identical. This is not entirely accurate: the particulars of the Non-Capital and Capital Charges were not identical because there were differences as to the drug type and weight.

  71. [23] On the other hand, the Prosecution submitted that a purposive interpretation of the term “same offence” in s 244(1) of the CPC and in Art 11(2) of the Constitution would establish that it only applies to an offence that is the same in both fact and law. The Capital and Non-Capital Charges did not involve the “same offence” because the Charges involved different controlled drugs of different weights which are classified differently under the MDA. By extension, the specific mens rea and actus reus elements to be proved also differed.

  72. [24] We agreed with the Prosecution. The phrase “same offence” requires an offence identical in fact and law, in contrast to “any other offence” caught by the second limb of s 244(1) or “distinct offences” mentioned in s 244(2) of the CPC. We reach this conclusion even on a textual interpretation of the first limb of s 244(1) of the CPC and Art 11(2) of the Constitution, because the ordinary and natural meaning of the term “same”, as highlighted by the Prosecution, would require the offences to be identical.

  73. [25] As the drugs and drug weights indicated in the Non-Capital and Capital Charges differ, the Charges were not identical in fact, and thus were not in respect of the “same offences”. In simple terms, the Capital Charge was for importing a certain quantity of methamphetamine while the Non-Capital Charges were for importing various quantities of various other drugs. As such, we were satisfied that Art 11(2) of the Constitution and the first limb of s 244(1) of the CPC did not prevent the Prosecution from proceeding with the Non-Capital Charges.

  74. Retrial “on the same facts for any other offence” within the second limb of s 244(1) of the CPC

  75. [26] As to the second limb of s 244(1) of the CPC, Mr Beh submitted that the Prosecution was seeking to retry him on the basis of “reformulated charges” that arise from only one material act – his entering Singapore on 26 October 2016 with the plastic bag containing the drugs as set out in the Charges.

  76. [27] The Prosecution submitted that the Non-Capital Charges were not ones for which a different charge might have been made under s 138 of the CPC or for which Mr Beh might have been convicted under ss 139 or 140 of the CPC, which is the limitation contained within the second limb of s 244(1) of the CPC. The Prosecution also argued, as a point of general application to the entire double jeopardy argument, that s 244(2) of the CPC expressly permitted Mr Beh to be tried for the Non-Capital Charges as it specifically provides that a person acquitted of any offence may afterwards be tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him in the former trial under s 134 of the CPC. The Prosecution submits that Mr Beh could have been tried for the Non-Capital Charges in the former trial under s 134.

  77. [28] We also agreed with the Prosecution on this issue. The second limb of s 244(1) of the CPC was not at issue here because the provisos concerning ss 138, 139 and 140 of the CPC had not been met. These provisions provide as follows:

  78. [29] These provisions were analysed and construed in Public Prosecutor v Wee Teong Boo and other appeal and another matter [2020] 2 SLR 533 at [89]–[116] and it is clear that they do not apply in the present context. Section 138 of the CPC involves an accused who has been charged with several offences because it is doubtful what offence has been committed on the provable facts and s 139 is a consequential provision to s 138. As for s 140, that involves an accused person who is charged with an offence and who may be convicted of having attempted to commit it or of having abetted its commission. None of these provisions applied to the Non-Capital Charges. Therefore, the second limb of s 244(1) of the CPC did not prevent the Prosecution from reinstating the Non-Capital Charges.

  79. [30] We also agreed with the Prosecution that the Non-Capital Charges in any event fell within s 244(2) of the CPC, which provides that a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may afterwards be tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him in the former trial under s 134 of the CPC. Section 134 of the CPC provides:

  80. [31] Section 134 of the CPC deals with the power to try a person at one trial for more than one offence, where all of the offences are committed by the same person in one series of acts forming the same transaction. Acts form the same transaction if there is “proximity of time, unity of place, unity of purpose or design and continuity of action”, though these requirements are not cumulative: see Tse Po Chung Nathan and another v Public Prosecutor [1993] 1 SLR(R) 308 at [31]. The Charges clearly involved acts forming the same transaction since all the drugs were found in the same plastic bag brought into Singapore by Mr Beh on the same occasion on 26 October 2016. As such, s 244(2) of the CPC was also applicable. This, however, was not the end of the matter, since there remained possible questions as to issue estoppel and abuse of process.

  81. Autrefois acquit

  82. [32] Before we turn to those questions, we briefly deal with one remaining aspect of double jeopardy. At common law, it is well-established under the doctrine of autrefois acquit and convict that a person cannot be tried for a crime in respect of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The locus classicus of this doctrine is the House of Lords’ decision in Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 (“Connelly”), though the precise contours of that judgment have been widely debated. In particular, Lord Devlin had taken a narrower view of autrefois convict in that case, concluding that the doctrine only applied if the offences are the same in both fact and law (at 1339). On the other hand, Lord Morris took the view that the doctrine could apply if the offences were substantially the same (at 1305).

  83. [33] Mr Beh submitted that his case fell within both the narrow and broader views of autrefois acquit in Connelly. The Prosecution made three main points in response.

  84. (a) The common law doctrine has been codified in Art 11(2) of the Constitution and s 244(1) of the CPC, and hence could not be relied upon as a separate principle of general application.

  85. (b) In any case, the accepted common law doctrine of autrefois acquit adopts the same formulation in Art 11(2) of the Constitution and s 244(1) of the CPC as requiring that the later offence be the same both in fact and in law.

  86. (c) Even if the broad view applied, there was no substantial similarity between the Non-Capital Charges and the Capital Charge.

  87. [34] We hesitate over the submission that the common law doctrines of autrefois convict and acquit have been completely repealed by Art 11(2) of the Constitution and/or s 244(1) of the CPC. Even in Gunalan s/o Govindarajoo v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 SLR(R) 578 (“Gunalan”) at [11], which was referred to by the Prosecution, Yong Pung How CJ, while holding that the common law doctrine of autrefois convict is “enshrined in Art 11(2) of the Constitution”, also recognised that it was not yet settled whether the doctrine required the offences to be the same in both fact and law or merely to be substantially similar. This suggests an implicit recognition that the common law doctrine remains relevant in Singapore. In Gunalan, Yong CJ held at [12] that it was unnecessary in that case to decide the point because the petitioner’s claim of autrefois convict in that case failed on either view.

  88. [35] Nevertheless, the common law position has since been clarified in two English Court of Appeal cases, and it is now clear that the narrow view prevails. In R v J(JF) [2014] QB 561, Sir John Thomas P (delivering the judgment of the court), after a review of the different judgments in Connelly, concluded (at [23]) that, while it was “by no means easy to determine what the ratio in Connelly … was”, the majority decision of that case was “contained in the speech of Lord Devlin” because “Lord Reid, at p 1295, and Lord Pearce, at p 1368, agreed with Lord Devlin, rather than Lord Morris”. Therefore, “the scope of autrefois is narrow and the offence, as well as the facts, must be the same for the plea of autrefois to apply”. Similarly, in R v Lama [2017] QB 1171 at [109], Hallett LJ (delivering the judgment of the court) held that either plea of autrefois acquit or convict “will only succeed where the later proceedings are for an offence which is the same as an earlier offence both in fact and law.”

  89. [36] Therefore, we provisionally agree with the Prosecution’s second argument, which is that it ultimately does not matter whether the common law has been excluded because the position under the common law too adopts the narrow view, meaning that the offences must be the same in fact and in law. Consequently, on the facts of this case, we were satisfied that the common law doctrine of autrefois acquit would not preclude the Prosecution from proceeding with the Non-Capital Charges. Nevertheless, we found it unnecessary to reach a final conclusion on whether the common law doctrine of autrefois acquit should be expanded to accommodate the broader test of substantial similarity, since, as alluded to at [16] above and as will be evident below, we concluded that the Prosecution was precluded from reinstating the Non-Capital Charges by operation of the doctrine of abuse of process.

  90. Issue Estoppel

  91. [37] Mr Beh argued that the question of his knowledge of the existence of the drugs that form the subject matter of the Non-Capital Charges is in any case barred from being reopened by reason of the doctrine of res judicata. This was said to follow from his having successfully rebutted the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA in respect of the methamphetamine found in the same plastic bag that also contained the drugs in the Non-Capital Charges.

  92. [38] As this Court has stated in The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd (nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd and others, other parties) and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 1104 (“RBS”) at [98], endorsing Lord Sumption’s dicta in Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly Contour Aerospace Ltd) [2014] AC 160 at [17], res judicata is a “portmanteau term which is used to describe a number of different legal principles with different juridical origins”. The doctrine of res judicata includes the distinct but interrelated principles of (a) cause of action estoppel; (b) issue estoppel; and (c) the “extended” doctrine of res judicata under Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 (“Henderson”) (see RBS at [98]–[102]; see also Goh Nellie v Goh Lian Teck and others [2007] 1 SLR(R) 453 at [17]–[25]).

  93. (a) Cause of action estoppel prevents a party from asserting or denying against the other party the existence of a particular cause of action which has already been determined in previous litigation between the same parties.

  94. (b) Issue estoppel is of wider application than cause of action estoppel and arises when a court has determined some question of fact or law, either in the course of the same litigation (for example, as a preliminary point) or in other litigation which raises the same point between the same parties. Issue estoppel prevents a party from relitigating such a question of fact or law.

  95. (c) The rule in Henderson extends cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel to cases where the point sought to be argued in later proceedings was not previously decided by the court in the earlier proceedings between the same parties because it was not raised in the earlier proceedings, even though it could and should have been raised in those earlier proceedings (see also Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 760 (“Andy Lim”) at [36]). While some potential confusion on terminology might arise because the rule in Henderson is also sometimes referred to as the “abuse of process” doctrine, this overlap is rationalised on the basis that res judicata and abuse of process are overlapping concepts with a common underlying purpose of limiting abusive and duplicative litigation. Thus, there is no difficulty in conceiving of the rule in Henderson as being concerned with abuse of process while simultaneously being part of the doctrine of res judicata. This overlap was pertinent in the present case because, as shall be evident below, the abuse of process concerns in this case overlapped significantly with those underlying the rule in Henderson.

  96. [39] As we also explained in RBS at [103]–[104], it is important to determine precisely which of the three res judicata principles applies on the facts of a given case because they call for different approaches. Where cause of action estoppel applies, the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged. On the other hand, issue estoppel is less rigid, in that there might be an exception to it in the special circumstance that there has become available to a party further material relevant to the correct determination of a point involved in the earlier proceedings, provided that the further material in question could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in those earlier proceedings. This may be further contrasted with the Henderson extended doctrine of res judicata, which accords a higher degree of flexibility to the court to look at all the circumstances of the case, including whether there is fresh evidence that might warrant re-litigation or whether there are bona fide reasons for a matter not having been raised in the earlier proceedings.

  97. [40] Mr Beh did not identify which aspect of the doctrine of res judicata he was relying on. He also did not address the question of whether issue estoppel was applicable in the criminal context (“criminal issue estoppel”). It is unfortunate that Mr Beh was unable to provide a clear and precise articulation of the particular aspect of the res judicata doctrine which he was relying on.

  98. [41] The Prosecution submitted that the applicable doctrine was issue estoppel, and cited Bachoo Mohan Singh v Public Prosecutor [2010] 1 SLR 966 at [60] to emphasise that the court there thought it was not settled whether issue estoppel should apply to criminal law. In any case, the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed) imports the position in the UK that the doctrine of issue estoppel had no place in criminal law, as was held in Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1977] AC 1 (“Humphrys”). Thus, the Prosecution submitted that issue estoppel should not apply to criminal proceedings in Singapore. Alternatively, the Prosecution submitted that a broader exception to criminal issue estoppel than is applicable in civil proceedings should apply.

  99. [42] We agreed with the Prosecution that the issue framed by Mr Beh appeared to concern the principle of issue estoppel, since Mr Beh was submitting that a question of fact – namely, whether he knew of the existence of the plastic bag in the motorcycle’s seat compartment – had already been determined by this Court and therefore could not be raised in a fresh criminal trial. We thus proceed with the analysis on this basis.

  100. [43] The current status of criminal issue estoppel appears to vary across the common law jurisdictions. The starting point for analysing issue estoppel in the criminal law is the House of Lords’ decision in Humphrys. There, the respondent was acquitted on a charge of driving while disqualified because the constable’s eyewitness evidence was unsatisfactory. Subsequently, the respondent was charged with perjury for saying on oath that he had not driven any vehicle in 1972. The prosecution sought to call the constable as a witness again to repeat his testimony that the respondent was the rider of the motorcycle he had stopped. Over the objections of the defence, the constable gave evidence and the respondent was convicted of perjury. The English Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, finding that the constable’s evidence was inadmissible because of issue estoppel. The prosecution appealed.

  101. [44] The House of Lords allowed the appeal. First, the Law Lords unanimously rejected the applicability of issue estoppel in criminal proceedings (per Viscount Dilhorne at 21; per Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone at 40–41; per Lord Salmon at 43–44; per Lord Edmund-Davies at 48; per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton at 58). In so holding, they departed from dicta in Connelly (at 1306, 1321, 1334, 1366 per Lords Morris, Hodson and Pearce) suggesting the potential applicability of issue estoppel. The main reasons for coming to this view were explained primarily by Lord Salmon and can be distilled as follows.

  102. (a) First, it was unnecessary because the doctrines of autrefois acquit and convict sufficiently protect against double jeopardy without the need to introduce a technical and complex doctrine into the criminal law (per Lord Salmon at 43–44).

  103. (b) Second, it was inappropriate because there are no pleadings in criminal proceedings that serve to define the issues and no judgments that explain how the issues, even if identifiable, are decided. Juries return general verdicts of “guilty” or “not guilty” (per Lord Salmon at 43).

  104. (c) Third, it was artificial and unfair. Where the jury decides in favour of the accused only because they are left in doubt as to whether the contrary has been proved, it would be “artificial and unjust” if the accused is “given the added bonus that that issue should thereafter be presumed for ever to have been irrevocably decided in his favour as between himself and the Crown”, with the effect that upon a totally different charge, supported by overwhelming evidence against him, he might escape conviction because of issue estoppel (per Lord Salmon at 43). This would “work public mischief by bringing the law into disrepute” (per Lord Edmund-Davies at 56).

  105. (d) Finally, it should not be open to the Crown to invoke issue estoppel in criminal proceedings. The Crown and the accused are not in the same or even an analogous position to opposing litigants in civil proceedings (who are on an equal footing and subject to the same rules of public policy). In criminal cases, issue estoppel springs from the rule of public policy that is the prohibition against double jeopardy (which is intrinsically unavailable to the Crown). In civil cases, the relevant rule of public policy underlying issue estoppel – the need for finality in litigation – is intrinsically applicable to both parties. Also, in criminal proceedings the Crown is charged with protecting innocent citizens against crime and vindicating public justice. It therefore has “interests and duties which are not simply those of a civil litigant’” and the application of “artificial rules, like those of estoppel” to the criminal process must be seen in the light of these considerations (per Lord Hailsham at 32–33).

  106. [45] Therefore, the House of Lords held that the determination at the first trial of an issue in the accused’s favour was no bar to the admission at the second trial of evidence given at the first trial where this was directed to establishing perjury at the first trial (per Viscount Dilhorne at 26). The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal and restored the conviction entered by the trial judge.

  107. [46] Humphrys has been endorsed and followed in New Zealand (see R v Davis [1982] 1 NZLR 584 at 589) and Hong Kong (see R v Yu Wai-shan and another [1986] HKLR 550 at 553–554). Australia also does not recognise criminal issue estoppel (see, for example, Rogers v R (1994) 123 ALR 417).

  108. [47] On the other hand, other jurisdictions have recognised criminal issue estoppel. We do not propose to outline all the cases here. It suffices for present purposes to highlight the Canadian case of R v Mahalingan [2008] 3 SCR 316 (“Mahalingan”), which was a useful reasoned decision on this issue. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held by a 5:3 majority that fairness requires that an accused should not be called upon to answer discrete factual and legal issues (short of the ultimate verdict) that have been resolved in his or her favour in a previous proceeding. If an issue supporting an acquittal is resolved in favour of the accused person on one offence, whether on the basis of a positive factual finding or a reasonable doubt, evidence to contradict the finding on that issue cannot subsequently be led again in respect of different charges (Mahalingan at [31], [39], [40], and [75]). The majority in Mahalingan further opined that other rules of criminal law did not completely meet the fairness concern. The doctrine of autrefois acquit only applied to the final verdict and not to specific underlying elements of the Crown’s case. It was also thought that abuse of process was a broad, discretionary concept requiring a high threshold of proof that may not adequately protect against re-litigation of a particular issue (at [41]–[42]).

  109. [48] It is evident that a multitude of reasons have been cited both for and against the applicability of issue estoppel in criminal proceedings. Not all of them are relevant to the context in Singapore, particularly some of the concerns highlighted in Humphrys, since we do not have a system of jury trials at all. Consequently, Humphrys cannot be imported into Singapore without careful consideration of its applicability in our context.

  110. [49] In Singapore, this Court has made the following observations in relation to the differences between criminal and civil cases, and the implications of the applicability of res judicata in criminal proceedings, in RBS at [127]–[128] (though the issue there was whether a prior decision made by a court without jurisdiction can give rise to res judicata):

  111. [50] As alluded to at [16] above, it was unnecessary for us to reach a conclusion on this controversial issue of whether issue estoppel should apply in criminal proceedings. We thus left this question open for determination in a more appropriate case in the future where it squarely arises. In the present case, we found the crux of the problem with the Prosecution’s intention to proceed with the Non-Capital Charges to be that it would amount to an abuse of process. It is to this question that we now turn.

  112. Abuse of process

  113. [51] Mr Beh argued that the proposed trial of the Non-Capital Charges would be an abuse of process. The Prosecution’s intention in going ahead with the Non-Capital Charges was to call Mr Lew. Not only was this impermissible because Mr Lew’s testimony is not new evidence as it was reasonably available to the Prosecution, but calling Lew would also be an attempt to relitigate the acquittal on the Capital Charge. In addition, the proposed trial of the Non-Capital Charges was otherwise unfair or oppressive because it suggests that there was nothing preventing the Prosecution from proceeding with the Non-Capital Charges one at a time, perhaps until Mr Beh was eventually convicted.

  114. [52] The Prosecution submitted that there was no abuse of process because the criminal process was not being invoked to serve a purpose other than bona fide prosecution of Mr Beh on the remaining charges. The Prosecution was not seeking a retrial on the Capital Charge since, regardless of the outcome for the Non-Capital Charges, the former acquittal would stand. There was, in any case, no evidence of oppressive drip-feeding, because the Prosecution had indicated that it would apply for Mr Beh to be tried on all the Non-Capital charges together and not sequentially.

  115. The principles and contours of abuse of process

  116. [53] The traditional concept of abuse of process in the context of the criminal law is where the criminal process is being used for a purpose other than the bona fide prosecution of criminals. The essence of the concern is that the judicial process is being used for a purpose for which it was not intended or where the extraneous purpose is the dominant purpose for its use: see Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [132]. However, the doctrine of abuse of process is of wider application. For instance, in Effrizan Kamisran v Public Prosecutor [2020] 5 SLR 747 at [50], a special three-judge bench sitting in the High Court recognised that an individual would generally be protected by the abuse of process doctrine from a prosecution being initiated in respect of or arising from the same conduct that had led to an admission into a drug rehabilitation centre.

  117. [54] In this case, the specific complaint raised by Mr Beh was that the Prosecution was seeking, in effect, to mount a collateral attack against the first CA Judgment by attempting to secure an inconsistent court judgment in the proposed trial of the Non-Capital Charges and this would amount to an abuse of process. After all, if the trial of the Non-Capital Charges resulted in a finding that Mr Beh did know of the plastic bag and its contents, it would raise questions as to his acquittal on the Capital Charge.

  118. (a) on a prior civil judgment, in later civil proceedings;

  119. (b) on a prior criminal judgment, in later civil proceedings;

  120. (c) on a prior civil judgment, in later criminal proceedings; and

  121. (d) on a prior criminal judgment, in later criminal proceedings (the present case).

  122. Prior civil and later civil proceedings

  123. [56] We first consider the situation where the “collateral attack” is said to be on a prior civil judgment in later civil proceedings. Suppose that X has claims under three contracts against Z, and some of the issues overlap. X brings a claim under the first contract to trial and is unsuccessful. X then seeks to litigate the second claim but seeks to adduce new evidence in respect of the identical issue that has been ruled against it.

  124. [57] In such a scenario, where the litigant attempts to relitigate the matter instead of bringing its whole case at once, the Henderson extended doctrine of res judicata, which also has underlying considerations of preventing the abuse of the judicial process, would be a safeguard to bar the re-litigation of a point that properly belonged to the subject-matter of earlier litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, should have brought forward at the time (see [38(c)] above). The rule in Henderson is not confined only to repeated claims by the same plaintiff or to repeated claims against the same defendant. The rule is applicable where “some connection” can be shown between the party seeking to relitigate the issue and the earlier proceeding where that essential issue was litigated, and such a connection would make it unjust to allow that party to reopen the issue: see Andy Lim at [44].

  125. Prior criminal and later civil proceedings

  126. [58] The next situation is where the “collateral attack” is said to be on a prior criminal judgment in later civil proceedings (“criminal-civil” scenario). The leading case on this issue is and remains the House of Lords’ decision in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police and others [1982] AC 529 (“Hunter”). There, the appellant was charged with murder. During the trial, a voir dire was held to ascertain the voluntariness of certain statements recorded from the appellant. In particular, the appellant alleged that he had been assaulted by the police before his confession was obtained. The trial judge admitted the evidence, finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had not been assaulted by the police and the statements were in fact voluntary. The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed but no issue was taken with the judge’s ruling on the admissibility of the statements. The appeals were dismissed. Subsequently, the appellant commenced a civil action against the police claiming damages for the identical assaults that had allegedly taken place and had been canvassed at the voir dire to determine the voluntariness of the statements. The defendant sought to strike out the statement of claim on the ground of abuse of process.

  127. [59] The House of Lords unanimously held that the civil action was an abuse of process. Lord Diplock (who delivered the leading judgment) began by explaining the abuse of process doctrine as follows (at 536B):

  128. [60] Lord Diplock then further outlined the collateral attack doctrine as follows (at 541H–542C):

  129. [61] As to whether there was an abuse of process on the facts of that case, Lord Diplock found that “the identical question sought to be raised has been already decided” (at 542B). Thus, the abuse of process lay in (at 541B):

  130. [62] The “proper method” of attacking the trial judge’s decision in the voir dire that he was not assaulted by the police (at 541C):

  131. [63] This was a point which was somewhat material to the present case, as we explain below.

  132. [64] Also relevant to Lord Diplock’s decision was the fact that the expert evidence from the doctor that the appellant sought to adduce “was available at the trial or could by reasonable diligence have been obtained then” (at 545B); and further that the “dominant purpose” of the action was not to recover damages, but to pressurise the Home Secretary to release them from the life sentences. Lord Diplock inferred this purpose from the manner in which the action was conducted (the appellant did not obtain judgment on liability and proceed to assessment of damages, even though he was in a position to do so, since the Home Office had amended their defence to admit liability for the alleged assaults by the prison officers) (at 541F–G).

  133. [65] Lord Diplock went further on in Hunter to observe that, to relitigate the matter, there needs at least to be new evidence not called at the criminal trial that will “entirely change the aspect of the case” at the civil trial (at 545C, applying a dictum of Earl Cairns L.C. in Phosphate Sewage Co Ltd v Molleson (1879) 4 App Cas 801, 814).

  134. [66] While the Law Lords in Hunter found it relevant in that case that Hunter had improper purposes for the civil proceedings, it has since been established that an improper motive is not necessary for a finding that the subsequent proceedings constitute an abuse of process: see Smith v Linskills (a firm) [1996] 1 WLR 763 at 771D per Sir Thomas Bingham MR.

  135. [67] Hunter has been consistently considered and applied by the English courts: see, for example, Arthur J S Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons; Barratt v Woolf Seddon (a firm); Harris v Scholfield Roberts & Hill (a firm) [2002] 1 AC 615 (“Arthur J S Hall”) at [16] and [32]; Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Sinclair and others (Emmott, Part 20 defendant) [2017] 1 WLR 2646 (“Michael Wilson”) at [39]; Koza Ltd and another v Koza Altin Isletmeleri AS [2021] 1 WLR 170 (“Koza”) at [30] and [36].

  136. [68] In Arthur J S Hall, the House of Lords was concerned with the question of whether the advocate’s immunity from suit should be retained. It was in that context that the Law Lords had to consider the applicability of the principle in Hunter, including whether it precluded those convicted of criminal offences from suing their advocates for negligence. What is relevant for present purposes is that Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ said at [38] that a careful analysis of the specific circumstances of each case would have to be undertaken to determine whether there is an abuse of process by collateral attack:

  137. [69] In Arthur J S Hall, Lord Hoffmann outlined (at 701) two policies which underlie the discouragement of re-litigation:

  138. [70] Lord Hoffmann (with whom Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hutton and Millett agreed) also considered that there is a relevant distinction between criminal and civil proceedings (at 706):

  139. [71] As to the relationship between the rule in Henderson and the Hunter principle resting on a collateral attack constituting an abuse of process, there is, as recognised by Simon LJ in Koza at [38], a “potential overlap” between the two doctrines. In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1, which remains the leading modern authority on the rule in Henderson in England and Wales, Lord Bingham noted (at 31) that the Hunter fact pattern may simply be a “much more obviously abusive” situation than the Henderson scenario.

  140. [72] The modern principles on the relevant considerations under the Hunter doctrine were distilled and outlined by Simon LJ (with whom the other Lord Justices agreed with) in Michael Wilson at [48], which we reproduce in full here because it is a helpful summary of the position at common law:

  141. Prior civil and later criminal proceedings

  142. [73] As for the situation where the “collateral attack” is said to be on a prior civil judgment in later criminal proceedings, this appears hardly ever to have been regarded as giving rise to an abuse of process. This was succinctly explained by Templeman J in the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Western Australia in Roberts v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 37 at [50]:

  143. [74] Templeman J elaborated at [51]–[52] that a factor to consider is the public confidence in the administration of justice. That confidence would be lost if the State were unable to prosecute alleged offenders simply because the relevant issue had been litigated in civil proceedings.

  144. [75] McLure J further explained at [160]:

  145. Prior criminal and later criminal proceedings

  146. [76] We turn finally to the situation in this case, which concerns the potential “collateral attack” on a prior criminal judgment in later criminal proceedings (“criminal-criminal” scenario).

  147. [77] In R v Carroll (2002) 194 ALR 1 (“Carroll”), the High Court of Australia laid down a standard of manifest inconsistency to identify an abuse of process in circumstances where a prior criminal decision appeared to be collaterally attacked in subsequent criminal proceedings. The case concerned an earlier murder charge and a later perjury charge. The following principles may be distilled from the court’s reasoning, particularly in the judgments of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J.

  148. (a) Finality is an important aspect of any system of justice. The incontrovertibility of an acquittal is rooted in the finality of judicial proceedings: Carroll at [22] and [48].

  149. (b) The basic position is that the acquittal at the first trial is to be treated as “incontrovertibly correct”: Carroll at [35].

  150. (c) There are cases where a subsequent charge of an offence would be manifestly inconsistent on the facts with a previous acquittal, even though no plea of autrefois acquit was available. Since, in most cases of trial by jury, it will not be known why the accused was acquitted, the inconsistency, if it exists, will appear from a comparison of the elements of the new charge with the verdict of not guilty of the previous charge, understood in the light of the issues at the first trial: Carroll at [40].

  151. (d) The court declined to set down the limits of the incontrovertibility of a decision, beyond relying on manifest inconsistency or “direct inconsistency” between the new charge and earlier verdict as an instance of abuse. It observed that it would be necessary to examine the elements of the offence of which the person was acquitted and those of the offence with which the person is later charged. It also noted that the assessment of abuse would “[s]eldom, if ever” require considering whether the evidence which would be led at a second trial is new or persuasive: Carroll at [45] and [47].

  152. (e) The court also noted at [50] that the finality of a verdict of acquittal does not necessarily prevent the institution of proceedings or the tender of evidence “which might have the incidental effect of casting doubt upon, or even demonstrating the error of, an earlier decision”. The court had in mind cases where, at a later trial of allegedly similar conduct of an accused, evidence of conduct may be adduced even though the accused had earlier been charged with and acquitted of an offence said to be constituted by that conduct.

  153. [78] Manifest inconsistency was found on the facts of Carroll. The only element of the offence of murder in issue was whether the respondent killed the victim. The perjury alleged at the second trial was the respondent’s false denial on oath that he had killed the victim. It was necessarily implied in the perjury indictment that the respondent had killed the victim. Thus, the indictment for perjury should have been stayed as the prosecution “inevitably sought to controvert” the earlier acquittal on a charge of murder: Carroll at [41]–[42], [51].

  154. [79] Humphrys likewise highlights the importance of scrutinising the facts and allegations raised. The facts of that case have been summarised at [43] above. The House of Lords held (per Lord Hailsham at 41) that:

  155. [80] Therefore, unlike Carroll (see [77(d)] above), Humphrys emphasises the need to examine whether any fresh evidence is to be adduced in the subsequent proceedings. On the facts of Humphrys, Lord Salmon reasoned (at 47) that:

  156. [81] The notion that it may be an abuse of process to continue a prosecution in light of a prior court decision is also supported by the Canadian case of R v Clarke (2003) NSPC 12. The accused person there was charged in Nova Scotia with marijuana possession. She applied for a stay of the charge on the ground that courts in Ontario and Prince Edward Island had ruled that the offence was invalid. The Nova Scotia Provincial Court agreed that permitting the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process, as the Crown should not be allowed to relitigate the issue in each province and the public was entitled to expect uniformity in the prosecution of federal law (at [15] and [17]).

  157. The proper approach in the present case

  158. [82] We found the authorities in the criminal-civil and criminal-criminal scenarios to be relevant to the present situation. The following broad principles could be distilled from the cases.

  159. (a) The court has the inherent power to prevent the use of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people (see [59] above).

  160. (b) Finality is an important aspect of any system of justice (see [77(a)] above).

  161. (c) A verdict of acquittal (after the avenues of appeal have been exhausted) is to be treated as incontrovertibly correct (see [77(b)] above).

  162. (d) The doctrine of abuse of process is founded not only on the private interest of a party not to be vexed twice in respect of the same complaint but also on the public interest of the state in not having issues repeatedly litigated. These interests reflect unfairness to a party on the one hand, and the risk of the administration of justice being brought into disrepute on the other. On the latter point, it would bring disrepute to the administration of justice if, the same question having been disposed of in one case, the litigant in a civil case were permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to reopen the same issue (see [60], [69] and [72] above). This should similarly be the case in the criminal-criminal context.

  163. (e) The “proper method” of challenging any aspect of a trial judge’s decision is to make that challenge in an appeal against the trial judge’s decision (see [62] above).

  164. (f) The initiation of later proceedings collaterally challenging an earlier judgment is not necessarily an abuse of process, but it may be. The court’s power to strike out or prohibit the subsequent proceedings on the basis that it is an abusive collateral attack on the prior judgment should only be used where justice and public policy demand it. Whether or not there is an abusive collateral attack in any given case is a fact-sensitive enquiry (see [68], [72], [77(d)] and [79] above).

  165. [83] We were satisfied that the foregoing principles were applicable in the criminal-criminal context here. While Lord Hoffmann did recognise in Arthur J S Hall at 706 that the scope for re-examination is wider in criminal proceedings than civil proceedings (see [70] above), he was making this comment in the context of a prior criminal conviction which ought to be re-examined and set aside as unsafe and unsatisfactory on the basis of fresh evidence. This was not the same situation as the present, where there is a prior acquittal which may be potentially collaterally attacked by a court’s findings in the subsequent criminal trial (albeit on different charges).

  166. [84] Therefore, the central consideration is the degree of overlap between the issues raised in the prior and subsequent criminal proceedings. However, the existence of manifest inconsistency between the earlier and the pending or intended proceedings may not, in and of itself, amount to an abuse of process. It will be necessary to consider whether, in all the circumstances, it would be unfair and unjust to the accused person or otherwise inconsistent with the fair administration of justice to permit the pending or intended proceedings to continue (see [82(f)] above). We do not wish to be unduly prescriptive as to the factors that should be considered in determining whether there would be an abuse of process, but, in the context of this matter, we considered a number of factors which are set out below at [88] to [105] below. This included, in particular, the availability of what may properly be regarded as fresh evidence. Fresh proceedings that are commenced on the basis of evidence that was not available in the earlier proceedings might well not amount to an abuse of process. Conversely, an attempt in fresh proceedings to rely on evidence that was not, but could have been, adduced in the earlier proceedings would more likely amount to an abuse of process (see Humphrys at [79] above; see also Hunter at [65] above). This is because res judicata and abuse of process are overlapping concepts which seek to prohibit abusive and duplicative litigation (see [38(c)] above). The doctrine of abusive collateral attack is, essentially, an extension of the Henderson doctrine (see [71] above).

  167. [85] How do the foregoing principles implicate the Public Prosecutor’s discretion to conduct prosecutions? We accept that the Public Prosecutor has, under Art 35(8) of the Constitution and s 11 of the CPC, a wide discretion on how to institute, conduct or discontinue any criminal prosecutions. In this case, the Prosecution’s intention to reinstate and proceed with a trial of the Non-Capital Charges was prima facie permitted by s 147(3) of the CPC, as highlighted at [7] above. However, that was not the end of the matter. As this Court explained in Lim Chit Foo v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 64 (“Lim Chit Foo”) at [20]–[22], while the prosecutorial and judicial functions are given equal status in the Constitution, the judicial power may circumscribe prosecutorial power in two ways. First, the court may declare the wrongful exercise of the prosecutorial power to be unconstitutional. Second, when an accused is brought before a court, the proceedings thereafter are subject to the control of the court.

  168. Application to the present case

  169. [87] To be clear, there was no question or suggestion of any bad faith or improper motives underlying the intended prosecution of the Non-Capital Charges. However, as mentioned at [82(g)] above, this was neither relevant nor material and was not the nature of abuse of process with which we were concerned in this case. Rather, we found that allowing the Prosecution to reinstate and proceed with a trial of the Non-Capital Charges would amount to an abuse of process because it would amount to a collateral attack on Mr Beh’s prior acquittal of the Capital Charge and it would be unfair and unjust to him or otherwise inconsistent with the fair administration of justice to permit the intended trial of the Non-Capital Charges to be proceeded with.

  170. [88] There were five critical factors which led us to this conclusion.

  171. [89] First, the key fact on which Mr Beh was acquitted of the Capital Charge – the fact that he did not know of the existence of the blue plastic bag containing the Ice (the “possession issue”) – is the identical fact which will need to be proved by the Prosecution in any trial of the Non-Capital Charges. This is because (a) all the Charges were for the offence of unauthorised drug importation under s 7 of the MDA, which contain the same elements of knowing possession of the drug and knowledge of the nature of the drug; and (b) all the drugs in the Charges were found in the same blue plastic bag hidden in the motorcycle that Mr Beh had borrowed and ridden into Singapore with on the same occasion on 26 October 2016 at about 5.20am at the Woodlands Checkpoint. This gave rise to a manifest and irreconcilable inconsistency between the finding of this Court in respect of the Capital Charge and the outcome the Prosecution was seeking in respect of the Non-Capital Charges.

  172. [90] Had Mr Beh been acquitted of the Capital Charge because he successfully proved, for instance, that he did not know the nature of the drugs in that case, that would likely not have raised any risk of such manifest inconsistency since the drugs in the Non-Capital Charges are different in nature. However, the issue of knowing possession was identical for all the Charges, namely, whether Mr Beh knew of the existence of the blue plastic bag containing the “things” found to be drugs. This Court had made a finding on the possession issue in the first CA Judgment to the effect that Mr Beh did not knowingly possess the blue plastic bag containing the Ice. The Prosecution’s intention to proceed with a trial in the State Courts on the Non-Capital Charges would, as the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (“DPP”), Mr Wong Woon Kwong (“DPP Wong”), conceded, necessarily involve the Prosecution seeking to convince the trial court to reach an opposite conclusion on the possession issue. This was what created the risk of manifestly inconsistent findings on the possession issue. And as outlined above, this is one of the mischiefs which courts guard against, both because it would be unfair to the accused that the Prosecution can mount a second attempt to make its case against the accused on an identical issue, and also because it may bring the administration of justice into disrepute if manifestly inconsistent findings are reached by two different courts on the identical issue.

  173. [91] Second, to successfully prove the Non-Capital Charges, the Prosecution intended to adduce two pieces of evidence that it did not or was not able, in the event, to rely on in the Capital Charge proceedings. The Prosecution intended, first, to call Mr Lew as a witness and, second, to cross-examine Mr Beh on the text messages which the Judge had disallowed (see [8(e)] above). DPP Wong admitted at the hearing before us that, in light of this Court’s findings in the first CA Judgment, the prosecution of the Non-Capital Charges would not succeed or would at least face immense difficulties without these two pieces of evidence.

  174. [92] However, it was the Prosecution’s own election not to call Mr Lew as a witness in the trial of the Capital Charge and this was a material factor that was held against it in the earlier judgment of this Court.

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