Court of Appeal · Decided 29 June 2021
Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and other appeals and other matters
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 63 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 116 of 2020
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The heart of the four related appeals and six applications before this court concerned the use of four affidavits (“the EJD documents”) which were filed in response to the appellant’s application for examination of judgment debtor (“the EJD proceedings”). The judge below (“the Judge”) concluded that the appellant’s use of the EJD documents to commence HC/S 47/2020 (“Suit 47”) was an abuse of process in violation of the principle in Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 (“Riddick”). Suit 47 was consequently struck out. In essence, the ultimate purpose of these various appeals and applications relate to the lifting of the Riddick undertaking to permit the appellant to use the EJD documents in pursuit of Suit 47. In these grounds, we clarify the contours of the Riddick undertaking, which is an expression of the doctrine of abuse of process.
- [2]
[2] The present appeals and applications also serve as a cautionary tale on the undesirable consequences of poor case management. Through a series of missteps and impulsive applications which were filed by both parties without applying their minds to their necessity or utility, for reasons which will be elaborated below, what should have been one appeal before this court regrettably led to the proliferation of four appeals and six ill-advised applications. Unfortunately, as we will explain below, the Judge partly contributed to this state of affairs by hearing one prayer of an application and directing the alternative prayer to be heard by an Assistant Registrar. This led to two appeals being filed arising from one application.
- [4]
[4] Beyond the unnecessary multiplicity of appeals, the appellant made the estate of Mdm Lim Lie Hoa (“Mdm Lim”), the respondent in two of the appeals, bankrupt on the eve of her pending appeals. This added a further layer of complications entirely induced by the appellant. In fact, the six applications before this court can be traced to the questionable decision of the appellant to make Mdm Lim’s estate bankrupt notwithstanding her own pending appeals. We are not suggesting that the appellant should not have made Mdm Lim’s estate bankrupt but rather that this should have been done at the earliest opportunity after obtaining information from the EJD proceedings. Had she done so, it is likely that the arguments about Riddick and all the applications and appeals relating thereto might have been avoided.
- [5]
[5] On 27 May 2021, having heard the parties, we disposed of the six applications and allowed two of the four appeals, namely CA/CA 190/2020 (“CA 190”) and CA/CA 191/2020 (“CA 191”). The two other appeals (CA/CA 116/2020 and CA/CA 192/2020; “CA 116” and “CA 192”) were dismissed. We now set out the detailed grounds of our decision.
Factual background
- [6]
[6] The appellant’s quest to recover a legitimate judgment debt has spanned over three decades. In that time, she has been involved in a considerable amount of litigation in our courts, as well as abroad. There have been no less than 15 local judgments and three foreign judgments in relation to disputes between the appellant, her former husband and her in-laws. To give context to the present appeals, it would be apt for us to recapitulate, in brief, the events that have transpired.
Origin of the dispute and dramatis personae
- [7]
[7] On 23 October 1974, Mr Ong Seng Keng (“Mr Ong”), the patriarch of the Ong family, passed away. He was survived by his widow, Mdm Lim, and his three sons, Ong Siauw-Tjoan (“OST”), Ong Siauw Ping (“OSP”) and Ong Keng Tong (“OKT”). Mdm Lim passed away on 8 August 2009; her estate (“the Estate”) is the respondent in CA 116 and 190. OSP is the sole executor of the Estate, and the respondent in CA 191 and 192 in his personal capacity. Where appropriate, we will refer to the Estate and OSP collectively as “the respondents”.
- [8]
[8] The appellant in all four appeals, Jane Rebecca Ong, is the estranged wife of OST. They were married in England on 1 October 1982. The appellant commenced divorce proceedings in Singapore in March 1988, and a decree nisi was obtained in July 1988.
- [10]
[10] The monumental litigation that followed spanned from 1991 to the present, and may broadly be understood as a trilogy, as follows:
(a) The appellant’s claim for a share of Mr Ong’s estate. This involved OS 939/1991 (“OS 939”), the inquiry that followed, and the taxation of the Bill of Costs for OS 939 vide BC 118/2006 (“BC 118”).
(b) The appellant’s suit against PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), PwC UK, and her ex-solicitors via S 156/2006 (“Suit 156”). This was a claim for breach of contract and negligence.
Most germane, for the purposes of the present appeals and applications, would be the first instalment of the trilogy, ie, OS 939 and BC 118.
OS 939, the inquiry and BC 118
- [11]
[11] In 1991, OST assigned to the appellant half of his entitlement to the residuary estate of Mr Ong. He also executed a power of attorney to confer on the appellant powers to demand and sue the representatives of Mr Ong’s estate for OST’s share.
- [12]
[12] On 21 September 1991, the appellant commenced OS 939 in OST’s name against Mdm Lim, to claim a share of Mr Ong’s estate. OST and the appellant were on the same side at this stage. Soon after, however, OST shifted his allegiance back to Mdm Lim. He claimed that he had received his entitlement under Mr Ong’s estate, and instructed his lawyer to discontinue OS 939. Following this development, the appellant replaced OST as the plaintiff in OS 939, OST was added as the second defendant, and the proceedings were converted into one as if commenced by writ. Around the same time, the appellant restored the maintenance proceedings against OST.
- [13]
[13] On 16 July 1996, Chao Hick Tin J (as he then was) delivered judgment on OS 939 in favour of the appellant: Jane Rebecca Ong v Lim Lie Hoa also known as Lim Le Hoa also known as Lily Arief Husni and another [1996] SGHC 140. Mdm Lim’s and OST’s appeals were dismissed by this court in Lim Lie Hoa and another v Ong Jane Rebecca [1997] 1 SLR(R) 775.
- [16]
[16] Interspersed between the aforementioned decisions were multiple judgments on various interlocutory matters. These include Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others [2002] 1 SLR(R) 798, Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others (Lim Lie Hoa, third party) [2002] 2 SLR(R) 1078, Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others [2003] 1 SLR(R) 457 and Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others [2004] 4 SLR(R) 301.
The litigation involving PwC
- [18]
[18] In the interim, on 20 March 2006, the appellant had commenced Suit 156 against PwC, PwC UK and her ex-solicitors. She alleged that these entities, who had represented her in various professional capacities in the course of the proceedings in OS 939, had acted negligently. Suit 156 lent itself to the decisions in Ong Jane Rebecca v PricewaterhouseCoopers and others [2009] 2 SLR(R) 796, Ong Jane Rebecca v PricewaterhouseCoopers and others [2011] 4 SLR 242 and Ong Jane Rebecca v PricewaterhouseCoopers and others [2011] SGHC 203. The dispute culminated in Ong Jane Rebecca v PricewaterhouseCoopers and others [2012] 3 SLR 606. Lai Siu Chiu J (as she then was) dismissed the suit, as well as the applications by the appellant to set aside the judgment entered against her and to stay her appeal. The appellant’s appeals against Lai J’s decision were eventually deemed withdrawn.
The litigation abroad
- [19]
[19] As noted, Mdm Lim passed away on 8 August 2009. Following this, protracted proceedings took place in the English Courts between the appellant, the Estate and OSP. The appellant’s efforts in the United Kingdom (“UK”) were to challenge the sum she allegedly owed to Mdm Lim, ie, the basis upon which Ang J stayed the enforcement of BC 118: see [17] above.
Procedural history of the appeals and applications
The EJD proceeding
- [22]
[22] On 28 February 2019, the appellant applied to extract an interim Registrar’s Certificate for BC 118. On the court’s directions, the foreign currencies (see [15] above) were converted to Singapore dollars, and the total sum owed to the appellant by the Estate was S$786,348.30.
- [23]
[23] As at 8 March 2019, the total amount owing to the appellant under the interim Registrar’s Certificate was S$1,335,286.57, including accrued interest. Mdm Lim’s former solicitors then made payment to the appellant’s solicitors of the entire balance of stakeholder monies, amounting to S$423,581.03. The balance owing to the appellant by the Estate amounted to S$911,705.54.
- [24]
[24] On 14 May 2019, the appellant commenced the EJD proceedings. OSP was the respondent in his capacity as the sole executor of the Estate. OSP proceeded to file the EJD documents. Based on information disclosed in these documents, the appellant was of the view that OSP had breached his duties as the sole executor of the Estate. Chiefly, the appellant relied on the fact that OSP transferred one of the Estate’s properties (16 East Sussex Lane, Singapore 279802 (“16 East Sussex”)) to himself. This was stated in, inter alia, OSP’s first affidavit in the EJD proceedings.
Suit 47
- [26]
[26] On 3 March 2020, the appellant applied for summary judgment in HC/SUM 1046/2020 (“SUM 1046”). On 10 March 2020, OSP applied to strike out Suit 47 in HC/SUM 1168/2020 (“SUM 1168”). He argued that Suit 47 should be struck out because the appellant had used the EJD documents to commence Suit 47 in violation of the Riddick principle.
- [27]
[27] On 12 March 2020, the appellant filed HC/SUM 1237/2020 (“SUM 1237”), seeking a declaration that she was entitled to use the EJD documents, and the information therein, in Suit 47 without the leave of court (“Prayer 1”), or alternatively for the leave of court to be granted (“Prayer 2”). We reproduce the prayers in SUM 1237 below:
The decision below
Prayer 1 of SUM 1237
- [28]
[28] SUM 1046, 1168 and 1237 were fixed for hearing before the Judge. On 5 June 2020, the Judge part-heard SUM 1237 and dismissed Prayer 1. She found that there was no basis to conclude that the Riddick principle did not apply to the EJD documents.
- [29]
[29] The Judge directed Prayer 2 of SUM 1237, SUM 1046 and SUM 1168 to be heard by an Assistant Registrar. On 15 July 2020, the Assistant Registrar made the following orders:
(a) Prayer 2 of SUM 1237 was dismissed. The appellant was thus not granted leave to use the EJD documents and the information therein in Suit 47.
(d) Costs were awarded to the Estate and OSP.
- [30]
[30] The appellant appealed against these orders in HC/RA 157, 158 and 159/2020 (“RA 157”, “RA 158” and “RA 159”). On 8 October 2020, the Judge heard and dismissed the three appeals against the Assistant Registrar’s decision.
RA 157
- [31]
[31] RA 157 was the appeal against the Assistant Registrar’s dismissal of Prayer 2 of SUM 1237. The Judge concluded, applying this court’s decision in Lim Suk Ling Priscilla and another v Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and another and another appeal and another matter [2020] 2 SLR 912 (“Amber Compounding”), that there was no basis for granting retrospective leave to use the EJD documents. There was nothing “so unusual or exceptional about the present case that warrants the sparing exercise of the Court’s discretion”. Amongst other things, the Judge also found that OSP had not “waived” his right to privacy in the EJD proceedings, and that the merits of Suit 47, if any, were insufficient to warrant a lifting of the Riddick undertaking.
RA 158
- [32]
[32] RA 158 was the appeal against the Assistant Registrar’s decision to strike out the appellant’s claim in Suit 47 for abuse of process. The abuse of process complained of was the appellant’s conduct in taking the EJD documents and information outside of the confines of the EJD proceedings and using them to launch Suit 47. The Judge noted that the appellant’s supporting affidavit stated clearly that the EJD documents, namely OSP’s four affidavits, had allowed her to commence and to sustain Suit 47. The appellant therefore could not contend that she (a) did not need the EJD documents to commence Suit 47 and (b) could rely on other documents which she had obtained herself.
- [33]
[33] The Judge emphasised that the appellant had deliberately chosen to disregard the Riddick undertaking without leave. She was not ignorant of the existence of the Riddick principle. Instead, her explanation was that she did not first seek leave because she feared OSP would try to delay the proceedings if she did so. This was a conscious assessment. In any event, OSP did not conduct himself in such a manner as to delay and prolong the EJD proceedings, nor was he allowed to engage in delay tactics. In these circumstances, it was not possible to characterise the appellant’s breach of her Riddick undertaking as only a “very minor” breach, especially in view of the fact that she acted deliberately and with full awareness of the undertaking.
- [34]
[34] The Judge discussed this court’s recent decision in ED&F Man Capital Markets Limited v Straits (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 695 (“ED&F”), and found that it did not support the appellant’s case in resisting the striking out application. In that case, the foreign proceedings were permitted to continue because the High Court had separately concluded that the grounds for granting an anti-suit injunction were not made out (on grounds of natural forum). This was independent of any finding on the Riddick undertaking.
RA 159
Summary of appeals against the Judge’s decisions
- [36]
[36] To summarise, the four appeals before us were against the Judge’s decisions on (a) Prayer 1 of SUM 1237, via CA 116; (b) RA 157, via CA 190; (c) RA 158, via CA 191; and (d) RA 159, via CA 192. These four appeals were, as it turned out, not the end of the matter, due to the various steps taken by the appellant and OSP after the filing of the appeals.
Subsequent events: Bankruptcy of the Estate
- [37]
[37] The appeals were fixed for hearing before this court on 9 April 2021. Just before the hearing, however, the parties filed the six applications. These arose from the bankruptcy of the Estate, which was set into motion by the appellant.
- [38]
[38] On 17 December 2020, shortly after CA 190–192 were filed on 4 November 2020, the appellant filed the originating summons in HC/B 2704/2020 for the administration of the bankruptcy of the Estate. It was accompanied by an affidavit by the appellant’s solicitor, Mr Andrew Ohara (“Mr Ohara”). The sum in question in the application, which landed the Estate in bankruptcy, is S$1,038,511.01. This sum arose from inter alia the amounts owed to the appellant in BC 118, with accrued interest.
- [40]
[40] At this juncture, the appellant had not filed any stay application. Instead, the litigation over the issue of the stay of the appeals proceeded unsatisfactorily through correspondence. This correspondence comprised five letters from the appellant’s solicitors, dated 5, 8, 17, 19 and 21 March 2021, which contained arguments on why the appeals should be stayed, and two letters from the respondents’ solicitors, dated 5 and 19 March 2021, on the same issue.
- [41]
[41] It was only on 26 March 2021 that the appellant filed four applications in CA/SUM 34–37/2021 (“SUM 34” to “SUM 37” respectively). This was following directions from the court on 25 March 2021 that the appellant should, if she so wished, urgently file formal stay applications and proper written submissions in support. In SUM 34–37, the appellant sought to stay all four appeals, and argued that the appeals and Suit 47 were rendered redundant by the Estate’s bankruptcy. The respondents argued that there should be no stay, and that the appellant should discontinue the appeals if she deemed them redundant in light of the Estate’s bankruptcy.
- [42]
[42] On the same day (26 March 2021), the PTs informed that they had not appointed solicitors and were unable to take a position in respect of the appeals. They also faced issues with funding. It bears reiteration that it was the appellant herself who nominated Mr Rajagopalan and Mr Jotangia as private trustees, and this was a position taken as early as 17 December 2020, as expressed in Mr Ohara’s affidavit.
- [43]
[43] On 30 March 2021, OSP filed two applications in his personal capacity in CA/SUM 38 and 39/2021 (“SUM 38” and “SUM 39” respectively), applying for leave to intervene in CA 116 and 190 as a non-party and to make submissions on these appeals. These applications were filed out of the concern that the Estate might be deemed unable to defend CA 116 and 190.
- [44]
[44] Given the significance of the Estate’s bankruptcy on the appeals, the court issued directions for the PTs to attend at the hearing of the appeals on 9 April 2021. On 7 April 2021, the PTs informed the court via letter that they had appointed BlackOak LLC as their solicitors.
- [45]
[45] At the hearing on 9 April 2021, the PTs’ solicitors informed the court that they required more time to consider the Estate’s position, and that an adjournment of the hearing would be appropriate. Thus, the four appeals and six applications were adjourned to be heard on 27 May 2021. The parties, including the PTs, were also directed to affirm their positions on certain issues prior to the next hearing.
- [46]
[46] On 14 May 2021, the PTs wrote to the appellant and the court, informing that:
(a) they will not be receiving funding for the purposes of the administration of the Estate, but reserve their right to seek third-party funding for any litigation commenced by the Estate subsequently;
(b) they would not be commencing, for the time being, any fresh action against OSP, as their investigations into the affairs of the Estate will require three to six months; and
(c) subject to the appellant’s view on whether the appeals should proceed, they have no issues with the Estate participating in the appeals.
- [47]
[47] On 21 May 2021, having considered the position of the PTs, the parties filed written submissions on whether Suit 47 could proceed in light of the Estate’s bankruptcy, and, if so, the impact of the Estate’s bankruptcy on the appeals, the applications and all outstanding matters. The parties maintained the respective positions they took in SUM 34–37 (see [41] above). We add that any reference to arguments or positions taken by the respondents is to those taken by OSP and not the PTs who essentially took a neutral position in respect of the appeals and applications.
- [48]
[48] On 27 May 2021, we heard the parties and the PTs. Importantly, at the hearing, the PTs confirmed that they had no objections to the Estate participating in the appeals if the appellant was of the view that she should proceed. At the conclusion of the hearing, we made the following orders:
(a) SUM 34–37 were dismissed with costs.
(c) CA 116 was dismissed with costs.
(d) CA 190 was allowed, and consequently, CA 191 was allowed.
(f) Each party was to bear their own costs of the appeals and applications.
The parties’ cases on the appeals and applications
- [49]
[49] The parties have filed multiple volumes of written submissions, bundles and correspondence in relation to the multiple appeals and applications. We herein provide only a brief clarification of their positions on each of the appeals/applications. Where necessary, we will set out the specifics of the parties’ arguments in the course of these grounds.
- [50]
[50] The appellant sought the following relief:
(a) CA 116: A reversal of the Judge’s decision on Prayer 1 of SUM 1237, ie, a declaration that the appellant may use the EJD documents to pursue Suit 47 without the leave of court.
(b) CA 190: A reversal of the Judge’s decision in RA 157 and consequently leave to use the EJD documents to pursue Suit 47. In other words, the appellant sought a lifting of the Riddick undertaking. The relief sought in CA 190 was alternative to that sought in CA 116.
(c) CA 191: Restoration of Suit 47, ie, a reversal of the Judge’s decision in RA 158 to strike out her claim. The outcome of CA 191 was dependent on the outcomes of CA 116 and 190, because the appellant’s failure to obtain the reliefs sought in SUM 1237 was the basis upon which the Judge struck out Suit 47.
(e) SUM 34, 35, 36 and 37: The appellant sought a stay of all four appeals on the basis of the Estate’s bankruptcy. She contended that CA 116 and 190 were to be stayed pursuant to the provisions of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) (“IRDA”). CA 191 and 192 were to be stayed because they related to, and depended on the outcome of, CA 116 and 190.
- [51]
[51] The respondents sought to affirm all of the Judge’s findings in SUM 1237 and RA 157–159. On SUM 34–37, they argued that there is no basis for the appeals to be stayed under the IRDA. They stressed that the appropriate course of action was for the appellant to discontinue the appeals. As mentioned, in SUM 38 and 39, OSP sought leave to intervene in CA 116 and 190 in light of the Estate’s bankruptcy.
Issues
(a) the appellant’s stay applications in SUM 34–37;
(b) OSP’s leave to intervene applications in SUM 38 and 39;
(c) CA 116 – whether the Riddick undertaking applies;
(d) CA 190 – whether the Riddick undertaking should be lifted; and
(e) CA 191 and 192, which follow the outcomes of CA 116 and 190.
Before that, however, we make several observations on how the mismanagement of the litigation led to the present convoluted state of affairs.
Improper case management
- [54]
[54] The multiplicity of appeals and applications can broadly be traced to three missteps by the appellant – (a) the failure to make the Estate bankrupt at the earliest opportunity, (b) the failure to seek a declaration or alternatively, leave to use the EJD documents for Suit 47 at the outset prior to commencing Suit 47, and (c) the questionable decision to make the Estate bankrupt on the eve of the appeals after taking the EJD route and thereafter commencing a separate action against the Estate’s executor, OSP, for a different cause of action, though the actions ultimately share the same origin, ie, to enforce the judgment debt in BC 118. There were further missteps taken by the appellant thereafter, when the PTs stepped into the picture in light of the bankruptcy proceedings which were commenced by the appellant herself. We elaborate on these in the course of these grounds. These missteps led to the unnecessary stay applications and leave to intervene applications (ie, SUM 34–39) being filed.
- [55]
[55] We also observe that as a matter of proper case management, it was inappropriate for the Judge to deal with Prayer 1 of SUM 1237 and to direct that Prayer 2 be heard by the Assistant Registrar. Both prayers emanated from the same application and largely engaged the same legal issue, ie, the applicability of the Riddick undertaking and whether it ought to be lifted. This unnecessarily resulted in two appeals to this court from a single application – SUM 1237. The Judge should either have adjourned both prayers to be heard by the Assistant Registrar in question or dealt with both prayers herself at the same hearing.
- [56]
[56] The above culminated in four appeals and six applications that had to be dealt with in a single hearing by this court. The said hearing only took place on 27 May 2021, after a lengthy adjournment. The first hearing on 9 April 2021 had to be adjourned for nearly seven weeks because of the unsatisfactory manner in which the parties had managed the appeals up to that point. As a consequence, as at 9 April 2021, the parties and the court required time to achieve clarity on how best to proceed moving forward. The lengthy adjournment and convoluted hearing could have been easily avoided if the parties had prospectively applied their minds to the significance and purpose of the various steps they had taken.
Stay applications
- [58]
[58] The appellant sought a stay of all four appeals via SUM 34–37. The stay applications were necessitated by the appellant’s own decision to make the Estate bankrupt on the eve of her pending appeals. It would have been understandable if the appellant had filed the stay applications in response to a bankruptcy that had been brought about by a third-party creditor. Such a situation would have been outside the appellant’s control. But that was not what happened – it was the appellant herself who brought about the Estate’s bankruptcy, in the face of the four outstanding appeals that she filed. Let us be clear: as we intimated, there is nothing improper about the appellant commencing bankruptcy proceeding to enforce a judgment debt. What was improper was the timing of the appellant’s decision to commence bankruptcy proceedings on the eve of her own appeals and thereafter to use the bankruptcy status to apply to stay her own appeals.
- [59]
[59] The appellant should have anticipated the bankruptcy of the Estate and sought the views of the PTs at the earliest possible instance before filing the stay applications. As stated at [46] above, the PTs confirmed that they had no objections with the Estate’s participation in the appeals or, for that matter, with the appellant proceeding with her appeals. After all, it was the appellant who nominated Mr Rajagopalan and Mr Jotangia as private trustees as early as December 2020 – yet, apparently, arrangements were not made in advance for the PTs to be sufficiently informed and to have prompt access to legal advice and/or funding, with the result that their ability to take timely positions on the appeals was impaired. This led to further delays in the proceedings.
- [60]
[60] Despite the non-objection from the PTs, the appellant still decided to proceed with her stay applications. That was probably due to her recognition that the PTs would be in a better position to pursue any claim against OSP both in his capacity as executor of the Estate and in his personal capacity. This, however, harks back to our earlier point, ie, that she should have applied to make the Estate bankrupt and appoint the PTs at the earliest opportunity before commencing Suit 47.
- [61]
[61] We deal first with SUM 34 and 35, which pertained to CA 116 and 190. Two provisions were cited by the appellant, namely ss 327(1)(c) and 401(1) of the IRDA. We address each in turn.
No automatic stay under s 327(1)(c) IRDA
- [62]
[62] The first question that arose was whether CA 116 and 190, which were against the Estate, were proceedings that could not be sustained in light of s 327(1)(c) of the IRDA, which we reproduce below for convenience:
- [63]
[63] Section 327 is creditor-targeted. It is to be distinguished from s 401 of the IRDA, which is targeted at restricting the actions of the bankrupt – we elaborate on this distinction at [72] below. Section 327 of the IRDA operates automatically and disallows creditors to commence or sustain actions in debt against the bankrupt without the leave of court. Where leave is granted, the court may impose conditions to manage the litigation.
- [64]
[64] In this case, one key issue was whether CA 116 and 190 were “action[s] or proceedings … in respect of that debt” as per s 327(1)(c)(ii) of the IRDA. “Debt” is a reference to “any debt provable in bankruptcy”, and the phrase “in respect of that debt” in s 327(1)(c) of the IRDA was derived from, and identical to, the wording in s 76(1)(c) of the now-repealed Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed) (“Bankruptcy Act”). Section 76(1)(c) was amended in 2009 (pursuant to the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 2009) to include the words “in respect of that debt”. Parliamentary debates are silent on the definition of “debt”, and case law does not appear to have dealt with the significance of this suffix to s 76(1)(c) (or, for that matter, the new s 327(1)(c) IRDA). It was thus open to us to determine the scope of the provision and its applicability to CA 116 and 190.
- [66]
[66] It was clear that the sums owing to the appellant in BC 118 were a judgment debt provable in the Estate’s bankruptcy. The Estate was in fact placed into bankruptcy administration as a result of that debt. However, the appropriate actions to analyse were CA 116 and 190 specifically (and not BC 118 generally), and whether these were proceedings “in respect of that debt” by the mere fact that they arose from SUM 1237 and RA 157, which were applications made in BC 118.
- [67]
[67] In our view, CA 116 and 190 were not caught by s 327(1)(c) of the IRDA. SUM 1237 and RA 157 (and consequently, CA 116 and 190) were applications to use documents in BC 118 in Suit 47, against OSP. It was thus clear that the outcomes of CA 116 and CA 190 would not have any direct effect on the administration of the bankruptcy of the Estate. These proceedings would not affect the debt owed to the appellant in BC 118.
The PTs’ sanction under s 401(1)(a) IRDA
- [69]
[69] The next issue was whether the Estate was incompetent to defend CA 116 and 190 by operation of s 401(1)(a) of the IRDA. As mentioned, this provision is bankrupt-targeted, and seeks to restrain bankrupts from acting in a manner that may prejudice the interests of creditors:
- [70]
[70] In addition, the PTs’ prior sanction was required. This court in Standard Chartered Bank v Loh Chong Yong Thomas [2010] 2 SLR 569, referring to s 131 of the old Bankruptcy Act (which has been incorporated into s 401 IRDA), stated that the Official Assignee’s sanction cannot be granted ex post facto (at [28]), and must be sought prospectively: see also the observations in Takahashi Kenji v Koh Hiang Pin [2012] 4 SLR 1032 (“Takahashi Kenji”). This is clear from the plain words of s 401(1)(a) of the IRDA, which mandate a “previous” sanction.
- [71]
[71] The respondents argued that the appellant must proceed with her appeals if she is not precluded from doing so under s 327, regardless of the PTs’ position under s 401. In our view, this argument demonstrated a lack of understanding on how ss 327 and 401 of the IRDA operated as conjunctive requirements.
- [72]
[72] Sections 327 and 401 are creditor-targeted and bankrupt-targeted respectively. The latter in particular exists to impose criminal liability on errant bankrupts. For litigation to continue in the administration of a bankruptcy, both provisions must be satisfied. They function as a double lock, with the two keys held by different entities.
(a) A creditor who wishes to pursue an action against a bankrupt must obtain the court’s sanction under s 327 of the IRDA. The court is also statutorily empowered to stipulate conditions on creditors to manage the litigation if necessary. We have elaborated on this point at [68] above.
(b) At the same time, a bankrupt who wishes to defend or pursue the action must obtain the Official Assignee’s (or private trustee’s, where appointed) sanction under s 401 of the IRDA. The Official Assignee is statutorily empowered to determine whether it would be in the bankrupt’s and creditors’ interests for any litigation to proceed.
- [73]
[73] This distinction between the roles of the court and the Official Assignee in the context of a bankruptcy was recognised by the High Court in Takahashi Kenji. There, the court discussed whether retrospective leave to pursue proceedings could be granted by the court under s 76(1)(c) of the old Bankruptcy Act. It was held that “[t]he court cannot usurp the function of the Official Assignee where it is statutorily provided that it is the Official Assignee’s sanction which is required” (at [3]). It is thus clear that the courts and the Official Assignee hold different but connected roles in the management of litigation involving a bankrupt. Sections 327 and 401 of the IRDA provide two layers of control mechanisms to ensure that the interests of all involved in the bankruptcy are preserved.
- [74]
[74] The respondents also argued that s 401(1) of the IRDA did not apply to bankruptcies under s 419, which is the provision for the administration in bankruptcy of the estate of a dying insolvent person. The parties did not dispute the applicability of s 419 to the present proceedings involving the Estate, and the sole area of contention was whether s 401 applied in the context of a bankruptcy administration under s 419.
- [75]
[75] The respondents’ position was misconceived in light of s 419(2) of the IRDA, which makes Parts 16 to 21 of the IRDA applicable for s 419 bankruptcies. Section 401 falls under Part 19 of the IRDA and is thus applicable. The respondents’ argument, with respect, was not only incorrect, but was one that failed to appreciate the difficult reality it propounded – that for some reason, bankruptcies involving estates of deceased persons would not be subject to the same stringent controls imposed on living bankrupts. That cannot be the case, given that in both situations, the interests of other stakeholders – primarily, creditors – are equally at risk given a bankrupt’s parlous financial predicament. Accordingly, in light of the bankruptcy of the Estate, the PTs’ prior sanction under s 401(1)(a) of the IRDA had to be obtained before the Estate could continue defending any existing actions, including CA 116 and 190.
- [76]
[76] As it transpired, the s 401(1)(a) IRDA hurdle was crossed upon the PTs’ confirmation, by letter and at the hearing of the appeals, that they had no objections to the Estate’s participation in the appeals. Therefore, both s 327 and s 401 of the IRDA did not preclude the continuation of CA 116 and 190. SUM 34 and 35 were accordingly dismissed.
No consequential stay of CA 191 and 192
- [77]
[77] The appellant’s argument in SUM 36 and 37 (concerning CA 191 and 192) was parasitic on the court granting the stay applications in SUM 34 and 35. The appellant argued that because of the relationship between the four appeals and the fact that the outcomes of CA 191 and 192 hinged on CA 116 and 190, the former ought to be stayed alongside the latter.
- [78]
[78] Having rejected the appellant’s applications in SUM 34 and 35, there was no basis upon which the court could allow SUM 36 and 37. We accordingly dismissed these applications as well.
Further observations on the stay applications
- [79]
[79] We address briefly several further points raised by the appellant in support of SUM 34–37, as these cast further light on her mismanagement of the appeals and other related proceedings.
- [80]
[80] In her written submissions dated 21 May 2021, the appellant offered other reasons in support of the stay applications, namely considerations of practicality and the need to await the outcome of the PTs’ investigations, which required three to six months. She took the position that once the PTs are done with their investigations, Suit 47 would be rendered redundant as the PTs were better placed to commence an action against OSP.
- [81]
[81] These reasons, however, did not offer a principled basis for a stay of proceedings. SUM 34–37 were filed under the IRDA, and had to be made out on that basis. As we have explained, they were not. It was uncertain that the PTs would eventually commence an action against OSP. The appellant’s suggestion that Suit 47 was likely to be rendered redundant was thus speculative at present.
- [82]
[82] The appellant was also trying to adopt a wait-and-see approach in seeking for Suit 47 to be held in abeyance until documents from the administration of the Estate surfaced. This was objectionable. The appellant wished to use the documents from the bankruptcy to chart her course in Suit 47, and to determine, eventually, whether her claim against OSP would be sustainable. But Suit 47 is an independent action that, ordinarily, would proceed with its own discovery process. The suggestion of using discovered documents from one set of proceedings by the PTs to gauge the prospects of another ongoing action (Suit 47) bears shades of an abuse of the court’s processes. If not improper, such an approach of maintaining overlapping actions and engaging in “cross-pollination” of documents is at the very least opportunistic, a waste of time and resources, and should be viewed with great circumspection.
- [83]
[83] In sum, the appeals, Suit 47 and the bankruptcy were all set into motion by the appellant. As the bankruptcy did not disclose grounds warranting a stay under the IRDA, the appeals (and Suit 47) had to continue or be discontinued by the appellant. We highlighted this to Mr Ohara during the hearing on 27 May 2021, and the appellant opted to proceed. That said, we make no comment as to whether Suit 47 should be stayed if the PTs were to commence an action against OSP and/or anyone else, or if directions should be given for the conduct of Suit 47 and that action either on a consolidated basis, if available, or one after the other.
Leave to intervene applications
- [85]
[85] Having dealt with the six applications, we now turn to our analysis of the issues in the four appeals.
Whether leave to appeal was required
(b) CA 116 and 190 should be struck out on the basis that the orders made with respect to Prayers 1 and RA 157 are interlocutory orders within the meaning of para 1(h) of the Fifth Schedule of the SCJA. The orders made by the Judge were interlocutory as they did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties: see The “Nasco Gem” [2014] 2 SLR 63 (“Nasco Gem”).
- [87]
[87] In our view, leave to appeal was not required for CA 116 and 190. Given the way the three inter-related appeals (CA 116, 190 and 191) developed from two inter-related summonses, ie, SUM 1168 (striking out) and SUM 1237 (Riddick undertaking), it was appropriate to treat them as final orders since they collectively resulted in the striking out of Suit 47 (which is a matter appealable as of right under the Fifth Schedule of the SCJA). While orders concerning a declaration to use documents might appear to be interlocutory, they must be examined in their proper context. In this case, Suit 47 was struck out because the appellant was not allowed to use the EJD documents for Suit 47, following the outcomes of SUM 1237 and RA 157. Thus, the outcomes of SUM 1237 and RA 157 directly led to the final disposal of the rights of the parties, in the language of the court in Nasco Gem.
- [88]
[88] As for CA 192, we will elaborate below that we did not consider there to be any decision by the Judge against which an appeal could be filed: see [178] below onwards.
- [89]
[89] We were accordingly satisfied that the appellant was not obliged to seek leave to bring the appeals. On this basis, we heard the parties’ arguments on the merits. We first dealt with CA 116 and 190, because CA 191 and 192 followed the outcome of these two appeals.
CA 116 – Whether the Riddick undertaking applied to the EJD documents
- [90]
[90] We observe that Prayer 1 of SUM 1237 should not have been pursued in the first place. By then, Suit 47 and SUM 1168 had been filed, and the appellant had already utilised the EJD documents without leave of court. The argument that leave was not required in Prayer 1 of SUM 1237 could have been mounted as a defence to resist SUM 1168. It may have been understandable for the appellant to have sought alternative Prayers 1 and 2 if that had been done prior to the commencement of Suit 47. But it made no sense to do so after the commencement of Suit 47 and the filing of SUM 1168. This was a further example of an application filed without proper thought.
- [91]
[91] We address a preliminary factual issue which arose in CA 116 before engaging with the appellant’s legal arguments on the Riddick principle. The appellant contended that (a) the declaration sought in Prayer 1 of SUM 1237 was for her to use the transcripts in the EJD proceedings (“the EJD transcripts”), not OSP’s four affidavits; and (b) she could rely on OSP’s admissions in Suit 47 to pursue her claim, and hence did not need to rely on OSP’s four affidavits. In so arguing, the appellant purported to rely on the “open justice” argument, ie, that the information contained in the transcripts/admissions in open court was public information, and that there was therefore no room for the Riddick undertaking to operate.
- [92]
[92] We disagreed with the appellant. First, on the EJD transcripts, this issue in essence was on the scope of the declaration sought in CA 116, ie, under Prayer 1 of SUM 1237, as reproduced at [27] above. The declaration sought in Prayer 1 was for the appellant to be allowed to use OSP’s four affidavits without the leave of court. Although Prayer 1 referred to documents and information in the EJD proceedings generally, it then went on to specifically list the four affidavits that the appellant sought to rely on. The affidavit filed by the appellant in SUM 1237 also clearly referenced these documents and not the EJD transcripts. The Judge was accordingly correct in finding that the appellant’s application in SUM 1237 pertained only to OSP’s four affidavits.
- [93]
[93] It was furthermore telling that in the Appellant’s Case, the appellant was not able to point to any specific part of the EJD transcripts in support of her “open justice” argument. The appellant was therefore unable to invoke the rule in Foo Jong Long Dennis v Ang Yee Lim and another [2015] 2 SLR 578 that a protected document ceases to fall under the Riddick undertaking once it has been used in open court.
- [94]
[94] On OSP’s admissions, the appellant argued that OSP had made direct admissions in his defence in Suit 47, and that no claim to privilege against self-incrimination was invoked. According to the appellant, these admissions were not subject to the Riddick principle, and constituted relevant facts under the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) for the purposes of Suit 47.
- [95]
[95] This argument ignored the plain fact that the appellant did use the EJD documents, and the information therein, to commence Suit 47. The use of these documents preceded any admissions made. Absent the EJD documents, there would have been no suit to begin with, and no admissions to speak of. Given that the appellant indisputably relied on the EJD documents, the real issue was whether the documents were covered by a Riddick undertaking at the time when the appellant commenced Suit 47. OSP also rightly pointed out that contrary to the appellant’s assertion that no claim to privilege against self-incrimination was made, there was in fact such a specific reservation at para 19 of the defence in Suit 47.
- [96]
[96] As clarified at [1] above, by “EJD documents”, we refer solely to the four affidavits mentioned in Prayer 1 of SUM 1237. The real issue in CA 116 was whether the EJD documents, ie, OSP’s four affidavits, were covered by the Riddick undertaking, and if so, whether leave of court was required for their use.
- [97]
[97] In this respect, the appellant raised two main lines of argument:
(a) that the EJD documents were not disclosed on compulsion, and therefore the Riddick undertaking did not apply; and
(b) that Suit 47 is an enforcement proceeding in relation to BC 118, to which the Riddick principle has no application, as was the case in Re Mohan Bhagwandas v Murjani [1991] HKCFI 135 (“Bhagwandas”).
These two arguments presented several legal issues and important conceptual distinctions. We thus use this opportunity to clarify the framework of the law on the Riddick undertaking, and the different conceptual considerations that arise at various stages of the inquiry.
A framework for approaching cases involving the Riddick undertaking
- [98]
[98] In any case involving questions of the Riddick principle, it is important to bear in mind that there is a difference as to whether a disclosed document is even subject to the Riddick undertaking as opposed to whether such a document can be used in separate proceedings with or without leave. These are distinct inquiries that should not be conflated: see Amber Compounding at [43] and [44]. Unfortunately, this distinction has at times been overlooked.
- [99]
[99] We clarify that where issues on the Riddick principle arise, the approach to be taken is as follows. Situations involving the Riddick principle may broadly be classified under three categories:
(a) First, one must determine whether, on the basis of the element of compulsion, a document produced in discovery is covered by the Riddick undertaking. If the answer is in the negative, the documents are not protected and may be used without the leave of court. We shall refer to such scenarios as the “first category” of situations.
(b) Next, if the Riddick undertaking applies (due to the element of compulsion), the question is whether, notwithstanding the undertaking, the protected documents may nonetheless be used without leave of court, due to the nature of the related enforcement proceedings for which the documents are being used. This is where the appellant’s argument on Suit 47 being an “enforcement” proceeding is relevant. We describe such documents as being under the “second category” of situations.
(c) If neither of the above is satisfied, the party relying on the protected documents to commence or sustain related proceedings must seek the court’s leave for the undertaking to be lifted. This will involve a discussion on the factors espoused in Amber Compounding, which we address below in relation to CA 190. Such scenarios may be referred to as the “third category” of situations. Cases such as ED&F and Amber Compounding, which involved an examination as to whether leave should be granted to use protected documents, fall under this category.
We elaborate below on the specifics of the inquiry, as each stage involves distinct considerations. We address, at the same time, how the above framework would apply to EJD proceedings as a particular species.
The first category of cases: documents not protected by the undertaking
- [100]
[100] The first question in any case is whether a document is even protected by the Riddick principle. This turns on whether the documents sought to be used were disclosed on compulsion. This much is clear from how the Riddick principle itself was first developed. The Riddick principle states that a party who discloses a document in discovery in an action under compulsion is entitled to the protection of the court against any use of the document otherwise than in that action: ED&F at [66].
- [101]
[101] This court in ED&F also elaborated on the contours of the principle:
(a) The Riddick principle is not engaged simply because information has been disclosed in court proceedings. The critical factor is the element of compulsion that accompanies the discovery: at [68].
(c) Voluntariness is not an exception to the Riddick principle; the principle simply has no application to documents that have been voluntarily disclosed: at [81].
(d) In determining whether the discovery was voluntary or otherwise, the court must examine the context under which the disclosure was made: at [82].
- [102]
[102] There is no case law in our jurisdiction that directly addresses whether documents disclosed in EJD proceedings are considered as documents falling within the scope of the Riddick principle. Foreign jurisprudence, however, provides a useful point of reference. In the Canadian decision of Branconnier (Re) [2017] BCJ No 2107 (“Branconnier”), the Supreme Court of British Columbia held that the implied undertaking of confidentiality (ie, the Riddick undertaking) applied to the evidence and documents obtained at an examination in aid of execution. The court reasoned, inter alia, that examination in aid of execution is also an “examination for discovery”, referring to Rule 13-4(2) of the Canadian Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg 168/2009: Branconnier at [24]. The court highlighted that “judgment debtors are compelled, notwithstanding any privacy interest, to attend at the examination and to disclose information that is relevant” [emphasis added]: at [28]. The court also cited one of the key rationales undergirding the Riddick principle as recognised under Singapore law: that a “judgment debtor who has some assurance that the documents and answers that he or she provides will not be used for any collateral purpose is more likely to provide complete and honest responses to the questions that they are asked”: at [29].
- [104]
[104] In this sense, EJD proceedings bear stark similarities to search (or Anton Piller) orders, to which the Riddick principle applies: see Amber Compounding at [43] and Reebok International Ltd v Royal Corp and another action [1991] 2 SLR(R) 688 at [17]. Such search orders are coercive and function as a form of discovery: Amber Compounding at [43]. An EJD application operates similarly in that it requires a judgment debtor to disclose documents and furnish answers that will reveal its financial state of affairs.
- [105]
[105] It is also relevant that non-compliance with orders made in EJD proceedings can result, and have resulted, in committal proceedings being commenced: see Tay Kar Oon v Tahir [2017] 2 SLR 342 (“Tay Kar Oon”). If breaches of court orders which are non-punishable by contempt of court can engage the Riddick principle in so far as compulsion is present (ED&F at [69]), a fortiori, the fact that non-compliance with orders of a certain species may lead to committal/contempt proceedings strongly suggests that the principle applies to such situations with full force.
- [106]
[106] Thus, in general, documents disclosed in EJD proceedings are covered by the Riddick principle. These will not fall under the first category of situations identified in the framework above. The next question, then, is whether notwithstanding the Riddick undertaking, the protected documents may be used without leave of court.
The second category of cases: enforcement proceedings
- [107]
[107] The second category is perhaps the one that has featured least prominently in our case law. The dearth of jurisprudence in this regard, conceivably, arises from the fact that in such cases, no leave was required to use the protected documents, and parties hence did not raise the Riddick undertaking as a material objection. This point strictly need not be decided here because as we will explain shortly, Suit 47 was clearly not an enforcement action against the Estate, and the present case therefore does not fall within the second category. Nonetheless, in light of our delineation of the framework above, it would be useful for us to provide some guidance on when leave of court is required to use information and documents in subsequent enforcement actions.
- [109]
[109] The Riddick principle was not expressly addressed in the Tay Toh Hin decisions. We nevertheless consider these decisions as consistent with, and falling within, the second category of the framework. The appellant in both cases was allowed to use the information and documents he had obtained from EJD proceedings to pursue garnishee proceedings, ie, enforcement proceedings, against the judgment debtor and the entity obliged to dispense payments on behalf of the said debtor, ie, SCB, for the debt that formed the subject matter of the EJD proceedings.
- [110]
[110] That is not to say that the Riddick principle was completely inapplicable. In our view, the situation in the Tay Toh Hin decisions would have been different if the documents obtained from the relevant EJD proceedings had been used to commence a fresh action. In such a case, leave might have been required to use the documents. The documents, after all, were disclosed on compulsion in the context of EJD proceedings. This element of compulsion brings the Tay Toh Hin decisions into the second, not the first, category of the framework.
- [112]
[112] Based on these cases, it may be observed that in determining whether related proceedings are “enforcement” proceedings (in which documents covered by the Riddick principle may be used without leave), there are two key points of reference. First, the nature of the proceedings in which the documents were disclosed, and second, the nature of the proceedings in which the said documents are being used.
- [113]
[113] The nature of the application which led to the disclosure of documents is highly material. We have explained that EJD proceedings involve an exercise in obtaining information to assist in the enforcement of a judgment debt. Indeed, such proceedings are “intended to aid the judgment creditor … in garnering additional information which might – or might not – result in the implementation of actual execution of the judgment concerned” [emphasis in original]: PT Bakrie Investindo v Global Distressed Alpha Fund 1 Ltd Partnership [2013] 4 SLR 1116 (“PT Bakrie”) at [16]. Therefore, there is no question that the judgment debtor would know that information disclosed in the course of such EJD proceedings will be used for subsequent related proceedings. This is to be contrasted with, for example, specific discovery in the course of an action. The party producing documents pursuant to such discovery applications would have the expectation that the said documents would only be used for the purposes of that action. In ordinary circumstances, there would be no expectation that the documents would be used in related proceedings.
- [114]
[114] If the above hurdle is crossed, the focus then turns to the nature of the related proceedings in which the documents are being used. It may be observed that the Tay Toh Hin decisions and Leads Engineering bear several common features. In those cases, the parties in both sets of proceedings were identical, the debt pursued was the same, and the subsequent related action (the garnishee application) was clearly an enforcement action to compel payment. Thus, in our view, three factors are relevant when examining the nature of subsequent related proceedings:
(a) Identity of parties: If the defendant in the related proceeding is also the defendant in the original proceeding in which the documents were obtained, a case may be made that the related proceeding constitutes enforcement against that defendant. The same could be said if the related proceeding is against an entity legally empowered or obliged to make payment on behalf of the said defendant, eg, a bank.
(b) Nature of debt: If the sum being pursued in the related proceedings is the same debt that forms the subject matter of the original proceedings in which documents were disclosed, this would indicate that the former set of proceedings is an enforcement of the latter. If, however, the sum being pursued in related proceedings is different, this might suggest that it is a claim de novo, and leave of the court might be required.
(c) Nature of related proceedings: The question under this factor is whether the related proceedings can be considered “enforcement” in the ordinary sense, ie, modes of execution or proceedings that facilitate the payment of judgment debts owing to a plaintiff. This is to be determined in the context of the particular case, albeit we note that “traditional” enforcement actions recognised under the Rules of Court (eg, garnishee proceedings) would most likely satisfy this requirement: see also the discussion of this court in PT Bakrie at [14] on the various modes of execution under O 45 of the Rules of Court.
If a related proceeding complies with the factors delineated above, the party using protected documents to commence such proceeding would not require the leave of court, despite the existence of the Riddick undertaking.
- [115]
[115] In both the first and second category of situations, leave is not required to use the documents. Nevertheless, maintaining the distinction between the two categories is preferable because the inquiries are premised on different conceptual considerations. The first part of the inquiry hinges on the element of compulsion in relation to the disclosure of documents. In contrast, in determining whether a document falls under the second category, it is important to assess the separate considerations we have identified, which have less to do with the coercive nature of the discovery process, and more to do with the characteristics of the proceedings involved.
- [116]
[116] The distinction between the first and second categories is important for another reason. If a document falls under the second category, the Riddick undertaking nonetheless endures and will continue to cover the documents in question. The appropriate way to understand cases falling under the second category is that the specific use of the documents in the related enforcement proceeding is not a breach of the Riddick undertaking. There is no breach because, inter alia, the party against whom the documents are being used had an expectation that this would occur (eg, a judgment debtor facing enforcement proceedings). There is accordingly no abuse of process, because the protected documents are being used for the very purpose for which they were sought. This is important and must be borne in mind because while such documents can be used for enforcement proceedings, it may not be permissible to use them in another distinct set of civil/criminal proceedings without the leave of court. In other words, a pronouncement that documents fall under the second category for one case does not operate carte blanche to allow indiscriminate use of the said documents in any and all subsequent proceedings.
The third category of cases: leave of the court
- [117]
[117] If documents in question fall within neither the first nor the second category, leave of the court is required. The present case falls under this category, for reasons that will be made clear shortly. We discuss the factors relevant to the grant of leave in the next section on CA 190.
The element of compulsion in the present case
- [118]
[118] In our view, the EJD documents were clearly covered by the Riddick undertaking, because they were disclosed by OSP on compulsion in the course of the EJD proceedings. The present case hence did not fall under the first category.
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