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Grounds publishedDecided 12 Apr 2022

Court of Appeal

Wei Fengpin v Raymond Low Tuck Loong and others

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[2022] SGCA 32Case no. Civil Appeal No 63 of 202126 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This appeal can be traced to an oppression action which was commenced by the appellant (“Wei”) against the majority shareholders, the first and second respondents (“Low” and “Sim” respectively), in 2017. However, just a few months before the trial, Low and Sim caused the company, Lateral Solutions Pte Ltd (“the Company”) to be voluntarily wound up.

  3. Facts

  4. [6] The Judge had set out the facts in great detail in Wei Fengpin v Low Tuck Loong Raymond and others [2021] SGHC 90 (“the Judgment”). Given that the facts are not disputed on appeal, we will only set out the facts which are germane to the appeal.

  5. [7] The Company was incorporated in 2005 by Sim and one Edwin Seah (“Seah”). They were the directors and shareholders of the Company at that time.

  6. [8] In 2006, the Company began supplying polymer parts (“the Parts”) to Apple Inc (“Apple”), and sourced the Parts from suppliers such as Sei Woo Polymer Technologies Pte Ltd (“SWP”). In 2007, Low joined the Company and later became a director in 2012.

  7. [9] Wei joined SWP in 1998 but later left to set up two companies, Tianjin Synergy Hanil Precision Polymer Technologies Co Ltd (“SH”) and Synergy Hanil (S) Polymer Technologies Pte Ltd (“SHS”). From 2010, pursuant to discussions between Wei and Low, SH started supplying the Parts to the Company. In 2011, an entity indirectly owned by Low, Sim and Seah entered into a joint-venture agreement with SH and SHS to form SK Lateral Rubber & Plastic Technologies (Suzhou) Co Ltd (“SKL”). SKL then began manufacturing the Parts for the Company for its onward sale to Apple.

  8. [10] By around 2014, the Company’s suppliers of the Parts included three companies in which Wei had a substantial interest, namely, SH, SKL and SK Lateral Permen Electronic (Suzhou) Co Ltd (“SKLP”).

  9. [11] In December 2014, Wei bought Seah’s shares in the Company for US$5m and was registered as a shareholder and director in January 2015. About two years thereafter, on 15 March 2017, Wei commenced HC/S 238/2017 (“Suit 238”) against Low and Sim under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”), claiming that they had acted in a manner that was unfair, oppressive or prejudicial to him.

  10. Decision below

  11. [13] The principal part of the Judgment dealt with the substantive claim, ie, whether oppression was made out on the evidence before the court. The examination of the evidence by the Judge in relation to the oppression finding was both comprehensive and flawless. There is no need to repeat these findings save to identify the specific oppressive acts which were found by the Judge.

  12. [14] The Judge found that Low and Sim had conducted the affairs of the Company in a manner that was oppressive to Wei, and the acts which they had caused the Company to take also unfairly discriminated against or were prejudicial to Wei (see the Judgment at [137]):

  13. (a) They declared dividends of US$1.5m each to themselves (to the exclusion of Wei) in breach of the Company’s Articles and without informing Wei (the “Dividends”), although he was then a director and shareholder of the Company. The Dividends were paid to Low and Sim by way of a payment of US$800,000 each while the balance US$700,000 was set off against the sums which were owed by Low and Sim to the Company.

  14. (b) They paid excessive and unjustified bonuses of about S$1.5m collectively to themselves without Wei’s knowledge or consent, although he was then a director and shareholder of the Company (the “Big Bonuses”), and had also concealed this matter from Wei and ignored his queries on the bonuses.

  15. (c) They deliberately withheld the Company’s financial information from Wei and only provided the information after repeated chasers; and from June 2016, completely withheld such information from Wei to conceal their actions in relation to the Dividends and the Big Bonuses.

  16. (d) They subsequently sought to buyout Wei’s shares in the Company without providing him with the relevant financial information to determine the fair value of the shares.

  17. (e) They refused to call board meetings despite being obliged to do so.

  18. (g) They diverted a corporate opportunity to LSW Pte Ltd (“LSW”), a company incorporated by Low, so as to exclude Wei from benefitting through the Company.

  19. (h) Low failed to disclose to Wei related-party transactions between LSW and the Company despite his conflict of duty and interest.

  20. (i) They failed to involve Wei in key management decisions pertaining to transactions between LSW and the Company, such as the Company advancing loans to LSW for its set-up and operations and the subsequent decision not to recover the loans from LSW.

  21. Parties’ cases on appeal

  22. Wei’s case

  23. [20] Second, any redress obtained by the liquidators would only vindicate the corporate wrongs done by Low and Sim to the Company. They do not provide any remedy for the personal wrongs done to Wei as a minority shareholder.

  24. [22] Wei proposed four possible periods for the valuation of his shares: (a) December 2014/January 2015; (b) December 2015/January 2016; (c) December 2016/January 2017; and (d) 15 March 2017. The significance of each period will be explained in greater detail below at [41].

  25. [24] Wei also submitted that the Judge had erred in refusing to grant a declaration that Low and Sim had breached their fiduciary duties to the Company on the basis that this declaratory relief was not pleaded.

  26. Low’s and Sim’s case

  27. Issues to be determined

  28. [28] First, the Judge’s finding that oppression was made out against Low and Sim is not challenged.

  29. Applicable law

  30. Our decision

  31. Propriety of a buyout order

  32. [35] The Judge was also influenced by the consideration that the liquidators may carry out investigations and take appropriate steps to redress any wrongs to the Company committed by its directors. However, this overlooks the fact that such a remedy only addresses corporate and not personal wrongs. Any steps the liquidators take would not address the personal wrongs done to Wei, which include, among other things, the deprivation of profits and exclusion from management. The remedies under s 216(2) of the Companies Act should be directed towards the wronged shareholder and not the company.

  33. [37] The learned author of Robin Hollington, Hollington on Shareholder’s Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th Ed, 2020) explained at p 267 (citing the case of Interactive Technology Corp Ltd v Ferster [2016] EWHC 2896 (Ch) at [318]) that wrongdoing on the part of the minority shareholder can be relevant in two ways. The first way is that the minority shareholder’s wrongdoing may make the prejudicial conduct of the respondent not unfair. The second way is that the minority shareholder’s wrongdoing may justify the court in refusing to grant relief to the minority shareholder or may influence the choice of any relief which would otherwise be granted. Further, the court is not engaged in a balancing exercise of weighing one side’s misconduct against the other, but the minority shareholder’s misconduct is relevant “if it has an immediate and necessary relation to the unfairly prejudicial conduct of which complaint is made”.

  34. Appropriate valuation date

  35. [40] As earlier mentioned, Wei proposed four possible periods for the valuation of his shares: (a) December 2014/January 2015; (b) December 2015/January 2016; (c) December 2016/January 2017; and (d) 15 March 2017.

  36. [41] Wei explained the significance of these four periods as follows:

  37. (a) December 2014/January 2015: This was the period of Wei’s entry into the Company. Upon his entry into the Company, Low and Sim immediately embarked on a series of corporate manoeuvres to deprive Wei of the Company’s profits and his rights as a shareholder-director. Further, if this period were chosen, no formal valuation would be needed as the court could take reference from the purchase price of the shares, ie, US$5m.

  38. (b) December 2015/January 2016: This was the period when Low and Sim wrongfully paid themselves the Dividends and began preparation for an eventual separation from Wei. Low and Sim also diverted business away from the Company and completely cut off Wei’s access to the Company’s monthly management accounts.

  39. (c) December 2016/January 2017: This was when Wei recognised that his relationship with Low and Sim had broken down irreparably and proposed an amicable parting of ways by way of a share swap. However, this valuation date would make it difficult to value Wei’s shares, as it will require a valuer to account for Low’s and Sim’s diversion of corporate opportunities away from the Company, for which there is no reliable financial information.

  40. (d) 15 March 2017: This was the date of the commencement of Suit 238. This date is justified on the basis that it reflects the date on which a plaintiff elects to treat the unfair conduct of the majority as destroying the basis upon which he had agreed to continue as a shareholder. However, Wei recognised that the lack of financial information would render any such valuation complex and difficult.

  41. [42] During the hearing, Mr Yim confirmed that Wei’s primary position was for the shares to be valued as at 31 December 2015, ie, period (b) above. The reason was that Wei should be able to enjoy the fruits of his investment, after having been a shareholder for about a year. Mr Yim explained that if the court were to value the shares at the purchase price of those shares, ie, period (a), then Wei would not have reaped any benefits from his investment.

  42. (a) From the very outset when Wei became a shareholder of the Company, Low and Sim had substantially and systematically excluded him from all the benefits of a shareholder and director. The Judge found (at [19] and [21]) that Wei had a legitimate expectation to be a director and that there was an informal understanding that he would be one. The Judge also found (at [22]) that Wei had a legitimate expectation to participate in key management decisions. However, for all intents and purposes, Wei was treated by Low and Sim as a non-shareholder and non-director from inception. This is supported by the Judge’s finding at [59] that once Low and Sim knew that Wei was going to be a shareholder, they “decided to quickly pay out a huge sum of bonuses to themselves to Wei’s exclusion, and kept Wei in the dark about this at the material time”. Sim also acknowledged during cross-examination that Low and him had never involved Wei in any decision-making of the Company since he became a director.

  43. [46] In the circumstances, we are of the view that ordering a buyout at US$5m is fair for the following reasons:

  44. (a) This provides the best available objective valuation of the Company because this was in fact the actual value paid by Wei to Seah. It was not some hypothetical value. Both Seah and Wei are experienced businessmen and there is no suggestion by Low or Sim that Wei paid a premium for the shares. In fact, the evidence suggest that it might have been sold at a discounted price, as Seah initially wanted US$10m based on projected turnover of the Company of between US$70–80m. However, Seah eventually accepted Wei’s offer of US$5m because he wanted to exit the Company without any further delay.

  45. (b) Seah’s estimation based on the projected turnover of the Company is supported by a monthly report and a consolidated report by Octagon88 & Associates Pte Ltd (“Octagon”). In August/September 2015 (a few months after Wei became a shareholder), Low and Sim commissioned Octagon to prepare a report on the Company and its related companies for the purposes of fund raising. The monthly report concluded that the preliminary value of the Company and its related business was in the range of US$30m–60m. The consolidated report, on the other hand, concluded that the preliminary value of the Company was about US$32m, and if its interests in its subsidiaries were included, would total about US$70m. Interestingly, the consolidated report also observed that the shareholders of the Company were “[l]ooking at cashing out their shares at good valuation (preferably to be higher than what the previous shareholder [Seah] had received for his disposal of 33% stake to [Wei])”. This would suggest that the purchase price paid by Wei to Seah was both fair and reasonable. This might also explain why when Mr Yim put Octagon’s valuation to Low in cross-examination that the purchase price of US$5m was a fair and reasonable value, Low did not suggest otherwise. In fact, his evidence was that the Octagon report is reliable, because the valuation was based on the documents of the Company and that US$5m was not an “absurdly high figure”.

  46. [47] Once we adopt the acquisition date of the shares as the date of valuation, the Judge’s concerns about valuation would be sufficiently addressed. There is no further need to conduct any separate valuation. As such, the lack of audited accounts and other financial information can have no bearing on the valuation based on the purchase price. Similarly, there will be no need to factor any discount to the eventual valuation on account of Wei’s undercutting since that occurred way after the operative valuation date.

  47. [49] Wei also argued that his investment in the Company was made with the expectation that there would be return and as such, valuing the shares at the purchase price, ie, US$5m would not be fair and equitable. However, the expectation of returns does not always translate to guaranteed returns. Our view is that valuing the shares at the purchase price is the fairest outcome in light of the circumstances of this case.

  48. Wei’s other arguments

  49. [50] For completeness, we deal with two other points raised by Wei.

  50. [51] First, Wei also appealed against the Judge’s finding that he had breached his fiduciary duties. The Judge found that Wei was in a position of conflict of duty and interest. As a director of the Company, he had diverted business away from the Company and attempted to undercut the Company. Wei had intended to supply the Parts directly to Apple and undermine the Company’s business. We agree with the Judge’s findings, which is roundly supported by the evidence detailed in [121]–[125] of the Judgment.

  51. [52] On appeal, Wei relied on the cases of Tokuhon (Pte) Ltd v Seow Kang Hong and others [2003] 4 SLR(R) 414 (“Tokuhon”), In Plus Group Ltd and others v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370 (“Plus”), and Servis. In Tokuhon, the director in question wrote letters which contained confidential information to a third party, and placed the company in a bad light. Soon after, the third party terminated his distributorship relationship with the company. The director then resigned and was appointed the new distributor. This court found (at [39]) that the conflict between the company’s shareholders was always known to the third party and the other shareholders regarded the third party as a confidante, a peacemaker and a referee for the contending parties. In fact, the other shareholders had similarly divulged confidential information to the third party. All these demonstrated that each of the parties regarded such conduct as being fair game and acceptable, and that was the norm set by the shareholders of the company. Wei argued that similar to the company in Tokuhon, the Company was never run in a manner which suited its interests independently from those of its shareholders, at least from the time of his entry into the Company.

  52. [53] We disagree with Wei’s argument. In Sakae Holdings Ltd v Gryphon Real Estate Investment Corp Pte Ltd and others (Foo Peow Yong Douglas, third party) and another suit [2017] SGHC 73 at [257]–[258], the High Court observed that Tokuhon concerned “exceptional circumstances”. In applying the principles espoused in Tokuhon, the High Court held that there must be “a shared expectation regarding the conduct of directors” and the norm must be one that is specific and with defined limits. There was no such expectation or norm in the present case. In fact, Wei’s own case is that he was oppressed since he joined the Company. It would be entirely bizarre to suggest that such oppression, which is the genesis of this very dispute, was pursuant to any shared expectation or norm.

  53. [55] Second, given our decision, it is not necessary to deal with Wei’s claim for dividends and/or for the declaration against Low and Sim. In any event, these reliefs were not appropriate in the context of an oppression action and in light of the findings by the Judge below.

  54. Conclusion