Court of Appeal · Decided 14 April 2022
VEW v VEV
Feedback & support[2022] SGCA 34 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 52 of 2021
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction and overview
- [2]
[2] In essence, the matrimonial assets in the present case had been divided by the Singapore court between the parties following their divorce. However, one particular asset – real property (the “Property”) located in London (and which constituted the most valuable asset) – was held not to be a matrimonial asset and was therefore not part of the pool of matrimonial assets that was divided between the parties by the Singapore court.
- [3]
[3] The appellant wife (the “appellant”) subsequently brought a claim pursuant to Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (c 42) (UK) (the “MFPA”) for financial relief centring on the Property after an overseas (here, Singapore) divorce. The purpose of this claim provided for by the MFPA was to furnish financial relief in situations of need notwithstanding the fact that financial provision might have been provided pursuant to a prior overseas divorce by the relevant court in that particular jurisdiction.
- [4]
[4] At first blush, the subsequent claim for financial relief in the English court appears separate and distinct from the earlier proceedings related to the division of matrimonial assets in the Singapore court. However, it should be noted that the Property was – literally at least – involved in both sets of proceedings. The respondent husband (the “respondent”) sought an anti-suit injunction (“ASI”) to prevent the appellant from continuing with the English proceedings, arguing, amongst other things, that there would be a re-litigation of matters that had already been decided by the Singapore court. The issue that arises is whether or not re-litigation would in fact take place were the proceedings in the English court permitted to continue, given that both sets of proceedings had (as just mentioned) different purposes – the application in the English court being one for financial relief following a divorce in Singapore, and the proceedings in Singapore being for the division of matrimonial assets in the aforementioned divorce.
- [6]
[6] What, then, of the argument that the Singapore courts, by holding that the Property was not part of the pool of matrimonial assets, had in fact rendered a decision with respect to the matrimonial proceedings and that, therefore, the claim initiated by the plaintiff for financial relief pursuant to Part III did constitute a re-litigation of this particular decision? Whilst a not unattractive argument, it is our view that the fact that the Property had not been considered part of the pool of matrimonial assets meant that not a single iota of the Property could, ex hypothesi, have been the subject matter of distribution to one or both of the parties pursuant to the matrimonial proceedings. Looked at in that light, the subsequent claim initiated by the appellant for financial relief pursuant to Part III and which centred on the Property could not be construed as a re-litigation of a matter that, ex hypothesi, was never before the Singapore court hearing the matrimonial proceedings in the first place. It is important to emphasise once again that the inquiry is one of substance and not form. As importantly, it is an inquiry that should not be preoccupied with fine distinctions. As we pointed out to the parties during oral submissions before us, had the appellant accepted – without argument – that the Property did not form part of the pool of matrimonial assets, she would clearly not have been precluded from initiating a claim pursuant to Part III simply because the Property would clearly not have been the subject of the matrimonial proceedings in the Singapore court. The fact that she did argue – albeit unsuccessfully – that the Property ought to form part of the pool of matrimonial assets should not, in our view, make a difference. Indeed, to insist on drawing such a difference would be to engage in an overly technical inquiry that would produce rather arbitrary results. Such flexibility as well as the eschewing of an overly technical approach towards the concept of re-litigation is also needful in light of the fact that by their very nature, both Part III and Chapter 4A of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (the “Women’s Charter”) would – literally speaking – often involve a consideration of the same facts that were before the court concerned in respect of the foreign divorce proceedings.
- [7]
[7] More importantly, the court should – as far as it is possible – attempt to give effect to the underlying policy and spirit of these statutory provisions that do presuppose that there have been prior foreign matrimonial proceedings and whose purpose is nevertheless to provide financial relief where it is necessary to do so. In the context of the present appeal, the fact that the Property had not been the subject of any division by the Singapore courts as it was considered not to be within the pool of matrimonial assets that was to be divided between the parties renders it less likely – if at all – that the public policy of Singapore in relation to the division of matrimonial assets would be contravened, whilst simultaneously rendering it an eminently appropriate resource from which the financial hardship of the appellant could be alleviated provided that the appellant can make good her claim pursuant to the letter as well as spirit of Part III, thus giving effect to the policy and spirit underlying Part III.
- [9]
[9] As already mentioned, the above is a summary as well as overview of our reasons and decision. For completeness, we note that following the hearing before us on 18 January 2022, counsel for the appellant sent a letter to the court on 20 January 2022 (the “20 January 2022 Letter”) to address us on some of the questions raised during the hearing. In the court’s reply to counsel on 21 January 2022, it was noted that counsel had not sought leave to make further submissions to the court, that the 20 January 2022 Letter was a discourtesy to the court, and that the court would not consider the contents of the 20 January 2022 Letter. For the avoidance of doubt, we reiterate here that we did not consider the contents of the 20 January 2022 Letter in reaching our decision. We turn now to elaborate on the reasons set out above, commencing with a summary of the events leading up to the present appeal.
Facts
The parties
- [10]
[10] The appellant and respondent met in England in 2008 and moved into the Property, which is solely owned by the respondent, in March 2009. They married in Italy in July 2011 and moved to Singapore in February 2012. The parties are both Singapore permanent residents; the appellant has dual citizenship in the UK and the Republic of Ireland, while the respondent has dual citizenship in the UK and Australia.
- [11]
[11] On 26 June 2018, the appellant filed for divorce in England. On 9 July 2018, the respondent filed for divorce in Singapore. The appellant then applied for a stay of the divorce proceedings in Singapore. Her application was dismissed on 28 January 2019, and she proceeded to file a defence in the Singapore divorce proceedings in February 2019. The divorce was eventually granted in Singapore on an uncontested basis. The Interim Judgment of Divorce was granted on 5 March 2019, and the Certificate of Final Judgment of Divorce was granted on 23 December 2019. In the meantime, the parties’ dispute over the ancillary matters had been heard by a District Judge (the “DJ”).
Background
- [15]
[15] SUM 2619 was granted by the DJ on 26 October 2020. The appellant’s appeal to the High Court in HCF/RAS 27/2020 (“RAS 27”) was dismissed by the High Court judge (the “Judge”) on 11 March 2021. The appellant was subsequently granted leave to appeal to the Appellate Division of the High Court (the “Appellate Division”) against the Judge’s decision in RAS 27. In granting the appellant leave to appeal in AD/OS 14/2021 (“OS 14”), the Appellate Division observed:
The costs of OS 14 were reserved to the appeal court.
Summary of the decisions below
- [18]
[18] In SUM 2619, the DJ referred to and applied the principles set out in this court’s decision in Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar v Jhaveri Darsan Jitendra [2019] 2 SLR 372 (“Lakshmi”) at [50]. The DJ noted, inter alia, that Singapore was the natural forum of the parties’ dispute, and that the appellant was seeking a “second bite at the cherry” by commencing Part III proceedings in the UK. Having not filed an appeal against the AM orders, bringing duplicative proceedings in the UK was clearly vexatious conduct. Further, the appellant would be raising the same arguments and using the same factual matrix for her claim in respect of the Property in the UK, and she should not be permitted to do so as this would involve re-litigation of matters already the subject of judgment.
- [19]
[19] In RAS 27, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal and upheld the DJ’s grant of the ASI:
The parties’ cases on appeal
- [20]
[20] We now summarise the key points of the parties’ cases in the present appeal (viz, CA 52) as follows.
The appellant’s case
- [21]
[21] First, the appellant argues that the Judge had erred in upholding the grant of the ASI on the basis that there will be re-litigation of the entire division of matrimonial assets before the English court. Further, instituting the Part III proceedings is, in itself, not vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable conduct justifying the grant of the ASI – the whole basis of Part III is that it is appropriate for two jurisdictions to be involved.
- [22]
[22] Second, the Part III regime is designed to weed out unmeritorious cases, and due weight should be given to the decision of the English court in granting leave for Part III to proceed. Singapore’s own Chapter 4A was modelled after the Part III regime, and the Law Reform Committee of the Singapore Academy of Law had recognised that the requirement to seek leave from the English court – which is reproduced in Chapter 4A – was an effective filtering mechanism in Part III.
- [23]
[23] Finally, the respondent is not entitled to the ASI as he is before this court with “unclean hands”, given his delay in applying for an ASI, and the fact he seeks to rely on this application to circumvent the decision of DDJ Hodson.
The respondent’s case
- [24]
[24] The respondent’s arguments are as follows.
- [26]
[26] Second, it is important for the Singapore court to protect its own jurisdiction, particularly in the context of Part III proceedings. The appellant appears to be advocating an “ill-founded” view that the Singapore courts ought to defer completely and unquestioningly to the foreign court and the filtering system of the foreign court to decide if a Part III proceeding is an attack on Singapore court orders. However, the grant of leave by the foreign court cannot be determinative of the merits of an application for an ASI, nor does it give rise to an issue estoppel in respect of a subsequent ASI application in the competing forum.
- [27]
[27] Finally, the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply in this case. The respondent filed his ASI application on 7 September 2020, shortly after the appellant was granted leave on 21 August 2020 to pursue Part III proceedings in the UK. The respondent only took part in the UK proceedings under protest and subject to his strict reservations as to jurisdiction. Further, the UK proceedings have not progressed to an advanced stage.
- [28]
[28] Before we turn to the specific issues in the present appeal, it would be useful to set out the background to Part III of the MFPA and Chapter 4A of the Women’s Charter, as well as the general principles concerning the grant of an ASI.
Part III of the MFPA
- [29]
[29] Part III of the MFPA allows a party to apply for financial relief in England and Wales after an overseas divorce. The UK Supreme Court has explained the background to Part III of the MFPA in Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 13 (“Agbaje”) as follows (at [4]–[5]):
- [31]
[31] Under s 13 of the MFPA, an applicant must first be granted leave to commence proceedings under Part III of the MFPA (see Agbaje at [9]):
- [32]
[32] The principal object of this “filter mechanism” in s 13 is to “prevent wholly unmeritorious claims being pursued to oppress or blackmail a former spouse”; the threshold is “not high, but is higher than ‘serious issue to be tried’ or ‘good arguable case’ found in other contexts” (see Agbaje at [33]).
- [33]
[33] Section 15(1) of the MFPA sets out the jurisdictional requirements for the English court to entertain the Part III application, as follows:
- [34]
[34] Second, at the substantive hearing of the Part III application, the court has a duty to consider whether England and Wales is the appropriate venue for the application, having regard in particular to the factors under s 16(2) of the MFPA (see Agbaje at [42]):
Chapter 4A of the Women’s Charter
- [36]
[36] Chapter 4A of the Women’s Charter was modelled after Part III of the MFPA (see the decision of this court in UFN v UFM and another matter [2019] 2 SLR 650 (“UFN v UFM (CA)”) at [23]). Like Part III, Chapter 4A allows the Singapore court to grant financial relief to an applicant where (i) there was no relief available in the foreign court or (ii) the relief granted by the foreign court was inadequate or not a fair one (see the High Court decision of Harjit Kaur d/o Kulwant Singh v Saroop Singh a/l Amar Singh [2015] 4 SLR 1216 (“Harjit Kaur”) at [10]). As with applications under Part III of the MFPA, an application under Chapter 4A comprises two stages – an applicant must first obtain the leave of the court, before making a substantive application for financial relief at the second stage (see UFN v UFM (CA) at [17]).
- [40]
[40] Sections 121D and 121F of the Women’s Charter are in pari materia with ss 13 (the leave mechanism) and 16 (the duty to consider whether the court of England and Wales is the appropriate venue for the application) of the MFPA, respectively. However, we note that in respect of the jurisdictional requirements in s 15 of the MFPA and s 121C of the Women’s Charter, s 15 of the MFPA has an additional ground under s 15(1)(c) that is not present in s 121C of the Women’s Charter, this being the ground that “either or both of the parties to the marriage had at the date of the application for leave a beneficial interest in possession in a dwelling-house situated in England or Wales which was at some time during the marriage a matrimonial home of the parties to the marriage”. This is the ground on which the appellant was granted leave to commence Part III proceedings in the English court (see [13] above). In the LRC Report, the LRC explained (at [62]) that this was “thought to be too tenuous a connection for the Singapore court to assume jurisdiction where the parties have otherwise no other connection with Singapore, even if the resulting orders are only in relation to that property”.
Principles concerning the grant of an ASI
- [41]
[41] Finally, we turn to the principles concerning the grant of an ASI.
- [43]
[43] This court has also identified five factors (as stated in Lakshmi at [50]) that have to be considered when deciding whether to grant an ASI (see the decisions of this court in VKC v VJZ and another [2021] 2 SLR 753 (“VKC”) at [16]–[20]) and Sun Travels at [66]):
(a) whether the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court;
(b) whether Singapore is the natural forum for resolution of the dispute between the parties;
(c) whether the foreign proceedings would be vexatious or oppressive to the plaintiff if allowed to continue;
(d) whether the ASI would cause any injustice to the defendant by depriving the defendant of legitimate juridical advantages sought in the foreign proceedings; and
(e) whether the institution of foreign proceedings was or would be in breach of any agreement between the parties.
Although these factors are to be considered in the round, a breach of an agreement has been regarded as a separate basis on which an ASI may be granted; one that is distinct from vexatious or oppressive conduct (see Sun Travels at [67]).
- [44]
[44] Whether there has been vexatious conduct involves an assessment and evaluation of a number of factors. The list of factors is not closed. The inherent weakness of a claim sought to be pursued in the foreign proceedings when taken together with other factors may be a relevant factor in considering whether the foreign proceedings are vexatious (see VKC at [19]). Factual findings which have supported findings of vexation or oppression include where the foreign proceedings were instituted in bad faith or for no good reason, are bound to fail, will cause extreme inconvenience (see the decision of this court in John Reginald Stott Kirkham and others v Trane US Inc and others [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428 (“Kirkham”) at [47]), amount to an unlawful attack on the plaintiff’s legal rights (see the High Court decision of Evergreen International SA v Volkswagen Group Singapore Pte Ltd and others [2004] 2 SLR(R) 457 at [46]–[64]), or are duplicative of Singapore proceedings (see PT Sandipala at [112]–[129]). In so far as this last category is concerned, however, there is no presumption that a multiplicity of proceedings is vexatious or oppressive per se – something additional is required to make the duplication vexatious. For example, the greater the positive and voluntary involvement of the injunction respondent in the local proceedings, and the longer the local suit has been allowed to proceed before the commencement of the parallel foreign proceedings, the stronger the case for an injunction (see PT Sandipala at [137] as well as Thomas Raphael QC, The Anti-Suit Injunction (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2019) (“The Anti-Suit Injunction”) at paras 19.43–19.44).
- [45]
[45] Related to the question of whether or not the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive would be the injustice that each party might suffer if the injunction were or were not granted. Consideration of a juridical advantage in the foreign forum would include the kind of remedy and its availability to the party bringing proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction based on the application of foreign law to the substance of the parties’ dispute, rather than the law of the competing forum (see VKC at [20]).
- [46]
[46] Finally, we note the observation of the High Court in PT Sandipala (at [71]) that, while an ASI is directed at the opposing party and not the foreign court, its indirect effect on the foreign court may nevertheless be an affront to comity. Bearing in mind considerations of comity, it is apposite to note that the court’s jurisdiction in respect of an ASI should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases.
Issues before this court
- [47]
[47] The following issues arise for the court’s determination in the present appeal:
(a) What are the principles applicable to the grant of an ASI against Part III proceedings in the UK?
(b) Should an ASI have been granted in this case?
(c) Has the respondent come before this court with unclean hands?
Issue 1: What are the principles applicable to the grant of an ASI against Part III proceedings?
- [48]
[48] In the present case, as we noted earlier, the DJ applied the factors in Lakshmi at [50] (the “Lakshmi factors”) in ascertaining whether the ASI should be granted (see [43] above). In our view, this approach is, with respect, not appropriate in the context of this case.
The “typical” case
- [49]
[49] We begin by considering the context of a “typical” case where an ASI is sought based on allegations of vexatious or oppressive conduct.
- [50]
[50] The respondent referred to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Munib Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL and another [2008] EWCA Civ 625 (“Masri”). Masri had obtained judgment in London against two companies, “CCIC” and “CCOG” (at [2], [4]). CCIC and CCOG subsequently brought an action in Yemen for a declaration that they were not liable to Masri, and Masri successfully obtained an ASI against CCIC and CCOG in England (at [5]), which was upheld on appeal by the English Court of Appeal. The English Court of Appeal observed that the fact that a respondent was seeking to re-litigate in a foreign jurisdiction matters which were already res judicata between himself and the applicant by reason of an English judgment could be a sufficient ground for the grant of an ASI (at [82]). CCIC and CCOG were seeking to re-litigate abroad the merits of a case which they had lost in England, and this was a “classic case” of vexation and oppression designed to interfere with the process of the English court in litigation to which they had submitted (at [95]). The ASI was therefore necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the English court, its process and its judgments (at [99]–[100]).
- [51]
[51] Masri has been cited with approval in the Singapore courts, for example, by the High Court in Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG and another [2011] 1 SLR 524 (“Beckkett”) (at [34], [42]), and by the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) in Baker, Michael A (executor of the estate of Chantal Burnison, deceased) v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd and others [2022] 3 SLR 103 (at [51]–[54]), where the SICC noted that Masri was a “paradigm example of a case involving consecutive proceedings”.
The present case
- [54]
[54] However, unlike Masri, Ahmed and AQN v AQO, the present case concerns a situation where (i) the foreign proceedings are initiated under an English statute, and (ii) Singapore has enacted its own legislation modelled after Part III, in the form of Chapter 4A of the Women’s Charter.
- [55]
[55] The implications of these two points distinguish this case from the “typical” case.
Significance of proceedings under Part III of the MFPA
- [57]
[57] That said, however, not all applicants who have obtained a decree of divorce, annulment or legal separation outside the UK are automatically eligible for relief under Part III. The UK Supreme Court in Agbaje noted that (at [33]):
We note that this court has cited this paragraph of Agbaje in observing that the purpose of the equivalent leave mechanism under Chapter 4A “is only to sift out plainly unmeritorious cases or those which amount to an abuse of process” (see UFN v UFM (CA) at [29], [34]).
- [58]
[58] The Law Commission of England and Wales had proposed this “filter mechanism” in its 1982 Report to protect against unmeritorious applications and to ensure that the English court only intervenes in appropriate cases:
- [59]
[59] In our view, this “filter mechanism” in the MFPA presupposes that the English court will indeed be diligent in sifting out unmeritorious cases, including those cases which are “being used to exert improper pressure on respondents to settle”. Indeed, the Singapore High Court has noted, citing the LRC Report, that the leave requirement has proven in practice “to be useful in sieving out unmeritorious applications” in the UK (see Harjit Kaur at [13]).
Significance of Singapore enacting Chapter 4A
- [60]
[60] We now turn to the implications of Singapore having enacted legislation modelled after Part III of the MFPA, ie, Chapter 4A.
- [61]
[61] First, Chapter 4A is part of Singapore’s public policy under the Women’s Charter. This is significant because, in deciding whether considerations of comity should inhibit (or even proscribe) the grant of an ASI, the court must weigh those considerations against the public policy of the Singapore legal system (see Beckkett at [44]–[46]). In this appeal, therefore, this court must consider whether allowing the Part III proceedings to continue would offend the public policy underpinning Chapter 4A.
- [62]
[62] Second, Singapore’s interpretation of Part III (on which Chapter 4A is modelled) may also affect other foreign courts’ interpretation of Chapter 4A, and their willingness to grant an ASI (or similar relief) against the commencement of Chapter 4A proceedings in Singapore. The present appeal therefore has potential ramifications for how foreign jurisdictions deal with Chapter 4A.
- [63]
[63] With these differences in mind, we now consider whether it was appropriate to apply the Lakshmi factors to this case.
The applicability of the Lakshmi factors
(1) Amenability to the jurisdiction
(2) Natural forum for the resolution of the dispute
- [65]
[65] We now turn to the second Lakshmi factor of whether Singapore is the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute between the parties. The DJ said there was no dispute that Singapore “is clearly the more appropriate forum”.
- [66]
[66] In our view, however, unlike cases such as AQN v AQO, the question of whether Singapore is the “natural forum” is not relevant in this particular context. We agree with the appellant that the whole basis of Part III (and Chapter 4A) is that it may be appropriate for more than one jurisdiction to be involved (see UFN v UFM (CA) at [47] and Agbaje at [49]). As noted by the UK Supreme Court in Agbaje (at [49]–[50]):
- [67]
[67] Similarly, the High Court in UFM v UFN [2018] 3 SLR 450 (“UFM v UFN (HC)”) has observed (at [35]–[36]):
- [68]
[68] In our view, therefore, it is not helpful to ask which forum is the more appropriate forum in the present case and to apply the various factors considered in AQN v AQO (such as the availability of witnesses and the law governing the dispute (see AQN v AQO at [18])). The answer in this case would either be England and Wales, since that is the only place where Part III proceedings can be pursued, or Singapore, since that is where the parties divorced. However, that does not actually address the question of whether an ASI should be granted in the unique context of the Part III regime, which confers a statutory right on a certain class of litigant and which envisions that ancillary relief may be granted by more than one jurisdiction.
(3) Vexatious or oppressive conduct
- [69]
[69] The heart of the analysis in the present context, in our view, really rests on the third Lakshmi factor – whether the Part III proceedings would be vexatious or oppressive to the respondent if allowed to continue. We highlight here that, as stated at [8] above, we do not agree with the appellant’s counsel’s submission that the test of “vexatious or oppressive” conduct may be subsumed within the test of “unconscionable” conduct. The High Court in AQN v AQO at [25]–[26] has explained that the former term was coined by Lord Goff of Chieveley in the Privy Council decision of Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871, while the latter term was coined by Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough in the House of Lords decision of Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107, and that the two terms are not synonymous. In this regard, Thomas Raphael has suggested that the test of “vexatious or oppressive” conduct is to be preferred (see The Anti-Suit Injunction at paras 4.57–4.59):
We find this analysis persuasive, and we endorse the test of “vexatious and oppressive” conduct as stated in AQN v AQO. We also reiterate here our observation (see [8] above) that the concept of unconscionability is a specific legal term of art in the sphere of equity, and may itself be too vague and general in specific contexts even within that particular sphere (see the decision of this court in BOM v BOK).
- [70]
[70] We have noted earlier (at [44] above) that facts supporting a finding of vexation or oppression include the following factors: where the foreign proceedings were instituted in bad faith or for no good reason, are bound to fail, will cause extreme inconvenience, amount to an unlawful attack on the respondent’s legal rights or are duplicative of Singapore proceedings. In AQN v AQO, for example, the High Court found that the New York proceedings were vexatious and oppressive as the wife had not been receiving maintenance from the husband and her financial resources were strained from dealing with numerous applications filed by her husband both locally and in New York, whereas her wealthy husband had the resources to pursue litigation (at [27]). In Masri, the English Court of Appeal found that the judgment debtors were seeking to re-litigate abroad the merits of a case which they had lost in England, and that this was a “classic case of vexation and oppression”, designed to interfere with the process of the English court in litigation to which they had submitted (at [95]).
- [71]
[71] These same concerns are clearly relevant to Part III proceedings. First, as noted in Agbaje, there is a possibility that a party may pursue Part III proceedings to “oppress or blackmail a former spouse” (see [57] above), by embroiling the former spouse in a protracted dispute in England, causing the former spouse to incur further time and expenses in defending the Part III application, and thereby exert pressure on the former spouse to settle in the foreign court (see [58] above) – similar to the behaviour of the husband in AQN v AQO. Second, there is a possibility that an applicant will rely on Part III to take advantage of a “more generous approach” in English law that they may not have under foreign law (see Agbaje at [72]) and try to “get a second bite of the cherry” (see UFN v UFM (CA) at [48]) – similar to the judgment debtors in Masri who were trying to obtain a more favourable decision in Yemen than they had in England.
- [72]
[72] That said, however, it cannot be the case that the commencement of Part III proceedings is always vexatious and oppressive, justifying the grant of an ASI. First, this position would render Part III ineffectual, as parties who divorce in Singapore would then never be able to subsequently pursue Part III proceedings. That, in our view, would be an affront to comity, as the Singapore court would essentially be taking the position that Part III applications after a Singapore divorce are always an abuse of process.
- [76]
[76] In our view, therefore, these statutory provisions in the MFPA are useful “safety valves” against a foreign applicant taking advantage of the MFPA to undermine the Singapore court’s orders. Further, Singapore has itself adopted these same provisions in Chapter 4A. If a Singapore court were, by default, to grant an ASI against the commencement of Part III proceedings, this would preclude the English court from engaging in its own analysis, under its own law, of whether it is appropriate for England to grant leave or the relief sought. That would be contrary to the principle of comity as the Singapore court would effectively be taking the position that the UK’s legislation (and, likewise, Singapore’s Chapter 4A) does not provide sufficient safeguards against abuse of process. In our view, therefore, a Singapore court should generally be slow to grant an ASI against the commencement of Part III proceedings in the UK.
- [77]
[77] This, however, does not mean that a Singapore court can never grant an ASI against Part III proceedings. We think that these “safety valves” in Part III of the MFPA are useful as supplementary aids, and weight should certainly be placed on the grant of leave by an English court (again, bearing in mind that Singapore has adopted similar legislation in the form of Chapter 4A). However, this should not be conclusive of whether an ASI should be granted against Part III proceedings, as the Singapore court must retain the ability to intervene to safeguard its own public policy, and the integrity of its court proceedings, where necessary. In our view, there would certainly be some cases where the commencement of Part III proceedings would result in unwarranted interference with Singapore’s judgments and court process (as noted in Ahmed at [21], while a follow-on jurisdiction under Part III of the MFPA is “internationally acceptable”, that does not rule out the existence of cases where, “on the facts of the case, it is indeed unconscionable to contemplate either party seeking to have the very same issues re-determined before a different court”). One example might be where the Singapore court has reserved judgment on the ancillary matters, and, while the court is deliberating, one party then applies for leave in England to commence Part III proceedings. This is similar to the conduct of the plaintiff in Beckkett, which had commenced an action in Indonesia just after its appeal had been heard by this court but before this court had delivered judgment (at [35], [42], [46]). There is a strong argument, in our view, that such conduct would be sufficient basis for granting an ASI. However, what exactly constitutes an unwarranted interference with Singapore’s public policy ought to be dealt with after full consideration of all the facts in each case, taking into account factors like whether the English court has granted or denied leave, the stage of the divorce proceedings in Singapore, and the nature of the parties’ claims in the Part III proceedings.
- [79]
[79] We now turn to the next question – whether an ASI should have been granted in this case.
Issue 2: Should an ASI have been granted in this case?
Whether there will be re-litigation
- [80]
[80] The DJ reasoned that the appellant would be raising the same arguments and using the same factual matrix for her claim to the Property in the UK, and she “should not be permitted to relitigate this issue as the division of [the Property] was fully considered and concluded with orders made pertaining to its status”. On appeal, the Judge agreed with the DJ. He reasoned that once the Property was considered under Part III, the adequacy of the appellant’s share of the matrimonial assets, as decided by the DJ, would necessarily have to be reviewed in its entirety. This re-litigation could result in the possibility of the English court coming to a different finding from the DJ.
- [81]
[81] In one sense, the DJ and the Judge were correct that there would be “re-litigation” of the division of the Property in the UK. There would, literally, be another set of proceedings commenced in respect of the Property – such as how another set of proceedings was commenced in TRNC in Ahmed and in New York in AQN v AQO in respect of the parties’ divorce, and another action was commenced in Yemen in Masri in respect of the judgment debtors’ liability to Masri.
- [82]
[82] However, while there may literally be “re-litigation” of the division of the Property, it does not automatically follow that an ASI should issue. As we have said earlier (at [69] above), the heart of the analysis is not whether there is, literally, “re-litigation”, but whether the Part III proceedings amount to vexatious or oppressive conduct in the circumstances of the case. Even in the “typical” cases, there is no presumption that a multiplicity of proceedings, in and of itself, is vexatious and oppressive (see PT Sandipala at [112]). For example, in Masri, the attempted re-litigation by the judgment debtors was vexatious and oppressive because the matters in question were already res judicata between them and the applicant by reason of an English judgment (at [82]). In PT Sandipala, the plaintiff’s conduct in commencing an action in Singapore against the defendants and subsequently commencing an action against them in Jakarta after failing to bring forward the trial dates in Singapore (at [29]) was held to be vexatious and oppressive (at [110]), as, inter alia, the claim in Jakarta was founded on the same wrongful acts that were the subject of the action in Singapore (at [121]), and there was a lack of a good explanation for the duplicative proceedings (at [142]) (For completeness, we note here that the High Court’s decision in PT Sandipala was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No 182 of 2015).
- [83]
[83] In our view, however, the present case is different since the Property is the subject of Part III proceedings. Unlike the situation in PT Sandipala (at [142]), there is a “good explanation” for the duplicative proceedings in the present case because there is an English statute which gives the appellant a right to commence proceedings in the UK in respect of the Property (see [56] above). In these circumstances, the mere fact that the appellant is commencing Part III proceedings in respect of the Property, and her reliance on the same arguments or the same factual matrix present in the Singapore proceedings for her claim in the UK, is not a sufficient justification for the grant of an ASI.
- [87]
[87] In Agbaje, the wife commenced Part III proceedings after ancillary orders had been made in Nigeria in respect of the division of the matrimonial assets. In UFM v UFN (HC), the wife commenced Chapter 4A proceedings without seeking any ancillary orders in Indonesia in respect of the division of the matrimonial assets. In both cases, however, the applicants’ willingness to relinquish their rights in respect of matrimonial assets in Nigeria and Indonesia respectively was either a condition of or a relevant factor to the court granting financial relief under Part III and Chapter 4A. Rather than merely supplementing the orders of a foreign court (see Agbaje at [54]), it seems that the English and Singapore courts were, in substance, either supplanting the foreign orders (in Agbaje) or foreclosing the possibility of such foreign orders (in UFM v UFN (HC)). In the present case, it could be argued that there would be an impact on Singapore’s public policy if, as a condition of being granted financial relief under Part III in respect of the Property, the appellant is similarly required by the English court to relinquish her claim to the matrimonial assets in Singapore (like the wife in Agbaje), as this would, in effect, amount to setting aside the DJ’s AM orders.
- [89]
[89] First, we do not think there will be any supplanting of the Singapore orders or a risk of “conflicting judgments” in the present case. In this case, the DJ found that the Property was not part of the pool of matrimonial assets. Thus, the Property could not have been divided between the appellant and respondent pursuant to the divorce proceedings in Singapore – once the DJ found that it was not a matrimonial asset, the question of division did not even arise. As DDJ Hodson described it in his reasons for granting leave:
- [90]
[90] We therefore think that the Part III proceedings initiated by the appellant cannot constitute a “re-litigation” of the division of the Property, since the question of division was never before the Singapore court. That makes it less likely that there will be any conflict with Singapore’s public policy in relation to the division of matrimonial assets.
- [92]
[92] Further, as we have stated earlier (at [6]), had the appellant accepted before the Singapore court that the Property did not form part of the pool of matrimonial assets, she would not have been precluded from initiating a claim pursuant to Part III in respect of the Property as the Property would not have been the subject of the matrimonial proceedings in the Singapore court. We do not see why the outcome should be different just because the appellant was unsuccessful in her claim in respect of the Property before the Singapore courts.
- [93]
[93] Second, with respect to the possibility of the English court imposing certain conditions on the grant of financial relief, we do not think that this is a sufficient basis to justify the grant of an ASI in this case. In our view, it would be mere speculation to assume that the appellant would be required to relinquish her rights over the matrimonial assets in Singapore as a condition of being granted financial relief under Part III. There was no indication of such a condition being imposed when the appellant was granted leave to commence Part III proceedings, nor was there any intimation of this in DDJ Hodson’s judgment. Nonetheless, while the issue does not arise in the present appeal, we observe that such a question could possibly arise for determination in future cases, depending on the facts and circumstances of those cases.
- [94]
[94] The above analysis, in our view, suffices to dispose of the appeal before us. We set aside the ASI on the basis that there has been no re-litigation of any kind, nor has there been any vexatious or oppressive conduct on the appellant’s part.
- [95]
[95] For completeness, however, we will briefly address the other points raised by the DJ and by the respondent.
Not filing an appeal in the Singapore court
- [96]
[96] The DJ reasoned that not filing an appeal against the AM orders and bringing duplicative proceedings in the UK was clearly vexatious conduct on the appellant’s part. According to the DJ, the “correct thing” for the appellant was to appeal against the AM orders, “not re-litigate the issue in a different forum”.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.