Court of Appeal · Decided 11 June 2025
Disputing the engagement's validity did not halt assessment of the firm's bills
Lun Yaodong Clarence v Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP
Feedback & support[2025] SGCA 25 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Originating Application No 10 of 2025 · 36 paragraphs
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Disputing the engagement's validity did not halt assessment of the firm's bills
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [4], [39]
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The applicant, Mr Clarence Lun Yaodong (“Mr Lun”), instructed solicitors from the respondent law firm, Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP (“Dentons”), to act for him in disciplinary proceedings before the Court of Three Judges (the “C3J”). Mr Lun was facing charges centred around his acting as a supervising solicitor of two practice trainees when he was not qualified to do so. At the close of those proceedings, the C3J found that the charges were made out and imposed a sanction of suspension from practice for a period of 18 months: see Law Society of Singapore v Lun Yaodong Clarence [2023] 4 SLR 638 (“Clarence Lun (C3J)”).
- [3]
[3] An Assistant Registrar (the “AR”) dismissed Mr Lun’s application to stay BC 123 on the basis that the subject matter of BC 123 fell outside the scope of the parties’ submission to arbitration and was instead within the carve-out in the clause that covered “disputes concerning the amount or non-payment of part or all of [Dentons’] bills” (the “Carve-Out”). This decision was later affirmed on Mr Lun’s appeal by a Judge of the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”). In the present application, Mr Lun seeks permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision to this court on the ground that the Judge erred in law.
- [4]
[4] Having considered the parties’ submissions, we are satisfied that the Judge did not err. In our judgment, this application turns on a construction of the dispute resolution clause that bound the parties. Notably, the parties intentionally identified different fora to which they allocated the resolution of different issues. In our judgment, on a true construction of that clause, the parties intended to have the assessment of the quantum of Dentons’ bills determined by the court and, further, that this could take place independently of the resolution of any dispute over the validity of the LOE. Seen in this light, what Mr Lun seeks to do, by intermeshing the two disputes, is contrary to the parties’ agreement. The Judge was correct to respect the parties’ agreement and to decline to stay BC 123 based on Mr Lun’s dispute over the validity of the LOE. Accordingly, we refuse permission to appeal and dismiss the application. We now explain our decision more fully.
Background to the parties’ dispute
- [5]
[5] Sometime in June 2021, a Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) was constituted to hear and investigate allegations against Mr Lun for, among other things, acting as a supervising solicitor of two practice trainees when he was not qualified to do so.
- [6]
[6] Although he was initially represented by different counsel, Mr Lun subsequently instructed a team of solicitors from Dentons, led by Mr Mark Seah (“Mr Seah”), to act for him pursuant to the LOE dated 20 September 2021.
- [7]
[7] Mr Lun’s engagement with Dentons proceeded without incident during the proceedings before the DT. On 11 November 2021 and 14 January 2022, Dentons issued two invoices for work done in the respective periods from 27 September 2021 to 28 October 2021 and 29 October 2021 to 17 December 2021. It was communicated by Mr Seah to Mr Lun when these invoices were issued that Dentons had significantly discounted its fees as a “gesture of goodwill”, on account of the challenges Mr Lun was facing during what was a difficult period. Both these invoices were paid by Mr Lun without dispute and are not the subject of BC 123.
- [8]
[8] On 22 March 2022, the DT found that there was cause of sufficient gravity under s 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) for Mr Lun’s matter to be referred to the C3J: see Law Society of Singapore v Clarence Lun Yaodong [2022] SGDT 9. This gave rise to the proceedings in Clarence Lun (C3J).
- [9]
[9] Mr Lun claims that, at this point, after the release of the DT’s decision and prior to the C3J proceedings, he contemplated changing his solicitors and ending his engagement of Dentons and Mr Seah. His concerns were twofold: (a) first, the necessity of engaging Senior Counsel or more experienced practitioners to handle the C3J proceedings; and (b) second, the professional fees that Dentons would charge for acting for him in the C3J proceedings as he was “facing difficult times”.
- [10]
[10] In a nutshell, Mr Lun accuses Mr Seah of having misrepresented the position in relation to these two areas of concern, and that the effect of these misrepresentations was to induce him to retain Dentons and Mr Seah to act for him in the C3J proceedings. As to the misrepresentations:
(a) First, Mr Lun claims that he communicated with various members of the Bar who had advised him to engage Senior Counsel or suggested other experienced practitioners who would be willing to act for him on a pro bono or on a significantly discounted basis. After Mr Lun relayed these exchanges to Mr Seah, Mr Seah informed him that he wished to continue acting for Mr Lun before the C3J and that he considered himself sufficiently capable to do so, having already become acquainted with Mr Lun’s matter from the proceedings before the DT. Mr Lun characterises these alleged statements by Mr Seah as the “Competency Representation”.
(b) Second, Mr Lun claims that he broached the issue of Dentons’ estimated fees for acting for him in the C3J proceedings with Mr Seah on multiple occasions and at different stages of the C3J proceedings. On each occasion, Mr Seah assured him that Dentons’ fees would not be substantial “as most of the work and research had already been undertaken during the proceedings before the [DT]”. Mr Lun characterises these alleged assurances as the “Professional Fee Representation”.
- [12]
[12] These grievances, among others, were conveyed by Mr Lun in WhatsApp messages sent to Mr Seah on 23 December 2022, in which he also requested that Dentons defer the issue of its fees until he had completed his suspension. At the same time, however, Mr Lun also said that “if [Mr Seah] really want[ed] to, [he could] go and tax the bills”. Mr Lun subsequently repeated this stance when Mr Seah reached out to him yet again to discuss the issue of Dentons’ fees:
(a) Between 9 October 2023 and 10 October 2023, after Mr Seah had on 3 October 2023 informed Mr Lun that he “would need to speak to [Mr Lun] about the issue of billing”, the following exchange ensued between Mr Lun and Mr Seah:
(b) On 7 December 2023, Mr Lun responded to Mr Seah in terms which suggested that he wished to leave no ambiguity in his instructions that Dentons should proceed to have its bills assessed by the court:
- [13]
[13] On 30 April 2024, Mr Lun filed a complaint against Mr Seah to the Law Society of Singapore (the “Law Society” and the “Complaint”). The Complaint was dismissed by a Review Committee of the Law Society on 30 October 2024. Mr Lun has since filed HC/OA 1212/2024 (“OA 1212”) seeking permission to commence an application for judicial review of the dismissal of the Complaint. Most recently, following the dismissal of OA 1212 by the General Division of the High Court on 28 April 2025, Mr Lun has filed an appeal to this court in CA/CA 12/2025, which remains pending at the time of our decision in this application.
- [16]
[16] On 27 October 2024, Mr Lun filed HC/SUM 3129/2024 seeking a stay of BC 123. The AR dismissed Mr Lun’s application. Mr Lun subsequently appealed against the AR’s decision in HC/RA 18/2025, which was dismissed by the Judge. The application before us arises out of the Judge’s decision.
Decision below
- [20]
[20] In her brief oral remarks delivered at the hearing, the Judge agreed with the AR that Mr Lun could not bring himself within the scope of s 6 of the AA because BC 123 fell within the Carve-Out.
The parties’ submissions
- [21]
[21] In this application, Mr Lun seeks permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on the sole ground that there is a prima facie case of error in the Judge’s decision. According to Mr Lun, the Judge failed to identify the matters arising in BC 123 in accordance with the approach set out in our recent decision in COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers Co, Ltd v PT OKI Pulp & Paper Mills and others and another matter [2024] 2 SLR 516 (“COSCO”). If the Judge had correctly applied the principles, she should have appreciated that (a) Mr Lun was disputing the validity of the LOE on grounds of misrepresentation based on the Competency Representation and Professional Fee Representation; and (b) this dispute fell within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate as a dispute relating to the “existence, validity or termination” of the LOE. This should have justified a stay of BC 123.
- [22]
[22] To buttress his position, Mr Lun also raises the following points:
(a) First, the Carve-Out should be interpreted as being limited to “straightforward disputes about quantum or non-payment where there is no challenge to the validity, existence or termination of the retainer” and thus would not cover the sort of dispute he has raised, which goes to the validity of the LOE.
(b) Second, a refusal of a stay of BC 123 would result in a multiplicity of proceedings if the validity of the LOE were to be determined in BC 123 and separately in arbitration.
(c) Third, a stay of BC 123 would be consistent with the pro-arbitration policy of the Singapore courts, which weighs in favour of enforcing arbitration agreements and staying court proceedings in favour of arbitration.
- [23]
[23] Dentons, on the other hand, submits that the Judge did not commit any error of law. On the contrary, the Judge was correct to keep the assessment proceedings in BC 123 separate from Mr Lun’s challenge to the validity of the LOE. BC 123 concerns the amount of fees which Dentons is entitled to bill Mr Lun for its services; this clearly falls within the Carve-Out being a dispute over the amount of Dentons’ fees. The fact that Mr Lun has chosen to raise a dispute on the validity of the LOE in BC 123 cannot change the nature of the dispute in BC 123 and bring it within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
Our decision
- [24]
[24] The principles governing applications for permission to appeal based on a prima facie case of error are well-established. Given that the crux of Mr Lun’s case is that the Judge failed to follow the approach laid down in COSCO, his case seems to be centred on an alleged error of law. In such a case, an applicant would succeed in making out a prima facie case of error if two things are established: (a) the appeal is likely to succeed (this being a standard that goes beyond presenting what is merely an arguable case); and (b) there is a likelihood of substantial injustice if permission was not to be granted: Zhou Wenjing v Shun Heng Credit Pte Ltd [2023] 4 SLR 1599 at [37].
- [25]
[25] The court’s power to stay court proceedings in so far as they relate to a matter that is subject to an arbitration agreement is set out in s 6(1) of the AA. An important difference between s 6 of the AA, which applies to domestic arbitration, and s 6 of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed), which applies to international arbitration, is that the court retains some discretion under s 6(2) of the AA to refuse a stay of proceedings even if they engage a matter that is subject to an arbitration agreement: CSY v CSZ [2022] 2 SLR 622 at [1]. In Moveon Technologies Pte Ltd v Crystal-Moveon Technologies Pte Ltd [2024] 6 SLR 653, the court helpfully set out the analytical framework for considering whether to grant a stay of proceedings under s 6 of the AA, which we would articulate as follows (at [8]):
- [26]
[26] The present case centres around the second of these requirements. In this regard, we clarified in COSCO that a two-stage test should be applied to determine whether the court proceedings implicate any matter falling within the scope of an arbitration agreement between the parties (at [68]):
- [27]
[27] Mr Lun’s complaint focuses on the first of the two stages above. In essence, he contends that the Judge glossed over the first stage of the analysis and failed to identify the validity of the LOE as a matter that necessarily arose in BC 123, and that the question of the validity of the LOE was the subject of the parties’ arbitration agreement.
Whether the dispute over the validity of the LOE is a matter arising in BC 123
The applicable law
- [28]
[28] It is useful to start with a few basic propositions which are of particular importance in this case.
- [30]
[30] Second, the mere assertion of a dispute that comes within the scope of an arbitration agreement does not inexorably and automatically trigger the operation of s 6 of the AA. In Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2016] 1 SLR 373 (“Tomolugen”), we observed that whether there is a “matter” covered by an arbitration clause that would necessitate a stay calls for “a practical and common-sense inquiry in relation to any reasonably substantial issue that is not merely peripherally or tangentially connected to the dispute in the court proceedings” [emphasis added] (at [113]). In a pair of recent decisions handed down respectively by the UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“Privy Council”) in Republic of Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) and others [2023] Bus LR 1359 (“Mozambique”) (at [75]) and FamilyMart China Holding Co Ltd v Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corpn [2024] Bus LR 190 (“FamilyMart”) (at [61]), Lord Hodge DPSC cited with approval the aforesaid extract from Tomolugen, and noted that “[i]f the ‘matter’ is not an essential element of the claim or of a relevant defence to that claim, it is not a matter in respect of which the legal proceedings are brought”. His Lordship went on to say, and with which we respectfully agree, that (Mozambique at [77]; FamilyMart at [65]):
It follows from this that if the resolution of an issue that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration is not an essential step in the resolution of the dispute in the court proceedings, the issue in question will not constitute a matter that arises in the court proceedings and there will thus generally be no warrant for staying the court proceedings.
- [31]
[31] Third, as much as it has become common place for courts dealing with questions on the scope of arbitration agreements to recite the so-called “one-stop shop” presumption articulated by Lord Hoffmann in Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and others v Privalov and others [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254 (“Fiona Trust”) – that is, that “the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal” (at [13]) – that cannot be applied indiscriminately. The Fiona Trust principle is simply a presumption of the parties’ intentions. If, therefore, the language of the parties’ dispute resolution agreement(s) and the relevant circumstances as a whole reveal a contrary intention, there is no basis for superimposing a different intention. In Asiana Airlines, Inc v Gate Gourmet Korea Co, Ltd and others [2024] 2 SLR 279, we cautioned against ascribing undue weight to the risk of forum fragmentation, especially in the context of arbitration agreements, because such disputes are inherently prone to forum fragmentation (at [88]). This was reiterated, shortly after that, at the outset of our grounds of decision in COSCO (at [4]–[5]). To put the point differently, the objective risk of forum fragmentation is a neutral factor in the analysis of whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement, because what actually matters is whether the parties did or did not intend the fragmentation. It might be that the court considers it a matter of regret that the parties’ dispute may be resolved less efficiently than if it were centralised, and it could on occasion intervene through the judicious use of its case management powers, but otherwise, fragmentation must be accepted as “the inevitable result of upholding the parties’ bargain”: Sodzawiczny v Ruhan and others [2018] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 280 at [44].
The validity of the LOE is not a matter in BC 123
- [32]
[32] Turning to identify the substance of the controversy in this case, it is apparent from the Notice of Dispute filed by Mr Lun that there are broadly two areas of dispute between the parties: (a) first, whether the LOE is invalid due to misrepresentation; and (b) second, whether the fees claimed by Dentons are fair, reasonable and proportionate to the work done. It is indisputable that the second of these is a matter arising in BC 123 and that it falls within the scope of the Carve-Out. It is also not disputed by Dentons that the validity of the LOE is an issue that falls within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate in cl 42 of Dentons’ Terms of Business. The narrow question that we are concerned with, and which this application turns on, is whether the validity of the LOE is a matter which is an essential element of the dispute in BC 123 so as to warrant staying the latter.
- [39]
[39] It is true that this result will lead to the fragmentation of the parties’ dispute in that the validity of the LOE would be determined in arbitration while the quantum of Dentons’ fees will be dealt with in BC 123. This may be inconvenient, but as mentioned at [31] above, that is not a reason for the court to resist enforcing the parties’ agreement. This is especially so where, as in the present case, the parties have specifically carved-out certain disputes to be resolved in a different forum from others. In such a case, the fragmentation of the parties’ dispute is not only an inherent vice of the parties’ arrangement, but precisely what they intended. The parties agreed, by cl 42 of Dentons’ Terms of Business, that disputes over the validity of the LOE would be resolved separately from a dispute over the quantum or non-payment of Dentons’ fees. It would defeat the purpose of the Carve-Out if Mr Lun were permitted to seek a stay of the latter dispute in BC 123 by rolling up allegations concerning the former dispute into BC 123 as he has sought to do in the Notice of Dispute.
- [40]
[40] We therefore consider that the Judge and the AR did not err in concluding that the proceedings in BC 123 did not touch on any matter which the parties had agreed to resolve by arbitration. As Mr Lun has failed to establish a prima facie case of error on the Judge’s part, we refuse permission to appeal and dismiss the application. However, we will, for completeness, go on to address two more matters.
Whether a case management stay should be ordered
- [43]
[43] First, Mr Lun has not sought a case management stay. We therefore do not think we should intervene in the absence of grounds for thinking that the AR’s and the Judge’s decision was erroneous.
- [45]
[45] However, it seems to us that any dispute over the validity of the LOE can be avoided by the court when determining the quantum of Dentons’ fees. Specifically, we think that the assessment of Dentons’ bills could proceed on alternate bases: (a) first, on the basis that the LOE is valid; and (b) second, on the alternative basis that the LOE is invalid, in case there is any difference, which may or may not be the case, as can be seen at [48] below.
- [50]
[50] Fourth, although we do not rely on this as a basis for refusing a stay in and of itself, in our view there is a reasonable basis for believing that Mr Lun’s allegations of misrepresentation and his ill-conceived attempt to stay the proceedings in BC 123 are a ploy to delay settling Dentons’ fees.
- [52]
[52] For these reasons, we do not think it necessary or appropriate to impose a case management stay of BC 123.
The arbitrability of taxation or assessment disputes
- [54]
[54] It is trite that, while there is a strong presumption in favour of upholding the parties’ agreement, there are certain matters which, even if they fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement, will be treated under the relevant law as being incapable of being submitted to arbitration for reasons of public policy: Riverrock at [67]; Tomolugen at [75]; Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] 1 SLR 349 at [45]–[47].
- [55]
[55] In FamilyMart, the Privy Council conveniently set out two categories of non-arbitrability (at [70]):
(a) subject matter non-arbitrability: where certain types of dispute are excluded by statute or public policy from determination by an arbitral tribunal; and
(b) remedial non-arbitrability: where the award of certain remedies is beyond the jurisdiction which the parties can confer on an arbitral tribunal.
This dichotomy is consistent with the approach we have taken in previous cases: Tomolugen at [98]. Thus, where it is only remedial non-arbitrability that is implicated, there might well be no objection to the underlying dispute being resolved by an arbitral tribunal, with the parties remaining free to apply to the court for the grant of remedies that are beyond the power of the tribunal to award: Tomolugen at [100].
- [57]
[57] Assaubayev was subsequently cited with approval and followed in Hong Kong in Fung Hing Chiu Cyril & Anor v Henry Wai & Co (a firm) [2018] 3 HKC 375, the facts of which are essentially a mirror image of the present case. In that case, a firm of solicitors commenced arbitration against former clients (“CF” and “GA”) for outstanding fees due under bills which the firm had issued. The terms of appointment attached to the firm’s letter of appointment included an arbitration agreement providing for “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the contract between you and our firm, including the validity, invalidity, breach or termination thereof and any claim for any sum payable thereunder” to be resolved by arbitration in Hong Kong. CF and GA applied to the Hong Kong Court of First Instance for a declaration that the arbitration clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds and for the bills issued by the firm to be referred to a taxing master for taxation.
- [58]
[58] The court disagreed with CF and GA’s contention. Mimmie Chan J opined that there was nothing in the Hong Kong legislation on arbitration or the legal profession which prohibited solicitor-and-client fee disputes from being referred to arbitration (at [22] and [26]). There was no reason why an arbitrator could not apply the principles of taxation that a taxing master would in a court taxation (at [28]). Furthermore, although taxation was one method for assessing the reasonableness of the fees payable by a client to his or her solicitor, the existence of such a procedure did not mean that disputes between a client and solicitor over the latter’s fees could not be resolved by arbitration (at [30]).
- [62]
[62] We therefore leave open the question whether these purposes, which concern the court’s supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors, can be subordinated to the private interests of the parties. Simply put, the imperative of client protection may not be adequately served if the objectivity of the court’s assessment is displaced in favour of that of an arbitrator. Indeed, the objectivity of the court was emphasised by the C3J in Andre Arul when it suggested that the first port of call where an allegation of overcharging was made ought to be to have the solicitors’ bills taxed by the court rather than investigated by the Law Society itself because “[t]he opinion of another solicitor … on the matter, regardless of how eminent he may be, would ultimately still be a personal opinion and, thus, would not have the same degree of objectivity as a taxation done by the court” (at [41]).
- [63]
[63] Nevertheless, we reiterate that the point has not been fully argued, and we therefore say no more on the issue and will leave this to be resolved in an appropriate future case. We should add that as the present case concerns fees charged by a solicitor for work done in court proceedings, the observations we have made on the potential difficulties with subjecting disputes over the quantification of a solicitor’s permissible fees to the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal are confined to this context. These observations may or may not apply in the context of other types of work undertaken by a solicitor such as in arbitral proceedings. We have also not considered this since it was not in issue before us.
Conclusion