Court of Appeal · Decided 24 June 2025
A person need not be summoned to court before being ordered to produce documents
Zhu Su v Three Arrows Capital Ltd and others and other appeals
Feedback & support[2025] SGCA 31 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 19 of 2024 · 22 paragraphs
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A person need not be summoned to court before being ordered to produce documents
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [48], [43]
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Three Arrows Capital Ltd (“TA-BVI”) was a large cryptocurrency fund. Following its spectacular collapse in 2022, its liquidators sought orders to compel its directors to provide certain information and to produce some documents. A judge sitting in the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) granted those orders. Rather than appealing against those orders when they were first made, the directors, Mr Zhu Su (“Mr Zhu”) and Mr Kyle Livingston Davies (“Mr Davies”) (collectively, the “Appellants”), took no action for many months until Mr Zhu was arrested and committed to prison for not complying with these orders, when he tried to leave Singapore. After Mr Zhu’s arrest, the Appellants filed applications to set aside the orders made by the Judge, which the Judge dismissed. The first question in these appeals is whether the Judge was correct to do so.
Facts
- [3]
[3] By way of background, reference may be made to the narration of the facts in our earlier decision in this matter, where we dealt with a procedural point: see Zhu Su v Three Arrows Capital Ltd [2024] 1 SLR 579 (“Zhu Su (Permission)”). We will supplement this as necessary. The Appellants were the directors of Three Arrows Capital Pte Ltd (“TA-SG”), a Singapore entity which owned 100% of the shares in TA-BVI, the first respondent. The Appellants were also the directors of TA-BVI. TA-BVI was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”) and was in the business of trading cryptocurrency, with operations in Singapore and elsewhere. The liquidators of TA-BVI, Mr Christopher Farmer and Mr Russell Crumpler (the “Liquidators”), are the second and third respondents respectively. We refer collectively to all three respondents as the “Respondents”.
- [4]
[4] On 9 July 2022, the Respondents filed HC/OA 317/2022 (“OA 317”) seeking recognition of TA-BVI’s liquidation proceedings in the BVI as a foreign main proceeding under Art 2(f) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Model Law”) as adopted in Singapore pursuant to the Third Schedule of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”). The Respondents also sought various consequential orders, including recognition of the liquidators as foreign representatives within the meaning of Art 2(i) of the Model Law with standing to make applications for orders or reliefs under the IRDA. The Appellants were not parties to OA 317. The Judge allowed OA 317 on 22 August 2022.
The Disclosure Order
- [11]
[11] On 11 December 2023, the Appellants filed CA/OA 37/2023 and CA/OA 38/2023 for permission to appeal the Judge’s dismissal of the Setting-Aside Applications (the “Permission Applications”). On 22 January 2024, we dismissed the Permission Applications on the ground that no permission was necessary (see Zhu Su (Permission)). We granted the Appellants an extension of time to file and serve their notices of appeal against the dismissal of the Setting-Aside Applications. On 16 May 2024, the Appellants duly filed the said appeals in CA/CA 30/2024 (“CA 30”) and CA/CA 31/2024 (“CA 31”).
The Examination Order
Cases on Appeal
- [16]
[16] CA 30, CA 31 (the appeals against the dismissal of the Setting-Aside Orders) and CA 19 (Mr Zhu’s appeal against the Judge’s dismissal of SUM 284) were heard together. The parties’ arguments on appeal are largely similar to the arguments they mounted below. The Appellants argued that the Judge had erred in dismissing the Setting-Aside Applications because:
(a) There had been no delay in filing the Setting-Aside Applications.
(b) Even if there had been a delay, the court ought to have granted an extension of time.
(b) The Judge also erred in coming to the view that the bulk of the questioning at the examination hearings would be directed at the general affairs of TA-BVI, and not to any of the claims that the Liquidators had resolved to bring against Mr Zhu.
- [18]
[18] The Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the Judge had been correct to dismiss the Setting-Aside Applications because:
(a) The Appellants had breached the deadline to bring the Setting-Aside Applications.
(b) The Judge was correct not to grant them an extension of time.
(c) The Judge had jurisdiction over the Appellants because s 244 of the IRDA operates extra-territorially.
(a) The examination was not oppressive given that the Liquidators’ purpose in commencing SUM 3306 as stated on affidavit was proper.
(b) The majority of the questions posed to Mr Zhu would have no connection at all to the claims made in the BVI Proceedings against him.
(c) Even the questions that allegedly overlapped with the claims in the BVI Proceedings would not be oppressive because the purpose behind those questions was proper.
(d) As for the Deferred Questions, these have nothing to do with the claims in the BVI Proceedings.
Issues to be determined
- [20]
[20] The parties’ submissions raise the following issues in relation to the Setting-Aside Applications:
(a) Were the Appellants out of time in filing the Setting-Aside Applications? If they were out of time, should they be given an extension of time to file the Setting-Aside Applications?
(b) Did the Judge have the jurisdiction to hear SUM 3802?
(e) Should the Leave Orders and Committal Orders be set aside for reason of the Liquidators’ failure to provide full and frank disclosure?
The Setting-Aside Applications
Issue 1: Whether the Appellants were out of time to file the Setting-Aside Applications and if so, whether they should be granted an extension of time
- [27]
[27] As for whether we should grant the Appellants an extension of time, the factors that the court generally takes into account in deciding whether to do so are: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for delay, (c) the chance of the defaulting party succeeding in the relevant action or proceeding should the extension be granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the counterparty if the extension of time were granted (Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc and another v Global Gaming Philippines LLC and another [2021] 3 SLR 725 at [49]; Sun Jin Engineering Pte Ltd v Hwang Jae Woo [2011] 2 SLR 196 at [29]). In our judgment, there was no good explanation for the delay because of the reasons canvassed above and in particular, because it follows from the inference which the Judge drew, and which we agree with, that this situation was the result of the Appellants’ own cynical litigation choices. That simply cannot be a ground to warrant the exercise of our discretion in their favour.
Issue 2: Whether the court had jurisdiction over the Appellants
- [31]
[31] The Appellants are mistaken given that s 16(2) of the SCJA expressly provides that the General Division of the High Court “has such jurisdiction as is vested in it by any other written law”. It is quite clear from s 16 of the SCJA that aside from jurisdiction founded on personal service of proceedings, the court’s jurisdiction may also be conferred by suitable statutory provisions, including those in the IRDA and the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed). Such provisions would include s 244(1) of the IRDA, which, on its face, does not require service of the originating process to found the court’s jurisdiction to make orders thereunder. It is therefore unsurprising that Ms Yeo and her lead counsel, Mr Christopher Anand Daniel, did not pursue this argument seriously at the hearing.
- [32]
[32] This is sufficient to dispose of much of CA 30 and CA 31. We nonetheless go on to consider the next three issues as these were fully argued before us.
Issue 3: Whether the court was entitled to make the Disclosure Order under r 12(6) of the CIR
- [34]
[34] The Judge considered that “serious mischief” would result from any delay because he disbelieved the Appellants’ claim that they were cooperating with the Liquidators, and given the size of the insolvency, and the fact that a substantial part if not most of TA-BVI’s assets comprised cryptocurrency, which could be transferred very rapidly and without being traced, he considered it a matter of importance that the Liquidators be assisted in every way in their effort to gain some control over the situation.
- [37]
[37] Our second reservation is that r 12 appears to be concerned with service of the proceedings on parties to the proceedings, and not primarily with the joinder of additional parties. We explain with reference to the structure of r 12 of the CIR, which provides:
Issue 4: Whether s 244(1) of the IRDA first requires a person to be summoned to court before he can be compelled to submit an affidavit or produce books and records
- [42]
[42] The next issue concerns s 244(1) of the IRDA, which confers on the court two discretionary powers. The question is whether the exercise of the first discretion is a pre-requisite for the exercise of the second. Section 244 provides:
- [43]
[43] The first discretion is the power to “summon to appear before the Court” certain specified persons (the “First Discretion”). The second discretion is the power to require certain persons to submit an affidavit or produce any books, papers or other records in the person’s possession or control (the “Second Discretion”). The question is whether a person must first be summoned to court (pursuant to the First Discretion) before that person can be required to produce an affidavit or documents (pursuant to the Second Discretion).
- [44]
[44] The Appellants submit it is so for two reasons. First, the use of the word “and” prior to the Second Discretion suggests that the two discretions are to be read conjunctively. Second, case law pertaining to the now-repealed s 285 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”), which is the predecessor provision of s 244(1) of the IRDA, suggests that a person must first be summoned to court before he can be required to produce documents.
- [45]
[45] We do not agree. In our judgment, s 285 of the Companies Act has limited relevance in interpreting s 244(1) of the IRDA due to the structural and linguistic differences between the provisions. Section 285 of the Companies Act reads:
- [46]
[46] It will be apparent, even from a brief comparison of this with the text of s 244(1) of the IRDA (see at [42] above), that there are both linguistic and structural differences between them. Under s 285 of the Companies Act, it is only after a person identified in s 285(1) has been summoned pursuant to s 285(1) that the court may either examine him on oath pursuant to s 285(2), or require him to produce documents pursuant to s 285(3), or both (Sinfeng Marine Services Pte Ltd v Taylor, Joshua James and another and other appeals [2020] 2 SLR 1332 at [67]). This follows from the use of the word “him” in ss 285(2) and 285(3), which can only refer to the person already summoned in s 285(1).
- [47]
[47] On the other hand, the language of s 244(1) of the IRDA is different. Section 244(1) begins by setting out the court’s discretion to summon certain categories of people this being the first of the discretionary powers. That is then followed by the second of the discretionary powers, which is worded as “and the Court may require any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) to…”. The class of persons mentioned in “paragraphs (a) to (d)” apply equally and separately to the power to summon such persons, as to the power to require such persons to submit an affidavit or to produce documents. There is no necessary or logical link between these two powers under s 244(1) of the IRDA, unlike the position under s 285 of the Companies Act. Given that the starting point of interpreting legislation must be its plain language, the difference in wording between s 244(1) of the IRDA and s 285 of the Companies Act requires that the two provisions be read differently, unless there is a clear indication to the contrary, and there is none.
- [48]
[48] We are therefore satisfied that unlike s 285 of the Companies Act, s 244(1) of the IRDA does not require a person first to be summoned to court before he can be made to submit an affidavit or produce documents. The Judge, in our view, interpreted s 244(1) of the IRDA correctly, and this therefore affords no basis for the Appellants to challenge the Disclosure Orders against Mr Zhu and Mr Davies.
Issue 5: Whether the Liquidators failed to make full and frank disclosure in seeking the Leave and Committal Orders
- [51]
[51] It follows that there is no basis for setting aside the Leave and Committal Orders for any failure to make full and frank disclosure. In any event, we observe that the Committal Orders were not made ex parte by the Respondents (though the Leave Orders were) – notice was given to the Appellants, but they simply refused to participate. In these circumstances, it seems to us there is no question of any lack of full and frank disclosure in relation to the Committal Orders.
The Examination Order
- [53]
[53] The description of the examination procedure as an “aberration” in the normally adversarial system of civil litigation alludes to the tension between the rationale of the examination procedure, which is to facilitate the insolvency process, and the general rules of civil procedure which serve to regulate adversarial proceedings. There are established procedures and concomitant safeguards in civil procedure designed to secure fair play between litigating parties. If the power to examine officers of the company is not overseen by the court, there is a risk that such examinations may be used to circumvent the rules of civil procedure. The question is as to the point at which the examination of an examinee becomes inappropriate.
(a) First, he considered it part of the Liquidators’ duties to ascertain the causes of TA-BVI’s insolvency and uphold standards of commercial morality in the dealings that led to its insolvency.
(b) Second, the collapse of TA-BVI was large, and involved cryptocurrency which, in turn, gave rise to novel and developing issues of law.
(c) Third, Mr Zhu had not satisfactorily cooperated with the Liquidators. As a result, the two-day examination in December 2023 was quite possibly the Liquidators’ only chance to put questions to Mr Zhu where he would have been obliged to answer them. Once he was released from prison, it was anticipated that he would leave Singapore and no further opportunities to question him in a similar way might be available. As a result, the Liquidators were entitled to slightly more latitude in the opportunity to put questions to Mr Zhu than might normally be the case.
(d) Fourth, the bulk of the questioning in the examination was directed towards the general affairs of TA-BVI, and not any claims that the Liquidators had already resolved to bring against Mr Zhu.
Conclusion
- [63]
[63] In conclusion, we dismiss CA 30 and CA 31 but allow CA 19 in part. In place of the Final Ancillary Directions, we make the orders set out at [62] above.