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Grounds publishedDecided 10 Oct 2025

Court of Appeal

Appeals against convictions over a share price manipulation scheme were dismissed

Soh Chee Wen v Public Prosecutor and another appeal

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[2025] SGCA 49Case no. Court of Appeal / Criminal Appeal No 40 of 2022

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Appeals against convictions over a share price manipulation scheme were dismissed

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] It is not the role of an appellate court to retry a matter that comes before it. This principle, which is so entrenched it may be said to be trite, is reflected in the high threshold that must be met before findings of fact will be overturned on appeal. It should therefore be obvious that it would be ill-advised, especially in a case as factually intensive as the present, to mount an appeal, the central thrust of which is to contend for a different set of factual conclusions premised on the appellate court reconsidering essentially the same contentions that had already been advanced and rejected at first instance. This is even more the case where the appellant fails to engage meaningfully with the reasons for which those contentions were rejected; or where the appellant’s submissions do not even characterise the approach and reasoning of the trial judge accurately. Faced with these realities, we feel constrained to reiterate the altogether banal point that whenever a factual finding is challenged on appeal, it is incumbent on the appellant to identify precisely where the trial judge is said to have erred and to demonstrate that the high threshold for appellate intervention has indeed been crossed.

  3. [2] CA/CCA 40/2022 (“CCA 40”) and CA/CCA 41/2022 (“CCA 41”) (collectively, “the Appeals”) are the respective appeals of Mr Soh Chee Wen (the “First Appellant”) and Ms Quah Su-Ling (the “Second Appellant”) (collectively, the “Appellants”) against their convictions and sentences in HC/CC 9/2019 (“CC 9”). In CC 9, the Appellants were jointly tried for various offences arising out of an alleged scheme to manipulate the markets for and prices of three counters that were being traded on the Mainboard of the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”), namely Blumont Group Limited (“Blumont”), Asiasons Capital Ltd (“Asiasons”) and LionGold Corp Ltd (“LionGold”) (collectively, “BAL”). Following the trial, which spanned more than two years and took around 200 hearing days, a Judge of the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) convicted the First Appellant of 180 of the 189 charges brought against him and the Second Appellant of 169 of the 178 charges brought against her. The Judge sentenced the First Appellant to 36 years’ imprisonment and the Second Appellant to 20 years’ imprisonment (see Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen and another [2023] SGHC 299 (“GD”)). The GD spanned some 895 pages and 1,493 paragraphs not including the annexes. While we do not equate quantity with quality, it has to be said, after careful review of the GD, that it was reflective of exemplary diligence and care, and of clear exposition. In any case, the Appellants challenge their convictions and sentences in the present appeals.

  4. [3] Given the scale of the materials and the nature of the issues that were before us, we decided to hear the Appeals over three tranches, dealing respectively with the following broad heads of issues: (a) preliminary issues raised by the Appellants; (b) substantive issues relating to the Appellants’ convictions; and (c) if the Appellants’ convictions were affirmed in whole or in part, issues relating to their sentences. Counsel agreed with this approach when it was proposed at a case management conference. The first two tranches of the hearing having now been concluded, this judgment addresses the preliminary issues and the Appellants’ appeals against their convictions.

  5. The proceedings below

  6. [4] We begin with a brief account of the trial below. It was the Prosecution’s case that, between 1 August 2012 and 3 October 2013 (the “Relevant Period”), the Appellants masterminded a scheme to artificially inflate the markets for, and so manipulate the prices of, BAL shares (the “Scheme”). The Appellants were alleged to have carried out the Scheme by controlling, coordinating their use of, obtaining financing for, and conducting illegitimate trading activity using an extensive web of 189 trading accounts (the “Relevant Accounts”) held with 20 financial institutions (“FIs”) in the names of 60 individuals and companies (the “Relevant Accountholders”) (see GD at [25]).

  7. [5] Arising from their alleged involvement in the Scheme, the Appellants each faced the following 178 charges (see GD at [4]–[5]):

  8. (a) Ten charges of being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 197(1)(b) of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “SFA”), which prohibited “[f]alse trading and market rigging transactions”. Six of these ten charges concerned the markets for BAL shares (the “False Trading Charges”) while the remaining four concerned the prices of BAL shares (the “Price Manipulation Charges”).

  9. (b) 162 charges of being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 201(b) of the SFA, which prohibited the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the subscription, purchase or sale of securities (the “Deception Charges”).

  10. (c) Six charges of being a party to conspiracies to commit the offences of cheating and dishonestly inducing property to be delivered, under s 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, Rev Ed 2008) (the “Penal Code”) (the “Cheating Charges”).

  11. We refer to the False Trading, Price Manipulation, Deception and Cheating Charges collectively as the “Conspiracy Charges”.

  12. [6] In addition to the Conspiracy Charges, which were brought against both Appellants, 11 further charges were brought against the First Appellant alone, comprising (see GD at [4]):

  13. (a) Three charges of being concerned in the management of Blumont, Asiasons and LionGold while being an undischarged bankrupt, contrary to s 148(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”) (the “Company Management Charges”).

  14. (b) Five charges of perverting the course of justice contrary to s 204A of the Penal Code, and a further three charges of attempting to pervert the course of justice contrary to s 204A read with s 511 of the Penal Code (collectively, the “Witness Tampering Charges”).

  15. [7] The Appellants claimed trial to all these charges. Their defence consisted, fundamentally, of the denial that they had been in control of any of the 189 Relevant Accounts. Central to this denial was the alternative factual narrative they advanced to the effect that many of these Relevant Accounts had in fact been controlled and used by certain other individuals to carry out illegal activities without the Appellants’ knowledge or involvement. These individuals, according to the Appellants, were the true wrongdoers who should be held responsible for any manipulation of the markets for and prices of BAL shares (see GD at [122]). Aside from this general denial of control over the Relevant Accounts, the Appellants also raised a litany of legal and factual arguments specific to each group of charges. These included preliminary objections to the framing of the charges, such as the objections that these were insufficiently particularised, or that they were duplicitous.

  16. [8] Two aspects of the proceedings below merit a brief mention at this stage. First, the Conspiracy Charges were originally framed as charges of abetment by conspiracy under s 107(1)(b) punishable under s 109 of the Penal Code. However, shortly after the commencement of the trial, the Prosecution applied to amend these charges to charges of criminal conspiracy under s 120A punishable under s 120B of the Penal Code. The Judge allowed the Prosecution’s application. However, notwithstanding the amendment, the Prosecution’s position remained that the substantive offences underlying the Conspiracy Charges had been completed. This being the case, the Prosecution accepted that it would be appropriate to include references to s 109 of the Penal Code so that it would be clear what the applicable sentencing provision would be (see GD at [1502]–[1506]). We will shortly explain the significance of this amendment to the arguments advanced by the Appellants.

  17. [9] Second, the Second Appellant elected not to give evidence in her defence. Her primary explanation for this election was that she was unrepresented following the close of the Prosecution’s case and she considered that she would be prejudiced if she took the stand and gave evidence in such circumstances, having regard to the complexity of the issues raised in the case (see GD at [6] and [285]).

  18. The Judge’s decision

  19. [10] Following the trial, the Judge convicted the Appellants of most of the charges. Of the Conspiracy Charges, the Judge convicted the Appellants of: (a) all ten False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges; (b) 153 of 162 of the Deception Charges; and (c) all six Cheating Charges. The Judge also convicted the First Appellant of all 11 of the additional charges brought against him, namely: (a) all three Company Management Charges; and (b) all eight Witness Tampering Charges (see GD at [1489]).

  20. [11] The Judge sentenced the First Appellant to an aggregate of 36 years’ imprisonment (see GD at [1453]) and the Second Appellant to an aggregate of 20 years’ imprisonment (see GD at [1454]). Key to the Judge’s decision was her finding that the substantive offences underlying the Conspiracy Charges had been carried out. In the premises, the Judge concluded that the Appellants were liable, under s 109 of the Penal Code, to the same punishment as is provided for the underlying offences (see GD at [1319]–[1339]).

  21. The parties’ cases on appeal

  22. [12] In the Appeals, the Appellants challenge their convictions and sentences in their entirety, save that the First Appellant does not challenge his convictions or the related individual sentences for the Company Management Charges. The Prosecution, on the other hand, submits that the Appeals are unmeritorious and should be dismissed in their entirety.

  23. Outline of this judgment

  24. [13] We begin by addressing two preliminary objections raised by the Appellants to the framing of the Conspiracy Charges, namely, that the Conspiracy Charges are insufficiently particularised and duplicitous. Having done so, we turn to the substantive issues relating to the appeals against conviction. Under this head, we first consider the overarching issue of whether the Appellants did exercise control over the Relevant Accounts, this being an issue which cuts across the Conspiracy Charges as a whole. Next, we address the First Appellant’s Witness Tampering Charges, which, as we explain, are probative of both Appellants’ liability for the Conspiracy Charges. We next address one other preliminary objection to the framing of the Conspiracy Charges, which is that the Appellants should have been charged with a single offence relating to a single conspiracy and not with multiple charges relating to multiple conspiracies. Having done so, we consider other legal and factual arguments specific to each category of Conspiracy Charges, going from the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges to the Deception Charges and then the Cheating Charges. Finally, we consider several arguments relating specifically to the Second Appellant’s convictions.

  25. Whether the Conspiracy Charges were legally defective

  26. [14] We first address two preliminary arguments which the Appellants mount against the Conspiracy Charges in general. The Appellants submit that the Conspiracy Charges were defective on two grounds: (a) first, they were insufficiently particularised; and (b) second, they were duplicitous as they alleged more than one offence by referring to ss 120B and 109 of the Penal Code. Neither of these submissions finds favour with us.

  27. Whether the Conspiracy Charges were sufficiently particularised

  28. [15] We first consider whether the Conspiracy Charges were sufficiently particularised by the Prosecution. In gist, the Appellants submit that they were unable to effectively defend the Conspiracy Charges because these were insufficiently particularised in three main respects. First, the Conspiracy Charges failed to specify the circumstances in which each of the relevant conspiracies had been entered into. Second, the Conspiracy Charges failed to specify the precise acts which the Appellants had conspired to commit, the transactions which were the subject-matter of each charge and the Relevant Accounts to which those transactions related. Third, the Appellants argue that the time period stated in each Conspiracy Charge was overly broad. As the Appellants explained in their oral submissions, these arguments are rooted in ss 124(1) and 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “CPC”), which require the charge to contain certain details as are reasonably sufficient to give an accused person notice of what he is charged with. We will deal with the foregoing points raised by the Appellants in turn.

  29. The circumstances surrounding the entering into of each conspiracy

  30. [16] The Appellants contend that the Conspiracy Charges were deficient because they failed to specify when or where the Appellants were said to have entered into each conspiracy. According to the First Appellant, this supposedly made it impossible for them to answer the charges because, for example, they were not able to explore the possibility of providing an alibi for the period when the conspiracy was allegedly entered into.

  31. [17] We do not accept this submission because criminal liability under s 120B of the Penal Code is predicated upon a person being a party to a criminal conspiracy and not the specific act of entering into that criminal conspiracy. This is borne out by the plain words of s 120B, which punishes persons who are party to a criminal conspiracy:

  32. [18] It necessarily follows, in our view, that the offence under s 120B continues for such time as the offender remains a party to the criminal conspiracy. We find support for this in the Bruneian case of Public Prosecutor v Khoo Ban Hock & ors [1988] 2 MLJ 217 (“Khoo Ban Hock”), where the High Court of Brunei considered an equivalent provision in the Penal Code (Cap 22, 1984 Rev Ed) (Brunei) (the “Bruneian Penal Code”) and concluded that the offence was a continuing one. In Khoo Ban Hock, several foreign nationals had been charged with being parties to a criminal conspiracy under s 120A of the Bruneian Penal Code. The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to entertain these charges despite the suggestion that the accused persons may have entered into the criminal conspiracy while they were outside Brunei. This was relevant because the court’s jurisdiction extended only to offences committed by a foreign national within Brunei. After considering the plain text of the provision and relevant Indian and English authorities, the court concluded that a criminal conspiracy is a continuing offence. The offence is committed once the parties arrive at an agreement, but the offence does not conclude upon such agreement. Instead, it continues for as long as the accused persons remain party to the agreement to carry out the plan. As such, the court held that the accused persons could be charged with the offence of being party to a criminal conspiracy so long as they continued to be party to it while they were in Brunei, even if they might have first entered into the agreement outside Brunei.

  33. [19] We consider Khoo Ban Hock to be persuasive because ss 120A and 120B of the Bruneian Penal Code (as they then were) are worded similarly to the equivalent provisions in our Penal Code. Sections 120A and 120B of the Bruneian Penal Code read:

  34. Further, we also consider that the reasoning and the interpretation placed on the words “whoever is a party to” in s 120B of the Bruneian Penal Code, in Khoo Ban Hock, are entirely sensible and accord with their plain and natural meaning.

  35. [20] Given our determination that the offence under s 120B of the Penal Code is a continuing one, it was open to the Prosecution to charge the Appellants for a specified period of their offending, even if this might not have commenced from the moment the conspiracies were entered into. Indeed, as the Prosecution made clear in the proceedings below, its case was that the purported agreements subsisted (but were not necessarily entered into) during the periods specified in the charges. It is also clear from the following extract of the First Appellant’s submissions, in the course of the proceedings below, that he understood this to be the Prosecution’s position:

  36. [21] We note that this is also logical given the nature of the offence. A criminal conspiracy is generally established as a matter of inference, and direct evidence of criminal conspiracies will rarely be available given that the relevant agreements tend to be made in private (Public Prosecutor v Yeo Choon Poh [1993] 3 SLR(R) 302 at [19]; Er Joo Nguang and another v Public Prosecutor [2000] 1 SLR(R) 756 at [35]). It follows that the precise circumstances surrounding the inception of the agreement, such as when and where the agreement was formed, may never be known to persons other than the co-conspirators. It would be unsatisfactory if such parties could not be charged with an offence under s 120B of the Penal Code, even in the face of overwhelming evidence that the conspiracy subsisted during some later period, simply because it was unclear when or where the conspiracy was initially formed. This is often an inevitable reality, especially in the case of prolonged and complex conspiracies such as the present.

  37. [22] The Prosecution may therefore choose to charge the co-conspirators for a shorter, known period of their offending (meaning a specified period during which they remained parties to the conspiracy). Where this is so, as is the case for most of the Conspiracy Charges, the gravamen of the charge would be the accused persons’ continued involvement in the conspiracy during the specified period. The Conspiracy Charges therefore cannot be said to be defective for failing to particularise the date or other circumstances surrounding the entry into the conspiracies. It suffices in this regard that they state when the accused person is alleged to have been party to the alleged conspiracies.

  38. [23] For completeness, we observe that the Prosecution’s case for some of the Deception Charges where the trading accounts were opened during the Relevant Period was that the conspiracies “crystallised on or about the account opening date”. The Prosecution’s case for these charges was somewhat different, in that those agreements were alleged to have been entered into on or about the account opening date. As such, the time period stated in the charges began from the date on which the account was opened. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the Prosecution had insufficiently particularised the circumstances relating to the inception of the conspiracy for these charges. Nonetheless, we consider that the gravamen of those charges remains the Appellants’ continued involvement in the conspiracy (and not the act of entering into it) and in line with this, those charges too specify a date range when the Appellants were party to the relevant conspiracy.

  39. [24] In any case, s 127 of the CPC states that an error or omission in stating the necessary particulars will only be a material error if the accused person is in fact misled by that error or omission. We do not see how the omission to state the circumstances under which the conspiracies were entered into can be said to have misled or prejudiced the Appellants. The First Appellant contends that he was unable to provide an alibi or otherwise disprove the existence of the conspiracies by adducing evidence showing that the conspiracies had not been entered into on a particular date as specified in the charge. But as we have already explained, this is misconceived and would not have assisted him in defending the Conspiracy Charges. This was pointed out by the Prosecution in its submissions below, which we agree with. Even assuming that the First Appellant was able to show that a conspiracy was not formed on a particular day, this is conceptually distinct from and ultimately not relevant to whether he was a party to the conspiracy during a different and particularised time period.

  40. The precise acts which the Appellants conspired to commit

  41. [25] The Appellants’ next objection is that the Conspiracy Charges did not specify relevant details relating to each purported conspiracy. By way of illustration, the Appellants contend that the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges should have specified the precise agreement which the Appellants had entered into, which would entail identifying: (a) the Relevant Account(s) which the Appellants had conspired to use for each time period; (b) the specific Trading Representatives (“TRs”) the Appellants had agreed to work with in respect of each time period; and (c) in relation to the Price Manipulation Charges, the specific price or prices to which the shares in question were to be manipulated. The First Appellant also contends that the Deception Charges should have specified the purportedly manipulative trades as well as the manner in which the First Appellant allegedly exercised control over the Relevant Accounts. During the oral hearing, Mr Sivananthan Nithyanantham (“Mr Sivananthan”) for the Second Appellant also raised the general argument that all the Conspiracy Charges should have particularised the acts and/or transactions which were committed in pursuance of the conspiracies.

  42. [26] The Appellants had unsuccessfully mounted a similar argument at the trial below (see GD at [180]–[190]). For much the same reasons given by the Judge (see GD at [182]), we reject the Appellants’ submission. The Conspiracy Charges are charges under s 120B of the Penal Code, and for criminal liability to be established under this provision, what needs to be established is an agreement between the Appellants to commit an offence; there is no need for them to have taken steps to carry out that agreement (see Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619 at [75]). It was theoretically possible for the Appellants to be convicted on the Conspiracy Charges even if they had never actually come to control the Relevant Accounts, deceive the FIs, or instruct the various trades. It would have sufficed if they had agreed to commit the underlying offences. It thus follows that the mere fact that the charges did not specify the precise trades or transactions which the Appellants had purportedly conducted in furtherance of each conspiracy did not render those charges defective.

  43. [27] Further, while some degree of particularisation would have been appropriate, we are satisfied that the Conspiracy Charges did provide the Appellants with sufficient notice about the conspiracies to which they had allegedly been a party. For instance, each of the Deception Charges stated: (a) the period during which the Appellants were alleged to have been a party to the relevant conspiracy; (b) the Relevant Account which the Appellants had conspired to use; (c) the purportedly deceptive practice which the Appellants had conspired to engage in; (d) the specific FI which the Appellants wanted to deceive; and (e) the specific securities which were to be traded. A sample Deception Charge, brought against the First Appellant, is set out below:

  44. [28] These details would undoubtedly have allowed the Appellants to understand the nature of the allegations levelled against them, which is that they were parties to a conspiracy to deceive a specific FI by concealing their involvement in the instructing of orders and trades of specified securities in a specified account. The omission of the disputed particulars, such as the precise manner in which the Appellants had exercised control over the account pursuant to the conspiracy or the precise trade(s) which had been committed pursuant to the conspiracy, could not have prevented the Appellants from understanding the substance of the allegations levelled against them. It may be noted that the foregoing sample charge is a Deception Charge, and as we have already noted at [25], this specific complaint was raised in relation to the other Conspiracy Charges. Indeed, during the oral hearing before us, counsel for the First Appellant, Mr Narayanan Sreenivasan SC (“Mr Sreenivasan”) implicitly accepted that the Deception Charges had provided sufficient notice of the relevant FIs and TRs involved in relation to each charge:

  45. [29] But the fact is that the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges too set out the essential particulars concerning the alleged conspiracies. These charges stated: (a) the time period during which the Appellants were alleged to have been a party to the relevant conspiracy; (b) the relevant security which the Appellants allegedly wanted to create a false appearance in (whether in respect of the market for or the price of the security); (c) and the Relevant Accounts which the Appellants had conspired to control to achieve this goal. A sample Price Manipulation Charge is set out below:

  46. [30] Further, the Prosecution had also provided an annex (“Annex A”) to the charge sheet, which furnished additional details of the Relevant Accounts that the Appellants had conspired to control, such as the account numbers, the names of the Relevant Accountholders, the FI with which the account was registered, the account opening date, and the status of the account as at 3 October 2013, this being the last date of the Relevant Period. The First Appellant contends that this was insufficient because Annex A failed to particularise which of the Relevant Accounts pertained to each of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges. However, we do not think that such granularity is even realistic in the context of a charge that pertains to manipulating the market for a specified security. This would tend to be investigated by looking at the overall picture than at each of the specific trades said to have been carried out to this end.

  47. [31] There is also no need for such granularity in the context of the Conspiracy Charges as would extend to specifying the precise transactions which were purportedly carried out pursuant to the relevant conspiracies. As alluded to earlier (at [26]), this is because the crux of the offence of criminal conspiracy under s 120B of the Penal Code is an agreement to commit the underlying offence.

  48. [32] During oral arguments, the Appellants submitted that the particularisation of the underlying offence took on greater importance in the present case because the Prosecution sought to have the Appellants sentenced pursuant to s 109 of the Penal Code on the basis that the conspiracies had in fact been carried to fruition. As the completion of the underlying offences materially affected the manner in which the Appellants would be punished, they argued that the Prosecution should be required to set out the further particulars of each underlying offence in the Conspiracy Charges even if such details might not have been necessary to establish criminal liability under s 120B of the Penal Code. In effect, the Appellants contend that ss 124(1) and 125 of the CPC require the Prosecution to furnish sufficient particulars relating both to liability and punishment.

  49. [33] In our judgment, the argument is flawed for at least two reasons. First, the underlying offence in the case of the 6th Charge set out above, was to engage in a course of conduct to create a false appearance with respect to the price of Asiasons securities by using the Relevant Accounts to trade in those shares in order to manipulate their price. To invoke s 109 of the Penal Code when punishing the offence of participating in a criminal conspiracy to achieve this end, it would not have been necessary to establish each and every transaction that is said to have been engaged in. The key question, instead, would have been whether the alleged course of conduct was engaged in for the purpose that is set out in the relevant charges. And to this extent, the provided particulars were sufficient.

  50. [34] Second, a close reading of s 123 of the CPC leads us to conclude that the required particulars concern facts giving rise to criminal liability and not punishment. We briefly reproduce the relevant subsections of the provision below:

  51. [35] To begin with, s 123(1) of the CPC mandates that every charge must state the offence with which the accused is charged. The charge itself may be seen as a statement that, if proved, would fulfil every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence alleged (see s 123(5) of the CPC). This suggests that what must be particularised are the facts which allegedly give rise to criminal liability. This interpretation is also supported by ss 123(6) and 123(6A) of the CPC, which state that the charge must include certain particulars if the Prosecution intends to prove certain facts for the purpose of affecting the punishment the court is competent to award. These provisos would be otiose if the starting position was that the charge must also particularise facts relevant to the sentence to be imposed.

  52. [36] Furthermore, even the plain words of ss 123(6) and 123(6A) do not suggest that particulars relating to how the offence was alleged to have been committed need to be set out within the charge. The relevant provisos essentially require the bare facts which afford the basis for imposing enhanced sentences to be stated in the charge.

  53. [37] In the final analysis, there is nothing in the relevant provisions that supports the contention advanced by the Appellants, and we therefore conclude that it is sufficient for the Conspiracy Charges to assert that the underlying offences were completed, which was done in this case by inserting a reference to s 109 of the Penal Code in the charges (see [52] below). It was not necessary for the Conspiracy Charges to particularise the specific manner in which the offences were purportedly completed or the specific transactions that were carried out as a result. In any case, it remains open to the Appellants, at the sentencing stage, to point to any real prejudice this might have caused them, assuming they were in fact unaware of what was being alleged against them for the purpose of sentencing.

  54. The time period stated in each charge

  55. [38] Lastly, the First Appellant contends that the date ranges stated in the Conspiracy Charges were overly broad. As the Conspiracy Charges alleged that the Appellants were parties to the relevant conspiracies over a period of several months, the First Appellant submits that this prevented him from identifying the specific impugned trades. Instead, the First Appellant argues that the Conspiracy Charges should have stated “reasonable periods of time of related activity”, which would have allowed the Appellants to identify the Relevant Accounts and TRs forming the subject of each charge.

  56. [39] This argument again misunderstands the nature of the Conspiracy Charges. As explained earlier, the Conspiracy Charges relate to the Appellants’ continued involvement in various conspiracies. As such, the Conspiracy Charges allege that the conspiracies subsisted throughout the range of the dates stated in the charges. They do not purport to state a range of dates on which the Appellants carried out the underlying offences. We therefore find no merit in the Appellants’ submission that the date ranges in the Conspiracy Charges were overly broad.

  57. Whether the Conspiracy Charges were duplicitous

  58. [40] Before the Judge, the Appellants’ chief contention on the framing of the Conspiracy Charges related to the issue of sentence. Specifically, they submitted that they ought to have been sentenced pursuant to s 116 rather than s 109 of the Penal Code (see GD at [1317(a)]). On appeal, the Second Appellant’s argument is a somewhat different one. She submits that the Judge erred in failing to appreciate that abetment by conspiracy (under s 107(1)(b) of the Penal Code) and criminal conspiracy (under s 120A of the Penal Code) are separate and distinct offences comprising distinct elements. As a result, the Conspiracy Charges, by referring to both ss 120B and 109 of the Penal Code, were legally defective because they contravened s 132 of the CPC (which provides that every distinct offence must be charged and tried separately). This ostensibly resulted in grave prejudice to the Second Appellant, because it supposedly made it impossible for her to put up a defence properly in respect of both liability and sentencing. On this basis, it was submitted that the Conspiracy Charges were defective and legally unsustainable, and that the Appellants’ convictions premised on them are wholly unsafe and liable to be set aside.

  59. [41] In our judgment, it is permissible for the Conspiracy Charges to refer both to ss 120 and 109 of the Penal Code. It follows that the Conspiracy Charges were not improperly framed. In any event, there is no evidence to suggest that the Appellants were misled or otherwise prejudiced by the manner in which the Conspiracy Charges were framed. Accordingly, even if the Conspiracy Charges were legally defective, the appropriate recourse would have been to amend these charges and not to set aside the Appellants’ convictions. We explain.

  60. [42] The Judge was satisfied that it was permissible to rely on s 109 of the Penal Code when sentencing an offender convicted under s 120A of the Penal Code.

  61. [43] She began by looking at the plain wording of s 120B of the Penal Code, which provides that “a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted the offence that is the subject of the conspiracy” [emphasis added] (see [17] above for the full text of the provision). In this regard, ss 109 and 116 of the Penal Code outline how abettors are to be punished. For ease of reference, we reproduce both of these sections in full:

  62. As can be seen, if an individual abets an offence and that abetted offence is committed as a consequence, s 109 of the Penal Code is the applicable provision, and the abettor is liable to face the full punishment of that offence as if he were a primary offender. Conversely, if the abetted offence is not committed as a consequence, s 116 of the Penal Code would be the applicable provision and the abettor typically faces, at most, one-fourth of the maximum term of imprisonment, leaving aside any fine that may also be imposed, for the abetted offence.

  63. [44] Accordingly, on a plain and logical reading of the aforementioned provisions, since s 120B of the Penal Code requires that a criminal conspirator be punished “as if” he were an abettor, his punishment would similarly depend on whether the substantive offence underlying the conspiracy had actually been committed (see GD at [1332]).

  64. [45] Apart from the plain wording of the statute, the Judge found further support for such a view in the case law. For instance, in Lau Cheng Kai and others v Public Prosecutor [2019] 3 SLR 374, Chan Seng Onn J (as he then was) accepted (at [43]) that in the case where “the offence which is the subject of the criminal conspiracy has been committed, s 109 [of the Penal Code] is the more appropriate section” to be read with s 120B of the Penal Code (see GD at [1333]–[1335]).

  65. [46] We agree with the Judge’s reasoning. As we explained in our brief oral remarks at the oral hearing on 3 March 2025, s 120B of the Penal Code (which is the punishment provision for a criminal conspiracy offence) provides that an offender will be punished “as if” he had abetted the offence. The applicable punishment for the abetment of an offence, in turn, is set out in various other provisions in the Penal Code and the choice of the applicable provision depends on what the Prosecution is able to establish. Such a position is in accordance with the plain reading of the relevant provisions of the Penal Code, and also supported by the case law. In Tay Huay Hong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 290, which was cited by the Prosecution, the accused person was similarly charged with the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under s 120B of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed), which is substantially similar to the version of s 120B that is relevant to our present purposes. On the issue of sentence, Yong Pung How CJ observed, referring to both ss 109 and 120B, that the accused person “was party to a conspiracy to commit an offence” and was “therefore liable to be punished as if he had abetted [that] offence” (at [39]).

  66. [47] Counsel for the Second Appellant, Mr Sivananthan, submitted at length before us that the offences of criminal conspiracy and abetment by conspiracy were distinct offences. However, this was irrelevant and therefore of no assistance to his case. It is incontrovertible, and indeed was accepted by the Judge below, that criminal conspiracy and abetment by conspiracy are distinct offences with distinct elements. However, it does not follow that they cannot share the same punishment provisions when that is precisely what is contemplated by the plain reading of the provisions in the Penal Code. The Second Appellant’s submission in effect was that criminal conspiracy, being a distinct offence, could only be punished under s 116 of the Penal Code. However, as we indicated to Mr Sivananthan, had this been Parliament’s intention, s 120B of the Penal Code would simply have said so in terms. It would have been wholly unnecessary for s 120B to state that a party to a criminal conspiracy is to be punished “as if he had abetted such offence”. To adopt the Second Appellant’s position would effectively be to rewrite these clear words.

  67. The lack of prejudice to the Second Appellant

  68. [48] Quite apart from the legal permissibility of how the Conspiracy Charges were framed, we make a separate but related point on the effect of this.

  69. [49] It is trite that the purpose of the charge is to ensure that the accused person knows the offence of which he is accused and is thus able to meet the case against him. In Viswanathan Ramachandran v Public Prosecutor [2003] 3 SLR(R) 435, Yong CJ (citing Norris R in Lim Beh & Ors v Opium Farmer (1842) 3 Kys 10 at 12) made the following observation as to the purpose of a charge (at [24]):

  70. [50] In the present case, even assuming (contrary to our judgment on this) that it was legally impermissible for the Conspiracy Charges to invoke the punishment provision in s 109 when the Appellants were charged with the offence of criminal conspiracy under s 120B, we are unable to see how the Second Appellant can be said to have been prejudiced as a result. In particular, there is no indication that the framing of the Conspiracy Charges rendered the Second Appellant unable to meet the case against her. We say this for two reasons.

  71. [51] First, it was patently clear, from the plain language of the Conspiracy Charges, what precisely the Second Appellant was being accused of (namely, her engaging in a criminal conspiracy pursuant to s 120A of the Penal Code) and how she was liable to be punished (namely, under s 109 of the Penal Code). For ease of illustration, we reproduce, in full, one of the False Trading Charges brought against the Second Appellant:

  72. [52] In our judgment, it is clear that the Second Appellant was only charged with a single offence, which is that of being party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence under s 197(1)(b) of the SFA. The subsequent reference to s 109 of the Penal Code, which was prefaced by the words “thereby committed an offence punishable under” [emphasis added], could not plausibly have been understood as an allegation of a further and distinct offence of abetment by conspiracy. Hence, it cannot be said that the Conspiracy Charges were in any way duplicitous, or liable to mislead the Second Appellant in any way.

  73. [53] Second, the fact that the Second Appellant was unrepresented following the close of the Prosecution’s case did not preclude her from understanding the case which she had to meet as regards the Conspiracy Charges. In a letter to the Second Appellant dated 6 June 2022, the court expressly informed the Second Appellant that “the offence for which [she] is being charged is criminal conspiracy, not for the abetment of an offence” [emphasis in original]. The court further explained that the reference to s 109 of the Penal Code was included simply to make clear to the Appellants that “the Prosecution’s case [was] that the offence underlying the criminal conspiracy was actually committed” so that the Appellants were aware of “the potential punishment they could face in the event that the Prosecution’s case against them is made out”. It did not, however, have the effect of charging her with two offences in a single charge. Finally, the letter also made clear that “[i]t is not the court’s position that it is proper or legal for two distinct offences to appear in a single charge, or that it is proper or legal for [the Appellants] to be punished on a single charge for two distinct offences”.

  74. [54] The upshot of all this is that even if the Conspiracy Charges were duplicitous, which we have held they were not, in the absence of any evidence that the Appellants had suffered prejudice as a consequence, the appropriate recourse would have been for us simply to amend the charges to remove any reference to s 109 of the Penal Code. In this connection, s 390(4) of the CPC provides that “the appellate court may frame an altered charge (whether or not it attracts a higher punishment) if satisfied that, based on the records before the court, there is sufficient evidence to constitute a case which the accused has to answer”. Contrary to the Second Appellant’s argument, it would have been neither necessary nor appropriate for us to set aside the Appellants’ convictions on the Conspiracy Charges even if those charges were found to be duplicitous.

  75. [55] We therefore do not accept that the Conspiracy Charges were duplicitous. And in any event, there is nothing to suggest that the Appellants were misled or otherwise prejudiced by the manner in which the Conspiracy Charges were framed. There is therefore no basis to set aside the Appellants’ convictions on this ground.

  76. The Second Appellant’s allegation of bias against the Judge

  77. [56] Before we leave the preliminary issues relating to the framing of the Conspiracy Charges, we wish to address a serious allegation made by Mr Sivananthan with respect to the Judge’s conduct of the hearing for the amendment of the charges (the “Amendment Hearing”).

  78. [57] During the first hearing before us on 3 March 2025, Mr Sivananthan alleged that the Prosecution had only ever intended to prove, in relation to the Conspiracy Charges, that the Appellants were parties to the alleged criminal conspiracies. According to Mr Sivananthan, it was not originally the Prosecution’s case that the Appellants had gone further than this by also committing the substantive offences underlying those criminal offences. He submitted that it was the Judge who prompted the Prosecution to reconsider its position by suggesting, during the Amendment Hearing, that the Conspiracy Charges be amended to incorporate references to s 109 of the Penal Code. Mr Sivananthan submitted that the Judge was wrong to have done so. When we invited clarification from Mr Sivananthan as to the precise nature of his objection to how the Judge dealt with the matter, he informed us that he was alleging actual bias, apparent bias and excessive inference on the part of the Judge. We reminded Mr Sivananthan that these were serious allegations to level against the Judge. Mr Sivananthan eventually informed us that he was withdrawing those allegations, although he maintained that the Judge was wrong to have allowed the Prosecution’s application to amend the Conspiracy Charges. Despite this, Mr Sivananthan inexplicably repeated his allegations of bias at the subsequent hearing on 6 May 2025, both in an aide-memoire and in his oral submissions. Once again, Mr Sivananthan asserted that the Prosecution’s original intention had been only to prove that the Appellants were parties to various criminal conspiracies. It was the Judge who had allegedly suggested, during the Amendment Hearing, in Mr Sivananthan’s words: “No, why don't you go further? If you can show that the acts were committed, then [s] 109. You can go for the full sentencing tariff”. Mr Sivananthan submitted that, in so doing, the Judge had descended into the arena and exhibited apparent bias.

  79. [58] In our view, this was a clear, blatant and mischievous mischaracterisation of the proceedings and the Amendment Hearing.

  80. [59] It is true that at the Amendment Hearing, the Prosecution had indicated that they did not intend to allege in the Conspiracy Charges that “pursuant to [the] criminal conspiracy, the accused persons have committed” the underlying offences, but this was only because such an assertion was “not a necessary ingredient for a 120A offence”. The Prosecution maintained “unequivocally that [its] case is still the same [… and it intends] to still prove all the acts … in pursuance” of the conspiracy. In response, Mr Sreenivasan for the First Appellant took the position that it would be impermissible for the Prosecution to omit such a specification and leave the Conspiracy Charges vague; instead, he said, the Prosecution should be made to “take the next step and specify which abetment section they want [the Appellants] punished under – 109 or 116”. Counsel for the Second Appellant at the time, Mr Sui Yi Siong, aligned himself with Mr Sreenivasan’s position on this matter.

  81. [60] It was pursuant to this exchange and discussion that the Judge invited the Prosecution to consider incorporating references to s 109 of the Penal Code in each of the Conspiracy Charges. She made this invitation after the Prosecution acceded to the Appellants’ request for the Conspiracy Charges to expressly state the Prosecution’s position on whether the underlying offences had been completed (see GD at [1506]).

  82. [61] Having regard to what actually transpired during the Amendment Hearing, it is clear to us that the Second Appellant cannot seriously claim to have been confused or otherwise prejudiced by the framing of the Conspiracy Charges. As noted above, her counsel at the time had supported the request made on behalf of the First Appellant that the Prosecution do precisely what her present counsel was complaining of. More troublingly, it is equally obvious that Mr Sivananthan’s allegations of bias against the Judge were wholly without merit. The Prosecution’s express position had always been that the Appellants had committed the substantive offences underlying the criminal conspiracies, and this remained its position even when it applied to amend the Conspiracy Charges. It is therefore simply false for Mr Sivananthan to assert that the Prosecution had only adopted this position upon prompting by the Judge.

  83. [62] In BOI v BOJ [2018] 2 SLR 1156 (at [141]), and indeed even at the hearing before us, we warned that allegations of judicial bias are extremely serious as they can be weaponised by disgruntled litigants to cast baseless aspersions against judges and waste valuable court time and resources in the process. It is even more reprehensible when this is done by counsel. In our view, Mr Sivananthan’s conduct in this regard was wholly irresponsible and improper. It was unacceptable for him, during the first hearing before us on 3 March 2025, to have advanced spurious allegations of bias against the Judge based on a false characterisation of the events at the Amendment Hearing. It was even more unsatisfactory for him, having then withdrawn these allegations, to subsequently repeat them before us on 6 May 2025.

  84. A review of the Judge’s main factual findings

  85. [63] We turn to the substantive issues pertaining to the appeals against conviction. We begin with a discussion of the factual issues raised by the Appellants before turning to each set of charges. At the conclusion of the second tranche of the oral hearing of the Appeals, which concerned the Judge’s decision on conviction, it became clear that the core of the Appellants’ – and in particular, the First Appellant’s – appeal against the Judge’s decision on conviction centred on her determination that the Appellants exercised control over the Relevant Accounts. It is therefore appropriate for us to start with this foundational factual finding, since this undergirds all the Conspiracy Charges and is the key finding against which the Appellants have directed most of their attacks.

  86. The applicable law for appellate intervention

  87. [64] We begin with a few observations on the limited nature of review afforded to an appellate court. As we have said at the outset, in a factually intensive case such as the present, it is not advisable for appellants to seek to challenge the trial judge’s findings just by inviting the appellate court to review all the material that had been before the trial court and consider arriving at a different set of findings and conclusions.

  88. [65] Indeed, it is well settled that in an appeal based on points of fact, the appellate court will be slow to overturn the trial judge’s findings of fact, especially where they hinge on the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility and veracity of witnesses, unless they can be shown to be plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence (see Yap Giau Beng Terence v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 SLR(R) 855 at [24]). In Sakthivel Punithavathi v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983, the High Court observed (at [67]) that for a verdict to be assessed as going “against the weight of evidence”, the appellant must be able to show that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge, afforded by having seen and heard the witnesses first hand, is not sufficient to explain and justify the trial judge’s conclusions on credibility (citing Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370 at 375). The court also referred with approval (at [68]) to the statement of the High Court of Australia in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) and others (1999) 160 ALR 588 at [93] that appellate intervention would be justified where the trial judge’s conclusion was “plainly wrong” as demonstrated by incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony. In short, the factual findings of a trial judge should be taken as prima facie correct and would not lightly be disturbed in the absence of good reasons (Syed Jafaralsadeg bin Abdul Kadir Alhadad v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 352 at [56], referring to Tan Chow Soo v Ratna Ammal [1969] 2 MLJ 49). This is, and is intended to be, a significantly high threshold that entails showing that the trial judge made an error in his or her analysis and evaluation of the material that was presented and/or misunderstood the applicable legal principles upon which that analysis and evaluation was to be conducted.

  89. The First Appellant’s case on appeal

  90. [66] Although the First Appellant’s case on appeal is multi-faceted and his challenges against the Judge’s findings are manifold, the key thrust of his case is that the bulk of the trading activity in the Relevant Accounts during the Relevant Period was conducted by a group of individuals acting on their own or collectively, but not at the Appellants’ behest or with their knowledge. These individuals were Mr Dick Gwee (“Mr Gwee”), Mr Ken Tai (“Mr Tai”), Mr Henry Tjoa (“Mr Tjoa”) and Mr Gabriel Gan (“Mr Gan”), who belonged to a group which the parties and the Judge referred to as the “Manhattan House Group” (“MHG”), as well as one Mr Leroy Lau (“Mr Lau”). Because these individuals operated as a separate entity allegedly beyond the control of the Appellants and coordinated their trades amongst themselves without the Appellants’ knowledge, involvement or consent, it was submitted that none of the trading activities in the Relevant Accounts connected to them could be attributed to the Appellants.

  91. [67] A related point raised by the First Appellant – though it is, if at all, only relevant to the issue of sentencing – is that even assuming that the Appellants did exercise control over some of the Relevant Accounts, it cannot be said that they had successfully manipulated the market and price for BAL shares. This is because the bulk of the manipulative trades, which caused the false and/or misleading appearance in the market for and price of BAL shares, were conducted by the MHG and Mr Lau, and not by the Appellants – who, according to the Appellants, did not ultimately exercise control over those accounts connected to the MHG and Mr Lau. In the First Appellant’s submission, it follows that the Appellants’ convictions for the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges should be set aside. He advances a similar argument in respect of the Deception and Cheating Charges.

  92. [68] In this regard, the First Appellant’s primary ground of attack on appeal concerns the Judge’s treatment of the oral evidence of the members of the MHG and Mr Lau. More specifically, the First Appellant takes issue with the Judge’s assessment of their credibility as well as the inferences that she drew from their evidence. In short, the First Appellant argues that the members of the MHG and Mr Lau were not witnesses of truth and that their evidence ought not to have been accepted. Their evidence was not only internally inconsistent (as between their court testimonies and their prior statements to the authorities) but also against the weight of the evidence as a whole. These individuals also had a strong motive to lie to protect themselves. In the circumstances, the Judge erred in accepting their evidence. Leaving aside the Judge’s treatment of the oral evidence of these individuals, the First Appellant also attacks the Judge’s reliance on certain objective evidence to support the conclusions she arrived at in convicting the Appellants.

  93. The Judge’s approach to the evidence

  94. [69] As has already been noted, a party seeking to overturn a factual finding on appeal is required to identify precisely how the trial judge is said to have erred. It is therefore appropriate to carefully examine the approach that the Judge took in concluding that the Appellants, in fact, did control the Relevant Accounts.

  95. [70] The Judge, of course, was mindful of the fact that a key strand of the Appellants’ case in the proceedings below was that “the bulk of the trading activity carried out in all 189 accounts could be traced to accounts under the management of a few individuals” and these individuals had been trading “amongst themselves … without the knowledge or involvement of the accused persons and with the goal of ‘churning’ trades in order to earn commissions” [emphasis in original] (see GD at [129]–[130(a)]). The Judge was also aware that the Appellants’ primary strategy, to advance their narrative, was to challenge the cogency and credibility of the evidence of the alleged rogue traders who testified on behalf of the Prosecution (see GD at [129]–[134]). We make this point because it follows from the First Appellant’s election to adopt what in essence is the identical approach on appeal, that the burden rests upon him to show that the Judge’s assessment of these individuals’ evidence was plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence, and this is not achieved just by making assertions to this effect.

  96. [71] The Judge was equally aware that a key factual pillar of the Prosecution’s case was that the Appellants controlled the Relevant Accounts and used this to effect the Scheme. To determine whether that premise was made out, the Judge divided the 189 Relevant Accounts into five main categories. The first category consists of the 61 Relevant Accounts which had been under the management of the MHG. The Judge found that it would be useful to analyse the Appellants’ control of these accounts independently, in light of the centrality of the MHG in the Appellants’ case before her. Indeed, the MHG remains central to their case on appeal as well (see above at [67]–[68]).

  97. [72] The remaining four categories were divided according to whether the accounts formed the subject of the Deception Charges, and whether the account was an account with a foreign or local FI. The first demarcation, on whether the accounts formed the subject of the Deception Charges or not, served broadly to differentiate between accounts which the Second Appellant had the actual authority to instruct orders and trades in, and accounts where the Appellants had concealed their involvement in the instructing of orders and trades in (see GD at [633]). The second demarcation, on whether the account was one with a foreign or local FI, arose because, before the Judge, the Appellants had advanced two distinct lines of argument regarding the Deception Charges based on whether the accounts were foreign or local accounts (see GD at [144]–[157]). As regards the local accounts, the Appellants’ main defence for the bulk of these accounts, for which they purportedly gave direct instructions to the TRs, was that there was no deception as the knowledge of the TR could be attributed to their FIs. However, as regards the foreign accounts, the Appellant’s defence was that since they gave instructions through the accounts’ intermediaries, it was akin to relaying their instructions through an authorised person (see GD at [986]). Within these five main categories, the Judge further sub-divided the accounts into groups based on the identity of either the TR or Relevant Accountholder associated with those accounts. The Judge then carefully went through each of these sub-groups to determine whether the Appellants exercised control over the identified Relevant Accounts.

  98. [73] We do not propose to set out the Judge’s analysis of each of these categories and sub-groups in exhaustive detail. Instead, we outline her approach to the evidence by reference to two illustrative examples, namely, the Relevant Accounts held in the names of Mr Lau and Ms Cheng Jo-Ee (“Ms Cheng”) respectively. Mr Lau had a single Relevant Account, which was a local account and was the subject of the Deception Charges. Ms Cheng had five Relevant Accounts, either in her own name or for which she was an authorised signatory, all of which were categorised as foreign accounts that were the subject of the Deception Charges. We have focused on these individuals’ accounts because these were among the ones that featured significantly during the second tranche of the oral hearing, apart from the Relevant Accounts managed by the MHG.

  99. [74] We turn to the Relevant Account belonging to Mr Lau, who was an important witness because of the volume of his trading activity and his centrality to the Appellants’ alternative factual narrative that he was trading for and in collaboration with the MHG. Although we will return to Mr Lau’s evidence and the Relevant Account in greater detail subsequently (at [112] below), we briefly canvass the Judge’s approach here as an illustrative example of her approach to the witnesses’ evidence on the issue of control.

  100. [75] The Judge first began with an overview of Mr Lau’s alleged role in the Appellants’ Scheme based on his witness testimony. Mr Lau testified that he was a “highly skilled day trader” who was operating with a general mandate and/or instructions from the Appellants to trade BAL shares in his account in a way that would assist in manipulating the liquidity and price of BAL, though he also, at times, acted on the Appellants’ specific instructions (see GD at [308]–[313]).

  101. [76] Next, the Judge proceeded to outline various strands of evidence which corroborated Mr Lau’s testimony. Such evidence broadly consisted of messages between Mr Lau and the First Appellant, as well as corroborative evidence emanating from other witnesses (such as Mr Tai and one Mr Wong Xue Yu (“Mr XY Wong”)). The Judge found that these messages were especially damning because they showed regular communications between Mr Lau and the First Appellant that were interspersed with bids being made to transact LionGold shares using Mr Lau’s account, as well as trading instructions that were conveyed in messages from the First Appellant to Mr Lau. The Judge accordingly accepted Mr Lau’s testimony and found his “account of the facts to be detailed, specific, independently logical, and thus indicative of the truth … [further,] it also cohered with the objective evidence adduced” (see GD at [314]–[315]).

  102. [77] Finally, the Judge considered and rejected the First Appellant’s attempt to discredit Mr Lau’s evidence and paint him as an unreliable witness. The First Appellant’s attack rested on two main planks. First, it was said that the nature of Mr Lau’s trading activities was such that he would have needed to make split-second decisions in response to market conditions. He could not, therefore, have been taking instructions from the Appellants. We digress to observe that it was not Mr Lau’s evidence, nor the Prosecution’s case that each and every transaction carried out by Mr Lau on the First Appellant’s instructions was preceded by a specific conversation or direction. In fact, Mr Lau’s claim, that he had been given a general mandate to carry out what the Judge referred to as “market rolling activities”, would be indicative of the opposite. These activities refer to a practice Mr Lau had with the Appellants where he would coordinate “rollover trades” with them, by purchasing shares from the Relevant Accounts that were to be paid for or sold within five days from the date of the trade. Ensuring that the transaction was completed in this way within five days was crucial because as long as the shares were bought and then resold within that period, the purchaser would not need to incur the expense necessary to purchase the shares. They would either enjoy the nett profit or have to contend only with the nett loss, depending on whether the shares were resold at a higher or lower price than that at which they were bought. Importantly, such a practice allowed the Appellants to refresh the positions in Relevant Accounts by trading and purchasing more shares in those accounts.

  103. [78] Second, it was argued that Mr Lau had revised his testimony in court to cover up his own wrongdoing (see GD at [316]–[317]). The Judge was unpersuaded by these arguments. She found that the First Appellant’s bare assertions did not stand up to scrutiny when placed against the evidence of Mr Lau and the corroborative objective evidence adduced by the Prosecution. In this connection, the Judge had specific regard to the First Appellant’s inability to furnish any explanation for the most probative and incriminating messages exchanged between the First Appellant and Mr Lau (see GD at [318]–[320]).

  104. [79] In a similar vein, we turn to the Relevant Accounts belonging to Ms Cheng. Ms Cheng held one personal Relevant Account and was the authorised signatory of four other corporate accounts.

  105. [80] As regards three of the four corporate accounts, the Judge first took note of Ms Cheng’s testimony and her ready admission that she made these three accounts available to the Appellants to place trades in BAL shares. The Judge then proceeded to review the extensive communication records between the First Appellant and Ms Cheng and found that it was “readily apparent that the First [Appellant] had given BAL trading instructions” for transactions that were entered into using these accounts. The Judge also noted that: (a) these three accounts inexplicably traded almost exclusively in BAL shares; and (b) an e-mail sent by Ms Cheng to the First Appellant of a spreadsheet showed they were tracking BAL shareholdings in her accounts. Finally, the Judge considered and rejected the First Appellant’s submission that he was just “giving trading advice to his girlfriend for her to make money”. In the Judge’s view, it was clear from the contents of the messages that these were trading instructions. It was also significant that the timing of the various orders placed in BAL shares (in particular, Blumont shares) coincided with communications between the First Appellant and Ms Cheng. Therefore, after applying this analytical method, the Judge found that collectively, these various strands of evidence, namely Ms Cheng’s own testimony, the communications between her and the First Appellant, the trading patterns in the accounts in question, the monitoring of these trades, and the untenable explanation advanced by the First Appellant when confronted with some of these points, supported the conclusion that the three corporate accounts in the name of Ms Cheng were in fact being controlled by the First Appellant (see, generally, GD at [602]–[606]).

  106. [81] However, as regards Ms Cheng’s final corporate account and her personal account, she denied that they were controlled by the Appellants. With respect to the aforementioned accounts, the Judge rejected the Prosecution’s argument that the First Appellant controlled these accounts based solely on the notion that Ms Cheng’s accounts were generally available for the Appellants’ use. She observed that the mere fact that the Appellant had generally drawn on Ms Cheng’s accounts could not, without more, support the inference that a specific account was being used and controlled by the Accused (see GD at [608]–[616]).

  107. [82] It will be apparent from this brief summary that the Judge’s forensic approach to the evidence of the numerous witnesses who testified was layered and textured. Her analysis, in sum, consisted of three main steps:

  108. (a) First, she reviewed the witness’s testimony on the role they played in the Scheme, having regard to factors that made the evidence more reliable or less so.

  109. (b) Second, she considered the available corroborating evidence which supported the witnesses’ evidence. Such corroborating evidence typically came in the form of other witnesses’ testimony and/or corroborative objective evidence.

  110. (c) Third, and finally, she evaluated the combined weight of the witnesses’ testimony and corroborating evidence against the Appellants’ counter-narrative and determined which of the two she ultimately found to be the true version of events. In particular, she considered whether the Defence had been able to account for the difficult inferences that were suggested by the evidence taken as a whole

  111. Such an approach was, in our judgment, sensible and appropriate – it was wholly insufficient for the Appellants to focus on the supposed limitations of a discrete layer or strand of the evidence when it was evidently their combined force that underlay the Judge’s conclusions.

  112. [83] We also develop a point in this connection that relates specifically to how the Judge treated the available objective evidence. This generally comprised: (a) communication records, which included recorded calls, messages, and e-mails exchanged between the relevant persons; (b) spreadsheets and other documentary records which indicated the Appellants’ control over and coordination or monitoring of the Relevant Accounts; (c) the investigative analysis carried out by the Commercial Affairs Department (the “CAD”) in relation to these records; (d) raw trading data of BAL shares obtained from the SGX; and (e) analytical work carried out by the Government Technology Agency (“GovTech”) (see GD at [107]). Despite finding some of the objective evidence highly probative, the Judge was cognisant of their limitations and certainly did not regard them as being conclusive of the Appellants’ guilt on their own. Rather, the Judge regarded the objective evidence as being primarily of corroborative value (see, for instance, GD at [116]–[120]).

  113. [84] It was only upon a careful and holistic consideration of various interlocking strands of evidence, including the testimonies of various witnesses, the expert evidence and the objective evidence, that the Judge came to a conclusion as to whether the Appellants had been in control of each of the Relevant Accounts. We also note that the Judge eschewed a broad-brush approach in favour of a granular one, as seen in her treatment of the Relevant Accounts associated with Ms Cheng (see above at [80]–[81]).

  114. Whether the threshold for appellate intervention has been met

  115. [85] We return to the First Appellant’s complaints directed at the Judge’s factual findings, which rest heavily on the Judge’s treatment of the oral evidence of members of the MHG and Mr Lau. The primary difficulty, as we have already alluded to above, is that these complaints typically ignore the multi-layered and textured approach that was an integral feature of the Judge’s analysis. Most significantly, he ignores her careful review and consideration of the objective evidence and oral evidence as a whole, as well as how those pieces of evidence corroborated and supported one another (both in terms of how the objective evidence supported the testimony of various witnesses, as well as how those testimonies corroborated one another). We have illustrated this in the examples cited above. To persuade us that the Judge’s findings were plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence, it was neither sufficient nor satisfactory for the First Appellant to engage with a specific aspect of her reasoning in isolation, without acknowledging the various other interlocking strands supporting it. It is thus to the Judge’s analysis of these various other strands that we now turn.

  116. The witness testimonies relied on by the Judge

  117. [86] As mentioned above, the Judge’s approach to evaluating this issue of control began with the consideration of the relevant witnesses’ testimony. We similarly begin our analysis on this footing.

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