Court of Appeal · Decided 6 July 2022
Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another and other appeals and other matters
Feedback & support[2022] SGCA(I) 5 · Case no. Civil Appeals Nos 7, 22 and 47 of 2021 and Summonses Nos 1 and 2 of 2022
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
The SICC’s judgments in the valuation proceedings
The First Valuation Judgment
- [4]
[4] The SICC also found that DyStar management forecasts prepared in April 2019 (the “April 2019 Forecasts”), which Mr Lie had relied on in his valuation exercise, were unreliable and skewed in Senda’s favour (see First Valuation Judgment at [138]-[150]). It was of the view that Mr Lie’s valuation had been overly depressed because of his reliance on the April 2019 Forecasts (see First Valuation Judgment at [137]). A financial model purportedly building on the April 2019 Forecasts and which quantified the impact of various risk events that Senda said negatively impacted DyStar’s valuation (the “February 2020 Model”) was also rejected by the SICC (see First Valuation Judgment at [154]). The SICC considered that most of the assumptions made by the February 2020 Model were not backed up with evidence and the circumstances in which it had been prepared suggested that, like the April 2019 Forecasts, it had been prepared specifically for the valuation proceedings and consciously skewed in Senda’s favour (see First Valuation Judgment at [152]-[153]).
- [5]
[5] The SICC accepted Ms Harfouche’s valuation of US$1,636m but required nine adjustments:
(a) Incorporation in DyStar’s valuation of notional licence fees payable by Longsheng for its use of a patent known as Orange 288 (the “O288 Patent”) (see First Valuation Judgment at [178]-[203]). The O288 Patent is owned by a DyStar affiliate, DyStar Colour Deutschland GmbH and is used in the manufacture of black and navy blue disperse dyes. The O288 Patent had temporarily been assigned to Longsheng in August 2010 for the purpose of Longsheng defending it from invalidation proceedings in China. It was not reassigned after the settlement of those proceedings and Longsheng had exploited the O288 Patent in its commercial production of black and navy blue disperse dyes and also collected licence fees from third parties for the use of the O288 Patent without accounting to DyStar, which the SICC had found to constitute an oppressive act (see Main Judgment at [74]-[78] and [189]-[198]). In connection with the quantification of the notional licence fee, the SICC held that:
(i) The litigation costs incurred by Longsheng in defending the O288 Patent were not to be deducted from the notional licence fee because the terms on which the O288 Patent had been assigned to Longsheng suggested that such costs were to be borne by Longsheng (see First Valuation Judgment at [195]-[197]).
(ii) The benefits obtained by Longsheng from the use of the O288 Patent were not to be quantified by way of an account of profits made by Longsheng from the sale of products manufactured by Longsheng using the O288 Patent, as Kiri had urged the SICC (see First Valuation Judgment at [185]).
(iii) The notional licence fee was to be calculated based upon the quantity of products manufactured using and falling within the scope of the O288 Patent (also referred to by the SICC and Kiri as “Related Products”). The SICC relied on Senda’s evidence in this regard although it accepted that there had been incomplete disclosure of the same by Senda (see First Valuation Judgment at [194]).
(b) The downstream financial impact on DyStar due to the expiration of the O288 Patent to be deducted from Ms Harfouche’s computation of DyStar’s maintainable earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (“EBITDA”) with an impact of US$6.5m, as suggested by Mr Lie (see First Valuation Judgment at [210]-[213]).
(c) The downstream financial impact on DyStar due to the expiration of other patents used in the manufacture of a solution known as Indigo 40% for the production of Indigo dyes (the “I40 Patents”) to be deducted from DyStar’s maintainable EBITDA. This event would have an impact of US$17.2m as suggested by Mr Lie (see First Valuation Judgment at [214]-[223]).
(d) A discount for lack of marketability (“DLOM”) of 19% to be applied to the value of Kiri’s 37.57% share in DyStar (see First Valuation Judgment at [224]-[246]).
(e) A country risk premium of 1.6% to be accounted for in DyStar’s cost of equity, which would increase DyStar’s weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) and result in a larger discount rate in the discounted cash flow (“DCF”) approach (see First Valuation Judgment at [247]-[250]). The SICC however rejected Senda’s contention that a size premium be applied in calculating DyStar’s cost of equity (see First Valuation Judgment at [251]-[265]).
(f) The applicable tax rate for DyStar’s revenue to be 26.7% instead of 23% (see First Valuation Judgment at [266]-[268]).
(h) A “special incentive payment” of US$2m made in 2014 by DyStar to one Mr Ruan Weixiang (“Mr Ruan”), a director of both Senda and DyStar at the material time, and which the SICC had found in the Main Judgment to be an act of oppression (at [71]-[73] and [179]), had been accounted for in Ms Harfouche’s valuation (see First Valuation Judgment at [291]-[292]). However, an adjustment to the applicable tax rate was required. That was to be DyStar’s historical rate in 2014 when the special incentive payment was made (see First Valuation Judgment at [293]).
(i) A US$4m insurance payout to DyStar in May and June 2019, to be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation (see First Valuation Judgment at [302]).
- [6]
[6] The SICC rejected Senda’s contentions that DyStar’s enterprise value should be adjusted downwards by reason of:
(a) The closure of DyStar’s plant in Nanjing, China (the “Nanjing Plant”) following an explosion in February 2018 (see First Valuation Judgment at [157]-[163]).
(b) The closure of Dystar’s plant in Wuxi, China (the “Wuxi Plant”) following the acquisition by Chinese authorities of the land upon which it was built (see First Valuation Judgment at [164]-[169]).
(c) The closure of DyStar’s plant in Ankleshwar, India which was a post-valuation event held not to be foreseeable at the date of valuation (see First Valuation Judgment at [170]-[177]).
- [7]
[7] The SICC made the following directions (see First Valuation Judgment at [313]):
(a) The parties’ experts are to revise the notional licence fee of US$473,744 proposed by Mr Chan to take into account a starting point of 2010 and not 2013. This was because, as the SICC found, Longsheng had begun trading products falling within the scope of the O288 Patent since 2010 and so any such notional licence fee payable by Longsheng to DyStar for the use of the O288 Patent would have been chargeable from 2010 onwards (see First Valuation Judgment at [192]). On the other hand, the long-stop date for the notional licence fee was the date of the expiration of the O288 Patent (see First Valuation Judgment at [191]).
(b) The parties’ experts are to ascertain the relevant historical tax rates and general interest rates.
(c) The parties’ experts are to ascertain how the notional licence fee and third party licence fees collected by Longsheng are to be factored into DyStar’s valuation.
(d) The parties’ experts are to revise Ms Harfouche’s final valuation and submit the same within 28 days of the judgment.
(e) If unable to agree on the matters directed, the parties are to submit within 28 days of the judgment a joint statement identifying points of agreement and disagreement with succinct explanations of their reasons for disagreeing.
The Oral Judgment
- [10]
[10] In the Oral Judgment (see [2] above), the SICC held that pre-judgment interest cannot be awarded in an oppression claim, but noted that it had been accepted by the Court of Appeal in Yeo Hung Khiang v Dickson Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others [1999] 1 SLR(R) 773 (“Yeo Hung Khiang”) that the court, in an oppression claim, has the discretion to enhance or adjust the value of the shares to arrive at a fair and equitable result. The SICC held there was no basis, in this case, to make an adjustment to the value of DyStar’s shares. It declined to impose any discretionary enhancement on DyStar’s share value.
The Second Valuation Judgment
- [11]
[11] In the Second Valuation Judgment, the SICC referred to the nine outstanding issues identified in the First Valuation Judgment.
- [12]
[12] In the Joint Expert Report, Senda’s experts, Mr Lie and Mr Chan (the latter two referred to collectively as “PwC”) disagreed with the approach that Ms Harfouche was taking. In her preliminary comment in the Joint Expert Report, Ms Harfouche had said:
- [13]
[13] Mr Lie and Mr Chan stated:
This difference was reflected in arguments put to this court by Senda, which are discussed below.
- [14]
[14] The issues on the DLOM and the special incentive payment were not in dispute. The experts had agreed upon them and their joint position was incorporated into the SICC’s final valuation of DyStar (see Second Valuation Judgment at [7]). There remained seven issues in dispute. The experts disagreed on how the matters in respect of these issues were to be incorporated into the final valuation of DyStar. These were:
(a) The notional licence fee and third party licence fees in respect of the O288 Patent.
(b) The effect of the expiration of the O288 Patent and the I40 Patents (collectively referred to as the “Patent Expirations”).
(c) Country risk premium and the effective tax rate.
(d) Longsheng Fees and applicable tax rates.
- [15]
[15] The SICC made some preliminary observations to the following effect (see Second Valuation Judgment at [12]):
(a) Ms Harfouche provided a well-reasoned report on the seven disputed issues.
(b) In the First Valuation Judgment, it had accepted Ms Harfouche’s valuation model.
(d) Mr Lie had adopted an approach departing in some instances from Ms Harfouche’s valuation model.
- [16]
[16] The SICC described Ms Harfouche’s approach in an overview paragraph (see Second Valuation Judgment at [13]):
- [17]
[17] The SICC also noted that Ms Harfouche, in supporting her positions in the Joint Expert Report, had referred to underlying documents. On several issues, Mr Lie and Mr Chan had failed to refer to any underlying documents (see Second Valuation Judgment at [14]).
- [18]
[18] The SICC identified the positions of the experts and their conclusions on the issues in dispute. Each of them is referred to as a “Trial Issue” to distinguish them from the appeal issues before this court.
Trial Issue 1: Notional and Third-Party Licence Fees
- [19]
[19] The SICC held that DyStar’s group tax rates were to apply. The applicable tax rates were determined having regard to the evidence of Ms Harfouche and Mr Chan and were set out in a table (see Second Valuation Judgment at [28]).
- [20]
[20] The SICC held that third party licence fees of US$12.6m as proposed by Ms Harfouche should be applied (see Second Valuation Judgment at [29]). The SICC however rejected the contention that audit fees which Longsheng allegedly incurred in respect of the third party licence fees ought to be taken into account in determining the quantum of those third party licence fees which are to be added back into DyStar’s final valuation (see Second Valuation Judgment at [33]-[34]).
Trial Issues 2 and 3: The Patent Expirations
- [21]
[21] The SICC had held in the First Valuation Judgment that the expiration of the O288 Patent and the I40 Patents held by DyStar must be taken into account in determining DyStar’s maintainable EBITDA. The best evidence was Mr Lie’s view that the expiration of the O288 Patent would lead to a US$6.5m drop in DyStar’s maintainable EBITDA (see First Valuation Judgment at [213]). In relation to the I40 Patents, the SICC referred to the evidence of DyStar’s Chief Executive Officer, Mr Eric Hopmann (“Mr Hopmann”), that the benefits that had accrued upon validation of the I40 Patents would be reversed upon expiration with a proportional drop in revenue (see First Valuation Judgment at [214]-[215]). The SICC held this to be a logical and sound position. Mr Hopmann’s estimations and that of DyStar’s management resulted in a 16.42% to 16.67% drop across five years for the average selling price (“ASP”) of Indigo 40% products. These projections were held to be reasonable (see First Valuation Judgment at [218]-[219]). In this respect the SICC accepted Mr Lie’s calculations of a US$17.2m drop in DyStar’s maintainable EBITDA (see First Valuation Judgment at [223]).
- [22]
[22] In the Second Valuation Judgment, the SICC held that the effect of the Patent Expirations should be modelled only for a finite period as Ms Harfouche contended, rather than in perpetuity which reflected Mr Lie’s position (at [45]). The SICC explained that the First Valuation Judgment, which had accepted Mr Lie’s evidence in relation to impact on EBITDA of US$6.5m for the O288 Patent and US$17.2m for the I40 Patents, did not involve a determination that the effect should be modelled into perpetuity (see Second Valuation Judgment at [44]). The SICC also noted that, as was also common ground between the experts, the finite impact of the Patent Expirations could only be assessed using the DCF method (see Second Valuation Judgment at [54]). On that basis, Ms Harfouche had made a US$72.5m deduction to DyStar’s enterprise value. The SICC considered that was “the best available information upon which the court [was] able to act” (see Second Valuation Judgment at [57]).
Trial Issues 5 and 6: Country risk premium and effective tax rate of 26.7%
- [23]
[23] The SICC held that Ms Harfouche’s model was to be updated in accordance with the First Valuation Judgment. Mr Lie’s calculations on country risk premium and effective tax rates involved fresh DCF calculations that did not accord with its acceptance of Ms Harfouche’s valuation method (see Second Valuation Judgment at [58]).
- [24]
[24] Ms Harfouche had worked a country risk premium of 1.6% (as directed in the First Valuation Judgment) into her valuation model. There was no meaningful shift in the line representing the valuation range obtained using the DCF method which she had previously drawn on a diagrammatic representation of the application of different modes of valuation that was referred to by the SICC as “the football field” (see [16] above). Her position was similar in respect to the 26.7% DyStar group tax rate. Corporate tax rates for comparable companies ranging from 18% to 34% had already been factored into her valuation approach. Thus, no further adjustment was required because the tax rate of 26.7% had already been taken into account in her model by the selection of comparable companies with similar characteristics for the valuation exercise (see Second Valuation Judgment at [60]).
- [25]
[25] The SICC rejected Mr Lie’s fresh set of calculations using a pure DCF method. The SICC considered that his approach did not assess the impact of the country risk premium and the 26.7% tax rate in the context of Ms Harfouche’s valuation approach (see Second Valuation Judgment at [61]-[62]). It considered that Senda was effectively relitigating the appropriate valuation approach by putting forth the fresh set of calculations by Mr Lie (see Second Valuation Judgment at [62(b)]). The SICC therefore accepted Ms Harfouche’s position for the adjustments to be made under Trial Issues 5 and 6 (see Second Valuation Judgment at [63]).
Trial Issue 7: Longsheng Fees for 2015 and 2016
- [26]
[26] Trial Issue 7 also had to do with applicable tax rates. The difference between the experts arose from disagreement over the applicable rates. They were apart by about US$4.2m. Mr Chan’s position was that DyStar’s group rates ought to apply. The SICC preferred his position as a matter of consistency (see Second Valuation Judgment at [37]). The SICC also noted that Ms Harfouche’s position (that the tax rates of the second respondent in these appeals, and not DyStar’s group rates, ought to apply) was inconsistent with the conclusion in the First Valuation Judgment that the applicable tax rate ought to be that of the DyStar group, not its individual entities (see Second Valuation Judgment at [38]). The SICC held that DyStar’s group rates ought to apply (see Second Valuation Judgment at [40]). On that basis, it had been Ms Harfouche’s view in the Joint Expert Report that the value of Kiri’s shares would “fall by at most US$1.2m”. The SICC stated that Ms Harfouche must clarify that point because the term “at most US$1.2m” seemed to indicate a range rather than a figure. The SICC therefore directed that Ms Harfouche incorporate the final figure into DyStar’s final valuation (see Second Valuation Judgment at [40]).
Trial Issue 9: Insurance payout
- [27]
[27] The SICC resolved Trial Issue 9 in Kiri’s favour. Ms Harfouche had provided updated calculations and arrived at a net impact of US$4.6m to be added to DyStar’s final valuation. The SICC considered that Mr Lie’s position on this issue had not conformed with the SICC’s direction in the First Valuation Judgment. The SICC considered that it had been clear that its direction in the First Valuation Judgment required the final figure to be that found in Ms Harfouche’s updated calculations which Kiri had submitted to the SICC in the valuation proceedings (see Second Valuation Judgment at [65]). Instead, Mr Lie had put forth an entirely different figure. The SICC therefore agreed with Ms Harfouche that the net impact of the insurance payout was US$4.6m, an amount which ought to be incorporated into DyStar’s final valuation (see Second Valuation Judgment at [66]).
Outstanding Issues and Directions
- [28]
[28] The SICC directed the experts to arrive at DyStar’s final valuation based on its conclusions in the Second Valuation Judgment as set out above. The SICC considered that Ms Harfouche’s figure of US$482.5m for the updated value of Kiri’s shares would have to be revised in light of the findings in the Second Valuation Judgment, specifically on the issues on which SICC had departed from Ms Harfouche (see Second Valuation Judgment at [67]). Those were:
(a) That while the applicable tax rates for all years except for 2018 should be as proposed by Ms Harfouche, the rate for that year ought to be 45.5% (see also [19] above).
(b) For Trial Issue 7, Ms Harfouche ought to apply DyStar’s group rates and not the tax rates of the individual companies in the group (see [26] above).
- [29]
[29] The SICC emphasised in the Second Valuation Judgment that the experts were to arrive at a final value of Kiri’s shares based solely on the preceding conclusions (at [68]). Ms Harfouche’s valuation approach and methodology was to be developed and all that was left was to undertake specific calculations to arrive at a number for DyStar’s final valuation.
The Final Valuation Judgment
The appeals
- [31]
[31] The parties lodged three Notices of Appeal each. They may be summarised briefly as follows.
CA 8
- [32]
[32] In Civil Appeal No 8 of 2021 (“CA 8”), Senda appealed against the First Valuation Judgment, including (amongst others), the following:
(a) The decision that post-valuation events unforeseeable at the valuation date should not be used to adjust DyStar’s valuation.
(b) The decision that Ms Harfouche’s valuation approach be adopted over Mr Lie’s valuation approach and the acceptance of Ms Harfouche’s final equity value of US$1,636m, including the SICC’s decision that the various broker and market reports relied on by Ms Harfouche in her valuation exercise were not inadmissible hearsay (see [3] above). On the appeal to this court, Senda accepted Ms Harfouche’s interim valuation of US$1,636m. Its principal contention on appeal was that the SICC-directed adjustments (see [5] above) should be incorporated into the interim valuation using Mr Lie’s rather than Ms Harfouche’s approach.
(c) The decision to reject Mr Lie’s valuation approach and his final equity value of US$609m (see [3] above).
(d) The decision that the April 2019 Forecasts, which Mr Lie had relied in his valuation model, were unreliable (see [3] above).
(e) The decision that the closure of the Nanjing Plant would not significantly impact DyStar’s valuation (see [6(a)] above).
(f) The decision that the closure of the Wuxi Plant would not significantly affect DyStar’s valuation (see [6(b)] above).
(g) The decision that (i) the long-stop date for licence fees notionally charged to Longsheng for its use of the O288 Patent ought to be the date of the expiration of the O288 Patent (see [7(a)] above); and (ii) that the appropriate starting date to compute the licence fees notionally charged to Longsheng for its use of the O288 Patent ought to be from 31 August 2010 (see [7(a)] above).
(h) The decision that litigation costs incurred by Longsheng should not be deducted from the notional licence fees (see [5(a)] above) and be added back to the valuation.
(i) The decision that the application of a size premium in the valuation of DyStar was inappropriate (see [5(e)] above).
(j) The decision that tax liabilities and associated administrative penalties should not be factored into the valuation of DyStar.
- [33]
[33] Senda’s case on appeal did not address the issues set out at [32(a)], [32(h]) and [32(j)] above.
CA 45
- [34]
[34] Following the issuance of the Second Valuation Judgment, Senda filed Civil Appeal No 45 of 2021 (“CA 45”), appealing against parts of that judgment, including (but not limited to) the following:
(a) The decision that audit fees incurred by Longsheng in relation to the third party licence fees it had collected for the O288 Patent should not be added back to DyStar’s valuation.
(b) The decision that the impact of the Patent Expirations would only be for a finite period (see [21] above).
(c) The decision that the quantification of the impact of the Patent Expirations by Kiri’s expert, Ms Harfouche, was appropriate (see [22] above).
(d) The decision that it was not appropriate for Senda’s expert, Mr Lie, to prepare new DCF method calculations to take into account the impact of a country risk premium of 1.6% and DyStar’s effective tax rate of 26.7% on Ms Harfouche’s valuation (see [15] and [25] above).
(e) The decision that Ms Harfouche had properly adjusted her model to take into account a country risk premium of 1.6% and DyStar’s effective tax rate of 26.7% (see [24] above).
(f) The decision to accept Ms Harfouche’s calculated valuation of Kiri’s shares at US$482.5 million (subject to prescribed adjustments) and the direction that the parties’ experts were to arrive at a final valuation of Kiri’s shares in DyStar based on adjustments to Ms Harfouche’s calculated valuation of Kiri’s shares at US$482.5 million (see [28]-[29] above).
- [35]
[35] Senda’s case on appeal did not address the issue set out at [34(a)] above.
CA 48
CA 7
- [37]
[37] In Civil Appeal No 7 of 2021 (“CA 7”), Kiri appeals against the following parts of the SICC’s decision in the First Valuation Judgment:
(a) The decision that the quantification of the benefits derived by Longsheng from its wrongful exploitation of the O288 Patent be based upon a notional licence fee instead of an account of profits, as well as the SICC’s decision on the basis upon which the quantum of the notional licence fee was to be determined (see [5(a)(ii)] and [5(a)(iii)] above). Kiri urged this court to accept calculations by Ms Harfouche of the estimated quantity of Related Products (as defined at [5(a)(iii)] above) produced by Longsheng using the O288 Patent as the basis for quantifying the notional licence fee.
(b) The decision that there be a DLOM of 19% to Kiri’s 37.5% share in DyStar (see [5(d)] above).
(c) The decision that there be an adjustment to DyStar’s valuation for the downstream impact on DyStar’s maintainable EBITDA due to the Patent Expirations (see [5(b)]-[5(c)] above).
(d) The decision that a country risk premium of 1.6% be applied to DyStar’s valuation (see [5(e)] above).
CA 22
- [38]
[38] Following the issuance of the Oral Judgment, Kiri filed Civil Appeal No 22 of 2021 (“CA 22”), appealing against the SICC’s decision that no discretionary enhancement on the value of Kiri’s shares in DyStar should be imposed (see [10] above).
CA 47
Issues on the appeals
- [40]
[40] The issues raised on the appeals, each referred to as an “Appeal Issue”, may be summarised as follows:
(a) Appeal Issue 1: Whether information and forecasts for comparable companies found in generally available market and broker reports used by Ms Harfouche involved a reliance by Ms Harfouche upon inadmissible hearsay evidence to establish the basis of her opinions?
(b) Appeal Issue 2: Whether Ms Harfouche’s valuation methodology should have been preferred to Mr Lie’s methodology, specifically in the incorporation of the SICC-directed adjustments into DyStar’s enterprise value?
(c) Appeal Issue 3: Whether downward adjustments to DyStar’s enterprise value should be made on account of the closures of the Nanjing Plant and/or the Wuxi Plant?
(d) Appeal Issue 4: Whether the impact of the Patent Expirations on DyStar’s enterprise value should be treated as finite or perpetual or non-existent?
(e) Appeal Issue 5: Whether a size premium is to be accounted for in DyStar’s cost of equity?
(f) Appeal Issue 6: Whether a country risk premium is to be accounted for in DyStar’s cost of equity?
(g) Appeal Issue 7: Whether a downward adjustment was to be made at all to DyStar’s enterprise value on account of the impact of the Patent Expirations?
(h) Appeal Issue 8: Whether a DLOM should be applied in the valuation of Kiri’s shareholding in DyStar?
(i) Appeal Issue 9: Whether the benefits derived by Longsheng from its exploitation of the O288 Patent in the manufacture of black and blue disperse dyes should be quantified by way of an account of profits or a notional licence fee?
(j) Appeal Issue 10: Whether Senda’s or Kiri’s evidence on the calculation of the notional licence fee was to be accepted?
(k) Appeal Issue 11: Whether a discretionary enhancement was to be applied to the value of Kiri’s shares in DyStar?
- [41]
[41] Appeal Issues 1 to 5 are raised by Senda’s appeals while Appeal Issues 6 to 11 are raised by Kiri’s appeals.
Written submissions
- [42]
[42] The court received extensive written submissions from both parties, supplemented by oral argument at the hearing of the appeals. The submissions were helpful but marred in some instances by distracting polemic. Such terms as “charade”, “blatant untruth”, “with a sleight of hand” and “conveniently and brazenly” — conclusionary epithets impugning the integrity of an expert witness — were of little assistance to this court on the appeal. This court is concerned to hear each party’s substantive arguments on whether and if so how the SICC erred — not free character analyses of the opposing party’s witnesses or generalised denunciations of the opponent’s case.
Appeal Issue 1: The hearsay objection
- [43]
[43] Senda had raised a general challenge to Ms Harfouche’s valuation methodology. This included an objection to her reference to information and forecasts for comparable companies found in market and broker reports, which Ms Harfouche had relied on in arriving at her interim valuation of US$1,636m. Senda says that these reports constitute inadmissible hearsay evidence. It is not necessary, however, for this court to deal with the hearsay issue because Senda accepted in its Skeletal Arguments in these appeals that this court could adopt Ms Harfouche’s interim valuation of US$1,636m – which was only 2% higher than Mr Lie’s figure. In those submissions and before this court, Senda stated that its case in these appeals was instead focused on how the SICC-directed adjustments were to be applied to that interim valuation. The hearsay question no doubt raises matters of interest at both common law and under statute. Although it need not be determined now, this court notes that it is common practice in commercial litigation for expert evidence to draw upon material of the kind to which Ms Harfouche referred in her reports. Indeed, Mr Lie in his reports referred to analogous material. In the event, the hearsay question does not fall for determination as both parties accept the interim valuation of Ms Harfouche of US$1,636m.
Appeal Issue 2: Valuation methodology applied to adjustments
The SICC’s approach to the valuation methodologies of the experts
- [44]
[44] Kiri’s expert, Ms Harfouche, relied upon figures derived from the DCF method and from market-based approaches. On the other hand, Senda’s expert, Mr Lie, primarily applied the DCF method, relying on the April 2019 Forecasts as the main (if not sole) source of information on DyStar’s revenue forecasts, and used the market-based approach only as a cross-check.
- [45]
[45] Ms Harfouche’s application of the DCF method involved a projection of DyStar’s revenue to financial year (“FY”) 2027 using average revenue forecasts of comparable companies and the compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”) of 6% for the global textile dyestuff industry over 2017 to 2022 as set out in a report published by “MarketsandMarkets” (the “MM Report”). Ms Harfouche also referred to another report published by “Research Reports Insights” (the “RRI Report”). She derived a long-term CAGR of 2.1%. Using this long-term CAGR of 2.1%, Ms Harfocuhe identified the pool of companies from which she reached projected cash flows for DyStar and projected growth trends for the dyestuff industry. She also projected DyStar’s EBITDA based on the performance of 13 comparable companies and applied a flat EBITDA margin of 14.8% from FY 2020 onwards. Using the projected revenue and EBITDA figures she reached a figure for DyStar’s enterprise value applying the DCF method.
- [46]
[46] The SICC rejected Senda’s submission that Ms Harfouche was wrong to refer to the MM Report and the RRI Report. These reports set out the revenue growth rates of the global textile dyestuff industry. On the other hand, the report published by IHS Markit that Senda relied upon related to volume growth rates. The SICC considered that revenue growth rates were more relevant given that the DCF approach to valuation was based on revenue projections. It held that Ms Harfouche’s reliance on the MM Report and the RRI Report and, in particular, the 6% CAGR in the MM Report, was well-founded. Ms Harfouche’s selection of 13 comparable companies from a starting sample of 811 was held to be sound. The SICC found that her approach conformed with the standards for a valuation exercise stipulated in the International Valuation Standards (“IVS”), a set of guidelines issued by the IVS Council.
- [47]
[47] Ms Harfouche used EBITDA and revenue forecasts of the 13 comparable companies to determine a projected future EBITDA for DyStar and also to project DyStar’s financial performance until FY 2020. The projected revenue and EBITDA margins for the comparable companies had been taken from broker forecasts collected by Capital IQ. Ms Harfouche then extrapolated her projections for DyStar’s revenue and EBITDA (as mentioned earlier) from FY 2020 to FY 2027, which gave her a “steady state” of revenue growth and EBITDA. In her extrapolation, Ms Harfouche gradually decreased the annual revenue growth rate to a terminal growth rate of 2.1%, which was the International Monetary Fund’s long-term US dollar inflation rate. This involved a conservative assumption of no real revenue growth for DyStar from FY 2027 onwards. EBITDA growth from FY 2020 was also capped at 14.8%.
- [48]
[48] The SICC also held that Ms Harfouche had applied an appropriate discount rate to DyStar’s projected earnings. Ms Harfouche had correctly taken into account the relevant factors affecting DyStar’s projected earnings and growth and her approach had resulted in a reasonable application of the DCF method.
- [49]
[49] The SICC then reviewed Ms Harfouche’s application of the market-based approach. She had used the enterprise values of the 13 comparable companies to establish enterprise value ranges from which she could determine sound trading multiples. In calculating her trading multiples, Ms Harfouche applied a ratio of EV/(EBITDA-Capital Expenditure (“Capex”)). This was in contrast with Mr Lie. In his application of the market approach, he disregarded Capex and used EV/EBITDA to derive a trading multiple. The SICC agreed with Ms Harfouche’s approach of using EV/(EBITDA-Capex) (see First Valuation Judgment at [71]):
The SICC also noted that Mr Lie’s application of the market approach had only considered the non-listed segment of one comparable company in deriving his trading multiple. That was “a less robust method”.
- [50]
[50] Ms Harfouche had also used a transactions multiple method — analysing acquisitions of companies similar to DyStar. She reviewed four comparable transactions. The relevant companies were all large players in segments of the paint/pigment manufacturing industries. The transactions were held to be “valid reference points”. The SICC did not accept Mr Lie’s contention that it was difficult to find transactions for companies which were comparable to DyStar.
- [51]
[51] A useful summary of Ms Harfouche’s approach was provided in Kiri’s Respondent’s Case filed in these appeals:
Ms Harfouche’s calculations following the First Valuation Judgment
- [52]
[52] Ms Harfouche’s calculations of DyStar’s enterprise value based on the DCF method and market-based approaches were represented in her first report, her updated calculations as at 30 March 2020 and in the Joint Expert Report as horizontal bar chart diagrams, which she designated “football fields” (see also [16] above). These “football fields” showed value ranges derived from the different valuation methods she had adopted. It is sufficient to reproduce the last of those, which appeared in the Joint Expert Report:
- [53]
[53] It should be noted that the term “transaction multiples” had been explained briefly in Ms Harfouche’s outline of valuation methods in her first expert report dated 22 August 2019, where she said:
- [54]
[54] Ms Harfouche’s chosen valuation of DyStar (US$1,636m) was described by Kiri in its Respondent’s Case as corresponding to DyStar’s enterprise value derived from one of the valuation methods under the markets-based approach - namely, by comparing the comparable companies’ EV/Revenue to their EBITDA-Capex margins in FY 2017. That is the right-most edge of the fourth bar in figure 1 above described as “EV/Revenue vs EBITDA-Capex % (FY2017-19)” in all of Ms Harfouche’s reports.
The SICC’s findings on valuation methodology of the experts
- [55]
[55] In the First Valuation Judgment, the SICC held that (at [76]):
- [56]
[56] The SICC had also referred earlier in the First Valuation Judgment to Senda’s failure to disclose key financial documents for the purposes of the valuation proceedings and observed (at [43]):
- [57]
[57] A consequence of those shortcomings was that Senda’s case on valuation was undermined. To the extent that Senda’s conclusions and positions were not supported by primary evidence, they were held by the SICC to be of questionable evidential value (see First Valuation Judgment at [44]).
- [58]
[58] The April 2019 Forecasts, which we have earlier referred to in this judgment (see [3] above), were forecasts prepared by the DyStar board. Ms Harfouche did not rely on them in the valuation exercise as she regarded them as unreliable and skewed (see First Valuation Judgment at [14]). They were, however, relied upon heavily, if not unquestioningly, by Mr Lie (see First Valuation Judgment at [137]). The SICC agreed with Ms Harfouche’s assessment of the April 2019 Forecasts.
- [59]
[59] The SICC observed that before adjustments for risk events, Ms Harfouche’s assessment of DyStar’s equity value was US$1,636m as at the valuation date, excluding the Longsheng Fees for 2017 and 2018 and the benefits and third party licence fees earned by Longsheng from the O288 Patent.
Senda’s concession on interim valuation
- [60]
[60] In its Skeletal Arguments, Senda submitted that this court could, as a starting premise, adopt Ms Harfouche’s interim valuation of US$1,636m, which was only 2% higher than Mr Lie’s after adjustments (see also [43] above).
- [61]
[61] In particular, Senda wrote:
Senda then submitted that this court should decide how adjustments should be made to the starting figure of US$1,636m.
- [62]
[62] Ultimately, Senda’s attack on Ms Harfouche’s valuation methodology was directed to her approach to incorporating the SICC-directed adjustments into the interim valuation of US$1,636m. According to Senda, that approach supposedly represented a departure from her pre-adjustment valuation methodology (see [72]-[73] below). That did involve criticism of Ms Harfouche’s pre-adjustment valuation (which the SICC accepted as the interim valuation of DyStar), but it was a criticism which was in tension with Senda’s acceptance of the interim valuation in these appeals.
SICC’s approach to valuation of adjustments
- [63]
[63] In the Second Valuation Judgment, when considering the quantum of the adjustment to be made on account of the Patent Expirations, the SICC held that the impact was finite. That finding is addressed specifically in relation to Appeal Issues 4 and 7 (see [118] and [166] below). At this point, this court is concerned with the allegedly arbitrary variations in Ms Harfouche’s approach to the incorporation of the necessary adjustments into the interim valuation.
- [64]
[64] In applying its finding that the impact of the Patent Expirations was finite, the SICC referred to Ms Harfouche’s methodology in quantifying that impact. Her position was that only the DCF method would allow a finite impact of the Patent Expirations to be modelled. Senda had complained before the SICC that Ms Harfouche had “force-fed” the DCF method into her valuation of DyStar, which was derived using the markets-based approach (see Second Valaution Judgment at [51]). The SICC understood that as a criticism against Ms Harfouche for not applying the market-based approach in computing the impact of the Patent Expirations (see Second Valuation Judgment at [52]).
- [65]
[65] The SICC quoted from Mr Lie’s contributions to the Joint Expert Report in which he had said that Ms Harfouche “should have carried out the [SICC-directed] adjustments using a particular chosen method, instead of selectively deriving certain inputs using one approach, and force-feeding that input into her computation in another approach” (see Second Valuation Judgment at [52]). Mr Lie had complained that in computing the overall impact of the court-directed adjustments, Ms Harfouche had adopted the market-based approach. However, when computing the impact of the Patent Expirations, Ms Harfouche arbitrarily relied upon and adopted the value of the US$72.5m (as the quantum of the impact) which she computed using the DCF method (see Second Valuation Judgment at [52]).
- [66]
[66] The SICC observed that Ms Harfouche did apply the market-based approach in determining the impact of, inter alia, the country risk premium on DyStar’s valuation (see Second Valuation Judgment at [59]), which is discussed later in this judgment. The question that consequently arose was whether it was acceptable for Ms Harfouche to use the market-based approach in determining the impact of, inter alia, the country risk premium on DyStar’s valuation, but use a different approach, the DCF method, in computing the impact of the Patent Expirations.
- [67]
[67] The SICC accepted Ms Harfouche’s methodology. Her approach, while a “compromise solution”, was explicable (see Second Valuation Judgment at [53]). Ms Harfouche did not accept that Mr Lie’s method of computing the impact of the Patent Expirations using the market-based approach would achieve an accurate figure as it assumed a perpetual impact flowing from the Patent Expirations. It was necessary for her to arrive at a figure based on a finite impact. That was only possible with the DCF method and not the market approach. Using the DCF method, the figure of US$72.5m was arrived at which had then to be incorporated into the market-based approach. That was done by way of deduction. The overall approach was the “compromise” that Ms Harfouche had acknowledged (see Second Valuation Judgment at [54]).
- [68]
[68] The SICC accepted that Ms Harfouche had adopted a differing method when computing the impact of the country risk premium and a 26.7% tax rate, but it considered that this could be explained (see Second Valuation Judgment at [56]). Apart from the fact that the DCF method was the only method applicable to estimate the finite impact of the Patent Expirations, the SICC pointed to a further difficulty with incorporating the impact by making deductions to DyStar’s revenue and EBITDA-Capex margin as Mr Lie had done. That difficulty was encapsulated in the following observations (see Second Valuation Judgment at [56]):
Senda’s criticism of Ms Harfouche’s valuation methodology as applied to the SICC-directed adjustments
- [69]
[69] In its Skeletal Arguments, Senda submitted, inter alia, that:
(a) The dotted vertical line applied by Ms Harfouche to her “football field” (see [52] above) did not achieve a central pricing tendency (for context, that dotted line was drawn based on Ms Harfouche’s chosen value of US$1,636m and Ms Harfouche had considered that the position of that line, relative to the enterprise value ranges derived from the other valuation methods, gave her comfort over her chosen value (see [51] above)). According to Senda, it should be moved to the left and DyStar’s value in her first and second reports should be reduced by at least US$100m to US$150m.
(b) Ms Harfouche completely reformulated her valuation approach after the First Valuation Judgment was issued.
(c) Ms Harfouche used her reformulated valuation approach to avoid adjustments such as country risk premium, effective tax rate and, potentially, DLOM, but abandoned her market approach and reverted to the DCF method in respect of some other adjustments.
- [70]
[70] Senda’s argument about Ms Harfouche’s approach to the adjustments can be dealt with discretely. There is no basis for interfering with the SICC’s acceptance of the pre-adjustment valuation method adopted by her.
Senda’s submission on Ms Harfouche’s approach to the adjustment valuation
- [71]
[71] The question raised by Appeal Issue 2, given Senda’s concession, is whether Ms Harfouche adopted an approach to the adjustments inconsistent with the methodology which she had applied to reach the pre-adjustment figure.
- [72]
[72] In its Skeletal Arguments, Senda said that Ms Harfouche had “completely reformulated her valuation approach” after the First Valuation Judgment was issued. She allegedly took the position in the Joint Expert Report that her valuation was based solely on her chosen valuation method – by comparing the comparable companies’ EV/Revenue to their EBITDA-Capex margins in FY 2017 to derive the value of DyStar (see [54] above). So, according to Senda, the values computed by the other methods, including the DCF method, had simply been cross-checks to her sole valuation method.
- [73]
[73] This new approach, according to Senda, served the purpose of enabling Ms Harfouche to avoid taking into account some of the SICC-directed adjustments. Those adjustments, it was said, were not valuation-approach agnostic and became irrelevant if computed purely using a markets-based approach. The adjustments which are the subject of that argument were country risk premium and effective tax rates, which it was said, would only apply if the DCF method was employed.
- [74]
[74] Ms Harfouche’s “entirely new narrative” was also said to enable her to “completely side-step the [SICC’s] direction that a 19% DLOM should apply”. Then it was said by Senda that Ms Harfouche had abandoned the market-based approach and reverted to the DCF method for other SICC-directed adjustments where the same were favourable to Kiri.
- [75]
[75] Senda submitted that there was a clear basis for this court to find that Ms Harfouche’s approach was arbitrary and should not be accepted.
Kiri’s submission on Ms Harfouche’s approach to the adjustment valuation
- [76]
[76] In answer, Kiri pointed out that Ms Harfouche’s position had consistently been that her chosen valuation of DyStar was derived by comparing the comparable companies’ EV/Revenue to their EBITDA-Capex margins in FY 2017 to derive the value of DyStar (see [54] above). Thus, Senda was wrong to allege that her valuation approach (which involved the use of different valuation methods: see the “football field” at [52] above) was based solely from the same.
- [77]
[77] Neither Kiri nor Ms Harfouche had ever said that her chosen valuation was the result of an “amalgamation” of her DCF method and various markets-based approach methods. The term “amalgamation” had been used by the SICC in the context of the valuation approaches that Ms Harfouche had adopted - namely the DCF method and the market-based approaches. It was not used to describe an amalgamation of respective valuations that Ms Harfouche obtained from those approaches. Ms Harfouche’s chosen valuation for DyStar was selected by comparing the comparable companies’ EV/Revenue to their EBITDA-Capex margins in FY 2017.
- [78]
[78] Kiri referred to the SICC’s understanding of her approach and in particular directed attention to a passage in the Second Valuation Judgment in which the SICC described Ms Harfouche’s valuation methodology, which has been quoted earlier in this judgment (see [16] above).
- [79]
[79] Kiri took issue with Senda’s contention that, by deriving her valuation solely by comparing the comparable companies’ EV/Revenue to their EBITDA-Capex margins in FY 2017, Ms Harfouche was able to maximise the value of Kiri’s shares in DyStar by negating the impact of the various SICC-directed adjustments in Senda’s favour. Kiri pointed to the SICC’s finding in the First Valuation Judgment that (at [133]):
- [80]
[80] Kiri also took issue with Senda’s contention that Ms Harfouche’s insistence that her valuation approach was solely a methodology under the market-based approach allowed her to side-step the SICC’s direction that a DLOM of 19% should be applicable. Kiri pointed out that in the Joint Expert Report, Ms Harfouche deducted a DLOM of 19% from her final value of her chosen valuation of DyStar. In the same vein, the final valuation of Kiri’s shares in DyStar, which the SICC found to be US$481.6m, was arrived at after deducting a DLOM of 19%.
Conclusion on Senda’s criticism of Ms Harfouche’s valuation methodology as applied to the SICC-directed adjustments
- [81]
[81] There was no impermissible arbitrariness in the approach adopted by Ms Harfouche in her valuation methodology when considering the adjustments which she was required to make. The SICC did not err in its consideration of her application of that methodology. It gave a perfectly comprehensible explanation of the difference in approach between valuation of the impact of the Patent Expirations and the other adjustments to be made (see [68] above). This court accepts the substance of the submissions on this issue by Kiri. Senda’s challenge under Appeal Issue 2 does not succeed.
Appeal Issue 3: Closures of the Nanjing Plant and the Wuxi Plant
The SICC’s reasoning
- [82]
[82] DyStar had a dye production plant at Nanjing in China. The Nanjing Plant suffered an explosion on 23 February 2018 (ie, it was a pre-valuation date event and undisputedly relevant to the valuation of DyStar). It was common ground that, after the explosion, dye production at the Nanjing Plant was not viable. The SICC found that, following the explosion, the Nanjing Plant had been shut down and “alternative sources for all products concerned” had to be identified (see First Valuation Judgment at [157]).
- [83]
[83] DyStar also had a plant at Wuxi in China. The Wuxi Plant was what had been described as a “finishing plant” in the production of dyes as distinct from a “synthesis plant” of the kind like the Nanjing Plant (see First Valuation Judgment at [165]). DyStar had been notified in 2014 of the intention of the Chinese authorities to acquire and redevelop the land on which the Wuxi Plant was built. The plan was put into motion in 2017 and the Chinese authorities expected the site to be vacated by the end of 2019. On 22 July 2019, the Wuxi New District Land Reversion Centre issued a notice requiring the reversion of the plot of land occupied by the Wuxi Plant to be completed by 31 December 2019. As a result, production at the Wuxi Plant had to cease (see First Valuation Judgment at [164]). The closure of the Wuxi Plant was a foreseeable event as at the valuation date and therefore relevant to the valuation of DyStar (see First Valuation Judgment at [164]).
- [84]
[84] The SICC took the view that the loss of the Nanjing Plant did not significantly impact upon the valuation of DyStar (see First Valuation Judgment at [157]).
- [85]
[85] Two of the classes of dyes produced at the Nanjing Plant, Vat dyes and cationic dyes were characterised by Mr Ruan, a director and chairman of the board of directors of DyStar (see [5(h)] above), as small volume businesses with a lot of issues (see First Valuation Judgment at [158]). The SICC noted that Mr Ruan’s evidence on this point was not contradicted (see First Valuation Judgment at [158]). Besides Vat and cationic dyes, the Nanjing Plant also produced Indigo solution dyes, which represented about 50% of the Indigo solution production capacity of DyStar (see First Valuation Judgment at [158]).
- [86]
[86] The SICC held that there was ample evidence that DyStar had prepared a contingency plan to ameliorate the impact of the closure of the Nanjing Plant (see First Valuation Judgment at [159]).
(a) In 2018, part of its Indigo dye production was moved to DyStar’s manufacturing facility in Ludwigshafen, Germany and toll manufacturing arrangements by which DyStar outsourced its production were also entered into. Production of cationic and Vat dyes was also relocated.
(b) The tolling fees associated with the relocation of the Indigo dye production were held to be insignificant, or at least offset by the revenue earned from the tolling arrangements. Ms Harfouche had given unrefuted evidence that the arrangements had generated significant revenue.
- [87]
[87] Further, there was evidence that DyStar had concrete plans in place for the long term (see First Valuation Judgment at [160]). The SICC held that there was no evidential basis for Senda’s contention that the measures adopted and available to DyStar would not be sufficient to mitigate the effects of the closure of the Nanjing Plant (see First Valuation Judgment at [161]).
- [89]
[89] Having regard to the foregoing, the SICC held that no amendment to Ms Harfouche’s interim valuation of US$1,636m was required in respect of the closure of the Nanjing Plant.
- [90]
[90] As to the closure of the Wuxi Plant, the SICC accepted, contrary to Kiri’s submission, that a finishing plant is as important as a dye synthesis plant in the context of DyStar’s dye production operations (see First Valuation Judgment at [165]-[166]). The real question was whether contingency plans were put in place given that DyStar had been made aware, in 2014, of the Chinese authorities’ intention to close the Wuxi Plant (see First Valuation Judgment at [166]).
- [91]
[91] The SICC said that it was inconceivable that DyStar would not have prepared for a future post-2019 without the Wuxi Plant, bearing in mind the importance of the Wuxi Plant in DyStar’s production chain (see First Valuation Judgment at [167]). There was evidence of numerous contingency plans. The SICC referred to relevant DyStar Board packs. It held that regardless of whether the Wuxi Plant was a finishing plant or a production plant, it remained the case that there were sufficient contingency plans in place to ameliorate any potential or deleterious effects that the closure might have had on DyStar’s valuation (see First Valuation Judgment at [168]). No amendment to Ms Harfouche’s interim valuation of US$1,636m was therefore required in respect of that risk event (see First Valuation Judgment at [169]).
Senda’s submissions
- [92]
[92] In its challenge to these findings, Senda argued that the SICC failed to consider the limitations of the contingency plans in relation to the closure of the Nanjing Plant and the Wuxi Plant. It also argued that the SICC had erred in accepting Ms Harfouche’s evidence in relation to tolling fee arrangements.
- [93]
[93] Senda referred to the evidence of Mr Hopmann, DyStar’s CEO (see [21] above), about the global distribution of DyStar’s manufacturing sites and the significance of the Nanjing Plant in the production of textile dyes. Only that site was “multi-purpose” — capable of manufacturing a diverse range of products. The Nanjing Plant was the main production centre for certain key products of the DyStar group. It represented about 50% of the Indigo solution production capabilities of the DyStar group. The Nanjing Plant was said to have accounted for 25.8% and 28% of the total textile dye production volume of the entire DyStar group in 2016 and 2017. According to Mr Hopmann’s evidence, the Nanjing Plant had been by far the most important manufacturing centre of the entire group. It was also operationally synergistic with the Wuxi Plant. Senda argued that Mr Hopmann’s evidence on the importance of the Nanjing Plant had not been challenged in cross-examination.
- [94]
[94] Senda submitted that the SICC had erroneously accepted evidence of contingency measures at face value by assuming that the presence of mitigating measures per se would completely negate the negative impact of the closure of the Nanjing Plant. Senda argued that the SICC had not given proper consideration to the limitations of those mitigating measures. The SICC was said to have disregarded clear and unchallenged evidence that Senda had adduced on that issue. As Senda noted, the SICC had refused to accept Mr Hopmann’s evidence because it was of the view that he had not provided any evidential basis and those portions of his affidavit of evidence-in-chief on the limitations of the contingency measures comprised bare assertions (see also First Valuation Judgment at [161]). Senda argued that the SICC erred in doing so because Mr Hopmann did not merely make bare allegations, but had “opined” on the limits to these mitigating measures.
- [95]
[95] Senda relied upon Mr Hopmann’s opinions that there were limits to the various mitigating measures:
(a) Even if DyStar’s production capacity at the Nanjing Plant was outsourced, time was still required for the production facilities of outsourced production sites to be upgraded, and in any case, those other production sites had limited capacity.
(b) The cost of production, in particular higher labour costs in Japan and Germany, would reduce profitability.
(c) Outsourcing to third parties necessarily diminished DyStar’s profit margins. This proposition, accepted by the SICC in relation to the Wuxi Plant, should have applied to the Nanjing Plant closure as well. Senda placed reliance upon DyStar’s November 2018 Board Pack, which recorded that outsourcing would completely erode DyStar’s profit margin. It also referred to import duties imposed on Indigo dyes, which had the strongest demand in China. There was also the cost of transporting raw materials and Indigo dyes to and from DyStar’s other production centres in and out of China, which when coupled with tax, would further erode DyStar’s profit margin.
(d) Increased competition in the market arising from imports from India for textile dyes, which would result in a lower ASP (as defined at [21] above) for DyStar, was not something that would have been addressed by short or long-term mitigating measures.
(e) DyStar’s own “stringent criteria on environmental standards” were also said to have made potential outsourcing difficult.
- [96]
[96] Senda relied upon DyStar management’s quantitative projections based on what was known to them at the relevant time, backed up by historical data and their own assessment of market sentiment. It was critical of the SICC’s consideration of DyStar’s May 2018 and November 2018 Board Packs. Senda submitted that had the SICC properly addressed the importance of the Nanjing Plant and weighed that against the effectiveness (and not merely the existence) of various short-term and long-term contingency plans, it would have concluded that DyStar’s production capabilities as well as revenue would be gravely impacted by the closure of the Nanjing Plant. Therefore, the SICC should have taken that factor into account in the valuation of DyStar.
- [97]
[97] As to the Wuxi Plant, Senda again invoked Mr Hopmann’s evidence on the importance of the plant to the DyStar group as a whole:
(a) The Wuxi Plant had a production capacity of 6,000MT per year. Together with the Nanjing Plant, the Wuxi Plant accounted for approximately 70% of the total production of Vat dyes for the DyStar group.
(b) Historical production data showed that the Wuxi Plant generated sales of between US$55.7m to US$73.1m annually. The Wuxi Plant alone accounted for 9.8% of the total textile dye production volume of the DyStar group for 2017, which amounted to 3.2% of the DyStar group’s annual production capacity.
(c) The Nanjing Plant and the Wuxi Plant were the DyStar group’s only production sites in China and they accounted for approximately 17.4% to 22% of the DyStar group’s total revenue and 22.7% to 29.2% of its revenue on textile dyes in the five years preceding 2018. With the closure of the plants, the DyStar group was completely exposed to market forces and price fluctuations by its suppliers in respect of its business in the Chinese dye market.
- [98]
[98] Senda argued that Mr Hopmann’s evidence on the importance of the Wuxi Plant had not been controverted at the valuation proceedings. Senda points to how the SICC had agreed with and accepted as evidence, that given its function as a “finishing plant”, the Wuxi Plant was a “separate but indispensable part of DyStar’s entire integrated operation” (see First Valuation Judgment at [166]). Again, Senda argued the SICC erred by equating the existence of contingency plans with their efficacy to negate or ameliorate all potential deleterious effects that the Wuxi Plant closure might have on DyStar’s valuation, as it has done for the Nanjing Plant (see [96] above).
- [99]
[99] Senda referred to evidence relied upon by the SICC in arriving at its conclusion that sufficient contingency plans had been put in place to ameliorate any potential deleterious effects that the closure of the Wuxi Plant might have had on DyStar’s valuation (see First Valuation Judgment at [167]-[168]), including:
(a) Statements of intent in DyStar’s Salient Features Memorandum 2018 to relocate the Wuxi functions to Cilegon, Indonesia.
(b) Statements in the November 2018 Board Pack that DyStar was prepared to use three other plants to replace the role that the Wuxi Plant had played in its operations.
(c) Statements in the May and November 2019 Board Packs that DyStar was to transfer the processes for Vat and cationic dyes to Omuta, Japan and that the necessary infrastructure was to be relocated from the Wuxi Plant to Omuta and Gabus, Indonesia.
- [100]
[100] The SICC had disagreed with the proposition that notwithstanding these mitigating measures, there would still be a long-term negative impact on DyStar group’s production capacity (see First Valuation Judgment at [168]). Again, Senda challenged the SICC’s finding that Mr Hopmann “could only offer unsubstantiated assertions that DyStar’s production capacity would be affected in the long-term”. This was said to have ignored the body of evidence before the SICC.
- [102]
[102] Senda also referred to the May 2019 Board Pack which acknowledged that there was no solution for domestically sold products as it was highly uncompetitive to import finished products from Indonesia or Japan to China. Thus, Senda argued that the contingency plans were only effective in so far as the production of dyes for markets outside China was concerned. They could not eradicate the negative financial impact arising from loss in sales from the Chinese market.
- [103]
[103] Mr Hopmann’s evidence that the quality control requirements for products manufactured in the Wuxi Plant, as well as stringent eco-profiles, meant that the outsourcing process to other plants would be difficult and laborious. According to Mr Hopmann, DyStar’s management had predicted that with mitigation efforts, DyStar would recover around 40% of the Wuxi Plant’s production and sales. This was because management had anticipated a gradual reduction in ASP given the increased competition in the textile dye industry. Senda therefore submitted that management’s prediction of only 40% recoverability of loss production and revenue owing to the closure of the Wuxi Plant (as opposed to the SICC’s finding of no negative impact whatsoever, ie, 100% recoverability) was reasonable.
- [105]
[105] In the event, Senda argued that if this court were of the view that the closures of the Nanjing Plant and the Wuxi Plant would have an impact on the valuation of DyStar, the only evidence before this court is the assessed impact by DyStar’s management and Mr Lie. It was submitted therefore that this court should accept that evidence as the only available evidence on the issue. Mr Lie’s view had been that the closures of the Nanjing Plant and the Wuxi Plant would lead to a US$17.1m and US$18.1m drop in DyStar’s maintainable EBITDA respectively.
Kiri’s submissions
- [106]
[106] In its Respondent’s Case, Kiri pointed to the absence of an evidential basis for Mr Hopmann’s views on the insufficiency of the various mitigating measures in respect of the Nanjing Plant. Ms Harfouche had observed in her second expert report that neither Mr Lie nor Mr Hopmann had disclosed any actual production data to support their projections. It also pointed to how Mr Hopmann had not produced any evidence regarding the breakdown of the sales figures of the Wuxi Plant based on DyStar’s domestic and overseas markets. When asked in the valuation proceedings to confirm that the closure of the Wuxi Plant would not impact DyStar significantly because only the domestic Chinese market would be affected, Mr Hopmann had replied:
- [107]
[107] At that time DyStar was already thinking of moving production out of its plants in China, having regard to increasingly stringent environmental regulations in that country. Kiri referred to evidence by Mr Hopmann to that effect. The February 2020 Model (see [4] above), said by Senda to have been arrived at through “a meticulous consideration” of various factors, was dismissed by Kiri. Kiri pointed to how Senda’s own expert witness Mr Lie had highlighted the failure of the February 2020 Model to account for the estimated gross margin reductions arising from the closures of the Nanjing Plant and the Wuxi Plant. Mr Lie said those figures were not documented in the DyStar forecast model. Mr Lie said it appeared that it was a commercial judgment by DyStar’s management.
- [108]
[108] Nor did the February 2020 Model account for the estimation of the amount of revenue mitigated by outsourcing or using excess production capacities in other factories arising from the closures of the Nanjing Plant and the Wuxi Plant. Kiri pointed to how Mr Lie had been unable to comment on the percentage of the mitigation estimated by the management of DyStar as he did not have the production capacity of all products in DyStar’s dye producing factory.
- [109]
[109] This was also the case with respect to DyStar’s EBITDA margin in 2023 as stated in the April 2019 Forecasts.
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