Court of Appeal · Decided 31 January 2025
Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another and another appeal
Feedback & support[2025] SGCA(I) 1 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 4 of 2024 · 39 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] These appeals concern the orders (the “Orders”) made by the Singapore International Commercial Court (the “SICC”) against a majority shareholder, Senda International Capital Ltd (“Senda”), for oppression of a minority shareholder, Kiri Industries Ltd (“Kiri”), in the conduct of the affairs of a Singapore-incorporated private company, viz, DyStar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“DyStar”), in which they are both members. CA/CAS 4/2024 (“CAS 4”) and CA/CAS 5/2024 (“CAS 5”) are Kiri’s and Senda’s respective appeals against the Orders of the SICC (collectively, the “Appeals”).
- [2]
[2] While DyStar is nominally the second respondent in CAS 4, and is represented in the Appeals before us, it has taken no position on the Appeals (ie, it filed no written submissions and abstained from making oral submissions at the hearing before us on 12 November 2024). Thus, subsequent references to the “parties” should be read as referring to Kiri and Senda – to the exclusion of DyStar.
- [3]
[3] The oppression proceedings were commenced by Kiri on 26 June 2015. A brief chronology of events is set out in the judgment under appeal (see Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another [2024] SGHC(I) 14 (the “Judgment”) at [3]–[4]). A more extensive chronology may be found in the SICC’s prior decisions (see Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another [2023] 3 SLR 140 at [1]–[5] and Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another [2023] SGHC(I) 4 (the “Valuation”) at [2]–[4]). There is no need to restate that history here.
- [5]
[5] On 20 May 2024, the SICC delivered the Judgment presently under appeal, which both set out its reasoning supporting the Orders made on 23 February 2024 and extracted on 1 March 2024 and made the following additional Orders (see the Judgment at [84(a)]–[84(b)]):
- [6]
[6] The SICC also rejected a claim by Kiri that it was entitled to interest or payment in the nature of interest on the purchase price of US$603.8m running from 3 April 2023 – ie, one month from the date that the SICC determined the final value of Kiri’s shares in its Valuation (see at [4] above) – until the date Kiri receives the purchase price (see the Judgment at [7] and [67]). Nor was Kiri entitled to any adjustment to the sum of the purchase price (viz, US$603.8m) to account for interest thereon (see the Judgment at [80]–[83]).
The reasoning of the SICC in its Judgment below
The reasoning of the SICC on the Priority Order
- [7]
[7] The Judgment set out the reasoning which led to the substitution of an en bloc sale for a buy-out at the valuation of US$603.8m previously determined by the SICC. In explaining its conclusion, the SICC said (see the Judgment at [36]):
- [11]
[11] The SICC referred to two paragraphs from the Main Judgment in which it had said (see the Judgment at [54]; see also the Main Judgment at [278]–[279]):
The reasoning of the SICC on an upward adjustment of the value to be received by Kiri from the en bloc sale to account for interest on the purchase price of Kiri’s shares
- [19]
[19] The SICC referred to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “SCJA”) which provides for the award of post-judgment interest. Section 18 of the SCJA and para 6 of the First Schedule to the SCJA were said to be relevant (see the Judgment at [70]). Section 18 of the SCJA reads as follows:
- [20]
[20] Paragraph 6 of the First Schedule under the heading “Interest” provides:
- [25]
[25] Although the SICC held that it did not have the power to award post-judgment interest, that did not mean that it had no power to account for interest (see the Judgment at [75]). The SICC referred to two ways, set out in Yeo Hung Khiang (at [23]), in which an oppressed shareholder may be compensated for being kept out of its money (see the Judgment at [76]):
(a) First, the court may calculate an interest factor separately from the value of the shareholding. This interest factor may then be added to the value of the shareholding to arrive at a fair price at which the minority’s shares should be purchased. This was said to be in line with the Australian case of Coombs v Dynasty Pty Ltd and others (1994) 14 ACSR 60.
- [26]
[26] The SICC then considered whether it should account for interest in the case that was before it. The SICC noted that interest formed no part of its original decision because Kiri did not ask for it in the first tranche of the proceedings resulting in the Main Judgment. In ordering substitute relief to give effect to its original decision, the SICC was not obliged to award any interest in favour of Kiri, there being none awarded in the Main Judgment to begin with (see the Judgment at [81]).
- [28]
[28] Hence, the SICC concluded as such on Kiri’s claim for interest (see the Judgment at [83]):
Issues to be decided
- [30]
[30] We hence proceed to consider the following two issues:
(b) secondly, whether adjustments should be made to the value to be received by Kiri from the net sale proceeds of the en bloc sale to account for interest on the purchase price (ie, CAS 4).
CAS 5
Senda’s submissions on the Priority Order
(b) The primary decision in the Main Judgment covered only the finding of minority oppression and not the consequential orders made with a view to bringing to an end or remedying the oppression. It was not part of the primary decision that Kiri was to receive the buy-out sum of US$603.8m for the sale of its 37.57% shareholding in DyStar. The SICC erred in holding to the contrary.
- [37]
[37] Moreover, Senda submits that there is a distinction between the primary or main orders of the SICC and the consequential orders for relief. The SICC is said to have erred in rejecting that distinction.
(a) reached beyond the proper purpose of consequential orders under s 216(2) of the Companies Act – specifically to fairly bring an end to or remedy the oppression without penalising the oppressive party.
Kiri’s submissions on the Priority Order
- [49]
[49] Kiri further submits that impecuniosity is not a sufficient reason to deprive the oppressed minority shareholder of the assessed value of its shareholding, citing the English Court of Appeal Civil Division decision in Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430 (at 436–437 (per Lawton LJ)) and the English High Court Chancery Division case of Re Ghyll Beck Driving Range Ltd [1993] BCLC 1126 (at 1134 (per Vinelott J)) to derive such a proposition. Further, it is said to be unfair to expose Kiri to the risk of fluctuations in the market price of the shares in DyStar, when DyStar’s business operations were under the control of Senda.
- [50]
[50] Kiri relies upon the reasoning by the SICC in DyStar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kiri Industries Ltd and another [2022] 3 SLR 1 at [76] to the effect that the Main Judgment effected a “clean break” between the parties in DyStar on 3 July 2018. It reasons therefrom that any fluctuations in DyStar’s share price should not affect the amount which Kiri should receive for its shares, the date of valuation for which had already been fixed in the Main Judgment, with Senda being presumed to have bought out Kiri’s interest in DyStar upon the parties’ “clean break” on 3 July 2018 (ie, the date of valuation in the SICC’s Main Judgment).
- [52]
[52] In the proceedings before the SICC below, Senda had relied upon Snell v Glatis (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 166 (“Snell”), a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (see the Judgment at [58]). In that case, the relevant company had been placed in solvent liquidation by the court, which – in the words of the SICC below – “would naturally result in proceeds from the realisation of the assets of the company being shared pro rata to the parties’ respective equity” (Judgment at [59]). Kiri agrees with the SICC’s reasoning that Senda’s reliance on Snell was misplaced and contends that the distribution of the proceeds of a solvent liquidation cannot be extended by analogy to the distribution of the proceeds of an en bloc sale.
Consideration and conclusions
- [53]
[53] The starting point in considering the respective submissions of the parties must be s 216 of the Companies Act. The relevant parts of s 216 provide as follows:
- [55]
[55] Relevant to the kind of relief to be granted in exercise of the remedial discretion in s 216(2), this Court observed in the Valuation Appeal Judgment at [219] that:
CAS 4
Kiri’s submissions on a discretionary adjustment to account for interest
- [59]
[59] In CAS 4, Kiri appeals against the decision of the SICC that no interest on the purchase price of US$603.8m should be imposed from 3 April 2023 until the date that Kiri receives the purchase price.
- [60]
[60] Kiri identifies the following grounds in its appeal against the SICC’s exercise of discretion to decline to account for interest in its Orders below:
(c) The SICC erred in applying the principles for exercising its discretion. In weighing the balance of justice, the SICC ought not to have placed the burden of bearing the consequences of the receivers’ delay in effecting the en bloc sale fully on Kiri.
- [62]
[62] Kiri submits that its inability to use the purchase price has delayed its own business plans and that it has had to borrow moneys to fund its operations. It invokes the fairness principle under s 216(2) of the Companies Act, which it maintains dictates that it should be awarded interest for being kept out of the purchase price that was due to it.
- [63]
[63] Kiri disclaims any claim for interest on a debt under the SCJA. Nor did it make a claim for interest on “debt or damages” under s 12(1) of the Civil Law Act. Kiri points out that the SICC had accepted that it had the power, in the interests of effecting justice, to make orders recognising an interest factor in its Orders for substitute relief below.
- [64]
[64] Kiri refers to the observation by this Court in the Valuation Appeal Judgment at [323], in which it was said that:
- [65]
[65] Kiri submits that the purpose of an award reflecting an interest factor is to compensate it for being kept out of the purchase price because it is deprived of the benefit of the use of the purchase price until its shares are purchased.
- [66]
[66] The SICC is said to have erred in assuming that Kiri had not raised the issue of interest at the liability tranche. Interest had not formed any part of its original decision in its Main Judgment. It saw that as an obstacle to Kiri’s claim for interest. However, Kiri says that it had raised the question of interest at the liability tranche but that it was deferred twice by the SICC, first to the valuation stage and then to the enforcement stage. The SICC therefore declined to consider Kiri’s claim for interest on the erroneous premise that Kiri had not sought interest at the liability tranche of the proceedings.
- [67]
[67] Kiri sets out a chronology of relevant events, which includes the following:
(a) The Main Judgment on liability was issued on 3 July 2018 and a Case Management Conference (“CMC”) was fixed for parties to address the SICC on “any other questions relevant to the valuation of Kiri’s shareholding”.
(f) In its oral judgment dated 8 January 2019, the SICC said (at [9]) that:
- [72]
[72] Kiri submits that the approach of dealing with interest subsequent to the liability stage is consistent with case law and refers to the practice adopted by the English High Court Chancery Division in cases such as Estera Trust, Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd [2010] EWHC 3334 (Ch) and Wells v Hornshaw and others [2024] EWHC 970 (Ch). Kiri points out that its original statement of claim in its oppression action had included a prayer for “[s]uch other orders or reliefs as this Honourable Court deems fit”, and this prayer covered any interest due to Kiri in the event of a delay in receiving the purchase price from Senda.
- [75]
[75] Kiri submits, in the alternative, that if the prime lending rate of the State Bank of India is not adopted by the Court, it should use the USD prime lending rate, given that the purchase price of US$603.8m was denominated in USD (see the Valuation at [5]). Evidence before the SICC showed that the Bank of America’s prime rate was 8% as of 23 March 2023 and 8.2% as of 4 May 2023.
- [77]
[77] Assuming interest is to run from 3 March 2024 to 3 March 2026, Kiri calculates that the total interest would be as follows: (a) on the application of the prime lending rate of the State Bank of India at 14.85% per annum, total interest would amount to about US$179.33m; (b) applying the USD prime lending rate of 8% per annum, the total interest would be about US$96.61m; and (c) based on the statutory interest rate of 5.33%, the amount would be about US$64.37m.
Senda’s submissions on a discretionary adjustment to account for interest
- [78]
[78] Senda submits that the Court has no power to award post-judgment interest on the assessed value of Kiri’s shares in DyStar. The Court’s power to award interest is prescribed in s 18(2) of, read with para 6 of the First Schedule to, the SCJA (the text of which was reproduced at [19]–[20] above).
- [81]
[81] Senda seeks to extend the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Yeo Hung Khiang beyond the award of pre-judgment interest to post-judgment interest. It relies upon the following passage at [16] of the decision in Yeo Hung Khiang:
- [83]
[83] Senda also submits that it was an abuse of process for Kiri to have attempted to seek an award of post-judgment interest from the SICC below after having failed in its previous attempt before the SICC.
- [87]
[87] Senda goes on to contend that there is no basis for a discretionary enhancement to be made on the value of Kiri’s shares. In Senda’s view, the factors weighing against discretionary enhancement in the value of Kiri’s shares from 3 April 2023 to completion of the en bloc sale are that:
(c) The en bloc sale is being conducted through a process managed and controlled by court-appointed independent receivers. There is a possibility of delay due to factors entirely out of either of the parties’ control. On that basis, it is highly inappropriate for Senda alone to bear the consequence of any delay in completion of the en bloc sale. Senda refers to the analysis of the SICC in its Judgment below (at [83]), which reasoned to the same effect.
- [88]
[88] Senda refers to its alternative proposal in CAS 5 to address the impact of its oppressive conduct vis-à-vis the value of DyStar (see at [40] above).
- [89]
[89] Finally, Senda submits that the interest rates proffered by Kiri – viz, the State Bank of India’s benchmark prime lending rate at 14.85% and the USD prime lending rate at 8% or 8.2% – are inappropriate for various reasons and should therefore be rejected by this Court. Senda purports to reserve the right to propose a fair interest rate if the Court was minded to “impose a post-judgment interest” against Senda and/or DyStar.
Consideration and conclusions
- [93]
[93] The principle of “fairness” underpinning the remedial discretion to formulate relief under s 216(2) of the Companies Act (see at [54]–[55] above) allows the Court to make orders enhancing the amount to be paid for the shares of the oppressed shareholder, taking into account any period of delay in their realisation.
- [94]
[94] Having regard to Kiri’s submissions in relation to the way in which the issue was approached below (see at [67]–[71] above), this Court does not consider that Kiri is precluded from asserting a claim for discretionary enhancement of the value to be received by Kiri from the en bloc sale for its shareholding, calculated by reference to an appropriate interest rate. The Court finds, however, that the calculation in this case should not be informed by the higher interest rates applicable to commercial borrowings whether in India or in the United States.
Costs
CAS 4
CAS 5
- [99]
[99] The usual consequential orders shall apply.