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Grounds publishedDecided 1 Aug 2025

District Court

[2025] SGDC 195

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[2025] SGDC 195Case no. District Court Originating Application No 65 of 2024District Court Summons No 1008 of 202424 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. District Court Originating Application No 65 of 2024 (District Court Summons No 1008 of 2024) District Judge Chiah Kok Khun

  2. Introduction

  3. [2] The claimant is in the business of running and operating the Intercontinental Hotel Singapore at 80 Middle Road (the “Hotel”).

  4. [3] The 1st defendant’s business profile with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”) states that it carries out the business of an investment holding company and the development of software, web portals and e-commerce. It does not appear however that the 1st defendant has carried out any business since its incorporation. The 2nd defendant is at all material times a director and shareholder of the 1st defendant. The 2nd defendant owns 2,358,900 shares in the 3,000,000 fully paid-up share capital of the 1st defendant. His son Mr Lee Puay Hien (“Mr Lee”), who was formerly a director of the 1st defendant, owns the remaining 641,100 shares.

  5. [6] The 1st and 2nd defendant’s answer to the claimant’s application is that the 1st defendant does not have any asset or means to make payment of the sum. The 2nd defendant also separately contends that the defendants are victims of a fraud perpetuated by one Murray Teo Kar Boon (“Murray Teo”), which resulted in the 1st defendant incurring the Judgment Debt.

  6. Issues to be determined

  7. [7] The issues to be decided by me in this case are as follows:

  8. Analysis and findings

  9. The statutory provisions

  10. [8] I begin with the relevant statutory provisions, found in the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (“AJPA”).

  11. [9] Section 4(1) of the AJPA provides as follows:

  12. [11] It is seen that an officer of a corporation which is found guilty of contempt of court is deemed to be guilty of the same contempt committed by the corporation if he consented to or knew or ought to have known of the commission of contempt by the corporation.

  13. The underlying dispute between the parties was precipitated by Murray Teo

  14. [12] With the above statutory provisions in mind, I turn to the material facts relevant to the application.

  15. [13] The claim made by the claimant at the SCT that culminated in the Judgment Debt stems from services provided at the Hotel a year earlier, in November 2022. These services were provided to the representatives and guests of the 1st defendant, on the 1st defendant’s account, between 7 November 2022 and 30 November 2022. They amounted to $23,839.62.

  16. [14] Prior to the expenses of $23,839.62 being incurred, the claimant had granted credit facilities of $10,000 to 1st defendant. The events leading to the claimant granting the credit facilities are as follows.

  17. [15] On 21 October 2022, the claimant received an email from a Ms Atthapon enquiring on behalf of the 1st defendant about:

  18. [16] On 25 October 2022, Ms Atthapon sent an email to the claimant requesting for credit facilities of $20,000 to be extended to the 1st defendant. She forwarded as supporting documents the following: a) a completed credit application form; b) the 1st defendant’s financial statements as at 30 June 2022; and c) the 1st defendant’s ACRA profile dated 9 April 2022. The credit application was imprinted with the 1st defendant’s company stamp and signed by two persons, namely a Huang Zuming (“Mr Huang”) and Murray Teo. Their job titles were indicated as director and finance manager respectively. The set of 1st defendant’s financial statements carried the signatures of both Mr Huang and Murray Lee. The 1st defendant’s ACRA profile showed the directors of the 1st defendant to be Mr Huang and Murray Teo. It also showed Ms Atthapon as a shareholder of the 1st defendant.

  19. [17] On 28 October 2022, the claimant approved 1st defendant’s application and granted credit facilities of $10,000 to the 1st defendant. The approval was granted on the strength of the documents referred to above. Following the approval, services amounting to $23,839.62 were provided at the Hotel to the representatives and guests of the 1st Defendant at the Hotel between 7 November 2022 and 30 November 2022.

  20. [19] Mr Lee, at the behest of the 2nd defendant wrote to the Singapore Hotel Association on 14 April 2023 to alert them of Murray Teo’s fraudulent conduct of using the 1st defendant to apply for credit facilities from hotels, using services from the hotels and not paying for them. On 2 August 2023 Mr Huang and Ms Attaphon were removed as director and shareholder respectively from the 1st defendant.

  21. [20] The claimant’s case is that there was nothing in the documents submitted by Ms Atthapon that suggested that any of them were false. There was also nothing uncommon with the claimant allowing Murray Teo to accrue services of $23,839.62, beyond the approved credit limit of $10,000, as it is the common practice in the hotel industry to address its customers’ accounts at the end of a hotel stay. By that, the claimant is essentially saying that it should not be faulted for been deceived by Murray Teo and allowing him to chalk up services provided by the Hotel to the amount of $23,839.62. The 2nd defendant’s position on the other hand is that Murray Teo had cheated him, Mr Lee and the claimant; and in fact many others. He contends that the 1st defendant should not be liable to the claimant for the services utilised by Murray Teo.

  22. No evidence that the 1st defendant has the means to pay up on the Judgment Debt and the Costs Order

  23. [25] As seen, not all failures to comply with court orders are deemed contemptuous. The requisite mens rea for contempt must be proven. The Court of Appeal provided valuable guidance as regards what the requisite mens rea might look like. In Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 (“Mok Kah Hong”) at [86], the Court of Appeal stated:

  24. [27] It should also be noted that the applicable standard of proof is that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt: The Court of Appeal stated in Mok Kah Hong at [85]:

  25. [28] Before I turn to the question of whether the 1st defendant in the present application acted with the requisite mental element for contempt to be established, I note that committal proceedings should be brought as a remedy of last resort. In this regard, the claimant referred to a distinction between using committal proceedings as a remedy of last resort and the requirement of having to exhaust all other alternative remedies before resorting to committal proceedings. The claimant is effectively contending that it is not obliged to exhaust all other remedies and forms of enforcement before applying for committal proceedings against the defendants. The claimant referred to Mok Kah Hong at [96] in this regard.

  26. [29] However, this does not detract from the accepted principle that committal proceedings remain a remedy of last resort. The Court of Appeal stated in Mok Kah Hong at [96] as follows:

  27. [35] In this regard, I would add that the 2nd defendant’s assertion in his AEIC that he has called for payment of the unpaid shares from both himself and Mr Tan; and that both of them have been unable to pay up on the issued shares, is neither here nor there. The 2nd defendant’s assertion has no bearing on my findings one way or the other.

  28. The 2nd defendant is not in a position to ensure that the 1st defendant pay up on the Judgment Debt and the Costs Order

  29. [39] There must be evidence that a director has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or stop the commission of that contempt of court. This is seen in Neo Chin Heng at [33], where the High Court stated as follows:

  30. [42] In the present case, there is no such evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the 1st defendant’s failure to make payment was intentional and not due to its impecuniosity. There was certainly no expert valuation report which showed that the 1st defendant had the means to pay the judgment debt but chose not to do so. There is also no further evidence that the 1st defendant had no intention of satisfying the judgment debt.

  31. [43] As well for completeness, I note that it is not the claimant’s case that there is collusion between the defendants and Murray Teo. Neither is there any evidence of any such collusion. The claimant is also not proceeding on the basis of piercing the corporate veil. In any event, I do not see the basis for the claimant to proceed on this basis.

  32. Conclusion

  33. [46] The burden is on the claimant asserting contemptuous conduct on the part of the defendants to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The claimant has not adduced any evidence to persuade me that the defendants possess the requisite mens rea for contempt.