District Court · Decided 6 February 2025
Goh King Kwee and another v Liu Shu Ming and another
Feedback & support[2025] SGDC 37 · Case no. [2025] SGDC 37
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
The parties
- [1]
[1] The Claimants and Defendants in Counterclaim are husband and wife. The 1st Claimant and 1st Defendant in Counterclaim, Mr Goh King Kwee (“Mr Goh”), was formerly an engineer and is now retired . The 2nd Claimant and 2nd Defendant in Counterclaim, Mdm Hon Chin Lan (“Mdm Hon”), is working part time as an accounts assistant .
- [2]
[2] The Defendants and Claimants in Counterclaim are also husband and wife. The 1st Defendant and 1st Claimant in Counterclaim, Mr Liu Shu Ming (“Mr Liu”), is a freelance trainer conducting public management training to Chinese government officials and management training to entrepreneurs. He has also taught at Nanyang Technological University . The 2nd Defendant and the 2nd Claimant in Counterclaim, Mdm Tong Xin (“Mdm Tong”) is the wife of Mr Liu. Together they operate several companies in the Philippines and Singapore .
- [3]
[3] The Defendants directed some of their business dealings through a company named Max Property Holding Pte. Ltd. (“Max Property”), an exempt private company limited by shares. The Defendants owned, controlled and were the only directors of Max Property. On or about 4 May 2020, the Defendants struck off Max Property .
Background to the dispute
- [4]
[4] Mr Goh and Mr Liu were schoolmates in Pay Fong Middle School, Melaka Malaysia . In February 2016, at a reunion organised by Pay Fong Middle School Alumni Singapore, Mr Liu and Mdm Tong shared a potential investment opportunity with the attendees . Mr Goh and Mdm Hon expressed their interest to learn more about the investments and a meeting was arranged in or around March 2016 at the Defendants’ offices at 81 Ubi Avenue 4 #05-23 (Ubi One) Singapore 408830 (hereinafter to be referred to as “the March Meeting” and “the Defendants’ Singapore Office” respectively) .
- [5]
[5] At the March Meeting, the Defendants made an investment presentation to the Claimants and proposed and offered for sale to the Claimants two financial instruments . The first was the sale of shares in Max Property and the second was the sale of convertible bonds issued by Max Property .
- [6]
[6] On 7 March 2016, the following agreements were entered into:
(a) Two share sale agreements between Mr Goh and Mdm Hon on one hand and Mr Liu on the other (“the Share Sale Agreements”); and
(b) Two investment agreements between Mr Goh and Mdm Hon one hand and Max Property on the other (“the Investment Agreements”).
- [7]
[7] In or around April 2017, after another meeting at the Defendants’ Singapore Offices (“the April Meeting”), the Claimants entered into a series of agreements with the Defendants for the purchase of an apartment in the Philippines.
(a) The first agreement is for the purchase of a unit at Fort Victoria condominium at Bonifacio Global City, Manila, Philippines (“Fort Victoria”) (“the Purchase Agreement”) .
(b) The second is an agreement for the Defendants to lease the unit at Fort Victoria purchased by the Claimants for a period of three years, that is renewable every three years at a market rate (“the Lease Back Agreement”).
- [8]
[8] Both the Purchase Agreement and the Lease Back Agreement were evinced in contemporaneous documents in the form of a Lease Back Guarantee signed on 21 April 2017 (“the Lease Back Guarantee”) and a receipt issued by both the Defendants on the same day (“the Receipt”).
- [9]
[9] I note that the Lease Back Guarantee and the Receipt do not contain substantive terms and details one would typically expect to be seen and documented in sale and purchase agreements and/or lease agreements. However, this is not an issue that I will need to go into for the purposes of the present judgment as it is not disputed by the Defendants and accepted by all parties that :
(a) There was an agreement for the sale and lease back of a unit at Fort Victoria;
(b) The Lease Back Guarantee was signed by all parties; and
(c) The Receipt was signed and issued by both Defendants.
- [11]
[11] The Defendants however deny that any Oral Agreement was reached and aver that the transfer of the unit sold at Fort Victoria to the Claimants was conditional on the Claimants “paying the transfer fee and government taxes to the Defendants and availing the mandatory documents required to initiate the transfer” .
- [12]
[12] Within the context of the above agreements, issues began to arise between parties in late 2019 when the Defendants stopped making rental payments under the Lease Back Agreement after August 2019 . The disagreements culminated in the present suit which was commenced on 5 May 2022.
Issues to be determined
- [13]
[13] It is the Claimant’s pleaded case that:
(a) Various misrepresentations were made by the Defendants at the March Meeting inducing the Claimants into entering the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements ;
(b) Various misrepresentations were made by the Defendants at the April Meeting inducing the Claimants into entering the Purchase Agreement, the Lease Back Agreement and the Oral Agreement ;
(c) The Defendants breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lease Back Agreement and the Oral Agreement ;
(d) The Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Claimants and are liable to pay the Claimants the sum of S$222,852 ; and/or
(e) The Defendants and Max Property had wrongfully and with intent to injure and/or to cause loss to the Claimants by unlawful means conspired and combined together to cause loss and damage to the Claimant .
- [14]
[14] I note that in the Statement of Claim filed herein , the Claimants have pleaded conspiracy on the part of the Defendants. However, this claim appears to have been abandoned by the Claimants with no cross-examination being conducted on a conspiracy claim at trial and no submissions made on a conspiracy claim in the Claimants’ closing submissions. As such, I will not be addressing the Claimant’s pleaded claims for conspiracy in this judgment.
- [15]
[15] It is the Defendants’ pleaded defence and counterclaim that:
(a) They did not make any misrepresentations ;
(b) The Share Sale Agreements, the Investment Agreements, the Receipt and the Lease Back Guarantee constitute the entire agreement and understanding between parties and no other representations or inducements were made ;
(c) They did not enter into the Oral Agreement ;
(d) The unit stated in the Receipt and Lease Back Guarantee was “incorrect” and “should be 7A14, as unit 10A14 was reclaimed by (the developer of Fort Victoria)” ;
(e) Pursuant to the various agreements between parties, the Claimants are required to pay title transfer fees, parking fees and government taxes (collectively referred to as “Additional Costs” hereinafter) so as to enable the Defendants to effect the transfer of unit 7A14 at Fort Victoria but did not do so in a bid “to frustrate and coerce the Defendants into buying back the Units” ;
(f) The Defendants did not breach any agreements as they were and are ready and willing to finalise the transfer of Unit 7A14 at Fort Victoria to the Claimants upon the payment of the requisite fees and taxes and the provision of the mandatory documentation required to initiate the transfer ; and
(g) The Court should issue orders :
(i) For the Claimants to pay parking fees and title transfer fees amounting to the sums of S$73,650 (“the Parking Fees”) and S$13,400 (“the Transfer Fees”) respectively; and
(ii) Compelling specific performance of the “agreements”.
- [16]
[16] Bearing in mind the above, the issues before me are as follows:
(i) What were the contractual terms agreed to between parties in April 2017?
(ii) whether the Claimants and/or Defendants breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Lease Back Agreement and/or the purported Oral Agreement (“the Property Agreements”);
(iii) whether the Claimants can succeed in their claim for misrepresentation with respect to the Property Agreements; and
(iv) whether the Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of the Claimants in the sum of S$222,852 as a result of there being a total failure of consideration in the Purchase Agreement, the Lease Back Agreement and/or the purported Oral Agreement ;
Plaintiff’s claim for misrepresentation with respect to the Share Sale Agreements and Investment Agreements
- [17]
[17] I now turn to consider the legal principles applicable to the first issue before me.
The law on misrepresentation
- [18]
[18] A misrepresentation is an untrue or misleading statement that induces the formation of a contract: See Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore (Volume 7) (Lexis Nexis, 2023) (“Halsbury’s”) at [80.172]. At its core, a misrepresentation must be false or untrue. To be actionable, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the representation was false: See Changi Makan Pte Ltd v Development 2003 Holding Pte Ltd and others [2020] SGHC 27 (“Changi Makan”) at [64] and [65].
- [19]
[19] A misrepresentation must also be statement of fact, past or present, and not one of opinion, intention or law: See Halsbury’s at [80.173]
- [20]
[20] In the case of Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen and another [2013] 4 SLR 886 (“Deutsche Bank v Chang Tse Wen”) at [83] referring to FoodCo UK LLP (t/a Muffin Break) v Henry Boot Developments Limited [2010] EWHC 358 (Ch) at [198] (“FoodCo UK”), the Court of Appeal observed that:
(a) Statements of future intention are prima facie not statements of fact which could ground a claim in misrepresentation.
(b) However, a statement of future intention can sometimes be re-characterised as a representation of fact.
(c) A statement of future intention might contain an implicit representation that:
(i) Its maker had an honest belief in the statement;
(ii) Its maker had reasonable grounds to make the statement; or
(iii) Its maker had the present intention to carry out the matters expressed in the statement.
- [21]
[21] To be clear, the position above does not change the primary principle that a bare prediction does not attract legal consequences. It merely recognises that a statement about the future may contain a statement about the present. Where misrepresentation is alleged, it is that implicit representation about a present fact rather than the forecast itself that constitutes the actionable representation: See FoodCo UK at [196] and [207].
- [22]
[22] In the context of the above, broadly speaking, a misrepresentation can be made fraudulently, negligently or innocently.
- [24]
[24] Under common law, the elements necessary to make out negligent misrepresentation are as follows (See IM Skaugen SE and another v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE and another [2018] SGHC 123 (“IM Skaugen”) at [121]):
(a) the defendant must have made a false representation of fact;
(b) the representation induced actual reliance;
(c) the defendant must owe a duty of care;
(d) there must be a breach of that duty of care; and
(e) the breach must have caused damage to the plaintiff.
- [25]
[25] In addition to the above, claimants have recourse under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Misrepresentation Act”) which provides that:
- [26]
[26] A claim under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act co-exists with the tort of negligent misrepresentation at common law to perform the same function – to furnish a remedy in damages where none had hitherto (apart from fraud or deceit) existed: See RBC Properties Pte Ltd v Defu Furniture Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 997 (“RBC Properties”) at [66].
- [27]
[27] There are however some crucial differences between a claim advanced under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act and one under the tort of negligent misrepresentation:
(a) The burden of proof to establish all elements in the tort of negligent misrepresentation rests on the claimant. However, under the Misrepresentation Act, once the claimant proves that a false representation has been made to him/her and as a result thereof loss has been suffered by the claimant, the burden of proof shifts to the representor to prove that he/she “had reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented were true”: See RBC Properties at [66]
(b) The remedy under section 2(1) of Misrepresentation Act is restricted and only available to one contracting party against the other contracting party, whereas the tort of negligence applies to all cases where a claimant can establish a duty of care: See RBC Properties at [66] quoting John Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-disclosure (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2012) (“Cartwright”) at [6-64].
(c) While the equitable remedy of recission is always available for every type of misrepresentation, section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act furnishes the claimant with the additional option of claiming damages in lieu of recission: See RBC Properties at [67].
- [28]
[28] Bearing in mind the principles above, I now turn to the facts before me.
The Claimants’ case
- [29]
[29] As stated above, it is not disputed that parties attended the March Meeting at the Defendants’ Singapore Offices and that the Defendants made an investment presentation to the Claimants at the said meeting .
- [30]
[30] The Claimants have pleaded and stated in their Affidavits of Evidence in Chief (“AEIC”) that the following representations were made by the Defendants during the presentation at the March Meeting and that in reliance on the truth of the following representations and induced thereby they had entered into the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements :
(a) The Philippines was a good investment destination with a high potential for returns, especially in the real estate sector (“Representation 1”);
(b) The Defendants had invested into the Philippines and operated a ‘condotel’ business under the name of “Max Stays” where the Defendants purchased apartment units in upmarket condominium developments in choice districts within Metro Manila and let them out to business travellers and tourists in a similar manner as hotel rooms or apartments on Airbnb (“Representation 2”);
(c) The Defendants had identified and purchased about 20 apartment units at a number of developments including (i) Fort Victoria which was located in a safe neighbourhood, being right across the street from the Singapore Embassy in Manila, and (ii) the Venice Luxury Residences at McKinley Hill, Taguig City, Manila, Philippines (the “Venice Residences”) , which was conveniently located next to a huge shopping mall with amenities (“Representation 3”);
(d) The Defendants were intending to make further property investments in Australia and Malaysia (“Representation 4”);
(e) The 1st Defendant was responsible for the growth and financial affairs of the business while the 2nd Defendant was in charge of the day-to-day operations of the business (“Representation 5(a)”), and the Defendants intended to take their business, which was operated primarily through Max Property, public on the Australian Securities Exchange very shortly (“Representation 5b”);
(f) In the event that the Defendants failed to take Max Property public on the Australian Securities Exchange, the Defendants intended to take Max Property public on the Philippine Stock Exchange instead (“Representation 6”);
(g) The Defendants required finance to expand their business and were looking for investors (“Representation 7”); and
(h) That upon the listing of Max Property and/or its related companies on either the Australian Securities Exchange or the Philippine Stock Exchange, the financial reward which stood to be gained by the investors of any investments made in Max Property would be substantial (“Representation 8”).
(Collectively referred to hereinafter as the “Investment Representations”)
- [31]
[31] It is the Claimants primary pleaded case that the Investment Representations were fraudulently made by the Defendants at the March Meeting to induce them to enter into the Share Sale Agreements and Investment Agreements . In the alternative, the Claimants seek to rely on section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act and in the further alternative, the Claimants also plead that the Investment Representations were made negligently .
My findings
- [32]
[32] For the reasons below, I am not of the view that the Claimants can succeed in their misrepresentation claim against the Defendants with respect to the Investment Representations.
- [33]
[33] Firstly, the Claimants have not adduced sufficient evidence enabling me to conclude that the pleaded Investment Representations are false or untrue. The evidence relied on by the Claimants in support of their assertion that the Investment Representations are false can be found in the Affidavit of Evidence in Chief (“AEIC”) of Mr Goh from [172] to [174] and the exhibits referred to therein. Mr Goh’s evidence is mirrored at [172] to [174] of Mdm Hon’s AEIC.
- [34]
[34] In their AEICs, neither Claimant has placed evidence before me enabling me to conclude that Representations 1 to 4, 5(a) and 7 are untrue or false. There is no evidence before me showing inter alia that the Philippines is not a good investment destination with a high potential for returns, that the Defendants did not invest in the Philippines or conduct a ‘condotel’ under the name “Max Stays”, that the Defendants did not purchase 20 apartment units in Fort Victoria and the Venice Residences, that the Defendants did not intend to make further property investments in Australia and Malaysia, that Mr Liu was not responsible for the growth and financial affairs of the business while Mdm Tong was in charge of day-to-day operations and/or that the Defendants did not require finance to expand their business and were looking for investors.
- [35]
[35] Mr Goh’s and Mdm Hon’s AEICs appear to only address Representations 5(b), 6 and 8 (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as the “Listing Representations” where appropriate) at [172] to [174] of their AEICs. In their AEIC, both Claimants broadly state that the Listing Representations were false as “primarily, there was no reasonable basis for the Defendants to represent to (the Claimants) that Max Property and/or its related companies were likely to be listed on the Australian Securities Exchange or the Philippine Stock Exchange”.
- [36]
[36] In my view, it cannot be disputed that the Listing Representations are statements of future intention, not fact, which prima facie cannot ground a claim in misrepresentation. The issue before this Court is therefore whether these statements of future intention can be re-characterised as representations of fact and if implicit representations were made by the Defendants (See Deutsche Bank AG at [83]).
- [37]
[37] The scope of the intentions of the Defendants conveyed via the purported Listing Representations contain no defined prediction of the future of the contemplated investments (with potential alternative listings on different security exchanges being represented as possibilities for future development), no fixed timeline for any listing to be carried out and no guarantee or assurance that Max Property would be listed on either the Australian or Philippines Securities Exchange. I note that Representation 6 itself contemplates a scenario where the Defendants fail to take Max Property public on the Australian Securities Exchange and conveyed the intention of the Defendants to take Max Property public on the Philippine Stock Exchange instead.
- [38]
[38] Given the vague nature of the future intentions conveyed, I am not of the view that they are capable of being re-characterised as representations of fact (expressly or implicitly) on inter alia the success or likelihood of Max Property being listed. The Listing Representations are at best representations that the Claimants had future intentions to list Max Property and even if it is accepted that this expression of future intention is itself a representation of fact made (which I do not accept), it must be shown by the Claimants that as at March 2016, the Defendants did not have the general intention to list Max Property shortly or in the future. I am of the view that, in any event, this has not been done.
- [39]
[39] The evidence referred to in the Claimants’ AEIC is not sufficient to show that there was no intention on the part of the Defendants to list Max Property in Australia or the Philippines “shortly” or otherwise as at March 2016.
(a) At [173(a)] of the Claimants’ AEICs, the Claimants refer to Max Property being struck off by the Defendants on 4 May 2020 in support of their claim that the Listing Representations are false. While I do appreciate that Max Property was ultimately struck off, this was an event that occurred about four years after the Share Sale Agreements and Investment Agreements were entered into in March 2016 and does not in my view support an assertion that there was no intention to go public in 2016 and/or reflect the viability of the business and/or the likelihood of Max Property going public as at 2016. The commercial landscape for investments and companies is a fluid and fast-moving one and many intervening events can occur resulting in a company being struck off in four years. Without more cogent evidence showing the reasons behind and/or leading up to the closure of Max Property, the striking off of Max Property in itself in 2020 does not support the Claimants’ assertions that the Listing Representations were false.
(b) At [173(b)] of the Claimants’ AEICs, the Claimants opined that the Defendants’ plans for any proposed listing were rudimentary and unsophisticated and assert that it was therefore “highly unlikely that the Defendants had any concrete plans to list” Max Property. In support of this they rely on a document named “MaxStays (Philippines), Inc (“MaxStays”), IPO Plan” (“the IPO Plan”) which had purportedly been presented to another investor Ms Koh by the Claimants . Leaving aside the evidentiary issues or weight to be ascribed to a plan which had been purportedly given to another investor by the Defendants at an unspecified date or time in relation to an unrelated investment, the contents of the IPO Plan itself do not appear unusual and is insufficient to establish that the Defendants’ listing plans in general are rudimentary or unsophisticated and/or that the Listing Representations were false. The contents of the plan also relate to another entity owned by the Defendants, MaxStays and is not a plan for Max Property.
(c) At [173(c)] of their AEICs, the Claimants characterised the Defendants’ response to their request for specific disclosure of all “documents, correspondence and/or material evidencing the imminent listing of (Max Property) on the Australian Securities Exchange” as an “admission that they had no plans to list Max Property and/or any of their companies”. I do not accept this submission. The Claimants had sought documents evincing the “imminent listing of Max Property” and did not seek the disclosure of documents evincing all plans or steps taken to list Max Property. In the context of the request made, the Defendants’ response does not amount to an admission that they had no plans for listing. In their affidavit filed on 11 July 2023, the Defendants were responding to the request made and were therefore confirming that there were no documents “evidencing the imminent listing of Max Property” in response to the Claimant’s request for specific disclosure and had further stated that this was because “it was only their intention to list (Max Property) in the future”. Their response that “no actual action has been taken” can only be properly taken to mean that no actual action had been taken with respect to an “imminent listing” of Max Property. This response is not equivalent to an admission that there had been no intention or plans to list Max Property in Australia or the Philippines at all given the nature of the request made by the Claimants.
(d) At [173(d)] to [173(e)] of their AEICs, the Claimants take issue with the valuation of Max Property in the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements.
(i) The Claimants essentially argue that the gap between the valuations in both agreements and the inability of the Defendants to provide a clear basis for the valuations establish the “irresistible conclusion that the Defendants have no reasonable basis for valuing Max Property for a possible IPO” and no reasonable basis for asserting that the public listing of Max Property is likely.
(ii) There is however no clear link between the valuations stated in the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements on one hand and the valuation of Max Property for any potential future public listing or the likelihood of listing on the other.
(iii) The valuation of S$31.5 million in the Share Sale Agreements appears to be extrapolated from the consideration of S$31,500 paid by each of the Claimants for the 10 ordinary shares they each obtained under the Share Sale Agreements. The internal valuation of the price at which shares are sold to potential investors is one subject to commercial negotiations and there is no evidence that the share price agreed to between the parties was meant to form the basis of any eventual listing of Max Property.
(iv) The valuation of S$52,500,00 in the Investment Agreements was expressly stated at Clause 3.2 to be “for the purposes of the subscription of Convertible Bonds by the subscribers”. Again, the price at which a company is valued for the issuance of bonds is one that is commercially reached between parties depending on inter alia the value which the purchaser is willing to ascribe to or pay for the bonds. The link between this agreed price or value and the potential listing valuation of Max Property is again not established.
(v) Further to the above, the relevance of the valuations towards showing that the Investments Representations are false is also unclear as none of Investment Representations and/or the Listed Representations reflect the communication of a representation or statements of fact by the Defendants to the Claimants on the value of Max Property and/or the value at which Max Property would be listed.
(vi) In my view, any disagreements on the valuation of Max Property belatedly raised by the Claimants at this stage does not support their assertion that the Investment Representations and/or Listing Representations are false or untrue.
- [40]
[40] Further to the above, the contemporaneous documents before me and the witness testimony at trial similarly do not show that the Listing Representations were statements of fact or false and lend support to my view that there were no representations of fact made (expressly or implicitly through the intentions expressed by the Defendants) as to the likelihood or success of any potential listing of Max Property in the future.
(a) The Defendants have admitted on the stand that they had an intention to list Max Property and had informed the Claimant of the same but did not any point accept or gave evidence that they had assured the Claimants that a listing would definitely occur “shortly” or otherwise and/or that they had given a representation on the likelihood of Max Property being listed in Australia or the Philippines.
(b) It was accepted by Mr Liu on the stand that he had an intention to list Max Property by the first quarter of 2017 and that no application for a listing was made in Australia . This does not however render any of the Listing Representations false as the fact that no listing had ever come into fruition does not in itself indicate or prove that there was no intention on the part of the Defendants to list Max Property in Australia or the Philippines shortly or otherwise.
(c) The Claimants also seek to rely on a set of presentation slides obtained from another individual who invested with the Defendants, Ms Koh Chew Chee, which they assert are substantially similar to the slides they were purportedly shown at the March Meeting. The slides produced do not reflect any timeline being imposed on the listing of Max Property and/or any assurance that a listing would definitely occur. The slides do however evince an intention on the part of the Defendants to take steps to list Max Property.
(d) The Investment Agreements do not reflect any agreed timeline being imposed on the potential listing of Max Property and/or any assurance that a listing would definitely occur shortly or otherwise. It does however reflect an intention for a listing to potentially occur with Clause 8 of the Investment Agreements stating the obligations of the investor “in the event that the Board decides to seek…a (listing)” of Max Property on the “Mainboard of the Australian Securities Exchange or any other securities exchange” (Emphasis added).
(e) The Share Sale Agreements are silent as to the listing of Max Property.
(f) Apart from the agreements entered into between parties, in Mr Goh’s Supplementary AEIC, a document labelled “Term Sheet – Issuance of Convertible Bond” (“the Term Sheet”) is exhibited. While it is not pleaded that the Term Sheet formed part of the agreements entered into between parties, Mr Goh refers to the Term Sheet in his Supplementary AEIC as a “document supplementary to the Investment Agreements” which was handed to him along with the Investment Agreements in support of his case that the Listing Representations were made. I note that the Term Sheet records “the intention of the directors of Max to list on ASX main board latest by 1Q 2017” but in line with the Listing Representations made and the Investment Agreements, the Term Sheet similarly makes clear that there is a likelihood of listing on the Australian Securities Exchange not occurring by providing for redemption rights in the event that “listing is not obtained by the end of eighteen months from the disbursement date”. Again, this document indicates the intention on the part of the Defendants to list Max Property but highlights that
- [41]
[41] In the circumstances, I find that the Claimants have not satisfactorily proven that: (a) the Investment Representations are false or untrue; (b) the Listing Representations are statements of fact capable of grounding a claim in misrepresentation; and (c) the Listing Representations are false or untrue.
- [42]
[42] Secondly, even if the Investment Representations were shown to be false or untrue, there is no loss or damage particularised or shown by the Claimants as resulting and/or caused by the said representations being untrue.
(a) Under the terms of the Share Sale Agreements , in exchange for the payment of the aggregate sum of S$63,000, the Claimants were each entitled to receive 10 shares in Max Property from Mr Liu.
(b) It is not disputed that pursuant to the Share Sale Agreements, 20 ordinary shares in Max property were duly transferred from Mr Liu to the Claimants .
(c) Under the terms of the Investment Agreements , in exchange for the payment of the aggregate sum of S$105,000, the Claimants were each entitled to:
(i) The issuance of convertible bonds in Max Property with an aggregate principal value of S$52,500 (See Recital A read with Clause 2 of the Investment Agreements); and
(ii) The payment of interest on an annual basis at the rate of 6% per annum on the sum of S$52,500 (See Clause 5 of the Investment Agreements).
(d) It is not disputed that pursuant to the Investment Agreements: (a) Max Property had issued convertible bonds amounting to the aggregate value of S$105,000 on 7 March 2016; and (b) interest amounting to the sum of S$6,300 was paid on 25 April 2017 .
(e) In addition to the above, it is the Claimants’ evidence and indisputable that in April 2017 by agreement between the parties, the ordinary shares and convertible bonds issued to the Claimants were “converted” into property in the Philippines pursuant to the Purchase Agreement and the Lease Back Agreement.
(f) This is reflected in the Receipt which reflects that the “payment mode” for the purchase price of the unit at Fort Victoria under the Purchase Agreement was as follows:
(g) Given the subsequent agreed conversion of the ordinary shares and convertible bonds in April 2017 into consideration for the Purchase Agreement and the Lease Back Agreement at the same value of the total sums injected by the Claimants into Max Property, I am of the view that:
(i) the obligations and entitlements accruing to both parties under the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements effectively came to an end in April 2017 as the Claimants no longer held any interest in Max Property thereafter and no further residual rights or interests under the Share Sale Agreements or the Investment Agreements; and
(ii) There was no tangible or quantifiable loss or damage suffered by the Claimants at the conclusion of the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements and/or a result of the Investment Representations even if they were untrue.
(h) Save for broadly asserting that they had suffered a loss after purchasing the ordinary shares and convertible bonds as a result of Max Property not being listed , no further particulars or quantification of the loss purportedly suffered have been provided by the Claimants in support of their claim that they had suffered loss arising from the Investment Misrepresentations made in respect of the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements.
(i) It was also accepted by Mr Goh during cross-examination that after the shares and convertible bonds were used as consideration for the Purchase Agreement: (a) Mr Liu no longer owed him money under the Investment Agreements and Share Sale Agreements; but (b) “what (Mr Liu) owe(d) is the title deed of the condominium”.
(j) The obligations that the Defendants owed under the Property Agreements and any failure on their part to fulfil the same is however a separate matter from their obligations under the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements. In converting their shares and bonds into consideration for the Property Agreements, the Claimants had obtained the benefit of being entitled to inter alia the condominium unit that they now say the Defendants failed to transfer to them.
(k) In the circumstances, I am not satisfised that any loss or damage has been suffered by the Claimants as a result of the Investment Representations even if they are untrue or false.+
- [43]
[43] Thirdly, there are also issues with the Claimant’s claim for negligent misrepresentation in common law with respect to the Investment Representations. Save for broad assertions that the Investment Representations have been made negligently, the Claimants have not pleaded the duty of care which the Defendants owe to them and/or particulars of how any such duty of care has been breached. The pleadings as they stand do not sufficiently disclose the material facts which would support a claim in negligent misrepresentation against the Defendants. The state of the pleadings before me is similar to that of the pleadings before Justice Lee Seiu Kin in Low Sing Khiang v LogicMills Learning Centre Pte Ltd [2024] 3 SLR 759 (“Low Sing Khiang”). In Low Sing Khiang, the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the necessary elements supporting their claim in negligent misrepresentation and had their claim dismissed on this basis. Adopting Justice Lee’s approach at Low Sing Khiang at [34], in the present case, I find that the Claimants are bound by their pleadings and find that the Claimant’s pleadings do not support their claim in negligent misrepresentation against the Defendants with respect to the Investment Representations. I accordingly dismiss their claim.
- [44]
[44] Fourthly, the Claimants have no basis for a claim under section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act against: (a) the 2nd Defendant as she was not a contracting party to the Share Sale Agreements and/or the Investment Agreements; and (b) the 1st Defendant with respect to the Investment Agreements as he was not a contracting party to the said agreements.
- [45]
[45] If the Claimants intended to make arguments that the corporate veil should be pierced and that they were in effect contracting with Mr Liu and Mdm Tong instead of Max Property, they would have had to necessarily plead this issue. I do note that it was pleaded that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are the only directors of Max Property who owned and controlled Max Property . This averment does not however sufficiently disclose the material facts that would support a submission to pierce the corporate veil and/or a finding that Mr Liu and/or Mdm Tong are the alter egos of Max Property bearing in mind that: (a) the key question to be asked whenever an argument of alter ego is raised is whether the company is carrying on the business of its controller; and (b) mere evidence of sole shareholding and control of a company would not be enough to make out the ground of alter ego: See Low Sing Khiang at [36] to [37] citing Mohamed Shiyam v Tuff Offshore Engineering Services Pte Ltd [2021] 5 SLR 188 at [71] and [76].
Conclusion
- [46]
[46] For the reasons above, I dismiss the Claimants’ misrepresentation claim with respect to the Share Sale Agreements and the Investment Agreements.
The contractual terms agreed to in April 2017
- [47]
[47] Turning now to the agreements entered into with respect to the purchase of property in the Philippines in April 2017, the first step this Court has to take is to identify the terms agreed to between parties in April 2017.
- [48]
[48] It is not disputed by the Defendants in their AEICs and on the stand that in April 2017:
(a) A unit in Fort Victoria was sold by the Defendants to the Claimants in 2017 at the value of S$256,818 ; and
(b) The Claimants would be entitled to a transfer of title upon their request .
- [49]
[49] However, the following three key areas of contention arise from the Claimants’ pleaded case and the Defendants’ pleaded counterclaim:
(a) whether the Defendants are entitled to elect to transfer Unit 7A14 in lieu of Unit 10A14 to the Claimants under the terms of the Purchase Agreement;
(b) whether the purported Oral Agreement was entered into between parties as at April 2017 for the property at Fort Victoria to be transferred to the Claimants at no additional costs; and
(c) whether it was a term of the Purchase Agreement or Lease Back Agreement for Transfer Fees, Parking Fees and government taxes arising from the transfer to be borne by the Claimants before a transfer of a unit at Fort Victoria would or could be effected.
Applicable legal principles
- [50]
[50] It is trite law that in ascertaining the terms of a contract a holistic approach is taken with the Court considering both documentary evidence and witness testimony before reaching a determination: See Forefront Medical Technology Pte Ltd (Pte) Ltd v Modern-Pak Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR (R) 927 (“Forefront Medical”) at [46] cited in Naughty G Pte Ltd v Fortune Marketing Pte Ltd [2018] 5 SLR 1208 (“Naughty G”).
- [51]
[51] In the context of oral agreements, the following guiding principles have been distilled by the Court in ARS v ART [2015] SGHC 78 (“ARS v ART”) at [53] (cited in Naughty G at [56]) setting out the proper approach to be adopted in determining the existence of an oral agreement.
The subject matter of the Purchase Agreement
- [52]
[52] In the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No. 1) filed herein:
(a) The Defendants admit that in April 2017, they had offered and proposed for sale Unit 10A14 at Fort Victoria (“Unit 10A14”) to the Claimants ; but
(b) Assert that the unit stated in the Receipt and Lease Back Guarantee was “incorrect” and “should be 7A14, as unit 10A14 was reclaimed by (the developer of Fort Victoria)” .
- [53]
[53] Despite the usage of the term “incorrect” in their pleadings, it appears from a review of the Defendants’ evidence (in AEICs and on the stand) and closing submissions that the Defendants are not relying on the doctrine of mistake in their defence but are instead asserting that: (a) they did not specifically agree to sell Unit 10A14 to the Claimants but had instead allocated or sold a unit in Fort Victoria to the Claimants in April 2017 ; and (b) they have a “contractual right to reassign the unit from 10A14 to 7A14” .
- [54]
[54] I do not accept their submissions.
- [55]
[55] First, the contractual documentation executed by parties expressly refer to the sale of unit 10A14 (not Unit 7A14 or an unidentified unit) in Fort Victoria and do not contemplate any substitution or reassignment rights vesting in the Defendants.
(a) The Receipt clearly acknowledges that the aggregate value of S$256,818 was transferred to the Claimants by way of cheque, shares and bonds in Max Property (“the Purchase Price”) as “Full Payment of Purchase Price for one loft unit of Fort Victoria Condominium at Bonifacio Global City, Manila, Philippines, unit no: 10A14, size: 46.44 SQM”.
(b) The Lease Back Guarantee similarly refers to the agreement to “lease back the loft unit at Fort Victori Condominium at Bonifacio Global City, Manila, Philippines, unit no: 10A14, size:46.44 SQM from the buyer for 3 years at the lease of 6.5% per annum based on the buyer’s purchase price”.
- [56]
[56] Second, on all accounts, as at April 2017 there was no discussion and there was no agreement between parties that: (a) any unit in Fort Victoria (of equivalent value or otherwise) can be substituted and/or transferred to the Claimants pursuant to the Purchase Agreement; and (b) the Defendants would have a right to reassign or substitute a new unit to the Claimants in lieu of Unit 10A14.
- [57]
[57] It is not pleaded by either party and there is no evidence that the potential reassignment or substitution of units in Fort Victoria by the Defendants was ever raised in April 2017 when parties entered into the Purchase Agreement. In particular, it is not pleaded by the Defendants that parties had contractually agreed (expressly or implicitly) to the Defendants having a right to reassign or substitute Unit 10A14.
- [58]
[58] It is simply the Defendants’ position that when they had discovered that Unit 10A14 was forfeited by the developer in the Philippines (at an unspecified later date) that they were entitled to claim the contracts were not “correct” and had the “contractual right” to reassign Unit 7A14 because :
(a) Unit 10A14 was allocated or assigned to the Claimants and not chosen by the Claimants;
(b) The Claimants are “investing for a return rather than purchasing the unit for residence” and as such the unit at Fort Victoria “can be viewed as a collateral for the investment”;
(c) It was necessary because Unit 10A14 was forfeited by the developers after it was sold to the Claimants;
(d) Unit 7A14 is similar to Unit 10A14 except for being three floors lower; and
(e) The reassignment of Unit 7A14 “ensured that the Claimants would still receive a comparable unit”, addresses the “unforeseen challenge of the developer’s cancellation” and “is reasonable and should be acceptable”
- [59]
[59] The Defendants’ arguments fail to address the crucial point that a contractual right for the unilateral assignment or substitution of units cannot exist if there was never a discussion, understanding and/or agreement reached between parties for Unit 10A14 at Fort Victoria to be substituted with Unit 7A14 or any other unit as at April 2017.
- [60]
[60] Even if Unit 10A14 in Fort Victoria was allocated, selected or assigned by the Defendants for the Claimants’ consideration, it was the unit that was offered to and contractually accepted by the Claimants. The Purchase Agreement was for the sale and purchase of 10A14 and not any other unit at Fort Victoria, however purportedly comparable.
- [61]
[61] The purposes for which the Claimants purchased Unit 10A14 and the fact that it may have been selected by the Defendants to be the subject matter of the Purchase Agreement are immaterial. The bottom line remains that there was no discussion and no agreement that Unit 10A14 could be substituted and another unit in Fort Victoria could be reassigned by the Defendants even if a supervening event purportedly out of the hands of the Defendants had occurred.
- [62]
[62] Third, it appears from the contemporaneous correspondence and witness testimony that the substitution of Unit 10A14 with Unit 7A14 was only first raised in October 2021 and therefor clearly did not form of the Purchase Agreement reached between parties in April 2017.
(a) It was accepted by both Defendants on the stand that in April 2017, Unit 10A14 was sold to the Claimants .
(b) When referred to WhatsApp messages exchanged on 23 September 2021 between him and Mr Goh , Mr Liu conceded on the stand that as late as 23 September 2021 he was still offering to and had communicated his willingness to transfer Unit 10A14 to the Claimants .
(c) It is Mr Goh’s evidence that it was only on 17 October 2021 that Mr Liu first informed Mr Goh via a text message (replicated below) that he had decided to “change 10A14 to 7A14” without any explanation.
(d) When cross-examined on the message he had sent on 17 October 2021, Mr Liu did not dispute that this was the date on which he first informed the Claimants of the proposed re-assignment of units though he did express his views that he “think(s”) and “feel(s)” that he “should” have provided an explanation to the Claimants when he had informed them of the change in units.
- [63]
[63] Lastly, Unit 10A14 and Unit 7A14 in Fort Victoria are not equivalent in value or interchangeable commodities.
(a) In comparison to Unit 10A14, Unit 7A14 was given a lower purchase price when it was first sold by the developer of Fort Victoria, New San Jose Builders Inc (“San Jose”).
(i) The contract for the sale of Unit 7A14 in Fort Victoria between San Jose and MaxStays dated 8 October 2018 expressly states that the unit was priced at 5,779,237.90 pesos.
(ii) The undated contract for the sale of Unit 10A14 between San Jose and the Claimants expressly states that the unit was priced at 5,817,655.88 pesos.
(b) In a valuation report dated 25 July 2023 issued by Asian Appraisal , Unit 10A14 was valued at 9,234,000 pesos and Unit 7A14 was valued at 8,772,000 pesos as at 24 July 2023 .
(c) In my view, the above difference in pricing and valuation illustrates the fact that an apartment unit is not a fungible commodity which is interchangeable with another apartment unit even if they both happen to be in the same tower block in the same development or have similar floor plans . Apartments are by their very nature unique or differentiated goods with seemingly minor differences in layouts, floor area, floor plans, height and other intangibles potentially resulting in vastly different property valuations.
(d) In the circumstances, I do not accept the Defendants’ proposition that it is “reasonable” or “comparable” for them to substitute Unit 10A14 with Unit 7A14 at Fort Victoria.
- [64]
[64] For all the reasons stated above, I find that:
(a) In April 2017, the Defendants had expressly agreed to sell Unit 10A14 to the Claimants under the Purchase Agreement and had not merely agreed to sell an unspecified unit in Fort Victoria to the Claimants; and
(b) There were no substitution or assignments rights agreed to in April 2017 and the Defendants are not entitled to and do not have a “contractual right” to unilaterally substitute Unit 10A14 with Unit 7A14 in Fort Victoria thereafter.
The agreement(s) reached with respect to additional costs (if any)
(a) It is the Claimants’ case that “on or about 21 April 2017 the Claimants and the Defendants orally agreed that while the legal ownership of (unit 10A14 at Fort Victoria) will remain with the Defendants for administrative and taxation reasons, it can be transferred to the Claimants immediately upon the Claimants’ request at no additional cost” ; and
(b) It is the Defendants’ counterclaim that the Claimants were obliged to pay them the Additional Costs under the “various agreements” entered into between the parties so as to enable the Defendants to effect the transfer of a unit at Fort Victoria but did not do so in a bid “to frustrate and coerce the Defendants into buying back the Units” .
- [67]
[67] To determine this issue, I adopt the approach taken in ARS v ART and turn first to the available contractual documentation.
- [70]
[70] I am not of the view that the terms contained (or not contained) within the Receipt and the Lease Back Guarantee assists either party.
(a) The Lease Back Guarantee reflects the costs and fees applicable to the rental of Unit 10A14 and provide that monthly maintenance fees and income tax arising from rental is to be borne by the Claimants during the term of the lease. There is however no reason for this document governing the rental terms between parties to contain terms reflecting an agreement (if any) on the imposition of Additional Costs for the purchase or transfer of Unit 10A14 to the Claimants after the payment of the Purchase Price.
(b) The Receipt merely states that the “purchase price” of Unit 10A14 had been paid. I do not think that the omission of the phrase “all-in” within the Receipt is particularly compelling in itself. The key in the present case is the scope of costs or fees that parties had intended to include within the term “purchase price” when they had entered into the Purchase Agreement and signed off on the Receipt. The comparison drawn by the Defendants between the Receipt issued in the present contract and other receipts issued by them to unrelated parties for the sale of properties in the Philippines which included the phrase “all-in” is not particularly helpful as the receipts issued in other transactions evince (at best) the intentions of the Defendants in those transactions and cannot by imputation reflect or evidence the discussions or agreement reached between parties in the present case. This is particularly true since there is no evidence that the Claimants ever had sight of the transactional documents for these other investments and would therefore not be aware that the term “all-in” would have to be included in the Receipt if they wished to protect their interests or reduce part of the Oral Agreement purportedly reached in writing.
(c) As such, in my view, the terms contained with the Receipt and the Lease Back Guarantee are ambiguous and do not support either the Claimants’ case or the Defendants’ counterclaim.
- [71]
[71] There are however 3 categories of documents produced recording the contemporaneous communication between partes at the material time which assist:
(a) A translated copy of text messages exchanged in a group chat between Mr Liu, Mr Goh and Mdm Hon from 24 July 2017 to 27 January 2022 (“the Group Chat Messages”);
(b) A translated copy of text messages exchanged in a chat between Mr Liu and Mr Goh from 26 December 2019 to 14 February 2022 (“the Private Chat Messages”); and
(c) A transcript of a recording made at a meeting on 26 December 2021 between Mr Liu, Mr Goh and Mdm Hon translated and produced by Elite Asia (SG) Pte Ltd (“the December Meeting Transcript”).
- [78]
[78] From the middle of 2019 to 2020, the Group Chat Messages record Mr Liu asking the Claimants to make further investments and personal loans due to inter alia financial difficulties encountered by him and/or his companies at the material time . These conversations did not result in any further investments being made or loans being given but did appear to cause concern on the part of the Claimants.
- [79]
[79] It is the Claimants’ evidence that pursuant to the Oral Agreement, they had first requested for the transfer of their property in the Philippines on 30 January 2020 verbally when both Mr Liu and Mdm Tong visited their home during the Chinese New Year. It was the Claimants’ further evidence that several excuses were made by Mr Liu during this visit “as to why (that was) no longer possible” and that Mr Liu had said that “it would take too long and that the bureaucracy in Philippines would be too slow and inefficient”.
- [80]
[80] The Claimants’ recounting of events that had occurred during this 30 January 2020 visit was not disputed by the Defendants, not challenged by the Defendants during cross-examination and consistent with the contemporaneous communication reflected in the Private Chat Messages.
- [81]
[81] The Private Chat Messages record that on 30 January 2020: (a) arrangements were made for a visit in the morning at the request of Mr Liu; (b) Mr Liu informed Mr Goh that he had “assets but lack cash” at the material time; (c) Mr Goh had requested for the transfer of Unit 10A14; and (d) Mr Liu had refused to do so on vague grounds.
- [82]
[82] Mr Liu claimed on the stand that his last message on “things (being) beyond his control” : (a) was not a response to Mr Goh’s request for a transfer and not a refusal to transfer title; but (b) was an effort on his part to “comprehensively” reply to all messages from “26 December 2019”. I do not accept this explanation as it does not appear to be logical or true. I further find that even if the message was a “comprehensive” response to a loose collection of messages which preceded it, the message remains (at its essence) a refusal to transfer the title of the property as at January 2020 on the purported basis that “such things are beyond (Mr Liu’s) control”.
- [84]
[84] It was the Claimants’ evidence that at the material time, they were “shaken” by the Defendants’ inability to make further rental payments after August 2019 and the Defendants’ refusal to transfer the title of Unit 10A14 to them but were generally at a loss on how to proceed.
- [85]
[85] Shortly thereafter, the Covid-19 pandemic began. On 24 March 2020, Mr Goh sent a message to Mr Liu checking in on “the situation over there” and they had a call thereafter during which he was informed by Mr Liu that he was not doing too well.
(a) It was accepted by Mr Liu on the stand that it was only on 24 September 2021, via a message sent in the Private Chat Messages that he had first raised the issue of the Transfer Fees and government taxes to the Claimants.
(b) It was also accepted by Mr Liu on the stand that it was only on 17 October 2021 that he had first asked the Claimants to pay him Parking Fees .
- [92]
[92] From 23 September 2021 to 17 October 2021, Mr Liu made the following requests for fees from the Claimants in the Private Chat Messages:
(a) On 23 September 2021, Mr Liu informed the Claimants via a text that they had to pay the aggregate sum of S$3,150 being 21 months of property management fees purportedly owed from April 2020 to December 2021 at the monthly rate of S$150.
(b) On 24 September 2021, Mr Liu informed the Claimants via a second text that they would have to pay:
(i) transfer fees amounting to approximately S$13,400; and
(ii) additional government taxes and fees based on the actual charges incurred.
(c) On 28 September 2021, in addition to the transfer fees and government taxes previously raised, Mr Liu stated in another text that:
(i) if management services were still required in 2022, an additional service fee of S$150 a month would be charged; and
(ii) if the transfer process is not initiated by January 2022 that the Claimants would also have to pay parking fees at the rate of 500 pesos per day to “the company”.
(d) On 11 and 17 October 2021 , Mr Liu sent two texts to Mr Goh requesting for the sum of S$8,966 which he had arrived at by adding the property management fees (S$3,150) to the transfer fees (S$13,400) before deducting rental owed to the Claimants from August 2019 to February 2020 (S$7,584).
- [93]
[93] Mr Goh did not respond to any of the texts above in the Private Chat Messages.
- [94]
[94] On 17 October 2019, Mr Liu informed the Claimants in texts sent in the Group Chat Messages that: (a) the rent for August 2019 had been paid; (b) that the unit had been “change(d from) 10A14 to 7A14”; (c) if they paid the transfer fee, he would “provide a receipt, but will not sign any legal documents”; and (d) repeated that “(their) company will charge a daily property parking fee of 500 pesos from January 1st (2022)”.
- [95]
[95] By this time, the Claimants were extremely concerned and engaged their present solicitors and requested for documentation proving the Claimants’ ownership of Unit 7A14 in Fort Victoria on the advice of their solicitors .
- [96]
[96] Thereafter, parties arranged to meet on 26 December 2021.
- [97]
[97] In the December Meeting Transcript, it was recorded that:
(a) While Mr Goh maintained that he was contractually entitled to Unit 10A14, he was still willing to consider the substitution of Unit 10A14 with Unit 7A14 and the request for additional fees made but :
(i) wanted documentation to be sent to his lawyers assuring him that Mr Liu had title to Unit 7A14 in Fort Victoria;
(ii) wanted to inform Mr Liu of his decision by the end of December 2021; and
(iii) wanted a receipt and guarantee that the newly proposed Unit 7A14 would be transferred to him if he agreed to pay the additional fees amounting to the sum of S$8,966 that the Defendants were asking for.
(b) Mr Liu urged Mr Goh to decide and make payment of the additional costs sought that very day but refused to give any assurance that a unit would be transferred after payment of S$8,966 was made .
(c) At the end of the meeting, no resolution was reached and parties agreed that Mr Goh would inform Mr Liu of his decision at the end of the month.
(a) On 31 December 2021, Mr Liu repeated his request for the sum of S$8,966.
(b) On 1 January 2022, Mr Liu informed Mr Goh that the parking fee had been increased to 5,000 pesos a day.
(c) On 27 January 2022, Mr Liu informed Mr Goh that if he insisted on a transfer of Unit 10A14 and did not accept Unit 7A14 that the processing time would be longer and that the transfer fee of Unit 7A14 would be increased to S$24,000 with effect from 1 February 2022.
(d) On 11 February 2022, Mr Liu: (i) informed Mr Goh that the “best choice for (him) is to transfer the title immediately” as in the event that Mr Liu lost the appeal in another law suit, Mr Goh “will get nothing”; but (ii) refused to guarantee the transfer of a unit.
(e) The last two messages from Mr Liu were sent on 14 February 2022 in which he urged Mr Goh to fill up forms and initiate the transfer as his “prompt action will save (him) cost on processing fee and parking fee”.
- [99]
[99] In its Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No. 1) filed on 3 May 2023, the Defendants streamlined their requests for additional fees from the Claimants and now seek orders from this Court compelling the Claimants to pay:
(a) The sum of S$73,650 being Parking Fees incurred till 20 May 2023;
(b) The sum of S$13,400 being Transfer Fees for Unit 7A14; and
(c) An unspecified quantum of government taxes.
- [100]
[100] The above contemporaneous communications reflect an ad hoc imposition of different categories of fees by Mr Liu (in stages) over a period of 5 months from September 2021 to February 2022 with the quantum of certain categories of fees being increased without any apparent breakdown or justification as the conversation between parties continued. I further note that in their present pleaded counterclaim, for reasons that are not apparent to this Court, the Defendants are not pursuing a claim for property management fees and service fees sought in late 2021.
- [104]
[104] Fourthly, further to the above and in any event, there does not appear to be any basis for the Defendants’ claim for Parking Fees in contract or otherwise. The contractual or factual basis for the imposition of the Parking Fees by MaxStays in 2021 was not adequately particularised or explained in the pleadings and evidence tendered by the Defendants before trial.
- [105]
[105] On the stand, Mr Liu clarified for the first time that parking fees were imposed on investors who “continue to park property under our company’s name” .
- [106]
[106] In the closing submissions filed, the Defendants further elaborated that :
(a) The Parking Fees were imposed by MaxStays (a company in which they were the main shareholders);
(b) The Parking Fees are levied “on buyers who refuse to transfer their units on or before the date requested by the defendants on behalf of MaxStays” and are a “necessary measure to encourage timely compliance with the title transfer process”;
(c) “In this case, the fee was imposed on 1 January 2022”; and
(d) The imposition of the Parking Fees was “communicated” to the Claimants who were “aware of their obligation to transfer the unit and pay the associated fees before 31 December 2021”.
- [107]
[107] I cannot accept the Defendants’ pleaded counterclaim that the Claimants were obliged under the “various agreements” entered into between parties to pay the Parking Fees when:
(a) MaxStays was not a party to any of the discussions leading up to or the agreements entered into between the parties including the Purchase Agreement and the Lease Back Agreement;
(b) There is no evidence or basis for claiming that the Claimants had ever asked or agreed to “park” Unit 10A14 (or any other unit) in Fort Victoria with MaxStays as at April 2017 or otherwise;
(c) There is no evidence that MaxStays ever held the title to Unit 10A14 at any material time;
(d) There is no evidence that the Claimants had ever agreed to the Defendants’ proposed substitution of Unit 10A14 with Unit 7A14 which was the subject of a contract to sell entered into between San Jose and MaxStays;
(e) It is the Defendants’ evidence and case that the Parking Fees were only raised and communicated to the Claimants in October 2021 (more than 4 years after the Purchase Agreement was entered into);
(f) The contemporaneous communication records that the Claimants had never accepted the belated and unilateral imposition of the Parking Fees by MaxStays and/or the Defendants in 2021 or otherwise; and
(g) There is no contractual or reasonable basis for the Defendants to be entitled to unilaterally elect to substitute Unit 10A14 with Unit 7A14 and thereafter look to the Claimants for Parking Fees imposed by MaxStays for the “parking” of Unit 7A14 in the MaxStay’s name.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.