Public Prosecutor v Nguyen Tuong Van

Kan Ting Chiu J:

[1] The accused, Nguyen Tuong Van, appeared before me charged that he:

[2] He is an Australian national aged 23 years. On 12 December 2002 he arrived in Singapore from Phnom Penh. At about 7.45pm he was at Boarding Gate C22 of the airport waiting to board a flight to Melbourne. During a routine check, a police officer felt something bulky on his lower back. He was brought to a search room for a thorough search, taking his haversack and business bag with him.

[3] In the search room he was asked to remove his jacket and shirt. When that was done, a plastic packet was seen strapped to his lower back with masking tape. At that stage he started crying and tried to hit his head against a wall.

[4] Sergeant Teh Kim Leng (“Sgt Teh”), the officer in charge of the security screening unit, was notified. He went to the search room and saw the accused, who appeared to be in distress, holding his head with his hands. When Sgt Teh asked him what was on his back, the accused replied that it was heroin. With the help of Sgt Teh the accused removed the packet from his body. When Sgt Teh asked him if there was anything to declare in his luggage, the accused opened the haversack, took out another packet, and handed it to him.

[5] The two packets were subsequently sent for analysis. The packet from the body was found to contain not less than 151.5g of diamorphine and the other packet not less than 244.7g. The analysis results were not disputed.

[6] The Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) was then informed of the matter. At 9.10pm CNB officers arrived at the airport and took over the case from the airport police. At about 10.05pm Station Inspector Ng Beng Chin (“SI Ng”) spoke to the accused and recorded a statement from him. SI Ng and the accused appended their signatures to the statement after it was recorded and read back to the accused. The statement read:

[7] The CNB officers took the accused together with the two packets and other case exhibits back with them to the CNB Headquarters at Police Cantonment Complex at about 12.05am on 13 December.

[8] At about 1.50am, the two packets were weighed. The packet recovered from the accused’s back weighed 381.66g and the packet from his haversack weighed 380.36g.

[9] At 4.12am the investigating officer Assistant Superintendent of Police Toh Soon Teck (“ASP Toh”) recorded a cautioned statement from the accused. After the cautioned statement was recorded ASP Toh recorded further statements, which I shall refer to as investigation statements, from the accused. One was recorded on the same day, 13 December, and the others on 15, 16 and 19 December.

[10] Defence counsel accepted that these statements were made voluntarily. Nevertheless, it was contended that they are not admissible in evidence.

[11] This statement was recorded under s 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). Sub-sections (6) and (8) thereof are of particular relevance:

[12] Defence counsel’s argument centred on the admissibility of confessions. Section 17 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) defines “admission” and “confession” as follows:

and s 24 provides that:

This has been construed to mean that confessions not so afflicted are relevant and admissible in evidence.

[13] Counsel argued that when the accused said in his cautioned statement:

he was not making a confession as defined by s 17 or by the test set out by Lord Guest in Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] 1 WLR 817 at 823–824 that:

[14] In Abdul Rashid v PP [1994] 1 SLR 119 the Court of Criminal Appeal adopted Lord Guest’s test and added at 129, [29]:

[15] Counsel went further, and argued that as ASP Toh is a CNB officer and not a police officer, the cautioned statement was not admissible under the CPC as s 122(5) of the CPC stipulates that:

[16] This argument overlooks the fact that the purpose of recording a cautioned statement is to get an accused person to respond to a charge after being advised that if there is any fact that he intends to rely on in his defence in court, he should mention it in his cautioned statement, and that if he holds it back till he goes to court, his evidence may be less likely to be believed.

[17] A cautioned statement is not intended to be taken with a view to obtain a confession. It is to inform the accused person of the charge he is facing and to get his response to it. The purpose of a cautioned statement is to enable the Prosecution to confront the accused at his trial with questions such as “If this is your defence, why didn’t you disclose it in your cautioned statement?” or “Why did you not say this, but say that instead when you made your cautioned statement?” if the accused presents a defence different from or not disclosed in his cautioned statement. Conversely, the accused can rely on his cautioned statement to show that he has been consistent in his defence from the time he was first charged. It would be a departure from the purpose of recording cautioned statements if a cautioned statement is only admissible as a confession. If, however, the cautioned statement also happens to be a confession, it can be admitted and used as one.

[18] The power to record cautioned statements is not limited to police officers. By sub-s (8), other officers charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders also have the authority. Section 32(2)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2001 Rev Ed) provides that where the offence is seizable, an officer of the CNB shall have all the powers of a police officer under the CPC in relation to an investigation into a seizable offence. ASP Toh comes within s 122(8) as a person charged with the duty of investigating offences and charging offenders.

[19] Consequently, while I agree with counsel that the accused’s cautioned statement is not a confession, I held that it is admissible in evidence under s 122.

[20] The statements recorded on 13, 15, 16 and 19 December were not recorded under s 122(6) and (8), and as ASP Toh is not a police officer, the admissibility of the statements is not governed by s 122(5) of the CPC which governs the admission of statements made to police officers.

[21] The Court of Criminal Appeal held in Tan Boon Tat v PP [1992] 2 SLR 1 at 9–10, [35], that a confession made to a narcotics officer is admissible if it complies with s 24 of the Evidence Act.

[22] The recording of the statement of 13 December started at 4.05pm and ended two hours later. The statement reads:

[23] The statement of 15 December reads:

[24] The statement of 16 December reads:

[25] Finally, the statement of 19 December read:

[26] Counsel for the accused acknowledged that no inducement, threat or promise was employed or held out when the four statements were recorded. If the statements had been affected by inducement, threat or promise, they would be inadmissible whether or not they are confessions.

[27] Moving on from there, the next issue is whether the statements should be read separately or together, to determine whether they are a confession. Where two statements, A and B, are recorded in the course of investigations, they may be taken to be one statement in two parts or two separate statements. They will be treated as one complete statement where statement B is a follow-up on statement A. Where they are not connected, and relate to different matters, eg where statement A relates to a charge of drug trafficking, and statement B relates to a charge of illegal entry into Singapore, they may be treated as separate statements.

[28] Looking at the four investigation statements, it can be seen that they narrated the events from before the time the accused came to be in the possession of the two packets of heroin to the time of his arrest and each succeeding statement was recorded as a continuation of the preceding one, after the previous statement had been read back to him, with the paragraphs numbered serially.

[29] The statements are to be treated as one whole statement for deciding whether it is a confession under s 17(2) of the Evidence Act. On that basis, it is quite clear that it has all the ingredients of a confession, and is admissible under s 24.

[30] Defence counsel objected to the admission of the statements on a further ground, that the statements were taken in breach of Art 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 (“VCCR”). It was submitted that the breach amounted to an illegality and operated unfairly against the accused as he was not advised of his rights and did not have the opportunity to consult with a consular officer until 3.30pm on 13 December, after the cautioned statement was recorded, but before any of the investigation statements were taken. Article 36(1) reads:

[31] Although Singapore is not a signatory to the Convention, it was contended that the VCCR applies to Singapore because it is customary international law.

[32] The Prosecution’s reply can be summarised as:

(a) there was no breach of Art 36;

(b) even if there was, the breach does not entitle the Defence to challenge the admissibility of the statements; and

(c) Singapore is not a party to the VCCR.

It is silent on whether Art 36(1) is customary international law which applies to Singapore.

[33] The VCCR is a key instrument in the regulation and conduct of consular activities. As at 1 January 2000, at least 167 countries were parties to the convention. Luke T Lee in his book Consular Law and Practice (2nd Ed, 1991) stated at 26:

[34] There is an established practice for a state which has arrested a national of another state to notify the consular officers of the state of the accused person. Singapore subscribes to the practice. ASP Toh had notified the Australian High Commission of the arrest of the accused person in compliance with a directive.

[35] The directive, which is a part of the standard operation procedures of the CNB, reads:

It is reasonable to infer that the other law enforcement agencies in Singapore would have similar directives.

[36] Singapore holds herself out as a responsible member of the international community and conforms with the prevailing norms of the conduct between states. Specifically, the directive suggests the acceptance of the obligations set out in Art 36(1).

[37] All this leads me to agree with the defence counsel that Art 36(1) applies in Singapore. The Prosecution, which is in a good position to have knowledge of Singapore’s position on this issue, did not assert the contrary.

[38] Was there a breach of Art 36(1)? It was established that a member of the Australian High Commission saw the accused at about 3.30pm on 13 December. The CNB took charge of the investigations at 9.10pm on 12 December, 18hrs 40min before the member of the High Commission met the accused. If one takes the effective starting time as 7.45pm, when the accused was detained by the airport police, the elapsed time was 20hrs 5min. The High Commission must have been notified before 3.30pm, for an official to be instructed, and for him or her to go and see the accused, but no evidence was led to the time of notification. For the present purpose, I will round off the time between arrest and notification to 20 hours.

[39] Article 36(1) does not set a time period for notification; it is to be done without delay. Is 20 hours a delay? Reference to state practice can be helpful. By an Agreement on Consular Relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China which came into force on 15 September 2000, notification is to be made within three days. As Australia regards three days an appropriate period under the agreement, there is little basis to suppose that it would find the 20 hours in this case unacceptable. It was not the defence case that the Australian government considers the notification to have been delayed in this case.

[40] The Defence referred to the case of LaGrand (Germany v USA) (27 June 2001) ICJ General List No 104. This is a decision by the International Court of Justice where two accused persons were not informed of the right to consular access for almost 17 years after their arrest. This decision does not offer any assistance to the accused. The acceptable time was not considered by the Court as the United States accepted that there was a breach of Art 36(1).

[41] The Defence has therefore failed to make out a case that there was a breach of Art 36(1) because of the 20-hour interval. But I will go one stage further. Assuming that there was a breach, it does not necessarily follow that the accused’s statements are inadmissible in evidence. There must be some resultant prejudice that renders it wrong for the statements to be used, for example, that if he had timely consular advice, he would not have made the statements at all, or in the form or at the times he did.

[42] No prejudice was disclosed. The issue relating to Art 36(1) was not raised when the admissibility of the statements was argued, but was only brought up in the closing submissions. The accused did not say anything about the making of the statements and the consular visit. There is no basis for excluding the statements as evidence.

[43] Before concluding this part of my judgment, I should address an issue relating to the directive. ASP Toh’s evidence was that he acted pursuant to the directive. When defence counsel applied for it to be produced and admitted in evidence, the prosecutor objected.

[44] He relied on s 126(1) of the Evidence Act that:

and argued that the directive was restricted information given to ASP Toh and other CNB officers.[1]

[45] He had not given proper attention to the second element of the provision, that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. ASP Toh had not said that the disclosure of the directive was inimical to the public interest, and I saw no reason to suppose that it would.

[46] I therefore ruled that the directive be produced and admitted in evidence.

[47] Defence counsel raised an issue on the chain of custody of the two packets of heroin. This relates to the time when the packets came into ASP Toh’s custody at 12.50am on 13 December up to the time that he submitted them to Dr Lee Tong Kooi of the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) for analysis on 13 December at 11.40am.

[48] ASP Toh’s evidence in his conditioned statement was that he marked the packet that was strapped to the accused’s back “A”, and the other packet recovered from the haversack “B1”. At 1.55am on 13 December he weighed the two packets and recorded their weights as 381.66g for packet A and 380.36g for packet B1, and at 5.30am he locked the two packets in his cabinet and left for home. On the following day, 13 December, at 11.00am he took out the two packets again and sealed them before delivering them to the HSA for analysis.

[49] When he was cross-examined by defence counsel, he agreed with counsel that the established practice is for drug exhibits to be sealed at the earliest possible time. He explained that he did not do that immediately after weighing the packets because there was to be a press conference. That explanation was corrected in re-examination when he said that there was no press conference, only a press release.

[50] He also said that on the morning of 13 December after he locked the packets in his cabinet, he took them out, and locked them again before he left for home, but he cannot remember why he took them out.[2] He had kept the packets in his cabinet that night because the CNB store for drug exhibits is only open during office hours, and does not receive drugs during the night.

[51] His evidence was that the previous occasion he had kept drugs in the cabinet was in July 2002, and those drugs were no longer kept there in December. After December no drugs were kept there till May 2003.[3]

[52] ASP Toh was also asked about the discrepancy between the weights he recorded of the two packets (381.66g for packet A and 380.36g for packet B1) and that recorded by Dr Lee Tong Kooi (361.64g for packet A and 370.94g for packet B1). The significance was not only that different weights were recorded by ASP Toh and Dr Lee for the same packets, but that packet A was the heavier packet by ASP Toh’s weighing, while packet B1 was heavier than packet A when Dr Lee weighed them.

[53] No explanation was offered by ASP Toh. One can only look at the circumstances of the two weighings. ASP Toh weighed the packets in his office to obtain a weight of the suspected drugs to prefer a holding charge against the accused, and to carry on with his investigations.

[54] When Dr Lee weighed the exhibits he was doing that as an analyst. The weighing was done under laboratory conditions to establish the diamorphine content of the suspected drugs. The levels of expertise between ASP Toh and Dr Lee, and the equipment they used, were different. The difference in the results may have arisen for these reasons. There was no suggestion that when ASP Toh opened the packets, he added to or removed anything from them before sending them to Dr Lee.

[55] The Defence also complained that ASP Toh did not seal the drugs promptly. The two packets came into ASP Toh’s possession at 12.50am on 13 December and he sealed them at 11.00am the same day. The lapse was 10hrs 10min. During that time ASP Toh was briefed by the officer who handed custody of the case exhibits to him, and he instructed the officer to list the exhibits, and he also weighed the packets and locked them in his cabinet.

[56] The sealing could have been carried out earlier, perhaps immediately after the weighing at 1.55am, 9hrs 5min earlier than the actual time of weighing.

[57] ASP Toh made reference to a press conference which did not take place. The Prosecution did not clarify with him whether he believed that there was going to be a press conference, and whether there is a practice that if there is a press conference, drug exhibits are not sealed until after that has taken place. There was no suggestion that anyone other than ASP Toh had possession of the packets during the 10hrs 10min.

[58] Defence counsel submitted that:

[59] I do not agree. For the reasons I have stated I find that the integrity of the exhibits was not compromised.

[60] There was undisputed evidence that the two packets were in the possession of the accused. The airport officers gave clear evidence on the recovery of those packets from his body and his haversack. He had also admitted in his statements that he had those packets in his possession. There was also undisputed evidence from other prosecution witnesses that he had flown in from Phnom Penh. In his statement he admitted that he brought the two packets with him when he entered Singapore.

[61] At the close of the Prosecution’s case, defence counsel decided not to make any submissions. I found on the evidence before me that the Prosecution had proved a sufficient case for the accused to enter his defence.

[62] When he was called to do that, he elected not to enter his defence. He did not give evidence himself, or call any one to give evidence as his witness.

[63] I proceeded to hear closing submissions. I have reviewed the evidence and the submissions and my rulings and findings made during the trial since. I find that the Prosecution has proved its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore find the accused guilty on the charge he faces, and convict him thereon.

[64] I will now deal with the issues raised by the Defence on the sentence to be imposed.

[65] The Defence contended that the sentence of death is not a mandatory sentence and that it is the maximum sentence.

[66] The punishments for offences are referred to in s 33 and the Second Schedule of the Misuse of Drugs Act. The first column of the schedule relates to “Section creating offence”, the second column relates to “General nature of offence” and the third to seventh columns relate to “Punishment”.

[67] To ascertain the punishment for the offence committed by the accused one looks under the first column for s 7. Then one looks across the schedule for the specific offence or type and quantity of drug involved under the second column, and finally one looks for the punishment under columns three to seven.

[68] When the second schedule is read in this way, the punishment for an offence under s 7 for the unauthorised import of more than 15g of diamorphine is stated in one word, “Death”.

[69] It was submitted that this “as a matter of statutory interpretation, is open to be regarded as a maximum penalty not a death penalty”. Reliance is placed on ss 9A(1) and 41 of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed):

[70] I do not see any merit in this argument. The schedule provides specifically and clearly that the punishment is death. It does not say that the maximum sentence is death. The schedule provides for the maximum sentence in clear terms. It is replete with references to maximum and minimum sentences for other offences, for example, for the offence of unauthorised import of not less than 10g and not more than 15g of diamorphine, the punishment is maximum 30 years’ imprisonment or imprisonment for life and 15 strokes, and minimum 20 years’ imprisonment and 15 strokes.

[71] When there is a range of punishment prescribed, there is a maximum and a minimum sentence. When a single punishment is prescribed, it is manifestly wrong to take it to be the maximum sentence.

[72] A more substantial issue raised on behalf of the accused is that the mandatory death penalty is unconstitutional for contravening Art 12(1) of the Constitution (1999 Rev Ed) that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”.

[73] Counsel submitted that:

[74] The constitutionality of the mandatory death sentence under the Misuse of Drugs Act was argued before and considered by the Privy Council two decades ago in Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1980–1981] SLR 48.

[75] The argument made, as Lord Diplock put it in his judgment at 63, [32] was:

and that it:

[76] That argument was rejected at 64, [35]–[37] on the ground that:

and Lord Diplock added at 65, [39]:

This decision is binding on me.

[77] The Court of Appeal ruled in Jabar v PP [1995] 1 SLR 617 at 631, [53], in connection with the requirement in Art 9(1) that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, that:

There is room for debate whether “so long as it is validly passed by Parliament” refers to the compliance with the processes for passing an Act or to its constitutional validity. I think it relates to both, as the court must be concerned that statutes be properly enacted and do not contravene the Constitution.

[78] In Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v PP [1997] 1 SLR 123, Yong Pung How CJ adopted the test laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Budhan Choudhry v State of Bihar AIR (42) 1955 SC 191 at 193 for the equal protection of the law under Art 14 of the Constitution of India:

[79] In their closing submissions defence counsel referred to Ong Ah Chuan and conceded that:

[80] Counsel argued:

[81] The argument is that the death sentence cannot be imposed without regard to the degree of moral blameworthiness of the convicted person, and that the court must treat an offender with little or no blameworthiness differently from a blameworthy offender when it imposes a sentence.

[82] As Lord Diplock explained, equal protection does not require that everyone be dealt with equally. It requires that like be compared with like. Different bases of classification may be employed. In setting punishments for drug importation, for example, the criteria employed may be by the offence, the type of drugs, the quantity of the drugs, the value of the drugs, whether the offender is a willing or reluctant participant, a principal or an agent, or whether he is a first offender or a repeat offender. The power to determine the criteria for identifying and distinguishing one class from others is vested in the legislature. Provided that the distinguishing factor employed is not purely arbitrary, and it bears a reasonable relation to the object of the law, that is not discrimination even if arguments can be made that some other criteria could suit the purpose better.

[83] Parliament has prescribed the offence, the type and quantity of drugs as the bases to determine the sentences to be meted out to offenders. By its preamble the Misuse of Drugs Act was enacted “for the control of dangerous drugs or otherwise harmful drugs and substances and for purposes connected therewith”. The differentiating factors employed for the death sentence are not arbitrary, and they bear a reasonable relation to the object of the Act.

[84] The degree of moral blameworthiness of an offender and other mitigating and aggravating factors are taken into consideration for sentencing in the vast majority of the offences where the sentence is not fixed. The failure to do so could raise questions whether the sentencing power is properly exercised. But where the legislature has by the proper exercise of its powers prescribed that for offences involving large quantities of drugs the offenders shall be punished with death, the punishment will be imposed without hearing pleas in mitigation, and there is no denial of the equal protection of the law to the offenders.

[85] The Defence also relied on the Privy Council’s decision in Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235 that a mandatory death penalty is cruel and inhuman punishment.[8] This case originated in Belize. Reyes was convicted of murder by shooting, a class A murder under the laws of Belize, and the mandatory death sentence for class A murders was imposed. He challenged the constitutional validity of the sentence, and succeeded before the Privy Council.

[86] Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in delivering the judgment of the Board, ruled at [29] that:

[87] The provision referred to is s 7 of the Constitution of Belize which provides that:

[88] To ascertain whether a punishment is inhuman or degrading a court is required to take into account the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”.

[89] Lord Bingham reviewed decisions from several jurisdictions and came to the conclusion at [43] that:

[90] The case was argued and decided around s 7 of the Belize Constitution. Reyes would be relevant to the present case if there is an equivalent provision to s 7 in Singapore, but no such provision exists in the Constitution or any Act. The Defence was not deterred by that, and submitted after referring to the passage in the foregoing paragraph that “the mandatory death penalty offends the protection offered by Article 12 in the same manner”.[9]

[91] That brings the argument back to the question of proper and impermissible classification criteria, which has been dealt with.

[92] Article 93 of the Constitution declares that:

[93] The distinction between the judicial power and the legislative power on the punishment of offenders is very well set out by the Supreme Court of Ireland in Deaton v The Attorney General and the Revenue Commissioners [1963] IR 170 at 182:

and at 183:

[94] On that basis, there can be nothing objectionable in s 33 and the Second Schedule of the Misuse of Drugs Act.

[95] Defence counsel also took issue with the post-sentencing provisions in the CPC relating to death sentences. The specific provisions counsel were concerned with are sub-ss (c) and (e) of s 220 which read:

[96] They submit that:

It was not made clear whether the submission is that the sentence of death or the power conferred by s 220 is invalid for being in breach of the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the Constitution. The tenor of the submission suggested the latter.

[97] Section 220 does not stand alone. It draws its authority from Art 22P of the Constitution which provides that:

[98] Art 22P and Art 93 exist together. The judicial power of the courts is to be wielded alongside the President’s prerogative powers. A power conferred by the Constitution cannot be considered unconstitutional.

[99] The statement entitled “Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region” was signed by the participants at the 6th Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific, including the Chief Justice of Singapore, on 19 August 1995.

[100] Defence counsel submitted:

[101] I have to say that I read nothing in the Statement that relates to death sentences or mandatory death sentences. Counsel did not explain how the Statement, which does not have the force of a treaty or a convention, assists the accused’s argument that mandatory death sentences are illegal.

[102] The defence asserted that the death penalty that the accused faces is not only unconstitutional for being a denial of equal protection, but is also unconstitutional because execution by hanging is cruel, inhuman and degrading and is not compatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.[12]

[103] Counsel argued that although there is no constitutional provision against cruel and inhuman punishment, hanging contravenes Art 9(1) which provides that:

[104] Section 216 of the CPC states that sentences of death are to be carried out by hanging. Nevertheless counsel argued that “law” should be read to include Art 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) that:

[105] Counsel justified the position on the basis that:

[106] The Declaration is not an international treaty or convention and there is no consensus that it is a statement or codification of customary international law, and it does not refer to hanging.

[107] There are those who believe that hanging is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, but that is by no means a settled view. For example, when this issue was brought up before the United States Court of Appeals in Campbell v Wood 18 F 3d 662 (1994), the majority decision was that hanging did not violate the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishments.

[108] Even if there is such a customary rule, it would not apply if it is inconsistent with the domestic law. As Lord Atkin explained in Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC 160 at 167–168:

And in Collco Dealings Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1962] AC 1, the House of Lords affirmed the proposition that if a statute is unambiguous, its provisions must be followed even if they are contrary to international law.

[109] The Defence has failed to establish that the mandatory death sentence is unlawful for contravening the Constitution or international law. That being the case, and having found the accused guilty and convicted him, the sentence I impose is that he shall suffer death.

[1] Notes of Evidence page 129

[2] Notes of Evidence page 120

[3] Notes of Evidence page 115

[4] Defence Closing Submissions Part I, para 29

[5] Defence Closing Submissions, Part II, paras 40 and 44

[6] Defence Closing Submissions Part II, para 52

[7] Defence’s Response To The Prosecution’s Closing Submissions Part II, paras 7 and 8

[8] Defence Closing Submissions Part II, para 6

[9] Defence Closing Submissions Part II, para 47

[10] Defence Closing Submissions Part II, paras 66–67, 69

[11] Defence Closing Submissions Part II, paras 56–58

[12] Defence Closing Submissions Part II, para 114

[13] Defence Closing Submissions Part II, paras 106 and 107