Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 27 Sep 2017

High Court

Oon Heng Lye v Public Prosecutor

Feedback & support

[2017] SGHC 236Case no. Criminal Revision No 4 of 201730 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [3] I now furnish my detailed grounds of decision, as I said I would when I gave my judgment.

  3. Background

  4. [4] On 18 October 2007, the police arrested Oon on suspicion of operating a business of unlicensed moneylending, an offence under s 8(1)(b) of the Moneylenders Act (Cap 188, 1985 Rev Ed). They seized a number of items from Oon. These included $123,020 in cash, a bank book for a POSB Bank account, and a bank transaction slip for a UOB account. Both the POSB account and the UOB account were in Oon’s sole name.

  5. [5] The investigating officer, Assistant Superintendent Norlinda binte Ismail (“ASP Norlinda”), ascertained that the POSB account had a balance of $62,996.80 as of 2 November 2007 and that the UOB account had a balance of $80,572.89 as of 12 November 2007. She applied, while investigations were pending, for both accounts to be frozen pursuant to s 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“CPC 1985”). Section 68 confers upon the police the power to “seize any property which is alleged or suspected to have been stolen or which is found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence.”

  6. [6] Thereafter, Oon made a number of statements to the police. In a statement recorded by Station Inspector Clayton Tan (“SI Tan”) on 18 October 2007, Oon admitted that he had worked as an unlicensed moneylender since 2005.

  7. [7] In two subsequent statements recorded by ASP Norlinda, both on 24 October 2007, Oon gave a fairly detailed history of his involvement in unlicensed moneylending. In the first of these statements, he admitted also that the said sum of $123,020 in cash and the money in the aforementioned POSB and UOB accounts were proceeds from unlicensed moneylending.

  8. [10] I should mention that s 392 of the CPC 1985 has been re-enacted, with some amendments, as ss 370 to 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC 2012”).

  9. [12] Oon was not thereafter charged with any offence relating to unlicensed moneylending. He was released from detention under the CLTPA on 1 November 2013.

  10. Grounds for revision

  11. [14] It is settled law that the revisionary jurisdiction of the court is to be sparingly exercised. Typically, this will require a demonstration not only that there has been some error but also that material and serious injustice has been occasioned as a result. In Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 196, the High Court said as follows (at [19]):

  12. [15] It has also been observed that the threshold of “serious injustice” will only be crossed if there is “something palpably wrong in the decision that strikes at its basis as an exercise of judicial power” by the court below (Rajendar Prasad Rai and another v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 333 (“Rajendar”) at [24], citing Ang Poh Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 929 at [17]).

  13. [17] First, Oon claimed that he had not been notified of the application for forfeiture of the seized funds nor had he been allowed to be present at the hearing before the Magistrate. This, he argued, violated his right to be heard at such proceedings, as was held to exist by the Court of Appeal in Mustafa Ahunbay v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 903 at [45] (“Mustafa Ahunbay”), albeit under s 370 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (Act 15 of 2010) (“CPC 2010”), which is identical to s 370 of the CPC 2012. He claimed that he had been deprived of his property contrary to the rules of natural justice because he had not been given the opportunity to prove his entitlement to the seized funds.

  14. [18] Second, Oon argued that s 392(1) of the CPC 1985 did not empower the Magistrate’s Court to forfeit the seized funds.

  15. My decision

  16. [22] I elaborate on each of these points in turn.

  17. Right to be heard

  18. [23] Oon argued that the principles established by Mustafa Ahunbay in relation to s 370 of the CPC 2010 were equally applicable to s 392 of the CPC 1985. The Prosecution’s position on this was that under the CPC 1985, there was no legal requirement for an accused person, from whom property has been seized, to be formally notified of proceedings under s 392.

  19. (a) A person who claims an interest in seized property has a right to be heard when the seized property is reported to a Magistrate’s Court under s 370 of the CPC 2010. The right to be heard entails being “afforded an opportunity to make representations” to the Magistrate (Mustafa Ahunbay at [45]).

  20. (b) In addition, the right to be heard entails the right to be given notice of the hearing and the right to further information concerning the seized property, including the contents of the investigation report provided by the police to the Magistrate’s Court (at [70] and [77]).

  21. (c) It is not necessary for the authorities to make inquiries as to who might possibly have an interest in the seized property and thus should be notified of the hearing. But so long as a person has informed the authorities that he has an interest in the seized property, the authorities should notify that person of any hearing under s 370 of the CPC 2010 (at [73]–[74]).

  22. [26] Furthermore, the requirement of notice is well established. As the authors of Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Code of Criminal Procedure (Act II of 1974) (Y V Chandrachud et al gen ed) (Wadhwa and Company Nagpur, 18th Ed, 2006) (“Ratanlal”) note in relation to s 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act No 2 of 1974) (India) at p 1745 (“Indian CPC”):

  23. [27] This passage was cited by the Court of Appeal in Mustafa Ahunbay (at [46]–[47]) in support of its view that the right to be heard exists under s 370 of the CPC 2010. Section 457(1) of the Indian CPC is similar to s 392(1) of the CPC 1985 and s 370 of the CPC 2010, and provides as follows:

  24. [32] In my judgment, taken together, Mustafa Ahunbay and Ung Yoke Hooi suggest that there is a requirement to give notice of the hearing before the Magistrate to the following persons: (a) the person from whom the property has been seized, and (b) anyone else who has formally informed the authorities of his claim to the seized property. Those persons should then have the opportunity to make representations to the Magistrate to prove their entitlement to the property. But the Magistrate’s Court need not hold a formal inquiry to determine the question of who is entitled to the possession of the property if it does not consider it necessary to do so in all the circumstances.

  25. [33] The Prosecution submitted that even if there was a right to be heard, it had been duly accorded to Oon given that it was the usual practice for the police to inform an accused person that they would apply for the forfeiture of items, and for the police to seek a disposal inquiry where any objections were raised as to entitlement. ASP Norlinda deposed in her affidavit that it had been her practice at that time to inform accused persons while recording their statements that exhibits seized from them that were related to the crime would be forfeited to the State, and that if they had any objection, she would have recorded it down.

  26. Power of forfeiture

  27. [37] In my judgment, there is no power of forfeiture under s 392(1) of the CPC 1985. I reached that conclusion for several reasons.

  28. [39] On the basis of the differences in the way that both provisions had been drafted, Yong Pung How CJ observed in Magnum Finance Bhd v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 159 (at [18]), that “[u]nlike s 386(2), no power of forfeiture exists under s 392”. The distinction between the two provisions was again highlighted in Ung Yoke Hooi, where the Court of Appeal said at [19(g)] that:

  29. [41] The third reason pertains to something that transpired after I had disposed of this matter, but it bears noting because it supports the view I had already formed. On 24 July 2017, shortly after the hearing of this petition, the Ministry of Law announced that it intended to introduce amendments to the CPC 2012 and sought public feedback on the proposed amendments. Among these was a proposed amendment to introduce the power of disposal under s 370(2) of the CPC 2012. The explanation given by the Ministry of Law for this proposal is that the power of forfeiture does not exist under s 370 of the CPC 2012 (see Ministry of Law, “Table of Proposed Legislative Changes to the Criminal Procedure Code (“CPC”) and the Evidence Act” <https://mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/AnnexB.pdf> at 36):

  30. Since the power of forfeiture does not presently exist under s 370 of the CPC 2012, by extension, it would not have existed under s 392(1) of the CPC 1985.

  31. Entitlement to the seized funds

  32. [44] I did not think that Oon was the person entitled to the possession of the seized funds. This was because I found, as submitted by the Prosecution, that a person could only be “entitled to the possession” of seized property under s 392 of the CPC 1985 if he satisfies the precondition of being in lawful possession of the seized property.

  33. [45] As a matter of statutory interpretation, the CPC 1985 appeared to contemplate that a person could only be entitled to possession if such possession was lawful. It is necessary here to look at s 392 of the CPC 1985 within its broader statutory context – that is, the provisions on the disposal of property in general. Section 393(1) of the CPC 1985 is significant in this regard. It must be read with s 392(4), which establishes what is to be done when a Magistrate determines that the person “entitled to the possession” of the seized property is unknown or cannot be found. In that event, s 392(4) requires the police to issue a notification to require anyone with a claim to the seized property to come forward within six months to establish his claim. I set out the relevant parts of s 392(4) and s 393:

  34. [47] This interpretation is supported by two cases on the Indian CPC to which the Prosecution referred me. In Nand Lal v State of Rajasthan and another, 1986 (1) WLN 18, the Rajasthan High Court interpreting s 457 of the Indian CPC, held (at [10]), that a person who had acquired seized property by “dishonest means” would not be entitled to its possession even though no offence was subsequently made out against him. In a similar vein, in A.S.S. Ahmed Sahib v Commissioner of Police, Madras and another, 1970 Cri LJ 1016, which concerned the interpretation of s 523 of the Indian CPC 1898 (the precursor to s 457 of the Indian CPC which is in similar terms to s 392 of the CPC 1985), the Madras High Court held (at [10]):

  35. [49] Whether or not a person in actual possession of seized property would nevertheless be regarded as being in lawful possession therefore depends on the circumstances. It suffices to state for now that where a person admits that property seized from his possession are the proceeds of a crime, his possession cannot be regarded as lawful. This principle would be consistent with my finding in Rajendar that the powers of seizure under the CPC 2012 extend to the traceable proceeds of a crime because “an offender has no basis for asserting any enforceable proprietary interest in such property” (at [38]).

  36. [50] During the hearing, I asked Oon’s counsel, Mr Ong Ying Ping, if there were any facts showing that his client was in lawful possession of the seized funds. Mr Ong pointed to two facts in the petition for revision. But these did not assist his submission at all.

  37. [51] The first fact was Oon’s allegation in the petition that he had “repeatedly informed the investigating officer that he was not involved in moneylending at all”. But this was flatly contradicted by his statements which contained unequivocal admissions about his long involvement in unlicensed moneylending. Of the four statements the PP produced in evidence, the more material were the two which he gave on 24 October 2007 which I have mentioned at [7] above. In these statements, Oon admitted that:

  38. (a) He had not been employed since quitting his last job in 2000;

  39. (b) He had operated five unlicensed moneylending stalls since 2001, issuing loans ranging from $$500 to $2000 at an interest rate of 20%, repayable in weekly instalments;

  40. (c) At the time of his arrest, he had about 500 debtors and live loans of about $200,000 in circulation;

  41. (d) The seized funds were the proceeds of unlicensed moneylending; and

  42. (e) In particular, he admitted to having instructed one of his associates to transfer money that had been deposited by debtors into other bank accounts, into the UOB account that was in his sole name.

  43. [52] It is true that Oon was not charged, much less convicted, for any offence relating to unlicensed moneylending. Even so, there was no basis for me to ignore Oon’s admissions that the seized funds were the proceeds of unlicensed moneylending. Oon signed every page of the statements he made to ASP Norlinda. Furthermore, up to the hearing of this petition, Oon had not deposed any affidavit to challenge the veracity or voluntariness of the admissions he had made in any of the statements the Prosecution had exhibited. Since it was undisputed that the seized funds were the proceeds of unlicensed moneylending, it followed that Oon had no lawful entitlement to those funds.

  44. [53] Second, Mr Ong pointed to Oon’s claim in his petition of revision that he had won money from betting on the “4D” lottery. However, as SI Tan deposed in his affidavit, Oon had confirmed to him that the winnings from the “4D” lottery were not part of the monies seized during the arrest as he had used those winnings to pay for a new car and to renovate his house. Oon did not dispute SI Tan’s statement. In any event, as I mentioned, Oon admitted that the seized funds were proceeds from unlicensed moneylending. There was no suggestion in his statements that the seized funds were his winnings from betting on “4D”.

  45. [54] Furthermore, Oon had not offered, or hinted at the existence of, any positive evidence showing how he had come to acquire the seized funds by means other than unlicensed moneylending.

  46. Conclusion

  47. [57] For the reasons given, I dismissed the petition.