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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Mar 2017

High Court

Rajendar Prasad Rai and another v Public Prosecutor and another matter

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[2017] SGHC 49Case no. Criminal Motion Nos 71 and 72 of 201641 paragraphs

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  1. Sundaresh Menon CJ:

  2. Introduction

  3. Background facts

  4. [2] The 1st Applicant was arrested by officers from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) on 26 September 2015. He was subsequently charged with six counts under s 5(b)(i) read with s 29 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“the PCA offences”). He contested the PCA offences. The trial for the PCA offences is part-heard and currently continuing. It has since emerged that the 1st Applicant is also being investigated for offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Serious Offences (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A, 2000 Rev Ed) (“the CDSA”), although no further charges have been preferred under the CDSA or otherwise.

  5. [3] By 8 October 2015, all the funds in some ten bank accounts belonging to the Applicants had been seized by the CPIB pursuant to powers conferred by s 35 of the CPC. These bank accounts contained a total of US$2,204.88 and S$556,404.07. It is not clear on the evidence whether the Applicants had any other bank accounts. Caveats were also lodged by the Registrar of the Singapore Land Authority (“the Registrar”) over three of the Applicants’ properties on 5 October 2015 preventing any dealing with the land (“the Caveated Properties”). It is now evident that the Registrar acted pursuant to s 7(1)(b) of the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 2004 Rev Ed) (“the LTA”). It is also now evident that the Registrar acted on the basis of an intimation or request emanating from the CPIB although the details of this have not been disclosed.

  6. [4] Section 370 of the CPC provides as follows:

  7. [5] Pursuant to the requirement in s 370(1)(b), the seizure was reported and the parties appeared before the learned District Judge (“the Magistrate”) on 1 November 2016 and again on 21 November 2016 (“the s 370 Hearing”).

  8. [6] At the s 370 Hearing on 1 November 2016, the Prosecution submitted that in relation to three out of the ten bank accounts, the seizure should be extended because they were relevant to investigations into the CDSA offences. Seeking to make good its contention in this regard, the Prosecution led the evidence of the Investigating Officer from the CPIB (“the IO”) who stated, among other things:

  9. (a) that “there [is] an ongoing CDSA investigation and these three accounts [are] relevant to [CPIB’s] investigation”;

  10. (b) that the CDSA investigations are “separate” from the PCA offences which were then and are still being tried;

  11. (c) that the continued seizure of the bank accounts would be relevant to the CDSA investigations; and

  12. (d) repeatedly that this was so because the Applicants had amassed a “huge sum of money” and the CPIB needed to establish “whether it [came] from known or unknown sources of income”.

  13. [7] The Prosecution’s position in this connection was supported by two written reports that had been issued by the CPIB dated 21 September 2016 and 14 October 2016 respectively (“the CPIB Reports”). In the first report, the CPIB listed the ten bank accounts that had been seized and asserted that they were relevant and required for investigation into the CDSA offences. In the second report, the CPIB indicated that only three of the ten accounts that had been seized remained relevant to the CDSA offences. It may be noted that pursuant to the second report, the total amount that was released to the Applicants following the release from seizure of the other seven accounts was a modest sum of US$2,204.88 and S$4,680.51.

  14. [8] In my judgment, certain conclusions may be drawn from the evidence that was led from the IO at the hearing, as well as from the CPIB Reports and these are as follows:

  15. (a) At all times, the seizure was sought to be justified on the basis that this was required for the purposes of investigation. What is significant is that on the evidence before the Magistrate, the position taken by the Prosecution and the IO was that they were still looking into the matter and were not yet ready to come to any conclusion. At the s 370 Hearing, the IO explained that the CPIB’s investigations into the CDSA offences remained incomplete because the CPIB had not taken a statement from the 1st Applicant for the CDSA offences due to the ongoing trial for the PCA offences. I also note that during the s 370 Hearing, the Prosecution did not seek to justify the seizure on the basis of the risk of dissipation of the funds in the three bank accounts;

  16. (b) The investigations, for which the extension of the seizure was sought, were those pertaining to possible offences under the CDSA, which were evidently still being investigated, and not the PCA offences. In a sense this stood to reason: the investigations into the PCA offences must have been completed since they were the subject of the ongoing trial. The continuing investigation into the CDSA offences was also the express basis upon which the CPIB Reports rested; and

  17. (c) The central point advanced by the Prosecution as matters stood at the time of the s 370 Hearing was that the CPIB was not yet satisfied as to whether the sums of money amassed by the Applicants could be explained on the basis of their known legitimate sources of wealth.

  18. [9] Faced with these considerations, the Applicants’ counsel, Mr N Sreenivasan SC (“Mr Sreenivasan”), mounted a robust challenge against any extension of the seizure. The centrepiece of that challenge may be summarised in his contentions that:

  19. (a) By the time of the s 370 Hearing, it was incumbent on the Prosecution to explain to the Magistrate the basis upon which it sought to extend the seizure. This was so because it was in turn incumbent on the Magistrate to consider whether the extension was justified. It was only upon considering the reasons and the basis for the extension including, at least in general terms, the matters that were being investigated, that the Magistrate could apply her mind to whether in the circumstances, the continued seizure was relevant to such investigations and could therefore be justified.

  20. (b) The court could not reasonably be so satisfied in the present circumstances because the Prosecution had not disclosed anything in relation to the offences that were being investigated beyond identifying s 47 of the CDSA as the possibly relevant provision.

  21. [11] On 2 December 2016, the Applicants filed CM 71/2016 and CM 72/2016, seeking the release of the Seized Funds and the Caveated Properties.

  22. The parties’ submissions before the High Court

  23. [12] The parties appeared before me on 14 February 2017 and at the end of the hearing, I posed some questions. They then appeared before me again on 20 February 2017, at which time, among other things, they addressed the questions I had posed.

  24. [15] As for the Prosecution, it submitted first, that the application for the release of the Caveated Properties pursuant to s 370 of the CPC was procedurally incorrect. That is because it was not the Police but the Registrar who had lodged the caveats under the LTA.

  25. (c) If the answer to (b) is yes, whether such evidence may be considered by the High Court exercising its revisionary jurisdiction or whether the matter should be remitted to the Magistrate for further consideration; and

  26. (d) If the matter may be considered by the High Court, whether in all the circumstances it should.

  27. [19] In response, the Applicants submitted that s 35(1)(a) of the CPC is specific as to the property that may be seized and this requires that the seizure be limited to property in respect of which an offence has been or is suspected to have been committed. This allows a seizure where a specific offence is being investigated or prosecuted. To the extent that the courts have exercised the powers of confiscation in respect of such property, this has occurred where the property was the traceable proceeds of the very offence of which the accused has been convicted. However, this does not extend to permitting the seizure of an accused person’s property with a view to conserving those assets for the purpose of an eventual confiscation under the CDSA that may or may not be initiated.

  28. The issues

  29. [23] Having heard the parties’ submissions on both 14 and 20 February 2017, the following issues arise for my determination and I deal with them in this sequence:

  30. (d) Whether, and if so how, the powers of seizure or restraint under the CDSA are distinct from the powers of seizure that are found in s 35 of the CPC; and

  31. My decision

  32. The High Court’s revisionary jurisdiction and powers

  33. [26] The specific question in Sollihin CA was whether the High Court could be moved in its revisionary jurisdiction to consider new facts to review the propriety of a lower court’s bail decision. In that context, the Court of Appeal held that (a) it could not be said the lower court’s decision was wrongly made so as to warrant invoking the revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court, if that conclusion was predicated on new material that had not been before the lower court; and (b) in the context of a bail application, there would also, at least in general, be no need to invoke the High Court’s revisionary jurisdiction on the basis of any new material because it would be possible to go back before the lower court to review the matter with the benefit of that new material since in that particular context, the court would not be functus officio upon issuing its decision on bail (see Sollihin CA at [14]–[19], especially [16], [18] and [19]).

  34. The Caveated Properties

  35. [29] I turn then to the substantive issues. I deal first with the Caveated Properties. The caveats were lodged by the Registrar exercising his discretion under s 7(1)(b) of the LTA. That section provides as follows:

  36. [30] It emerged from the evidence of the IO at the s 370 Hearing that the information given by the CPIB to the Registrar concerning its investigation into the possible CDSA offences on the part of the 1st Applicant had, in all probability, led the Registrar to lodge the caveats. The nature of that information was not disclosed to the court and having regard to the view I take of its relevance to the present proceedings, it is not necessary for me to examine it. What is material and seems to be common ground is that it was the Registrar who lodged the caveats in the purported exercise of his powers and not the CPIB that acted in the exercise of its powers under s 35 of the CPC.

  37. [32] The rest of my judgment is therefore concerned only with the Seized Funds.

  38. The extent of the powers of seizure under section 35 of the CPC

  39. [33] Section 35(1) of the CPC provides as follows:

  40. [35] In my judgment, it would, but this is subject to an important limit which is that the items seized must be the fruits or the traceable proceeds of an identifiable crime. I arrive at this conclusion on the basis of (1) the language of s 35 of the CPC; (2) local and Indian precedents; and (3) the Minister’s speech during the Second Reading of the Criminal Procedure Code Bill in 2010 (“CPC Bill”) which sheds some light on Parliament’s intention behind the enactment of s 35 of the CPC.

  41. The language of s 35 of the CPC

  42. [36] I begin with the language of s 35 of the CPC. In my judgment, it is evident from the distinction between s 35(1)(a) on the one hand, and ss 35(1)(b) and (c) on the other, that the former cannot be confined to property that is either evidence of an offence (s 35(1)(c)) or suspected to have been used or intended to be used in an offence (s 35(1)(b)). The natural reading of s 35(1)(a) which refers to property “in respect of which an offence has been committed” would certainly encompass property that represents the fruits or proceeds of a crime. To put it starkly, if a painting were stolen, it seems plain and obvious that such a painting is property in respect of which an offence has been committed. Equally, it seems plain and obvious that s 35(1)(a) would not extend to property in respect of which no identifiable offence has been committed.

  43. [37] Hence, I am satisfied that the power to seize property under s 35(1)(a) does extend beyond property that may be used as evidence or that may be the items used in the commission of the offence, to property that is the fruits or the proceeds of an offence. This is then extended further by s 35(9)(b) which provides that “property in respect of which an offence is suspected to have been committed” (which is property referred to in s 35(1)(a)), extends to “any property into or for which the property which was originally in the possession or under the control of any person has been converted or exchanged and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise”. It is not necessary for me, for the purpose of the present applications, to decide how far s 35(9)(b) extends. In the course of its submissions, the Prosecution contended that if the 1st Applicant had corruptly fixed a soccer match and then placed bets in the expectation that the match result would be as fixed, the winnings would be proceeds or fruits of the crime within the meaning of s 35(1)(a) and/or s 35(9)(b). While this seems a reasonable view, it is not necessary for me to reach a conclusion on this point at this stage. Hence, any reference to the direct and traceable proceeds of an identifiable offence should be understood subject to this qualification.

  44. [38] In my judgment, the extension of the powers of seizure to the traceable proceeds of a crime is founded on the principle that an offender has no basis for asserting any enforceable proprietary interest in such property. Such is the position in equity (see Halley v The Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 97 (“Halley”) at [105]) and it should be even more so in the context of the criminal law, which is concerned with criminal conduct that generally goes beyond conduct that is merely inequitable or unconscionable in nature. In this sense, the power in s 35(1)(a) of the CPC can be seen as analogous to the right of a claimant in equity to seek relief in respect of a specific asset or fund. In equity, a constructive trust would arise where a person procures a transfer of property to himself by fraud, bribery, or breach of trust (see Halley at [83] and Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Charles Warwick Reid and others [1994] 1 AC 324 (“Reid”) at 331). The victim may assert a proprietary claim in such circumstances using various remedies and devices including tracing. Tracing “enables the claimant to substitute the traceable proceeds for the original asset as the subject matter of his claim” (Forskett v McKeown and others [2001] 1 AC 102 at 128, cited in John McGhee gen ed, Snell’s Equity (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Ed, 2015) at para 30-051). This is analogous to the provision in s 35(9)(b), to which I have referred and which extends the property referred to in s 35(1)(a) to anything else to which it has been converted or for which it has been exchanged. Similarly, s 35(9)(c) of the CPC allows interest in such bank accounts to be seized and this too is analogous to the position in equity, where the victim may claim any increase in the value of the property (see Reid at 331).

  45. [39] For the avoidance of doubt, my observations in this context are not meant to import into the criminal law the technical rules of tracing or of other equitable remedies or devices. Rather my point is to situate the extent of the seizure power in s 35 of the CPC to the proceeds of the crime in question by analogising this to the parallel (but distinct) remedy fashioned by equity to affect the proceeds of inequitable conduct.

  46. [41] Section 35 of the CPC, in the first instance, confers the power of seizure on the Police. But, in keeping with the oft-cited observation in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs and others and other appeals [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [86] and reiterated more recently in Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General and another matter [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [2], “all power has legal limits”. Hence the power of seizure under s 35 of the CPC is not immune from review; but in keeping with the architecture of the provision itself and of the CPC as a whole, it would fall on the applicant, in a given case, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the power has been invoked or exercised unlawfully, even if this is likely to place an imposing burden on such an applicant.

  47. [42] Leaving that to one side, in the normal case, after a seizure has been made under s 35, the process then shifts to s 370. Specifically, s 370(1)(b) of the CPC imposes a long-stop date of one year from the date of seizure, within which the Police must report the seizure to the Magistrate. Should the Police consider that the seized property is no longer relevant for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CPC, it should also make the report: see s 370(1)(a) of the CPC.

  48. [43] At this stage, assuming the Police wish to extend the seizure beyond the one-year period, judicial oversight is imposed. For convenience, I set out ss 370(2) and (3) again, as follows:

  49. [44] It will be evident from these provisions that the Magistrate:

  50. (a) must not dispose of the property and must extend the seizure if there are pending court proceedings (whether under the CPC or not) in relation to that property – s 370(3);

  51. (b) must not dispose of the property if satisfied that such property is relevant for the purposes of any investigations, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CPC – s 370(3); and

  52. [46] In my judgment, having regard to the observations of the Court of Appeal in Mustafa Ahunbay and having regard also to the relevant provisions of the CPC, the Magistrate when exercising her power under s 370 must apply her mind to:

  53. (b) the purpose for which it is sought; and

  54. (c) the factual basis on which it is sought,

  55. and in that light, the Magistrate must determine whether she is satisfied that the seizure should be extended.

  56. [47] This means that before exercising her powers under s 370 of the CPC, the Magistrate must first be satisfied that the Police seized the property pursuant to its powers under ss 35 or 78 of the CPC (which is the other provision that is contemplated in s 370(1) of the CPC), and not pursuant to some other legislation that is not contemplated in s 370 of the CPC. If the property is seized under s 35 of the CPC, the Magistrate should next be apprised of the limb of s 35(1) under which the extension is sought. If the extension is sought pursuant to s 35(1)(a), the Prosecution would have to satisfy the Magistrate that the property is reasonably believed to be the fruits or the traceable proceeds of an identifiable crime that the applicant is suspected to have committed. In this connection, the Prosecution would also ordinarily have to inform the Magistrate of the offence to which the seized property relates.

  57. [48] The Prosecution would also have to inform the Magistrate of the justification for the extension and of such facts as form the basis of its request. I accept that notwithstanding the passage of a year since the seizure, investigations might not yet be complete. But this does not mean that a bland assertion from the Investigating Officer to the effect that investigations are continuing and that the seized assets are relevant will suffice. In such circumstances, the Magistrate would be entitled to some explanation for the delay. The short point is that the Magistrate should be provided with such information as would enable her to be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for thinking that the seized property is “relevant for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under [the CPC]” if, as is the case here, that is the basis on which the required extension is being sought.

  58. [50] In my judgment, the threshold for continued seizure under s 370 of the CPC should be and is more stringent than the threshold for initial seizure under s 35 of the CPC. This follows from the fact that:

  59. (a) by the time the matter is reviewed under s 370, a period of up to one year would have passed;

  60. (b) judicial oversight is introduced at this stage and this is only meaningful, as I have noted above, if the court is presented with enough information to assess and calibrate the balance between the private interests of an applicant who has not yet been convicted and the public interest in the contemplated prosecution; and

  61. (c) otherwise, the only remedy in respect of a seizure under s 35 would be judicial review, which as I have noted in [41] above presents a demanding threshold to meet given the broad powers conferred upon the Police by s 35.

  62. Local and Indian precedents

  63. [53] Having examined the statutory framework, I briefly turn to the local and Indian precedents which in my judgment are consistent with the foregoing analysis.

  64. [54] There are two local cases in which the Police exercised powers of seizure under s 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the 1985 CPC”), which was the predecessor to s 35 of the CPC. In Sim Cheng Ho and another v Lee Eng Soon [1997] 3 SLR(R) 190, the Police seized three vehicles in the course of investigations into the forgery of the complainant’s signature on the instruments of transfer of the vehicles; and in Public Prosecutor v Intra Group (Holdings) Co Inc [1999] 1 SLR(R) 154, the accused pleaded guilty to purchasing a property as a nominee in contravention of the Residential Property Act (Cap 274, 1985 Rev Ed). The accused had also contracted to sell the property to another company without his principal’s consent. The Police seized the proceeds of sale which consisted of some S$1.1m in a bank account. It is evident that both these cases involved either the property that was the very subject of the offence or the direct proceeds of the offence.

  65. [55] Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v Tapas D. Neogy (1999) 3 A.Cr.R. 2154 (“Tapas”), the Indian Supreme Court held that a bank account could be seized under s 102(1) of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, which is in pari materia with s 68 of the 1985 CPC. It said at [12] that the bank account of the accused or any of his relation can be seized “if such assets have direct links with the commission of the offence for which the police officer is investigating into.” Otherwise, the “[c]ourts would be powerless to get the said money which has any direct link with the commission of the offence” because all the money “could be withdrawn by the accused”. In my judgment, this is entirely consistent with my analysis at [36]–[39] above. Significantly, it may be noted that the Prosecution was not able to produce any case in which the seizure power under s 35(1)(a) had been invoked in relation to property that was not the traceable proceeds of an identifiable offence.

  66. Minister’s speech during the Second Reading of the CPC Bill

  67. [56] Finally, I turn to parts of the Minister’s speech at the Second Reading of the Criminal Procedure Code Bill in 2010 (“the CPC Bill”). The Minister then sought to illustrate the nature of the powers conferred upon the Police by clause 35(1) and (2) of the CPC Bill (which is now ss 35(1) and 35(2) of the CPC), stating that “if a suspected watch thief has sold the stolen watch and used the proceeds to buy a computer, the Police may seize the computer instead”: see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 May 2010) vol 87 at col 411 (K Shanmugam, Minister for Law). In my judgment, this too is consistent with my foregoing analysis, especially at [37]–[38] above.

  68. Seizure under the CDSA

  69. [57] It will be recalled that until the resumed hearing on 20 February 2017, the Prosecution had taken the position that the continued seizure was relevant to the investigation of possible offences under the CDSA. This raised the question as to why the Prosecution did not then proceed under the CDSA on the basis of the powers contained there. In response, the Prosecution submitted that the powers of seizure under the CPC overlapped with but were nonetheless distinct from the powers of seizure and confiscation under the CDSA. As noted above (at [20]), it also subsequently took the position that it would be seeking the extension for the purpose of preserving the funds on the basis that these were the suspected proceeds of the PCA offences.

  70. [59] The Second Minister for Law made it clear that the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Bill 1988 (“CCB Bill”), which is the predecessor of the CDSA, extends the powers of seizure to a new class of property, namely, the unexplained assets of persons convicted of certain serious offences: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (30 March 1988) vol 50 (“Parliamentary Debates 30 March 1988”) at col 1717 (Prof S. Jayakumar, Second Minister for Law). The Minister explained that the law as it then stood was inadequate to deal with the confiscation and recovery of corruption benefits. The following paragraphs of the Minister’s speech at the Second Reading of the CCB Bill encapsulates the purpose of the CCB Bill (see Parliamentary Debates 30 March 1988 at col 1718):

  71. [60] Unsurprisingly, the CDSA reflects this position. Under the CDSA, an accused person or an offender may have his property seized pursuant to restraint orders or confiscation orders. These orders may be sought in the context of drug dealing offences and criminal conduct amounting to serious offences which are specified in the First and Second Schedule of the CDSA respectively.

  72. [62] After a person has been convicted of one or more drug dealing offences (s 4) or one or more serious offences (s 5), confiscation orders can be issued on the application of the Prosecution in respect of the “benefits derived by [the defendant]” from drug dealing or serious offences (ss 4(1), 5(1)). Further, ss 4(4) and 5(6) of the CDSA provide that where a person holds “any property or any interest therein (including income accruing from such property or interest) disproportionate to his known sources of income, the holding of which cannot be explained to the satisfaction of the court, [such property] shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have derived benefits from drug dealing” or “criminal conduct”. This is consistent with the purpose of the CDSA, which casts its ambit beyond the direct and traceable proceeds of a crime and into unexplained wealth.

  73. [63] Therefore, the purpose of the CCB Bill and the subsequent enactment of the CDSA is clear – it seeks to expand the powers of seizure that are vested in the Police to include unexplained wealth even where the evidence linking such wealth to specific offences may be difficult to obtain because it lies in the hands of the accused. This simply does not apply in the context of the powers arising under s 35 of the CPC, which is the provision that the Prosecution and the CPIB relied on in this case.

  74. Whether in all the circumstances, the Magistrate’s Order should be set aside and if so, whether a further order should be made

  75. [67] Third, on the evidence, the Applicants had put forward a case purporting to explain the sources of their wealth in a bid to show that the funds had been obtained before the alleged acts that are the subject matter of the PCA offences that are now being tried. Although the Prosecution’s position at that time was that they were proceeding in respect of possible offences under the CDSA and although there appeared to be some suggestion that these were somehow separate from the PCA offences, the Applicants presumably did this in an attempt to address the only criminal conduct that they were aware had been alleged against the 1st Applicant, which was the PCA offences. The Prosecution did not put forward any evidence to rebut this. Perhaps this was because at that stage, the Prosecution’s position was that the extension of the seizure was justified on the basis of its relevance to continuing investigations to the CDSA offences. However, once its case shifted to the assertion that the funds were being held because they were suspected to be the proceeds of the PCA offences, then this directly engaged the evidence that the Applicants had put forward. The question is not whether the evidence of the Applicants is therefore deemed to be true; rather, the point is that in these circumstances, there is no apparent basis for rejecting the Applicants’ evidence when no contrary material has as yet been put forth by the Prosecution.

  76. Conclusion