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Grounds publishedDecided 19 Jan 2018

High Court

Grande Corp Pte Ltd v Cubix International Pte Ltd and others

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[2018] SGHC 13Case no. Suit No 331 of 2013(Summons No 2275 of 2017)

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. The underlying dispute

  3. Relationship between the parties

  4. [2] The plaintiff is Grande Corporation Pte Ltd (“the plaintiff”), a Singapore-incorporated investment holding company.

  5. [3] The first defendant is Cubix International Pte Ltd (“Cubix International”), a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of providing business and management consultancy services, and art and graphic design services. On 1 February 2017, the plaintiff discontinued the claim against it. The second defendant is Cubix Group Pte Ltd (“Cubix Group”), a Singapore-incorporated investment holding company.

  6. [4] The third defendant is Toh Wee Ping Benjamin (“Ben”). Ben is the sole director and shareholder of Cubix International. He is also the sole director and a 95% shareholder of Cubix Group. The fourth defendant is Goh Bee Heong (“Bee”), who holds 5% of the shares in Cubix Group.

  7. [5] The fifth defendant is Cubix and Kosmic Pte Ltd (“C&K”). C&K was incorporated in March 2007 as a joint venture between the plaintiff and Cubix Group, to carry out the business of developing, producing, distributing and exploiting film, television, digital and interactive media. The plaintiff and Cubix Group each held one share out of a total of two shares in C&K. Ben was the sole director of C&K. The plaintiff and Cubix Group entered into a joint venture agreement (“the JV Agreement”) on 18 July 2007 to govern the terms of their joint venture. By the terms of the JV Agreement, the plaintiff and Cubix Group undertook not to solicit or entice away any business or custom from any customer or partner of C&K, and not to engage in any business in direct competition with C&K’s business (“the non-competition obligations”).

  8. [6] As part of the joint venture between the plaintiff and Cubix Group, the plaintiff claims that between 25 April 2007 and 28 January 2008, it transferred to C&K sums totalling S$291,288.00 and US$458,000 as contributions to, and/or loans for, the operating expenses of C&K. The first, third and fourth defendants disagree that these sums were transferred to C&K as “loans” and characterise these sums as “capital contributions” instead. I will refer to these sums as “funding”.

  9. [7] The sixth, seventh, and eighth defendants are AXXIS Group Pte Ltd (“AXXIS Group”), AXXIS International Pte Ltd (“AXXIS International”) and AXXIS Pte Ltd respectively. They will collectively be referred to as “the AXXIS Companies”. Ben and Bee incorporated the AXXIS Companies in February 2008, and are both directors and equal shareholders in each of the AXXIS Companies. The plaintiff claims that the AXXIS Companies were established for the very same aims and objectives for which C&K was established, and are involved in the same business activities.

  10. The plaintiff’s claim and the defendants’ defence

  11. [8] The plaintiff claims that the funding, business, clientele, projects and staff of C&K were wrongfully transferred or diverted to the AXXIS Companies. The plaintiff pleads the following causes of action (among others) against the various defendants:

  12. (a) Cubix Group owed fiduciary duties and duties of good faith and fidelity to the plaintiff. These included the obligation to use funds that were extended by the plaintiff to C&K for their intended purpose, a duty to act in the best interests of the plaintiff, and a duty not to defeat the intention and purpose of the joint venture. Cubix Group breached these duties by using and transferring funding, business, clientele, projects and staff that were intended for C&K to the AXXIS Companies. Cubix Group also breached its non-competition obligations under the JV Agreement.

  13. (b) Ben and Bee personally breached their fiduciary duties and duties of good faith and fidelity which they owed to the plaintiff “as joint venture partners”. They breached those duties by using and diverting the funding, business, clientele, projects and staff that were intended for C&K towards the AXXIS Companies. Ben and Bee are also liable to account to the plaintiff for any profits derived from such breaches. The plaintiff also claims that Ben and Bee breached s 340 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) by conducting the business of C&K with the intention to defraud the plaintiff as its “sole or main creditor”. The plaintiff also claims against Ben and Bee in dishonest assistance.

  14. (c) Leading up to the entering of the JV Agreement, Cubix Group, Ben and Bee fraudulently or recklessly made misrepresentations to the plaintiff, including misrepresentations that Cubix Group would match any funding contributions that the plaintiff made to C&K, that any funding which the plaintiff contributed to C&K would be used for the business and expenses of C&K only, and that these contributions (which the plaintiff describes as “loans”) would be repayable by C&K on the plaintiff’s demand.

  15. (d) The AXXIS Companies are in knowing receipt of any profits or benefits derived from the wrongful use of C&K’s funding, and the transfer of any business, clientele and/or staff of C&K. Further, the corporate veil of the AXXIS Companies should be lifted and Ben and Bee should be made jointly and severally liable for all claims by the plaintiff.

  16. (e) The AXXIS Companies, Cubix Group, Ben and Bee are liable in conspiracy because they conspired together to defraud the plaintiff by causing the plaintiff to enter into the JV Agreement and to transfer the funding to C&K.

  17. [9] On 14 June 2013, Cubix International, Cubix Group, Ben, Bee and the AXXIS Companies jointly filed a defence. However, on 20 March 2014, Cubix Group, C&K and the AXXIS Companies filed notices of intention to act in person. I note that it is technically impossible for these defendants to act in person, since under O 12 r 1(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”), a defendant to an action begun by writ which is a body corporate may only defend the action through a solicitor. Further, none of these defendants have applied for leave for their officers to act on their behalf. Since filing these notices of intention to act in person, Cubix Group, C&K and the AXXIS Companies have not taken any further steps in these proceedings. They also did not appear at the hearing of the present application. This is an issue to which I shall return later.

  18. [10] On 15 May 2014, Cubix International, Ben and Bee (collectively, “the Represented Defendants”) filed an amended defence, which was subsequently amended again on 18 April 2016. By their defence (as amended), the Represented Defendants plead as follows:

  19. (b) Ben and Bee never wrongfully used the moneys provided by the plaintiff to C&K, or transferred any business, clientele or employees of C&K to the AXXIS Companies. The moneys provided by the plaintiff to C&K were used solely and specifically for C&K and its principal project, an animation known as “Fabulous Fat Fish”. At all material times, the staff and management of C&K were also working on Fabulous Fat Fish.

  20. (c) Ben and Bee were not in the position of joint venturers vis-à-vis- the plaintiff as they were never party to the JV Agreement.

  21. The relevant procedural history

  22. [11] In this summons, the plaintiff seeks to strike out the defences of Ben, Bee and the AXXIS Companies broadly on the basis that these parties have breached their discovery obligations and certain court orders. As I shall elaborate on later, the particular breaches which the plaintiff relies on relate to three separate categories of documents. I shall first set out an overview of the key events in the procedural timeline leading up to this application, before I discuss the detailed chronology relating to each category of documents.

  23. Overview

  24. The plaintiff’s requests for specific discovery

  25. [12] After the plaintiff commenced its claim on 15 April 2013, the defendants entered appearances from 22 April 2013 to 27 April 2013. They were all represented by solicitors at the time. Since 7 April 2014, the Represented Defendants have been represented by the same set of solicitors, Messrs MG Chambers LLC (“MG Chambers”).

  26. [13] On 18 November 2014, the plaintiff’s solicitors, Messrs Characterist LLC (“Characterist”), sent MG Chambers a letter (“the 18 November 2014 Letter”) requesting specific discovery of several categories of documents set out in an annex. One of the classes of documents requested was the “AXXIS Documents”. These included the following:

  27. (a) All bank account statements of the AXXIS Companies (“Item 1(2)”).

  28. (b) All annual financial statements of the AXXIS Companies (including but not limited to the balance sheets of the AXXIS Companies) (“Item 1(3)”).

  29. (c) All documents evidencing or summarising the costs and expenses incurred and revenue generated or received by the AXXIS Companies in respect of the production, distribution and reproduction of each and every project (“Item 1(5)”).

  30. [14] On 24 December 2014, MG Chambers responded via a letter to Characterist, which stated as follows:

  31. [15] Subsequently, several letters were exchanged between Characterist and MG Chambers. In gist, the plaintiff took the position that the documents it had requested were relevant and necessary, and that it was within the Represented Defendants’ power to obtain those documents by enquiring with the banks and the accountants of the AXXIS Companies. MG Chambers said that the Represented Defendants would “endeavour to make the necessary enquiries”. On 25 March 2015, the Represented Defendants disclosed some documents falling within Item 1(2) – specifically, AXXIS International’s bank statements from HSBC bank for the months of April 2008 to December 2008. It did not, however, disclose any other documents in Items 1(2), 1(3) and 1(5).

  32. The plaintiff’s application for specific discovery

  33. The First Unless Order Application

  34. (a) Ben and Bee were to explain why the Category 1(2) documents had emerged late, and, if they had only obtained the documents after making enquiries with HSBC bank, they were to explain why the enquiries to HSBC bank were not made earlier. This was to be done within 14 days, failing which Ben and Bee’s defences were to be struck out and interlocutory judgment entered in favour of the plaintiff.

  35. (b) Ben and Bee were to produce the Category 1(5) documents for the AXXIS Companies’ projects prior to 18 December 2009 within 14 days, failing which Ben and Bee’s defences were to be struck out and interlocutory judgment entered in favour of the plaintiff.

  36. The Second Unless Order Application

  37. The present striking out application

  38. [22] To summarise, the following table sets out a timeline of the significant stages in the procedural history leading up to this striking out application. I also include in this table the key letters and affidavits which the Represented Defendants have written or filed in connection with the plaintiff’s various applications. I will frequently be referring to these letters and affidavits in the following sections of this judgment.

  39. Category 1(2)

  40. [23] It will be recalled that the Category 1(2) documents are bank account statements of the AXXIS Companies for the period of 2008 to 2009.

  41. [24] After the plaintiff initiated the request for specific discovery in the 18 November 2014 Letter, MG Chambers stated in the 24 December 2014 Letter that the Represented Defendants had “thrown away” these documents for the years prior to 2010 sometime in the “first quarter of this year”. In response, the plaintiff insisted that the Represented Defendants could obtain the statements by making enquiries with the banks (see [15] above).

  42. [25] The Represented Defendants wrote to HSBC on 16 March 2015 to request only for AXXIS International’s bank statements for 2008. On 25 March 2015, the Represented Defendants disclosed AXXIS International’s bank statements for April to December 2008.

  43. [26] After the plaintiff filed the SD Application, Ben filed his sixth Affidavit to resist the SD Application on 25 May 2015, in which he explained that “the Represented Defendants obtained the HSBC bank statements for that particular period ie, 2008 for reasons described in the section above”. It appears that the “section above” refers to an earlier portion of Ben’s sixth Affidavit in which he had stated:

  44. [30] In the Fourth LOD, the Represented Defendants also disclosed AXXIS International’s HSBC bank statements for the year 2009.

  45. [32] On 30 May 2017, about two weeks after the plaintiff had filed the present striking out application, Ben affirmed his fifteenth Affidavit, in which he again attempted to explain the Represented Defendants’ delay in disclosing the Category 1(2) documents:

  46. [33] After I directed the Represented Defendants to file an affidavit by the person who caused the AXXIS documents in Categories 1(2), 1(3) and 1(5) to be destroyed or disposed of, Ben filed his seventeenth Affidavit on 28 August 2017, and Bee filed her second Affidavit on 29 August 2017. Ben’s 17th Affidavit stated as follows:

  47. [34] Ben also stated that he had contacted a former employee of the AXXIS Companies, Ms Khoo Chok Theng (“Ms Khoo”), by phone. According to Ben, Ms Khoo told him that she had been serving her notice period “shortly before the lease for the [AXXIS] Companies’ premises expired”. According to Ben’s version of events, this would have been some time shortly before 31 July 2012. Ben also stated that Ms Khoo had denied destroying any documents which were “5 or more years old”. Ben had requested that she make herself available for an interview with MG Chambers and to affirm an affidavit. However, she had ignored his attempts to contact her since 21 August 2017.

  48. [35] Ben’s seventeenth Affidavit stated that Bee would “elaborate” on his own statements, because she had instituted the policy of throwing away documents not needed for income tax reporting purposes, “and was in charge of determining which documents were not necessary and therefore could be thrown away”. However, in Bee’s second Affidavit she stated that she “cannot recall who actually threw away or destroyed the [AXXIS] documents for 2008 and 2009, or if [she] had instructed any of the [AXXIS] Companies’ staff to shred the documents” [emphasis added].

  49. [36] Having set out the above sequence of events relating to the Category 1(2) documents, I now turn to Category 1(5).

  50. Category 1(5)

  51. [38] As with the Category 1(2) documents, Characterist requested discovery of the Category 1(5) documents in the 18 November 2014 Letter. MG Chambers replied via the 24 December 2014 Letter, stating that these documents had been thrown away in the first quarter of 2014. However, on 5 January 2015, MG Chambers sent Characterist a letter and provided discovery of the Category 1(5) documents for the year 2010 and onwards. The plaintiff was however dissatisfied that no Category 1(5) documents had been provided for the years prior to 2010.

  52. [43] A further exchange between the parties concerning the Category 1(5) documents occurred between April and May 2017. To provide some context, in or around April 2017, the Represented Defendants disclosed to the plaintiff some unaudited general ledgers falling within Category 1(3). Seeing that these unaudited general ledgers revealed certain transactions between the AXXIS Companies and other entities, the plaintiff took the view that it was entitled to further discovery of Category 1(5) documents relating to those transactions. However, after Characterist wrote to MG Chambers on 19 April 2017 to request such further discovery, MG Chambers replied on 3 May 2017, essentially reiterating its position that the Represented Defendants had already fully complied with their obligations to disclose the Category1(5) documents.

  53. [44] The plaintiff filed the present striking out application on 18 May 2017. Ben filed his fifteenth Affidavit on 30 May 2017 to resist the striking out. Before I discuss the contents of this affidavit, I should explain that when Ben filed his Affidavit Verifying the Third LOD in September 2015, he had alluded to the existence of an old computer (“the Old Computer”) which possibly contained documents under Category 1(3):

  54. [45] Up until Ben’s fifteenth Affidavit was filed on 30 May 2017, the Represented Defendants had only mentioned the possibility that the Old Computer contained Category 1(3) documents. The plaintiff therefore says the Represented Defendants took a “completely new position” when Ben stated the following in his fifteenth Affidavit:

  55. [46] What is clear is that while the Represented Defendants had previously suggested that only Category 1(3) documents were possibly stored on the Old Computer, that position appears to have been arrived at without the Represented Defendants ever having started up the Old Computer.

  56. [47] While Ben’s fifteenth Affidavit states that the directory listing of the Peachtree folder (“the Peachtree Directory”) “show[s] … that [the Represented Defendants] are not hiding any documents that might fall into Category 1(5)”, the plaintiff takes the view that the Peachtree Directory does disclose documents which may fall into Category 1(5). This is on the basis that the directory listing includes files such as “Aged Payables v9.rpt”, “Aged Receivables v9.rpt”, “Customer Balance Graph v9.rpt”, “Customer Detail List v9.rpt”, “Customer Sales by Item v9.rpt” and “Customer Sales by Month v9.rpt”.

  57. Category 1(3)

  58. [49] The Category 1(3) documents are the annual financial statements of the AXXIS Companies for the period of 2008 to 2009. As with Categories 1(2) and 1(5), the plaintiff requested discovery of these documents in the 18 November 2014 Letter, and the Represented Defendants stated in their reply of 24 December 2014 that documents in this category prior to 2010 had been “thrown away sometime in the first quarter of [2014] when the [AXXIS] Companies became dormant”.

  59. [50] On 24 March 2015, the Represented Defendants filed a supplementary list of documents in which they disclosed the corporate secretarial documents of the AXXIS Companies from the time of their incorporation to 2013. This evidently did not satisfy the plaintiff who nevertheless proceeded to include the Category 1(3) documents in the SD Application which they filed on 27 April 2015.

  60. [52] It should also be noted that in Ben’s Affidavit Verifying the Third LOD, he did not explain how the Represented Defendants had managed to obtain these documents despite their earlier statement in the 24 December 2014 Letter that the Category 1(3) documents had been disposed of or destroyed.

  61. [55] Subsequently, on 6 March 2017, the Represented Defendants filed the Fifth LOD, by which they provided discovery of the remaining Category 1(3) documents. That same day, Ben affirmed the Affidavit Verifying the Fifth LOD, in which he stated:

  62. [58] Again, since the Represented Defendants initially took the position that the Category 1(3) documents had been destroyed or disposed of, it is relevant to note Ben’s latest position in his seventeenth Affidavit that that he had made the statements in his previous affidavits without being able to recall whether the documents requested by the plaintiff were thrown away, when they were thrown away, and who threw them away.

  63. Inconsistencies in the Represented Defendants’ position

  64. [59] Before I discuss the parties’ arguments, I pause to summarise the significant inconsistencies and variations in the Represented Defendants’ position with regard to the AXXIS documents.

  65. [60] First, the Represented Defendants have taken shifting positions regarding when, and by whom the documents were destroyed. In the 24 December 2014 Letter, it was said that the documents in Categories 1(2), 1(3) and 1(5) were destroyed “in the first quarter of this year when the AXXIS Companies became dormant” [emphasis added]. This must refer to 2014, since that is both (a) the year during which the 24 December 2014 Letter was sent, and (b) the year when the Represented Defendants themselves say the AXXIS Companies became dormant. However, Ben’s Affidavit verifying the Third LOD suggests that the destruction of documents (or at least those in Category 1(2)) occurred in or around December 2012, when the AXXIS Companies closed their office premises (see [27] above).

  66. [61] Secondly, the Represented Defendants have taken shifting positions regarding who was responsible for the destruction of the AXXIS documents. Ben’s Affidavit Verifying the Third LOD stated that the Category 1(2) documents “were disposed of by the bookkeeper, one Ms Khoo” (see [27] above). Yet Ben’s seventeenth Affidavit suggests that Ms Khoo was already “serving her notice period” sometime shortly before July 2012 (see [34] above), five months before December 2012, which is the earliest of the dates on which the Represented Defendants variously claim the Category 1(2) documents were destroyed. Finally, in Ben’s seventeenth Affidavit and Bee’s second Affidavit, Ben and Bee admit that they simply cannot recall who threw the AXXIS documents away.

  67. [62] Thirdly, the Represented Defendants have taken shifting positions regarding whether some of the documents even existed to begin with. With respect to Category 1(2), the Represented Defendants stated in a letter on 25 August 2016 that there were simply “no statements” for AXXIS Pte Ltd and AXXIS Group. However, in their Fourth LOD, the Represented Defendants did disclose bank statements for AXXIS Group for the period of May 2008 to December 2009.

  68. [64] At the broadest level, the most significant shift in the Represented Defendants’ position is that they initially gave the impression that Ben and Bee actually knew what became of the AXXIS documents, but much later revealed that this was not the case at all. In the 24 December 2014 Letter, the Represented Defendants refused disclosure on the basis that the documents in categories 1(2), 1(3) and 1(5) had been thrown away. Then, in successive affidavits, Ben spoke in considerable detail about when, by whom, and for what reason they were disposed of or destroyed. These statements were made in no uncertain terms. None contained the slightest indication that Ben was unsure of what had happened to the AXXIS documents, or that he was speaking based on his “limited memory”. Yet in August 2017, Ben conceded in his seventeenth Affidavit that he cannot recall when and by whom the documents were thrown away. In fact, he revealed that he cannot even recall whether they were thrown away or destroyed at all, or simply lost. Even Bee, whom Ben said was responsible for deciding which documents were unnecessary and could be disposed of, cannot recall whether she instructed any staff to dispose of the documents.

  69. The parties’ submissions

  70. The plaintiff’s submissions

  71. [65] The plaintiff argues that Ben, Bee and the AXXIS Companies’ defences should be struck out on three grounds. First, a fair trial is no longer possible because the Represented Defendants have destroyed core or essential documents:

  72. (a) The Category 1(5) documents are essential because they would reveal the name of the projects undertaken by the AXXIS Companies, which would allow the court to determine whether projects intended to be carried out by C&K were in fact carried out by the AXXIS Companies. The Category 1(5) documents would also reveal the resources used by the AXXIS Companies to generate revenue for themselves, and whether such resources are traceable to C&K.

  73. (b) The Category 1(3) documents are essential because they would show “what the AXXIS Companies were all about, and what they did”, including the AXXIS Companies’ revenue, costs and expenses, what assets they held, what liabilities they owed. This would all go towards establishing whether the AXXIS Companies had misused the resources of C&K.

  74. The plaintiff says that the Represented Defendants’ deficiencies in discovery “simply cannot be remedied” and that a fair trial is “objectively not possible”.

  75. [68] Thirdly, the plaintiff argues that Ben, Bee and the AXXIS Companies’ defences should be struck out because the Represented Defendants are in contumelious breach of their discovery obligations. In this regard, the plaintiff says that the Represented Defendants have shown a pattern of making only “incomplete” disclosure of the documents in each category, taking inconsistent and changing positions, lying about the existence of documents, and acting to disclose documents only when they are forced to do so by the plaintiff’s applications for specific discovery and unless orders.

  76. Ben and Bee’s submissions

  77. [69] Although the plaintiff is also seeking to strike out the defences of the AXXIS Companies, as I have mentioned (see [9] above), only Ben and Bee were represented at the hearing of this application.

  78. [70] Ben and Bee argue that the plaintiff is attempting to avoid a full trial of the issues in the main action because there are gaps and “obvious loopholes” in the plaintiff’s case which would be exposed if the matter proceeded to a full trial. They argue that there are “issues which ought to be tried”, including whether there were any transfers of money from C&K to the AXXIS Companies, and whether the Represented Defendants owe fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. It should be noted that a large part of Ben and Bee’s arguments are focused on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. Their written submissions descend into the details of whether the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to support various aspects of its claim, and point out “flaws” in the plaintiff’s case.

  79. [72] Ben and Bee further argue that a fair trial remains possible. While the plaintiff has complained that the Represented Defendants have not explained the facts behind the delayed disclosure of the Category 1(2) documents, these are merely “background facts”. The plaintiff has not demonstrated that it cannot have a fair trial without knowing the reasons behind the delayed disclosure of the Category 1(2) documents, or without knowing the identity of the employee who provided the password to the Peachtree documents. In Ben and Bee’s words, “These are not issues that have been pleaded or will be tried, and they only arose tangentially out of ongoing discovery proceedings”. It would be disproportionate to strike out their defences “for the late disclosure of background facts, as these background facts are not required for a fair trial of the issues in the action.” [emphasis added].

  80. [73] Finally, with regard to the plaintiff’s allegation that the Represented Defendants have provided incomplete disclosure of the Category 1(3) documents, Ben and Bee argue that this position is “untenable”. While the plaintiff claims that the Represented Defendants must have selectively disclosed only the fourth page of each of the balance sheets for the AXXIS Companies (see [51] above), this argument “is simply non-sequitur, since the essential part of the balance sheets, being assets and liabilities, are displayed in documents already disclosed.”

  81. The issues

  82. (a) Whether Ben, Bee and the AXXIS Companies’ defences should be struck out on the basis that a fair trial is no longer possible.

  83. Applicable law

  84. [75] The court’s power to strike out a defence or action for failure to make discovery of documents is enshrined in O 24 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court (“ROC”), which provides:

  85. [77] In deciding whether there are such “exceptional circumstances” justifying a striking out, the court is entitled to look at all the circumstances (Mitora at [48]). The cases have commonly used terms such as “contumelious” and “contumacious” to express the idea that something beyond ordinary procedural default is required (see for example, Alliance Management SA v Pendleton Lane P [2008] 4 SLR(R) 1 (“Alliance Management”) at [6] and K Solutions at [112], citing Landauer Ltd v Comins & Co The Times (7 August 1991)). It is not the law, however, that wilful disobedience is required. Even a failure to comply with court orders “through negligence, incompetence, or sheer indolence” may justify striking out, as noted by the Court of Appeal in Mitora at [40], endorsing the remarks of Auld LJ in Hytec Information Systems Ltd v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 1666 at 1677.

  86. [80] In exercising the discretion under O 24 r 16 of the Rules of Court, the factors which the courts have taken into account include the following:

  87. (a) Whether a fair trial remains possible, which may include an inquiry into whether the defaulting party’s conduct shows that they are unlikely to pursue their claim honestly and fairly if the action is not struck out (Lee Chang Rung at [34]).

  88. (b) Whether the defaulting party’s delay has caused any “irremediable prejudice” to the other parties to the litigation (Mitora at [41]).

  89. (c) Whether there has been any deliberate suppression of highly relevant documents (Lee Chang-Rung v Standard Chartered Bank [2011] 1 SLR 337 (“Lee Chang-Rung”) at [35]).

  90. (e) Whether the delay or default was due to any extraneous circumstances (Mitora at [41]).

  91. [81] It is also worth noting that a failure to disclose need not be continuing before it is capable of attracting a remedial response from the courts. A court may strike out an action or defence even where the defaulting party has rectified his non-compliance (Mitora at [47], citing Tan Kok Ing v Ang Boon Aik [2002] SGHC 215 at [30]).

  92. [82] Finally, a litigant cannot obtain the remedy of a striking out under O 24 r 16 by raising a “formalistic declaration” that the allegedly defaulting party has provided inadequate disclosure. So, in Mitora, the Court of Appeal held that the Appellant’s action ought not to have been struck out despite the Respondent’s contention that the Appellant had provided inadequate disclosure, because the requested documents appeared not to exist, and in any event, an “adequate substitute had been disclosed in their stead” (Mitora at [25]).

  93. My decision

  94. Whether the defences should be struck out on the basis that a fair trial is no longer possible

  95. [83] As mentioned, the courts will strike out a defence or action where a failure to comply with the rules on discovery has created a real risk that a fair trial will not be possible (Mitora at [48]). The underlying reason for this is that in such circumstances “any judgment in favour of the offender [would be] unsafe” (Logicrose Ltd v Southend United Football Club Ltd The Times (5 March 1988) (“Logicrose”), as endorsed in K Solutions at [111]).

  96. [84] Landauer Ltd v Comins & Co The Times (7 August 1991) (“Landauer”) provides an example of a situation where a claim was struck out on the ground that there was a real risk that a fair trial would be impossible as a result of a breach of discovery obligations. The plaintiff in that case was the parent company of three subsidiaries. The plaintiff and its subsidiaries engaged the defendants to act as its auditors. The plaintiff alleged that it was its policy to protect itself and its subsidiaries against foreign currency fluctuations by buying or selling forward. Its claim was that the defendants had on two occasions failed to draw the plaintiff’s attention to the existence of substantial uncovered liabilities in US dollars, which in turn led to the plaintiff failing to take measures to avoid substantial losses. An essential element of the plaintiff’s case was that it was wholly unaware of its foreign currency exposure. The defendants argued that the plaintiff’s managing director, a Mr Axford, knew or should have known of the fact and extent of the plaintiff’s foreign currency exposure. Lloyd LJ, who delivered the judgment of the English Court of Appeal, noted that Mr Axford’s state of knowledge would be “of critical importance” to the plaintiff’s claim.

  97. [86] The English Court of Appeal upheld the decision to strike out the plaintiff’s claim. Lloyd LJ noted that based on the available evidence, it was clear that Mr Axford’s management files would contain the types of documents which would be “directly relevant to the question of foreign currency exposure and the steps taken to cover that exposure”. These were also the types of documents “which could prove vital in cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses on the all-important question of their knowledge”. Without those documents, there was a real risk that a fair trial was no longer possible.

  98. [87] Landauer was a case concerning the destruction of relevant documents. As I alluded to at [80(a)] above, there are also cases in which the withholding of relevant documents has led to a similar conclusion that a fair trial may not be possible. For example, in Lee Chang-Rung, Tay Yong Kwang J noted that the plaintiffs’ “deliberate suppression of highly relevant documents”, their “selective disclosures” and “hide and seek strategy” disclosed a “serious risk” that a fair trial would not be possible because there was no indication that the plaintiffs would pursue their claim honestly and fairly (Lee Chang-Rung at [30]–[32]). In this regard there is some overlap between this ground for striking out a claim or defence under O 24 r 16 and the ground of “contumelious” conduct.

  99. [88] In the present case, the plaintiff claims that there is a real risk that a fair trial is no longer possible based on the destruction and incomplete disclosure of documents in Categories 1(3) and 1(5). Having considered the arguments, I am not satisfied that there is a real risk that a fair trial is not possible. I say this because I do not think that the allegedly missing or destroyed Category 1(3) and 1(5) documents are so “vital” to the plaintiff’s case such that their non-disclosure has foreclosed the possibility of a fair trial.

  100. Whether the defences should be struck out on the basis that Ben, Bee and the AXXIS Companies are in inexcusable breach of their discovery obligations

  101. Breaches of the Unless Order

  102. (1) Have the Represented Defendants breached the Unless Order?

  103. (a) First, Ben and Bee were required to explain why the Category 1(2) documents had emerged “later”, and if they had only obtained the documents after making enquiries with HSBC bank, to explain why such enquiries were not made “earlier”.

  104. (b) Secondly, Ben and Bee were to produce the Category 1(5) documents for the AXXIS Companies’ projects prior to 18 December 2009 within 14 days.

  105. (a) The reason why the HSBC bank documents only emerged later was that “the Represented Defendants did not have possession of these documents” and only obtained them “after making enquiries with HSBC.”

  106. (b) The plaintiff had not requested for the bank statements of the AXXIS Companies until the 18 November 2014 Letter.

  107. (2) Do the breaches of the Unless Order warrant striking out of the defences of Ben, Bee and the AXXIS Companies?

  108. [101] Even where a breach has been found to be intentional and contumelious, however, the court must decide what is the appropriate response, having regard to the “drastic” effects of striking out an action or defence (Von Roll Asia at [43]). As stated by Chan Seng Onn J in Teeni Enterprise Pte Ltd v Singco Pte Ltd [2008] SGHC 115 at [64]:

  109. [105] However, even if I give the Represented Defendants the benefit of the doubt, and assume they in fact had nothing further to disclose within Category 1(5), it would surely be incumbent upon Ben and Bee to make the necessary checks and enquiries to satisfy themselves that this was true. They would also have to take steps to satisfy the court that they had made such checks and enquiries. I stress the statement in Syed Mohamed Abdul Muthaliff at [14] that the defaulting party must show that he made positive efforts to comply but was prevented from doing so by extraneous circumstances.

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