District Court · Decided 9 September 2026
H M Luqman Al Hakim Ang and another v Wonderz Pty Ltd and others
Feedback & support[2026] SGDC 295 · Case no. District Court Originating Claim No 706 of 2024 · 25 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
Background
- [6]
[6] On 7 May 2024, the claimants sued Wonderz Pty Ltd (“Wonderz”), and the defendants, ie, Halalxpert Pte Ltd (“Halalxpert”) and ARK Group of Companies Pte Ltd (“ARK”), for breach of contract. According to the claimants, they were lay investors who separately entered into “Contract Agreements for Sheep Meat Trading Program (SMTP)” with Wonderz and the defendants in 2022 (“the Agreements”). Wonderz did not enter an appearance as it was insolvent.
- [7]
[7] Wonderz provided wethers (castrated male sheep) for meat trading and pregnant ewes for the SMTP, whilst Halalxpert administered the SMTP on behalf of Wonderz and the defendants. In turn, ARK managed the SMTP and ensured that it was Syariah compliant.
- [8]
[8] In their statement of claim, the claimants pleaded that they invested sums for wethers in Australia for trading in the halal meat market for a period of 13 months, under separate agreements. Both claimants claimed that they had opted for the “Compounded Profit Earned” option in the Agreements for which they were each entitled “to switch between receiving a share of the profits earned each month”. Luqman pleaded that he had invested the sum of $45,000 for 150 wethers. His contract matured on or about 7 June 2023. Based on Schedule I of his agreement, Luqman was to receive a sum of $141,229.28 on maturity of his contract. Nelli, on the other hand, invested the sum of $30,000 for 100 wethers. Her contract matured on or about 7 September 2023. Based on Schedule I of her agreement, Nelli was to receive a sum of $94,152.85 on maturity of her contract.
- [9]
[9] According to the claimants, in breach of the Agreements, Wonderz and the defendants failed to fulfil their obligations and decided to terminate the SMTP on or around 22 November 2023, when Halalxpert sent an undated “Agreement for Refund of Principal Amount for the Termination of Sheep Meat Trading Program” (“Refund Agreement”). This agreement provided that the claimants would receive the sums they had invested within 180 days, but Wonderz and the defendants failed to pay the proceeds “despite numerous requests and demands” in breach of the Refund Agreement. This led to the claim in OC 706 where Luqman and Nelli respectively sought $141,229.28 and $94,152.85 in damages.
- [10]
[10] The defendants denied the claim in full. According to the defendants, Nelli’s husband, one Jumari Naiyan, was the shareholder, corporate secretary, and managing director of Halalxpert with full control of the company until 12 March 2023. Further, various terms including the following must be implied into the Agreements to give meaning to the words “Syariah Compliance”: (a) the underlying business shall have an element of risk sharing; (b) investors agree to bear the loss; and (c) recovery of the principal sums invested is not guaranteed. The Refund Agreement was also unenforceable as the claimants did not provide valuable consideration, and in any case it was entered into under a unilateral mistake of Halalxpert who had falsely believed that it was liable to the claimants under the Agreements.
- [13]
[13] The defendants filed a further appeal to the General Division of the High Court (“General Division”) vide HC/RAS 16/2025 (“RAS 16”) on 22 October 2025. RAS 16 was, however, deemed withdrawn on 3 December 2025 as the defendants had failed to file the requisite documents under O 18 r 21(5) of the ROC.
Procedural history
The hearing on 17 June 2026
The hearing on 8 July 2026
- [19]
[19] Had the claimants objected to the filing of a supplementary affidavit, this court would likely have sustained that objection in view of the strict requirements for allowing a further affidavit (see Mazzagatti, Francesco v Alliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2025] SGCA 46 (“Mazzagatti”) at [35]–[37]). In the main, when a party’s conduct indicated that a further affidavit is needed to supplement his defective or ill-prepared affidavit, and there are no good reasons to explain the defect, the court would be unlikely to exercise its discretion to allow a further affidavit (Mazzagatti at [36]). The financial documents that were missing in the original affidavit were clearly relevant information which should have been adduced at the outset, but they were not. Instead, the defendants made bare allegations of their financial problems and only exhibited some news articles on the general downturn of the sheep farming industry in Australia. This court accordingly allowed the defendants to file supplementary affidavits exhibiting such essential documents by 21 August 2026. A further hearing was fixed on 2 September 2026.
The defendants’ request for an extension of time to file their supplementary affidavits
- [20]
[20] On 18 August 2026, at the eleventh hour of the court’s very liberal six-week period to file their supplementary affidavits, the defendants wrote in seeking a month’s extension of time to file the affidavits. The claimants objected to the extension of time by their letter to court dated 19 August 2026.
- [22]
[22] This court summarily refused the defendants’ request on 21 August 2026 and directed that the further hearing fixed on 2 September 2026 was to stand. In deciding whether an extension of time should be granted generally in interlocutory applications, the following legal principles, as summarised by the General Division in Affert Resources Pte Ltd (in compulsory winding up) v Industries Chimiques du Senegal and another [2024] 4 SLR 258 at [26], apply:
- [23]
[23] The court was mindful that the refusal of an extension of time should not operate merely as a punishment for a procedural breach, particularly where it would deprive a party of an opportunity to have the relevant issues determined on their merits. That being so, this consideration did not apply in the present case. As stated at [19] above, the financial documents should have been exhibited in the defendants’ original affidavit. Despite this, this court exercised its discretion generously and granted the defendants permission to supplement their evidence.
- [24]
[24] More importantly, the reason advanced by the defendants did not justify the extension sought. The defendants appeared to have proceeded on the premise that they had to engage accountants to prepare or finalise their financial statements. That was not what the court had directed. The defendants were only required to produce documentary evidence to substantiate their alleged financial impecuniosity, which could have included bank statements, documents evidencing the closure of bank accounts and other existing financial records. It was also telling that the Maybank inquiry slips were dated a few days prior to the letter to court.
- [25]
[25] Nor did the defendants explain at all what steps they had taken during the six weeks afforded to them to obtain the necessary documents. Their bare statement that they were “exploring the possibility” of engaging more affordable accountants or accounting service providers did not explain why the documents which the court had granted them the indulgence to produce could not have been obtained within that period. It was also only three days before the deadline that the defendants sought a further extension of one month. In the court’s view, the defendants had clearly failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for requiring an extension of time.
- [26]
[26] Lastly, the refusal of the extension did not deprive the defendants of the opportunity to substantiate their claim of financial impecuniosity. They remained at liberty to file any documentary evidence that was already in existence to substantiate their financial position. The fact that further time might have enabled the defendants to obtain additional evidence did not, in light of the considerations outlined above, justify a further one-month extension. In contrast, granting an extension of time would have required the further hearing fixed on 2 September 2026 to be vacated and further delayed the determination of the Application and the progress of the entire action to trial.
- [27]
[27] Consequently, the defendants’ request for a one-month extension to file their supplementary affidavits was rejected, although a final short extension of time to 26 August 2026 was granted for the affidavits to be filed.
The hearing on 2 September 2026
- [28]
[28] Subsequently, the defendants duly filed their supplementary affidavits: (a) an affidavit deposed by Imran Musa (“Imran”), the director of Halalxpert, dated 26 August 2026; and (b) an affidavit deposed by Muhammad Khalis Imran, the sole shareholder and a director of ARK, dated 23 July 2026.
Parties’ arguments
Claimants
- [31]
[31] As for the defendants’ professed impecuniosity, this was difficult to reconcile in light of their continued ability to fund the present litigation. They pointed to the defendants’ three earlier unsuccessful applications and their continued preparation for the proceedings in OC 706, including an intended application for certain witnesses to give evidence by video link. These matters suggested that, notwithstanding the defendants’ assertion that they had no funds or bank account, they continued to have access to funds for the litigation.
Defendants
- [35]
[35] The defendants also sought to account for the monies previously received in connection with the SMTP by arguing that the monies received by Halalxpert were remitted to Wonderz when sheep meat trading opportunities arose. However, the sheep meat trading business subsequently suffered a downturn which resulted in the eventual winding up of Wonderz.
- [39]
[39] The defendants also maintained that they stood in a different position from that of the appellant in Chloe V. The defendants had not commenced the present proceedings and were seeking only to defend the claim brought against them. The merits of their Defence had yet to be adjudicated. Accordingly, striking out the Defence would be disproportionate and deprive the defendants of the opportunity to defend the claim substantively.
The legal context
Did the “extremely limited” standard in Chloe V apply?
The discretionary stage
- [54]
[54] Two further points may be made. First, it was held in Beech Hill at [33(iv)(c)] that the court must consider “all of the available options including other enforcement mechanisms outside the proceedings (including the usual procedures for enforcement of judgment debts) and the full range of possible orders within the proceedings designed to secure compliance with the court’s previous order(s)”. In the court’s respectful view, the claimant should not ordinarily be required to pursue alternative enforcement mechanisms before seeking relief under O 21 r 2(6) in view of the following pronouncement by the Court of Appeal at [34] of Chloe V, which should apply to both defaulting appellants and defendants:
- [55]
[55] Second, although the English High Court in Beech Hill referred to “a party’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR” (at [33(iv)(e)]), Singapore is not a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. While Art 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed) guarantees a right to a fair trial (Howe Wen Khong Rocky and others v Attorney-General [2026] SGCA 39 at [48]), this does not amount to a freestanding constitutional right to a fair trial in ordinary civil proceedings, unlike Art 6(1) of the ECHR, which expressly extends to the determination of “civil rights and obligations”. Article 9(1) is instead concerned with the guarantee that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law” [emphasis added]. Nevertheless, the Ideals in civil procedure under O 3 r 1 of the ROC, which have been described as “akin to constitutional principles by which the parties and the Court are guided in conducting civil proceedings” (Dai Yi Ting v Chuang Fu Yuan (Grabcycle (SG) Pte Ltd and another, third parties) [2023] 3 SLR 1574 at [13]), underscore the fundamental importance of procedural fairness in the conduct of civil litigation.
- [56]
[56] Apart from the above, the other principles set out by the English High Court in Beech Hill are relevant in guiding the court’s exercise of its discretion under the second stage in determining (a) whether an adverse order should be made and, if so, (b) the appropriate form of that order.
- [57]
[57] Before setting out the applicable principles in the exercise of the court’s discretion, it is appropriate to consider the following principles, concerning unless orders, from the Court of Appeal’s leading decision of Mitora Pte Ltd v Agritrade International (Pte) Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 1179 (“Mitora”):
The applicable framework
(a) The reasons why the unpaid costs orders were made. For example, where the costs were occasioned by the defendant’s breach of a court order, abuse of process, or other misconduct during litigation, a more serious sanction may be warranted.
(b) The amount of the outstanding costs relative to the value of the claim. Where the outstanding costs are substantial in comparison with the value of the claim, it may be appropriate to strike out the defence. Even then, it should generally be made on an unless order basis (see Beech Hill at [33(vii)]).
(c) The degree of the defendant’s culpability in failing to comply with the costs orders. In this regard, the reasons why the defendant has been found to have refused or neglected, at the first stage, to pay the outstanding costs will be relevant. A defendant whose conduct demonstrates deliberate or contumelious disregard of the court’s orders is more blameworthy than one whose failure, although unexplained or inadequately explained, does not evince such wilful disobedience.
(d) The prejudice to the claimant that has been caused by the non-payment.
(e) Whether the defendant has made genuine efforts to comply with the costs orders, for example by making partial payment, offering instalments, or proposing some reasonable arrangement.
Application to the facts
Stage 1 – whether the defendants have “refused or neglected” to pay outstanding costs
- [66]
[66] To begin with, the defendants’ evidence did not provide a sufficiently complete picture of their financial position. The evidence that Halalxpert’s Maybank account had been closed on 19 July 2025 because it was unable to maintain the minimum balance lent some support to its asserted impecuniosity. Likewise, ARK’s evidence that it had never maintained a bank account and had a paid-up capital of $100 was relevant. But these matters did not, without more, establish that the defendants had no financial resources available to them. In particular, the absence of a bank account said little about whether a company had assets or receivables. It was telling that despite being given the opportunity to supplement their evidence, neither defendant produced any existing financial documents which would shed light on the companies’ financial positions, such as financial statements, accounting records, bank statements or documents evidencing their assets and liabilities.
Stage 2 – the appropriate consequences
- [75]
[75] For completeness, the court was alive to the fact that such an order was not prayed for in the Application. The claimants contended that the order could be accommodated under the prayer in the Application for “[s]uch further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit”. However, as explained in Edmund Tie & Co (SEA) Pte Ltd v Savills Residential Pte Ltd [2018] 5 SLR 349 at [12] and Wong Shu Kiat and another v Chen Jinping Michelle (personal representative of the estate of Tin Koon Ming, deceased) and another [2023] SGHC 105 at [108], a prayer along such lines is intended to enable the court to make such orders that may facilitate the execution of the main orders, rather than a prayer for a substantive order.
Conclusion
- [79]
[79] It was impossible to accept the defendants’ submission. Far from the notion that the claimants were given “a way out”, it was the court’s observations that the “extremely limited” standard in the second stage of Chloe V might not be appropriate that led counsel for the defendants to abandon his passionate position that the entirety of Chloe V was “clearly binding on this court”. Moreover, the defendants were also granted the liberty to supplement their ill-prepared affidavit. Therefore, if at all, it was the defendants who were afforded an avenue to continue their defence of the action.