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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Dec 2018

High Court

BAZ v BBA and others and other matters

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[2018] SGHC 275Case no. HC/OS No 490 of 2016 (HC/SUM No 4497 of 2016) (HC/SUM No 4499 of 2016)

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] For convenience, the plaintiff in OS 490 is hereinafter referred to as the “Buyer”. The 1st to 4th, 6th to 8th, 13th to 20th defendants in OS 490 are the plaintiffs in OS 784. The 5th, 9th to 12th defendants in OS 490 are the plaintiffs in OS 787. I will refer to all the defendants in OS 490 and the plaintiffs in OS 784 and OS 787 collectively as the “Sellers”. As there are minors involved in these proceedings, whenever it is necessary to distinguish the minors, who are the plaintiffs in OS 787 and the 5th, 9th to 12th defendants in OS 490, the minors shall be collectively referred to as the “Minors” and the rest of the defendants in OS 490 shall be collectively referred to as the “OS 784 Sellers”.

  3. [3] The OS 784 Sellers are represented by Mr Alvin Yeo SC (“Mr Yeo”). The Minors are represented by Mr Lee Eng Beng, SC (“Mr Lee”). Mr Suresh Divyanathan (“Mr Divyanathan”) represents the Buyer. As for the several discrete issues on Indian law in the present case, Mr Harish Salve, SA (“Mr Salve”) represents the OS 784 Sellers and the Minors, and Mr Gopal Subramanium (“Mr Subramanium”) represents the Buyer.

  4. [4] The parties entered into a Share Purchase and Share Subscription Agreement dated 11 June 2008 (“the SPSSA”) under which the Buyer purchased shares in an Indian company (“C”) that were held by the Sellers in their respective sizes of shareholding (collectively referred to as the “Shares”). It is not disputed that Indian law governs the SPSSA. The SPSSA was completed on 7 November 2008 and the Buyer became the controlling shareholder of C. The SPSSA contains an arbitration agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”), which is clause 13.14.1 (reproduced at [71] supra).

  5. [5] In brief, the arbitration arose out of the Sellers’ concealment of a September 2004 internal report called the Self-Assessment Report (“SAR”) on the improper regulatory transgressions and practices involving false data for submissions to regulatory agencies in several countries. The Buyer said that the SAR was driving foreign government investigations into C’s distribution and sales overseas, and there was concealment from the Buyer of the genesis, nature and severity of the investigations that were ongoing at the time of the acquisition of the Shares. The Buyer claimed that the concealment was perpetrated by the Sellers so as to induce the Buyer to buy the Shares at a price that did not reflect their true value.

  6. [6] The Award was a decision of a majority (“the Majority”) of the three-member tribunal (“Tribunal”). The Majority decided that the Sellers are jointly and severally liable in damages for the harm suffered by the Buyer as a result of the concealment. The Sellers’ jurisdictional challenges on the damages and pre-award interest (“Pre-Award Interest”) are that the Majority exceeded the powers conferred on the Tribunal by the Arbitration Agreement. Specifically, clause 13.14.1 of the SPSSA provided that “[t]he arbitrators shall not award punitive, exemplary, multiple or consequential damages”. Another jurisdictional challenge raised by the OS 784 Sellers pertains to the question of time limitation which is a jurisdictional issue under Indian law.

  7. [7] It is not disputed that the Award is a Singapore-seated award. As to the governing law of the Arbitration Agreement, there is no express choice of law governing the Arbitration Agreement. Mr Salve for the Sellers submits that Indian law is the governing law, being the law that has the closest and most real connection with the underlying contract. As Mr Yeo explains, regardless of whether the governing law of the Arbitration Agreement is Indian or Singapore law, the challenge to the Award would be based on Singapore law as the law of the seat of the arbitration. To this end, given that the proper law of the SPSSA is Indian law, this court accepts that the implied choice of law of the Arbitration Agreement is Indian law in the absence of any contrary intention of the parties, applying BCY v BCZ [2017] 3 SLR 357. The Indian law issues are, inter alia, premised on Indian law as the governing law of the Arbitration Agreement and relevant aspects of Indian law would have to be adduced in evidence as facts for this court’s determination in the setting aside proceedings. This court agrees that the question as to whether HC/ORC 3190/2016 giving leave to enforce a Singapore award as a High Court judgment should be set aside or whether the Award should be set aside based on s 24 of the IAA and Article 34 of Model law is a matter of Singapore law as the law of the country where the Award was made.

  8. [8] Mr Lee for the Minors claim that although Indian law, being the substantive law of the SPSSA, should be used to construe the Arbitration Agreement, Singapore law might still have some relevance to the construction of the Arbitration Agreement because Indian law stipulates that the law of the seat should govern the interpretation of an arbitration agreement. This proposition is curious since Mr Salve, also acting for the Minors, has accepted that Indian law is the governing law, without acknowledging the correctness of the proposition. The determination of the governing law of an arbitration agreement is a matter for Singapore law, being that of the curial court which is adjudicating the current setting aside proceedings (OS 784 and OS 787) and enforcement proceedings (OS 490).

  9. [9] I take the background facts largely from the Award.

  10. The ICC Arbitration and the Award

  11. [10] The Award consists of 374 pages. I propose to summarise the details that illuminate the issues in the present applications. I start with the facts of the case and the findings of facts by the Majority that are not challenged. I will then touch on the Majority’s decision that is the subject matter of the setting aside proceedings.

  12. [11] As stated, the underlying dispute between the parties concerns the SPSSA whereby the Buyer acquired a controlling stake in C. The warranties and representations given by the Sellers were limited. In the same vein, the sale price of the Shares reflected to a certain extent the ongoing investigations into C by regulators and authorities in the United States of America. Whilst it was agreed that the Buyer was aware of the investigations throughout the period of negotiations, signing and completion of the SPSSA, the parties disagreed as to the Buyer’s knowledge of the source, extent and severity of the investigations that were being pursued in the USA at the time the Buyer entered into the SPSSA. The severity concerned the prospect of C facing criminal liability. After the Buyer took over C, the Buyer settled with the regulator in the USA on 13 May 2013 by paying a sum of money (“the Settlement Sum”). Subsequently, the Buyer entered into a share exchange (the “Share Swap”) with another company for its shares (“the Swapped Shares”), in the ratio of one C share for 0.8 of that company’s share. This Share Swap transaction was announced on 6 April 2014 and was completed on 25 March 2015.

  13. [12] The Buyer commenced arbitration proceedings against the Sellers on 14 November 2012. The Buyer’s primary claim in the arbitration was that the Sellers had concealed the SAR that was driving the investigations in the USA on the improper regulatory transgressions and practices involving false data for submissions to regulatory agencies in several countries, thereby fraudulently misrepresenting the level of risks posed by the investigations. The Buyer said that there was concealment from the Buyer of the genesis, nature and severity of the investigations. The Buyer claimed that the concealment was perpetrated by the Sellers so as to induce the Buyer to buy the Shares at a price that did not reflect their true value. It was averred that the concealment constituted fraud under the Indian Contract Act 1872 (Act No 9 of 1872) (India) (“Indian Contract Act”) and that but for the fraud, the Buyer would not have entered into the SPSSA. The Buyer did not seek rescission of the SPSSA but relied on s 19 of the Indian Contract Act to seek damages that would put it in the same positon as if the representation had been true. The Buyer also sought pre-award and post-award interests.

  14. [13] The Majority found that the elements of s 17 of the Indian Contract Act had been satisfied and that the Sellers were liable for fraudulently misrepresenting or concealing from the Buyer the genesis, nature and severity of C’s regulatory problems. The Majority held that the Buyer would not have bought the Shares had it known of the SAR, but also found that the Buyer did not seek to avoid the SPSSA, so the second limb of s 19 of the Indian Contract Act applied. Section 19 states:

  15. [15] The Sellers also advanced the argument before the Tribunal that the claim was time-barred. They submitted that the Buyer could have discovered the concealment of the SAR with reasonable diligence following multiple events spanning from October 2008 to April 2009, especially from the meeting on 11 March 2009 during which a person in a senior leadership position in the Buyer was informed that the USA authorities were in possession of the SAR. Thus, the commencement of arbitration was after the three-year limitation period provided for under the Indian Limitation Act 1963 (Act No 36 of 1963) (India) (“Indian Limitation Act”). On the other hand, the Buyer’s case was that it only became aware of the concealment of the SAR on 19 November 2009, so the commencement of arbitration on 14 November 2012 was within the limitation period. The Majority made a finding of fact that notwithstanding the meeting on 11 March 2009, the Buyer had acted with reasonable diligence in the entire context and could not have discovered the SAR before 19 November 2009 without having to take exceptional measures which it could not reasonably have been expected to take.

  16. [16] For completeness, the dissenting member of the Tribunal held that the evidence fell short of establishing the allegation of fraud or fraudulent conduct or fraudulent concealment beyond reasonable doubt. The dissenting member also found the claim to be time-barred: the Buyer had concrete knowledge of the SAR latest by March 2009, and even otherwise, with reasonable diligence could have discovered the SAR by then. In any case, the Buyer could have instituted legal proceedings before the discovery of the SAR, when it realised that the problem faced by C was severe. The dissenting member further held that because the Buyer chose to continue with the execution and performance of the SPSSA, it ratified the contract thereby extinguishing its right to avoid the contract as well as to the consequential remedy to claim compensation or damages.

  17. Enforcement proceedings in India

  18. [17] The Buyer commenced simultaneous proceedings for leave to enforce the Award as a court judgment in New Delhi and in Singapore on 17 May 2016. The Sellers opposed the Buyer’s enforcement proceedings. In Singapore, the Sellers applied to set aside HC/ORC 3190/2016 on 15 September 2016. Both OS 784 and OS 787 to set aside the Award were filed on 3 August 2016.

  19. [18] As it transpired, the enforcement proceedings in India went ahead of the Singapore proceedings. Before the New Delhi High Court (“the DHC”), the parties on both sides stated that the pendency of the proceedings in Singapore would not in any manner prevent the DHC from adjudicating the enforcement proceedings in India. The DHC reserved judgment on 6 September 2017, and pronounced judgment on 31 January 2018 (“the DHC Judgment”). The DHC refused to enforce the Award against the Minors on the ground of public policy but allowed enforcement of the Award against the OS 784 Sellers. The OS 784 Sellers applied for leave to appeal against the DHC Judgment but the Supreme Court of India declined to interfere with the DHC Judgment and dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on 16 February 2018.

  20. [19] Even though the DHC has refused to enforce the Award against the Minors, their application in OS 787 is for this court to exercise its supervisory power to set aside the Award against them under Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. Logically speaking, if the Award is set aside on the jurisdictional challenges in OS 784, not only would OS 787 become moot, the Award against the Minors would fall away.

  21. Summary of the DHC Judgment

  22. [20] The issues before the DHC were: (a) whether the damages awarded were contrary to s 19 of the Indian Contract Act and would shock the conscience of the court, (b) whether the Award granted consequential damages which were beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, (c) whether the claim was barred by limitation, and (d) whether the Pre-Award Interest amounted to an award of multiple damages. The DHC also considered whether the Award against the Minors was illegal, non est and void, and against the public policy of India.

  23. [21] After hearing the parties’ submissions, Nath J allowed the enforcement of the Award against the Sellers, except for the Minors, and held the following:

  24. (a) With regard to issue (a), the enforcement of a foreign award could only be refused under s 48(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (No 26 of 1996) (India) (“Indian Arbitration Act”) if such enforcement was found to be contrary to (a) fundamental policy of India law; (b) the interests of India; and (c) justice or morality. Fundamental policy of Indian law did not mean provisions of statute but substratal principles on which Indian law was founded. The damages awarded was within the ambit of section 19, and thus did not shock the conscience of the court.

  25. (i) The Majority was entitled to rely on the Supreme Court decision in Trojan & Co v Nagappa Chettiar 1953 AIR 235 (“Trojan”) which held that pursuant to s 19, in the case where a contract was not avoided, it has to be determined whether the goods handed over to the plaintiff were an equivalent for the money paid or to what extent they fell short of being the equivalent. Based on Trojan, Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158, and Smith New Court, a court while awarding damages under the second limb of s 19 would have to take care to award reasonable compensation to ensure that the plaintiff was put in the position he would have been if the representation had been true, ie, to put the Buyer in the same position as in 2008 when it bought the Shares, had there been no SAR in existence (at [62]). The loss awarded must be a natural and direct consequence of the illegal acts done by the defendant. Remote damages suffered cannot be awarded. The plaintiff would have a duty to mitigate the damages.

  26. (ii) The Majority relied on RC Thakkar (HC) in finding that the damages recoverable by a party defrauded under s 19 of the Indian Contract Act would be similar to those recoverable for fraudulent misrepresentation under general tort principles. RC Thakkar (HC) was contrary to the judgment in Gaurav Monga v Premier Inn India Pvt Ltd & Ors (2017) 237 DLT 67 where it was held that a case seeking damages on fraud and misrepresentations would be covered by s 19 of the Indian Contract Act and no claim for damages can be maintained under the law of torts. RC Thakkar (HC) was overruled only on the findings of facts that fraud had been committed. This controversy is irrelevant because the Majority stated that the Buyer was entitled to be put back in the position it would have been, had the wrong not been committed, ie, if the representations were true. This means that the Majority had kept in mind s 19 of the Indian Contract Act (at [50]).

  27. (iii) With regard to the calculation of the damages, the various factors that would have to be taken into account, which was necessarily a fact-based enquiry, and whether damages should be computed by using one or another formula would be within the domain of the arbitral tribunal (McDermott International Inc. v Burn Standard Co. Ltd and Ors (2006) 11 SCC 181) (at [64] and [65]).

  28. (iv) A simple mathematical calculation between what the Buyer paid for the Shares and what it received as benefits showed that it did not suffer a loss. However, the Majority rejected this, pointing out that there are other aspects including reputational issues, the opportunity cost of six years of the Buyer not entering into other business opportunities, diminution in C’s dividends, and the onerous costs faced by C in addressing the USA investigations including the settlement money paid (at [61]).

  29. (v) The various factors to be taken into account on the facts and circumstances, and the method of calculation are within the domain of the Tribunal. It was not possible to come to a conclusion that the computation done by the Majority was in complete breach of statutory provision or was contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law (at [70]).

  30. (vi) Keeping in mind the legal position that the Buyer had to be put in the position had there been no SAR in existence, the Majority concluded that using the Share Swap transaction was more workable than the approach suggested by the Sellers and quantified the damages by discounting the amount received from the Share Swap by the Buyer’s weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) rate of 4.44% (at [62] and [63]).

  31. (b) On issue (b), Nath J rejected the Sellers’ objection that the Award granted consequential damages which were beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (see [79] below).

  32. (c) On issue (c), the enforcement of the Award could not be refused on the basis that the Buyer’s claim was barred by limitation (at [99]–[101]) (see [123] below).

  33. (d) On issue (d), the award of interests was neither outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction nor in violation of the public policy of India.

  34. (i) Clause 13.14.4 in the SPSSA provided for the award of interest from the date of the breach at such rate as specified by the Tribunal.

  35. (ii) Having awarded the Pre-Award Interest as per the SPSSA, the Award could not be held contrary to the public policy of India.

  36. (iii) It could not be said to be a case of multiple damages by awarding interest from the date of the breach to the Award, relying on Hyder Counsulting (UK) Ltd v Governor, State of Orissa (2015) 2 SCC 189 and Renusagar Company Limited v General Electric Company 1994 Supp 1 SCC 644.

  37. (e) Finally, the Award as against the Minors could not be enforced because it was against the public policy of India (see [172] below).

  38. Grounds of setting aside in OS 784 and OS 787

  39. [22] The Sellers seek to set aside the Award on the following grounds:

  40. (a) the award of damages, in itself and/or collectively with the grant of Pre-Award Interest, is beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, so the Award should be set aside pursuant to Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law;

  41. (b) there are breaches of natural justice in that the Majority had failed to consider the Sellers’ position that the Tribunal was not permitted to apply a discount rate and whether it was correct to grant tortious relief in respect of a claim under s 19 of the Indian Contract Act, and had failed to allow the Sellers to present further arguments on subsequent sale of the Swapped Shares by the Buyer, so the Award should be set aside pursuant to s 24(b) of the IAA;

  42. (c) the issue of time limitation can be reviewed de novo given that the time limitation is a jurisdictional issue under Indian law, and the Majority was wrong to find that the claim was not time-barred, so the Award should be set aside;

  43. (d) the Award against BBB, BBD, BBG, BBH and BBM in OS 784 (“the Non-Management Sellers”) is against the public policy of Singapore because they should not be bound by the fraudulent misrepresentation of BBA, and the Award is disproportionate to their respective sizes of shareholding in C, so it should be set aside as against them pursuant to Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law; and

  44. (e) the Award against the Minors is against the public policy of Singapore because it is against the interests and welfare of the Minors and is disproportionate, so it should be set aside as against them pursuant to Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law.

  45. [23] The outcome of OS 784 and OS 787 will effectively dispose of Summons No 4497 of 2016 and Summons No 4499 of 2016 filed in OS 490.

  46. Summary of parties’ positions in OS 784 and OS 787

  47. [24] The Buyer’s case is as follows:

  48. (a) the Sellers are precluded on the basis of issue estoppel from litigating the jurisdictional challenges against the damages and Pre-Award Interest because they have already been canvassed before the DHC and decided by the DHC;

  49. (b) the Sellers are precluded on the basis of the extended doctrine of res judicata and waiver from raising the jurisdictional challenges against the damages and Pre-Award Interest, as well as their challenge as to the Majority’s reliance on RC Thakkar (HC) because the challenges should have been raised before the Tribunal;

  50. (c) the damages and Pre-Award Interest are not outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;

  51. (d) the Sellers cannot revisit the issue of time limitation because the merits of an Award cannot be reviewed;

  52. (e) there is no breach of natural justice;

  53. (f) the Award against the Non-Management Sellers does not violate the public policy of Singapore; and

  54. (g) the Award against the Minors does not violate the public policy of Singapore.

  55. [25] The OS 784 Sellers’ counter arguments in broad terms are as follows: (a) they are not estopped from arguing that the Majority exceeded their jurisdiction in relation to the award of consequential damages and Pre-Award Interest; (b) the extended doctrine of res judicata does not preclude the them from raising the jurisdictional challenges; and (c) the allegation of waiver of the right to raise the jurisdictional challenges is misconceived. The Sellers reiterated that there is a breach of natural justice as the Majority did not apply their minds to the fact that the Sellers disputed the application of a discount rate to the benefit received by the Buyer, that time limitation is a jurisdictional issue under Indian law, and that the Award should be set aside on the ground of public policy. The Minors raised the same counter argument that they were not issue estopped by virtue of the DHC Judgment to bring the jurisdictional challenge, and also emphasised that the Award should be set aside as against them on the ground of public policy.

  56. Issue 1: Whether the doctrine of issue estoppel arises from the DHC Judgment

  57. [26] As stated, in response to Nath J’s query, both parties said that the pendency of the proceedings in Singapore would not in any manner prevent the DHC from adjudicating the enforcement proceedings (see [18] supra), so the DHC went ahead with the proceedings and issued a decision before the Singapore proceedings were heard. For the OS 784 Sellers, this creates the situation where a foreign judgment enforcing an award is obtained before the seat court can decide on whether to set aside the award.

  58. [27] This sets the context of the Buyer’s submission on issue estoppel – the Buyer argues that the DHC Judgment should give rise to issue estoppel against the same issues brought by the Sellers before this court, as the DHC Judgment is a final and conclusive judgment of a competent court. Issue estoppel should apply to preclude the following issues which have been decided by the DHC and are before this court: whether the damages awarded are consequential damages and whether the Pre-Award Interest awarded constitutes multiple or punitive damages, both of which would be beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Mr Subramanium points out that what is being argued before this court has been argued verbatim before the DHC and dealt with by the DHC.

  59. [28] Disagreeing with the Buyer, the Sellers’ position is that the doctrine of issue estoppel has no place in an arbitration framework where the seat court has primacy in the review of an award. Their fall-back position is that even if a ruling of an enforcement court may be the subject of issue estoppel, the legal requirements of issue estoppel are not satisfied in the present case because there is no identity of issues between those decided in the DHC Judgment and those before this court.

  60. [29] During oral closing submissions, Mr Subramanium qualifies the Buyer’s position in stating that the DHC Judgment and the dismissal by the Supreme Court of India do not give rise to “res judicata in the traditional sense”, but have “persuasive influence”. He agrees that it would be inappropriate for the Buyer to argue that the DHC Judgment is binding on the court of the seat to preclude scrutiny. This seems to amount to a concession on the Buyer’s behalf that issue estoppel does not apply. In addition, it may be of some significance that both parties agreed for the Indian proceedings to go ahead regardless of the pendency of the proceedings before the seat court. But since parties did not raise this point, I say no more about it. On the other hand, it is unclear whether there has been a concession because it is uncertain what Mr Subramanium means by “res judicata in the traditional sense”. Moreover, Mr Subramanium is before this court to submit on Indian law, so it is unclear whether his concession, if any, would bind the Buyer on this issue which is to be determined by Singapore law, when Mr Divyanathan, who is the Buyer’s Singapore counsel, has submitted for the application of issue estoppel both in writing and orally.

  61. General principles of issue estoppel

  62. [30] To establish issue estoppel, the following four conditions must be satisfied (Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation of Strata Title Plan No 301 [2005] 3 SLR(R) 157 at [14] and [15]; The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 at 499):

  63. (a) There is a final and conclusive judgment on the merits;

  64. (b) The judgment has to be by a court of competent jurisdiction;

  65. (c) There has to be identity between the parties to the two actions that are being compared; and

  66. (d) There must be identity of subject matter in the two proceedings.

  67. [31] The English Court of Appeal in The Good Challenge [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67 in reviewing the authorities held that there are four further considerations in the approach of the English courts to issue estoppel (at [54]):

  68. (a) It is irrelevant that the English court may form the view that the decision of the foreign court was wrong either on the facts or as a matter of English law.

  69. (b) The courts must be cautious before concluding that the foreign court made a clear decision on the relevant issue because the procedures of the court may be different and it may not be easy to determine the precise identity of the issues being determined.

  70. (c) The decision of the court must be necessary for its decision.

  71. (d) The application of the principles of issue estoppel is subject to the overriding consideration that it must work justice and not injustice.

  72. [32] Underlying the principle is that litigants should not be twice vexed in the same matter, and that the public interest requires finality in litigation (The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd (nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd and others, other parties) and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 1104 at [98] and [100]).

  73. [33] Although the application of issue estoppel to foreign judgments is clear under Singapore law, the application of issue estoppel to re-litigation of identical issues in different fora in the context of arbitration is less than clear. The present case concerns proceedings before a seat court in which issue estoppel arising from a judgment of a foreign enforcement court is argued (“the Relevant Scenario”). I will confine my discussion to this scenario.

  74. [34] In Singapore, international arbitration is governed by the IAA, which implements the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and the Model Law. Taken together, they govern judicial control over Singapore-seated arbitrations, the setting aside of Singapore-seated awards, and the recognition and enforcement of all international arbitration awards. In this context, I will first examine whether application of issue estoppel is recognised under the IAA, the New York Convention and the Model Law, and whether its application in the Relevant Scenario is coherent with the principles underpinning the IAA, the New York Convention and the Model Law.

  75. Recognition of issue estoppel in arbitration

  76. [35] There is no article under the New York Convention or the Model Law, and no section under the IAA that provides for the application of the doctrine. Under the New York Convention, the only provision that suggests the possibility of applying the doctrine of issue estoppel is Art V(1)(e). It states:

  77. [36] Although Art V(1)(e) is phrased in permissive language (the word “may” is used) and does not dictate the application of issue estoppel, the article does refer the enforcement court applying Art V to the decision of the seat court in setting aside the award. Arguably because of the reference the article makes to a foreign judgment, it contemplates the application of issue estoppel.

  78. [37] The doctrine may be applied as part of the residual domestic law applicable in setting aside or enforcement proceedings. It has been recognised in the UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) (United Nations, 2016) (“2016 New York Convention Guide”) at para 8 that the New York Convention does not operate in isolation – in some circumstances, “other international treaties, or the domestic law of the country where enforcement is sought, will also apply to the question of whether a foreign arbitral award should be recognized and enforced”. Although Art 5 of the Model Law stipulates that “[i]n matters governed by [the Model Law], no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law”, in the interpretation of Art 5, “what was not governed by it must be governed by the other rules of domestic law” since no text for the unification of law was complete in every respect (Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its Eighteenth Session (A/40/17, 3–21 June 1985) (“1985 UN Commission Report”) at para 61). Neither the New York Convention nor the Model Law dictates how a court goes about deciding whether a ground under Art V or Art 36 has been established. There is no article on the preclusion of claims arising from a prior enforcement proceeding. With regard to Art 34, there is also no indication of such a matter being addressed in the preparatory materials (see 1985 UN Commission Report or the Summary Records for meetings on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration reproduced in the Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 1985, vol XVI at pp 399–510 (A/CN.9/SR.317–319, 324, 330–331, 333)). Thus, the domestic law on the area of preclusion arising from a prior enforcement judgment, on which the New York Convention and the Model Law are silent, could apply to supplement these instruments.

  79. The appropriateness of applying issue estoppel in the Relevant Scenario

  80. [38] There are differing views on whether issue estoppel should be applicable in setting aside proceedings to preclude a party from re-litigating issues already decided in a prior foreign enforcement proceeding, and the law in this area is underdeveloped and remains unsettled.

  81. [39] The cases and commentaries cited by parties are all on the converse situation of issue estoppel arising from the judgment of a seat court. One example is Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763 (“Dallah”). In the English Court of Appeal decision ([2009] EWCA Civ 755), Moore-Bick LJ was of the view that “a decision of the supervisory court may finally determine such questions and thereby itself create an estoppel by record” (at [56]). In the same judgment, Rix LJ stated that a successful challenge in the seat court is not only in itself a potential defence under the New York Convention or the UK statutes, but “likely also to raise an issue estoppel”. An issue estoppel may also arise similarly from an unsuccessful challenge (at [90]). Where an award was improperly set aside in the seat court, Rix LJ thought that the improper circumstances would have to be brought home to the court asked to enforce in such a way as either to destroy the defence based on Art V(1)(e), or to prevent an issue estoppel arising out of the judgment of the seat court (at [91]). In the Supreme Court judgment in Dallah, Lord Collins held that “in some cases a determination by the court of the seat may give rise to an issue estoppel or other preclusive effect in the court in which enforcement is sought” (at [98]). The dicta by Rix LJ and Lord Collins have been referred to by the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia TBK) v Astro Nusantara International BV and others and another appeal [2014] 1 SLR 372 (“Astro”) at [75]. The Singapore Court of Appeal stated that it saw no reason to regard the Model Law as any different, in so far as these dicta accurately describe the New York Convention.

  82. [40] Another such decision is the Australian Federal Court case, Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd v Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 109, as cited by Mr Lee for the Minors. In that case, the seat court (the English court) has decided that there was no breach of natural justice in that the parties had been given a reasonable opportunity to present their case at the arbitration. Before the Australian court, the party resisting enforcement raised the same natural justice point again. The other party argued issue estoppel arose from the English decision. The Australian court found that there was no breach of natural justice, so it was strictly unnecessary to deal with issue estoppel, and it did not propose to attempt a resolution of the issue. Nevertheless, the court commented that Foster J, who was the primary judge in the court below, at the very least “was correct to hold that it will generally be inappropriate for this Court, being the enforcement court of a Convention country, to reach a different conclusion on the same question of asserted procedural defects as that reached by the court of the seat of arbitration” (at [65]).

  83. [41] The Buyer relies on Newspeed International Ltd v Citus Trading Pte Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 1 (“Newspeed”) to show the stance against double attempts in litigation taken by the Singapore High Court. In that case, the High Court held that a party could either apply to the seat court to set aside the award or resist enforcement in a foreign enforcement court, and that these two remedies were alternatives, and not cumulative (at [28]). The correctness of this decision is in doubt given the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Astro that the Model Law provides for a system of “double-control” (at [75]). Although the holding in Newspeed is doubtful, the decision was driven by the notion that a party should not have two bites at the cherry (at [26]). In any case, the Singapore court was an enforcement court considering the effect of the prior decision of the seat court. The case thus provides little support as to whether issue estoppel should be applicable in the Relevant Scenario.

  84. [42] In response, the Sellers cited Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration vol 3 (Kluwer Law International, 2nd Ed, 2014) for the position that issue estoppel should not apply. However, it is not clear that Gary Born has taken a conclusive stance. In his commentary, Gary Born recognises that there is “a substantial argument that, where the parties have litigated the applicability of these exceptions in one national court, they should be bound by the results in other recognition forums” (at para 27.02[D]). On the other hand, “there is also a substantial argument that the [New York] Convention imposes independent international obligations on Contracting States to recognize awards in accordance with the Convention’s terms, regardless whether other national courts have failed to do so. If the courts of one Contracting State refuse to recognize an award, based upon an incorrect application of the Convention, that does not justify or excuse other Contracting State’s wrongful non-recognition of the same award.” He justifies the latter position on the basis of the “summary character of recognition proceedings, which makes the expenditure of judicial and other resources acceptable”. These opinions are in the context of recognition and enforcement proceedings, and may not apply to the Relevant Scenario.

  85. [43] I make brief mention of the English case of Diag Human SE v The Czech Republic [2014] EWHC 1639 (Comm) (“Diag”) where issue estoppel was unequivocally applied. It was likewise not a case falling within the Relevant Scenario – it involved proceedings before an enforcement court where issue estoppel was held to arise from a prior judgment of a foreign enforcement court (at [59]). Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon speaking extra-judicially in a speech delivered at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Centenary Conference on 2 July 2015, expressed approval of Diag, and said that recognising issue estoppel arising from a foreign enforcement judgment “seems eminently sensible, both from the perspective of harmonising the treatment of awards and perhaps even more importantly, the overarching public policy of finality”. I note that Diag does not concern the Relevant Scenario.

  86. [44] There is one judicial commentary on the application of issue estoppel in the Relevant Scenario, and that is the obiter dicta by Lord Mance in Dallah, who remarked that whilst the question whether an arbitral award is binding in France, the seat court, could only be decided by the French courts, “an English judgment holding that the award was not valid could prove significant in relation to such proceedings, if the French courts recognise any principle similar to the English principle of issue estoppel” (at [29]).

  87. [45] I begin with the supervisory powers of the seat court and the seat court’s primacy in reviewing an award. This primacy forms the basis for Art V(1)(e) and Art VI of the New York Convention, and s 31(5) of the IAA. Art V(1)(e) of the New York Convention (see [35] supra) provides that recognition or enforcement of an award may be refused where it has been set aside by the seat court. Article VI complements Art V(1)(e), by allowing the authority, before which enforcement of an award is sought, to adjourn the decision on the enforcement if an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to the seat court. A similar mechanism exists under the IAA, as provided for by s 31(5). In contrast, there is no similar provision directing a seat court to consider a judgment from a foreign enforcement court. Thus, Art V(1)(e) and Art VI of the New York Convention, along with s 31(5) of the IAA, show that a certain level of primacy is given to the judgment of the seat court. The judicial opinions in support of the application of issue estoppel in the converse situation of an enforcement court considering a judgment of the seat court (at [39] and [40] supra) also support the primacy accorded to the seat court.

  88. [46] There is no indication in the preparatory materials that issue estoppel arising from a prior foreign enforcement judgment should apply in the setting aside proceeding before a seat court. The commentary on Art VI in the 2016 New York Convention Guide (at p 264) explains that in the context of parallel proceedings, Art VI “achieves a compromise between the two equally legitimate concerns of promoting the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards and preserving judicial oversight over awards by granting courts of Contracting States the freedom to decide whether or not to adjourn enforcement proceedings”. Further, “the drafters of the [New York] Convention sought to ensure that a party wishing to frustrate the enforcement of an award could not circumvent the Convention by simply initiating proceedings to set aside or suspend the award, while at the same time limiting the risk that an enforced award would be subsequently set aside in the country in which it was made”. Art VI recognises the judicial oversight of each enforcement state by giving it the discretion to decide whether to grant a stay in favour of setting aside proceedings before the seat court. In pointing out the risk of an enforced award being subsequently set aside, the 2016 New York Convention Guide did not envision the application of issue estoppel arising from the enforcement judgment in the subsequent setting aside proceeding.

  89. [47] On the other hand, it could be said that the doctrine of issue estoppel promotes finality in litigation between the parties. The importance of finality is reflected in resolution 40/72 giving rise to the Model Law, in which the General Assembly recognized “the value of arbitration as a method of settling disputes arising in international commercial relations” in a manner that contributes to “harmonious international economic relations” (Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (A/RES/40/72, 11 December 1985) at preamble). On one view, finality is important in achieving efficiency and harmonious relations: the enforcement of an award could be sought in multiple jurisdictions, and if each jurisdiction chooses to look at each issue argued by the parties anew, there could be continuous prolonged litigations, at the expense of arbitration being an efficient dispute resolution mechanism and facilitating harmonious economic relations. However, this consideration of finality does not feature as strongly in the Relevant Scenario, because the seat court is the only court that has the power to set aside an award. The consideration of finality applies more strongly where the seat court has decided whether to set the award aside.

  90. [48] Another possible point in favour of the application of issue estoppel is the conscious decision to align the grounds under Art 34 with those for refusing enforcement or recognition under Art 36 and under the New York Convention. The inference may be that the seat court and the enforcement courts are equally qualified in examining the grounds. Although various amendment proposals to Art 34 were discussed, the substance of the grounds was not altered (Sundaresh Menon, Arbitration in Singapore A Practical Guide (Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at para 14.014). This was driven by the consideration that the alignment would facilitate international commercial arbitration by enhancing predictability and expeditiousness and would go a long way towards establishing a harmonised system of limited recourse against awards and their enforcement (Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the Work of its Fifth Session (A/CN.9/233, 22 February–4 March 1983) at para 187). The Secretariat commented that the alignment was desirable in reducing the impact of the place of arbitration, and it gives recognition to the fact that both provisions (Art 34 and Art 36) form part of the alternative defence system which provides a party with the option of attacking the award or invoking the grounds when recognition or enforcement is sought. The Secretariat further opined that the alignment avoids the problem of having awards which are void in the country of origin but valid and enforceable abroad (Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (A/CN.9/264, 25 March 1985) (“Analytical Commentary”) at pp 72 and 73). The alignment of grounds calls for the uniformity of judgments across all jurisdictions, but in my view, this does not translate to a need for the application of issue estoppel to achieve uniformity.

  91. [49] Despite the alignment of the grounds, the New York Convention and the Model Law still provide for a certain level of primacy to be accorded to the seat court as explained above at [45]. The instruments provide a mechanism for the seat court to decide whether to set aside an award first, and direct the enforcement court to give regard to the judgment of the seat court in setting aside an award. The primacy and the judicial oversight of the seat court is not entirely taken away by the alignment of the grounds. This is even more so, given that there may be differences in the applications of the grounds in the seat court and in an enforcement court. This has been acknowledged by the Secretariat, which stated, for example, that the application of the grounds under Art 34(2)(a)(i), Art 34(2)(a)(iv) and possibly Art 34(2)(a)(iii) may be limited by virtue of an application of an implied waiver pursuant to Art 4 of the Model Law (Analytical Commentary at p 73).

  92. [50] It is plain that issue estoppel would not arise with regard to the grounds of arbitrability and public policy under Art 34(2)(b)(i) and Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law respectively, because the public policy and the test for arbitrability are unique to each state. Therefore, there would be no identity of subject matter even if the ground of arbitrability or public policy has been raised before a different court.

  93. [51] Besides arbitrability and public policy grounds, I am of the view that where the ground of challenge attracts a de novo review from the seat court, the determination by the seat court should be given primacy, and the seat court would be slow to recognise the determination of a foreign enforcement court as giving rise to issue estoppel. A de novo review calls upon the seat court to examine the award and the evidence in detail with a view to setting aside the award if the challenge succeeds.

  94. [52] The present case concerns a de novo review of the award in the face of jurisdictional challenges to the powers of the Tribunal. Given the essence of the challenges, I am of the view that issue estoppel should not feature. Nevertheless, the decision of the Indian enforcement court may have persuasive effect, especially because the proper law of the Arbitration Agreement is Indian law. Mr Yeo clarifies that his position is not to deny this court from looking at the DHC Judgment, and Mr Salve agrees that it may be persuasive. I will refer to the relevant portions of the DHC Judgment where necessary when addressing the different claims made. This approach would not erode the primacy and judicial supervision of the seat court over the arbitral award.

  95. [53] I pause here to note Mr Lee’s submission for the Minors that Indian law takes the law of the seat court to be the law applicable to the construction of arbitration agreements (see [8] supra). This may be significant to the question of issue estoppel – if the governing law of the Arbitration Agreement is different under Singapore law and Indian law then the factors considered would be different and there would no issue estoppel arising from the DHC Judgment in the first place. However, no argument has been advanced on this point by any party and I say no more about it.

  96. Issue 2: Whether the extended doctrine of res judicata or waiver are applicable

  97. [54] The Buyer submits that the Sellers should be precluded from raising arguments that could and should have been raised in the arbitration based on the extended doctrine of res judicata. The Buyer also alleges that the Sellers have waived their rights to raise any jurisdictional challenge on the basis of Art 16(2) of the Model Law. Reliance is also placed on Art 6(3) of the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration 2012 (“ICC Rules 2012”), pursuant to which the parties agreed to conduct the arbitration, which provides that “any question of jurisdiction … shall be decided directly by the arbitral tribunal”. This reliance on Art 6(3) is misplaced, because the provision does not govern the issue of waiver or preclusion to begin with.

  98. [55] The Buyer claims that the Sellers could and should have raised the following points in the arbitration but failed to do so:

  99. (a) The objection that the methodology used by the Majority in assessing and computing damages resulted in an award of consequential damages that was in excess of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction should have been raised in the arbitration. Instead, in the arbitration, counsel for the Sellers agreed that the principle in Smith New Court applied to the assessment of damages and made submissions on the applicability of a discount rate to the benefits received by the Buyer. The use of the Buyer’s WACC rate as the discount rate was suggested by the Sellers’ expert.

  100. (b) The objection that the Pre-Award Interest awarded resulted in an award of punitive, exemplary, multiple or consequential damages that was in excess of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction should have been raised. Instead, the Sellers acknowledged during the arbitration that the Tribunal had the discretion to award interests.

  101. (c) The objection that the Majority should not have relied on RC Thakkar (HC) when it was overruled by the Supreme Court of India should have been raised.

  102. [56] The Buyer also submits that the Minors have waived their public policy objection that the Award is against their interests or welfare because they did not raise the concern during the arbitration though they could have done so. In so arguing, the Buyer relies on Art 16(2) of the Model Law and Art 6(3) and Art 39 of the ICC Rules 2012. The Buyer also argues that the public policy objection should not be entertained, based on BLC and others v BLB and another [2014] 4 SLR 79 (“BLC v BLB”) (at [53]), because the Minors had never raised the objection before the Tribunal. Here, the reliance on Art 6(3) is similarly misplaced (see [54] supra).

  103. [57] Separately, the Buyer submits that the Minors have waived their public policy objection that a litigation representative should have been appointed to represent them in the arbitration, based on Art 4 of the Model Law and Art 39 of the ICC Rules 2012.

  104. [58] Pausing here, the reliance on Art 4 of the Model Law is misconceived. Art 4 of the Model Law, which deals with requirements under the arbitration agreement and non-mandatory provisions under the Model Law, does not apply. The Minors’ objection before the setting aside court that there was no litigation representative during the arbitration does not concern a requirement under the Arbitration Agreement, nor a non-mandatory provision under the Model Law. Additionally, the reliance on Art 39 of the ICC Rules 2012 is unclear. Article 39 states that a party “which proceeds with the arbitration without raising its objection to a failure to comply with any provision of the Rules, or of any other rules applicable to the proceedings, any direction given by the arbitral tribunal, or any requirement under the arbitration agreement relating to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or the conduct of the proceedings, shall be deemed to have waived its right to object”. Mr Divyanathan did not explain how any of the elements in Art 39 applies to the Minors’ litigation representative argument.

  105. [59] On the Buyer’s reliance on Art 16(2) with respect to the Sellers’ jurisdictional objections, waiver by a party under Art 16(2) only applies if the objection was clear to the party and the party knew of the objection. On the facts, I find that the Sellers have not waived their objections. I will elaborate on this at [80]–[82] and [114] below.

  106. [60] I will examine the applicability of the extended doctrine of res judicata in arbitration, and the applicability of waiver in the context of public policy objections.

  107. The extended doctrine of res judicata in arbitration

  108. [61] In submitting that the extended doctrine of res judicata applies in the present case, the Buyer relied on AKN and another v ALC and others and other appeals [2016] 1 SLR 966 (“AKN v ALC 2016”). At [57]–[59] of the judgment, the Court of Appeal stated that “courts will typically not rehear matters that have already been determined in arbitration”, “the court may disallow a party to raise certain points in court which it could and should have raised in arbitration” and “there is strong support for the view that barring special circumstances, the ‘extended’ doctrine of res judicata operates to preclude the reopening of matters that (a) are covered by an arbitration agreement, (b) are arbitrable, and (c) could and should have been raised by one of the parties in an earlier set of proceedings that had already been concluded”. I agree with the Sellers that AKN v ALC 2016 concerns a different context. In that case, the arbitration award has been partially set aside on the ground of breach of natural justice, and the issue was whether the extended doctrine of res judicata applied to preclude the reopening of certain matters in a fresh arbitration. The principles pronounced on the applicability of the extended doctrine of res judicata do not apply to the present case, which is concerned with the review of an arbitration award.

  109. [62] The Sellers argue that the application of the extended doctrine of res judicata would be contrary to the de novo standard of review applied by the court when reviewing a tribunal’s jurisdiction in setting aside or enforcement proceedings. The de novo standard of review in such a situation is well established in Singapore law: AKN and another v ALC and others and other appeals [2015] 3 SLR 488 (“AKN v ALC 2015”) at [112]; Astro at [163]. In my view, the standard of review and the extended doctrine of res judicata operate on two different planes, for the standard of review does not govern whether a party would be estopped. The operation of preclusion is an issue anterior to the question of the standard of review: where an argument is not precluded on the basis of the extended doctrine of res judicata, the review is conducted on a de novo standard, and where an argument is precluded, the issue of the standard of review is not engaged.

  110. [63] More importantly, in my view, the concept of the extended doctrine of res judicata is wholly inapplicable to a court’s review of an arbitral award. Strictly speaking, the doctrine applies to preclude points in a second set of litigation proceedings on the merits of the dispute between the same parties where the points could have been brought in the earlier proceedings on the same dispute. In contrast, an enforcement proceeding or a setting aside proceeding of an arbitral award involves the review of the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. The court would not be concerned with the merits of the substantive claims between the parties. The points brought before the court would address the grounds for refusal to enforce or grounds for setting aside, instead of the merits of the dispute. Thus, the concept of the extended of doctrine of res judicata, which encourages parties to settle all their claims on their merits in one single litigation to prevent a party from being vexed by subsequent litigation, is extraneous to the role of the court in reviewing arbitral awards.

  111. [64] Without the extended doctrine of res judicata, a court can, in a proper case, dismiss an objection in a setting aside proceeding or an enforcement proceeding on the basis that the party had plainly made a decision not to raise it before the tribunal when it ought to have done so. One such case is Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd and others [2000] 1 QB 288 (“Westacre Investments”), a case involving enforcement proceedings of an arbitral award. The English Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision to disallow the application seeking leave to amend the defence to allege that the arbitral award was obtained by fraud because a number of witnesses called at the arbitration had given perjured evidence. In giving the reasoning on this point, with which Mantell LJ and Hirst LJ agreed, Waller LJ held that a party would not usually be allowed to adduce additional evidence to make good such a claim unless the evidence to establish the fraud was not available to the party alleging the fraud at the time of the hearing before the arbitrators and where perjury is the fraud alleged, the evidence was so strong that it would reasonably be expected to be decisive at a hearing, and if unanswered must have that result (at 309). The evidence of perjury was available during the arbitration and should have been raised then, to alert the tribunal to the untruth of the evidence presented to it before coming to a decision on the merits. The evidence of perjury would have had a material impact on the decision-making of the tribunal, going towards the merits of the claim.

  112. [65] The extended doctrine of res judicata has not been necessary in setting aside proceedings because of the court’s minimal curial intervention in arbitral proceedings (Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86 (“Soh Beng Tee”) at [65(c)]). The court would not allow a re-characterisation of an issue raised before the arbitration or an introduction of an issue material to the merits of the dispute not raised during the arbitration in an attempt to set aside an award. In BLC v BLB, the Court of Appeal considered that the party attempting to set aside the award was blatantly attempting to rely on a re-characterised case, and seeking to put forward the case they wished to put forward before the arbitrator and not the case that was actually run in the arbitral proceedings themselves (at [84]). This was in relation to the party’s argument that the counterparty’s list of issues submitted in the arbitration was wrong and misleading in failing to characterise a counterclaim as a stand-alone issue. However, this was exactly what its own list of issues in the arbitration suggested. The party also sought to rely on provisions in two joint venture agreements as the contractual basis of a counterclaim in the setting aside proceedings even though the provisions did not appear at all in the arbitral proceedings. The Court of Appeal found against the party in respect of these submissions. The rejection of a re-characterised claim and a new issue material to the merits of the dispute is rooted in the principle that there is no right of recourse to the courts where an arbitrator has simply made an error of law and/or fact, for it means a fortiori that the courts should guard against attempts by a disgruntled party to fault an arbitrator for failing to consider arguments or points which were never before him. Setting aside proceedings are not to be abused by parties who, with the benefit of hindsight, wished they had pleaded or presented their cases in a different way before the arbitrator (at [53]). No reliance on the extended doctrine of res judicata is needed.

  113. [66] As regard to objection (c) at [55(c)] above, RC Thakkar (HC) is raised by the Sellers to support their allegation that the Majority did not apply its mind to whether tortious damages are permitted under s 19 and whether the parties actually did not dispute this proposition. The Sellers do not object to RC Thakkar (HC) merely on the basis that it was overruled; they argue that because RC Thakkar (HC) does not support the Majority’s observation, it shows that the Majority have failed to apply their minds to the issue. To this objection, neither Art 4 nor Art 16(2) would apply in the first place, because it is not an objection on the non-compliance with a non-mandatory provision under the Model Law or a requirement under the Arbitration Agreement, or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

  114. The application of the doctrine of waiver in the context of public policy objections

  115. [67] With regard to the use of the doctrine of waiver to preclude a public policy objection, this is a serious contention. The importance of ensuring that an award does not offend the most basic notion of morality and justice outweighs the principle of finality in arbitration that the doctrine of waiver seeks to achieve. Thus, a genuine claim on the ground that an award would offend the public policy of the state cannot be easily waived.

  116. [68] Support for this position can be found in the preparatory materials to the Model Law. The Analytical Commentary notes that certain defects such as violation of public policy and non-arbitrability “cannot be cured” by submission to the arbitral proceedings and a failure to raise objections during the proceedings (at p 40). In the same vein, the 1985 Commission Report states that it was recognised that “the failure to raise [a plea as to jurisdiction pursuant to Art 16(2) of the Model Law] could not have the effect of a waiver in all circumstances, especially where the plea under subparagraph (2)(b) was that the dispute was non-arbitrable or that the award was in conflict with public policy” (at para 288). The rationale for the position is that public policy and arbitrability are fundamental to the forum, so an award that falls foul of the public policy or the arbitrability criteria of the state should not be enforced even if parties waived their objection. I observe that the commentaries above are in the context of jurisdictional challenges under Art 16(2) based on public policy and arbitrability reasons.

  117. [69] In any case, it is worth bearing in mind that the Minors’ objection is against the substantive Award on the basis that it is against their interests or welfare, rather than an objection targeted at the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Therefore in this context, Art 16(2) of the Model Law does not apply.

  118. [70] The caution of the Court of Appeal in BLB v BLC also does not apply to the Minors’ objection. The caution against the re-characterisation of an issue raised before an arbitration or an introduction of a new issue not raised before an arbitration but material to the merits of the dispute in the arbitration stems from the principle that there is no recourse where there is an error of law or fact made by an arbitrator. The Minors’ objection is that the outcome of the arbitration violates the public policy of Singapore; it is not related to the finding of fact or holding of law by the Majority.

  119. Issue 3: Whether the Majority had exceeded the powers conferred on them by the Arbitration Agreement

  120. Whether the Majority awarded consequential damages

  121. Parties’ submissions

  122. [71] The Sellers’ application to set aside the Award pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law is on the basis that the Majority had awarded punitive, multiple and/or consequential damages which were expressly prohibited by clause 13.14.1, and accordingly beyond the authority granted to the Tribunal by the Arbitration Agreement (see CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] 4 SLR 305 (“CRW”) at [31]). The central question on excess of jurisdiction relates to the scope of clause 13.14.1 of the SPSSA, which states as follows:

  123. [72] It is not disputed that an error of law or fact does not amount to an excess of power within the meaning of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. The main thrust of the Sellers’ case is that the damages awarded of INR 25,627,847,918.31, either by itself or together with the Pre-Award Interest, amounted to consequential damages (whether under Indian law or Singapore law) in the nature of “hypothetical lost profits” that exceeded the Tribunal’s power in clause 13.14.1 of the SPSSA (“the consequential-loss argument”). The Sellers agree that the damages should represent the difference in value between the price paid for the Shares and their actual value, which would be direct losses, but this is not what the Majority actually awarded. According to Mr Salve, the Majority awarded damages for hypothetical lost profits, which is consequential loss under Indian law. This award of hypothetical lost profits results from applying a discount rate based on the average of the Buyer’s WACC rate to the proceeds of the sale from the Share Swap and the dividends received. In support of his argument, the Sellers rely, first, on the fact that the WACC rate was used, and second, on the Majority’s reasoning as to the use of the WACC rate in the Award.

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