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Grounds publishedDecided 31 Jul 2019
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High Court

Gian Bee Choo and others v Meng Xianhui

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[2019] SGHC 179Case no. Suit No 487 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The central dispute is whether the marriage (“the Marriage”) between the deceased, Mr Gian Beng Hwee (“the Deceased”), and the defendant, Ms Meng Xianhui (“the Defendant”) was a sham marriage. If so, the next critical issue is whether the Marriage is valid.

  3. [2] The Marriage was solemnised on 20 January 2007. The first to fourth plaintiffs (“the Plaintiffs”) are the Deceased’s siblings. They did not attend the wedding and were completely unaware of the Marriage. The Deceased’s sudden death from a heart attack in 2017 came as a shock to the Plaintiffs. They received another shock when the Defendant turned up at the Deceased’s funeral wake and claimed to be his wife. The Plaintiffs had known the Deceased to be a bachelor before his demise. In this action the Plaintiffs seek the following reliefs:

  4. (a) firstly, a declaration that the Marriage was a sham marriage or marriage of convenience (“the First Declaration”); and

  5. (b) secondly, a declaration that the Deceased’s Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) moneys and all his other assets are to be distributed among the Deceased’s immediate family according to the prevailing laws, rules and regulations to the exclusion of the Defendant (“the Second Declaration”).

  6. [3] The First Declaration requires the court to determine whether the Marriage was a sham marriage. This is a question of fact. The Second Declaration raises important legal issues, such as whether a sham marriage is a valid or void marriage under the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”) and whether a party to a sham marriage is a “surviving spouse” under s 7 of the Intestate Succession Act (Cap 146, 2013 Rev Ed) (“ISA”) and a “wife” under s 73 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (Cap 61, 1994 Rev Ed) (“CLPA”). These provisions are relevant in determining whether the Defendant is entitled to the Deceased’s estate (under the ISA), CPF moneys (under the Central Provident Fund Act (Cap 36, 2013 Rev Ed) (“CPF Act”)) and life insurance proceeds (under the CLPA).

  7. [4] At the outset, the terminology used in this judgment ought to be clarified. The term sham marriage is not a term of art (Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737 (“Toh Seok Kheng”) at [17]). A sham marriage is a general term which may refer to any marriage where the parties do not genuinely intend to live as man and wife for whatever reason (eg, a marriage to further the parties’ business interests or to please their respective parents). However, the present case is not concerned with sham marriages in all its guises and forms, but only with a specific sub-species that corresponds with the definition of a marriage of convenience under s 11A of the Women’s Charter, with the following elements:

  8. (a) the purpose of the marriage is to assist one party to obtain an immigration advantage (eg, the grant of permanent residence (“PR”) under the Immigration Act (Cap 133, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Immigration Act”));

  9. (b) there is gratification given, offered, or received as an inducement or reward to the other party; and

  10. (c) the parties did not intend for the marriage to result in a genuine marital relationship.

  11. I shall refer to a sham marriage with the above elements as an “immigration-advantage sham marriage”. For short, I shall also refer to element (c) above in terms of whether the marriage was a “genuine marriage”, and references to whether a marriage was a genuine one should be read accordingly.

  12. [5] I shall now refer to the facts of this case.

  13. Facts

  14. Brief background

  15. [6] The Deceased was a Singapore citizen. The Plaintiffs are his siblings. The Deceased passed away intestate on 23 December 2017. From 1973 to 2017, the Deceased, whom his family and friends regarded as a bachelor, lived with the first plaintiff (“PW1”) and his late mother at the flat in Whampoa Drive (“the Whampoa flat”).

  16. [7] The Defendant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (“China”). She has two sons, aged 33 and 18 as of 2019, from a previous marriage. She first came to Singapore in 2004. According to her, she was granted a five-year permit as a “study mama” to her younger son. The Defendant and her younger son stayed at a five-room flat owned by her younger sister, Ms Meng Yutong (“DW2”) at Admiralty Drive (“DW2’s flat”).

  17. The Marriage

  18. [8] The Marriage was solemnised on 20 January 2007. The witnesses to the Marriage were DW2 and her then-husband, Mr Lee Chee Wah (“DW3”).

  19. [9] It is not disputed that the Deceased’s family and friends were not present at the marriage ceremony and the wedding lunch thereafter. The only attendees were the Defendant’s relatives and a friend.

  20. Events after the Marriage was solemnised

  21. [10] Notwithstanding that they were married, the Deceased continued to live in the Whampoa flat with his late mother and PW1, while the Defendant and her younger son continued to stay with DW2 at DW2’s flat. However, the address stated in the Defendant’s Singapore National Registration Identity Card (“NRIC”) was the Whampoa flat. At that time, the Deceased also owned a three-room flat in Potong Pasir which was purchased in 1999 and sold in 2016 (“the Potong Pasir flat”). Nevertheless, the Deceased and the Defendant did not live in the Potong Pasir flat as well.

  22. [11] The Defendant applied for PR on 6 June 2007 and obtained PR status on 21 April 2009, which was renewed in 2014. She remains a PR to date.

  23. [12] In or around August 2011, the Defendant returned to China. She came back to Singapore in November 2014 to renew her PR status and left for China in January 2015. The Deceased’s mother passed away in 2012 and the Defendant did not return to Singapore for the funeral.

  24. The Deceased’s death and funeral

  25. [14] The Deceased passed away intestate on 23 December 2017. His funeral was held from 23 to 27 December 2017.

  26. [15] The Deceased’s niece, Ms Low Hui Ying (“PW2”), had used the Deceased’s mobile phone to send a message to all of his phone contacts to inform them of the Deceased’s demise and the details of the funeral. The Defendant’s sister, DW2, was one of those in the Deceased’s contacts in his phone. However, the Defendant was not in the Deceased’s phone contact list. Upon receiving the message, DW2 informed the Defendant about the Deceased’s passing and the details of the funeral.

  27. [16] The Defendant turned up at the Deceased’s funeral wake on the night of 26 December 2017 at about 11pm, along with DW2, DW3, her brother-in-law Mr Jeffrey Ng (“DW4”) and her younger sister. When the Defendant informed the Plaintiffs that she was the Deceased’s wife, they were shocked as they never knew that he was ever married.

  28. [17] The last ceremonial rites and cremation took place on 27 December 2017 and the Defendant alleged that she was not allowed to attend. At 3.44pm of the same day, the Defendant went to the CPF Board to reset her SingPass password and to enquire about the Deceased’s moneys with the CPF Board.

  29. [18] On 10 May 2018, an interim injunction was granted to the Plaintiffs to restrain the Defendant from withdrawing, encumbering, disposing of, transferring, charging or otherwise dealing with the Deceased’s CPF moneys and/or his insurance policy proceeds/moneys.

  30. The parties’ cases

  31. The Plaintiffs’ case

  32. The Marriage was a sham marriage

  33. [19] The Plaintiffs contend that the Marriage was a sham marriage, relying principally on the following points:

  34. (a) The Deceased had lived as a bachelor with PW1 and his mother at the Whampoa flat until his demise. He did not inform his friends, family, insurers and employers about the purported marriage. He only claimed for wife deductions in his Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (“IRAS”) forms for the years of assessment of 2009, 2010 and 2012 so as to enjoy a tax relief of $2,000.

  35. (b) The Defendant could not give details of the frequency or duration of the Deceased’s alleged stays with her at DW2’s flat. Even DW4 stated that he had only seen the Deceased twice in the ten years of the Marriage although DW4 often visited DW2’s flat.

  36. (c) There were no records of communications between the Deceased and the Defendant, in contrast with the records of the Deceased’s communications with other individuals retained in his mobile phone (which was produced in court). The Deceased also did not have WeChat, a popular phone application in China, which the Defendant used. Further, the Defendant only came to know of the Deceased’s demise and funeral because her sister was his WhatsApp contact. There were also no photographs of the Deceased and the Defendant taken together other than their wedding photographs, which the Plaintiffs alleged were staged to mislead the authorities.

  37. (d) The circumstances of the registration of the Marriage were suspect. Nobody from the Deceased’s family attended and the Defendant was inconsistent in her evidence regarding whether her parents attended the wedding.

  38. (e) Finally, it was odd that the Defendant immediately went to the CPF Board to enquire about the Deceased’s outstanding account the very same day of the cremation when she was allegedly heartbroken, upset and in no mood to do anything.

  39. [20] Although the Deceased had not told his mother and siblings about the Marriage, it transpired that he had told at least three individuals about it. The Plaintiffs called them as witnesses.

  40. (a) The first witness is PW2. She is the niece of the Deceased and the daughter of the second plaintiff. The Deceased and PW2 met about three times a week in 2017 after she returned from further studies in the United Kingdom. According to PW2, sometime in the middle of 2017, the Deceased informed her that he was married to a lady from China and that this was purely to help her obtain PR status in Singapore.

  41. (b) The second witness is Mr Soh Keng Boon (“PW3”). PW3 was a long-time friend of the Deceased for about 20 years. The Deceased referred to PW3 as his “big brother”. They served as committee members in the same temple for about ten years. According to PW3, in or around 2007, the Deceased had told him that he had married the Defendant and the purpose of the Marriage was to help the Defendant apply for PR status in Singapore.

  42. (c) The third witness is Ms Guo Wenhui (“PW4”). PW4 was the Deceased’s financial advisor who had first met him in or around 2007. According to PW4, during one of their earlier meetings in 2007, the Deceased had informed her that he was married. However, he told her that this marriage was a sham marriage and that he was paid a certain amount to enter into this marriage. He had also said that he would divorce the Defendant in due course after she had obtained PR status, so that she would not be entitled to his assets.

  43. [21] The Plaintiffs contend that even if the Marriage is not void under the express provisions of the Women’s Charter, it is void for statutory illegality, or illegality at common law. Immigration-advantage sham marriages are now expressly prohibited by statute (ie, s 57C(1) of the Immigration Act). Even though that provision was not yet in force in 2007, such sham marriages would have been against public policy as the couples intended to deceive public authorities. Moreover, these sham marriages would have been prejudicial to the status of marriage.

  44. [22] The Plaintiffs assert that Parliament has all along been aware of the concept of immigration-advantage sham marriages, which constitute “fraud on the immigration authorities”. Such marriages had been dealt with previously under s 57(1)(k) of the Immigration Act and s 5(b)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, Rev Ed 1993) (“PCA”). Sham marriages more generally would also constitute “fraud on the Registrar of Marriages”.

  45. [23] Next, even if the Marriage were valid, the Defendant cannot succeed because the word “spouse” under the relevant provisions of the CPF Act and ISA should be interpreted to refer to a spouse in a genuine marriage.

  46. [24] Finally, separate from the issue of whether the Marriage is void and regardless of how “spouse” under the above-mentioned statutes should be interpreted, the court can nonetheless declare that the Defendant is not entitled to inherit the Deceased’s estate because the parties should not be allowed to benefit from their own illegal activities. The Plaintiffs rely on the principle that a person cannot gain the right to inherit properties by committing murder (also known as the “forfeiture rule”), citing Dunbar v Plant [1998] 1 Ch 412.

  47. The Defendant’s case

  48. The Marriage was not a sham marriage

  49. [25] The Defendant contends that the Marriage was not a sham marriage. According to the Defendant, she was introduced to the Deceased by her sister, DW2, sometime in the middle of 2006. They had a stable relationship which “grew steadily and developed quite fast” over the six months prior to their wedding. The Defendant had also introduced the Deceased to her parents, who were in Singapore at the material time, and her sons.

  50. [26] Sometime in late 2006, the Defendant’s family had a steamboat dinner at Marina South. The purpose of this dinner was to introduce the Deceased to the Defendant’s new brother-in-law, DW4.

  51. [27] The Marriage was solemnised on 20 January 2007. A wedding lunch was held on the same day at a restaurant in Toa Payoh. There were around 20 people present, which included DW2, DW3, DW4 and two other sisters of the Defendant. Several photographs which were taken at the wedding and the lunch were produced before the court. The Defendant denied paying any money to the Deceased to marry her.

  52. [28] According to the Defendant, the Deceased was probably embarrassed to tell his family that he had married a wife from China, who was also a divorcee with two sons. They had also agreed to live separately, although the Deceased would stay over at DW2’s flat with the Defendant “whenever he could”. According to DW3, the Defendant stayed over at DW2’s flat “occasionally”, although he was unable to provide an estimate. As for DW4, he testified that he would visit DW2’s flat about twice a month between 2007 and 2017. During this ten-year period, he had met the Deceased “once or twice” at DW2’s flat.

  53. [29] In 2011, the Defendant had to return to China as her mother became seriously ill. Although the Deceased remained in Singapore, they would communicate by telephone “whenever [they] wanted to discuss something with each other or missed each other”. The Deceased would also meet the Defendant whenever he went to China for business.

  54. [30] When DW2 informed the Defendant of the Deceased’s demise she quickly returned to Singapore and attended the funeral wake together with DW2, DW3, DW4 and her younger sister. The Defendant went to the CPF Board the following day to enquire about the Deceased’s moneys as she perceived herself as the lawful wife of the Deceased.

  55. [31] The Defendant also argues that even if the Marriage was initially a sham, it evolved over time into a genuine marital relationship.

  56. [32] The Defendant argues that the court cannot grant the First Declaration in the terms sought, because a “sham marriage” or “marriage of convenience” had no legal status before the enactment of s 11A of the Women’s Charter. A court cannot declare a marriage void on grounds other than those in s 105 of the Women’s Charter and the ground in s 11A cannot apply because this came into effect only on 1 October 2016. Thus, the Marriage would be valid and the Defendant retains all the rights of a lawful wife of the Deceased. Moreover, even if the Marriage were a sham marriage, they were entitled to be issued a marriage licence by the Registrar of Marriages and so no offence was committed. In support, the Defendant cited the cases of Tan Ah Thee and another (administrators of the estate of Tan Kiam Poh (alias Tan Gna Chua), deceased) v Lim Soo Foong [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957 (“Tan Ah Thee”), Toh Seok Kheng, and Soon Ah See and another v Diao Yanmei [2016] 5 SLR 693 (“Soon Ah See”).

  57. [33] The Defendant next argues that if the First Declaration is not granted, the Plaintiffs cannot be entitled to the Second Declaration.

  58. [34] The Defendant also submits that if the court found that the Marriage was a genuine one, that finding should extend to the relevant findings made under other statutes such as the CPF Act. She submits that Soon Ah See was wrongly decided in holding that a sham marriage was valid but that for purposes of s 25(5)(a) of the CPF Act, Parliament’s intention did not extend to making financial provision for a surviving party to a sham marriage.

  59. My decision

  60. Issues to be determined

  61. [35] The main issues before me are as follows:

  62. (a) Was the Marriage an immigration-advantage sham marriage?

  63. (b) If so, is it a valid or void marriage under the Women’s Charter?

  64. (c) Is the Defendant a “surviving spouse” under s 7 of the ISA and a “wife” under s 73 of the CLPA?

  65. [36] The Defendant also challenges the admissibility of certain statements referred to by various witnesses. Thus, it is more appropriate to deal with this first.

  66. Preliminary issue: Admissibility of statements

  67. [37] The Defendant disputes the admissibility of statements allegedly made by the Deceased regarding the Marriage as recounted by PW2, PW3 and PW4 in their affidavits. She alleges that these are hearsay statements under ss 32(1)(e) and 32(1)(j)(i) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act”), which: (i) are inadmissible because the notice requirements under s 32(4)(b) read with O 38 r 4 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) have not been complied with; or (ii) should be excluded under s 32(3) of the Evidence Act because of their unreliability and limited probative value. Alternatively, (iii) these statements should be given minimal weight.

  68. [38] I shall deal with points (i) and (ii) together. I do not accept either argument. It is not disputed that the notice requirements were not complied with. But even when the notice requirements in O 38 r 4 of the ROC are not complied with, the court may exercise its discretion under O 2 r 1 to cure such non-compliance where the failure to give notice did not cause prejudice to the opposing party rendering it unfair for the hearsay evidence to be admitted: Singapore Civil Procedure 2019 vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th Ed, 2019) at para 38/4/3. The curing of any irregularity must be considered in the light of the court’s discretion to exclude evidence under s 32(3): Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 (“Gimpex”) at [137]–[141].

  69. [39] In this case, I decide to exercise my discretion to overcome the irregularity of the lack of notice under O 2 r 1 of the ROC and not to exclude the evidence under s 32(3) of the Evidence Act.

  70. (a) The starting point under O 38 r 4(1) of the ROC is that the onus is on the party seeking to adduce hearsay evidence to comply with the requirements therein. These include serving a notice in writing to inform the other parties of his intention to introduce the evidence contained in the affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) of the witness through whom the statement is to be admitted, which must state the grounds under s 32(1) of the Evidence Act that are relied on and give details about the circumstances in which non-documentary statements were made (eg, the time and place of making the statement, the name and address of the person who heard the statement, and the substance or actual words used).

  71. (b) The Plaintiffs contend that they have in substance complied with O 38 r 4 because all the requisite details could be found in the affidavits of PW2, PW3 and PW4. Unfortunately, the requisite details are inadequate as the affidavits did not state, amongst others, the time and place of making the statement.

  72. (c) However, what the Plaintiffs did or did not do must be seen against the fact that objections were not filed. The Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed out that at the pre-trial conference of 14 February 2019, parties were directed to exchange affidavits by 25 February 2019 and objections were to be raised by 4 March 2019. The Defendant’s counsel accepted that she had not filed a notice of objections, even though a party is obligated to file a notice of objections stating all grounds of objections under para 62 of the Supreme Court Practice Directions.

  73. (d) Furthermore, it is relevant to my determination that no prejudice was caused to the Defendant arising from the Plaintiffs’ lack of notice. As explained in Gimpex (at [138], citing Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2013)):

  74. The Defendant has, indeed, challenged the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4 and sought to discredit the reliability of the same and whether the evidence is reliable should be viewed in that light. I note also that the Defendant ultimately relied on the Deceased’s evidence elicited from their cross-examination to support her case. She was not disadvantaged or caught off guard.

  75. [40] Accordingly, I find that the Deceased’s evidence as recounted by PW2, PW3 and PW4 in their affidavits are admissible. What weight to be accorded to the evidence pertaining to the Deceased requires the court to carefully consider and analyse its reliability in the light of all the evidence to ascertain where the truth lies on the balance of probabilities. I shall explain in detail my analysis below.

  76. [41] The Defendant also disputes the admissibility of:

  77. (a) an allegation by PW1 in her affidavit that “some of [the Deceased’s] friends also informed us during the funeral about the sham marriage” on the ground that this is hearsay; and

  78. (b) a statement in PW3’s affidavit regarding the Deceased’s alleged sexual lifestyle and the Defendant and her sister’s alleged involvement in vice-related activities on the ground that this is irrelevant.

  79. [42] Regarding the allegation in [41(a)], PW1 had testified that:

  80. The Plaintiffs had called the Deceased’s friend, ie, PW3, to testify. This aspect of PW1’s evidence is, therefore, not hearsay and is admissible. I have already dealt with PW3’s statement above.

  81. [43] Regarding the allegation in [41(b)], I do not accept that this particular statement is irrelevant. PW3 made the statement that he understood both the Defendant and her sister, DW2, to be working in the same trade and engaged in vice-related activities for a living in the context of explaining what he knew of the circumstances in which the Defendant met the Deceased. That forms part of the background to his understanding of the parties’ relationship. The weight to be attached to this statement is a separate issue.

  82. [44] I therefore find that the statements at [37] and [41] are admissible.

  83. Financial documents adduced by the Plaintiffs

  84. [45] The Defendant also disputes the admissibility of the Deceased’s financial documents found in the Plaintiffs’ bundle of documents. The Plaintiffs’ position is that these documents had been disclosed in a supplementary list of documents filed on 23 April 2019 and no notice of non-admission was filed by the Defendant under O 27 rr 4 and 5 of the ROC. Therefore, the Defendant is deemed to have admitted the authenticity of the documents. The Defendant contends that while no notice of non-admission was issued, under O 27 r 4(1)(b) she is deemed to admit only that the copies of the financial documents are true copies but not that their contents are correct.

  85. [46] The financial documents in this case are clearly admissible under s 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act as these statements were made “in the ordinary course of a trade, business, profession or other occupation …”. Such documents are admissible as the risks of these documents and their contents being doctored are very low, if at all. Hence, the Defendant’s objection is unmeritorious.

  86. Issue 1: Whether the Marriage was an immigration-advantage sham marriage

  87. [47] I am of the view that the Plaintiffs have proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the Marriage was not a genuine one. I also find that the Deceased had agreed to marry the Defendant to help her obtain PR status and he was paid a sum of money in return, bringing the Marriage within the definition of an immigration-advantage sham marriage. There is no credible evidence that the parties had intended the Marriage to be a genuine one at any point during the ten years they were married. I shall now furnish my analysis.

  88. The Plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge about the Marriage

  89. [48] It was a key plank of PW1’s evidence that the Deceased had never told her or their mother about his relationship or marriage with the Defendant despite them having a close relationship and living together.

  90. [49] The Defendant argues that the Deceased did not tell his family about the Marriage as he was embarrassed to tell them he had married a “China lady” whom he picked up at a place like a KTV lounge; alternatively, that he did not tell his family about her because she was a divorcee with two children. However, PW1 explained that the Deceased would not have felt ashamed to tell them about such a relationship because their mother was not strongly against any nationality and would have been very happy that the Deceased was getting married. I note that the point made by the Defendant’s counsel about her allegedly being picked up at a KTV lounge is inconsistent with the Defendant’s own version of events, which is that she was introduced to him through DW2 at a meeting for selling health products. The Defendant’s alternative explanation for why the Deceased did not inform his family was, on her own admission, “just a conjecture on [her] part”. In any case, PW1 also stated that even if the Deceased’s prospective wife was a divorcee, the family would still have supported his decision. A marriage is a momentous and joyous occasion that would have warranted some announcement to the family members by the Deceased.

  91. [50] Accordingly, I find the undisputed fact that the Deceased did not tell his family of the Marriage to be significant circumstantial evidence that the Marriage was not genuine.

  92. Gratification for entering into the Marriage

  93. [52] There is no reason for me to doubt the credibility and veracity of PW4’s evidence as she is an independent witness with no vested interest. She is the only witness who is not a current or former family member or friend of either the Deceased or the Defendant.

  94. [53] I am unable to accept the Defendant’s argument that PW4’s evidence on gratification is “extremely weak” and must be disregarded simply because she could not recall the amount of gratification that was given to the Deceased, given the lapse of time. PW4’s evidence is compelling and reveals not only that the Marriage was not a genuine one from the outset but also that there was gratification paid to the Deceased for entering into the Marriage.

  95. [54] I would like to comment on a minor point relating to PW1’s testimony. She appears to have conceded that there was no evidence that the Defendant had paid the Deceased and no evidence that the purpose of the Marriage was to help the Defendant obtain PR status. This apparent concession has to be considered in its proper context. It is clear that PW1’s testimony was based on her personal knowledge of the case and did not include the evidence of the other witnesses, ie, she had candidly admitted that she was unaware about the Marriage and that she knew nothing about the purpose of the Marriage. This is consistent with her testimony that she did not know about the Marriage, such that the sudden appearance of the Defendant at the Deceased’s funeral wake came as a shock to her and her siblings.

  96. Lack of proper living arrangements

  97. [55] The Defendant’s position is that she lived in DW2’s flat with her son and the Deceased stayed with her “whenever he could”. I do not accept the Defendant’s version that the Deceased occasionally stayed with her and her son at DW2’s flat. That position is undermined by the evidence of her own witness, DW4, who said that he saw the Deceased only “once or twice” at DW2’s flat in the ten years of the Marriage although he went there twice a month.

  98. [56] Instead, I find that the Deceased and the Defendant had lived separately at all material times. By her own admission, she had never moved into or lived together with the Deceased at the Whampoa flat (initially she believed this was rented out and later she found out that it was occupied by the Deceased’s mother). The Deceased lived in the Whampoa flat (owned by PW1) and the Defendant lived in DW2’s flat. The Deceased purchased the Potong Pasir flat in 1999 and only sold it in 2016. Instead of living in the Potong Pasir flat with the Defendant and her younger son, the Deceased chose to rent out the Potong Pasir flat. The Defendant testified that there were eight people living in DW2’s flat, which had four bedrooms. This would have made DW2’s flat fairly crowded, as pointed out by DW3, and ought to have provided greater reason for the Deceased, the Defendant and her younger son to live in the Potong Pasir flat which was owned by the Deceased.

  99. [57] This then raises the question of why the Defendant’s address was reflected in her NRIC as the Whampoa flat even though she never lived there. The Defendant claimed that this was done so that the Deceased could help to read her letters. This explanation is contrived. If the Deceased had, indeed, stayed over at DW2’s flat with the Defendant regularly, then he could have easily helped to read her letters at DW2’s flat. In all probability, the Whampoa flat was reflected as the Defendant’s address on her NRIC to maintain the façade of a genuine marriage and to deceive the authorities into granting PR status to the Defendant. Interestingly, when asked in cross-examination whether it was misleading to the authorities to give the impression she was living there, the Defendant’s reply was that it was a “very strange question” that she did not wish to and did not know how to answer. I find that the true reason for this arrangement was to mislead the authorities by creating the impression that she and the Deceased were living together in a genuine marriage.

  100. No sharing of financial burdens between the Deceased and the Defendant

  101. [58] In a genuine marriage, one would expect the Deceased to have made financial contributions to the Defendant’s household expenses as he was drawing a salary and the Defendant had to support her family. There was a complete silence in the Defendant’s AEIC and testimony in court in this regard. Any financial contributions to the Defendant would be good evidence to support the legitimacy of her marriage to the Deceased. The inference that could be drawn, on a balance of probabilities, is that the Deceased did not contribute financially to the Defendant who had to care for and financially support her younger son studying in Singapore.

  102. [59] Subsequently, when the Deceased faced financial difficulties and eventually became a bankrupt, there was also no evidence that the Defendant helped to ease his financial woes. The Defendant did not deny that she had not assisted the Deceased financially in his hours of needs. In fact, it was PW1 who lent the Deceased around $11,000 in 2017 as he had asked her for financial help instead of the Defendant.

  103. Lack of phone records and photographs

  104. [60] If the Deceased and the Defendant were in a genuine marriage, then one would have logically expected her phone number to be listed in his phone’s contact list. This would be all the more so if they had communicated frequently by phone, as the Defendant asserts. After all, the Defendant had returned to China in 2011 without the Deceased. She had only made two trips to Singapore thereafter: once in 2014 to renew her PR status and once more in 2017 to attend his funeral. However, the Defendant was not listed in the Deceased’s phone contact list and it was in fact DW2 who was listed as a contact and who alerted the Defendant of the Deceased’s demise.

  105. [61] The Defendant testified that she communicated with the Deceased mainly through phone calls. However, she was unable to produce any phone records in these proceedings. Even if I accept her explanation that the phone records were with the Chinese telecoms authorities, that does not explain why she could not produce any evidence of text messages exchanged with the Deceased. She claimed that the Deceased did not like to communicate through text messages. However, this assertion was flatly contradicted by the numerous text messages in the Deceased’s phone, which were produced before the court and went unchallenged by the Defendant’s counsel.

  106. [62] The Defendant, in trying to establish that the Marriage was a genuine marriage, produced a series of photographs taken during the wedding, including several taken of themselves. The Defendant also produced a photograph of the Deceased and two friends in China, supposedly taken by the Defendant’s elder son when the Deceased visited China sometime in 2013. Notably, however, the Defendant was not in this photograph.

  107. [63] While the Defendant relied heavily on these photographs to assert that the Marriage was a genuine one, it is telling that these were the only photographs that she could produce. The Defendant explained that her mobile phone had been damaged and that her other photographs with the Deceased that were stored in the mobile phone could no longer be retrieved. There was no evidence to substantiate this explanation which was, in my view, contrived and a mere afterthought. Even if the Defendant’s mobile phone was indeed damaged, it was inexplicable that she could not obtain photographs of the couple from the Defendant’s family and friends if the Marriage was genuine, taking into account the fact that the Marriage was 10 years long. The Defendant further sought to explain that the parties did not have the habit of taking photographs because they led a normal, routine life. This point does not assist her because it does not explain the complete lack of non-wedding photographs.

  108. [64] The Defendant also argued that the Plaintiffs had produced only five photographs of the Deceased. But reliance on the number of photographs produced by the Plaintiffs is misplaced. The Plaintiffs are not the ones alleging that the Deceased was in a relationship with the Defendant in these proceedings. Thus, there would have been no need for them to adduce extensive photographic evidence to prove that relationship.

  109. Objective evidence that the Deceased regarded himself as single

  110. [65] The Plaintiffs adduced various documents which showed that the Deceased regarded himself as single and portrayed himself as such to third parties at all material times, even after the Marriage was solemnised on 20 January 2007. These documents are as follows:

  111. (a) a proposal form for an AXA insurance policy dated 25 October 2007, around 9 months after the wedding, in which the Deceased stated that he was single in two separate sections;

  112. (b) an IRAS Form IR8A completed by the Deceased’s employer (ICOS Vision Systems Pte Ltd) on 5 February 2010, which indicated that the Deceased was single; and

  113. (c) salary slips by another employer of the Deceased (Provectus Lifestyle Asia Pte Ltd) from March 2014 to July 2014, which indicated that the Deceased was single.

  114. [66] These documents show that the Deceased had regarded himself as single even soon after the wedding and support the Plaintiffs’ contention that the Marriage was not a genuine one. While the Defendant does not accept that the Deceased would have stated that he was single and also challenges whether the designation as “single” in the AXA insurance policy was made by the Deceased himself, there is no reason for me to doubt the authenticity of these documents.

  115. [67] For completeness, I note that there is also a CPF nomination form signed by the Deceased but not submitted to the CPF Board, in which the Deceased stated that he was single. However, this form is not dated and I therefore place more weight on the other documents cited above. I also do not accept that the Deceased, by completing the nomination form but not submitting it, evinced an intention to benefit the Defendant.

  116. Purpose of the Marriage and the Defendant’s assertion that she does not require PR to stay in Singapore

  117. [68] The Defendant claims that there was no reason for her to enter into the Marriage simply to become a Singapore PR and that she did not give any gratification to the Defendant. She had initially come to Singapore on a “study mama” pass, which was a legitimate pass allowing her to stay legally in Singapore from 2004 to 2009. This was granted well before she met the Deceased in mid-2006, which showed that she did not come to Singapore to obtain PR. There was no urgency or necessity to apply for PR because she was here on a “study mama” pass. She also claims to be uninterested in applying for PR given her status as a “study mama” and to have been unsure about how to apply for PR.

  118. [69] I find her alleged lack of knowledge about how to apply for PR to be an attempt to distance herself from the true purpose of the Marriage. The Defendant had to admit that she knew that if she was married, she could apply for PR. This was clear from the experiences of her two sisters, who obtained PR after their marriage to Singaporeans.

  119. [70] Having PR status would be superior to having a “study mama” pass as the former would be valid for a longer duration and come with more privileges. In comparison, the continued validity of a “study mama” pass would depend on her son studying in Singapore. Thus, on the totality of the evidence, I am inclined to believe that the Defendant wanted to follow her sisters’ footsteps to seek PR status. The purpose of the Marriage was, therefore, to assist her in obtaining an immigration advantage.

  120. Evidence of other witnesses

  121. PW2’s testimony that the Deceased had told her that he had entered into a sham marriage

  122. [71] PW2 testified that the Deceased told her that the Marriage was purely to help the Defendant remain in Singapore, as the latter was in danger of being deported. I have to view PW2’s evidence with great caution as she was the Deceased’s niece and was also the one who, by sending messages to everyone in the Deceased’s phone contact list, unwittingly alerted the Defendant (through DW2) and thereby precipitated this lawsuit. Thus, she may have a vested interest in this case.

  123. PW3’s testimony that the Deceased had confided in him about the Marriage being a sham

  124. [72] PW3 said that the Deceased informed him that the purpose of the Marriage was to help the Defendant apply for PR status, but he was not told whether the Deceased was paid. Although PW3’s testimony is relevant and pertinent, I initially approached his evidence with some caution, as he and the Deceased were friends involved in the same temple activities. However, I ultimately accept PW3’s evidence because it is materially corroborated by PW4’s testimony, which I have given full weight to as explained above.

  125. DW2’s testimony that the Defendant and the Deceased were a married couple after the Marriage

  126. [73] I do not accept the evidence of the Defendant’s sister, DW2.

  127. [74] Firstly, DW2 conceded that she had no personal knowledge about the arrangements between the Deceased and the Defendant on matters such as why his family did not attend the wedding and why he did not stay in her flat on a daily basis.

  128. [75] Secondly, DW2 was unable to even estimate how frequently the Deceased allegedly stayed over in her flat with the Defendant, stating only that “[s]ometimes he would come during midnight” and “I can’t tell a figure, I don’t know how to go about calculating this”. It beggars belief that she would have difficulty answering such a simple question, if it were true that the Deceased had stayed over. I disagree with the Defendant’s counsel’s contention that her inability to give details of the frequency of the Deceased’s stay at DW2’s flat “shows honesty on their part” in not trying to fabricate evidence. DW2’s evidence on the frequency of the Deceased’s visits to DW2’s flat was materially contradicted by her own brother-in-law, DW4, who said he met the Deceased once or twice at DW2’s flat in the ten years of their Marriage, although he visited DW2’s flat fortnightly.

  129. [76] Thirdly, some of her answers were clear postulations that show she was grasping at straws to present a credible account. The following exchange, regarding her allegation that the Defendant had asked her to look after the Deceased’s health, is telling:

  130. The Plaintiffs’ position is that the Deceased was never diagnosed with diabetes. The above demonstrates that DW2 did not, in fact, have knowledge of the Deceased’s medical status and was trying to cobble together a logical explanation. Thus, I disbelieve DW2.

  131. [77] I also do not have the confidence to accept DW3’s evidence as his testimony merely corroborated the fractured defence. The Defendant urges the court to accept DW3’s testimony as DW3 and DW2 were divorced. Although DW3 and DW2 were divorced in 2014, they are not on hostile terms. After DW3 testified, I noticed that he sat next to DW2 in the almost-empty public gallery.

  132. Summary of findings on the first issue

  133. [78] To summarise my findings on the first issue, the Marriage was entered into with the purpose of assisting the Defendant to obtain PR status, there was gratification given and the parties did not intend for the Marriage to result in a genuine marital relationship. For this reason, I reject the Defendant’s argument that s 11A(2) of the Women’s Charter applies in this case. This provision deals with marriages where both parties to the marriage believed on reasonable grounds when contracting or entering into the sham marriage that the marriage would result in a genuine marital relationship. There is no evidence to that effect for the Marriage. Nor did the Marriage evolve into a genuine marital relationship at any point afterwards.

  134. [79] The Defendant submits, relying on Tan Yoke Kheng (trading as Niklex Supply Co) v Lek Benedict and others [2005] 3 SLR(R) 263 at [10]–[15], that while the standard of proof in a civil case where fraud is alleged is still based on a balance of probabilities, the more serious the allegation, the more the party on whose shoulders the burden of proof falls needs to do to establish his case. Even on this more onerous threshold, I find that the Plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to discharge their burden of proof on a balance of probabilities.

  135. Issue 2: Validity of the Marriage

  136. [80] The next issue is whether the Marriage, which was solemnised on 20 January 2007, is void under the Women’s Charter. Before I start my analysis with the relevant provisions of the Women’s Charter, I would like to deal briefly with the Plaintiffs’ arguments that the principles of illegality in contract law are applicable to the contract of marriage. The Plaintiffs rely on Ochroid Trading Ltd and another v Chua Siok Lui (trading as VIE Import & Export) and another [2018] 1 SLR 363 and argue that marriages should be analysed as contracts and subjected to the usual contractual principles regarding statutory and common law illegality. I disagree. The concept of illegality applicable to commercial contracts cannot be transplanted to the context of marriage as all aspects regarding the contract of marriages are dealt with under the Women’s Charter. Moreover, that approach is too simplistic considering that a marriage is more than a contract. Marriage embodies concepts of love, the union of different genders, procreation, life, morality and institutional facets (see Toh Seok Kheng at [11]). I shall now examine the relevant provisions of the Women’s Charter.

  137. Sections 11A and 105 of the Women’s Charter

  138. [81] The Marriage was solemnised on 20 January 2007. If the marriage was solemnised on or after 1 October 2016, it would have fallen squarely within the definition of a marriage of convenience as defined under s 11A(1) of the Women’s Charter and thus void under s 105 of the same.

  139. [82] Section 11A of the Women’s Charter states:

  140. [83] In line with the introduction of s 11A, s 105 of the Women’s Charter was also amended in 2016. Section 105 of the Women’s Charter now contains a new paragraph (aa) which states:

  141. [84] The Defendant contends that because all immigration-advantage sham marriages solemnised on or after the commencement date of ss 11A and 105(aa) are void, all such sham marriages solemnised before 1 October 2016 are valid. I disagree:

  142. (a) Nothing in the relevant Parliamentary debates indicates that it was Parliament’s intention for immigration-advantage sham marriages solemnised before 1 October 2016 to be valid.

  143. (b) To the contrary, having regard to the statutes and case law (which I shall refer to below), it is consistent with Parliament’s intention that such marriages should be invalidated.

  144. Parliament’s intention in introducing s 11A of the Women’s Charter

  145. [85] The Parliamentary debates on s 11A of the Women’s Charter shed light on why the commencement date of 1 October 2016 was chosen. This puts to rest the Defendant’s contention that Parliament intended to validate all immigration-advantage marriages pre-dating the commencement date of s 11A that would otherwise have been caught by that provision.

  146. [86] It is clear from the Parliamentary debates that Parliament was under the impression that s 11A of the Women’s Charter would only operate upon a conviction under s 57C of the Immigration Act. During the second reading of the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Bill 2016 (Bill 46 of 2016), then-Minister for Social and Family Development Mr Tan Chuan-Jin (“Mr Tan”) stated (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (29 February 2016) vol 94):

  147. In his response to questions posed by Members of Parliament, Mr Tan also explained as follows:

  148. [87] Section 57C(1) of the Immigration Act, which came into force on 19 December 2012, states:

  149. [88] When one examines s 57C of the Immigration Act, s 11A of the Women’s Charter and the relevant Parliamentary debates, it becomes apparent that s 11A of the Women’s Charter was introduced in the wake of s 57C of the Immigration Act. The legal test to determine a sham marriage, which was first set out in s 57C(1) of the Immigration Act, is in substance exactly the same as that in s 11A(1) of the Women’s Charter. Parliament was also under the understanding that s 11A of the Women’s Charter would only operate once a party to the marriage had been convicted under s 57C of the Immigration Act.

  150. [89] Therefore, there is a close nexus between s 11A of the Women’s Charter and s 57C of the Immigration Act. Critically, s 57C of the Immigration Act is a penal provision and cannot apply retrospectively. Retrospective criminal laws are unconstitutional under Art 11(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) which protects against retrospective criminal laws. With this background in mind, one can then understand why s 11A of the Women’s Charter does not have retrospective effect.

  151. [90] However, I am unable to accept the proposition that just because s 11A of the Women’s Charter only applies to marriages solemnised on or after 1 October 2016, this means that all immigration-advantage sham marriages solemnised before then were valid. By introducing s 11A of the Women’s Charter, the legislature made clear that such sham marriages entered into from 1 October 2016 are invalid. Did the legislature intend to validate such marriages simply because they occurred before this date?

  152. The relevant case law

  153. Tan Ah Thee

  154. [92] In Tan Ah Thee, the two plaintiffs were the deceased’s children from his first marriage. They were also the administrators of the deceased’s estate. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that there was no valid marriage between the deceased and the defendant whom the deceased married in 1996 (“the second marriage”) after his first wife passed away in 1994. It transpired that the deceased had an extramarital relationship with the defendant much earlier, around 1952, which resulted in the defendant bearing a child. But by the time of the second marriage in 1996, the deceased was 81 years old, wheelchair-bound and suffering from Parkinson’s disease.

  155. [93] The plaintiffs argued, amongst other things, that the marriage was void because it was “a sham marriage against public policy as the defendant’s sole or predominant motive in registering the marriage was to revoke the deceased’s will”, made before the second marriage (Tan Ah Thee at [10]) The plaintiffs contended that the grounds provided for in s 105 of the Women’s Charter were not exhaustive of the grounds on which a marriage may be found void.

  156. [94] Judith Prakash J (as she then was) rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the marriage was void for being a sham marriage. Prakash J reasoned that s 105 of the Women’s Charter is an “all exhaustive provision” and marriages celebrated in Singapore could not be declared void on any ground other than those provided for in s 105 (at [35]). In holding that the second marriage was valid, Prakash J added at [56]:

  157. [95] However, it ought to be emphasised that while the second marriage in Tan Ah Thee was characterised by the plaintiffs as a “sham marriage”, the facts differ materially from the type of sham marriage that this case is concerned with (ie, immigration-advantage sham marriages). In Tan Ah Thee, the deceased and the defendant had a genuine romantic relationship and the couple even had a son. There was no allegation that the couple had defrauded or deceived the Registrar of Marriages into issuing them a valid marriage licence. There was also no allegation that the parties had contravened any laws in the process of getting married. Furthermore, while the plaintiffs in Tan Ah Thee had alleged that the marriage contravened public policy, this public policy was not clearly identified and articulated. In the circumstances, the facts of Tan Ah Thee are wholly distinguishable from this case.

  158. [96] I accept the propositions stated by Prakash J in Tan Ah Thee, namely, that s 105 of the Women’s Charter is an “all exhaustive provision”. But it is worth pointing out that Tan Ah Thee did not consider the situation where a marriage licence issued by the Registrar of Marriages was procured by the parties’ fraud and deception, and where the primary purpose of the marriage was never to live as husband and wife but only to perpetuate criminal acts and contravene existing laws. If such a marriage can be caught under one of the grounds in s 105 of the Women’s Charter (which is indeed the case, under s 22 and s 17 of the Women’s Charter read with s 105, as I shall go on to explain), then it will be void.

  159. Toh Seok Kheng

  160. [97] The plaintiff in Toh Seok Kheng was the mother of the deceased, who died intestate in 2009. The defendant was a Chinese national whom the deceased married without informing his family. He continued to live with his family even after the marriage and his family only found out about the existence of the defendant at the deceased’s funeral. After the deceased’s death, the plaintiff applied for a grant of letters of administration of the deceased’s estate but ran into difficulty because the defendant had lodged a caveat, intending to do the same herself.

  161. [98] The plaintiff applied for, amongst others, a declaration that the marriage entered into between the deceased and the defendant was void as a “sham marriage in keeping with public policy considerations” (at [6]), alleging that the marriage was entered into to facilitate the defendant’s PR application.

  162. [99] Prakash J dismissed the plaintiff’s application. There were procedural defects in the plaintiff’s application, given that it was mandatory for the contentious probate action to be commenced by writ. It was an abuse of process for the plaintiff to initiate an originating summons for a declaration that the plaintiff be made the sole administrator of the deceased’s estate (Toh Seok Kheng at [26]).

  163. [100] Prakash J also reiterated the legal propositions stated in Tan Ah Thee. In response to the local cases cited by the plaintiffs in support of the public policy argument where the parties involved were convicted for corruption for entering into sham marriages, Prakash J stated as follows at [16]–[17]:

  164. [101] I agree entirely that the court cannot declare a marriage void on a ground other than those provided for in s 105 of the Women’s Charter (Toh Seok Kheng at [12]). But with the greatest of respect, I am of the view that there is a general public policy against immigration-advantage sham marriages in Singapore, which also existed at the time the Marriage in this case was solemnised in 2007.

  165. [102] I note that arguments pertaining to whether the marriage was void pursuant to s 22 and s 17 of the Women’s Charter, read with s 105, were not raised in Toh Seok Kheng. I shall now examine the judgment of Toh Seok Kheng in the light of public policy and other relevant statutory provisions.

  166. (1) A general public policy against immigration-advantage sham marriages existed in 2007

  167. [103] It could, perhaps, be the case that Prakash J was referring to sham marriages in a broad and generic sense, where parties enter into the sham marriage for “motives which some might consider improper” or where “spouses continue to conduct their respective lives as though they were unmarried” (Toh Seok Kheng at [12]). These types of sham marriages are not relevant to this case, and I need not say more regarding whether there was a general public policy against sham marriages in that broad sense. However, with regard to immigration-advantage sham marriages specifically, I find that there was already a public policy that existed against such sham marriages in 2007.

  168. [104] Section 57C of the Immigration Act and s 11A of the Women’s Charter were only introduced in 2012 and 2016 respectively, after Toh Seok Kheng was decided. However, I do not find that a public policy against sham marriages only existed once these provisions came into effect. I am of the view that such a public policy had always existed and that s 57C of the Immigration Act merely created a specific and targeted offence against such sham marriages. Prior to the enactment of s 57C, acts associated with such sham marriages were frequently prosecuted under other statutory provisions, namely s 5(b)(i) of the PCA or s 57(1)(k) of the Immigration Act (Mehra Radhika v Public Prosecutor [2015] 1 SLR 96 (“Mehra Radhika”) at [32]). I shall elaborate on these provisions after explaining the intention behind enacting s 57C of the Immigration Act.

  169. (2) The Parliamentary debates on s 57C of the Immigration Act

  170. [105] Prakash J had stated in Toh Seok Kheng that a public policy against sham marriages ought to be “properly reserved to Parliament for articulation, delineation and enactment” (Toh Seok Kheng at [15]). However, in my view, it is proper for the courts to identify such a public policy, so long as it is attributable to a constitutionally authoritative source, as stated by the Court of Appeal in UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874 (“UKM”) at [162(a)(i)]. In UKM, the Court of Appeal stated that there were at least four authoritative sources of public policy:

  171. (a) primary legislation;

  172. (b) subsidiary legislation;

  173. (c) statements made by Cabinet ministers; and

  174. (d) judicial decisions.

  175. [106] In this regard, I find support for the view that such sham marriages were always against public policy in the second reading of the Immigration (Amendment) Bill 2012 (Bill 16 of 2012) (“Immigration (Amendment) Bill 2012”) by the then-Second Minister for Home Affairs, Mr S Iswaran (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 August 2012) vol 89). The then-Second Minister for Home Affairs had stated:

  176. [107] In response to questions posed by Members of Parliament, the then-Second Minister for Home Affairs had also stated:

  177. [108] With the benefit of these statements made by the then-Second Minister for Home Affairs, it is apparent that s 57C of Immigration Act did not represent a new public policy against sham marriages in Singapore. The purpose of s 57C of the Immigration Act was to create a more specific and targeted offence against such sham marriages, in furtherance of a public policy against these immigration-advantage sham marriages which had always existed.

  178. (3) Penal provisions pre-dating s 57C of the Immigration Act

  179. [109] Prior to the commencement of s 57C of the Immigration Act, such sham marriages were criminalised, albeit indirectly, through two other statutory provisions, both of which were in force at the time the Marriage in this case was solemnised. As explained in Mehra Radhika at [32]:

  180. [110] The first provision referred to is s 5 of the PCA, which states:

  181. [111] Parties to a sham marriage (ie, the Deceased and the Defendant in this case, as well as any middleman) could be prosecuted under s 5 of the PCA, a generic provision which targets all corrupt acts (Tan Boon Gin, The Law on Corruption in Singapore: Cases and Materials (Academy Publishing, 2007) at pp 32–33). The cases in or around 2007 involving charges under s 5 of the PCA include Public Prosecutor v Ng Ai Hong [2007] SGDC 68 and Liu Ying v Public Prosecutor [2007] SGDC 352 (“Liu Ying”). I agree with the remarks made by the District Judge in Liu Ying at [11]:

  182. [112] The second provision that was used to prosecute couples of such sham marriages is s 57(1)(k) of the Immigration Act, which states:

  183. [113] The relevant act that is prosecuted under s 57(1)(k) of the Immigration Act is that of a false declaration for the purpose of obtaining an immigration advantage. Typically, the facts would involve a false statement made on a prescribed form of the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (“ICA”) by one party to the sham marriage. The falsehood would usually pertain to the foreign spouse’s address, which would reflect that of her spouse instead of her actual address (see, for example, Public Prosecutor v Jiang Yan [2009] SGDC 348). The Defendant’s counsel in her oral submissions argued that s 57(1)(k) was only brought into effect on 19 December 2012, the same date as for s 57C. That submission must be rejected. Section 57(1)(k) pre-dated s 57C and the amendment on 19 December 2012 was merely editorial. Prosecutions have routinely been brought under the former provision before the latter provision’s introduction (see, for example, Hong Weng Shing Andrew @ Liow Andrew v Public Prosecutor [2002] SGDC 83, involving false declarations regarding capacity to marry).

  184. [114] Given the findings of fact I have made, the Deceased and the Defendant would have, at least on a prima facie basis, breached some of these offences cited above. As this is not a criminal trial, I need not say any further.

  185. (4) An immigration-advantage sham marriage corrupts the sanctity of marriage and is inconsistent with the Women’s Charter

  186. [115] An immigration-advantage sham marriage does not merely contravene public policy. This type of sham marriage corrupts the very sanctity of marriage as the fundamental purpose underpinning the marriage is to obtain an immigration benefit fraudulently. This view is grounded in the provisions of the Women’s Charter, specifically s 46(1), which states:

  187. In an immigration-advantage sham marriage, the parties have evinced an intention to subvert the exhortation contained in s 46(1) of the Women’s Charter.

  188. [116] Furthermore, the long title of the Women’s Charter states that it is “an Act to provide for monogamous marriages”, which in turn is defined in s 2(1) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) (“Interpretation Act”) to mean “a marriage which is … contracted as a voluntary union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others during the continuance of the marriage” [emphasis added]. An immigration-advantage sham marriage is inconsistent with the fundamental assumption in the Women’s Charter that marriage should carry with it all the duties and obligations that parties are “mutually bound to co-operate” in upholding.

  189. [117] Therefore, that there was a general public policy against immigration-advantage sham marriages is also supported by the provisions of the Women’s Charter.

  190. Soon Ah See

  191. [118] Soon Ah See was a recent case decided by Edmund Leow JC in 2016. The deceased died in 2013, leaving more than $170,000 in his CPF accounts. He had nominated his sisters, the plaintiffs, as the beneficiaries of his CPF moneys in 2009. When the plaintiffs visited the CPF Board after the deceased’s death, they discovered that his nomination had been automatically revoked. Unknown to them, the deceased had married the defendant in 2011. The plaintiffs were convinced that this was a sham marriage and therefore initiated an action to prevent the defendant from obtaining a share of the deceased’s CPF moneys.

  192. [119] Leow JC found that the marriage between the deceased and the defendant was a sham marriage, entered into so the defendant could live and work in Singapore (ie, an immigration-advantage sham marriage).

  193. [120] He next considered the issue of whether the marriage was void under the Women’s Charter. The plaintiffs in that case referred to s 22 of the Women’s Charter, which provides that every marriage solemnised in Singapore shall be void unless it is solemnised on the authority of a “valid marriage licence” issued by the Registrar of Marriages. In Tan Ah Thee at [45], Prakash J had stated:

  194. [121] The plaintiffs contended that when parties enter into a marriage “with ulterior intent and motive, or without any intention to enter into a genuine marriage, then this would constitute a lawful impediment” (Soon Ah See at [39]). I note that this argument is quite different from one that alleges that a sham marriage is a lawful impediment because it is contrary to public policy, breaches other penal provisions and constitutes a fraud against the authorities.

  195. [122] In any event, Leow JC was not persuaded that an intention to enter into a sham marriage qualified as a lawful impediment. Leow JC endorsed Prakash J’s statement in Tan Ah Thee that “the law desists from identifying what are the ‘proper’ motives of marriage and does not allow the parties’ private motives to undermine the validity of the marriage” (Soon Ah See at [40]).

  196. [123] Leow JC also noted that “it cannot be open to two individuals to enter into a marriage and then say, perhaps months or even years down the road, that the marriage was void all along merely because they did not have the requisite intention to enter into a genuine marriage” (Soon Ah See at [43]). I generally agree with this statement. However, such marriages are not the type of sham marriages that I am concerned with in this case.

  197. [124] Leow JC further observed that “prior to the introduction of s 57C of the Immigration Act, there was no clear parliamentary intention that such sham marriages should be void” (Soon Ah See at [48]). As I have explained above, I would respectfully differ and find that there was such a public policy against immigration-advantage sham marriages.

  198. [125] Leow JC also mentioned that during the second reading of the Immigration (Amendment) Bill 2012 by the then-Second Minister for Home Affairs, “there was no suggestion that the validity of marriages would be affected by the criminalisation of marriages of convenience to obtain an immigration advantage” (Soon Ah See at [48]). The lack of express reference to whether a sham marriage before 1 October 2016 is valid can, at best, support the view that the issue was not considered by Parliament. But Parliament had enacted s 11A of the Women’s Charter to invalidate all immigration-advantage sham marriages. The logical inference must, therefore, be that such marriages that were criminalised prior to 1 October 2016 cannot be valid.

  199. [126] Therefore, with the greatest of respect, I disagree with the reasons provided by Leow JC to justify why a sham marriage before 1 October 2016 is not void under the Women’s Charter. As I shall further explain, the Marriage, being an immigration-advantage sham marriage as borne out by the facts in this case, is a void marriage, notwithstanding that it was solemnised in 2007 before s 57C of the Immigration Act and s 11A of the Women’s Charter came into force. Before I discuss these reasons, I shall briefly refer to some academic commentaries which may be relevant.

  200. Academic commentaries

  201. [127] The first commentary is by Associate Professor Chen Siyuan in “Sham Marriages, Ancillary Powers, and Moral Discourse: Toh Seok Kheng v. Huang Huiqun; ADP v. ADQ” (2011) Research Collection School of Law 1–10. In this commentary, Assoc Prof Chen proffered reasons for why a sham marriage should be void and how this could be justified. He acknowledged that s 105 of the Women’s Charter “quite categorically” rules out any other ground for making a marriage void. However, he then suggested that the court could have recourse to its inherent powers to render a sham marriage void. Assoc Prof Chen suggested that the invoking of the court’s inherent powers could be justified as follows:

  202. [128] Assoc Prof Chen’s view is contrary to that of Professor Leong Wai Kum in “Clarity in the Law of Valid, Void and Voidable Non-Muslim Marriages” (2009) 21 SAcLJ 575. In this case note, Prof Leong opined at para 21:

  203. [129] While I share the concerns raised by Assoc Prof Chen, I am of the view that the court’s inherent powers should not be readily invoked, especially if an immigration-advantage sham marriage can be declared void on some ground stated in s 105 of the Women’s Charter. In this case, the provisions that are particularly relevant are ss 22 and 17 of the Women’s Charter, and s 22 is expressly referred to in s 105 of the Women’s Charter.

  204. Sections 22 and 17(2)(d) of the Women’s Charter

  205. [130] To recapitulate, s 22 of the Women’s Charter, which embodies one of the grounds on which a marriage is void under s 105 of the Women’s Charter, states:

  206. [131] As stated in Tan Ah Thee at [45], the reference to a “valid marriage licence” in s 22 of the Women’s Charter must be read as meaning a marriage licence issued by the Registrar of Marriages when he was correctly satisfied that all the requirements of s 17(2) have been met. For the purposes of this case, the relevant requirement is that under s 17(2)(d):

  207. Whether a lawful impediment must be identified with reference to a specific prohibition in the Women’s Charter

  208. [132] Therefore, the issue before the court is whether an intention to enter into an immigration-advantage sham marriage constitutes a lawful impediment to the proposed marriage. The first matter to be considered is whether a lawful impediment must be identified with reference to a specific prohibition in the Women’s Charter. In Tan Ah Thee at [50], Prakash J suggested that a lawful impediment can be identified “notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision so promulgating”. This was in the context of a discussion of the decision in Lim Ying v Hiok Kian Ming Eric [1991] 2 SLR(R) 525 (“Lim Ying”). In Lim Ying, the respondent was a female-born transsexual. Following sex reassignment surgery, his sex was re-recorded on his NRIC as male. He later married the petitioner. The petitioner claimed that she had no knowledge that the respondent was a transsexual and applied for a judgment of nullity.

  209. [133] When Lim Ying was decided, s 12 of the Women’s Charter, which pertains to avoidance of marriages between persons of the same sex, had yet to be enacted. K S Rajah JC held that the sex of a person was to be determined by the sex assigned to him at birth, and not the sex shown on the NRIC (this has since been legislatively overturned by s 12(2) of the Women’s Charter). Given that both the petitioner and the respondent were of the same sex, the marriage was void.

  210. [134] Prakash J observed in Tan Ah Thee that Rajah JC did not expressly refer to s 105 of the Women’s Charter and whether a judgment of nullity could be made on the basis of a ground that was not specified in s 105. Nevertheless, Prakash J explained that Lim Ying could be decided on the ground that the fact that the parties were of the same gender was a lawful impediment to the relationship. Prakash J explained at [50]:

  211. [135] Prakash J’s rationalisation of Lim Ying is entirely consistent with the ordinary meaning of s 17(2) of the Women’s Charter, which does not require the lawful impediment to be based on a specific provision in the Women’s Charter.

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