High Court · Decided 24 December 2019
Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 291 · Case no. Originating Summons No 762 of 2017 · 36 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] In the appeal, arising out of examination of judgment debtor (“EJD”) proceedings under O 48 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”), the appellant, Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd, sought to have questions relating to its assets in the Maldives disallowed on the basis that the Singapore judgment was not enforceable there. I dismissed the appeal; the appellant now appeals to the Court of Appeal.
Background
- [2]
[2] The respondent, Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd, and appellant were parties to a hotel management contract (“the Management Contract”) in respect of a hotel located in the Maldives. A dispute arose between the parties on or around 30 April 2013. Arbitration proceedings were commenced in May 2013 pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Management Contract. The arbitration proceedings resulted in a partial award in favour of the respondent on 27 May 2015, followed by a final award on 17 August 2015 (collectively known as “the Awards”).
- [3]
[3] The respondent commenced attempts to enforce the Awards in Maldivian courts in December 2015. It appears that some delay was engendered owing to confusion over the appropriate procedure for enforcing the Awards. It was only upon the respondent’s appeal to the High Court of the Maldives that the proper procedure for such an enforcement action was determined on 20 April 2017.
- [4]
[4] In the midst of this, the appellant, on 17 October 2016, commenced separate proceedings in the Maldives against the respondent alleging: (a) fraudulent misrepresentation in relation to the Management Contract; and (b) breach of the terms of the Management Contract (“the Maldivian Action”). These proceedings resulted in a judgment in favour of the appellant being handed down on 9 March 2017 holding that the Management Contract was void and unenforceable (“the Maldivian Judgment”). The result of this was that the Maldivian courts eventually declined to enforce the Awards on 22 June 2017. The respondent has since appealed against the Maldivian Judgment.
- [5]
[5] In July 2017, the respondent applied for and obtained leave to enforce the Awards in Singapore. A judgment was granted on 13 April 2018 (“the Singapore Judgment”), which is the basis of the EJD proceedings at issue in the present appeal before me.
- [6]
[6] Separately, in July 2017, the respondent made a separate application in Originating Summons No 845 of 2017 (“OS 845”) for injunctive and declaratory relief. A limited anti-suit injunction was granted, preventing the appellant from relying on the Maldivian Judgment. Declarations were also granted that: (a) the Awards are final, valid and binding on the parties; and (b) the appellant’s claim against the respondent in respect of disputes that have arisen out of or in connection with the Management Contract and any consequential proceedings (including appeals) would be in breach of the arbitration agreement contained in the Management Contract. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which set aside the anti-suit injunction, but upheld the declarations awarded: see Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd v Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR 732 (“Sun Travels (CA)”).
- [7]
[7] In respect of the EJD proceedings, a number of questions in the form of a questionnaire were directed to one Mr Ahmed Siyam Mohamed (“Mr Siyam”), an officer of the appellant, in preparation of the oral examination of Mr Siyam. Objections were taken in respect of some of the questions which can be summarised into two categories: (a) questions relating to assets of corporate entities related to the appellant or Mr Siyam; and (b) questions relating to assets of the appellant located in the Maldives. At a hearing held on 19 February 2019, Assistant Registrar Jacqueline Lee (“AR Lee”) decided that questions falling in category (a) would not be allowed in so far as they did not pertain to assets owned by the appellant available to satisfy the Singapore Judgment. As for category (b), AR Lee found that the respondent was entitled to ask questions concerning the assets of the appellant located in the Maldives. This was notwithstanding the fact that the Awards could not have been enforced in the Maldives at the time. The appellant appealed against this aspect of AR Lee’s decision.
The appellant’s case
- [9]
[9] The appellant argued that the purpose of the EJD proceeding is to enable a judgment creditor to obtain information which would enable it to enforce the judgment against a judgment debtor. The appellant relied on the wording of O 48 r 1 of the ROC and Form 99, as well as the Court of Appeal’s decision in PT Bakrie. According to the appellant, this requires the existence of a nexus between the proposed questions and potential enforcement of a Singapore judgment. AR Lee had recognised this in disallowing questions pertaining to the assets of corporate entities related to the appellant or Mr Siyam.
- [10]
[10] There was no evidence that the Singapore judgment could be enforced in the Maldives; the property and means there are not property or means of satisfying the judgment debt. Following the case of Indian Overseas Bank v Sarabjit Singh [1990] 3 MLJ xxxi (“IOB”), the onus lay on the respondent to show that the Singapore Judgment is enforceable in the Maldives. The appellant had in fact applied to adduce expert opinion to show that the Singapore Judgment could not be enforced in the Maldives, but AR Lee had instead directed submissions on what the position would be under Singapore law where it is certain that the foreign jurisdiction will not permit enforcement of a Singapore judgment. AR Lee erred in finding that the Singapore judgment could possibly be enforceable in the Maldives as IOB requires that the judgment creditor satisfy the court that the Singapore judgment can be enforced in the foreign jurisdiction. AR Lee also erred in conflating the enforcement of the Awards with the enforcement of the Singapore Judgment.
The respondent’s case
- [13]
[13] The approach advocated for by the respondent, that the ability to enforce a Singapore judgment is irrelevant to whether questions about such assets are allowed, is sensible as assets which are presently unavailable to satisfy a Singapore judgment may eventually become available (eg, by being physically moved to a different jurisdiction, converted to other assets or generating income). The appellant’s position would allow judgment debtors to frustrate judgments through intentional non-compliance, and lead to additional proceedings whenever a judgment creditor learns about assets of the judgment debtor which might become accessible for execution. The effectiveness of EJD proceedings in Singapore would also be seriously undermined by allowing judgment debtors to hinder or drag out enforcement proceedings by asserting that foreign assets are untouchable. In this particular case, the Singapore courts would have to await the outcome of the appellate process in the Maldives to determine whether the Awards are in fact enforceable.
- [14]
[14] The respondent also submitted that the appellant’s collateral attack on the Awards in commencing the Maldivian Action should not be a basis to frustrate the EJD proceedings in Singapore.
- [15]
[15] Finally, the respondent argued that allowing questions about the appellant’s Maldivian assets would not be inconsistent with comity. The EJD proceedings are only a means of obtaining information which may result in the actual enforcement of the Singapore Judgment, and are not the mode by which the Singapore Judgment is enforced.
The Decision
- [16]
[16] I was satisfied that the questions that are the subject matter of the appeal could properly be asked as part of the EJD proceedings under O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC, and therefore dismissed the appeal.
The Analysis
- [17]
[17] The starting point of the analysis would be the interpretation of the words used in O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC. The words used would then be considered in light of the purpose of the EJD process.
Interpretation of O 48 r 1 of the ROC
The statutory provisions
- [18]
[18] O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC reads:
- [19]
[19] Any application under O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC is to be supported by information entered into Form 99. Given that the appellant’s arguments hinged on the wording of Form 99, it is set out in full below.
- [21]
[21] To my mind, the use of the phrases “whatever property the judgment debtor has” and “wheresoever situated” indicates that the purpose of O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC is identification of property that could potentially satisfy the judgment debt, and casts a wide net, not delineated by the type of property or its location. I did not see anything in the language used that indicated that it is meant to be restricted to enforceable judgments.
- [23]
[23] I did not accept the appellant’s submission. As a starting point, the wording of Form 99 could not control the operation of O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC, which governs the EJD process. The prescribed form is only intended to facilitate the process and stipulate the information to be provided, and cannot widen or narrow the scope of O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC.
- [24]
[24] In any case, I did not find the appellant’s interpretation to be supported by the plain wording of Form 99. Paragraph 3 of Form 99 refers to EJD proceedings being brought to enable the plaintiff to decide on the methods to employ in enforcing a Singapore judgment, determine if there are any debts owing to the judgment debtor and ascertain whether it has any means of satisfying the Singapore judgment. The words are only enabling: the use of the terms “enforce” and “satisfying” should be taken generally, and questions in EJD proceedings are not limited in any way to assets in jurisdictions where the Singapore judgment in question is enforceable.
The purpose of the examination of judgment debtor process
- [27]
[27] I was satisfied that my conclusions on the interpretation of O 48 r 1(1) of the ROC were consonant with the purpose of the EJD process and the Court of Appeal’s decision in PT Bakrie.
- [28]
[28] PT Bakrie stands for the proposition that the EJD proceedings do not involve execution, but rather are about information gathering (PT Bakrie at [16]):
- [29]
[29] A similar position was taken in Pacific Harbor, where Assistant Registrar Tan Teck Ping Karen (“AR Tan”) had found that questions could be asked if these allowed the judgment creditor to obtain information on the estate’s existing property as well as property which may become available (Pacific Advisors at [31]).
- [30]
[30] As was argued by the respondent, information would be useful even if execution is not possible in the current location of the appellant’s assets (ie, the Maldives) as the assets may be moved, converted into other assets or generate income. These could lead to other assets or funds against which execution is available.
- [32]
[32] In IOB, the plaintiff sought to examine the defendant judgment debtor on certain assets located in Japan, a jurisdiction where Singapore judgments were not enforceable. In disallowing the plaintiff judgment creditor from asking questions on the defendant judgment debtor’s Japanese assets, the court reasoned that questions could only be asked in respect of property if that property could be used to satisfy the judgment. Where a judgment would not be enforceable in a particular jurisdiction, questions concerning such property should not be allowed, as was made clear in the following passage from IOB:
IOB is authority in support of the appellant’s position that enforceability in the jurisdiction where the assets are located would be a requirement for questioning to be allowed in EJD proceedings. However, that case, being the decision of an Assistant Registrar, was not binding on me, though it remained long standing authority referred to in Singapore Civil Procedure 2019: Vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th Ed, 2019) at para 48/3/6.
- [35]
[35] As for the appellant’s argument that questions about its Maldivian assets would not produce information which may result in the actual enforcement of the Singapore Judgment, this elided the information gathering process with the actual enforcement process; nothing in PT Bakrie supports this approach. The EJD process is only about gathering information so that the judgment creditor may determine how enforcement should be pursued. Questions irrelevant to this should certainly be excluded, but it is not irrelevant to determine where assets may be situated, even if the judgment is not enforceable in one jurisdiction. In this day and age, assets can certainly be almost anywhere in the world, and enforcement may be pursued in different fori. Limiting the EJD process as the appellant contended would be far too restrictive.
- [36]
[36] The appellant’s approach would also conflate the information gathering process that is the EJD with the actual application for recognition and enforcement abroad, about which the rules here are by necessity largely silent, since the latter is a matter for the foreign court’s laws and rules of procedure.
- [37]
[37] It may be argued that the even if the focus of the examination process is information gathering, only information that is pertinent to possible execution should be obtained. This can perhaps be built upon Pacific Harbor where AR Tan had declined to allow questions on the historical assets (ie, those which are not presently available).
- [38]
[38] I accepted that the information gathering process could not be so broad as to capture past assets, though there may be some possible connection to the availability of present assets. The respondent here did not make such an argument. It is necessary that the information obtained should not be too remote or divorced from eventual enforcement; the possibility of movement and identification of other assets or funds that may be available, is sufficiently closely connected. I did not think that there was anything to be gained by attempting to formulate a precise rule on the limits of questions which can be asked in EJD proceedings in relation to foreign assets: the observations of Reyes J in Bloomsbury International Ltd v Nouvelle Foods (Hong Kong) Ltd [2005] 1 HKC 337 at [75], and cited in Pacific Harbor, commend themselves:
Comity
- [39]
[39] The appellant argued that it would be against comity if the questions were required to be answered, given the existence of the Maldivian Judgment refusing enforcement of the Awards in the Maldives. The proceedings there were far advanced owing to the respondent’s failure to enforce the Awards in Singapore and pursue the questions in EJD proceedings promptly. It was also material that the High Court in OS 845 expressly permitted the appellant to resist enforcement of the Awards in the Maldives.
- [40]
[40] The appellant referred to the Court of Appeal’s remarks in the appeal in Sun Travels (CA) at [76]–[78], where the Court of Appeal cited the English Court of Appeal case of Ecobank Transnational Inc v Tanoh [2016] 1 WLR 223 (“Ecobank”) in considering the interplay between delay and comity. The appellant seemed to rely on the Court of Appeal’s endorsement of the remarks in Ecobank to argue that comity was threatened as a result of the pursuit of the EJD proceedings to belatedly enforce a Singapore judgment based on the Awards, the enforcement of which had been refused by the Maldivian courts.
- [41]
[41] But these arguments on comity failed simply because comity was not threatened: the EJD proceedings only concerned the gathering of information, and did not by themselves constitute enforcement of the Singapore Judgment. It was hard to see how any impact could be felt in the Maldivian Action that would amount to interference or a disregard for the orders of the Maldivian court within its territory, whether or not any delay has been caused. The present proceedings and orders, did not clash at all with the Maldivian refusal to enforce the Awards.
Miscellaneous matters
- [42]
[42] There was some argument about whether there was a possibility that the Singapore Judgment could be enforced in the Maldives. This was immaterial and irrelevant to the outcome of the appeal before me.
- [43]
[43] I noted that there were a number of allegations made about the conduct of the parties, especially of the appellant. It was not necessary for me to make any finding on this, and I did not think that what was before me was sufficient for any such finding to be made anyway.
- [44]
[44] Similarly, the fact that the appellant might have adopted different positions in different countries as to the Awards, while true, was also irrelevant.
- [45]
[45] Finally, the appellant complained that AR Lee had conflated enforcement of the judgement with that of the award; this again was not material.
Leave to Appeal
- [46]
[46] Leave to appeal was not seriously resisted as such. I was satisfied that leave should be granted on the basis that there were questions of importance for which a Court of Appeal pronouncement or guidance would be useful.