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Grounds publishedDecided 10 Nov 2020

High Court

Shankar’s Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Jethanand Harkishindas Bhojwani and another

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[2020] SGHC 244Case no. Originating Summons No 365 of 202024 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [3] Having heard the parties, I dismissed the Companies’ application. The Companies have appealed, and I now furnish the grounds for my decision.

  3. Background

  4. Parties

  5. [4] Given the considerable overlap between the present application and the prior proceedings, the detailed background can be found in my grounds of decision in OS 1339/2019, Jethanand Harkishindas Bhojwani v Lakshmi Prataprai Bhojwani (alias Mrs Lakshmi Jethanand Bhojwani) [2020] SGHC 216 (“Jethanand”). I summarise the main points briefly.

  6. [5] The underlying dispute arose from the last will and testament (“the Will”) of the late Harkishindas Ghumanmal Bhojwani (“the Testator”). The Husband is one of the Testator’s three sons: Jethanand at [4].

  7. [6] The three Companies are all incorporated in Singapore. They are Shankar’s Emporium Pte Ltd (“SE”), Malaya Silk Store Pte Ltd (“MSS”), and Liberty Merchandising Company Pte Ltd (“LMC”). The Husband is a director of all three Companies. Various family members related to the Testator and the Husband are involved in the management of the Companies. The Companies’ involvement in the dispute between the Husband and the Wife arose from the fact that various shares in the Companies (“the Shares”) are part of the subject matter of a trust established by the Testator’s Will, for which the Husband is a trustee and the Wife (previously) one of the beneficiaries.

  8. The Will and the trust

  9. [7] The Testator’s Will established five discretionary trusts: Jethanand at [6]. The relevant trust in this case was established by cl 5 of the Will. The property in this trust (“the Clause 5 Trust”) was defined by cl 5.1(iv) of the Will to include, inter alia, the Shares in the Companies, as follows:

  10. (a) 9,000 shares in MSS;

  11. (b) 150,000 shares and one founder’s share (and any conversion therefrom to shares of any other class) in SE; and

  12. (c) one share in LMC.

  13. [8] The Husband is the trustee of the Clause 5 Trust. The Will defined the beneficiaries of the trust as, inter alia, the Wife and their three sons: Jethanand ([4] supra) at [7]. The exact nature of the Clause 5 Trust is not at issue in the present case, and it is sufficient to note that the Husband was given a discretionary power of appointment.

  14. [9] The Testator passed away on 4 March 2007 and on 1 August 2008, the Shares were transferred to the Husband: Jethanand at [10]. As such, from that date onwards, the Husband held the Shares in the Companies as a trustee for the Clause 5 Trust.

  15. History of the dispute

  16. [10] Over the course of several actions, the courts have addressed the issue of the Husband’s obligation to account for the trust property to the Wife.

  17. OS 1407/2017 and CA 231/2018

  18. [11] The Wife commenced OS 1407/2017 seeking an account of the trust property from the Husband. On 21 November 2018, the High Court granted the Wife’s application on the following terms as recorded in ORC 50/2019 (later amended in HC/SUM 1941/2019):

  19. [12] The annexed document, P1, provided a list of documents which the Husband was to disclose to the Wife. The present proceedings concern three categories of documents in that list, at S/Ns 5, 7, and 8, which I have referred to as the “Corporate Documents”. I reproduce the relevant parts of P1 as follows:

  20. HC/SUM 3013/2019

  21. [14] The Companies had previously made an application in HC/SUM 3013/2019 (“SUM 3013/2019”) on 17 June 2019 for leave to intervene in OS 1407/2017. This application was filed after ORC 50/2019 but before the appeal in CA 231/2018 was heard. The relevant prayers in SUM 3013/2019 were as follows:

  22. OS 1339/2019

  23. [16] After CA 231/2018, the Husband executed a number of deeds purporting to exclude the Wife from any future interest in the Clause 5 Trust, by way of his discretionary power of appointment. The application in OS 1339/2019 was concerned primarily with the effect of these deeds. In Jethanand, I held that the deeds executed on 10 January 2020 were sufficient to exclude the Wife’s interest as a beneficiary from that date onwards. This meant that her entitlement to an account from the Husband had ceased by 10 January 2020: Jethanand at [78].

  24. [17] While the focus of OS 1339/2019 was on the effect of those deeds, the Husband had also raised the issue of the scope of the documents to be disclosed, citing issues relating to the Companies. He argued that the scope of the documents should be varied to account for those issues. In that case, I held that issue estoppel prevented the Husband from revisiting the scope of the documents on the basis of the alleged objections by the Companies: Jethanand ([4] supra) at [39]. In any event, I would not have granted the variation sought by the Husband, since the Companies were not before me in OS 1339/2019 (Jethanand at [84]) and, as between the Husband and the Wife, the Husband’s difficulty, if any, in obtaining the documents did not warrant a variation of the Wife’s entitlement to the account: Jethanand at [86].

  25. The application

  26. [19] On 27 March 2020, the Companies filed OS 365/2020, in which they sought the following reliefs:

  27. Parties’ cases

  28. [23] The Husband did not take a position on the Companies’ application. Instead, his affidavit evidence and submissions were concerned primarily with the Wife’s allegations of intentional delay and collusion with the Companies.

  29. [25] Before me, counsel for the Wife, Mr Alvin Yeo SC (“Mr Yeo”), urged the court to consider not just the prayer in OS 365/2020, but also to decide that the Corporate Documents ought to be produced. In other words, in the interest of resolving the disputes between the parties, Mr Yeo asked not just that OS 365/2020 be dismissed, but also that a positive determination be made by the court that the Companies are obliged to produce the Corporate Documents. At the same time, Mr Yeo recognised that future proceedings might be brought against the Companies for the Corporate Documents, if needed.

  30. Issues

  31. [26] As the brief summary of the parties’ cases in these proceedings show, there were differing views on the scope of OS 365/2020 and what the court should determine. While I acknowledge that there were a number of peripheral issues surrounding the present application, these were ultimately not before me for determination. For reasons that I will elaborate on below, I considered it appropriate to determine OS 365/2020 on the narrow grounds relating to the specific prayer for variation sought.

  32. [27] I begin with what this case was not. This was not an application by the Wife or the Husband for the Companies to disclose and produce the Corporate Documents. Correspondingly, it was not an application by the Companies for a declaration that they could resist any application by the Wife or the Husband for the Corporate Documents. Neither was it an application by the Companies to restrain the Husband from disclosing whatever subset of the Corporate Documents that was already in his possession. It was also not an action by the Wife against the Companies for interfering with the Husband’s administration of the Clause 5 Trust.

  33. [30] While it was possible for the court to go further into the issue of whether the Companies could resist any application for production and disclosure by the Husband and the Wife, or whether, more generally, the Companies could justifiably refuse production and disclosure of the Corporate Documents, I did not consider it appropriate to do so in this case.

  34. [31] First, this being the Companies’ application, I preferred to allow the Companies to set the scope of their application, rather than to deal with issues that were not directly raised by the application and unnecessary for its disposal. Any determination I made must be focused on the relief sought by the Companies, rather than try to resolve all the issues as between the Husband, Wife, and Companies.

  35. [33] Third, relatedly, if the question of whether the Companies could resist a request for production and disclosure were to be determined in vacuo, the determination would be made without the benefit of having all the facts before the court. Specifically, in the absence of a particular request by the Husband and/or Wife accompanied by a list of documents, the following facts remained uncertain: (a) which documents did the Husband already have in his possession and would thus not need to be requested from the Companies; (b) which documents still remained to be produced and disclosed; and (c) which categories of documents fell into which rules of disclosure and production. The first question of fact affects the legal analysis as the dispute over those documents would raise different principles relating to the Husband’s use of documents previously given by the Companies. That would involve the question of whether the Companies were entitled to restrain a shareholder from using documents already in his possession for the purpose of accounting for trust property. The latter two questions would be relevant as to whether the existing rules on disclosure of documents, for example, s 203(3) of the Companies Act, would cover the documents. Given the absence of facts, this was not an appropriate case for determining, in the abstract, whether the Companies could resist any application for the documents by the Husband and/or the Wife.

  36. [34] Fourth, these issues were of general importance, far beyond the scope of the present dispute. The position taken by the Companies would, as Mr Damodara accepted on the face of the proposition, also affect all of their other shareholders who may be trustees, including the Husband’s two brothers who are also trustees for different trusts under the Will. More generally, it would also have an impact on many companies whose shares are the subject matter of trusts. I considered it prudent not to make determinations that would affect a significant range of companies and individuals on an application that was directed at a narrower matter. This was especially given that the resolution of these issues was not necessary for my decision in OS 365/2020.

  37. [37] Hence, bearing in mind the scope of the application and the parties’ submissions, I identified the following two issues for my determination:

  38. (a) Did the prior orders of court compel the Companies to produce and disclose the Corporate Documents?

  39. Decision

  40. Did any of the prior orders of court compel the Companies to produce and disclose the Corporate Documents?

  41. Should the court vary the Order?

  42. Costs

  43. Conclusion

  44. [54] Therefore, I dismissed OS 365/2020.