High Court · Decided 27 July 2020
Lin Jianwei v Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and another and another matter
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 158 · Case no. Originating Summons No 1446 of 2018 (Summons No 1281 of 2020) · 15 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The plaintiff in Originating Summons No 1446 of 2018 (“OS 1446”), Lin Jianwei, and the first defendant in OS 1446, Tung Yu-Lien Margaret, are the only two shareholders and directors of the second defendant in OS 1446, Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd. The plaintiff is the second defendant’s majority shareholder, holding 60% of the second defendant’s shares, while the first defendant holds 40% of the second defendant’s shares. The plaintiff is also the second defendant’s executive chairman. OS 1446 revolves around the issue of the validity of certain Extraordinary General Meetings, board of directors’ meetings, and related notices issued in relation to the second defendant. The present applications, namely, Summons No 1281 of 2020 (“SUM 1281”) and Originating Summons No 320 of 2020 (“OS 320”), arise from OS 1446.
- [2]
[2] In SUM 1281, the first defendant, Tung Yu-Lien Margaret, is the applicant. In OS 320, the plaintiff, Lin Jianwei, is the applicant while Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd is the defendant and Tung Yu-Lien Margaret is the intervener. For convenience, I shall refer to the parties in their capacities in OS 1446.
Brief facts
- [4]
[4] The plaintiff refuses to authorise this reimbursement on the ground that the Fees are unreasonable and excessive. Accordingly, the plaintiff then took out OS 320 under s 216A of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”) seeking for the Fees to be taxed.
My decision
OS 320
- [5]
[5] I shall first deal with the issues relating to OS 320. The issues that arise for my determination are:
(a) whether the plaintiff has shown that he is acting in good faith in his application for taxation of the Fees, thereby satisfying s 216A(3)(b) of the Companies Act; and
Whether the plaintiff is acting in good faith
- [6]
[6] Under s 216A(3) of the Companies Act, the complainant has to satisfy three requirements before the court grants leave to the complainant to bring an action in the name of and on behalf of the company, as follows:
- [7]
[7] Pursuant to s 216A(3)(b) of the Companies Act, one of the requirements for the statutory derivative action sought by the plaintiff is he must satisfy the court that he is acting in good faith in his application for taxation of the Fees in OS 320. As observed by the Court of Appeal in Ang Thiam Swee v Low Hian Chor [2013] 2 SLR 340 at [31]:
- [8]
[8] The evidence does not suggest that the plaintiff is acting in good faith. Rather, this application appears to be another acrimonious instance of personal grievances between the two directors (ie, the plaintiff and the first defendant), played out under the semblance of a corporate dispute.
- [9]
[9] First, the plaintiff claims that he is seeking for the taxation of the Fees in the interests of the second defendant as the Fees are unreasonable and excessive. But this is not borne out by the facts. The second defendant’s solicitors had drafted affidavits and written submissions for at least five applications, including applications for discovery and cross-examination. They also had to prepare for and make submissions at four hearings. Apart from bare assertions that the amounts billed are excessive, the plaintiff has not provided further reasons to substantiate his position although he has been provided with a considerable amount of documents in the form of itemised invoices, timesheets and the solicitors’ warrant to act.
Whether there are special circumstances warranting taxation
- [14]
[14] The plaintiff has also not satisfied s 122 of the LPA, the reasons for which I shall now elaborate.
- [15]
[15] Section 122 of the LPA states:
- [18]
[18] Further, some of the invoices for the Fees were issued more than 12 months ago, thereby also triggering the application of s 122 of the LPA. For instance, N&C’s invoice was issued on 11 March 2019 for services rendered from 13 December 2018 to 4 March 2019.
- [19]
[19] Since payment has been made to the second defendant’s solicitors, and 12 months have elapsed from the delivery of the bill in respect of some of the Fees, s 122 of the LPA applies. Therefore, the onus is on the plaintiff to show that there are special circumstances to warrant the taxation of the Fees. I have dealt with this legal issue comprehensively in my recent decision in JWR Pte Ltd v Syn Kok Kay (trading as Patrick Chin Syn & Co) [2019] SGHC 253 at [37]–[40]:
- [21]
[21] Furthermore, as mentioned above, the first defendant was the only director who dealt with the second defendant’s solicitors. Hence, she is better-placed than the plaintiff to assess the reasonableness of the Fees. There is also no issue of the bill being insufficiently particularised in this case, as the itemised invoices, timesheets and the solicitors’ warrant to act were all disclosed by the solicitors to the first defendant and subsequently to the plaintiff. To allow taxation under the circumstances will be unfair to the second defendant’s solicitors who should not be dragged into the personal disputes between the only two shareholders and directors of the second defendant.
The Consent Order
Conclusion on OS 320
- [23]
[23] In summary, as far as OS 320 is concerned, the plaintiff has not satisfied s 216A of the Companies Act and s 122 of the LPA. The evidence shows that the first defendant had paid the Fees on behalf of the second defendant as she opines that the Fees are reasonable. Further, some of the invoices for the Fees were issued more than 12 months ago. The plaintiff has also not satisfied the court that there are special circumstances under s 122 of the LPA to warrant the taxation of the Fees. Rather, the circumstances under which he now seeks to apply for taxation on the second defendant’s behalf suggest that the application is not being made in good faith. Accordingly, OS 320 is dismissed.
SUM 1281
- [25]
[25] I have explained above that there is no basis for the Fees to be sent for taxation. Therefore, I allow SUM 1281.
Summary of findings
Conclusion