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Grounds publishedDecided 30 Jul 2020
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High Court

CIMB Bank Bhd v Italmatic Tyre & Retreading Equipment (Asia) Pte Ltd

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[2020] SGHC 160Case no. Suit No 186 of 2018

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  1. [1] In this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover US$2.43m plus contractual interest from the defendant. The plaintiff claims to be entitled to recover that sum as the assignee of its customer’s contractual rights against the defendant.

  2. [2] For the reasons which follow, I allow the plaintiff’s claim.

  3. Factual background

  4. [3] The plaintiff is a bank. One of the plaintiff’s customers was a company known as Panoil Petroleum Pte Ltd (“Panoil”). Panoil sold marine fuel. The defendant is one of Panoil’s trading counterparties. Panoil is now in liquidation.

  5. [4] In June 2016, the plaintiff granted trade financing facilities to Panoil. In July 2016, as security for the facilities, Panoil executed an all-monies debenture (“the Debenture”) in favour of the plaintiff. The Debenture gave the plaintiff a security interest in Panoil’s goods financed by the plaintiff and in all of Panoil’s receivables and documents representing goods financed by the plaintiff.

  6. [6] Arising from the Contracts, the defendant owed Panoil a total of US$2.43m together with contractual interest at 2% per month from the due date of each invoice until payment (“the Debt”). The plaintiff’s claim in this action is that it is entitled to recover the Debt from the defendant as Panoil’s assignee under cll 3.1(c) and 3.1(e) of the Debenture (set out at [53] below).

  7. [8] On 29 August 2017, the plaintiff sent by fax and by courier a notice of assignment to the defendant (“the Notice”). The Notice informed the defendant of the contents and effect of the Debenture and asked the defendant to pay the Debt to the plaintiff. To evidence the Debt, the Notice attached copies of the invoices arising from the Contracts. It is not disputed that the defendant received the Notice by fax on 29 August 2017 and by courier on 30 August 2017.

  8. [9] On 30 August 2017, Panoil applied to the High Court to place itself in judicial management. On 2 October 2017, Panoil’s application was granted and judicial managers were appointed. Panoil’s debts could not be restructured and its business could not be rehabilitated. In April 2019, Panoil went into insolvent liquidation. The judicial managers continued as Panoil’s liquidators.

  9. [10] Meanwhile, in October 2017, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant pay the Debt to the plaintiff as Panoil’s assignee. The defendant failed to do so. The plaintiff now seeks to recover the Debt from the defendant.

  10. [11] The defendant denies liability to the plaintiff. The defendant’s case is that, even before the plaintiff served the Notice on the defendant, Panoil and the defendant had agreed to extinguish the Debt by setting it off against Panoil’s debt to the defendant (“the Set-off Defence”); in the alternative, that Panoil had cancelled the Debt (“the Cancellation Defence”).

  11. Preliminary issues

  12. [12] Before I analyse these two defences, I must first deal with two preliminary issues: (a) whether the Contracts incorporate Panoil’s standard terms and conditions of trading; and (b) whether Panoil’s assignment of the Debt to the plaintiff is effective.

  13. The Contracts incorporate Panoil’s terms and conditions

  14. [13] The plaintiff relies on cl 8.2 of Panoil’s Terms and Conditions for the Sale of Marine Fuel (“Panoil’s T&Cs”) to meet the Set-off Defence. The defendant denies that the Contracts incorporate cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs. Clause 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs expressly obliges the defendant to pay Panoil under the Contracts without deduction, set-off or counterclaim:

  15. The parties’ arguments

  16. [14] The plaintiff’s primary submission is that each Contract expressly incorporates Panoil’s T&Cs, and therefore cl 8.2. It relies on the following endorsement which appears under a column headed “Terms” in each sale confirmation:

  17. [15] The plaintiff’s alternative submission is that each Contract incorporates cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs by the parties’ prior course of dealings or as an implied term. Between April 2017 and June 2017, the parties entered into six transactions, identical in structure to those underlying the Contracts. In that course of dealing, consistently with cl 8.2, the defendant paid Panoil in full within the number of days after delivery stipulated in the invoice, free and clear of any deduction, set-off or counterclaim.

  18. [16] The plaintiff’s final alternative submission is that a clause excluding set-off is common in the marine fuel trade.

  19. [17] The defendant’s submission is that it is not bound by cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs because: (a) the sale confirmations on which the plaintiff relies are fabricated; (b) even if they are not fabricated, the defendant did not sign and stamp the confirmations; (c) even if the defendant did sign and stamp the confirmations, a final draft of Panoil’s T&Cs was not in existence when Panoil issued the confirmations; (d) even if a final draft of Panoil’s T&Cs was in existence at that time, Panoil did not make those terms and conditions known to the defendant; (e) the defendant received the confirmations by email from Panoil long after Panoil had delivered the marine fuel; and (f) the defendant would never have accepted a term excluding set-off.

  20. [18] For the reasons which follow, I reject each of the defendant’s submissions. I therefore accept the plaintiff’s submission that the Contracts incorporate Panoil’s T&Cs and, in particular, cl 8.2.

  21. The law on incorporation of contractual terms

  22. [19] The “law adopts an objective approach towards questions of contractual formation and the incorporation of terms” (R1 International Pte Ltd v Lonstroff AG [2015] 1 SLR 521 at [51] (“Lonstroff”)). Whether a term is incorporated into a contract therefore turns, as is usual in matters of contract, upon ascertaining the parties’ objective intentions from their communications and conduct in light of the relevant background at the time they entered into the contract.

  23. [20] The relevant background includes the industry in which the parties are in business, the character of the document which contains the terms in question as well as the course of dealings between the parties (Lonstroff at [51]). For example, if the parties ordinarily agree on a set of essential terms first while continuing negotiations on the other, more detailed terms, the terms agreed later will be more readily found to have been incorporated into their contract (Lonstroff at [52]). Further, even if a party does not expressly communicate acceptance of the terms in question, the party’s positive, negative or even neutral conduct is capable of evincing acceptance (Midlink Development Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group Pte Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 258 at [50] and [52]).

  24. [21] Terms may also be incorporated by notice. As the learned authors of The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) (“The Law of Contract in Singapore”) observe at para 7.22, incorporation by notice “is, by its very nature, heavily dependent on the particular facts of the case concerned”. Actual notice is not required, and notice which is objectively reasonable will suffice.

  25. [22] Circle Freight International Ltd (trading as Mogul Air) v Medeast Gulf Exports Ltd (trading as Gulf Export) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 427 illustrates these principles. In that case, the English Court of Appeal held that the standard terms and conditions of an industry body were incorporated into the parties’ contract by reference and by a course of dealing. Each invoice which the plaintiff issued to the defendant carried the following express endorsement: “all business is transacted by the company under the current trading conditions of the Institute of Freight Forwarders, a copy of which is available on request”. The plaintiff sent an invoice bearing this endorsement to the defendant on at least 11 occasions over six months preceding the consignment which gave rise to the dispute. The English Court of Appeal held that the contract covering the disputed consignment incorporated the industry body’s trading conditions. As Taylor LJ said at 433:

  26. [23] Taylor LJ’s final point is echoed in the observation of Belinda Ang J in Wartsila Singapore Pte Ltd v Lau Yew Choong and another suit [2017] 5 SLR 268 at [122]. Ang J noted there that, where a term is onerous or unusual, there is an enhanced standard for ascertaining whether a party was given reasonable notice of it. The defendant does not suggest that cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs is an onerous or unusual term. In any event, for the reasons set out at [39]–[42] below, I accept that clauses which exclude set-off are common in the marine fuel industry.

  27. The sale confirmations are not fabricated

  28. [24] As a threshold issue, the defendant submits that the sale confirmations are fabricated. In particular, the submission is that the defendant’s company stamp and countersignature on the sale confirmations are not genuine. For this submission, the defendant relies on the evidence of Mr Parry Yeo (“Mr Yeo”). Mr Yeo was the defendant’s managing director at the material time. Mr Yeo testified that the defendant’s genuine company stamp is 2 mm smaller than that which appears on the sale confirmations. He also testified that the countersignature on the sale confirmations is not that of any of the defendant’s authorised signatories.

  29. [25] The defendant also called Panoil’s managing director at the material time, Mr Yong Chee Ming (“Mr Yong”). He testified that Panoil had an oral agreement with the defendant which allowed Panoil to apply the defendant’s company stamp to its sale confirmations and to sign sale confirmations for the defendant. Mr Yong later gave a different version. He said that it was not in fact an agreement. He said instead that Panoil’s staff had told the defendant unilaterally that Panoil would apply the defendant’s company stamp and sign the sale confirmations for the defendant, allegedly to comply with financing requirements imposed by the plaintiff. Mr Yong does not suggest that the defendant ever objected to the practice he described in his second version. The defendant denies both versions.

  30. [26] I accept Mr Yong’s evidence and reject Mr Yeo’s evidence. Mr Yong’s evidence is more consistent with the objective evidence and the inherent probabilities.

  31. [27] The difference in the size of the company stamp is meaningless. It is not uncommon for a company to have more than one company stamp and for there to be minor variations between them, including as to size. I also note that the seven sale confirmations underlying the Contracts bear the same company stamp as appears on the six earlier sale confirmations which comprise the parties’ prior course of dealings (see [15] above). The defendant certainly has never challenged the authenticity of its company stamp on these earlier sale confirmations, whether after receiving them or in the course of this litigation.

  32. [28] I reject any attempt on the defendant’s part to attack Mr Yong’s credibility. Mr Yong was the defendant’s own witness. At common law, a party may not attack the credibility of its own witness and cross-examine the witness unless certain conditions are met. This common law rule is given statutory expression in s 156 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (see PP v BAU [2016] 5 SLR 146 at [24]). The reason for the rule is that a party who calls a witness at trial is deemed to put the witness forward as a witness of truth. The party accordingly vouches to the court for the honesty of the witness (see Alexander v Gibson (1811) 2 Camp. 555). A party cannot resile from this and discredit its own witness unless specific conditions are met. The rule places a salutary burden on a party to choose its witnesses carefully.

  33. [29] On Mr Yong’s evidence, whichever of his two versions at [25] above is true, the defendant cannot now allege that the defendant’s acceptance of the sale confirmations is fabricated. On the first version, Panoil applied the defendant’s company stamp and signed the confirmations for the defendant with the defendant’s express agreement. On the second version, Panoil did so with the defendant’s knowledge and acquiescence. Mr Yeo’s evidence that none of the defendant’s authorised signatories signed the sale confirmations for the defendant is immaterial. The defendant was and is bound by the sale confirmations.

  34. Panoil’s T&Cs came into existence as early as June 2016

  35. [31] Second, I do not accept the defendant’s submission that the final draft of Panoil’s T&Cs came into existence only after Panoil had issued the sale confirmations to the defendant. The plaintiff’s Director of Commercial Banking at the material time was Ms Vanessa Khoo (“Ms Khoo”). The plaintiff’s relationship manager in charge of Panoil’s account at the material time was Ms Lai Shing Joo (“Ms Lai”). Both of them gave evidence at trial. Their evidence is that Panoil gave a copy of Panoil’s T&Cs to the plaintiff at the outset of their banking relationship, ie, in June 2016. The plaintiff then placed the copy in Panoil’s credit file.

  36. [32] I accept Ms Khoo’s and Ms Lai’s evidence. The defendant attempts to cast doubt on their evidence by pointing to a WhatsApp exchange between Ms Lai and Mr Yong in September 2017. The defendant’s case is that Ms Lai asked Mr Yong for a copy of Panoil’s T&Cs in this exchange. The defendant submits that Ms Lai’s request in September 2017 would not have been necessary if Panoil had indeed given the plaintiff a copy of Panoil’s T&Cs in June 2016.

  37. [33] I reject this submission. In the WhatsApp exchange, Ms Lai did not ask for a copy of Panoil’s T&Cs. Rather, she asked “for the sales contract of various suppliers”. Mr Yong responded with a copy of Panoil’s T&Cs. I accept that Ms Lai was simply trying to ascertain the specific terms of the Contracts in view of Panoil’s deteriorating solvency in September 2017. Thus, she replied that she was not asking for Panoil’s T&Cs. She said: “Not this one, we need the sales contract from your suppliers”, mentioning the defendant by name. Mr Yong understood this. That is why he replied to Ms Lai to say that Panoil only has the sale confirmations and Panoil’s T&Cs. This WhatsApp exchange does not contradict the plaintiff’s evidence that Panoil gave a copy of its T&Cs to the plaintiff in June 2016.

  38. [34] I therefore find that Panoil’s T&Cs, including cl 8.2 in its current form, were in existence as early as June 2016, well before Panoil and the defendant entered into the Contracts in July and August 2017.

  39. [35] The defendant relies on Mr Yong’s suggestion that the document setting out Panoil’s T&Cs which the plaintiff adduced in evidence at trial is not the “final copy of the standard terms and conditions” as they stood in July and August 2017. This suggestion is, to my mind, immaterial. Mr Yong does not deny that a set of Panoil’s T&Cs existed in July and August 2017 which governed the contractual relationship between Panoil and the defendant. Further, each sale confirmation expressly provides that it is governed by Panoil’s T&Cs as they may be “updated from time to time” (see [14] above). This language suffices to capture and incorporate the existing version of Panoil’s T&Cs into each Contract.

  40. [36] Mr Yong also points out that Panoil’s T&Cs were amended and updated. But the update was merely to correct a grammatical error in cl 8.5. He confirmed that cl 8.2 had remained “untouched” by the update. It is in any event, not the defendant’s case that there was ever a version of Panoil’s T&Cs which did not contain cl 8.2.

  41. Immaterial that the sale confirmations followed delivery

  42. [37] Third, even though Panoil sent the sale confirmations to the defendant after the marine fuel had been delivered, this does not mean that the Contracts did not incorporate Panoil’s T&Cs. This is because the common law acknowledges that it is “not uncommon for parties to first agree on a set of essential terms which the parties may be bound by as a matter of law and on the basis of which they may act, even while there may be ongoing discussions on the incorporation of other usually detailed terms” (Lonstroff ([19] supra]) at [52]).

  43. [38] Further, the defendant’s argument that the Contracts would have been performed and discharged by the time the defendant received the sale confirmations is factually misconceived. The Contracts have never been discharged by bilateral performance. Under the Contracts, the defendant was obliged to pay the plaintiff under the Contracts within either 35 days (under six of the Contracts) or 45 days (under one of the Contracts) from the date of delivery. It is undisputed that the defendant has never paid Panoil under the Contracts. Subject only to the Set-off Defence, which I analyse and reject at [76]–[137] below, the defendant’s contractual obligation to pay Panoil has never been discharged by performance.

  44. No set-off clauses are common in the industry

  45. [39] Fourth, I accept the plaintiff’s submission that a no set-off clause is a common clause in the marine fuel industry. The plaintiff refers to the English Court of Appeal decision of CMA-CGM Marseille v Petro Bunker International (formerly known as Petroval Bunker International) [2011] EWCA Civ 461. In that case, Tomlinson LJ referred to Steel J’s decision below in refusing leave to appeal, in which he observed that a no set-off clause is “commonplace in the oil supply industry” (at [13], citing Totsa Total Oil Trading SA v Bharat Petroleum Corp Ltd [2005] EWHC 1641 (Comm)).

  46. [40] The prevalence of no set-off clauses is also illustrated by the General Terms and Conditions published by an international shipping association, The Baltic and International Maritime Council (“BIMCO”). Clause 8(b) of the BIMCO Standard Terms and Conditions provides that “payment shall be made in full, without set-off, counterclaim, deduction and/or discount, and free of bank charges”. The defendant did not challenge this point either at trial or in its submissions. It thus should be taken to accept it (Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [65]).

  47. [41] Given that a no set-off clause is common in the industry, it is not necessary to apply an enhanced standard to ascertain whether Panoil gave the defendant reasonable notice of the term (see [22]–[23] above). I find that Panoil did give reasonable notice to the defendant of the no set-off clause in all the circumstances. Panoil and the defendant are experienced commercial parties. Their commercial relationship stretches back to 2015. Each sale confirmation makes express reference to Panoil’s T&Cs under its “Terms” column. The reference is not only express but also clear and prominent. It is not, as sometimes happens, illegible or hidden in fine print. The sale confirmation is itself a brief document. It does not claim to spell out in detail the terms of the parties’ agreement. Even though there is a column headed “Additional Terms” in each sale confirmation, only a few additional terms are listed there. Any experienced commercial party would be aware that the detailed terms governing the whole of the contractual relationship between the parties must be set out in the separate document which is expressly referred to in the sale confirmations ie, Panoil’s T&Cs.

  48. [42] It is true that the sale confirmations do not have an express provision obliging Panoil to supply a copy of Panoil’s T&Cs to the defendant upon request. But I do not think that this affects the analysis. Panoil and the defendant are in the same industry. They have a course of dealing with each other. The absence of an express provision to this effect does not mean that the defendant has no right to ask Panoil for a copy of Panoil’s T&Cs or that Panoil would refuse to supply a copy if asked. It is telling that the defendant never once did ask Panoil for a copy. Indeed, the defendant never even asked Panoil for a summary of the contents of Panoil’s T&Cs. The defendant must be taken to have accepted Panoil’s T&Cs.

  49. The defendant’s subjective intention is immaterial

  50. [43] Finally, the defendant attempts to disclaim cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs by asserting that it would never have agreed to such a term. I reject the attempt. The defendant’s subjective intent is legally irrelevant on the objective approach to contract and to the incorporation of terms. This argument is nothing more than a self-serving afterthought.

  51. Conclusion

  52. [44] In the absence of fraud and misrepresentation, a party is bound by all of the terms of a contract that it signs, even if that party did not read or understand those terms (Bintai Kindenko Pte Ltd v Samsung C&T Corp and another [2019] 2 SLR 295 at [58]). That is true whether the contract sets those terms out in its body or incorporates those terms by reference. I am therefore satisfied that, on the objective approach, each of the Contracts incorporates Panoil’s T&Cs. The defendant is accordingly obliged by cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs to pay the Debt to Panoil without deduction, set-off or counterclaims.

  53. Panoil’s assignment of the Debt to the plaintiff is effective

  54. [45] The plaintiff’s case against the defendant rests on the fundamental proposition that Panoil assigned the Debt to the plaintiff. The defendant, in response, does not suggest that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy any of the legal requirements for an assignment which is effective to support the plaintiff’s claim in this action, including the requirement of notice. Instead, the defendant focuses its attack on the Debenture.

  55. [46] The defendant submits that: (a) the defendant has no knowledge of the Debenture; (b) the defendant would never have agreed to the assignment under the Debenture; (c) there is no receivable due to Panoil from the defendant on which cl 3.1(c) of the Debenture can operate; and (d) cl 3.1(e) of the Debenture is not wide enough to capture Panoil’s future contractual rights, such as the Debt.

  56. [47] All of these submissions are misconceived.

  57. Defendant’s knowledge of the Debenture immaterial

  58. [48] The defendant’s first attack on the assignment is that the defendant was unaware of the Debenture. This attack is misconceived. The defendant does not challenge either the authenticity or validity of the Debenture. The defendant must thus be taken to accept that the Debenture binds the plaintiff and Panoil in accordance with its terms.

  59. [49] Given that, whether the defendant was or was not aware of the Debenture or of its terms is immaterial in law to whether Panoil’s assignment of the Debt to the plaintiff is effective.

  60. Defendant’s agreement to assignment unnecessary

  61. [50] The defendant then submits that Panoil was precluded from assigning the Debt to the plaintiff because Panoil’s obligor, in this case the defendant, would never agree to assignment under the Debenture. This argument is likewise misconceived.

  62. [51] The consent of the obligor at the time of the assignment is not one of the legal requirements for an effective assignment. Simply put, an assignor’s right to assign a contractual right is subject only to any restrictions on the right of assignment which the obligor may have bargained for in the contract out of which that right arises. The defendant does not suggest that the Contracts contained any provision barring Panoil from assigning the Debt, whether under the Debenture or otherwise.

  63. Debenture covers book debts and receivables gross

  64. [52] The defendant next makes the submission that the Debt does not fall within the terms of the Debenture. The first ground on which the defendant makes this submission is that there is no “book debt” or “receivable” due from the defendant to Panoil on which the Debenture can operate because Panoil’s books show that the defendant was a creditor of Panoil rather than a debtor. This submission too is misconceived.

  65. [53] Clauses 3.1(c) and 3.1(e) of the Debenture provide as follows:

  66. [54] By referring to “book debts”, cl 3.1(c) of the Debenture makes clear that the clause operates whether or not the defendant is recorded as a creditor or a debtor in Panoil’s books. “Book debts” are different from net debts or a net position. Until and unless the parties take a settled account and arrive at a net position, the debts on each side remain distinct. As such, they are liable to be paid and recovered gross.

  67. [55] In that sense, this aspect of the defendant’s submission places the cart before the horse. Whether the defendant is recorded as a creditor or a debtor in Panoil’s books depends on whether the debts due from the defendant to Panoil under the Contracts have been extinguished by being set off against debts due from Panoil to the defendant. This argument therefore presupposes that the defendant’s Set-off Defence has succeeded. I analyse and reject the Set-off Defence at [76]–[137] below.

  68. [56] Further, I accept the plaintiff’s submission that each Contract and its associated invoice gives rise to a book debt. A book debt is a debt which arises in the ordinary course of a company’s business (Jurong Data Centre Development Pte Ltd (provisional liquidator appointed) (receivers and managers appointed) v M+W Singapore Pte Ltd and others [2011] 3 SLR 337 at [80]). Moreover, a “book debt” is a debt which should be entered in such books as should be kept in the business and as would, if properly kept, sufficiently disclose the company’s business transactions and financial position from time to time (Duncan, Cameron Lindsay and another v Diablo Fortune Inc and another matter [2018] 4 SLR 240 at [43], citing Motor Credits Ltd v WF Wollaston Ltd (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 227 at 244).

  69. [57] In determining whether a particular debt is a “book debt”, the court looks at whether it is the practice to enter the debt in question in well-kept books of account in the ordinary course of a company’s business. It is not, however, necessary that the debt be actually entered in the company’s books. A debt which is omitted from the books does not by that fact alone cease to be a book debt (Paul & Frank Ltd v Discount Bank (Overseas) Ltd [1967] Ch 348 at 360F – 361C). It is also the common understanding that each account receivable is a book debt (Dawson v Isle [1906] 1 Ch 633 at 637; In re Stevens [1888] W.N 110 at 116).

  70. [58] I therefore agree that each Contract and its associated invoice constitutes a book debt for the purposes of cl 3.1(c) of the Debenture. These debts ought to be entered into well-kept books of account in the ordinary course of Panoil’s business and is prima facie enforceable by action by Panoil directly against the defendant. The Debt therefore comprises seven book debts.

  71. Debenture covers future debts

  72. [59] The second ground on which the defendant submits that Panoil’s rights under the Contracts do not fall within the terms of the Debenture is that the terms of the Debenture capture only Panoil’s contractual rights which were in existence at the time Panoil executed the Debenture in July 2016 and not Panoil’s future contractual rights, such as the Debt, which arose only in July and August 2017.

  73. [60] Clause 3.1(c) of the Debenture assigns to the plaintiff, by way of fixed security, “all … future book debts” [emphasis added]. Clause 3.1(e) further assigns “all … future contract rights, receivables, books and other debts and monetary claims now or at any time hereafter due, owing or payable to the Borrower” [emphasis added]. The explicit references to the “future” and to “any time hereafter” make the defendant’s argument misconceived. Both clauses clearly cover book debts and contractual rights which come into existence after Panoil granted the plaintiff the Debenture.

  74. [61] The Debenture accordingly captures the Debt even though it did not exist at the time of the Debenture.

  75. Conclusion

  76. [62] I am satisfied that the Debenture is effective to assign all of Panoil’s rights against the defendant under the Contracts to the plaintiff. I therefore reject the defendant’s submission that the plaintiff has no right to bring this action as Panoil’s assignee under the Debenture.

  77. The Defences

  78. [63] As I have mentioned, the defendant raises two substantive defences to the plaintiff’s claim: (a) the Set-off Defence; and (b) the Cancellation Defence. I summarise them now.

  79. [64] The Set-off Defence runs as follows. Panoil and the defendant entered into a set-off agreement on 1 July 2015 (“the Set-off Agreement”). The Set-off Agreement permitted each party to set off its undisputed invoices against the other party’s undisputed invoices. The effect was to nullify contractually cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs. By an exchange of letters on 13 August 2017, both parties agreed to apply the Set-off Agreement to their intercompany balances. All of the debts owing between Panoil and the defendant as at 13 August 2017 have accordingly been set off by agreement. This includes the Debt. The Debt was therefore extinguished by discharge well before the defendant received the Notice on 29 August 2017.

  80. [65] The Cancellation Defence runs as follows. Panoil cancelled all seven of the invoices issued under the Contracts on 18 August 2017. The Debt was therefore extinguished by cancellation well before the defendant received the Notice on 29 August 2017.

  81. [66] The plaintiff’s case in reply is that the documents which form the basis of both the Set-off Defence and the Cancellation Defence are fabrications, ie, they do not reflect any actual set-off or cancellation effected in August 2017 or at all. The defendant has brought these documents into existence purely to be adduced as evidence in these proceedings.

  82. [67] If the documents are indeed fabrications, both defences must necessarily fail.

  83. The plaintiff puts in issue the authenticity of the defence documents

  84. [68] The question of authenticity is an evidential issue that must be kept conceptually distinct from the more usual evidential issues of admissibility, relevance and weight. Evidence which is fabricated is not really evidence at all. It is incapable of being relevant to any fact in issue (other than to prove the fabrication itself). Without relevance, the question of admissibility does not even arise. As I observed in Super Group Ltd v Mysore Nagaraja Kartik [2018] SGHC 192 (“Super Group”) at [53]:

  85. [69] A document cannot be admitted in evidence until its authenticity has been established (Singapore Tourism Board v Children’s Media Ltd and others [2008] 3 SLR(R) 981 at [78], citing Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377 at 381). And even after authenticity has been established, it is still necessary to prove the truth of the contents of the document by admissible evidence (Jet Holding Ltd and others v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2006] 3 SLR(R) 769 (“Jet Holding”) at [76]).

  86. [70] The authenticity of a document must be proved by admissible evidence: s 106 the Evidence Act. A witness who proves a document must do so by evidence as to the circumstances in which the document was created which is either: (a) direct evidence of those circumstances within the meaning of s 62 of the Act; or (b) within one of the exceptions to the requirement in s 62 of the Act, principally those in s 32 of the Act. That ordinarily means, for all practical purposes, that a witness who proves a document must either be the maker of the document or someone who was present when the maker created the document.

  87. [71] A litigant is entitled to object to the authenticity of documents adduced in evidence by its opponent and to require the opponent to prove them in accordance with the Evidence Act (see Jet Holding at [51]). However, pursuant to O 27 r 4(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules of Court”), a party is deemed to admit the authenticity of a document in its opponent’s list of documents unless that party issues a notice of non-admission in respect of that document within the time stipulated in O 27 r 4(2) of the Rules of Court (Jet Holding at [73]). The purpose of this notice is to forewarn the opponent that it will be required to prove the document at trial.

  88. [72] The plaintiff duly filed and served on the defendant a notice of non-admission under O 27 r 4(2) of the Rules of Court in respect of all of the key documents which the defendant relies upon for the Set-off Defence and the Cancellation Defence. The authenticity of these documents have validly been put in issue.

  89. [73] It is the defendant who asserts that these documents are authentic. Under s 105 of the Evidence Act, the burden is squarely upon the defendant to prove that assertion. Under s 106 of the Act, the defendant must prove the documents’ authenticity by evidence which is itself admissible.

  90. [74] I note here that, with one exception, all of the documents which the defendant adduces to support its two defences are not originals. The defendant has failed to establish that any of the exceptions in s 67 of the Evidence Act permitting secondary evidence of these copy documents applies. Defendant’s counsel nevertheless submits that all of these copies fall within s 32(1)(b)(iv) of the Act, being documents “compiled by a person acting in the ordinary course of a trade, business, profession or occupation based on information supplied by other persons”. This may be so, but s 32(1)(b)(iv) goes to admissibility, not authenticity. This section neither dispenses with the defendant’s burden to establish the anterior evidential issue of authenticity nor establishes authenticity ipso facto.

  91. [75] I now analyse the Set-off Defence and the Cancellation Defence in turn. In the course of that analysis, I will consider the authenticity of the underlying documents.

  92. The Set-off Defence

  93. [76] The Set-off Agreement is fundamental to the Set-off Defence. The defendant’s case is that Panoil and the defendant entered into the Set-off Agreement on 1 July 2015. On 13 August 2017, the defendant and Panoil effected a set-off by an exchange of letters (“D’s 13 August Letter” and “Panoil’s 13 August Letter” respectively; collectively, the “13 August Letters”). This exchange of letters set off and extinguished by discharge the amounts Panoil and the defendant owed each other on that date. This set-off was reflected in Contra Statement No. IP-001 dated 15 August 2017 (“the Contra Statement”). The defendant prepared the Contra Statement and both the defendant and Panoil signed it. The defendant therefore no longer owed the Debt to Panoil when it received the Notice on 29 August 2017. This set-off is why Panoil’s accounts reflect the defendant as a creditor of Panoil rather than a debtor.

  94. [77] In response, the plaintiff disputes the authenticity of: (a) the Set-off Agreement; (b) the 13 August Letters; and (c) the Contra Statement. The plaintiff’s grounds are as follows. Panoil’s judicial managers found the Set-off Agreement in Panoil’s books and records in October 2017. They forwarded a copy to the plaintiff’s solicitors in November 2017. In the first half of 2018 and again in August 2018, the plaintiff asked the judicial managers to look for the 13 August Letters and the Contra Statement in Panoil’s records. On both occasions, the judicial managers could not find any of these documents. On this basis, the plaintiff submits that these documents are fabrications. Clause 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs has not been nullified by contract. It continues to bind the defendant and precludes it from effecting or purporting to effect any set off.

  95. [78] In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that, even if these documents are not fabrications, the defendant is precluded from relying on the set-off purportedly effected on 13 August 2017 because it participated in Panoil’s wrongdoing by effecting the set-off. As I have held that the plaintiff succeeds on the first argument, it is not necessary for me to consider the remaining arguments in detail. I do nevertheless make some observations on the plaintiff’s alternative argument at [125]–[137] below.

  96. The contents of the underlying documents

  97. [79] In the Set-off Agreement, Panoil and the defendant agreed that each party would be entitled to set off its own invoices against the other party’s invoices from time to time without reference to the other party:

  98. [80] In 2017, by D’s 13 August Letter, the defendant proposed to Panoil that the balances between the two companies be immediately set off in view of Panoil’s financial difficulties:

  99. [81] Panoil’s 13 August Letter in response confirmed a set-off of the intercompany balances in accordance with the two-page statement attached to the letter:

  100. [82] The Contra Statement is a separate document dated 15 August 2017. It is signed by Mr Yeo on behalf of the defendant and Mr Yong on behalf of Panoil. It shows that the defendant, after the purported set-off, is a net creditor of Panoil in the sum of US$2,100.

  101. The Set-off Agreement is authentic

  102. [84] The Set-off Agreement, however, is of no consequence to my decision on the Set-off Defence. I say that for four reasons.

  103. [85] First, the Set-off Agreement does not provide that all debts owing between Panoil and the defendant in the future will be automatically set off against one another. It merely entitles either party to effect a set-off “from time to time, without further reference to the other party”. The Set-off Agreement therefore contemplates that a party must take a further step to exercise its entitlement and actually to set-off the intercompany debts. Until that further step is taken, there is no set-off.

  104. [86] Second, none of the Contracts subjects the Debt to the Set-off Agreement. Further, the Set-off Agreement does not refer specifically to the Debt. Indeed, it could not: the Debt did not exist when the parties entered into the Set-off Agreement in July 2015.

  105. [87] Finally, the specific terms of the Contracts are inconsistent with the Set-off Agreement. As I have found, the Contracts incorporate cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs. This provision requires the defendant to pay Panoil the Debt without deduction, set-off or counterclaim. Clause 8.2 operates contractually to preclude the defendant from exercising its entitlement under the Set-off Agreement.

  106. [88] That is not, of course, the end of the matter. It was within the power of Panoil and the defendant to vary the Contracts by nullifying cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs. The parties do not dispute this. But it is not the defendant’s case that the 13 August Letters effected any such variation. That is no doubt because the essential element of consideration is lacking to support the variation: Panoil was either insolvent or near insolvency in August 2017 and gained nothing from a set-off.

  107. The 13 August Letters are fabrications

  108. [89] The issue of whether Panoil and the defendant effected a set off of the Debt does not therefore turn on the authenticity of the Set-off Agreement. It turns only on the authenticity of the 13 August Letters and the Contra Statement. I find these documents to be fabrications. I make two observations of general application on this issue before giving my specific reasons for this finding.

  109. [90] First, the defendant failed to prove the 13 August Letters and the Contra Statement at trial. The defendant did not call the two signatories of the two 13 August Letters to prove them. It did not call the maker of the Contra Statement to prove it. It attempted to prove these documents through the oral evidence of Mr Yeo and Mr Yong. But neither of these men is the maker of either of these documents. Neither man could give any evidence which is admissible to prove these documents.

  110. [91] Second, Mr Yeo was a wholly unsatisfactory witness. He was less than forthcoming in cross-examination. His evidence lacked clarity and consistency and was entirely self-serving. The defendant’s evidence on the authenticity of these documents, even if admissible, was bereft of credibility.

  111. [92] I now set out five specific reasons for rejecting the Set-off Defence and for my finding that the 13 August Letters and the Contra Statement are fabrications.

  112. (1) Circumstances leading up to the set-off

  113. [93] Mr Yeo’s evidence about the lead up to the set-off was wholly unsatisfactory. It was inconsistent not only with Mr Yong’s evidence but also – and more importantly – with the contents of the 13 August Letters themselves.

  114. [94] According to Mr Yeo, it was Panoil who proposed a set-off to the defendant, following discussions on or about 13 August 2017:

  115. I note in passing that this passage is most telling. In it, Mr Yeo testified that a condition precedent for the set-off failed to eventuate. According to him, that is why the plan turned from set-off to cancellation. That implies that the proposed set-off never actually took place.

  116. [95] Mr Yong’s evidence and the terms of the 13 August Letters both contradict Mr Yeo. Mr Yong’s evidence was unequivocally that it was the defendant who suggested the set-off by D’s 13 August Letter. The plain language of that letter supports Mr Yong. The defendant states in that letter that “we are proposing to offset the inter company balances” [emphasis added]. Only when he was cross-examined further on this point was Mr Yeo willing to concede that “in [D’s 13 August Letter], it’s my proposal. I propose[d] to offset” [emphasis added].

  117. [96] That the defendant proposed the set-off to Panoil is also far more consistent with the inherent probabilities and the commercial incentives in August 2017. Mr Yeo confirmed that the defendant was concerned at that time about Panoil’s ability to pay its debts in light of the MPA’s disciplinary action. The defendant had every incentive to protect its interests by approaching Panoil and suggesting a set-off. Panoil had no incentive to approach the defendant and suggest a set-off.

  118. [98] Further, Mr Yeo’s evidence on this point was internally inconsistent. Although he said that Panoil created Panoil’s 13 August Letter only because he insisted upon it, he also said that he went to Panoil’s office on 13 August 2017 because someone had asked him to do so. Later in his evidence, he changed his story and said that when he went to deliver D’s 13 August Letter: “they were not expecting me to keep going to look for them, but I went there to deliver letters and ask them to settle the invoices we asked”.

  119. (2) The documents are missing from Panoil’s books and records

  120. [99] The defendant did not challenge the judicial manager’s evidence that they were unable to find originals or copies of the 13 August Letters or of the Contra Statement in Panoil’s books and records. The absence of these documents in Panoil’s books and records is peculiar given the substantial financial significance to Panoil and the defendant of setting off the Debt. The defendant failed to suggest any explanation as to why these documents would not be amongst Panoil’s books and records. This failure is peculiar given that the defendant called Mr Yong as a defence witness. As a director of Panoil, Mr Yong has far more personal knowledge of what is and is not in Panoil’s books and records than the judicial managers.

  121. [100] It might perhaps be plausible to say that Panoil handed the original of Panoil’s 13 August Letter to the defendant but failed to make a copy for its own records. But I cannot believe that Panoil would have received D’s 13 August Letter and not have retained the original in its books and records. The Contra Statement is an even more important document than the 13 August Letters. It purports to evidence a settled account between the two companies establishing that the defendant is no longer a debtor of Panoil. A settled account of this nature is a critical document for both the defendant and Panoil. This is so even if Panoil had never assigned its rights under the Contracts to the plaintiff. It is therefore of substantial commercial and accounting significance, quite apart from this litigation.

  122. [102] The absence of all three of these documents in Panoil’s books and records, whether as originals or copies, is to my mind evidence that the documents were not exchanged in August 2017 as Mr Yeo and Mr Yong would have me believe. This is particularly the case given that the judicial managers were able to find the Set-off Agreement in Panoil’s books and records. There is no reason why Panoil should have been more concerned about retaining the Set-off Agreement in its books and records for the future than about retaining the 13 August Letters and the Contra Statement in its books and records for the future. After all, it is the 13 August Letters and the Contra Statement which actually effected the set-off.

  123. [103] My finding that the Contra Statement is fabricated is underscored by the defendant’s belated disclosure of the Contra Statement in this action. In October 2017, after Panoil’s judicial managers sent a letter of demand to the defendant, the defendant and Panoil’s judicial managers exchanged correspondence through solicitors. In that exchange, the defendant raised the Set-off Defence but never disclosed or made reference to the Contra Statement, even in passing. Given the legal and commercial significance of the Contra Statement to the claim asserted against the defendant and to the Set-off Defence, it is beyond belief that the defendant or its solicitors would have had it in October 2017 and yet have failed to deploy it in the correspondence. This suggests to me very strongly that the Contra Statement did not exist in October 2017.

  124. [104] So too in March 2018, when the defendant’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors, the former made no mention whatsoever of the Contra Statement. If it were genuine, producing it at that time would again have disposed of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant. The defendant’s failure to deploy the Contra Statement in response to the plaintiff’s demands suggests to me very strongly once again that it did not exist even as late as March 2018.

  125. [105] Mr Yeo’s evidence is that the defendant gave the Contra Statement to its solicitors before the October 2017 correspondence with the judicial managers. If that were true, it is incredible that its solicitors would have failed to make any mention of the Contra Statement in that correspondence. Even if I were to accept this evidence, it nevertheless fails to explain why the Contra Statement was not disclosed in the March 2018 correspondence with the plaintiff’s solicitors, close to five months after the defendant had allegedly given a copy to its solicitors.

  126. [106] I reject Mr Yeo’s attempt to blame the defendant’s solicitors for the failure to deploy the Contra Statement in the correspondence. The defendant does not require legal advice to appreciate that the Contra Statement is central to the claims made both by the judicial managers and the plaintiff. If the Contra Statement were indeed genuine, and if the defendant had indeed given a copy to its solicitors as early as October 2017, I would have expected the defendant positively to instruct its solicitors to deploy the Contra Statement in both the October 2017 correspondence and in the March 2018 correspondence, rather than to leave it to its solicitors to decide whether to do so. Mr Yeo’s blame directed at the defendant’s solicitors does not cause me to doubt my finding that, even as late as March 2018, the Contra Statement did not in fact exist.

  127. [107] The defendant also relies on Mr Yong’s evidence. The defendant argues that it corroborates Mr Yeo’s evidence that the Contra Statement was in existence on 15 August 2017. Mr Yong testified that it was Mr Yeo who brought the Contra Statement to Panoil’s office for Mr Yong to sign on or about 15 August 2017. Mr Yong then signed the document.

  128. [108] This evidence is, however, contradicted by a series of WhatsApp messages which Mr Yong sent to Ms Lai. Ms Lai messaged Mr Yong on 15 August 2017 to ask whether he was in Singapore. Mr Yong messaged in response that he would be “[b]ack on Thursday” ie, 17 August 2017. This implies that Mr Yong was not in Singapore on 15 August 2017. That, of course, is the date on which Mr Yong claims he signed the Contra Statement. When confronted with this discrepancy in cross-examination, Mr Yong was suddenly unable to recall the exact date on which he signed the Contra Statement. Instead, he suggested that he “could [have been] departing on the 15th” instead. This explanation is unsatisfactory. I reject it.

  129. (3) The date of the set-off

  130. [109] The defendant’s pleaded case is that the set-off took place by the exchange of letters on 13 August 2017. Yet, this is contradicted by the Contra Statement. It states “Contra on: 15/08/2017”. It thereby purports to record that the “contra”, a commercial synonym for a set-off, took place on 15 August 2017. Mr Yong readily accepted this at trial.

  131. [110] When Mr Yeo was pressed on the discrepancy in the dates, he sought to attribute the mistake to the maker of the Contra Statement:

  132. This was not the first time that Mr Yeo sought to explain away inconsistencies in his evidence by attributing a mistake to the maker of a document. I note also that the defendant neither identified the maker of the Contra Statement nor called the maker as a witness.

  133. [111] Even if I were to accept Mr Yeo’s evidence that the Contra Statement was prepared on 15 August 2017, there is no reason that it could not have accurately recorded that the set-off was actually effected on 13 August 2017. Contrary to Mr Yeo’s suggestion, that does not amount to back-dating the document. It would simply record in the body of the Contra Statement that it was brought into existence on 15 August 2017 to reflect a set-off which had been effected two days earlier.

  134. (4) Net position after the set-off

  135. [112] I also find striking the defendant’s inability to state accurately the net amount owed by Panoil to the defendant after effecting the purported set-off. The obvious and critical question for two parties who are setting off their debts is the net position after the set-off has been effected. Calculating this is a simple question of arithmetic. Yet, the defendant’s witnesses were unable to provide any clear answer on this point. The documentary evidence was likewise inconsistent.

  136. [113] At trial, Mr Yeo took wholly different positions on this critical question. He first relied on the two-page statement attached to Panoil’s 13 August Letter to assert that the result of the set-off was that Panoil owed the defendant US$2,400.12. This is, however, contradicted by an email from the defendant’s solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors on 23 October 2017. In that email, the defendant’s solicitors took the position that “[Panoil] still owes [the defendant] about US$600,000 or more”, alleged to be evidenced by the documents attached to the email.

  137. [114] When this discrepancy was put to Mr Yeo, he referred to a statement of account from the defendant dated 31 August 2017. That statement shows Panoil owing the defendant a net sum of just over US$2.6m. He said that this “statement showed that they actually have outstanding of 2.6 million, which is more than 600,000”. But that is not the point. Mr Yeo could not explain how the US$600,000 figure in the defendant’s solicitors’ email could be derived from this document.

  138. [115] To try and explain the US$600,000 figure, Mr Yeo relied on an invoice which the defendant issued to Panoil on 15 August 2017 showing that Panoil owed a sum of just over US$431,000 to the defendant. He added to this a sum of approximately US$70,000 which he claimed Panoil was obliged to reimburse the defendant for payments on Panoil’s behalf. Yet, these adjustments bring the figure to the region of US$501,000, not US$600,000. And the US$431,000 figure is in any event inconsistent with a statement of account dated 31 August 2017 which was also in evidence, which suggests that Panoil made a payment to the defendant of US$50,000 against the sum due under this invoice.

  139. [116] Mr Yeo eventually sought to disavow the US$600,000 figure in the defendant’s solicitors’ email of 23 October 2017. He claimed that it “maybe was a mistake”. But the defendant’s solicitors prepared their email advancing the US$600,000 figure on Mr Yeo’s instructions.

  140. [117] What is more puzzling is that Mr Yeo later testified that, around 13 August 2017, all that Panoil owed the defendant was “$2-over million”. Yet, if this were true, bearing in mind that the Debt was US$2.43m, the set-off would actually result in Panoil being a net creditor of the defendant rather than a net debtor, as is the defendant’s case.

  141. [118] Yet another figure appears in the Contra Statement dated 15 August 2017. The settled account under that document shows that Panoil owes the defendant the sum of US$2,100.

  142. [119] The widely discrepant evidence as to the net position between Panoil and the defendant after the purported set-off, coupled with Mr Yeo’s inability to explain any of the discrepancies, also leads me to my finding that the 13 August Letters and the Contra Statement are fabrications.

  143. (5) Mr Yeo and Mr Yong’s close ties

  144. [120] Finally, my finding is bolstered by the relationship between Mr Yong and Mr Yeo. This relationship supplies the motive for the fabrication. It gave Mr Yong every incentive to favour the defendant as Panoil slid into insolvency.

  145. [121] Mr Yong and Mr Yeo have had a close personal and professional relationship spanning a few decades. They met for the first time in secondary school and grew closer during national service. They then went into a series of business ventures together. They were partners in an engineering firm and shareholders in a food and beverage outlet. Further, Mr Yong was a director of a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant from 2008 to 2012.

  146. [122] It is noteworthy that neither Mr Yong nor Mr Yeo deny the close nature of their relationship. The best evidence of this is a series of four letters which Panoil sent between February 2017 and August 2017 to its ship management company relating to the unauthorised alterations which had led to the MPA’s disciplinary action against Panoil. At that time, Mr Yong and Mr Lim Zhisheng (“Mr Joe Lim”), were the only two directors of Panoil. Mr Yeo was neither a director nor an employee of Panoil. Mr Yong drafted these four letters. But neither he nor Mr Joe Lim signed the letters. Instead, Mr Yong asked Mr Yeo to sign the letters, drawing on his close relationship with Mr Yeo. As further evidence of their close relationship, Mr Yeo readily agreed to Mr Yong’s request. He therefore signed these four letters for Panoil and applied Panoil’s company stamp to them even though he had no involvement in Panoil or in the subject-matter of the letter.

  147. [123] When asked to explain, Mr Yong said that he had asked Mr Yeo to sign the letters to exert pressure on the ship management company to continue managing Panoil’s ships by giving it the impression that Panoil had employed an external consultant. Mr Yeo gave a different reason. He said that he thought it was possible that the ship management company was connected to Mr Yong and Mr Joe Lim. So he thought that Mr Yong had sought Mr Yeo’s help to avoid involving Mr Yeo and Mr Joe Lim’s names and thereby giving the appearance of a conflict of interest. Ultimately, the actual reason does not matter. What matters is that Mr Yong and Mr Yeo’s relationship was so close in 2017, when Panoil was insolvent or near insolvency, that Mr Yong asked Mr Yeo to sign four letters for Panoil and Mr Yeo agreed even though he had no involvement in Panoil.

  148. Conclusion on the Set-off Defence

  149. [124] Given my findings, I am satisfied that no set-off took place in August 2017. The documents on which the defendant relies for the Set-off Defence are fabrications. They were created for the purposes of defending a claim on the Contracts. Accordingly, I hold that Set-off Defence fails.

  150. Is the defendant barred from relying on the Set-off Defence?

  151. [125] Given my rejection of the Set-off Defence, it is strictly speaking unnecessary for me to consider the plaintiff’s alternative submission. That submission is that, if a set-off had indeed been effected in August 2017, upholding the set-off in this action would impermissibly allow the defendant to take advantage of its own wrong. Nevertheless, as the plaintiff made detailed submissions on this point, I shall analyse this point. For the purposes of my analysis, I shall assume – contrary to my finding – that the Debt was in fact set off in August 2017.

  152. [126] In my view, this alternative submission would not have succeeded had it been necessary for the plaintiff to rely on it.

  153. [127] The plaintiff’s submission is straightforward. The plaintiff accepts that Panoil and the defendant had it within their power to agree to nullify cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs. However, by reaching such an agreement, the defendant dishonestly assisted Mr Yong in breaching his fiduciary duties as a director of Panoil.

  154. [128] The breach of fiduciary duties arises in this way. By August 2017, Panoil was insolvent or near-insolvent. Panoil’s directors then owed a “fiduciary duty to take into account the interests of the company’s creditors when making decisions for the company” (Liquidators of Progen Engineering Pte Ltd v Progen Holdings Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 1089 at [48]). The defendant was contractually bound by cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs not to effect a set-off. By agreeing to nullify cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs and by permitting a set-off, Mr Yong placed the defendant in a better position than it would have been in Panoil’s liquidation. The corollary is that the set-off prejudiced Panoil’s other creditors in the liquidation. Mr Yong thereby breached his fiduciary duty to take into account the interests of Panoil’s creditors. The defendant agreed to the set-off with knowledge of its effect. The defendant thereby dishonestly assisted Mr Yong’s breach. To allow the defendant to rely on the Set-off Defence would therefore amount to allowing it to rely on its own wrong. This, the plaintiff says, is impermissible as a matter of law. It relies on the maxim, nullus commodum caper potest de injuria sua propria.

  155. [129] This maxim is described in R.H Kersley, Broom’s Legal Maxims (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th Ed, 1939) at 191 as follows:

  156. This maxim and the well-established maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio are two facets of the same fundamental principle: the court should not lend its assistance to a wrongdoer. The classic statement of the ex turpi causa doctrine can be found in Lord Mansfield CJHolman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341. In that case, Lord Mansfield CJ stated that “[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral or an illegal act” (at 343).

  157. [130] This fundamental principle applies equally to defences as it does to claims. In Montefiori v Montefiori (1762) 1 Wm Bl 363, Lord Mansfield noted that “no man shall set up his own iniquity as a defence, any more than as a cause of action” (at 364, cited in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd and others [2019] UKSC 13 at [92]).

  158. [131] For the plaintiff to rely on this maxim successfully, it must establish each of the following propositions:

  159. (a) Panoil was insolvent or near insolvent in August 2017;

  160. (b) Mr Yeo acted dishonestly when he assisted Mr Yong to nullify cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs and to effect the set-off;

  161. (c) as a result of the set-off, the defendant was placed in a better position than it would otherwise have been in in Panoil’s liquidation;

  162. (d) Mr Yeo’s dishonest assistance constitutes sufficient turpitude to invoke the maxim; and

  163. (e) the defendant, in asserting its Set-off Defence, relies on that turpitude.

  164. [132] The central difficulty with the plaintiff’s alternative submission is proposition (c). It is undisputed that, in Panoil’s liquidation, insolvency set-off would have applied as between Panoil and the defendant under s 88 of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed) read with s 327(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed).

  165. [133] The essential question on proposition (c) is therefore the effect of cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs in Panoil’s liquidation. Does cl. 8.2 bind Panoil even in liquidation so as to prevent insolvency set-off from taking effect? Or does cl 8.2 yield to insolvency set-off? If the latter is correct, it cannot be said that effecting a pre-insolvency set-off put the defendant in a better position post-insolvency. That is because insolvency set-off would in any event have operated post-insolvency to the same economic effect. As Vaughan Williams J noted in Re Washington Diamond Mining Company [1893] 3 Ch 95, “[y]ou cannot prefer a man…by merely putting him in the very position in which he would be if a bankruptcy followed” (at 104).

  166. [134] Two propositions of law on insolvency set-off are well-established. First, insolvency set-off is mandatory. Parties are not permitted contractually to exclude its effect (Good Property Land Development Pte Ltd v Societe-Generale [1996] 1 SLR(R) 884 at [10]; National Westminster Bank v Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785 at 805). Second, it is automatic. Insolvency set-off is a self-executing procedural directive. It takes effect without the need for further intervention and arises automatically by operation of law. And it does so irrespective of the wishes of the parties (Stein v Blake [1995] 2 All ER 961 at 967).

  167. [135] The mandatory nature of insolvency set-off means that a pre-insolvency agreement excluding set-off, such as cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs, yields to insolvency set-off once insolvency intervenes. Thus, in Coca-Cola Financial Corpn v Finsat International Ltd [1996] 3 WLR 849, Neill LJ characterised the “statutory obligation to set off mutual debts as an exception to the general principle that someone may renounce the benefit or other right introduced entirely in his favour” (at 857). Goh Joon Seng J cited this proposition with approval in Citibank NA v Lee Hooi Lian and another [1999] 2 SLR(R) 1 at [62]. As Rory Derham, author of Derham on the Law of Set-Off (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2010) notes at 127:

  168. [136] If the plaintiff had had to rely on its alternative submission, proposition (c) would therefore not have been established. Insolvency set-off prevails over cl 8.2 of Panoil’s T&Cs in Panoil’s liquidation. In economic terms, insolvency set-off operating automatically post-insolvency is indistinguishable from a set-off agreed between Panoil and the defendant in August 2017, pre-insolvency. The agreed set-off would not have placed the defendant in a better position than it would otherwise have been in in Panoil’s liquidation. There would have been no breach of fiduciary duty by Mr Yong for Mr Yeo dishonestly to have assisted.

  169. [137] Had it been necessary for my decision, therefore, I would have answered this essential question on proposition (c) in the defendant’s favour. On this ground alone, the plaintiff’s alternative submission could not have succeeded, had it been necessary for the plaintiff to rely on it.

  170. The Cancellation Defence

  171. [138] The defendant’s alternative defence is that Panoil cancelled the invoices which represent the Debt.

  172. [139] The defendant on sold the marine fuel which it purchased from Panoil under the Contracts to a company called Eastern Pacific Tankers Sdn Bhd (“Eastern Pacific”). The defendant’s case is that it received a copy of a letter from Eastern Pacific to Panoil dated 17 August 2017 (“EP’s 17 August Letter”) in which Eastern Pacific notified Panoil that Panoil should bill the Debt directly to Eastern Pacific. Panoil accepted Eastern Pacific’s request by letter the following day (“Panoil’s 18 August Letter”), copied to the defendant. Panoil then cancelled the invoices it had issued to the defendant representing the Debt, thereby cancelling the Debt. On the same day, the defendant wrote to Panoil asking Panoil to reflect the cancellation of the Debt (“D’s 18 August Letter”).

  173. [140] The Cancellation Defence has always been framed as relying on Panoil cancelling the Debt. However, in the defendant’s oral closing submissions, counsel for the defendant raised the issue of novation for the first time. When pressed, he confirmed that the defendant’s position is that Panoil cancelled the invoices as part of a broader transaction involving a novation – understood in its strict legal sense of a tripartite agreement – under which Eastern Pacific entered into a fresh contract with Panoil, taking over the defendant’s obligation to pay the Debt to Panoil.

  174. [141] In response, the plaintiff challenges the authenticity of EP’s 17 August Letter, Panoil’s 18 August Letter, D’s 18 August Letter and the two-page statement account dated 31 August 2017 attached to this letter. It argues that none of these documents were among Panoil’s records handed over to the judicial managers. Further, two of these letters were found much later in suspicious circumstances.

  175. [142] The plaintiff also points out that Panoil never actually cancelled the invoices issued to the defendant and never issued any fresh invoices to Eastern Pacific. Further, given that Panoil’s financial difficulties were well known by August 2017, it makes no commercial sense for Eastern Pacific to prefer to deal directly with Panoil instead of the defendant.

  176. The documents

  177. [143] The Cancellation Defence is premised on three key documents: (a) EP’s 17 August Letter; (b) Panoil’s 18 August Letter; and (c) D’s 18 August Letter and the attached two-page statement of account dated 31 August 2017.

  178. [144] EP’s 17 August Letter is addressed to Panoil and copied to the defendant. It asks Panoil to bill Eastern Pacific directly for the marine fuel delivered under the Contracts:

  179. [145] In response, Panoil’s 18 August Letter was addressed to Eastern Pacific and copied to the defendant. Panoil informed Eastern Pacific that it had no objection to its request:

  180. It is curious that this letter refers to Eastern Pacific’s letter “dated 18 August 2017”. The preceding email from Eastern Pacific was actually dated 17 August 2017. The parties did not address this discrepancy in any admissible evidence. Mr Shaik Saleem (“Mr Saleem”), a witness for the defendant, suggested in his affidavit of evidence in chief that this was the result of a typographical error. However Mr Saleem’s affidavit of evidence in chief was never admitted in evidence because he did not attend to be cross-examined on it (see [153] below). I am content nevertheless to assume that this is a mere typographical error. Certainly, there is no suggestion that there is some other letter or email dated 18 August 2017 from Eastern Pacific to Panoil which has not been disclosed.

  181. [146] D’s 18 August Letter is addressed to Panoil and seeks an updated statement of deliveries and payments:

  182. [147] The defendant has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the documents supporting the Cancellation Defence are authentic. I therefore reject these documents as fabrications. I have seven reasons for arriving at this conclusion.

  183. The defendant failed to call the makers of the 18 August letters

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