High Court · Decided 30 July 2020
Ong Heng Chuan v Ong Teck Chuan and others
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 161 · Case no. Suit No 1086 of 2017
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] OHC and OTC each hold 520,000 shares, which amount to about 17.33% of the total shares in the Company; OBC holds 1,760,000 shares (58.6%); and OSA holds 200,000 shares (6.67%). Currently, according to the Company’s business profile on the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”) website, the only director of the Company is OTC: the ACRA profile shows that he was appointed as director on 30 December 2015. It is not disputed that prior to OTC’s appointment on 30 December 2015, he was appointed as a director of the Company between 3 July 1984 and 14 April 2001. In the present suit, OHC alleged that OTC also acted as a de facto and/or shadow director of the Company in the period between 14 January 2008 and 29 December 2015 . This allegation was disputed by OTC.
- [3]
[3] In respect of OBC, it is not disputed that he was previously appointed as a director of the Company from 16 August 1980 to 8 December 1983, and subsequently from 1 September 1999 until his resignation on 30 December 2015. It is not disputed that for most of the period when OBC served as a director of the Company from the late 1990s to 30 December 2015, he was also running his own property development business, which was unrelated to the Tong Garden business. In so far as the running of the Company was concerned, OHC alleged in the present suit that OBC was “accustomed to act[ing] on the directions and/or instructions and/or influence and/or wishes” of OTC in the period between 14 January 2008 and 29 December 2015 . This allegation was disputed by OBC and OTC.
- [4]
[4] OSA was a director of the Company from 10 April 1999 to 15 July 2009 (although OHC has alleged that she was “removed” sometime in 2008).
- [5]
[5] As for OHC, he was a director of the Company from 16 August 1980 until 7 May 2003. During this period, he was also the managing director of the Company from 31 July 1999 until 7 May 2003. An Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) of the Company on 7 May 2003 voted not to re-elect him as director. He was declared a bankrupt on 3 December 2004 and obtained a discharge from bankruptcy on 16 September 2016.
Background
- [8]
[8] OHC, OTC, OBC and OSA are four of the ten children of the late Mr Ong Tong Guan (“the late Mr Ong”) and his wife, the late Mdm Chai Ah Hee. The late Mr Ong set up a sole proprietorship, Tong Garden Product Services, in the 1960s, to sell snack food under the “Tong Garden” brand (“Tong Garden Business”). In 1980, the Company – Tong Guan Food Products Pte Ltd – was incorporated. It grew to become the ultimate holding company for a number of subsidiaries and associated companies (which the parties have referred to collectively as the “Tong Garden Group”) involved in the manufacture, marketing and sale of various snack products such as nuts, seeds and dried fruits.
- [9]
[9] Over the years, several of the siblings joined the Tong Garden Business – including OHC, OTC, OBC, OSA, and their eldest brother Ong Leong Chuan (“OLC”). It is not disputed that the late Mr Ong remained in sole control of the business until he became ill in early 1984. He passed away on 24 July 1984. OHC, OTC, OBC and OSA are currently the only four shareholders of the Company after multiple changes in shareholdings over the years, these changes having resulted from “a multitude of legal actions between the siblings” and from sales by siblings uninvolved in running the Company of their shares to other siblings .
The subsidiaries and associated companies
- [10]
[10] In his statement of claim, OHC has asserted – and the other three siblings agree – that the Company “is a pure holding company. It does not conduct any business. It derives revenue via its investments in the businesses of its subsidiaries and associated companies” . For the purposes of the present action, the relevant subsidiaries and associated companies were the following.
The Singapore subsidiary
- [11]
[11] Within the Tong Garden Group, Tong Garden Food Products Singapore Pte Ltd (“Food Products (S)”) was the main operating entity in Singapore. It handled the manufacturing, sales and marketing of Tong Garden snack products in Singapore. Incorporated in Singapore in 1994, it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tong Garden Holdings Pte Ltd (“TGHPL”) which was in turn a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company.
- [12]
[12] Food Products (S) was wound up by way of a members’ voluntary liquidation on 8 July 2013.
The Malaysian subsidiaries
- [13]
[13] Tong Garden Food Products Sdn Bhd (“Food Products (M)”) was the manufacturing arm of the Tong Garden Group in Malaysia while Tong Garden Snack Food Sdn Bhd (“Snack Food (M)”) took care of sales and marketing in Malaysia. Both were subsidiaries of Tong Garden Holdings Sdn Bhd, itself a subsidiary of TGHPL (which in turn was wholly owned by the Company).
- [14]
[14] Food Products (M) and Snack Food (M) are presently in liquidation.
The Thai entities
- [15]
[15] As to the Thai entities, it was OHC’s case in these proceedings that the Company had interests in the following three Thai companies prior to 20 July 2009 :
(a) Tong Garden Co Ltd (“Tong Garden (T)”);
(b) Nut Candy House Co Ltd (“Nut Candy (T)”); and
(c) NOI Food Industry Co Ltd (“NOI (T)”).
- [16]
[16] According to OHC:
- [17]
[17] While OTC agreed that Tong Garden (T) was the main operating entity of the Tong Garden Group in Thailand and that NOI (T) was its subsidiary, it was OTC’s case that the Company had sold him its 39.99% shareholding in Tong Garden (T) via a sale and purchase agreement on 4 January 2001. According to OTC, the “beneficial interest in the remaining 60.01% of the shareholding in Tong Garden (T)” belonged to him. As for NOI (T), OTC asserted that it “was never a subsidiary or an associated company of the Company, and the Company has never had any direct or indirect interest in it” .
- [18]
[18] The corporate structure of the Tong Garden Group prior to March 2008 is set out in the chart contained in exhibit P1. The corporate structure of the Tong Garden Group after March 2008 is set out in the chart in exhibit P2. These two charts were tendered by OHC’s counsel. The reason why OHC drew up the corporate structure charts prior to and after March 2008 was because on 15 March 2008, OTC and OBC had entered into an agreement concerning, inter alia, the transfer of OBC’s shares in the Tong Garden Group to OTC: OHC has alleged that this agreement was relevant to the acts of oppression he suffered.
OHC’s allegations of minority oppression
- [19]
[19] I will next summarise OHC’s case in respect of his claims of minority oppression. At this juncture I will confine myself for the most part to what OHC has pleaded in his statement of claim. It should be noted that in his evidence at trial, he deviated in a number of instances from the case pleaded in his statement of claim. I will address the relevance and the effect of these deviations in the later part of these written grounds.
- [20]
[20] According to OHC, he had “legitimate expectations” as to how the Company should be run, which expectations were breached by OTC and OBC in their treatment and disposal of the trademarks, assets and business of subsidiaries and associated companies in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. It should be highlighted that OHC’s case was not based on the Company being (or being akin to) a quasi-partnership: he accepted that it was not. Instead, he pleaded that his “legitimate expectations” as to how the Company should be run were “based on his strict legal rights under the Articles of Association of the Company, Section 157 of the Companies Act (Cap 50), common law and/or equity” . According to OHC, “[t]hese legal rights were derived from and/or based on the duties owed by [OTC] as a de jure, de facto and/or shadow director and/or [OBC] as a de jure director at the material time”. In his statement of claim, OHC pleaded that the duties owed by OTC and OBC were as follows:
(a) that “[p]ursuant to Article 97(15) of the Articles of Association of the Company, the directors would enter into contracts and/or vary contracts, and do all things on behalf of the Company as they may consider expedient or otherwise for the purposes of the Company”;
(b) that the directors of the Company “would at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of their duties”;
(c) that the directors “would not make improper use of their position as directors to gain directly or indirectly an advantage for themselves or for any other person or cause detriment to the Company”;
(d) that the directors “would always act in the interests of the Company and all shareholders”;
(e) that the directors “would not place themselves in positions where their interests and the interests of the Company may conflict”;
(f) that the directors “would use their powers for proper purposes and for the benefit of the Company and all shareholders”; and
(g) that the directors “would not misapply the Company’s assets”.
- [21]
[21] In the present case, OHC’s case was that OTC and/or OBC had “whether acting by themselves or acting in concert … committed, procured and/or caused” certain “oppressive acts … to have taken place” which were “unfairly prejudicial to [OHC] and ... contrary to or departed from [the above] legitimate expectations … to the extent that it was grossly and manifestly unfair to [OHC]” . According to OHC, the allegedly oppressive conduct by OTC and OBC had “effectively resulted in the Company’s operations, assets (including trademarks) and business being unlawfully diverted, disposed and/or transferred to companies owned and/or controlled by [OTC] … without the knowledge of [OHC]”; further, that “[q)uite apart from the said unlawful diversion, disposal and/or transfer, no proper or adequate consideration was paid to the Company” .
- [23]
[23] Firstly, to reiterate, the Company was a holding company that carried out no business activities of its own; and as such, it derived its revenue – and indeed, its value – from its investments in the businesses of its subsidiaries and associated companies .
- [25]
[25] According to OTC and OBC, however, the Company – and the wider Tong Garden Group – had long been mired in financial difficulties. According to their narrative, things had gotten so dire that by 2007, none of the Ong siblings wanted anything more to do with the Tong Garden business as they saw it as a sinking ship. It was in this context that OBC – then the majority shareholder and one of only two remaining directors of the Company – had approached OTC for help. The transactions on which OHC relied in advancing his oppression claim were in fact part of a larger effort to wind down the entire Group’s business in an orderly manner, while preserving the reputation and standing of the brand started by their father.
- [26]
[26] Thirdly, OTC and OBC took the position that in any event, the acts which OHC complained of in the present suit – even if proven – were wrongs done to the Company and not to any individual shareholder of the Company. In other words, OHC had suffered no loss or harm in his personal capacity other than an alleged diminution in the value of his shares; and his use of s 216 of the Companies Act in these circumstances constituted an abuse of process.
- [27]
[27] I will deal with the first set of transactions which – according to OHC – constituted oppressive acts carried out by OTC and OBC against him. These were the transactions relating to the disposal of trademarks belonging to the Tong Garden Group.
OHC’s account of the oppressive acts carried out against him
The disposal of the Tong Garden Group’s trademarks
- [28]
[28] Prior to being wound up, Food Products (S) and Snack Food (M) sold Tong Garden snack products under the “Tong Garden” and “NOI” trademarks in Singapore, Malaysia and other countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Hong Kong . The “Tong Garden” and “NOI” trademarks were owned by TGHPL, Food Products (S) and NOI Food Products Pte Ltd. The latter two companies, according to OHC, were wholly owned by TGHPL which in turn was wholly owned by the Company – a state of affairs which in OHC’s view meant that “the Company was the beneficial owner of the trademarks” .
- [29]
[29] By an agreement dated 13 March 2000 , the Tong Garden Group (through the Company, TGHPL, Food Products (S) and NOI Food Products Pte Ltd) sold, inter alia, the “Tong Garden” and “NOI” trademarks, together with the goodwill of the business relating to the goods in respect of which these trademarks were registered, to a company called Villawood Holdings Limited (“Villawood”). A list of the trademarks registered to entities within the Tong Garden Group as at March 2000 – and transferred to Villawood through the said sale and purchase transaction – can be found in the schedule to the agreement of 13 March 2000 . The consideration paid by Villawood was a sum of S$260,003. It is not disputed that Villawood is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, and that it is owned and controlled by OBC and his wife who was also a director of the said company at the material time.
- [30]
[30] In his statement of claim, OHC pleaded that the agreement of 13 March 2000 concerned the transfer of trademarks that were initially registered in the name of the Company, Food Products (S), TGHPL, and NOI Food Products Pte Ltd, as well as the benefit of trademark applications in the names of these companies for trademarks which were pending registration (collectively, the “Registered Trademarks”). It was further pleaded that in relation to the “Tong Garden” and “NOI” trademarks which had not been registered, the Company owned these unregistered trademarks under common law by virtue of the reputation and goodwill in these unregistered trademarks used in conjunction with the business operated by the Company through its subsidiaries (the “Common Law Trademarks”). The Registered Trademarks and Common Law Trademarks are collectively referred to as “the Trademarks” in OHC’s statement of claim.
- [31]
[31] It is not disputed that the following events took place in the period prior to the sale of the Trademarks. In 1998, the Tong Garden Group was facing pressure from, inter alia, UOB Venture Investments Limited (“UOBVI”) and UOB Venture Investments II Limited (“UOBVII”) (collectively, the “UOB Entities”) regarding its liability for certain investments made by the UOB Entities into the Tong Garden Business. On 18 August 1998, the UOB Entities claimed that default had occurred in relation to an investment agreement whereby the UOB Entities had granted TGHPL a convertible bond of $1.5m. In Suit No 1390 of 1998 (“Suit 1390”), the UOB Entities sued TGHPL – as well as the Company, OLC, OHC, OTC, Tong Garden (T) and NOI (T) – for immediate repayment of the $1.5m with accrued interest . In October 1999, OHC, OBC and OTC agreed to carry out a rights issue to raise the Company’s capital for the purpose of negotiating a settlement of Suit 1390. Suit 1390 was settled via an agreement to pay the UOB Entities an 18% penalty on top of the debt amount .
- [32]
[32] Separately, on 26 August 1999, UOBVI served a notice on TGHPL to redeem preference shares granted to UOBVI pursuant to an investment agreement dated 12 December 1995 (the “1995 UOB Agreement”). Pursuant to the 1995 UOB Agreement, UOBVI had invested a sum of $3.5m in TGHPL by subscribing for redeemable convertible preference shares (the “Preference Shares”) in TGHPL : the price of the redemption of these Preference Shares in the event of default was $3.5m plus interest (the “Redemption Price”). In its notice dated 26 August 1999, UOBVI noted that an event of default had occurred, and “in light of the continuing disagreement between the Directors of the company”, it wanted the Preference Shares redeemed at the Redemption Price.
- [33]
[33] On 12 November 1999, TGHPL held an EGM , whereby it was resolved that the directors “whenever deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the Company, [would] be authorised to sell any of the Company properties or assets to raise funds for the redemption RCP shares held in the name of UOBVI”. The resolution further provided that any such sales “shall be at valuation price or market price as may be determined” by any of the firms named in the resolution – namely, KPMG Peat Marwick, Arthur Anderson & Co, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
- [34]
[34] PricewaterhouseCoopers Management Services Pte Ltd (“PWC”) was engaged by OHC in his capacity as the then managing director of TGHPL to “provide a desktop valuation of the “Tong Garden” brand (including the “NOI” brand) for Singapore and Malaysia” . In their report dated 17 February 2000, PWC opined that the value of the “Tong Garden” and the “NOI” brand names was “estimated to be in the range of S$200,000 – S$260,000” .
- [35]
[35] The purchase consideration of S$260,003 was accordingly based on PWC’s valuation. The agreement to sell the Trademarks to Villawood was approved by a TGHPL director’s resolution on 17 March 2000. It should be noted that by 2000, UOBVI’s claim against TGHPL for redemption of the Preference Shares under the 1995 UOB Agreement had taken a litigious turn via the former’s commencement of Suit No 84 of 2000. The payment made by Villawood went towards part payment of TGHPL’s liability to UOBVI .
- [36]
[36] In pursuing his present claim for oppression, however, OHC took the position that the sum of S$260,003 paid by Villawood “did not in any way reflect the true value” of the “Tong Garden” and “NOI” trademarks . According to OHC, the Trademarks were “the most valuable asset of the Tong Garden Group”. He claimed that the reason why these valuable assets were sold to Villawood was to “protect” them “by transferring them offshore on a temporary basis” . In OHC’s statement of claim, it was not stated what the Trademarks were to be “protected” from. Nevertheless, he asserted that the “intention” was for them “to ultimately be returned to companies within the Tong Garden Group at a later stage”. He did not plead the date when this “return” of the Trademarks was to take place. According to him, OTC and OBC owed the following fiduciary duties to the Company in relation to the Trademarks transferred to Villawood :
(a) to ensure that the Registered Trademarks “as substantial assets of the Company, were protected and preserved, whilst registered in the name of Villawood”;
(b) to procure Villawood to “grant the necessary permissions and licences to the companies within the Tong Garden Group to use the Trademarks (such that the Company ultimately benefitted from the use of the Trademarks) until such time that the Trademarks are returned or transferred to the Company and/or companies within the Tong Garden Group”;
(c) to ensure that Villawood “would not dispose and/or transfer any of the Trademarks to any entity which was not within the Tong Garden Group thereby preventing the benefit from the use of the Trademarks accruing to the Company as the ultimate holding company and beneficial owner of the Trademarks”; and
(d) to ensure that “no other entity apart from the Company and/or its subsidiaries would apply for or obtain any further ancillary or concurrent trademark rights (registered or otherwise) based on any of the Trademarks”.
- [37]
[37] Sometime in October 2002, Villawood granted a ten-year licence to Food Products (S) and Snack Food (M) to manufacture and sell products bearing, inter alia, the “Tong Garden” and “NOI” trademarks. As this licence was to run with effect from 13 March 2000, it would have expired on 13 March 2010. It was not renewed. Nor were the Trademarks “returned” to the Tong Garden Group. According to OHC, “[w]ithout ownership of the trademarks or at the very least, the right to use the trademarks, the Company (through its subsidiaries) was not able to manufacture, distribute and/or sell the various Tong Garden Products” .
- [38]
[38] OHC claimed that he only found out about this state of affairs in 2015. It was in 2015 that he came to realise that Tong Garden snack products were being manufactured, marketed and sold in Singapore and Malaysia by Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Tong Garden Food (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd – entities which were not actually part of the Tong Garden Group . Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd was incorporated on 7 March 2008 with OTC as its sole director: it is wholly owned by a company known as OTC Food Corporation Pte Ltd. As for Tong Garden Food (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, it was incorporated on 3 April 2008 and is 99% owned by OTC Food Corporation Pte Ltd (the other two shareholders being OTC and his wife, each with one share). OTC is one of the directors of Tong Garden Food (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd. OTC Food Corporation Pte Ltd was incorporated on 12 September 2014 and is wholly owned by OTC, who is also a director of the said company.
- [39]
[39] Broadly, therefore, OHC’s case was that OTC and OBC had breached their fiduciary duties to the Company by “surreptitiously” arranging for the “diversion” of “valuable” trademark assets to entities owned and/or controlled by OTC, so as to benefit OTC at the expense of the Company and its shareholders. As to how this was allegedly done, OHC provided a number of details in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”). Prior to the expiry of the ten-year licence in March 2010, Villawood had written to Food Products (S) and Snack Food (M) on 8 February 2010 to notify them that the licence would not be renewed . On 13 March 2010, Villawood entered into a Trademarks Licence Agreement with Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Tong Garden Food (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd respectively . Through these agreements, Villawood granted each company a perpetual, irrevocable and exclusive licence to market, manufacture and sell products under (inter alia) the “Tong Garden” and the “NOI” trademarks – including the “Tong Garden” trademark registered via Trade Mark Registration No T9510191B – in Singapore and Malaysia respectively.
- [40]
[40] It will be recalled that in addition to the Registered Trademarks, OHC had pleaded that the Company also owned under common law those “Tong Garden” and “NOI” trademarks which had not been registered. It was OHC’s case that post 13 March 2000, the Company remained “the beneficial owner of all the goodwill, intellectual property rights, title and interest in or arising from the use of” the Common Law Trademarks . According to OHC, therefore, any registration of the Common Law Trademarks “had to be effected in the name of the Company or any of the companies within the Tong Garden Group with the approval of the Company” . Notwithstanding this, OTC and/or OBC were said to have procured Villawood to apply to register the “Tong Garden” trademark via Trade Mark Registration No T0914609F in the name of Villawood before arranging for its “subsequent transfer to [OTC]’s company”. The Company, which had been “the owner of the Common Law Trademarks”, “ultimately lost ownership of the said asset” as a result of the registration in the name of Villawood.
- [41]
[41] All these trademarks – including Trade Mark Registration No T9510191B and Trade Mark Registration No T0914609F – were subsequently transferred to Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd on 9 November 2015 and thereafter to OTG Enterprise Pte Ltd on 8 April 2016. OTG Enterprise Pte Ltd was incorporated on 8 April 2016 and is wholly owned by OTC. OHC asserted that it was by virtue of the above acts that the “Tong Garden” trademarks (via Trade Mark Registration Nos T9510191B and T0914609F) came to be effectively owned by OTC . OHC contended that –
The agreement dated 15 March 2008 between OTC and OBC and the subsequent disposal of the Company’s assets and business
- [43]
[43] Pursuant to the 15 March 2008 agreement, it was provided that –
- [44]
[44] OHC claimed that the 15 March 2008 agreement was a “secret deal” between OTC and OBC; and that following this “secret deal”, OTC was able – with OBC’s connivance – to divert to his own companies “the Company’s assets, manpower, infrastructure, information relating to distribution networks and customers, and logistics” . I have already dealt with OHC’s allegations about the treatment of the Tong Garden Group’s trademarks which (according to OHC) the Company was the beneficial owner of. OHC contended that aside from the Trademarks, OTC also “misappropriated” the Company’s “tangible plants and equipment” as well as its “extremely valuable intangible assets such as technical knowhow and distribution networks”.
- [45]
[45] In alleging these “misappropriations”, OHC relied, inter alia, on the distributorship agreement which Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd entered into with Food Products (S) and Food Products (M), and the distributorship agreement which Tong Garden Marketing Sdn Bhd entered into with Snack Food (M) and Food Products (M) . Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Tong Garden Marketing Sdn Bhd are two of the companies ultimately controlled by OTC. The distributorship agreements were entered into on 14 August 2009. Pursuant to these distributorship agreements, Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Tong Garden Marketing Sdn Bhd were appointed the sole and exclusive distributor of peanuts and other snack foods in Singapore and Malaysia respectively. Food Products (S) and Snack Food (M) were to cease carrying on the business of developing and selling these snack foods, while providing Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Tong Garden Marketing Sdn Bhd with such promotional materials, information, expertise, know-how and other assistance as the latter two companies might reasonably require. It was also agreed as part of these distributorship agreements that the profits from the sale and distribution of the products would be shared among the various entities in the following proportions: 60% to Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd or Tong Garden Marketing Sdn Bhd (as the case might be), and the remaining 40% to Food Products (S) or Snack Food (M) (as the case might be).
- [46]
[46] Aside from the allegations about the “misappropriation” of “extremely valuable intangible assets such as technical knowhow and distribution networks”, OHC also pointed to invoices showing, firstly, that Food Products (S) had seconded staff to Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd for the periods August to December 2008 and January to December 2009 (excluding November 2009); secondly, that Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd had rented motor vehicles and office premises from Food Products (S) between June and December 2008 . The relevance of these matters was not made clear in OHC’s AEIC. The suggestion seemed to be that having acquired the Trademarks, the “technical know-how” and the “distribution networks” of the various Tong Garden Group entities, OTC made further inroads into the business activities and capabilities of these entities by making use of their vehicles and premises.
- [47]
[47] Indeed, according to OHC, it was not too long after the 2009 distributorship agreements that Food Products (S), Food Products (M) and Snack Food (M) were put into voluntary liquidation between 2012 and 2014 .
The disposal of the Thai entities
- [48]
[48] The next set of allegedly oppressive acts relied on by OHC related to the disposal of the Thai entities.
- [49]
[49] By way of background, it is not disputed that OTC was responsible for managing the Tong Garden Group’s business in Thailand since at least 1990. It is also not disputed that over the years, OTC found it difficult to work with his other siblings ; and that sometime in 2000, he wanted to focus on managing the Thai business. According to OHC, this led to OTC “orally” agreeing with “the rest of the shareholders in the Company that he would resign as a director of the Company and give up his shareholding interest in the Company in exchange for ownership and control of the Thai entities”. OTC and the Company then proceeded to enter into two sale and purchase agreements .
- [50]
[50] The first of these was a sale and purchase agreement dated 4 January 2001 (the “2001 Thailand SPA”), whereby OTC contracted to purchase from the Company “the whole of [its] undertaking” in “the Territory” (defined as being Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar) and “the goodwill and all other assets” situated in “the Territory”. Under clause 4 of this agreement, the purchase price was stated to be “based on the Net Tangible Assets of all the companies listed in the First Schedule to this Agreement as per the audited accounts for the year ended 31 December 2000, after making appropriate adjustment for difference in inter company balances”. It should be noted that no First Schedule was apparently attached to the 2001 Thailand SPA, although OTC’s evidence was that as at the date of this SPA, “the only interest that [the Company] held directly in the “Territory” was a 39.99% shareholding in Tong Garden (T)” . Clause 9 of the 2001 Thailand SPA further provided that completion of the agreement would take place at the law office of M/s Tan Cheng Yew & Partners at 2pm on 17 April 2000 “or such other date as may be mutually agreed by the parties”; while clause 17 stated that the “effective date of the Agreement shall be 2 weeks from the date of signing this Agreement”. Clause 19 stated that by the effective date, OTC “shall … deliver to [the Company] his duly executed letter of resignation as a director of [the Company] and all companies listed in the Third Schedule of this Agreement”. (The Third Schedule was also not attached to the 2001 Thailand SPA.)
- [51]
[51] Alongside the 2001 Thailand SPA, OTC also entered into an agreement with OHC, OBC and OSA to sell them “all his shares and interest in [the Company]”. Under clause 2 of this agreement, the purchase price was stated to be based on the Company’s Net Tangible Assets (“NTA”) as at 31 December 2000. Other clauses in the agreement provided for, inter alia, the completion date (clause 5) and the effective date (clause 7).
- [52]
[52] Although OHC claimed that the sale of the Thai entities “was never completed pursuant to the terms of [the 2001 Thailand SPA]” , it is not disputed that OTC did proceed on 23 February 2001 to send the Company a letter stating his resignation as director of the following companies:
(a) Tong Guan Food Product Pte Ltd (ie, the Company);
(b) Tong Garden Holding Pte Ltd (ie, TGHPL);
(c) Tong Garden Foods Products Pte Ltd (ie, Food Products (S));
(d) N.O.I. Foods Products Pte Ltd;
(e) Tong Garden Holding Sdn Bhd;
(f) Tong Garden Food Product Sdn Bhd (ie, Food Products (M)).
- [53]
[53] In his AEIC, OHC appeared to blame OTC for the delay in the completion of the 2001 Thailand SPA, claiming, inter alia, that OTC had dragged his feet about providing the audited accounts of the Thai entities . He also exhibited correspondence between OTC and the Company’s then solicitors Loy & Co between April and August 2002 in which the former apparently contended that the Company still held “40% equity” in Tong Garden (T) whereas the latter asserted that the Company had already agreed to sell him “the whole of the undertaking, the goodwill and any rights and interests” . However, nothing of any substance transpired between the parties until 20 July 2009 when the Company and OTC entered into an agreement intended to vary the 2001 Thailand SPA (the “Variation Agreement” ).
- [54]
[54] Inter alia, the Variation Agreement provided for the completion date of the 2001 Thailand SPA to be varied to 28 July 2009 (clause 2.1), while the effective date of the said agreement was varied to “the 14th day after the date of execution of the [Variation] Agreement” (clause 2.3). Clause 19 of the 2001 Thailand SPA, which had provided for OTC to tender his resignation from the Company and other entities, was deleted in its entirety vide clause 2.4 of the Variation Agreement.
- [55]
[55] The Variation Agreement did not make any changes to clause 4 of the 2001 Thailand SPA, which had provided for the purchase price to be based on the NTA – “as per the audited accounts for the year ended 31 December 2000” – of the companies listed in the First Schedule to the 2001 Thailand SPA, although clause 2.5 of the Variation Agreement stipulated that “the entity listed” in the (missing) First Schedule was to be Tong Garden (T).
- [56]
[56] The absence of any change to clause 4 of the 2001 Thailand SPA was the one feature of the Variation Agreement which appeared most to exercise OHC, who charged that –
- [57]
[57] For the purpose of establishing the amount of consideration to be paid by OTC under the 2001 Thailand SPA (as amended by the Variation Agreement), a firm of valuers – CC Koh & Co – was appointed to give an opinion on the fair market value of the shares in Tong Garden (T) as at 31 December 2000 (the “CCK valuation”). In their report , the valuers explained that “fair market value” was to be understood as “the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not under compulsion to sell, and both parties have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts”. In the valuer’s opinion, based on “historical financial information” provided by the management of Tong Garden (T), and using the “Net Tangible Assets Method” of valuation, the fair market value of Tong Garden (T) shares was computed as “a negative value of Baht 95.73 per share”: in other words, “technically the fair market value of the shares of [Tong Garden (T)] as at 31 December 2000 [had] nil value” .
- [58]
[58] In his AEIC, OHC decried the CCK valuation as being “misleading”, “inaccurate” and based on “unreliable” information. According to him, prior to his being removed from the office of director of the Company, the Thai entities had been the “jewels in the crown” of the Tong Garden Group : he felt it was “simply impossible” that they could have been insolvent and did not believe the CCK valuation reflected the true value of Tong Garden (T) .
- [59]
[59] In addition to executing the Variation Agreement in July 2009, the Company had signed two other documents which OHC also complained bitterly about. The first was the Deed of Waiver dated 20 July 2009 whereby the Company waived unconditionally its inter-company claims against Tong Garden (T). The second was the Trademarks Licence Agreement, whereby the Company granted OTC a perpetual, irrevocable and exclusive licence to market, manufacture and sell the Tong Garden products in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar under the trademarks stated in Schedule 1 of the licence agreement. A nominal one-time licence fee of $1 was to be paid to the Company as the consideration for the grant of the licence.
- [60]
[60] In OHC’s view, the Variation Agreement, the Deed of Waiver and the Trademarks Licence Agreement were “effectively a deal between OTC and OBC” pursuant to which OTC “got the Thai entities debt-free for S$1 and … remained as a shareholder of the Company and even became managing director of the Company”. OHC felt that OTC and OBC had behaved “as if they owned these entities in their names and could do what they wanted with it when they wanted” .
Summary of OHC’s case on minority oppression
- [61]
[61] To sum up, OHC’s case on minority oppression postulated that the unlawful diversion and disposal of “the Company’s operations, assets (including trademarks) and business” with “no proper or adequate consideration” constituted oppression of his minority interest because –
(a) these acts took place while he was a bankrupt and had difficulty in obtaining information about the Company. According to him, OTC and OBC “took advantage of this” to carry out the allegedly oppressive acts because they thought he would not be able to find out – and indeed he only found out about their actions in December 2015;
(b) these acts were “not single isolated acts” but were “part of a plan by OTC and OBC to secretly strip the Company to benefit themselves”;
(c) he (OHC) had “devoted the majority of [his] life to the Company” and had helped to build up the Tong Garden into a valuable brand name. In striking “at the very core of the Company’s business and existence”, OTC’s and OBC’s allegedly oppressive acts had thus caused him “to be personally affected”.
OTC’s and OBC’s version of events
- [62]
[62] OTC and OBC presented a starkly different picture of the financial state in which the Tong Garden Group found itself in March 2008. According to OTC and OBC, the Tong Garden Group had been beset for years with internecine strife among the Ong siblings which disrupted business operations and caused creditors to be chary of its financial stability. The business of the Tong Garden Group was itself beset with cash flow problems and pressure from creditors, even as far back as the late 1990s when it faced litigation from the UOB Entities over its financial liabilities to them (see [31]–[35] above).
The financial problems faced by the Company and the Tong Garden Group
- [63]
[63] Both OTC and OBC gave evidence as to the financial problems faced by the Company, and by the Tong Garden Group as a whole, in the years leading up to the 15 March 2008 agreement. Thus, for example, apart from the two suits brought by the UOB Entities between 1998 and 2000, TGHPL had its trade facilities with United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) frozen in mid-2000 as a result of outstanding amounts it owed UOB on trust receipts and a revolving loan ; and in March 2002, Food Products (S) had its credit facilities with Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (“OCBC”) frozen, apparently after it failed to comply with OCBC’s request for its audited accounts . Such was the parlous state of the Tong Garden Group’s finances that a Special Manager was appointed by the creditor banks ; and even then, by July 2002, at least one of the creditor banks (OCBC) was threatening to appoint judicial managers . By this time (July 2002), the Tong Garden Group as a whole owed some $9m to the creditor banks – UOB, OCBC and Bangkok Bank; and although by August 2003, this amount had been reduced to $7.7m , clearly this was still a very sizeable amount.
- [64]
[64] Nor were the banks the only creditors putting pressure on the Tong Garden Group in the period leading up to March 2008. Both OTC and OBC gave evidence about the pressure which the Tong Garden Group faced from other creditors. OBC has listed at paragraph 33(19) of his closing submissions a number of such examples; and OTC has done so too at paragraphs 293–324 of his closing submissions. These other creditors ranged from trade creditors to service providers seeking payment of their professional fees. There were trade creditors who sued for the sums owed to them and obtained judgment: for example, Maya Systems Consultants Pte Ltd obtained judgment against Food Products (S) in August 2004 for the sum of $51,000 ; Munchy Food Industries Sdn Bhd obtained judgment against Food Products (S) in January 2005 for the sum of $317,890.69 ; and Kian Cheong (Boxes) MFG Co Pte Ltd obtained judgment against Food Products (S) in August 2007 for the sum of $29,835.80. There were also letters of demand and chasers for payment from trade creditors – such as Meridian Nut Growers Alliance LLC, whose e-mails chasing for payment OHC forwarded to OTC with the comment that “[t]hese kind of mail from supplier not the first time”. As for the demands for payments from service providers, these included more than one accounting firm which had provided audit and other services .
- [65]
[65] According to OTC and OBC, while many of these financial woes appeared to be concentrated within Food Products (S), they had a direct impact on the Company’s financial viability. As a holding company that had no manufacturing or trading activity of its own, the Company derived its revenue – and therefore its financial viability, indeed its very value – from its investments in the businesses of its subsidiaries and associated companies. Financial trouble in those subsidiaries and associated companies could only spell trouble for the finances of the Tong Garden Group and of the Company itself – especially when the subsidiary in question was the Tong Garden Group’s main operating entity in Singapore. It was precisely because of these very shaky finances that the siblings then running the Company (OHC, OSA, later OBC, at times OTC) were preoccupied with finding ways to raise funds. In addition to bank borrowings, attempts were also made between the late 1990s and 2007 to raise funds by other means: for example, by means of rights issues (two in 1999), and by multiple loans advanced by OBC to the various subsidiaries .
The sale of the Trademarks to Villawood
- [66]
[66] It was in this context that on 12 November 1999, an EGM of TGHPL gave approval for the sale of the company’s assets, including its intellectual property rights . It will be remembered that in late August 1999, UOBVI had served on TGHPL a notice to redeem Preference Shares to the tune of $3.5m pursuant to the 1995 UOB Agreement. This meant that the Company and its subsidiaries needed, inter alia, to liquidate some of its assets to pay UOBVI the Redemption Price. Per the resolution passed at the EGM, any sale was to be subject to a valuation of the assets being conducted by any of the following firms: KPMG Peat Marwick; Arthur Anderson & Co; and PWC.
- [67]
[67] PWC was subsequently engaged to conduct a valuation of the “Tong Garden” brand prior to the sale of the Trademarks. Indeed, it was OHC himself who had represented TGHPL in engaging and instructing PWC; and it was OHC who had – together with OSA, OTC and OBC – accepted PWC’s valuation of “$200,000 to $260,000” before approving the sale of the Trademarks to Villawood at S$260,003 in March 2000. In short, the evidence showed that there had been a proper valuation of the Trademarks for the purpose of sale, and the valuation had been carried out independently by a reputable professional firm . Moreover, UOBVI – who was to receive the proceeds from the sale of the Trademarks in partial satisfaction of the amount owed to it – was vigilant in wanting to make sure that “the valuation and sale [were] at arm’s length” . The correspondence between TGHPL’s then solicitors and UOBVI’s solicitors in March 2000 showed that UOBVI was aware the Trademarks had been sold to a buyer related to TGHPL’s management, and that UOBVI had at one stage contemplated requiring another valuation to be carried out by KPMG Peat Marwick but had not subsequently proceeded with this course of action. It also had to be borne in mind that OTC and even OHC himself had given guarantees under the 1995 UOB Agreement and risked being held personally liable by UOBVI if TGHPL failed to settle its liability to the bank . In other words, they had a vested interest in making sure that there was a valid sale of the Trademarks resulting in proceeds being made available to pay UOBVI.
- [68]
[68] According to OTC and OBC, therefore, there was no room for OHC belatedly to contend that the Trademarks had been sold at an undervalue, or that the transfer to Villawood had merely been a “temporary” one. There was no agreement that Villawood or OBC would “hold the Trademarks for the Tong Garden business, nor was there any discussion about returning the Trademarks to the Tong Garden business”. Quite simply, the Trademarks belonged to Villawood once the sale had taken place ; and as OBC owned and controlled Villawood, it was he who decided what to do with the Trademarks post March 2000.
- [69]
[69] In the immediate aftermath of the March 2000 sale to Villawood, OBC continued to allow the various Tong Garden entities to use the Trademarks without bothering with any formalities. However, the Tong Garden Group’s creditor banks became nervous about what might happen in the absence of a formal licensing agreement if OBC – who had been providing financial support to the Group – were to withdraw his support . In October 2002, as a result of conditions set by the creditor banks, Villawood granted a ten-year trademark licence (with effect from 13 March 2000) to Food Products (S), Food Products (M) and Snack Food (M) to manufacture and sell products bearing the Trademarks .
- [70]
[70] According to OBC, the creditor banks had also asked that he waive the payment of royalties by the Tong Garden entities licensed to use the Trademarks. He did not give any such waiver but he did agree to a moratorium on payment of royalties until the Company’s finances improved. In any event, up until the time he entered into the 15 March 2008 agreement with OTC, he had not received any royalty payments from the Tong Garden entities .
The continuing financial woes of the Company and the Tong Garden Group
- [71]
[71] Even after TGHPL’s liability to UOBVI under the 1995 UOB Agreement was settled, the Company and its various subsidiaries continued to experience financial woes. The various attempts to raise funds created something of a vicious circle of indebtedness, whereby they would attempt to pay off creditor banks by deploying (inter alia) funds intended for use as working capital, and then find themselves having to borrow more funds for working capital. It is not disputed that the amount owing by TGHPL under the 1995 UOB Agreement was eventually paid off using the proceeds from the sale of the Trademarks and from a rights issue in October 1999, as well as moneys from a credit line obtained from Bangkok Bank and moneys taken from Food Products (S)’s working capital .
- [72]
[72] According to OTC and OBC, therefore, it was unsurprising that the Company, and the Tong Garden Group as a whole, continued to struggle to pay off debts. Indeed, it was OTC’s and OBC’s position that the Company was both balance sheet insolvent and cash flow insolvent in the period leading up to their 15 March 2008 agreement.
- [73]
[73] On 9 January 2007, OCBC sought to revise the credit facilities extended to Food Products (S), so as to require (inter alia) that OBC execute a Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity to secure these facilities. OBC refused to do so. By then, according to OBC, the audited accounts of the Tong Garden Group showed that he had lent at least a total of $3.5m to the various Tong Garden entities: in fact, by his own estimation, the total amount he had lent was “much closer to $5 million” . He was also feeling very frustrated by this time because despite having lent so much money to the Tong Garden Group and having expended much time and effort to help its business, he had never been paid a single cent in director’s fees or dividends, whereas he had to pay interest on the credit lines from which he made these loans – and even worse, he had also ended up being sued by OSA and two other sisters in 2007 .
- [74]
[74] On 24 May 2007, solicitors acting for OCBC wrote to Food Products (S) to demand repayment of some $3.7m . On 31 July 2007, OCBC wrote again to Food Products (S) to state that the excess arrears under its credit facilities amounted to about $3.8m. Within that same month (July 2007), the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (“IRAS”) issued notices against Food Products (S) for unpaid taxes totaling $1,289,326.32 and appointed UOB, OCBC and DBS as collection agents . In OSA’s reply to IRAS on 21 November 2007, she lamented that IRAS’ Enforcement Division was chasing Food Products (S) for $1.4m when the latter “just [didn’t] have that kind of money” .
The agreement dated 15 March 2008 between OTC and OBC
- [75]
[75] Around this time, OBC and OSA were the only two directors left in the Company. OBC left OSA to do most of the running of the Tong Garden business, since he had his own property development business: he was involved mainly when it came to negotiating with the creditor banks and when OSA needed him to lend money to the Tong Garden Group. By 2007, however, OBC had decided that he no longer wanted to be involved in the Tong Garden business. It was clear to him that the Tong Garden business “was badly insolvent” and that it was “not viable to keep pumping funds into it to prop it up”. It was also clear to him that OSA was unable to run the business and to turn it around by herself . He decided to offer to hand the business over to Ong Siew Lay (“OSL”), one of the sisters who was suing him.
- [76]
[76] On 6 August 2007, OBC sent OSL a letter which he copied to OHC, OSA and two other siblings (Ong Siew Kuan and Ong Siew Chin). In this letter, he noted that the Tong Garden business had not flourished in the Ong siblings’ hands. He also noted that he had his own business pursuits and had only joined the Company because of their mother’s request that he help to “‘salvage’ Tong Garden”, but felt disappointed to have had his efforts taken for granted :
- [77]
[77] OSL did not take up the offer. OBC then contemplated approaching OTC to take over the business. He knew that OTC was running the Thailand operations well; and in May 2007, he had actually broached with OSA the prospect of getting OTC back to run the Tong Garden business – but had met with OSA’s response that between letting OTC take over the business and winding up the Company, she preferred the option of winding up . By late 2007, however, OBC had concluded that if there were to be a winding up, it “would be in the interest of all parties concerned, creditors, employees and shareholders” that this “be done in an orderly manner rather than a sudden closure and assets sold at ‘fire-sale’ prices”. He decided to approach OTC to take over the business. He did not approach OLC or OHC because both of them were bankrupt at that time, and in any event OHC had not responded to the 6 August 2007 letter on which he (OHC) had been copied.
- [78]
[78] Initially, OTC was reluctant to take over the Tong Garden business in Singapore and Malaysia as he knew it was in bad shape . He eventually agreed to OBC’s request that he do so because he too realised it was important to make an effort to pay off the creditors of the business, especially since he remained a guarantor for various loans. He also wanted to prevent the Tong Garden brands from disappearing from the market, even if the business originally started by their father had to die .
- [79]
[79] It was in these circumstances that OTC and OBC entered into the 15 March 2008 agreement . As set out earlier (at [43]), clause 1 of this agreement provided that OBC would sell (or procure the sale of) and OTC would purchase – for $7m – all of OBC’s shares in the Tong Garden Group; all the debts owed to OBC by the Tong Garden Group; and the “Tong Garden” trademark owned by Villawood. In his AEIC, OTC stated that although the 15 March 2008 agreement referred to his being assigned the debts owed to OBC by the Tong Garden Group, the actual agreement between him and OBC was that he (OTC) would guarantee the payment to OBC of these debts: “[i]n other words, [he] would ensure that the relevant companies in Father’s Tong Garden Group repaid the debts. If they did not, [he] undertook to personally repay OBC” . The figure of $7m “represented a global settlement sum for the entire transaction”. The two brothers did not discuss in detail the amount attributable to OBC’s shares or to the Trademarks.
- [80]
[80] In his AEIC, OBC too clarified that he and OTC had not intended for the latter to purchase the debts he was owed by the Tong Garden entities. Instead, their agreement was for OTC to guarantee the return to OBC of “all the monies [he] had loaned to the Company plus all monies [he] had expended via shareholding” . Both brothers were also agreed that OTC “would restructure the business and salvage what could be saved”: in particular, OTC would “ensure that all creditors [were] paid and that the Tong Garden business remained within the family”.
The 2008 restructuring
- [81]
[81] OTC wanted OBC’s support to ensure that he would be able to do what he needed to restructure the Tong Garden business. On 14 January 2008, therefore, OBC issued an internal memorandum within the Tong Garden Group, in which he stated that with effect from that date, the business operations in Singapore and Malaysia would be taken over by OTC, and OSA would retire from the day-to-day management of the business . Once the 15 March 2008 agreement was executed, OBC left the running of the Tong Garden business to OTC.
- [82]
[82] OTC formed the view that it would be “impossible to carry on the business using the same corporate entities” in the Tong Garden Group as they were “plagued with demands for payment” and “burdened” by “severe liabilities” . He decided to invest his own money, time and effort “to build a new business”, as he did not want anything to do with the Company and its subsidiaries. He incorporated new legal entities – Tong Garden Food (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Tong Garden Food (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (referred to in his evidence as the “James Tong Garden Business”) – to carry out business operations in Singapore and Malaysia, and injected capital into these new entities by taking numerous loans and furnishing personal guarantees .
- [83]
[83] As for the Company and the other entities of the Tong Garden Group, OTC “began to gradually wind down [their] operations” by “realising their assets and paying off their creditors as best as possible” . Inter alia, his new Tong Garden entities entered into distributorship agreements with Food Products (S), Food Products (M) and Snack Food (M) whereby the new entities were appointed to carry out the distribution and sale of the latter’s products, with a profit-sharing arrangement . His new entities also bought over some of the business assets of Food Products (S), Food Products (M) and Snack Food (M). These sales were carried out at fair market value after obtaining valuation reports for the items to be purchased; and the proceeds from the sales were used to pay off the creditors of the various Tong Garden companies .
- [84]
[84] According to OTC and OBC, therefore, far from being an attempt by them to plunder the “valuable” assets and business of the Company and the wider Tong Garden Group, the 15 March 2008 agreement and the restructuring thereafter were an effort to wind down a business that had long been struggling financially – and most importantly, to wind it down via an orderly process in which creditors would get paid .
- [85]
[85] OTC also stressed that it was not a surreptitious process at all: he made sure that there was proper documentation of all transactions, that the assets to be purchased from the old Tong Garden entities were valued, and that fair market value was paid for them. In any event, he had no need to be surreptitious : his other siblings knew the poor state of financial health the Company and its various subsidiaries were in; and if any of them wanted to come in to manage these entities, he would have gladly stepped aside – but no one wanted to.
- [86]
[86] In addition, OTC pointed out that far from seeking to take advantage of OHC’s bankruptcy to disregard or damage his interest as a minority shareholder, he had made numerous offers to the Official Assignee (“OA”) to purchase OHC’s shares between 2010 and 2016, even proposing more than once that the purchase price be determined by an independent valuer . None of his offers was accepted.
The transfer of the Thai entities
- [87]
[87] As to the Thai entities, it was not disputed that OTC had from the outset been the one overseeing Tong Garden (T). In her defence, for example, OSA pleaded that OTC had “been managing the business of the Thai Entities from their incorporation to date” . OTC gave evidence that the 2001 Thailand SPA came about because he wanted nothing more to do with the running of the business in Singapore and Malaysia, having grown tired of the constant feuding among his siblings. At a meeting with OHC and OBC on 7 September 2000, he proposed to relinquish his interest in the Tong Garden business “in Singapore, Malaysia, China and elsewhere, in exchange for full control of [Tong Garden (T)]” . OHC and OBC were agreeable. After all, Tong Garden (T) – described in the minutes of the 7 September 2000 meeting as “the smallest entity within the group” – was at that point not regarded as an attractive proposition, being a loss-making company with negative book value .
- [88]
[88] By 26 October 2000, the Company’s solicitors had circulated a draft agreement to give effect to the understanding reached at the 7 September 2000 meeting. On 8 November 2000, Stone Forest Consulting Pte Ltd (“Stone Forest”) – which was then advising the Company on its financial matters – wrote to OHC, OBC, OTC and OSA to set out their advice on how the proposed arrangements should be effected . It was Stone Forest’s advice that there should be two agreements drawn up: one dealing with the sale of the Thai entities to OTC, the other dealing with the sale of OTC’s shares in the Company to OHC, OBC and OSA. In accordance with Stone Forest’s advice and following negotiations between the parties, OTC and the Company executed the 2001 Thailand SPA on 4 January 2001, while the corresponding agreement for the purchase of OTC’s shares in the Company by OHC, OBC and OSA was also executed by the four siblings concerned. According to OTC, although no First Schedule was attached to the 2001 Thailand SPA, it was “understood by all parties that [he] was to purchase the Parent Company’s 39.99% shareholding in Tong Garden (T)”: the reason why the term “Territory” in clause 1 of the agreement was defined so as to include countries such as Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam was to “enable [him] to use the ‘Tong Garden’ and ‘NOI’ trademarks in these countries”.
- [89]
[89] OTC also gave evidence that the sale of shares stipulated in the two agreements was not formalised because of disagreement over an inter-company loan owing by Tong Garden (T) to the Company. According to OTC, “OBC and/or OSA” wanted him to agree to a loan amount which was higher than the amount recorded in Tong Garden (T)’s books . OTC’s requests for documents supporting this higher loan amount were ignored. As a result of the impasse, the transfer of the Company’s shares in Tong Garden (T) to him was not formalised. Nevertheless, as far as OTC was concerned, the parties treated both the agreements as having been executed . On 23 February 2001, OTC tendered his resignation from the directorship of the Singaporean, Malaysian and Chinese entities in which the Company held a direct or an indirect interest. He proceeded to take over Tong Garden (T), pouring his own money into it in an effort to improve the business and treating it as his “own personal business” . The running of the Singapore, Malaysia and China business was left entirely to OHC, OBC and OSA.
- [90]
[90] OTC acknowledged that while he was managing Tong Garden (T) on his own, he had yet to make payment for the Company’s 39.99% shareholding in Tong Garden (T) . Following the 15 March 2008 agreement, he was advised by his lawyers to “complete the legal formalities required under” the 2001 Thailand SPA. It was in this context that he entered into the Variation Agreement with the Company on 20 July 2009. As far as he and OBC (who represented the Company) were concerned, the Variation Agreement did not change any of the material terms of the 2001 Thailand SPA. In particular, no change was made to the provision in the 2001 Thailand SPA that the purchase consideration for the Tong Garden (T) shares was to be based on the NTA of Tong Garden (T) as at 31 December 2000. This was because the parties themselves had always contemplated that they would be bound by the provisions in the 2001 Thailand SPA even though the NTA of Tong Garden (T) as at 31 December 2000 would not actually be determined until sometime after the execution of the agreement .
- [91]
[91] OTC and OBC also asserted that there was nothing surreptitious about the execution of the Variation Agreement. It was approved at the EGM of the Company on 8 October 2009 after notice of the EGM was given to all shareholders, including OHC (through the OA) . As for the valuation of the Tong Garden (T) shares, a firm of valuers (CC Koh & Co) was engaged to prepare a valuation report on the fair market value of the shares based on Tong Garden (T)’s NTA as at 31 December 2000 – as per the provisions of the 2001 Thailand SPA. It was the valuers’ opinion that the shares had negative value as at 31 December 2000 in light of Tong Garden (T)’s negative NTA at that date. That Tong Garden (T)’s NTA was negative as at 31 December 2000 was also evident from the company’s audited accounts and other documents . Indeed, some of these documents included correspondence sent to OHC and minutes of a meeting attended by him: they showed that he had been well aware, at the very least by early 2002, that Tong Garden (T)’s accounts showed a negative NTA ; and yet he had not raised any objections or expressed any consternation until the present litigation. In the circumstances, there was no basis for OHC to complain about the CCK valuation and/or the Valuation Agreement.
Summary of OTC’s and OBC’s case
- [92]
[92] To sum up, therefore: OTC’s and OBC’s position was that the transactions impugned by OHC were genuine transactions for which there were valid commercial reasons. Neither OTC nor OBC had committed any breaches of their fiduciary duties as directors of the Company. Moreover, OHC had known of these transactions for years prior to the present litigation and had not raised any objections for years. In particular, he had been contemporaneously aware of the 2008 restructuring exercise but had not protested then, nor for years afterwards. His present claim for minority oppression had come about only after he realised that OTC had made a success of the 2008 restructuring and that the new companies set up by OTC were doing well. That OHC’s claim of oppression was not genuine and was motivated by greed was seen, inter alia, in his asking – by way of his prayer for “alternative” relief – to be given shares in OTC’s new companies.
- [93]
[93] In any event, OTC and OBC contended that even assuming the breaches of fiduciary duties alleged by OHC were made out, they constituted wrongs done to the Company: OHC himself could not claim to have suffered any loss other than a diminution in the value of his shares in the Company, which was purely reflective of the Company’s loss. His claim, despite being cloaked in the rhetoric of minority oppression, was thus in reality a claim to vindicate corporate wrongs and recover reflective loss.
The law: The general principles applicable to claims of minority oppression
- [94]
[94] Having summarised each side’s narrative as to the alleged acts of oppression, I set out below the general principles applicable to claims under s 216 of the Companies Act. There is no real dispute as between the two sides about what these principles are. In Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd and another [2010] 2 SLR 776 (“Over & Over”), the Court of Appeal (“CA”) agreed with the first-instance judge that there was “no meaningful distinction” between the four limbs of injustice to minorities countenanced in s 216: the “common thread” under s 216 is “some element of unfairness which would justify the invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under s 216” (at [77]). In this connection, the CA cited the judgment of the Privy Council in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 227, a case on appeal from the Federal Court of Malaysia concerning the application of the Malaysian equivalent of our s 216. In that case, Lord Wilberforce held (at 229) –
- [95]
[95] In Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2016] 1 SLR 373 (“Tomolugen”), the CA held (at [88]) that
- [96]
[96] The special treatment of quasi-partnerships was explained in Over & Over. There, the CA noted (at [78]) that while a court in deciding whether to grant relief under s 216 will usually consider the legal rights and the legitimate expectations of members as enshrined in the company’s constitution, a special class of quasi-partnership companies form an exception to this rule. In such cases, shareholders may have enforceable expectations which do not emanate from any articles of association and which are not necessarily submerged in the company’s structure, but which arise from considerations of a personal character between one individual and another that may make it unjust or inequitable to insist on legal rights or to exercise them in a particular way (at [79]). In the context of quasi-partnerships, the courts have “consistently applied a stricter yardstick of scrutiny because of the peculiar vulnerability of minority shareholders in such companies” (at [83]).
- [97]
[97] In the present case, however, OHC has been clear that he does not allege the Company to be a quasi-partnership. He has been clear that his case is not based on equitable considerations arising from some personal relationship of mutual confidence between him, OTC and OBC. While each of the four siblings has at one point or another during these proceedings referred to the business of the Company (and of the Tong Garden Group) as “the family business”, it was evident from the outset that such references to “the family business” meant no more than that the shareholders of the Company were members of the same family. In this respect, the High Court in Leong Chee Kin (on behalf of himself and as a minority shareholder of Ideal Design Studio Pte Ltd) v Ideal Design Studio Pte Ltd and others [2017] SGHC 192 (“Ideal Design”) has noted that it is not the case that a minority oppression claim can succeed only where equitable considerations are superimposed or where the court finds that the company is a quasi-partnership (at [51]):
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