High Court · Decided 2 December 2020
Takaaki Masui v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 265 · Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9178 of 2018/01
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The aim of all sentencing courts, without exception, is to arrive at an appropriate sentence that befits the crime committed by the offender, after having regard to all the relevant facts, circumstances and societal context surrounding the offence. It is this infinite permutation of relevant considerations that renders sentencing a fluid exercise, and which accords the sentencing judge a degree of flexibility and autonomy in arriving at the appropriate sentence. This appropriate sentence is not defined by a rigid formula or a set of unyielding rules. Instead, the court’s discretion is guided by broad general principles of sentencing.
- [2]
[2] In Singapore, the sentencing process is further aided by the recent proliferation of sentencing guidelines and frameworks in our courts’ jurisprudence that guide, rather than restrict, the sentencing court’s discretion. These judicial creations take a wide variety of forms and have been applied to a wide assortment of offences. Constructed well, they are tools that promote consistency and transparency in our criminal justice system (amongst other aims), while reducing uncertainty and arbitrariness. Constructed poorly, they may generate unintended gaps, discontinuities, ceilings and/or minimum sentences which may result in incoherence and uncertainty in the sentencing process.
- [3]
[3] When constructing frameworks and guidelines, the form that each framework or guideline takes is secondary. What matters is its substantive content, and whether it adheres to and abides by the broad general principles of sentencing. The present appeals present an opportunity to revisit some of these broad general principles of sentencing.
Facts
- [4]
[4] The present appeals concern one of Singapore’s largest private sector corruption cases to date. The appellants, Takaaki Masui (“Masui”) and Katsutoshi Ishibe (“Ishibe”), each faces 28 charges under s 6(a) read with s 29(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”) for conspiring with one another to corruptly obtain bribes from one Koh Pee Chiang (“Koh”) as an inducement for doing acts in relation to their employers’ affairs. After a 15-day trial, the District Judge (“DJ”) convicted them on all charges. His decision can be found in Public Prosecutor v Katsutoshi Ishibe and another [2018] SGDC 239 (“Decision”). The DJ sentenced each appellant to 66 months’ imprisonment and a penalty of S$1,025,701 (in default to serve six months’ imprisonment) (Decision at [129], [132]).
- [5]
[5] The first charge for Masui is reproduced as follows:
- [6]
[6] The remaining 27 charges for Masui differ only in respect of: (a) the name of the appellants’ principal as it was renamed after a corporate merger; (b) the date on which the gratification was received; and (c) the amount of gratification received. Ishibe, as the co-conspirator faced the same 28 charges, except that the individual receiving the gratification from Koh was always Masui. For ease of reference, I refer to their respective charges as C1 to C28, with the understanding that each of these refers to one charge for Masui and/or one charge for Ishibe, as the case may be, ie, that C1 represents the first charge proceeded against Masui and/or Ishibe, as the case may be.
Procedural history
- [7]
[7] The appellants appealed against both their conviction and sentence, and their appeals were heard over the course of four non-consecutive days between 26 July 2019 and 21 August 2020.
- [8]
[8] On 26 July 2019, I allowed Ishibe’s criminal motion in Criminal Motion No 35 of 2019 to adduce further evidence in the form of the original charges against him dated 25 February 2015. I also allowed Masui’s criminal motion in Criminal Motion No 36 of 2019 to adduce further evidence in the form of two versions of an email from Masui to Koh dated 10 February 2004, an affidavit from a forensic consultant in respect of the email and the original charges against him dated 25 February 2015.
- [9]
[9] On 24 February 2020, after hearing the parties’ submissions and going through the evidence in substantial detail, I upheld the DJ’s conviction on all 28 charges. However, I amended the gratification quanta stated in the appellants’ C21 from S$102,115 to S$86,275, and C25 from S$137,340 to S$111,211. The total quantum of gratification received by the appellants is thus S$2,009,433.
- [10]
[10] Since the DJ’s decision on 19 September 2018, the law on sentencing for corruption offences has developed rapidly. Two new high court decisions on this general subject were published by the time the hearing of these appeals was completed: Hoo Sheau Peng J’s decision in PP v Tan Kok Ming Michael and other appeals [2019] 5 SLR 926 (“Michael Tan”) which involved the corruption of foreign public officials, and Sundaresh Menon CJ’s decision in Public Prosecutor v Wong Chee Meng and another appeal [2020] SGHC 144 (“Wong Chee Meng”) which laid down a sentencing framework for offences under s 6 read with s 7 of the PCA. I will deal with the impact of these decisions as and when they arise in the course of this judgment.
- [11]
[11] In line with these developments, the parties’ positions have also evolved during these appeal proceedings. To avoid confusion, I have taken the latest positions of the parties to be their final positions and will be referring to them throughout the course of this judgment, unless otherwise stated.
Facts
- [12]
[12] Apart from the exact quantum of the gratification received by the appellants, I am in agreement with the DJ’s findings of fact which can be found at [8]–[73] of the Decision. As this judgment focuses on the appeals against sentence, I shall only reproduce the salient facts as are necessary for an appreciation of the issues on sentence. I will also explain my decision to amend C21 and C25, and Ishibe’s new argument at the end of this section (see [32] onwards).
Background facts relating to the conviction
- [13]
[13] At the material time, the appellants worked as employees of Nissho Iwai Corporation (“Nissho Japan”), and following a merger between Nissho Japan and another company in April 2004, as employees of Sojitz Corporation (“Sojitz Japan”). At various points in their careers with the Japan Company, the appellants were seconded to Singapore to work for the wholly owned Singapore subsidiary of Nissho Japan, namely, Nissho Iwai International (Singapore) Ltd (“Nissho Singapore”). Following the abovementioned merger in April 2004, Nissho Singapore was renamed Sojitz Asia Pte Ltd (“Sojitz Singapore”). For ease of reference, Nissho Japan and Sojitz Japan (of which Nissho Japan became a part of after the merger) will be referred to collectively as the “Japan Company” if the temporal dimension is not important; and Nissho Singapore and Sojitz Singapore (the renamed entity after the merger) will be referred to as the “Singapore Company”. At all times, the appellants were agents of the Singapore Company and Japan Company.
- [14]
[14] The Japan Company is a trading company dealing in various commodities. Two of the products traded overseas by the Japan Company through its overseas subsidiary, ie, the Singapore Company, are edible and industrial wheat flour, the manufacturer and supplier of which is Nippon Flour Mills Co Ltd. (“Nippon Flour Mills”). Nippon Flour Mills would appoint its distribution agent for edible and industrial flour through the Singapore Company.
- [15]
[15] Koh was the sole proprietor of Chia Lee & Co (“Chia Lee”), a longstanding distributor of edible flour for the Singapore Company. From 1978 to 2002, Chia Lee was the sole distributor of only edible flour for Nippon Flour Mills (through Nissho Japan) in Singapore.
- [16]
[16] Both appellants held senior roles in the Japan Company and Singapore Company. Masui started work for Nissho Japan in 1987 and progressed up the ranks. In April 2002, he was seconded to Singapore and was subsequently entrusted with the role of General Manager of Nissho Singapore’s foodstuffs department in January 2004. He left the Singapore office in February 2005. After his return to Japan, he was promoted to General Manager of Sojitz Japan’s foodstuffs department from April 2005 to September 2007. There, he was responsible for the flour business in Japan and oversaw the flour business globally. Ishibe joined Nissho Japan in 1989. In October 2004, he was promoted to Manager of Sojitz Japan’s foodstuffs department. Ishibe was responsible for, inter alia, the sale of flour to the Singapore Company from the Japan Company and thus signed off on various flour packing lists.
- [17]
[17] In the course of their employment, the appellants were in charge of setting the selling price of the edible flour, informing Koh (who was trading as Chia Lee) of the market price and negotiating with him in relation to the edible flour business.
- [18]
[18] Prior to 2002, the industrial flour distributor for Nippon Flour Mills was a company called Sin Heng Chan. When Sin Heng Chan faced severe financial difficulties, Nissho Singapore searched for an alternative industrial flour distributor.
- [19]
[19] Sometime in 2002, the appellants approached Koh and asked him for a “favour”. Specifically, they wanted Koh (and by extension, Chia Lee) to enter the industrial flour business to sell industrial flour.
- [20]
[20] The appellants devised a scheme called the “profit-sharing arrangement” which pertained solely to industrial flour. At that time, the expected profits from the industrial flour business was US$23 per metric ton of industrial flour. Koh would receive US$3 per metric ton while the remaining US$20 would be passed to Masui who would then split it equally with Ishibe. The appellants agreed with each other that they would split the received moneys equally. The appellants claimed that their role was to find customers for industrial flour and negotiate with them. Meanwhile, Koh would handle the administrative paperwork, such as presenting bills of lading to the customers and collecting payments from them.
- [21]
[21] Koh agreed and Chia Lee was subsequently appointed to replace Sin Heng Chan as the industrial flour distributor. This was in spite of the fact that in 2002, Koh had no expertise in the industrial flour business, which operated in a markedly different fashion from the edible flour business.
- [22]
[22] The profit-sharing arrangement began in 2002 and lasted till 2007. The last payment from Koh to the appellants was made on 26 November 2007. Pursuant to this scheme, the appellants accepted numerous payments from Koh. From February 2004 to 26 November 2007, there were 28 distinct payments which formed the basis of Masui and Ishibe’s 28 charges under s 6(a) read with s 29(a) of the PCA. The total quantum of gratification received was reduced from S$2,051,402 to S$2,009,433 (after I amended the amount of gratification received in respect of the two charges referred to earlier at [9]).
- [23]
[23] The profit-sharing arrangement was a corrupt scheme devised by the appellants to extract bribes (ie, gratifications) from Koh in return for them continuing to “support and protect” Chia Lee’s edible flour business.
- [24]
[24] Although Koh remained in the profit-sharing arrangement for close to six years, this was not by choice. The appellants knew that Koh cherished Chia Lee’s role as the sole distributor of edible flour for Nippon Flour Mills in Singapore. Koh depended on it for his livelihood, but more than that, it represented the sum of his life’s work. In Koh’s words:
- [25]
[25] The appellants used Chia Lee’s edible flour sole distributorship as both carrot and stick to ensure Koh’s cooperation in the profit-sharing arrangement. In essence, as long as Koh remained in the profit-sharing arrangement, the appellants would safeguard Chia Lee’s position as the sole distributor of edible flour in Singapore. While the appellants were careful to mask their intention by calling it a “favour”, Koh knew that if he did not comply with their demands, the appellants might introduce new competitors who would sell edible flour in the Singapore market, hence threatening Chia Lee’s dominant market position and negatively affecting its business. When Koh sought to withdraw from the arrangement, the appellants explicitly told him that if he did not wish to continue, “[they] may change other people to do that”, and that they “will not continue to support and protect [Koh] anymore” in respect of the edible flour business. These were threats that Koh took very seriously.
- [26]
[26] I list a few salient features of the “profit-sharing arrangement”.
(a) At trial, Koh’s consistent evidence was that the profit-sharing arrangement was not profitable for him. Even in 2002, his share of the profits (ie, at a fixed rate of US$3 per metric ton) barely covered the costs of doing the industrial flour business.
(b) Over the years, the profits from the industrial flour business increased from US$23 per metric ton to US$40, US$50 and even US$60 per metric ton. Ironically, even though Chia Lee was the company handling the business, Koh’s share of the profits remained constant (ie, at US$3 per metric ton). The benefit of any increases in profits accrued solely to the appellants. Worse still, Koh estimated that as the industrial flour business flourished, the tax liability on the industrial flour business which fell directly on him and Chia Lee, would increase correspondingly as well.
(c) Koh was unable to extricate himself from the scheme, even when it became harmful to Chia Lee, and by extension, Koh who depended on it for his livelihood. When he voiced his concerns about the scheme, the appellants threatened him with the withdrawal of their support and protection for the edible flour business. As a result, Koh felt that he had no choice but to continue his payments to the appellants even when Chia Lee faced grave financial difficulties in 2005.
- [27]
[27] By June 2005, it was clear to the appellants that Chia Lee was in parlous financial straits. On 15 June 2005, the appellants transferred US$240,000 to Chia Lee. The payment was meant to keep the struggling Chia Lee afloat so that their corrupt scheme could continue.
- [28]
[28] Nonetheless, Koh continued to make payments to the appellants up till 26 November 2007. After November 2007, the global financial crisis negatively hit the industrial flour industry. Koh had no more money to pay the appellants and the profit-sharing arrangement thus came to an end.
- [29]
[29] The profit-sharing arrangement was discovered by Sojitz Japan around end 2009. Subsequently, on 26 February 2010, Sojitz Japan terminated the appellants’ employment.
- [30]
[30] Chia Lee continued being the sole distributor of edible flour for Nippon Flour Mills until May 2015 when it ceased operations.
My decision on conviction
- [31]
[31] In this section, I will explain my decision to amend C21 and C25 and deal with Ishibe’s new argument on appeal that he had only received US$50,000 from the profit-sharing arrangement.
(1) The quantum of gratification received by the appellants
- [32]
[32] I begin by laying out how the bribes were quantified.
- [33]
[33] The DJ found that the appellants had received payments totalling S$2,051,402 from Koh. This finding was based on photocopies of Koh’s contemporaneous handwritten notes which listed various amounts earned from the distribution of industrial flour and the sums paid to the appellants (Decision at [19]–[25]).
- [34]
[34] On appeal, the appellants dispute the exact sums received from Koh on the 28 occasions that gave rise to their respective 28 charges, arguing that the documentary records relied upon by the Prosecution to prove these sums were incomplete and unreliable.
- [35]
[35] I should explain that the Prosecution framed the 28 charges against each appellant with reference to several photocopied documents and Koh’s evidence. The sequence of events as narrated by Koh is as follows:
(a) Koh would make contemporaneous handwritten records of the amounts earned from the distribution of the industrial flour (“Handwritten Notes”). These notes included his calculations of the amounts owed to the appellants and the relevant USD/SGD exchange rates at the various points in time.
(b) Koh would then photocopy the original Handwritten Notes using the “photocopy function” on his facsimile machine which then printed them out on thermal paper (ie, exhibit P24). I refer to these as the “Thermal Paper Records”.
(c) Koh would then hand over the amounts owed to Masui along with the original copy of his Handwritten Notes.
(d) Subsequently further copies were made of these Thermal Paper Records (ie, exhibits P21, P22, P23 and P26). I refer to these as the “Photocopied Records”.
- [36]
[36] Counsel for Masui, Mr Nicolas Tang, embarked upon an extensive and meticulous analysis of the Photocopied Records and argued that they do not prove the amounts of gratification received by the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. His most convincing reasons were as follows:
(a) The Photocopied Records were not accurate reproductions of the Thermal Paper Records. Pages were missing from the Photocopied Records, which also included additional markings.
(b) The Photocopied Records could not be relied upon to prove that the appellants received an aggregate sum of S$2,051,402. Koh testified that he would refer to the invoices from the Singapore Company to Chia Lee to determine the buying price of industrial flour, and to the invoices issued by Chia Lee to the buyer to determine the selling price. While some of the Photocopied Records could be verified by referring to those invoices, not all the relevant invoices had been adduced during the trial. In respect of the Photocopied Records in exhibit P26, there were no invoices nor any calculations for the industrial flour transactions from 25 March 2006 to 26 November 2007.
(c) The invoices from Chia Lee and the Singapore Company were unreliable. Koh testified that the invoices from the Singapore Company (ie, to sell Chia Lee the industrial flour) would always be generated earlier than the invoices issued by Chia Lee (ie, to the buyers who purchased the shipment of industrial flour from Chia Lee). Koh agreed that the dates on the original handwritten notes would be the dates on which he received payment from Chia Lee’s buyers for the industrial flour. However, the Photocopied Records in P21, P22 and P23 sometimes predated the dates reflected on those invoices.
(d) Four of the Photocopied Records were visually unclear.
- [37]
[37] To corroborate the sums stated in the Photocopied Records, the Prosecution adduced OCBC bank deposit slips to show that Koh deposited sums into Masui’s OCBC bank account, and bank account statements from Chia Lee’s UOB account to show that Koh withdrew sums of cash from Chia Lee’s UOB account to pay Masui. In respect of this, Mr Tang pointed out that the OCBC deposit slips only covered two payments from Koh to Masui on 7 April 2006 and 26 November 2007.
- [38]
[38] Mr Tang also argued that there were gaps in Koh’s memory as he was also unable to concretely identify which withdrawals from Chia Lee’s UOB bank accounts were for the purpose of paying Masui, as reflected in the Photocopied Records. Koh admitted that he would sometimes withdraw amounts in excess of the sums that had to be paid to Masui for use as petty cash and to pay his workers. He thus could not fully remember the purposes for each withdrawal made. It was also strange that Koh testified that the payments which were the subject of C12 to C15 were “collected by Mr Masui” in cash when Masui was not in Singapore during the relevant period.
- [39]
[39] In the light of the arguments raised by Mr Tang, I directed the Prosecution to prepare a table of evidence (“Table of Evidence”) and allowed parties to file supplementary submissions in respect of this. Subsequently, the Prosecution filed two further table of profits (“the Tables of Profits”).
(a) The Table of Evidence summarised the testimonies of Koh, Masui and Ishibe and listed the invoices and OCBC deposit slips which were available to corroborate the stated quantum of gratification in each charge, along with the relevant references to the Records of Appeal.
(b) The first Table of Profits concerned C1 to C18 and provided a breakdown per charge of the amount of gratification that could be corroborated by reference to Chia Lee’s invoices, the Singapore Company’s invoices, both types of invoices and any further additions or deductions that ought to be made to the various sums. This table also included an additional column listing sums for which there was no corroborating documentary evidence.
(c) The second Table of Profits concerned C19 to C28 and listed the amounts stated, the amounts withdrawn from Chia Lee’s bank account or deposited into Masui’s bank account as reflected in the bank statements and Koh’s explanation in respect of each charge.
- [40]
[40] On 24 February 2020, after reviewing the parties’ submissions and the available evidence in substantial detail, I found that the Prosecution had proved the amounts of gratification received by the appellants from Koh beyond a reasonable doubt, except for C21 and C25 which were respectively amended to reflect a lower amount of gratification received. The appellants did not object to the amendment of C21 and C25.
(A) The quantum of gratification in the 28 charges generally
- [41]
[41] I agreed with the DJ that Koh gave a cogent and credible account of how the Handwritten Notes and the Photocopied Records came to be created, which was corroborated by objective evidence. Koh was able to explain the process of creating each Handwritten Note (see above at [35]). Crucially, Koh was also able to explain the contents within each Handwritten Note as reflected in the Photocopied Records. The Photocopied Records can be split into two groups – those with calculations in P21, P22 and P23 (which reflected the bribe quanta in C1 to C18) and those without calculations in P26 (which reflected the bribe quanta in C19 to C28).
- [42]
[42] First, Koh was able to explain the calculations within each of the Photocopied Records in P21, P22 and P23 in extensive detail. I use the first Photocopied Record (ie, the photocopy of the first Handwritten Note from which the bribe quantum in C1 was derived) as an illustration of this. There were four groups of transactions totaling S$71,773 (ie, the bribe quantum stated in C1). Koh explained that:
- [43]
[43] The sum of S$71,773 was the bribe quantum reflected in C1. As could be seen from the bolded words, the calculation of this sum was in accordance with the profit-sharing arrangement. The same process was repeated for each of the other 17 charges. During cross-examination, Masui agreed that the method of calculation in each Photocopied Record correctly reflected the profit-sharing arrangement between Koh and the appellants.
- [44]
[44] For C1 to C18, Koh’s testimony and the Photocopied Records could be corroborated partially by a mix of invoices from Chia Lee and the Singapore Company. Using the Table of Evidence, the Prosecution pointed out that a total of 306 transactions made up the 18 payments to the appellants (ie, the first 18 charges). Of these 306 transactions, 83% of them were corroborated by at least one invoice (ie, 255 transactions) and 51% of them were corroborated by both Chia Lee and Singapore Company’s invoices (ie, 155 transactions). I agreed with the Prosecution that taken as a whole, there was a high degree of corroboration.
- [45]
[45] Second, in respect of the Photocopied Record in P26 (ie, corresponding to C19 to C28), Koh provided a cogent explanation for why there were no calculations but simply a list of sums passed to the Appellants: in June 2005, Chia Lee was facing grave financial difficulties and Koh simply paid the appellants whatever he could afford. As recognised by Mr Tang (see above at [37]), two of the sums listed in P26 were corroborated by the OCBC bank deposit slips which showed deposits into Masui’s bank account on 7 April 2006 and 26 November 2007 (exhibit P27). These two deposits of S$13,750 and S$82,900 were the same amounts reflected in the C19 and C28.
- [46]
[46] In respect of the Defence’s argument that there were no bank records from Chia Lee prior to 2005, Koh explained that the bank statements might have been thrown away or lost when he shifted his warehouse. For C11 to C28 (excluding C19), Chia Lee’s bank records were available and Koh was able to identify various withdrawals which corresponded to some of the payments made to Masui.
- [47]
[47] While I noted the Defence’s argument that Koh was at times confused and unable to recall details about specific withdrawals in Chia Lee’s bank records, this was unsurprising given the voluminous number of transactions which made up 28 different payments to the appellants and the fact that more than 10 years had passed since the last payment and the first day of trial. Furthermore, as the Prosecution rightly pointed out, Koh did not rely solely on his memory when he identified various withdrawals in the bank statements, but also referred to the exchange rates stated in the bank statements which tallied with what he had recorded in the Handwritten Notes.
- [48]
[48] Ishibe’s counsel, Mr Sunil Sudheesan, submitted that the charges were not made out because the Prosecution did not adduce a complete set of documents. A complete set would mean: (a) signed invoices from Chia Lee; (b) invoices from the Japan Company; (c) bank records showing the withdrawal of moneys by Koh corresponding to each charge in terms of date and amount; and (d) Photocopied Records or Handwritten Notes with legible writing inclusive of dates that corresponded to the withdrawals and/or invoices.
- [49]
[49] I disagreed. The Prosecution must prove the quantum of gratification in each of the 28 charges beyond a reasonable doubt, but this did not mean that the Prosecution had to produce a perfect set of evidence to prove it beyond all doubt. It must be appreciated that the invoices, bank statements and deposit slips served a corroborative purpose. The key evidence relied upon by the Prosecution was the Photocopied Records and Koh’s explanation in respect of them (see above at [35]).
- [50]
[50] It will be obvious from the foregoing paragraphs that the mix of objective records adduced by the Prosecution was capable of corroborating almost all the values stated in the Photocopied Records such that they collectively strengthened their reliability.
- [51]
[51] Furthermore, as observed by the DJ, Koh was an honest witness, “readily admitting when he was unable to recall, rather than fudge.” (Decision at [23]). This gave his evidence (which was already corroborated) a ring of truth and reinforced his credibility. In contrast, Masui, the direct recipient of those moneys, was not a credible witness (Decision at [24]–[25]). He feigned ignorance about the amounts received from Koh and claimed that he did not keep records of the payments. He also asserted that he had never seen or received the Handwritten Notes from Koh. When questioned on how he knew that Koh would not short-change the appellants, Masui blithely claimed that he did not check. This seemed illogical in the light of (a) Masui’s concession that it was important to the appellants that Koh was keeping to his part of the agreement, and (b) the appellants’ joint defence at trial that they had taken joint responsibility for the risks of the industrial flour business and would use the payments to them to cover these risks, if needed.
- [52]
[52] On the whole, I accepted that the Prosecution had proved the values of the bribe quanta in the individual charges (except C21 and C25) beyond a reasonable doubt.
(I) The amended C21 and C25
- [53]
[53] C21 stated that Masui received S$102,115 from Koh on or about 12 July 2006. This sum was reflected as US$65,000 in the Photocopied Record in exhibit P26 (USD/SGD exchange rate of 1/1.571 per the Photocopied Record). The only corroborative evidence in respect of this was Chia Lee’s bank account statements from which Koh identified four withdrawals totalling S$101,734. Koh also stated that he had approximately S$400 on hand which he used to make up the sum of S$102,115. However, Chia Lee’s bank account statement stated that one of the four withdrawals was made on 17 July 2006, five days after the purported payment in C21. This withdrawal was of US$10,000 (ie, S$15,840).
- [54]
[54] C25 stated that Koh passed S$137,340 to Masui on or about 15 February 2007. This sum was reflected as US$90,000 in the Photocopied Record in exhibit P26 (USD/SGD exchange rate of 1/1.576 as stated in the Photocopied Record). However, according to the Photocopied Record, the US$90,000 was transferred on 8 February 2007. Again, the only corroborative evidence was Chia Lee’s bank account statements from which Koh identified four withdrawals totalling $145,237 and stated that he only paid $137,340 and had either kept the remainder or deposited it in the SGD account for other uses. Crucially, the bank statement shows that one of the four withdrawals was made on 13 February 2007, five days after the purported payment in the Photocopied Record. This withdrawal was of US$17,000 (ie, $26,129).
- [55]
[55] Given that the two abovementioned withdrawals occurred after the date reflected in either the charge or the documentary evidence, I was unable to accept that they should be factored into the gratification sums in the charges. I thus deducted the two withdrawals from the respective gratification quantum in C21 and C25. This gave sums of $86,275 and $111,211 respectively.
- [56]
[56] The total gratification quantum was thus reduced from $2,051,402 to $2,009,433. A breakdown of the total gratification quantum is set out at [303] below.
(2) Ishibe’s claimed receipt of only US$50,000 from Masui
- [57]
[57] During the trial, it was common ground between the appellants that Koh always passed the money directly to Masui who would then split it equally with Ishibe.
- [58]
[58] On appeal, Ishibe advanced a new position. He claimed that while there was an agreement to split the moneys equally, he had no knowledge of the true sum passed to Masui and had in fact only received US$50,000. As proof of this, Ishibe pointed to his long statements given to officers from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) on 12 March 2012 and 29 July 2013, and Masui’s statement to CPIB officers on 12 March 2013 that Masui passed “$50,000 to Ishibe”. Ishibe added that there was no objective evidence of the exact sum that Ishibe had received from Masui.
- [59]
[59] I did not accept this argument. During the trial below, the appellants had run their defences on the basis that they had split the moneys equally, as per their agreement. Interestingly, when the sum of US$50,000 was brought up by the Prosecution, this was in the context of exploring inconsistencies between Ishibe’s testimony in court and the version of events given in his CPIB statements. Ishibe’s response was telling and worth reproducing in full:
- [60]
[60] A few minutes later, Ishibe said that the sum of US$50,000 was a net figure that he was left with after covering the losses from the profit-sharing arrangement, but added that “[i]f you ask me that this amount is [a] hundred per cent correct, I am not confident”.
- [61]
[61] Furthermore, it was stated in their joint mitigation plea that “[i]t is also undisputed that Ishibe and Masui shared whatever money received from Koh equally with each other”.
- [62]
[62] In Mohd Suief bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2016] 2 SLR 893, the Court of Appeal clarified that an accused person is, strictly speaking, not precluded from relying upon a defence that is raised for the first time on appeal. However, the appellate court will have regard only to the evidence which had been led at the trial itself to ascertain whether that defence was reasonably available on the evidence before the court at the trial (at [25]). Accordingly, the “defence” that Ishibe only received US$50,000 was not available to Ishibe on appeal as it was unsupported (and in fact, contradicted) by his own testimony and position at trial.
The DJ’s decision on sentence
- [64]
[64] The DJ found it appropriate to adopt a sentencing framework for corruption offences under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA (Decision at [81]) and adopted a sentencing band approach modelled after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 (“Terence Ng”) (Decision at [85]). This comprised four broad steps (Decision at [86] – [111]):
(a) Step 1: Identify the significant offence-specific factors, such as the triggering of the public service rationale, premeditation, and abuse of trust and confidence.
(b) Step 2: Classify the offence into one of the four sentencing bands based on the number of significant offence-specific factors present, and their severity, to derive the indicative starting point sentence within the relevant sentencing band. The sentencing bands set out by the DJ were as follows (Decision at [102]):
Band
Sentence
Offence-specific factors
1
Fine
Less than 2
2
Up to 1 year’s imprisonment
- [2]
[2] or more
3
- [1]
[1] to 3 years’ imprisonment
- [4]
[4] or more
4
- [3]
[3] to 5 years’ imprisonment
- [6]
[6] or more
(c) Step 3: Adjust the indicative starting point sentence to account for offender-specific factors, such as a plea of guilt or criminal antecedents.
(d) Step 4: Adjust the sentence to take into account the totality principle where an offender faced multiple charges, to ensure that the global sentence was not crushing.
- [65]
[65] The DJ referred to the decision of Menon CJ in Public Prosecutor v Syed Mostofa Romel [2015] 3 SLR 1166 (“Romel”), which dealt with private sector corruption. By way of background, Menon CJ identified, for the purposes of sentencing, three categories of cases concerning three different ways by which private sector corruption could manifest (at [26]). In the first category, the receiving party confers a benefit on the paying party, without regard to whether the paying party ought properly to have received the benefit. In the second category, the receiving party forbears from doing what he was duty bound to do, and thus confers a benefit on the paying party. In the third category, the receiving party forbears from inflicting harm on the paying party, even though there may be no lawful basis for such harm to be inflicted. This analytical tool devised by Menon CJ is commonly known, and shall be referred to in this judgment, as the “Romel categories” (for further elaboration, see [A.10] below). Consequently, when I am referring to the Romel categories, I will use the terminology “Romel category 1/2/3”, as the case may be. The DJ found that the appellant’s conduct fell within Romel category 3 as their corrupt scheme interfered with, and deprived Koh of, his legitimate rights. The DJ identified five offence-specific factors (Decision at [112]–[113]): (a) high quantum of gratification; (b) sustained period of offending; (c) heightened culpability of Masui and Ishibe as the masterminds behind the corrupt transactions; (d) significant abuse of trust and authority; and (e) premeditation.
- [66]
[66] The DJ imposed the following starting point sentences (Decision at [121]):
(a) 12 months’ imprisonment for charges where the amount of gratification was less than $30,000;
(b) at least 12 months’ imprisonment for charges where the amount of gratification ranged from $30,000 to $50,000;
(c) at least 15 months’ imprisonment for charges where the amount of gratification was more than $50,000 to $100,000;
(d) at least 18 months’ imprisonment for charges where the amount of gratification was more than $100,000.
Parties’ cases on the appeal against sentence
- [68]
[68] The Prosecution puts forth a five-step sentencing framework modelled after the two-stage, five-step framework adopted in the case of Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 609 (“Logachev”) (as developed in Wong Chee Meng ([10] supra)) which applies to cases under ss 6(a) and (b) of the PCA (“Logachev framework”). Applying its proposed framework, it submits that the sentences and penalties imposed on the appellants are eminently justified on the facts.
- [69]
[69] Masui argues against the imposition of a sentencing framework for corruption offences under s 5 or s 6 of the PCA. He submits that his sentence is manifestly excessive as the DJ had misapplied the sentencing band framework by double counting the offence-specific factors and failing to account for offender-specific factors. An appropriate sentence would be one that is less than the 98-week imprisonment term imposed on the offender in Public Prosecutor v Leng Kah Poh [2014] 4 SLR 1264 (“Leng Kah Poh”) who had solicited and received bribes worth $2,341,508. Masui avers that the penalty imposed by the DJ is erroneous and ought not to exceed $500,525.23 as certain sums ought to be deducted (see [323] below).
- [70]
[70] Ishibe agrees with Masui. Having regard to the precedents, Ishibe argues that a fair sentence would be 12 months’ imprisonment (approximately 52 weeks). In respect of the penalty, Ishibe was originally aligned with Masui in seeking the deduction of various sums from the penalty. However, he subsequently argues that the penalty imposed on him should not exceed US$50,000 given that Masui had only passed him US$50,000.
Summary of issues
- [72]
[72] Bearing the above in mind, the following issues fall for my determination in the appeals against sentence:
(a) First, is it appropriate to develop a sentencing framework for corruption offences under the PCA?
(b) Second, assuming that the first question is answered in the affirmative, what type of framework should be employed and why?
(c) Third, what should the appropriate framework be?
(d) Fourth, applying the framework, what is the appropriate sentence for each appellant?
(e) Fifth, what is the appropriate penalty under s 13 of the PCA?
(f) Sixth, whether this is a case suitable for prospective overruling?
Relevant legal principles
- [73]
[73] Before turning to the specific issues raised, it is useful to make some general observations about corruption offences under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA which penalise corrupt transactions with agents.
- [74]
[74] The relevant legal provisions are as follows:
- [75]
[75] Section 6 of the PCA dates back to the original enactment of the PCA, ie, the old Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 1960 (No 39 of 1960). It predates the wider s 5 of the PCA which criminalises corruption generally and was introduced in 1960 as a means of “providing wider powers to combat corruption” (Song Meng Choon Andrew v Public Prosecutor [2015] 4 SLR 1090 (“Andrew Song”) at [34]). Sections 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA have remained largely unchanged since 1960.
- [76]
[76] There is currently no case in Singapore that sets out a general sentencing framework for the simpliciter offences under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA. I should clarify that I use the term “sentencing framework” in the narrow sense, ie, a framework that explains how the legislatively mandated sentencing spectrum of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years and/or a fine not exceeding $100,000 ought to be spread out across the myriad fact scenarios that come within the ambit of ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA.
- [77]
[77] At present, our sentencing courts have been guided by the landmark decision of Romel ([65] supra) which laid down the Romel categories. This useful analytical tool has helped our sentencing courts to broadly assess the type and seriousness of corruption disclosed in a case of private sector corruption (see [65] above).
- [78]
[78] In the absence of a general sentencing framework, our courts have typically approached sentencing in corruption cases under both ss 5 and 6 of the PCA by having regard to past cases which have identified a number of categories and factors pertinent to the sentencing process (see Wong Chee Meng ([10] supra) at [50] and Michael Tan ([10] supra) at [105]).
- [79]
[79] From the case law on corruption offences generally (ie, under ss 5, 6 and 7 of the PCA), it can be observed that there are four broad categories of corruption:
(a) Category 1: Corruption in the public sector which involves government servants or officers of public bodies. A custodial sentence is the norm for such cases in the light of the strong public interest in stamping out corruption in the public sector (see Romel at [15], Wong Chee Meng at [60]).
(b) Category 2: Corruption in the private sector which engages the public service rationale. For clarity, this refers to the “public interest in preventing a loss of confidence in Singapore’s public administration”. This sentencing principle is presumed to apply in cases of public sector corruption but has been extended to cases where private agents handle public money, supply public services or are involved in government contracts. This category also includes private sector offences that concern regulatory or oversight roles such a marine surveying (see Ang Seng Thor [2011] 4 SLR 217 (“Ang Seng Thor”) at [33(c)] citing Lim Teck Chye [2004] 2 SLR(R) 525 (“Lim Teck Chye”) at [66]–[68], and Romel at [24]). In such cases, a custodial sentence is often the norm (Ang Seng Thor at [33(d)] and Romel at [24]).
(c) Category 3: Corruption in the private sector which does not engage the public service rationale, ie, private sector agents performing purely commercial functions. I refer to this category as “purely private sector corruption”. While there is no norm in favour of non-custodial sentences in private sector corruption cases, the general trend indicates that where private sector agents performing purely commercial functions are concerned, offences which register a lower level of overall criminal culpability may be dealt with through the imposition of fines. However, our courts have repeatedly stressed that whether or not the custody threshold is breached will depend greatly on the “specific nature of corruption” [emphasis in original] that presents itself on the facts (see Romel at [20], Michael Tan at [64]). Examples of cases falling within this category include corruption that results in the loss of confidence in strategic industries such as bunkering or maritime industry (see Ang Seng Thor at [34], and Heng Tze Yong v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 576 (“Heng Tze Yong”) at [39]), the corruption of foreign public officials (see Michael Tan generally and at [72], [108]).
(d) Category 4: Corruption cases for which there are established sentencing guidelines. This is an open category that has been included to accommodate any present and future judgments that provide sentencing guidelines tailored to a specific type of fact scenario. At present, the only types of cases falling within this category are: (a) those relating to sports-betting and match-fixing (see Ding Si Yang v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 229 (“Ding Si Yang”); and (b) cases involving offenders prosecuted under s 6 read with s 7 of the PCA (see Wong Chee Meng).
For the avoidance of doubt, these categories are distinct from the “Romel categories” (see [65] above).
- [80]
[80] Focussing on Category 4, it is pertinent to note that while our courts do typically have regard to precedents when sentencing corrupt offenders, there are in fact only two existing sentencing frameworks for corruption offences.
- [81]
[81] In the recent case of Wong Chee Meng, Menon CJ laid down a sentencing framework which applies solely to aggravated offences under s 6 read with s 7 of the PCA (at [61]). This framework is modelled after the two-stage, five-step Logachev framework. In his judgment, Menon CJ took pains to caution that this framework cannot be “adapted for use with the basic offence under s 6 simply by making … a downward adjustment to the indicative sentencing ranges to account for the lower sentencing range prescribed by the statute”. This is because the public service rationale will be implicated in virtually all cases falling under the aggravated offence under ss 6 and 7 of the PCA, while the same cannot be said for the simpliciter offence under s 6 of the PCA (at [60]).
- [82]
[82] At first glance, the framework in Wong Chee Meng ([10] supra) appears to be a general framework as it applies to all offences under s 6 read with s 7 of the PCA. This may include offences under both Categories 1 and 2, if the offender is convicted under ss 5 or 6 read with s 7. It is also included in Category 4 because: (a) s 7 of the PCA is a punishment enhancement provision that increases the maximum imprisonment term under ss 5 or 6 of the PCA from 5 to 7 years; and (b) it only applies in the specific situation where the offence under ss 5 or 6 of the PCA takes place in relation to contracts with the Government or other public bodies (at [48]). The Wong Chee Meng framework is thus a narrow one when one considers the wide breadth of fact scenarios in which corruption offences may be committed.
- [83]
[83] In Ding Si Yang ([79(d)] supra), I formulated a narrow sentencing framework which applies only in the specific scenario of football match-fixers convicted under s 5 of the PCA.
- [84]
[84] It is not difficult to understand why our courts have, thus far, declined to devise a general sentencing framework for all simpliciter corruption offences under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA.
- [85]
[85] First, while there is a degree of overlap between ss 5 and 6 of the PCA, they are distinct offence creating provisions. Section 5 punishes corruption generally and is of a much wider ambit than s 6, the latter of which focuses on punishing agents who have allowed their loyalty to their principal to become suborned through the corrupt receipt of gratification. Different sentencing considerations may thus be relevant depending on which section the offender is charged under (see Wong Chee Meng at [59], citing Andrew Song ([75] supra) at [31]).
- [86]
[86] Second, focussing more narrowly on ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA, these two provisions will still cover a wide variety of factual scenarios. While “[t]he fact that corruption occurs in a wide variety of circumstances does not, in and of itself, preclude the adoption of a sentencing framework”, it cannot be denied that “[t]he wide variety of acts caught by ss 5 and 6 of the PCA would make [the] crafting of a single sentencing framework applicable to all such offences an extremely challenging task” [emphasis in original] (Wong Chee Meng ([10] supra) at [56] and Michael Tan ([10] supra) at [104]).
- [87]
[87] I end this section with a brief observation that the Prosecution had originally proposed the adoption of a general sentencing framework under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA. In the light of Wong Chee Meng, it no longer maintains this position and instead argues in favour of a general sentencing framework under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA. It is to this question that I now turn.
Issue 1: The appropriateness of a sentencing framework
- [88]
[88] In my judgment, the time has come for this court to lay down a sentencing framework for offences under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA. This framework will be limited to cases of purely private corruption, ie, Category 3, as defined above at [79(c)].
- [89]
[89] In coming to my decision, I have had regard to a long list of approximately 50 precedents involving around 160 individual charges compiled by the Prosecution and supplemented by the Defence. This list represents the majority of the available written decisions on corruption under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA in Singapore.
- [90]
[90] First, given the broad variety of ways in which corruption may manifest itself, a sentencing framework will provide guidance for sentencing courts as to the appropriate sentence in novel or unusual fact scenarios where there are no analogous precedents. Having reviewed the abovementioned list of precedents, I am of the view that the present case is indeed one where there a dearth of analogous precedents. The only other cases involving similarly high aggregate bribe quantum are Leng Kah Poh ([69] supra) and Public Prosecutor v Andrew Tee Fook Boon [2011] SGHC 192. However, these cases can be distinguished on the facts given the egregious conduct of the appellants in abusing their position to extract bribes by threatening Koh. The present case falls within Romel category 3 for which there are few available precedents, and no precedents involving such a high aggregate bribe quantum. Given the lack of analogous precedents, I am thus persuaded that a sentencing framework will help me to determine if the sentences imposed by the DJ are indeed manifestly excessive, and if so, to derive appropriate sentences for the appellants.
- [91]
[91] Second, a sentencing framework will be beneficial for achieving broad consistency in sentencing for purely private sector corruption cases. The word “consistency” here is used in two senses: (a) consistency in methodology; and (b) consistency in sentencing outcome. The former requires sentencing courts to apply a methodology that is broadly consistent when faced with a particular type of case. This needs no further elucidation as it has been amply explained in Wong Chee Meng ([10] supra) at [56]–[57].
- [92]
[92] The latter requires that a sentencing court arrives at broadly the same outcome for the sentences imposed irrespective of the methodology applied given the same equivalent set of facts. Consistency in sentencing outcome requires that all things being equal, sentencing courts faced with two very similar cases should arrive at broadly similar outcomes, irrespective of the methodology used. This is ideal. But the reality is that different methodologies are likely to give rise to different sentencing outcomes, thus the need for a sentencing framework. If the same methodology is applied (as in a sentencing framework prescribed for a particular type of offences), it is more likely for the same sentencing outcome to be reached, provided always that the methodology (ie, the sentencing framework) is well-defined and does not itself lead to different sentencing outcomes when applied to the same set of facts. If it does, then the methodology or the sentencing framework itself needs refinement.
- [93]
[93] Focusing on the latter, I agree with the Prosecution that there are inconsistencies in the case law. For example, in Public Prosecutor v Ng Sing Yuen [2007] SGDC 203 (upheld in Magistrate’s Appeal No 37 of 2007), a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment was imposed for a charge involving $100,000 with aggravating factors like a breach of trust and persistent and sustained offending. Meanwhile in Leng Kah Poh, a charge involving $86,000 with similar aggravating factors only attracted 14 weeks’ imprisonment (or approximately 3.23 months’ imprisonment at 4.33 weeks/month).
- [94]
[94] I acknowledge that full consistency is not possible given that: (a) no two cases are identical on the facts; and (b) a measure of discretion is accorded to sentencing judges in arriving at an appropriate sentence. That said, I believe that a prescribed sentencing framework will help sentencing courts to achieve a broadly consistent sentencing outcome. First, it will help the court to understand where a particular offender falls within the spectrum of the severity of offending. Second, it will enable the court, prosecutors and defence counsel to weed out precedent cases with sentencing outcomes that are wildly inconsistent with the general trend of similar cases. Third, it will cause sentencing courts to apply the same broad methodology, barring exceptional circumstances.
The scope of the sentencing framework
- [95]
[95] It is not appropriate at this juncture to lay down a general sentencing framework that deals with all categories of corruption for all offences under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA.
- [96]
[96] First, the development of a framework that pertains only to purely private sector corruption is in line with the nuanced context-specific approach that our sentencing courts have taken over the course of the past 80 years, ie, in developing lines of case law applicable to the various broad contexts in which corruption occurs (see Michael Tan ([10] supra) at [108]).
- [97]
[97] In this regard, I disagree with the Prosecution’s submission that it is “unclear” if a context-specific framework will be in line with the legislative intention behind ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA given that Parliament has legislated for a single offence-creating provision with a single sentencing spectrum. No authority is cited for this proposition, which ignores the fact that the same context-specific approach has been used by our courts for a variety of offences. Under s 338(b) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) which deals with negligent offenders who cause grievous hurt, the High Court in Tang Ling Lee v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 813 laid down a sentencing framework that applies only to cases involving traffic accidents.
- [98]
[98] The utility of the context-specific approach lies precisely in its ability to recognise that certain aggravating (or mitigating) factors may take on exceptional weight in specified contexts. The context-specific approach is best applied in cases where the offence-creating provision is worded so broadly as to encompass a wide variety of factual situations.
- [99]
[99] Second, the weight that our courts have placed on the public service rationale may well mean that any sentencing framework will have to be applied differently based on the absence or presence of such factors (see Wong Chee Meng ([10] supra) at [60] in respect of the public service rationale).
- [100]
[100] In any event, the present appeals concern a case of purely private sector corruption. It is not necessary for me to formulate a general sentencing framework under ss 6(a) and 6(b) to come to a determination on the present appeals against sentence. As such, the framework that I set out below concerns only cases involving purely private sector corruption under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA. I leave open the question of a general sentencing framework for corruption offences for a future court.
Issue 2: The type, form and design of a sentencing framework
The parties’ submissions on the possible frameworks
- [101]
[101] In the course of these appeals, various models of sentencing have been put forth by the parties. They are alternately described as “sentencing guidelines” and “sentencing frameworks”.
- [102]
[102] For conceptual clarity, where the expression “sentencing guideline” is used in this judgment, it will refer to a court’s guidance as to the presumptive sentences that should be imposed for the commission of an offence in defined factual scenarios (see Terence Ng ([64] supra) at [25]).
- [103]
[103] A sentencing framework as defined above at [76] is a type of sentencing guideline that explains how the entire statutory range of sentences for a particular offence ought to be spread across the myriad fact scenarios that fall under the offence-creating provision. Sentencing frameworks, as a form of sentencing guideline, can be contrasted with another form of sentencing guideline called sentencing “benchmarks”, in which the court identifies an archetypal case (or a series of archetypal cases) and the sentence which should be imposed in such a case. An example of a benchmark sentencing guideline can be found in Wong Hoi Len v Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 SLR(R) 115. There, the High Court found that the benchmark sentence for an uncontested charge of assaulting a public transport worker under s 323 of the Penal Code is 4 weeks’ imprisonment (see Terence Ng at [31]–[32]).
- [104]
[104] The parties’ proposed models take the form of sentencing frameworks.
The five-step sentencing framework (harm-culpability matrix)
- [105]
[105] The Prosecution proposes a five-step sentencing framework modelled on the two-stage, five-step Logachev framework. This framework applies to determine the sentence (per charge) for an offender who claims trial to offence(s) under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA. As in Logachev ([68] supra), the framework can broadly be split into two stages.
- [106]
[106] At the first stage (“Stage 1”), the court has regard to the severity of the offence committed by having regard to all the offence-specific factors present on the facts of the case and arrives at an indicative sentence to reflect it. Offence-specific factors are those which relate to the manner and mode in which the offence was committed as well as the harm caused to the victim or to the wider society. The offence-specific factors can be further grouped into factors that go towards the harm caused by the offence and the offender’s culpability (see Terence Ng ([64] supra) at [39], Logachev at [34]–[36]). In this sense, the overall severity of the offence is determined by the interaction between factors that separately go towards (a) harm, and (b) culpability.
- [107]
[107] At the second stage (“Stage 2”), the court considers all the offender-specific factors to derive a sentence for each individual charge. These are aggravating and mitigating factors that are personal to the offender. They do not relate directly to the commission of the offence but rather, to the personal circumstances of the offender (see Terence Ng at [39], Logachev at [34]–[36]), eg, a plea of guilt. In that regard, the offence-specific factors and offender-specific factors are generally treated as being mutually exclusive in nature.
- [108]
[108] The five steps of the Prosecution’s sentencing framework are as follows:
(a) Step 1: Identify the offence-specific factors that go towards harm and culpability. Culpability, as assessed by the manner, mode and extent of the offender’s involvement in the criminal act, is a measure of his relative blameworthiness. Harm is a measure of the injury caused to the society by the commission of the offence.
(b) Step 2: Identify the applicable indicative sentencing range having regard to the prescribed sentencing range in a sentencing matrix based on the two elements of “harm” and “culpability” (ie, the harm-culpability matrix). The available indicative sentencing ranges set out in the sentencing matrix fall within the spectrum of punishment prescribed by Parliament for ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA.
(c) Step 3: Identify the appropriate indicative starting point for the sentence (“indicative sentence” or “indicative starting sentence” being used and referred to hereafter interchangeably) within the indicative sentencing range identified in Step 2, as determined by an examination of the offence-specific factors.
(d) Step 4: Make adjustments to the indicative starting sentence to account for offender-specific factors.
(e) Step 5: Make further adjustments to the individual sentences, if necessary, to take into account the totality principle.
- [109]
[109] Steps 1 to 3 fall under Stage 1, Step 4 falls under Stage 2 and Step 5 relates to the determination of the final sentence per charge after the court considers the number of sentences of imprisonment to be run consecutively or concurrently for all the charges and the overall imprisonment sentence to be imposed on the offender having regard to the totality principle.
- [110]
[110] There is no substantial dispute in relation to the relevance of the offence and offender-specific factors listed out by the Prosecution and I will not go through them here. Instead, I focus on the determination of the indicative starting sentence.
- [111]
[111] The Prosecution’s harm-culpability matrix is reproduced below (with a mere re-arrangement of the layout of the boxes to reflect increasing harm from the left to the right boxes; and increasing culpability from the bottom to the top boxes and with no change whatsoever to the content or indicative sentencing range specified in each of the boxes). The general manner of spreading out the sentences by the Prosecution is typical of many of such matrices found in precedent cases setting out similar harm-culpability matrices.
- [112]
[112] I previously mentioned that Ishibe had also initially proposed the adoption of a sentencing framework modelled on the Logachev framework. As Ishibe did not delve into the specifics of the structure of his framework in his submissions, I can only assume that Ishibe’s proposed harm-culpability matrix operates in a similar fashion to the Prosecution’s framework but only differs in respect of the sentencing range prescribed for each box in his proposed matrix.
- [113]
[113] Ishibe’s harm-culpability matrix is reproduced as follows:
The graphical analysis
- [114]
[114] In addition to the five-step Logachev framework, Ishibe also undertook a graphical analysis to broadly show that the sentences imposed by the DJ are manifestly excessive when compared to other precedents involving high amounts of gratification.
- [115]
[115] Ishibe collated 13 corruption precedents under ss 5 and 6 of the PCA and plotted the total gratification received in those cases against the eventual imprisonment sentence passed on the offender. The graphs are designed to show the very broad correlation between the overall bribe quanta as a principal determinant of sentence (ie, the independent variable) and the indicative sentence (ie, the dependent variable). Ishibe was not trying to use his graphs to assist in determining an appropriate final sentence for himself based on the total bribe quantum involved in the present appeals.
- [116]
[116] I have not reproduced Ishibe’s graphs as they contain outdated cases (see, for example, the sentence of the offender in Public Prosecutor v Gursharan Kaur Sharon Rachel [2018] SGDC 217 which was recently enhanced on appeal in Michael Tan ([10] supra) at [161]–[162]), and cases involving public sector corruption. Nonetheless, I bear in mind this approach as a possible sentencing framework for purely private sector corruption under ss 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA.
- [117]
[117] The last sentencing framework is the sentencing band framework employed by the DJ. After Hoo J’s decision in Michael Tan, it is clear that this approach is unsuitable for corruption offences under the PCA (Michael Tan at [106]–[108]), and I say no more about it
- [118]
[118] There are thus two proposed sentencing frameworks for my consideration in these appeals, ie, the graphical analysis premised on bribe quantum and the harm-culpability matrix.
A general discussion on the construction of a sentencing guideline or framework
- [120]
[120] In Singapore, the task of issuing sentencing guidelines falls on the judiciary, rather than an executive body specially constituted for this purpose. As was observed by the Court of Appeal in Terence Ng ([64] supra) at [26], there are many forms of sentencing guidelines such as the benchmark approach, the single starting points approach and the sentencing matrix approach.
- [121]
[121] Constructed well, sentencing guidelines are formidable tools that help future sentencing courts work towards collectively achieving key goals such as:
(a) Promoting consistency in sentencing while maintaining an appropriate level of flexibility and discretion for sentencing courts.
(b) Encouraging transparency in reasoning. This is especially when future courts apply a similar methodology which requires them to explain their reasoning processes at different stages of the sentencing analysis.
(c) Creating a coherent picture of sentencing for a particular offence. The sentencing guideline should respect the statutory context by taking into account the whole range of penalties prescribed by the relevant statute. It should also ensure rationality in the spread of sentences and avoid arbitrariness in the indicative starting sentences laid out.
(See Terence Ng at [23] and Benny Tan Zhi Peng, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Sentencing Guideline Judgments in Singapore issued Post-March 2013 and A Guide to Constructing Frameworks” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 1004 at para 20.)
- [122]
[122] In Singapore, sentencing guideline judgments are found in the decisions of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. In accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis, such judgments are binding on any lower courts. This means that they will not only influence the way that future offenders are to be treated by other judges, but also have the potential to radically reform future sentencing trends for a particular offence.
- [123]
[123] It is for this very reason that the decision to lay down a sentencing guideline is not one that is undertaken lightly by our courts. In all cases where a court chooses to do so, the eventual guideline is invariably a product of intense deliberation. At the minimum, the court will have to answer two questions in respect of the type and content of the sentencing guideline.
Question 1: Type of sentencing guideline
- [124]
[124] First, what type of guideline will be best suited for the particular offence or the particular factual matrix? Sentencing guidelines are judicial creations that take many forms. Each comes with its own advantages and disadvantages that may make it uniquely well-suited to a specific context, but completely disastrous in another (see generally Terence Ng ([64] supra) at [26]–[34]).
- [125]
[125] As the parties’ submissions focus on sentencing frameworks, I will not delve into the advantages and disadvantages of other types of guideline judgments such as the benchmark approach. This has been adequately explored by the Court of Appeal in Terence Ng at [31]–[32]. Instead, I focus directly on sentencing frameworks.
- [126]
[126] It will be apparent from my summary of the parties’ proposed sentencing frameworks that sentencing frameworks tend to focus on deriving a preliminary sentence based on the presence or absence of certain key sentencing parameters. The preliminary sentence is then adjusted after the sentencing court has regard to the other relevant factors present in the case. The key sentencing parameters are “independent variables” as they will independently have an impact on the indicative starting sentence for a particular offender. The preliminary sentence is the “indicative sentence” or the “indicative starting sentence” as referred to above. The preliminary sentence is also the “dependent variable” as it is determined by the interaction of the independent variables.
- [127]
[127] To forestall confusion later, I elaborate on the difference between a sentencing parameter and a sentencing factor. A sentencing factor is an aggravating or mitigating factor that exists in the particular factual matrix of the offender’s offence. A sentencing parameter exists because of the design of the sentencing framework in question – the creator of a sentencing framework designs the framework such that any individual applying the framework will have to have regard to one or more sets of considerations (ie, parameters) to arrive at the indicative starting sentence. In some cases, the value and extent of a sentencing parameter may be derived from a number of sentencing factors. For example, the level of harm caused by an offence may be determined by the level of physical and emotional harm suffered by the victim and the public disquiet caused by the offence. In other cases, the value and extent of a sentencing parameter may be derived from just one main sentencing factor. An example of this is in Poh Boon Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2014] 4 SLR 892 (“Poh Boon Kiat”). There, the principal factual elements of vice-related offences were held to be (a) the manner and extent of the offender’s role in the vice syndicate (ie, the chosen primary determinant of offender’s culpability); and (b) treatment of the prostitute (ie, the chosen primary determinant of the harm caused by the offence) at [75]–[76] (see also Terence Ng at [34]). The two sentencing parameters of harm and culpability are thus determined with reference to only one sentencing factor each.
- [128]
[128] Returning to the point at [124], a general sentencing framework may take the form of a single independent variable sentencing framework (“Single Variable Framework” or “Single Variable Sentencing Framework”) that focuses on the presence of one dominant sentencing parameter to determine an indicative sentence. This framework is well suited for offences like drug trafficking and cigarette smuggling for two reasons: (a) there is one principal determinant of sentence for all factual scenarios covered by the offence; and (b) this independent variable is measurable according to a single (usually quantitative) metric (see Terence Ng at [29]–[30]). Ishibe’s graphical analysis is essentially a Single Variable Framework, where the dominant sentencing parameter is taken (or first assumed) to be the amount of gratification received and used to derive an indicative starting sentence, which is then adjusted to take into account all other aggravating and mitigating factors to arrive at the final sentence.
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