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Grounds publishedDecided 22 Jan 2021

General Division of the High Court

Public Prosecutor v Teo Ghim Heng

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[2021] SGHC 13Case no. Criminal Case No 27 of 2019

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This was a tragic case of a double homicide. In addressing the question of the accused’s guilt, the court had to consider the approach to analysing expert psychiatric evidence and the applicable medical diagnostic criteria for depressive disorders in ascertaining whether the accused met the legal criteria for the presence of mental disorder that was relevant to culpability. The court was also presented with novel issues of law concerning the constitutionality of the statutory provisions on murder under the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”).

  3. [2] The accused, Teo Ghim Heng, was charged with the murder of his wife, Choong Pei Shan (“Pei Shan”), and his daughter, Teo Zi Ning (“Zi Ning”). The two charges he faced were as follows:

  4. (a) The first charge was for committing murder, by causing the death of Pei Shan, an offence under s 300(a) of the Penal Code and punishable under s 302(1) of the said Act.

  5. (b) The second charge was for committing murder, by causing the death of Zi Ning, an offence under s 300(a) of the Penal Code and punishable under s 302(1) of the said Act.

  6. The Prosecution stood down a further charge against the accused under s 316 of the Penal Code for causing the death of the unborn baby that Pei Shan had been carrying at the time of her death.

  7. [3] There was little disagreement over whether the elements of the offence of murder were made out. The Prosecution and the Defence co-tendered an Agreed Statement of Facts (“ASOF”) pursuant to s 267(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) – in the ASOF, it was agreed that the accused performed the acts which caused the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning. It was also not disputed that the accused possessed the requisite mens rea of the offence (see [70] below). Indeed, in written closing submissions, the Defence did not contest the issues of actus reus and mens rea.

  8. [4] It was therefore common ground that the main question was whether the Defence had succeeded in establishing the defences which the accused relied on, which were as follows:

  9. (a) The partial defence of diminished responsibility under Exception 7 to s 300(a) of the Penal Code (henceforth referred to as “diminished responsibility” or “the defence of diminished responsibility”). The nub of the Defence’s case was that the accused suffered from a depressive disorder known as Major Depressive Disorder of moderate severity (“MDD Moderate”) at the time of the alleged offences which substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts which caused the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning.

  10. (b) The partial defence of grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to s 300(a) of the Penal Code (henceforth referred to as “provocation” or “the defence of provocation”). The Defence argued that the accused took the lives of Pei Shan and Zi Ning because he lost self-control as a result of provocation by Pei Shan.

  11. The burden of proof was on the accused to prove any of the relevant defences on a balance of probabilities. If the Defence succeeded in proving its case on either diminished responsibility or provocation, the accused would instead be guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under s 304(a) of the Penal Code.

  12. [5] In addition, in closing submissions, the Defence challenged the constitutionality of ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code. The Defence argued that ss 299 and 300(a) ought to be struck down for being (a) in violation of the separation of powers under the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”); and/or (b) in contravention of Article 12 of the Constitution. If the Defence succeeded in this challenge, ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code would be void for being inconsistent with the Constitution – the accused would then have to be either acquitted or tried on an amended charge.

  13. [6] The Prosecution submitted that the defences relied upon were not made out. As regards diminished responsibility, they primarily based their case on the expert psychiatric evidence adduced. They argued that diminished responsibility was inapplicable as it was evident that the accused had not been suffering from Major Depressive Disorder (“MDD”) or any other abnormality of mind at the material time that substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his actions. The Prosecution also argued that (a) provocation was not made out as the circumstances showed that the accused was not deprived of self-control, and (b) the constitutional challenge was without merit. I shall canvass the parties’ detailed arguments later in these grounds.

  14. [7] Having considered the evidence before me and the parties’ submissions, I found that the elements of the offence of murder were established beyond a reasonable doubt for both charges. I also found that the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation were not proven on a balance of probabilities for both charges. Further, I did not accept the Defence’s constitutional challenge as I was of the view that ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code were not inconsistent with the Constitution. I accordingly convicted the accused on both charges, and imposed the mandatory death penalty on him. Following conviction, the Prosecution applied for and was granted leave to withdraw the further charge under s 316 of the Penal Code.

  15. [8] The accused has appealed against my decision. I delivered detailed oral grounds on 12 November 2020 and now set out the full grounds of my decision. I will address first the elements of the offence and the defences relied on by the accused, before addressing the constitutional challenge raised by the Defence.

  16. The facts

  17. [9] A significant portion of the facts were undisputed at trial and are set out in the ASOF. The facts set out below comprise not only those in the ASOF, but also the facts asserted in portions of the accused’s evidence (either in his testimony or recorded statements) that have not been challenged by either party.

  18. Background facts

  19. [10] Prior to and at the time of the offences, the accused, Pei Shan and Zi Ning resided at Block 619 Woodlands Drive 52, #06-64, Singapore (“the flat”). The accused was the sole breadwinner of the family. He was a committed husband and father. The accused had been previously working as a property agent for over a decade. He performed well as a property agent and was financially stable. Between 2013 and 2015, he held the position of Divisional Director at two different real estate companies. According to the accused, he had been drawing a five-figure monthly salary.

  20. [11] In 2015, the accused’s income declined significantly principally because of a downturn in the property market. His family’s expenses, however, did not suffer a corresponding decline. These expenses remained high and well beyond the accused’s income. The accused had to dip into his savings to meet the expenses. Unable to sustain a meaningful income as a property agent, the accused decided to switch employment. By this time, he had resorted to borrowing from friends, colleagues and various financial institutions, and was heavily in debt.

  21. [12] In October 2016, a friend, Lim Zi Jian, Jordan (“Mr Jordan Lim”), introduced the accused to Carpentry Design Works Pte Ltd (“CDW”). Mr Jordan Lim was a sales manager at CDW. The accused was offered employment by CDW as a sales coordinator at a monthly salary of about $1,500. He accepted the offer and worked under the supervision of Mr Jordan Lim. The accused was a conscientious and committed employee and was well regarded, both professionally and personally, by his colleagues and superiors. Mr Jordan Lim described his attitude as “very good”; Mdm Husniyati binte Omar (“Mdm Husniyati”, also known as “Sharlyn”), the accused’s director at CDW, described him as “reliable” and “very hardworking”. The accused kept a consistent and rigorous work schedule, the details of which I will elaborate upon later in these grounds (see [164] below). The accused was working at CDW at the time of the offences.

  22. [13] However, the accused’s income at CDW was wholly insufficient to sustain the accused’s family expenses, and his financial situation continued to deteriorate. He struggled to pay Zi Ning’s school fees. Also, the accused resorted to gambling which became habitual. By the end of 2016, the accused owed some $120,000 to various creditors. He even listed the flat for sale and made plans to sell his car.

  23. [14] Creditors demanded payment from the accused and on one occasion, on 13 January 2017, a former colleague, Dickson Pang Choon Chuang (“Mr Dickson Pang”), turned up at the flat, albeit at the invitation of the accused, to discuss settlement of the debt owed to him. This sparked heated arguments between the accused and Pei Shan over the family’s finances. There were also arguments with Pei Shan over transferring Zi Ning to a less expensive school and Pei Shan’s refusal to take up employment to ameliorate the family’s financial difficulties.

  24. [15] On the evening of 18 January 2017, the accused and Pei Shan had another argument over the state of the family’s finances. The accused informed Pei Shan that he was $70,000 in debt, and was unable to pay Zi Ning’s school fees. Also, he felt pressured because the Lunar New Year was approaching, and his friends were pressing him for repayment of his debts. He again asked Pei Shan to look for part-time employment to help with the family’s expenses. According to the accused, upon hearing this, Pei Shan “hit the roof”. Harsh words were exchanged. During this fight, in anger, the accused brought up Pei Shan’s extra-marital affair with one Mark Mu which allegedly occurred in October 2014. The couple fought for a while, after which they smoked cigarettes before going to bed for the night.

  25. [16] The next day, 19 January 2017, the accused received a text message from the principal of the school that Zi Ning attended. The principal requested payment of overdue school fees amounting to about $1,700. The accused felt “very vexed” by this as he did not have the money to pay the overdue fees. This was not the first time that the accused had received such messages from the principal.

  26. The offences

  27. [17] The next day, 20 January 2017, at about 8.00am, the accused and Pei Shan were readying Zi Ning for school. All three of them were in the master bedroom. Zi Ning had put on her school uniform. As the accused was unable to pay the overdue school fees, he told Zi Ning to change out of her school uniform and into her home clothes. He switched on the television in the master bedroom and told Zi Ning to “watch TV”. Pei Shan, who was sitting at the edge of the bed in the room, asked the accused why Zi Ning was not going to school. He told Pei Shan that he “[did not] have the money to pay [Zi Ning’s] overdue school fees”. He feared that if Zi Ning were to go to school, she might be asked to leave, which would be “very embarrassing” and “[s]hameful”. This again sparked a heated argument between the accused and Pei Shan over the family’s financial situation.

  28. [18] The accused described Pei Shan as “super angry”. The accused claimed that Pei Shan had scolded him and “[said] that [he] was a useless father and husband”. The last thing he recalled Pei Shan saying (in Mandarin) was, “[Zi Ning], look at how useless your father is!” The accused found Pei Shan’s words very “sarcastic and hurtful”. He found the words hurtful and degrading. He testified that he had warned Pei Shan several times in the past not to belittle him in front of his daughter. The accused became “very agitated” and his mind “went blank”.

  29. The strangulation of Pei Shan

  30. [19] As Pei Shan continued scolding him, the accused walked to the en suite bathroom of the master bedroom. There, he retrieved a bath towel and held it in his right hand. He walked up to Pei Shan, who remained seated at the edge of the bed, and stood in front of her. He looped the bath towel around her neck “quite quickly and did not give her much time to react”, and pulled it tightly at the ends forming a tight noose. In his long statement dated 3 February 2017, the accused said that when Pei Shan attempted to pull the bath towel away from her neck, he “pulled with all [his] might and overpowered her”. In his long statement dated 9 February 2017, the accused said that five minutes into strangling Pei Shan, his mind cleared, and he asked himself whether he should stop. He then decided to continue strangling her as he did not want Pei Shan to be saddled with his debts.

  31. [20] The accused released his grip on the bath towel after strangling Pei Shan for about 15 minutes. He observed that she was breathing faintly and that bubbles had formed around her lips. The accused wanted to ensure that Pei Shan was dead. Thus, he removed the bath towel from around Pei Shan’s neck, and proceeded to strangle her with his hands. The accused strangled her “for about ten to 15 minutes”. While he was strangling Pei Shan with his hands, the accused spoke to her in Mandarin telling her to “leave first”, and that he and Zi Ning would “join [her] shortly”. In his long statement dated 3 February 2017, he said that at this point, he had “the intention of killing his entire family”. As Pei Shan was being strangled, Zi Ning remained in the master bedroom playing with her toys and watching television. She did not appear to be aware of what was going on. The accused continued strangling Pei Shan until she stopped breathing completely and was motionless. He then moved Pei Shan’s body further up the bed (as she had been lying on the edge of the bed) and rested her head on a pillow.

  32. [21] The accused then turned his attention to Zi Ning. He reflected on Zi Ning’s situation. After some deliberation, he decided that it would be best to take Zi Ning’s life as well. He rationalised that with her parents gone, Zi Ning would have no one to take care of her.

  33. The strangulation of Zi Ning

  34. [22] The accused sat down on the bed close to Zi Ning. He asked her to sit in front of him, with her back facing him – she complied. He then looped the same bath towel around Zi Ning’s neck. He pulled it tight “with all [his] strength”. As Zi Ning struggled “furiously”, he repeatedly told her to “leave first”, that Pei Shan had “left already” and that he would “join [them] shortly”. After about ten to 15 minutes, the accused felt Zi Ning’s body go limp, and released the bath towel.

  35. [23] The accused observed that Zi Ning was breathing faintly and “wanted to end her life”. He retrieved Zi Ning’s pillow from her bed and rested her head on it. He then strangled her with his hands “for a short while” until she stopped breathing and became motionless. The accused spoke to Zi Ning in Mandarin as he was strangling her. He told her “[y]ou have to go… Daddy will join you shortly”. The accused then left Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s bodies on the bed and went to the study to have a cigarette.

  36. The aftermath of the offences

  37. Immediate aftermath

  38. [24] Following the commission of the offences, on the same day, the accused attempted suicide by slitting his wrists but did not succeed. The cuts did not seem deep enough as the accused stopped bleeding “after about 15 to 20 minutes” and his wounds were “scabbing over” by then. He then decided to commit suicide by consuming “many pills of Panadol” (ie, paracetamol). He left the flat to buy Panadol pills as well as his lunch. He returned with 20 Panadol pills and his lunch. He consumed the pills later in the day (see [27] below).

  39. [26] Later that day, the accused drafted several suicide notes. He prepared a total of four handwritten notes (collectively, the “suicide notes”), which were seized upon his arrest and marked “WDL-W001” to “WDL-W004” respectively. The accused claimed in his long statement dated 3 February 2017 that he wrote a “few notes” addressed to his parents and Pei Shan’s parents, which broadly pertained to how Pei Shan’s and his assets were to be divided after their deaths. He also wrote a note to Pei Shan’s father “posing as [Pei Shan]”. It is important to note that the suicide notes either asserted or suggested that Pei Shan and the accused had agreed to commit suicide after taking Zi Ning’s life. In other words, the suicide notes conveyed the impression that there was a suicide pact between the accused and Pei Shan.

  40. [27] After writing the suicide notes, the accused consumed the 20 Panadol pills he had bought. He then lay on the bed in the master bedroom, next to Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s bodies. He claimed that he felt “groggy”, and expected not to wake up. However, this suicide attempt was also not successful.

  41. Events from 21 January 2017 to 27 January 2017

  42. [28] The next day, 21 January 2017, the accused woke up sometime between 7.00am and 9.00am next to Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s bodies. The accused in fact continued sleeping next to Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s bodies daily until he was arrested on 28 January 2017. He said that in the days that followed (until his arrest), he “made sure that [the bodies of Pei Shan and Zi Ning] were kept in the master bedroom where the air-conditioning was switched on”. He did so partly “out of habit”, and partly because he did not want their bodies to decompose.

  43. [29] Between 21 January and 27 January 2017, the accused claimed that he attempted or intended to commit suicide on several occasions:

  44. (a) On the morning of 21 January 2017, the accused hoped to commit suicide by consuming rat poison. However, he was unable to obtain rat poison from the shops he visited and returned home empty-handed. The accused claimed that on the same day, he “resolv[ed] to commit suicide by jumping to [his] death” the next day. He eventually did not do so.

  45. (b) On 24 January 2017, he contemplated jumping out of his kitchen window but did not have the courage to do so. He claimed he thought of postponing it to the next day but made no attempt then either.

  46. (c) On 25 January 2017, he attempted suicide by consuming 105 Panadol tablets. He felt nauseous and vomited.

  47. (d) On 26 January 2017, he attempted suicide by slitting his left wrist with a penknife but failed to kill himself. On the same day, he mixed a large quantity of insecticide with water and drank the mixture. He suffered from an upset stomach and diarrhoea.

  48. [30] During this period, various persons were looking for the accused, Pei Shan and/or Zi Ning. Many reached out through Pei Shan’s handphone and the accused responded. The accused made up multiple excuses to explain why he and his family were busy or uncontactable. He allegedly did so because he did not want Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s bodies to be discovered before he had succeeded in committing suicide. In addition to the incident involving Zi Ning’s teacher (see [25] above), there were other instances of questionable conduct by the accused. These were:

  49. (a) On 21 January 2017, at about noon, he lied to his mother-in-law on the phone that he and his family would not be going over for dinner that evening because he would be busy at work.

  50. (b) On 22 January 2017, he told his mother that he would not be visiting her for their weekly dinner as he, Pei Shan and Zi Ning were busy “getting ready for Chinese New Year”. He also told her that his handphone was not working, and asked her to contact him on Pei Shan’s handphone number.

  51. (d) On 24 January 2017, the accused received WhatsApp messages on Pei Shan’s handphone from Ms Fai, the principal of the school Zi Ning attended, and one of Zi Ning’s teachers. They wanted to inform Pei Shan of matters to note in anticipation of Zi Ning’s return to school the next day. There was also a WhatsApp message from Pei Shan’s brother, Choong Mun Chen (“Gordon”). Gordon sent the message to remind Pei Shan of the Lunar New Year reunion dinner that Friday (27 January 2017). The accused replied “Ok” to all these messages.

  52. (e) On 26 January 2017, the accused accessed Pei Shan’s Facebook account and changed her cover photo, thereby giving the impression that she was active on social media.

  53. (f) On 27 January 2017, the eve of the Lunar New Year, the accused, Pei Shan and Zi Ning were to attend a reunion dinner with the accused’s parents at 5.00pm, and another dinner with his in-laws at 8.00pm. The accused’s brother called Pei Shan on her handphone at about 5.00pm that day to ask what time they would arrive for the dinner at 8.00pm. The accused answered and said they would not be joining. He promised to update his family (ie, the accused’s family) later on the details. At about 7.30pm, he called Gordon and lied to him that Pei Shan was not feeling well and that he would be sending her to the hospital. The accused also lied that Zi Ning would be spending the night at his sister’s place. At about 8.30pm, he called Gordon again and informed him that Pei Shan was resting in the hospital. He then called Pei Shan’s mother to convey the same. He did so “[e]ven though [Gordon] and [Pei Shan’s mother] were together at the same dinner”, because he “did not want [Pei Shan’s] parents to be overly worried and come visit [him] at [the flat]”. These were all lies. The accused claimed that he made up the story about Zi Ning spending the night at his sister’s place because he “knew that [his] father-in-law loved Zi Ning a lot and would rush down to [his] house to take care of Zi Ning if… Zi Ning was left alone unattended”.

  54. [31] The accused spent the rest of his time between 21 January and 27 January 2017 watching television and YouTube videos in the master bedroom, playing games on his handphone, consuming pornography on the internet, surfing the internet on methods of committing suicide, and smoking in the study. He left the flat to buy food or substances for the purpose of committing suicide.

  55. The arrest of the accused

  56. [32] On the first day of the Lunar New Year (28 January 2017), the accused’s in-laws were looking for him and his family. The accused received two phone calls from Gordon. He wanted to know when the accused and his family would be visiting his in-laws’ house. The accused informed Gordon that Pei Shan was showering and “could not come to the phone”, and that they would reach his in-laws’ house at about 11.00am. By this time, the accused was feeling tremendous pressure as he felt that he “could no longer hide the fact that [he] had killed [his] wife and daughter”. He resolved to burn the bodies of Pei Shan and Zi Ning and immolate himself in the process. He lay next to Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s bodies, poured thinner on the blanket, covered himself and them with it and set it on fire. However, after lying under the blanket for “about 5 seconds”, the accused “[found] the heat unbearable” and rushed out of the master bedroom. He then left the flat and drove to Sembawang Beach planning to drown himself in the sea, but did not do so.

  57. [33] At about 3.30pm that day, the accused returned to the block where the flat was located. He kept a look out for the police and officers from the Singapore Civil Defence Force (“the SCDF”) as he thought that they might have turned up at the flat in light of the fire that he had started. He did not spot any police or SCDF officers. The accused used the payphone at the void deck of the block to make calls to his mother and Pei Shan’s mother. He told them that as a result of an argument between Pei Shan and him, he had been chased out of the flat. He said that the lie was his “excuse to explain why [he] did not visit them”. He explained in the 5 February 2017 long statement that by lying he hoped “to buy [himself] more time to think about what to do next”, and to avoid a situation where his mother and mother-in-law would turn up at the flat. The accused returned to the flat shortly after making the calls from the payphone. He found that the flat was very smoky. He sprayed air freshener in the master bedroom and living room before going to the study to smoke.

  58. [34] At about 6.30pm, Gordon visited the flat, accompanied by his brother-in-law. They rang the doorbell, knocked on the door and windows, and shouted for the family. The accused did not respond. Gordon forced open one of the windows to the flat and noticed a pungent odour. He called the police and reported smelling gas from inside the flat. A short while later, the police and officers from the SCDF arrived. The police officers shouted out to the accused and told him that if he did not open the door, they would enter the flat by force. Just as the SCDF officers were about to force an entry, the accused opened the door. At the insistence of the police officers, he unlocked the metal gate of the flat. The accused then stepped out of the flat, approached Gordon and told him in a calm and soft voice that Pei Shan was dead. He then dashed past Gordon but was apprehended by him, and the police and SCDF officers present.

  59. [35] One of the police officers, Sergeant Jonathan Low Jin Hua (“Sgt Jonathan”), asked the accused what had happened. The accused replied that “[i]t was my fault.” The SCDF officers who entered the flat identified a charred body in the master bedroom. Another police officer, Senior Staff Sergeant Nur Farhana binte Mohamad Nasir (“SSSgt Farhana”), also confirmed the presence of a charred body in the master bedroom of the flat. However, when the accused informed her that he had set fire to the bodies of Pei Shan and Zi Ning earlier in the day, she realised that there were in fact two charred bodies in the master bedroom, which she then confirmed. She placed the accused under arrest for murder.

  60. [36] Shortly after the accused’s arrest, Assistant Superintendent Ravindra s/o Subramaniam (“ASP Ravindra”) from the Special Investigation Section of the police arrived at the flat. ASP Ravindra asked the accused to show him around the flat. The accused pointed ASP Ravindra to a handwritten suicide note, which was placed on the bedside drawer in the master bedroom. The accused told ASP Ravindra that the suicide note had been written by Pei Shan and was addressed to Pei Shan’s father. The accused then pointed ASP Ravindra to three further handwritten suicide notes in the study, which he claimed were written by Pei Shan and him. These four notes collectively were the suicide notes forged by the accused (see [26] above). The suicide notes were seized and sent for forensic analysis.

  61. The recorded statements

  62. [37] After his arrest, the accused was warded at Changi General Hospital (“CGH”). On 29 January 2017, police officers recorded the following statements from the accused at CGH:

  63. (a) a long statement recorded by Assistant Superintendent Arun s/o Guruswamy (“ASP Arun”) on 29 January 2017 at about 2.20pm (“the 29 January long statement”); and

  64. (b) a cautioned statement recorded by Deputy Superintendent Tang Wenhao Jonathan (“DSP Tang”) on 29 January 2017 at about 5.25pm (“the first cautioned statement”).

  65. [38] Subsequently, a total of five long statements (under s 22 of the CPC) and one cautioned statement (under s 23 of the CPC) were recorded from the accused at the Police Cantonment Complex. I have referred to some of these statements in the preceding paragraphs (see inter alia [19] and [20] above). These statements, which were recorded by the Investigating Officer Deputy Superintendent Au Yong Kok Kong, Jonathan (“DSP Au Yong”), were as follows:

  66. (a) a long statement recorded on 1 February 2017 at about 8.40am (“the 1 February long statement”);

  67. (b) a long statement recorded on 3 February 2017 at about 2.55pm (“the 3 February long statement”);

  68. (c) a long statement recorded on 5 February 2017 at about 8.40pm (“the 5 February long statement”);

  69. (d) a long statement recorded on 9 February 2017 at about 5.00pm (“the 9 February long statement”);

  70. (e) a long statement recorded on 12 February 2017 at about 3.25pm; and

  71. (f) a cautioned statement recorded on 12 February 2017 at about 7.05pm (“the second cautioned statement”).

  72. [39] The eight statements in the two preceding paragraphs are collectively referred to as the “recorded statements”. All of the recorded statements were admitted into evidence by agreement, and the Defence did not challenge any of these statements on the grounds that they had been procured by a threat, inducement or promise from the police officers made during the statement recording process. There was also no challenge to the accuracy of the contents of the recorded statements.

  73. The autopsy report

  74. [40] On 29 January 2017 at or about 9.30am, Dr George Paul (“Dr Paul”), a Senior Consultant Forensic Pathologist with the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”), conducted autopsies on Pei Shan and Zi Ning. The relevant portions of his autopsy reports were admitted into evidence through the ASOF.

  75. [41] Dr Paul certified Pei Shan’s cause of death as “strangulation”. He observed multiple injuries on Pei Shan’s neck and near her jaw. His view was that the burns on Pei Shan’s body were inflicted post-mortem. Based on his observations, he concluded that Pei Shan’s external injuries and the injuries to her neck structures within were a result of strangulation, and were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

  76. [42] Dr Paul also observed that the foetus in Pei Shan’s uterus, which was of a gestational age of a little more than six months, was non-viable and its cause of death was the death of the mother.

  77. [43] Dr Paul certified Zi Ning’s cause of death as “consistent with smothering”. He observed multiple injuries on her neck and near her jaw, and was of the view that this was suggestive of smothering. He was of the further view that Zi Ning’s body showed advanced decomposition and post-mortem burn injuries. Based on this, he concluded that the injuries to Zi Ning’s lower face and neck region were representative of a blunt force being applied to those areas, and were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature by smothering.

  78. The parties’ cases

  79. [44] I shall briefly set out here the parties’ respective cases on the elements of the offence of murder and the relevant defences. I will address the parties’ respective positions on the constitutional issues in the latter portion of these grounds (see [206]–[207] below).

  80. The Prosecution’s case

  81. [45] The Prosecution submitted that the elements of the offence of murder were established beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to both charges. They relied on the facts in the ASOF, as canvassed above, as well as the recorded statements. The Prosecution pointed out that the accused admitted to strangling both Pei Shan and Zi Ning, and these were the acts that caused death. This issue was uncontentious. They argued that based on his acts, it was clear that the accused intended to cause Pei Shan and Zi Ning’s deaths. The Prosecution emphasised that the accused, on multiple occasions, admitted that he intended to strangle both Pei Shan and Zi Ning, and that it was clear he wanted to ensure that both Pei Shan and Zi Ning were “motionless” before he stopped.

  82. [46] The Prosecution also submitted that none of the general exceptions to murder was applicable. On diminished responsibility, they relied primarily on the evidence of Dr Yeo Chen Kuan Derrick (“Dr Yeo”), a Consultant with the Department of Forensic Psychiatry of the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”). In brief, Dr Yeo’s position was that the accused did not suffer from any mental disorder at the time of the offences. Instead, his view was that the accused “snapped”, wanted to teach his wife a lesson, and demonstrated “hatred” towards her. I will address Dr Yeo’s evidence in detail in the discussion on whether the accused had established diminished responsibility (see [76]–[190] below).

  83. [47] The Prosecution also relied on the evidence of two other experts – Dr Ong Pui Sim (“Dr Ong”) and Dr Stephen Phang (“Dr Phang”). I will also address the specifics of their evidence at the relevant junctures in the discussion on diminished responsibility. Dr Phang gave evidence as a rebuttal witness, which gave rise to an evidential issue which I will address shortly (see [52]–[61] below).

  84. [48] On provocation, the Prosecution argued that the accused’s conduct, in particular the manner in which he carried out the killings of Pei Shan and Zi Ning, showed that he did not lose self-control. They further argued that the provocation by Pei Shan was neither grave nor sudden and that the accused’s response was entirely disproportionate to whatever provocation he might have received.

  85. The Defence’s case

  86. [49] The Defence’s case centred on the defences mentioned earlier, and not the elements of the offence of murder. In fact, in closing submissions, the Defence did not contest the elements of the offence. Instead, they advanced a three-pronged defence: (a) diminished responsibility; (b) provocation; and (c) the constitutionality of ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code.

  87. [50] On diminished responsibility, the Defence argued that the accused was suffering from MDD Moderate before, during and after the commission of the offences. They relied primarily on the expert evidence of Dr Jacob Rajesh (“Dr Rajesh”), a Senior Consultant Psychiatrist with the Singapore Prison Service, Promises (Winslow) Clinic and the Department of Psychology Medicine at the National University Hospital. I will address Dr Rajesh’s evidence in detail in my analysis of the defence of diminished responsibility (see [76]–[190] below). Dr Rajesh was of the opinion that the accused started suffering from MDD in mid-2016, and the condition progressively worsened. The accused’s performance and behaviour at work, his poor financial circumstances, and his behaviour before, during and after the commission of the offences demonstrated this. The Defence argued that the MDD Moderate substantially impaired the accused’s mental responsibility for the acts that caused the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning. The Defence therefore argued that the court ought to find that diminished responsibility had been made out.

  88. [51] On provocation, the Defence argued that the accused had lost his self-control as a result of the words uttered by Pei Shan on 20 January 2017 immediately before he proceeded to strangle Pei Shan and Zi Ning. It was argued that the facts, as per the ASOF, disclosed that the accused had in fact lost his self-control in response to Pei Shan’s provocation, thereby fulfilling the requirements for provocation under Exception 1 to s 300(a) of the Penal Code.

  89. Preliminary evidential issue: Rebuttal evidence

  90. [52] At the close of the Defence’s case, the Prosecution applied under s 230(1)(t) of the CPC for leave to call Dr Phang as a rebuttal witness. Leave was sought for the purpose of addressing the following: (a) the proper “assessment protocol for forensic examinations”; (b) the correct interpretation of the diagnostic criteria for a diagnosis of MDD (see [113]–[125] below); and (c) the use of “legal definitions” in psychiatric reports, such as Dr Rajesh’s reliance on the doctrine of “masked depression”. The Defence objected on the basis that it would be inappropriate to allow Dr Phang to give evidence after the close of the Defence’s case.

  91. [53] Section 230(1)(t) of the CPC reads as follows:

  92. Section 230(1)(t) “statutorily enshrine[s] the prevailing practice [prior to the 2012 CPC amendments]” (see The Criminal Procedure Code of Singapore: Annotations and Commentary (Jennifer Marie & Mohamed Faizal Mohamed Abdul Kadir eds) (Academy Publishing, 2012) (“CPC Commentary”) at paragraph 12.060). Accordingly, the body of jurisprudence prior to the 2012 CPC amendments on the court’s approach to allowing rebuttal witnesses was relevant.

  93. [54] The Prosecution relied on the cases of Public Prosecutor v BNO [2018] SGHC 243 (“BNO”) and Osman bin Ali v Public Prosecutor [1971–1973] SLR(R) 503 in support of their application. Specifically, they argued that where the burden of proof on/concerning a particular issue was on/upon the accused, the Prosecution ought to be allowed to call rebuttal evidence: see BNO at [61]. This was regardless of whether the Prosecution had anticipated and led evidence on the issue in its case.

  94. [55] In response, the Defence made two arguments relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Public Prosecutor v Bridges Christopher [1997] 3 SLR(R) 467 (“Bridges”), as well as the CPC Commentary at paras 12.061–12.062:

  95. (a) First, the Prosecution could not adduce rebuttal evidence as they had “already put in medical evidence” in the case for the Prosecution; as they had done so, there had been “a complete joinder of issue”. The Prosecution could only adduce rebuttal evidence if they had “elect[ed] not to call an expert as part of [their] case, but rather wait[ed] for the defence” to make their case.

  96. (b) Second, since the Prosecution has already adduced evidence on the relevant issue in the case for the Prosecution, the only situation where they could adduce rebuttal evidence on the same issue after the Defence’s case was if further matters (related to the issue) arose which could not have been reasonably foreseen. That was not the case here – the issues Dr Phang’s evidence sought to address were foreseen by the Prosecution and addressed by Dr Yeo.

  97. [56] I agreed with the Prosecution. Bridges did not in fact support the Defence’s submissions. I reproduce the relevant extract from Bridges below:

  98. While the Court of Appeal did state in the reproduced extract (in the first sentence) that rebuttal evidence was permissible if the issue was not reasonably foreseeable, the subsequent sentence makes it clear that rebuttal evidence was permissible in two alternative situations. First, where the plaintiff (or in this case, the accused) was misled or taken by surprise, ie, the issue was not reasonably foreseeable. The second was where the burden of proof was on the accused. The two situations are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, the fact that the issue was or could have been reasonably foreseen was not a bar to allowing rebuttal evidence if the burden of proof was on an accused.

  99. [57] This interpretation of Bridges is consistent with the decision in BNO. In BNO (at [61]), the court considered whether the rebuttal evidence the Prosecution sought to adduce was either to address an issue that the Prosecution could not reasonably have foreseen, or to address “an issue in respect of which the burden of proof lay upon the Accused”. The court eventually ruled against the Prosecution on both counts, but the analysis in BNO reveals that the court’s approach was to consider both questions (reasonable foreseeability and burden of proof) as alternative, and not cumulative requirements. This, in my view, is the appropriate reading of Bridges. Bridges therefore does not assist the Defence.

  100. [58] The Defence submitted that the analysis in paragraph 12.062 of the CPC Commentary of the case of Jusri bin Mohamed Hussain v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 706 (“Jusri”) supported their argument. The Defence asserted that Jusri stood for the proposition that the Prosecution could call rebuttal evidence only if it elected not to call an expert as part of its case. Jusri does not in fact say that; also, in my view, the CPC Commentary did not support the Defence’s submission.

  101. [59] Referring to Jusri, the CPC Commentary noted that where the Prosecution relies on statutory presumptions, and the burden of proof is thus shifted to the accused, the Prosecution “need not” include in its case evidence that directly addresses the accused’s defence (Jusri at [31]). In such a case, it would be “far more preferable to allow the Prosecution to call expert evidence in rebuttal” (Jusri at [33]). Two things are clear from this. Where the burden of proof is on the accused:

  102. (a) the Prosecution has no obligation to (ie, “need not”) include evidence in its case that addresses the accused’s defence; and

  103. (b) the Prosecution is at liberty to call a rebuttal witness to address the accused’s defence.

  104. [60] The Defence expressed concerns over the apparent unfairness of allowing the Prosecution to have “two bites of the cherry”, as they would effectively be able to adduce evidence on the same issue before and after the case for the Defence. In my view, this argument misses the point for the following reasons.

  105. (a) First, the Prosecution was entitled to call rebuttal evidence because the burden of proof was on the accused to prove his defence. The fact that the Prosecution led evidence in their case on the issue did not change that fact. This is the effect of the decisions in BNO and Bridges (see [57] above).

  106. (b) Second, the accused was in fact advantaged by the Prosecution calling evidence on the issue in their case. Ordinarily, the Prosecution’s evidence on this issue would have been adduced in rebuttal. To the extent that the Prosecution had introduced evidence in their case, the accused had a preview of it. I made the point to counsel for the accused who fairly accepted it.

  107. (c) Third, case law makes it clear that an accused always possesses a right of surrebuttal. The authors of the CPC Commentary noted the observation in Jusri that when the Prosecution calls an expert witness in rebuttal, it would also be preferable to allow the recall of the Defence’s expert to reply to the Prosecution’s rebuttal. I informed the Defence that they would be entitled to call an expert, whether he be Dr Rajesh or some other witness, in surrebuttal if anything arose during the course of Dr Phang’s evidence that called for a response.

  108. [61] I therefore granted the Prosecution leave to call Dr Phang to give rebuttal evidence. This was subject to the Defence leading evidence on any point in surrebuttal, provided leave is granted. However, the Defence did not make this application.

  109. Issues

  110. [62] There were four main issues before me, which I address in turn.

  111. (a) First, whether the elements of the offence of murder were made out on both charges. The burden in this respect, as stated, was on the Prosecution to prove the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

  112. (b) Second, assuming the elements of the offence of murder were made out, whether the defence of diminished responsibility was made out on both charges. The burden of proof was on the Defence to prove diminished responsibility on a balance of probabilities.

  113. (c) Third, whether the defence of provocation was made out on both charges. Here, likewise, the burden of proof was on the Defence to prove the defence on a balance of probabilities.

  114. (d) Fourth, whether ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code were inconsistent with the separation of powers as provided for in the Constitution, and/or Article 12 of the Constitution.

  115. [63] I will briefly address the elements of the offences first, before discussing each of the three defences in turn.

  116. The elements of the offences

  117. The law on murder

  118. [64] The parties did not dispute the elements of the offence of murder under s 300(a) of the Penal Code. The two conjunctive elements under s 300(a) are: (a) an act by the accused that causes death (the actus reus); and (b) the act by which death is caused must be done with the intention of causing death (the mens rea).

  119. [65] The actus reus of murder under s 300(a) of the Penal Code is uncontroversial. Whether an act committed by an accused caused the death of the victim is a question of fact that is to be resolved on the evidence, such as the autopsy report, that is before the court.

  120. [66] On mens rea, it is well-settled that an accused is said to possess an intention to cause death if he or she “aims” to cause death, and strives to “bring about” the outcome of death (see A P Simester et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Bloomsbury Publishing, 5th Ed, 2014) (“Simester and Sullivan”) at p 135). This is to be discerned from the accused’s admission or by inferring intention from an accused’s actions. Further, the Court of Appeal noted in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505 (“Iskandar”) at [34] that it suffices if the intention to cause death under s 300(a) of the Penal Code is formed just before the actual killing takes place. The Prosecution need not prove pre-meditation or a particular motive by an accused. The inquiry focuses on an accused’s subjective state of mind at the time of commission of the relevant offence.

  121. Whether the elements of the offences were made out

  122. Actus reus

  123. [67] In the ASOF, the accused agreed that he strangled Pei Shan followed by Zi Ning, and that he adopted the same modus operandi on both occasions. He first strangled each of them with a bath towel before strangling them with his bare hands until they were motionless. He maintained this position in the recorded statements and in his oral testimony. It was also relevant that in the ASOF, the accused accepted that he caused the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning.

  124. [68] Dr Paul’s findings (see [40]–[43] above) confirmed that the accused’s acts caused Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s deaths. In the autopsy report, Dr Paul noted injuries on their necks and near their jaws. He concluded that Pei Shan’s death was caused by “strangulation”, and Zi Ning’s was “consistent with smothering”. The Defence did not dispute the accuracy of Dr Paul’s findings.

  125. [69] I was therefore satisfied that for both charges, the Prosecution had proved the actus reus of the offence of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

  126. Mens rea

  127. [70] On mens rea, the question was whether the accused had the intention to cause the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning when he acted in the manner that caused their respective deaths. All the evidence pointed to the conclusion that the accused possessed such intention in both cases.

  128. [71] First, the accused’s intentions could be discerned from his conduct at the time of the offences. As noted, the accused stated that while he had been strangling Pei Shan and Zi Ning, he told each of them to “leave first”. It is clear from these statements that his intention was to end their respective lives.

  129. [72] The accused’s answers to questions posed by the Deputy Public Prosecutor in cross-examination put the issue beyond doubt:

  130. From the above, it was clear that the accused possessed the intention to cause the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning. While strangling Pei Shan and Zi Ning, the accused knew exactly what he was doing and the likely outcome of his actions – that of Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s deaths. He was actively attempting to “bring about [that] outcome” (see Simester and Sullivan, [66] supra at p 135). In other words, the accused strangled Pei Shan and Zi Ning with the intention of causing their deaths.

  131. [73] The recorded statements corroborated this.

  132. (a) In the 1 February long statement, the accused stated that he strangled Pei Shan “with the intention of killing her as [he] felt that there was no way out financially for [his] family”.

  133. (b) Similarly, in the 3 February long statement, the accused stated that when he was strangling Pei Shan’s neck with his hands, he had “the intention of killing [his] entire family and committing suicide thereafter as [he] felt there was no way for [them] to repay all [his] debts”. He also stated that he was “committed … to seeing that [his] entire family die[d] with him”, and that he wanted to end Zi Ning’s life. Following this, he proceeded to strangle Zi Ning. These were admissions by the accused that he had possessed the requisite intention.

  134. (c) The 9 February long statement was also pertinent. The accused stated that he had asked himself whether he should have stopped midway into (ie, after around five minutes) strangling Pei Shan. However, he “reasoned” that killing her would release her from the burden of his debts. The accused also claimed that in the moments before he decided to strangle Zi Ning, he had considered whether his sister would be able to look after her and how unhappy she would be as an orphan. In his opinion, it was better for Zi Ning to join him and Pei Shan in death. These admissions again demonstrated that the accused intended to cause Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s deaths.

  135. [74] It was therefore clear from his answers in cross-examination and the recorded statements that the accused intended to kill Pei Shan and Zi Ning. I therefore found that the mens rea of the offence of murder had been established beyond a reasonable doubt on both charges.

  136. Conclusion on the elements of the offences

  137. [75] As the elements of the offence of murder were made out on both charges, the question that remained was whether the defences the accused relied on were made out.

  138. The defence of diminished responsibility

  139. [76] The defence of diminished responsibility, if established, reduces the offence of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The defence is found in Exception 7 to s 300 of the Penal Code, which provides as follows:

  140. [77] The law on diminished responsibility is well-settled. The burden of proof was on the accused to satisfy the court, on a balance of probabilities, that he fulfilled the following three elements of the legal test that (a) he was suffering from an abnormality of mind, (b) such abnormality of mind arose from inherent causes or was induced by disease or injury, and (c) the abnormality of mind substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the acts that caused the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning: see Nagaenthran al/l K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 2 SLR 216 (“Nagaenthran”) at [21]; Iskandar, [66] supra at [79]; Ong Pang Siew v Public Prosecutor [2011] 1 SLR 606 (“Ong Pang Siew”) at [58]; Public Prosecutor v Wang Zhijian (“Wang Zhijian”) [2014] SGCA 58 at [50].

  141. [78] The second limb was of particular importance in the present case as the central plank of the accused’s defence was that he suffered from an abnormality of the mind which was caused by a disease – MDD Moderate – which in turn substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the acts that caused the deaths of Pei Shan and Zi Ning. The accused did not rely on an “inherent cause” or “injury”. Therefore, much of the focus of the evidence at trial and in the closing submissions of the Defence was on the second limb, ie, whether the accused suffered from MDD Moderate at the material time. Significantly less emphasis was placed on the first and third limbs.

  142. [79] As the burden was on the accused, it was crucial to carefully examine how the accused defined his case on MDD Moderate. As MDD is a depressive disorder and therefore a question of expert opinion, extensive expert psychiatric evidence was adduced by the parties in support of their respective positions. I set out below the experts’ respective positions.

  143. The parties’ positions on whether the accused suffered from MDD Moderate

  144. The Defence

  145. [80] The Defence submitted that the accused suffered from MDD Moderate before, during and after the commission of the offences. The condition “substantially weakened his ability to make rational judgments and control his actions”, and this was said to satisfy the test for diminished responsibility. The Defence relied primarily on Dr Rajesh’s evidence in this regard.

  146. [81] Dr Rajesh’s evidence comprised two reports – a report dated 19 October 2018 (“Dr Rajesh’s first report”), and a second report dated 7 May 2019, which was prepared in response to Dr Yeo’s evidence (“Dr Rajesh’s reply report”). Dr Rajesh also gave oral evidence at trial. He examined the accused on four occasions between 28 August and 16 October 2018. The accused was remanded in Changi Prison Cluster B at that time. In forming his opinion, Dr Rajesh also relied on the following sources:

  147. (a) In preparing his first report, Dr Rajesh obtained information on the accused from:

  148. (i) interviews with the accused’s family members;

  149. (ii) the recorded statements;

  150. (iii) the charge sheets; and

  151. (iv) Dr Yeo’s first report (see [85] below).

  152. (b) In preparing his reply report, Dr Rajesh obtained further information on the accused based on:

  153. (i) an interview with Mdm Husniyati;

  154. (ii) an interview with Mr Dickson Pang; and

  155. (iii) three further interviews with the accused on 18 April, 25 April and 7 May 2019.

  156. [82] Dr Rajesh’s position was that the accused suffered from MDD Moderate at the time of the offences. According to Dr Rajesh, the accused’s MDD started in or around mid-2016 with the symptoms progressively worsening with time such that by the time the offences were committed, he was suffering from MDD Moderate. The condition persisted even after the offences. Thus, on the basis of Dr Rajesh’s evidence, the time frame for assessing whether the accused suffered from MDD was the period from mid-2016 to after the commission of the offences.

  157. [83] The specific diagnostic criteria used by Dr Rajesh are addressed below in the discussion on the parameters and analytical framework for my decision (see [95]–[125] below).

  158. The Prosecution

  159. [84] The Prosecution challenged the Defence’s assertion that the accused suffered from MDD Moderate. They argued that the accused was not, at the time of the offences, labouring under any disease that caused an abnormality of mind. They relied primarily on Dr Yeo’s evidence, and on Dr Ong’s and Dr Phang’s evidence where relevant.

  160. [85] Dr Yeo provided two reports – (a) a report dated 21 April 2017 (“Dr Yeo’s first report”), which was prepared shortly after he examined the accused, and (b) a second report dated 15 March 2019 in response to Dr Rajesh’s reply report (“Dr Yeo’s reply report”). He also gave oral evidence in court. Dr Yeo examined the accused on six occasions between 20 February 2017 and 17 April 2017. Dr Yeo also obtained information on the accused from the following sources:

  161. (a) interviews with the accused’s family members namely, his father, mother, older sister and younger brother;

  162. (b) an interview with Mdm Husniyati;

  163. (c) interviews with the accused’s ex-colleagues, Mr Dickson Pang and Mr Jeremy Peh Eng Kuan (“Mr Jeremy Peh”);

  164. (d) documented observations by the nursing staff at the Complex Medical Centre during the accused’s period of remand; and

  165. (e) the charge sheets and summary of facts provided by the police.

  166. [86] Dr Yeo was of the opinion that the accused did not suffer from MDD or any other disease that caused an abnormality of the mind. He accepted that the accused might have suffered from adjustment disorder after the offences, but was of the view that it did not, for obvious reasons, offer him a defence to the charges he faced.

  167. [87] The thrust of Dr Yeo’s evidence was that the accused’s self-reporting of symptoms that supported a diagnosis of MDD was unreliable and unsupported by corroborative evidence. This being the case, there was little to no basis to conclude that he suffered from the symptoms necessary to support a diagnosis of MDD Moderate. Dr Yeo’s further position was that the accused did not suffer from impairment to his social, occupational or other important areas of functioning. This, in his view, was mandatory under the diagnostic criteria for MDD. I will discuss this criteria shortly (see [95]–[125] below).

  168. [88] Before turning to my analysis of the facts of the case, I address two important matters: (a) the approach that ought to be taken in assessing expert psychiatric opinion evidence; and (b) the parameters of my analysis on whether the accused suffered from MDD Moderate.

  169. How expert medical evidence ought to be analysed in the diminished responsibility inquiry

  170. [89] It is established jurisprudence that the second limb of the test for diminished responsibility is a matter of expert medical evidence, and the first and third limbs are findings of fact for the court to make: see Nagaenthran at [27]; Iskandar at [80]; Ong Pang Siew at [59]. Having said that, it must be remembered that: (a) the expert testimony rests on a bedrock of facts that supports the medical opinion being advanced; and (b) the court must be satisfied that those facts have been properly established. The failure to establish the facts will naturally raise questions on the sustainability of the medical opinion. This is established jurisprudence for the defence of diminished responsibility. Indeed, it is true generally speaking of expert testimony of any kind, as per the observations in Anita Damu v Public Prosecutor [2020] 3 SLR 825 at [30] (“Anita Damu”), citing Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21 with approval:

  171. [90] This is particularly true of depressive disorders where the medical opinion is based on a set of symptoms elucidated from self-reporting by the accused and/or from other sources. The recent observations of the court in Kanagaratnam Nicholas Jens v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 887 (“Kanagaratnam”) as well as Anita Damu at [31] are apposite. Kanagaratnam emphasised the need to evaluate the soundness of an expert’s evidence with reference to underlying evidence relied upon and the analytical process that was used:

  172. [91] Anita Damu reiterated the same point, and stressed that in evaluating an expert’s evidence, the court’s task is to scrutinise the underlying facts that form the basis of an expert’s opinion:

  173. [92] Where the factual basis upon which the expert evidence is premised is rejected at trial, the expert evidence “may also be cast in doubt or rejected entirely”: Nagaenthran at [29]. This approach comports with the notion that it is the trial judge, not the expert(s), who is the ultimate finder of fact. As the finder of fact, the trial judge’s task is to scrutinise all the underlying facts that form the basis of an expert’s opinion, and consider all the facts of the case, in particular the specific events before, during and after the offence(s) (see also Nagaenthran at [28]–[29]).

  174. [93] Accordingly, I shall first address the key factual question: whether, based on the established diagnostic criteria for MDD, the facts relevant to support the medical opinion that the accused suffered from MDD Moderate at the material time existed. If this question is answered in the negative, there can be no diagnosis of MDD Moderate, and the accused’s defence of diminished responsibility must accordingly fail. This approach to assessing expert psychiatric evidence for the purpose of the defence of diminished responsibility mirrors that of the Court of Appeal’s in precedents such as Ong Pang Siew and Nagaenthran.

  175. The parameters of my analysis

  176. [94] I now turn to the analytical framework for assessing whether the accused suffered from MDD Moderate. As mentioned, expert medical evidence played a significant role in the parties’ respective cases on this issue. There was no dispute as to the credentials of the experts called to testify, with the disagreement being solely on the conclusions they each advanced.

  177. The diagnostic criteria for MDD

  178. [95] There was consensus amongst the experts on the relevant diagnostic criteria for assessing MDD Moderate. Two sets of diagnostic criteria were relied upon. These were the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Ed) (“DSM-V”), published by the American Psychiatric Association, and the International Classification of Disorders (10th Ed) (“ICD-10”), published by the World Health Organisation (“WHO”). DSM-V and ICD-10 each delineate a set of requirements that have to be fulfilled before an individual can be clinically diagnosed as suffering from MDD.

  179. [96] DSM-V in particular was pertinent. The court has in previous cases applied DSM-V in determining the presence of psychiatric illness in accused persons: for example, in Ong Pang Siew, where the question was whether the accused who was charged with murder suffered from MDD, the Court of Appeal applied the previous iteration of DSM-V, DSM-IV, in assessing the experts’ opinions. For present purposes, there is no material difference between DSM-IV and DSM-V.

  180. [97] ICD-10 is worded slightly differently from DSM-V but for all intents and purposes is consistent with DSM-V as regards the symptoms of and diagnostic methodology for MDD. My analysis is based principally on DSM-V given that DSM-V was used by both sets of experts for their analyses. Where pertinent, I supplement my reasoning with reference to relevant portions of ICD-10.

  181. [98] DSM-V sets out five cumulative criteria for the diagnosis of MDD, namely, Criteria A through E (which I refer to collectively as the “MDD diagnostic criteria”).

  182. Criteria C through E were not disputed; I therefore restrict my analysis to Criteria A and B, which were the areas of focus for both parties.

  183. Criterion A of DSM-V

  184. [99] DSM-V states that the common feature of depressive disorders, of which MDD is a variety, “is the presence of sad, empty, or irritable mood, accompanied by somatic and cognitive changes that significantly affect the individual’s capacity to function.” DSM-V further states that MDD “is characterised by discrete episodes of at least 2 weeks’ duration (although most episodes last considerably longer)” involving clear-cut changes in affect, cognition and neurovegetative functions and inter-episode remission. The nine symptoms listed in Criterion A as well as Criterion B are indicia of such changes in the individual and his behaviour in the relevant period. I refer to the Symptoms in Criterion A as Symptoms (1) through (9) respectively.

  185. [100] As regards Criterion A, DSM-V stipulates the following requirements for a diagnosis of MDD.

  186. (a) Five or more Symptoms must be present during the same two-week period and represent a change in previous functioning.

  187. (b) At least one of the five Symptoms must be either Symptom (1), depressed mood, or Symptom (2), loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities. They must be present most of the day, nearly every day.

  188. (c) If neither of these two cardinal symptoms is present and for the requisite duration, there cannot be a diagnosis of MDD.

  189. (d) With the exception of Symptom (3) (in so far as weight change is concerned) and Symptom (9) (suicidal ideations), the other Symptoms must be present nearly every day.

  190. [101] DSM-V notes that loss of interest or pleasure (Symptom (2)) is “nearly always present, at least to some degree”. In other words, a person with depressed mood will nearly always exhibit loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities, at least to some degree. Therefore, if Symptom (2) is absent, that ought to be adequately explained.

  191. [102] The Symptoms may be observed by third-parties and/or self-reported by the accused. This is plain from the text of the DSM-V (see [98] above, specifically the descriptions of each of the Symptoms) and other passages in DSM-V. The need for third-party observation of the Symptoms was an important aspect of the present case as the thrust of the Prosecution’s case on Criterion A in their written closing submissions was that the accused’s self-reporting was dishonest, and inconsistent or at least unsupported by corroborative evidence, and hence ought to be rejected.

  192. [103] The importance of corroborative evidence was emphasised in Ong Pang Siew at [43] where the Court of Appeal, in referring to DSM-IV, highlighted the significance of ensuring that “the interviews with the patient are carried out carefully”, and explained that “[a]dditional information from people who would ordinarily interact with the patient would be especially useful”. In this regard, DSM-V notes that additional information is relevant and usually required when assessing whether an accused met the legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder that is relevant for a finding of culpability. DSM-V further notes that “family members often notice social withdrawal or neglect of pleasurable avocations”; this was cited with approval in Ong Pang Siew at [41]. Dr Phang also made the same point in his evidence; he highlighted the importance of “information from collateral sources, such as from relatives”.

  193. [104] There is good reason for requiring additional or corroborative evidence in forensic psychiatric examinations. This court in Public Prosecutor v Chia Chee Yeen [1990] 1 SLR(R) 525 observed at [43] that:

  194. This observation was upheld on appeal. This is consistent with the observations in Ong Pang Siew (see [103] above). Dr Phang made very much the same point. The context of a forensic psychiatric assessment was, he emphasised, important. He made the point that “forensic psychiatric patients are actually facing charges”. He was therefore of the view that “it is fundamental in a forensic psychiatric assessment that one has to obtain collateral information”. He pointed out that such information could be from “collateral sources, such as from relatives”. He observed that in present day, it would be easy for an accused person to access the official diagnostic criteria for any psychiatric disorder, “memorise” such criteria, and then “portray” or “rattle off” symptoms to the examining psychiatrist. Accordingly, it would be “absolutely vital and critical to obtain collateral information” in such circumstances.

  195. [105] Dr Yeo also said the same. He emphasised the importance of corroborative evidence in a forensic psychiatric examination undertaken for the purpose of a diagnosis in criminal proceedings. The purpose for which the diagnosis was being sought (ie, to support an acquittal or a conviction) warranted a greater degree of “objectivity”. This could be achieved by seeking corroborative evidence.

  196. [106] The Defence did not disagree that seeking corroborative evidence was appropriate. They accepted that “this is correct practice.”

  197. [107] Therefore, in so far as it was possible, the presence of corroborative evidence supporting the accused’s self-reported Symptoms was important in my determination of whether the MDD diagnostic criteria had been satisfied. This approach was especially warranted in the present case because the accused had not been truthful on several occasions. I cite some instances.

  198. (a) First, upon his arrest, the accused told ASP Ravindra that some of the suicide notes had been written by Pei Shan.

  199. (b) Second, after his arrest, the accused told SSSgt Farhana that he had entered into a suicide pact with Pei Shan.

  200. (d) Fourth, in the 3 February long statement, the accused stated that when he suggested to Pei Shan that the family kill themselves, he “took her silence… as a form of implied consent”.

  201. All of these were lies. The accused forged the suicide notes. Ms Nellie Cheng, a Senior Forensic Scientist with the HSA, stated in her forensic report it was “highly probable” that the same author wrote all of the suicide notes. The accused in fact admitted in the 3 February long statement that he had forged one of the notes to Pei Shan’s father while “posing as [Pei Shan]”. There was in fact no suicide pact. This is evident from the account of events in the ASOF and the recorded statements, ie, that the accused took Pei Shan’s and Zi Ning’s lives against both their wills and not pursuant to a suicide pact between the accused and Pei Shan (see [19]–[23] above).

  202. [108] The lies about the suicide notes and the suicide pact were considered steps by the accused. In this regard, his conduct following arrest is important. As noted at [36] above, when arrested at the flat, the accused had the presence of mind to point ASP Ravindra to a handwritten suicide note, which was placed on the bedside drawer in the master bedroom. The accused then proceeded to lie to ASP Ravindra that this suicide note had been written by Pei Shan and addressed to Pei Shan’s father. He furthered the lie by pointing ASP Ravindra to three more handwritten suicide notes in the study, which he claimed were written by Pei Shan and him. He also lied to SSSgt Farhana that he and Pei Shan had agreed on a suicide pact.

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