General Division of the High Court · Decided 9 December 2021
Ratan Kumar Rai v Seah Hock Thiam and others
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 276 · Case no. Suit No 160 of 2019 and Summons No 2708 of 2021
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Social and commercial interests commonly intertwine and reinforce each other. Venturing into foreign lands, co-adventurers give each other collective wisdom, strength in numbers, and the security of company. Trust is reposed. Responsibilities are voluntarily undertaken. Little may be written, for fear of disrupting the bonds of trust between brothers. Such journeys carry the uncertainty of not knowing when a social obligation becomes a legal one and, inevitably, the possibility that the unwritten code fractures in the face of the diverse risks presented by the horizon.
- [2]
[2] The plaintiff, Mr Ratan Kumar Rai (“Mr Rai”), is a Singaporean businessman who was a practising lawyer for 23 years from 1994 to 2017. His claim pertains to a development of land in Cambodia and is premised on a tight friendship with the first two defendants and Mr Seah Chong Hwee (“Mr SCH”), since deceased. This friendship is not disputed. The first defendant, Mr Seah Hock Thiam (“Mr Seah”), is a businessman with wide business interests. The second defendant, Mr Tan Teck Kee (“Mr Tan”), was formerly a deputy superintendent in the Singapore Police Force, in which he served for some 12 years before he left on 1 October 2010.
- [3]
[3] The third defendant, WorldbridgeLand (Cambodia) Co Ltd (“WBL”), is a real estate company incorporated in Cambodia on 25 May 2011. The chairman of WBL’s board of directors, a Cambodian national named Mr Oknha Rithy Sear (“Mr Rithy”), holds the remaining 51% of its shares, as required by Cambodian law. At the material time, the only other director of WBL was Mr Tan, who is a 49% shareholder of WBL and who was an executive director of WBL from its incorporation on 25 May 2011. He resigned on 19 August 2020 and this resignation took effect on 19 November 2020.
- [4]
[4] A group of Mr Seah’s friends and business associates (“the Singapore investors”) invested in land purchased by WBL. In 2011 and 2012, Mr Rai contributed a total sum of US$5,394,252 towards the acquisition of two plots of land in Cambodia (collectively, “the Land”), which were both purchased by WBL. Subsequently, under a joint venture between WBL and Oxley Holdings Limited (“Oxley Holdings”), where profits were to be shared equally, the Land was developed into a 45-storey twin tower mixed-use development known as “The Bridge”.
Background
- [6]
[6] The two plots of land that together comprised the Land were denoted by the parties as “Plot A” and “Plot B”. They were purchased at separate points in time.
Acquisition of Plot A
- [7]
[7] On 10 October 2011, a sale and purchase agreement was entered into under which Mr Rithy, acting on behalf of WBL, purchased an approximately 7,000m2 plot of land in Phnom Penh (Plot A). A copy of the sale and purchase agreement was tendered during the trial stated that the purchase price of Plot A was US$11,854,100.
- [8]
[8] Mr Rai contributed a sum of US$1,904,000 to the acquisition of Plot A. He paid S$2,500,000 to Mr Seah through three cash cheques dated 10 October 2011, 21 November 2011 and 8 December 2011, of which S$20,851.01 was returned by Mr Seah on 23 December 2011 by way of an OCBC Bank cash cheque.
- [9]
[9] Several other individuals also contributed towards the acquisition of Plot A, including:
- [10]
[10] Mr LEN, Mr TLL and Mr LTL are all Mr Seah’s business partners or acquaintances. It is not disputed that Mr Seah assisted the Singapore investors in the transmission of funds between Singapore and Cambodia, both to and from WBL. Some of those fund transfers were done through Esun International Pte Ltd (“Esun”), a Singapore-incorporated company of which Mr Seah is a director. Mr Seah holds 26.5% of the shares in Esun. His wife, Mdm Lee Poh Choo (“Mdm Lee”), who is also a director of Esun, holds 24.5% of its shares and assisted him with managing the fund transfers.
“Cambodian Investment Funds” document
- [11]
[11] Following the acquisition of Plot A, on or around 1 December 2011, Mr Tan distributed a document titled “Cambodian Investment Funds” to those who had invested in Plot A (“the Cambodian Investment Funds Document”). This document, which was signed by Mr Tan, stated as follows:
Acquisition of Plot B
- [12]
[12] On 29 March 2012, another sale and purchase agreement was entered into under which WBL, acting through Mr Rithy, purchased an approximately 3,000m2 plot of land in Phnom Penh which was adjacent to Plot A (Plot B). A copy of this sale and purchase agreement tendered during the trial stated that the purchase price of Plot B was US$5,424,700.
- [13]
[13] In or around April 2012, Mr Rai contributed a total of US$3,490,252 towards the acquisition of Plot B, in the following sums:
- [14]
[14] Several other individuals also contributed to the acquisition of Plot B:
(a) Mr Rithy and Mr SCH each contributed US$542,470; and
(b) the remaining sum of $849,508 was contributed by Ms Amy Yap (Mr Tan’s “aunty”) and her “group of investors”. The contributor of this sum was previously identified only as “Investor X”.
- [15]
[15] Mr Seah did not contribute towards the acquisition of Plot B.
Joint venture to develop the Land
- [16]
[16] In late 2012 or early 2013, the Land had appreciated in value and the investors concluded it was more profitable to develop it instead of selling it. Mr Seah introduced several potential developers of the Land, including Mr Ching Chiat Kwong (“Mr Ching”), the executive chairman and chief executive officer of Oxley Holdings, a property development and property investment company listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. It is undisputed that Mr Tan was involved in negotiating the details of the joint venture agreement with Oxley Holdings’ Mr Ching. On 15 July 2013, Oxley Holdings (represented by Mr Ching) and WBL (represented by Mr Tan) entered into a joint venture agreement to develop the Land (“the JVA”) into a project which would eventually become known as The Bridge. The Bridge was a mixed-use development comprising 762 residential units, 963 “SoHo” units, five levels of retail units, two food and beverage spaces, and two sky bridges.
- [17]
[17] Pursuant to the JVA, Oxley Diamond (Cambodia) Co Ltd (“Oxley Diamond”) was incorporated on 1 July 2013 as the joint venture vehicle for the development of The Bridge. WBL and Oxley Holdings each hold 50% of the shares in Oxley Diamond. Mr Ching, Mr Tan and Mr Rithy were appointed as directors of Oxley Diamond (with Mr Rithy being the chairman of the board of directors ), with Mr Ching being Oxley Holdings’ nominee director and Mr Tan and Mr Rithy being WBL’s nominee directors.
- [18]
[18] Under the JVA, it was agreed that the net profits earned from The Bridge would be divided equally between Oxley Holdings and WBL.
“Investment Agreement for ‘The Bridge’” document
- [19]
[19] On or around 31 December 2013, Mr Tan provided Mr Rai with a document titled “Investment Agreement for ‘The Bridge’” (“the Bridge Investment Agreement”) of the same date. This document was issued on WBL’s letterhead and signed by Mr Tan. Mr Rai’s copy of the Bridge Investment Agreement provided as follows:
- [20]
[20] Mr Rai’s copy of the Bridge Investment Agreement was signed and acknowledged by him.
Ground-breaking ceremony for The Bridge
- [21]
[21] The ground-breaking ceremony for The Bridge took place in or around May 2014 in Phnom Penh. Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr Tan, Mr SCH and Mr Rithy, among others, attended this ceremony.
Addendum to the JVA
Monthly reports sent by Mr Tan
- [23]
[23] In most months during the period from August 2014 to June 2016, Mr Tan e-mailed Mr Rai and Mr Seah a monthly management report which Oxley Diamond had prepared for WBL. These management reports detailed the progress of the construction and the sale of the units in The Bridge. The last management report which Mr Rai received from Mr Tan was dated 31 May 2016 and received on 7 June 2016. After this, Mr Tan ceased to send Mr Rai any further monthly management reports.
Payouts received by Mr Rai
- [24]
[24] It is not disputed that Mr Rai received four payouts from the defendants, amounting to US$7,058,809 and S$5,379,555, between August 2015 and November 2018:
Commencement of the present suit and discovery orders against WBL
- [25]
[25] According to Mr Rai, he became suspicious of Mr Seah and Mr Tan after reading Oxley Holdings’ press statement dated 29 April 2018 which stated that The Bridge had generated a gross profit of approximately S$140.8m for Oxley Holdings. As an equal partner under the JVA, WBL should have received the same amount of gross profits. In September or October 2018, Mr Rai also read Oxley Holdings’ Annual Report 2018 which stated that The Bridge had been completed and handed over by June 2018 and that 100% of the residential and “SoHo” units, and 86% of the retail units, had been sold. Mr Rai had not received a full account of these profits from the defendants. He then attempted to ask Mr Seah and Mr Tan for more information and for his share of the profits from The Bridge, but they were not forthcoming.
- [26]
[26] On 4 February 2019, Mr Rai filed the writ of summons in the present suit against Mr Seah and Mr Tan. In December 2019, Mr Rai amended his Statement of Claim to add WBL as the third defendant. Subsequently, in February 2021, Mr Rai filed an application for specific discovery against WBL.
- [27]
[27] On 25 March 2021, WBL (through its solicitors in Singapore, Lee & Lee) confirmed to the court that it no longer intended to participate in this suit and Lee & Lee withdrew from representing them.
The parties’ positions on the suit
Mr Rai’s claim that the defendants owe him fiduciary duties to account
The relationship between Mr Rai, Mr Seah and Mr Tan
- [30]
[30] Mr Rai claims that the investment in Cambodia began as a venture by a group of close friends, namely, himself, Mr Seah, Mr Tan and Mr SCH. According to Mr Rai, he and Mr Seah had been friends since 2006. The key thrust of Mr Rai’s claim is that Mr Seah and Mr Tan had assured him on various occasions that they would “take care” of and manage the investment in Cambodia, and that they would be accountable to him. On this basis, and based on his deep friendship with Mr Seah, Mr Rai agreed to invest close to US$2m in Plot A without signing any formal agreement beforehand. Mr Rai contends that Mr Seah played a central role in gathering the Singapore investors to invest; engaging Mr Tan to manage the investment in Cambodia; collecting the contributions from the investors and distributing the payouts; and accounting to the Singapore investors for the same. Meanwhile, Mr Tan was the appointed representative of the Singapore investors tasked with managing the investment. Although he was a director and 49% shareholder in WBL, Mr Tan did not contribute any money towards the purchase of the Land. Mr Rai’s case is that the real decision-making power lay with Mr Seah, who regularly consulted Mr Rai and Mr SCH.
- [31]
[31] The version of events put forth by Mr Seah and Mr Tan is vastly different. They contend that the investment in Cambodia was initiated and driven by WBL, and that they played minor roles in the overall investment.
(a) Mr Seah contends that he was merely another individual investor as Mr Rai was, and he did not manage, control, or have any interest in WBL at all material times. He was not in any position to give instructions to Mr Rithy and/or Mr Tan, nor did he do so.
(b) Mr Tan contends that he was never engaged by Mr Seah. Instead, he was acting in his capacity as WBL’s representative, and was an agent of WBL, at all material times. Mr Tan argues that he does not owe any fiduciary duties to Mr Rai and/or any of the other individual investors, and also denies that Mr Rai reposed full trust and confidence in him. Instead, Mr Rai, as with the other investors, had a direct contractual relationship with WBL.
The agreement between the parties
- [32]
[32] Mr Rai’s case is that in September or early October 2011, he, Mr Seah and Mr SCH entered into an oral understanding to be partners (in a colloquial sense) in a land investment project in Cambodia (“the Oral Understanding”). Shortly after this Oral Understanding was formed, Mr Rai, Mr Seah and Mr Tan met with Mr Rithy to discuss the land investment. At this point, Mr Rithy agreed to join as a partner under the Oral Understanding.
- [33]
[33] Mr Rai contends that Mr Seah was not merely another individual investor who did not manage, control or have any interest in WBL. Instead, Mr Seah was the custodian of the investment fund set up for the purpose of the land investment in Cambodia (“the Investment Fund”) and the promoter of the project, and all the subscribers to the Investment Fund were members invited by Mr Seah. Mr Tan was merely his agent for the purpose of the Investment Fund. In the result, the partners made the following contributions to the Investment Fund in accordance with the Oral Understanding:
According to Mr Rai, Mr Seah and Mr Tan subsequently informed him that the total Investment Fund for all parties’ contributions was US$17,278,800. However, he is unable to verify this as the defendants have declined to provide supporting documents. The moneys from the Investment Fund were then used to purchase the Land.
- [34]
[34] On the other hand, Mr Seah and Mr Tan deny that the Oral Understanding existed. They aver that any communications to Mr Rai were direct communications from WBL to Mr Rai. In particular, they argue that it was not possible for Mr Seah to have communicated directly with Mr Rai as Mr Seah was not conversant in English. They contend that Mr Rai has been inconsistent as to the details of the Oral Understanding arising from differences in his original pleaded case, his AEIC, and his positions at trial and after trial. I deal with this issue at [81]–[90] below.
- [35]
[35] Mr Seah and Mr Tan’s narrative is instead that WBL was incorporated by Mr Tan and Mr Rithy on 25 May 2011 as a real estate company in Cambodia for use in various projects involving land investment and/or development in Cambodia. In or around October or November 2011, WBL, as one of its ventures, intended to purchase Plot A and sell the land at a profit when the price of the land appreciated. Mr Rithy personally contributed 20% of the purchase price for Plot A and WBL then sourced for individual investors to subscribe to the project for the remaining 80% of the purchase price, and Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Rai were all individual investors who invested directly with WBL for the project.
- [36]
[36] Further, the defendants aver that the project was to be managed and administered only by WBL, and that the individual investors (including Mr Rai and Mr Seah) were not entitled to play any decision-making role at all material times. In line with this, the individual investors (such as Mr Rai and Mr SCH) remitted the moneys to Mr Seah and/or his wife, who subsequently remitted such moneys to WBL, simply for convenience and at WBL’s request (as the investors were based in Singapore and WBL was a Cambodian company). There was no agreement between any of the investors that Mr Seah would be the custodian of the funds, and he was not responsible or accountable to Mr Rai and Mr SCH. Instead, at all material times, Mr Seah and/or his wife merely facilitated the transfer of the funds in relation to the project from Mr Rai and Mr SCH to WBL. Mr Seah also denies that he engaged Mr Tan, and argues that Mr Tan was an agent of WBL at all material times.
- [37]
[37] According to Mr Seah and Mr Tan, the terms of the investment, which were conveyed to all the individual potential investors (including Mr Seah and Mr Rai), were as follows:
(a) The funds from the individual investors would be used by WBL to purchase Plot A.
(b) WBL would sell Plot A at a profit when the land price appreciated. After deducting the costs and tax from the sale price of the land, the net profits would be distributed as follows; WBL would receive 10% (being management fees), while the remaining 90% would be split among the investors in accordance with the proportions of their respective investments in Plot A. Mr Seah and Mr Tan deny that they and Mr Rithy were entitled to receive, or did receive, any management fee.
- [38]
[38] The defendants accept that Mr Rai invested a total of US$5,394,252 in the Land, and that the total investment amount was US$17,278,800. However, the defendants contend that Mr Seah invested a total sum of US$2,856,000, Mr SCH invested a total sum of US$1,732,470, and Mr Rithy invested a total sum of US$2,922,470.
Duties owed by the defendants to Mr Rai
- [39]
[39] Mr Rai contends that Mr Seah and Mr Tan owe him fiduciary duties as he reposed full trust and confidence in them at all material times. Mr Rai and Mr SCH had entrusted Mr Seah and Mr Tan with their contributions to the Investment Fund, and Mr Seah and Mr Tan had complete knowledge and control over the use of the Investment Fund moneys for the partnership objective of land development in Cambodia. They knew that Mr Rai relied on what he was told by them about the use of the Investment Fund moneys because Mr Rai had no visibility over the same.
- [40]
[40] As for WBL, Mr Rai’s pleaded case was that WBL held the Land on resulting trust for the investors. Mr Rai’s eventual submission, however, focused on WBL’s joint and several liability to account to Mr Rai as the corporate vehicle receiving dividends from Oxley Diamond and holding on to these moneys even though its beneficial interest was confined to the 10% management fee.
- [41]
[41] On this basis, Mr Rai contends that all three defendants owe him a duty to account for all matters relating to the following:
- [42]
[42] In addition, Mr Rai contends that:
(a) Mr Seah and Mr Tan also owe him a duty to account for all matters relating to the business and financial affairs of the joint venture between WBL and Oxley Holdings, and the business and affairs of Oxley Diamond.
(b) WBL also owes him a duty to account for all matters relating to the use of the Land, and the distribution of profits earned from the sale of the Land.
- [43]
[43] Mr Seah and Mr Tan deny owing Mr Rai any of the above duties.
Mr Rai’s claim that Mr Tan owes him a duty to account as an agent
- [44]
[44] Further or in the alternative, Mr Rai avers that Mr Tan was his agent for the use of the moneys that he had paid for the acquisition of the Land. Under the Cambodian Investment Funds Document, Mr Tan was appointed as the agent of the “Subscribers” who had invested in Plot A, including Mr Rai, to make decisions on the use of the Investment Fund. The same arrangement applied in respect of Plot B. Mr Rai avers that Mr Tan has breached the fiduciary duties so arising by failing to provide him with any account.
- [45]
[45] On the other hand, the defendants aver that it was WBL who issued the Cambodian Investment Funds Document, and that Mr Tan signed this document on behalf of WBL. Mr Tan contends that he did not act as an agent of the investors (including Mr Rai), either individually or collectively. Each investor had a contractual relationship with WBL only, based on the terms and conditions of the Bridge Investment Agreement. Mr Tan acted in his capacity as a representative and agent of WBL at all material times in respect of the project.
Mr Rai’s claim that the defendants have breached their duty to account
- [47]
[47] Mr Rai’s case is that the defendants were, or must have been, fully aware of the financial details of all transactions regarding the Investment Fund, the joint venture between Oxley Holdings and WBL, the Land, the development and sale of The Bridge, and the profits made by Oxley Diamond. Notwithstanding this, in breach of the Oral Understanding and/or their respective duties to account and despite several oral requests for an account by Mr Rai, the defendants refused, failed or neglected to provide a sufficient or proper account to him.
Mr Rai’s claim for an account to be taken on the basis of wilful default
- [48]
[48] Mr Rai seeks an account from both Mr Seah and Mr Tan on a wilful default basis.
- [49]
[49] As against Mr Tan, he argues that the evidence discloses at least three areas of wilful default:
- [50]
[50] Mr Rai contends that Mr Tan has either misrepresented such payments to him or failed to protect his interests by overpaying capital gains and withholding tax to the Cambodian tax authorities. Further, Mr Rai seeks proof of payment to the Cambodian tax authorities for capital gains tax and withholding tax, as well as proof of the validity of the defendants’ calculations.
- [51]
[51] Mr Rai argues that Mr Seah should be made to account to him on the same terms, ie, on a wilful default basis, because Mr Seah’s duties to account are concomitant with Mr Tan’s and Mr Seah’s position is completely aligned with that of Mr Tan. Alternatively, Mr Rai argues that Mr Seah should nevertheless be liable to account on a common basis for:
Relief sought
- [52]
[52] Mr Rai seeks the following relief from the defendants:
- [53]
[53] At the end of the trial, Mr Rai additionally sought for various sums to be paid to him as interim payment.
Summary of issues and decision
Issues
- [54]
[54] The parties’ positions raise the following issues:
Decision
- [57]
[57] I explain the reasons for these findings below.
Whether fiduciary obligations to account are owed by the defendants
WBL
- [58]
[58] It is not disputed that WBL owes Mr Rai fiduciary duties, including the duty to give an account as prayed for. WBL was expressly identified in cl 2 of the Cambodian Investment Funds Document as “the company handling these funds”, and it is not disputed that it received and held the investment moneys from the investors. In its Defence, WBL did not plead any substantive defence to Mr Rai’s claim for an account. In these circumstances, I find that WBL clearly owed Mr Rai a fiduciary duty to account and it is not necessary for me to deal with Mr Rai’s further argument that WBL held the Land on resulting trust for the investors.
- [59]
[59] Mr Seah and Mr Tan contend that only WBL owes Mr Rai fiduciary duties, and it is in this context that I deal with their defences.
Mr Seah and Mr Tan
Legal conditions necessary for a fiduciary relationship
- [60]
[60] In Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals [2017] 1 SLR 654 (“Tan Yok Koon”) at [192]–[194], the Court of Appeal elucidated three principles on fiduciary obligations, as follows:
(a) The hallmark of a fiduciary obligation is that the fiduciary is to act in the interests of another person and must not exploit the relationship for his own benefit.
(b) The term used is unimportant. Equity has imposed obligations upon particular persons because they are carrying on particular activities that require the law’s regulation.
(c) Fiduciary obligations are voluntarily undertaken in the sense that they arise as a consequence of the fiduciary’s conduct. The question is not whether the fiduciary is subjectively willing to undertake those obligations, but rather whether the fiduciary “voluntarily places himself in a position where the law can objectively impute an intention on his or her part to undertake those obligations” [emphasis in original omitted].
- [61]
[61] The precise content of these duties is to be “deduced from the surrounding circumstances, including, and especially, any relationship between the parties” (Tan Yok Koon at [205]). A fiduciary obligation is therefore “a conclusion rather than a premise” [emphasis added], in that the label “fiduciary” is a conclusion reached only once it is determined that particular duties are owed (see Tan Yok Koon at [193].
- [62]
[62] In Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 655 (“Turf Club Auto Emporium”), the Court of Appeal endorsed this approach at [42], and at [43], emphasised that whether the parties are in a fiduciary relationship depends upon the nature of their relationship. The present case concerns parties in a joint venture, who “may or may not share a fiduciary relationship, depending on the circumstances of their relationship” (Turf Club Auto Emporium at [43]).
- [63]
[63] In a case such as the present, where the parties’ rights and obligations are not fully defined in any formal agreement, the observations of the High Court of Australia in United Dominions Corporation Limited v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 1 at 747 are also instructive:
- [64]
[64] Determining the legal query therefore requires an assessment of the following factual issues:
Whether WBL or the Singapore investors initiated the investment
- [65]
[65] Mr Rai’s claim is premised on the Singapore investors being the driving force behind the investment. Plot A was acquired by WBL on 10 October 2011. Prior to the acquisition of Plot A, a “Land Sale and Purchase Deposit Agreement” was signed on 30 September 2011, under which WBL agreed to purchase Plot A at the agreed price and placed a deposit of US$100,000 with the seller of Plot A. The intention to acquire Plot A must, therefore, have been formed by mid- to late 2011 at the very latest. Mr Rai contends that this intention was formed between him, Mr Seah and Mr SCH after they came across Plot A and saw its investment potential given its prime location in a central part of Phnom Penh. Mr Seah and Mr Tan, in contrast, contend that WBL formed the intention to purchase Plot A as one of its land investment ventures, and it was WBL which then sourced for individual investors who would invest directly with WBL.
- [66]
[66] However, Mr Seah and Mr Tan have not adduced evidence of any communications between the individual investors and WBL other than the Cambodian Investment Funds Document distributed in December 2011, which recorded the contributions already made by each investor. The absence of any communications is particularly glaring given that all five investors listed in the Cambodian Investment Funds Document were from Singapore, whereas WBL was a Cambodian company investing in land in Cambodia. Furthermore, WBL was incorporated in May 2011 with a nominal capitalisation of only approximately US$5,000 (20m Cambodian riel). The defendants have provided no explanation for why a group of Singapore investors would have, without any prior written communication with WBL, made substantial investments of at least US$1.1m each into a newly incorporated Cambodian company with such low capitalisation and no prior track record of land investments. Mr Seah and Mr Tan’s assertion that the land investment was initiated and driven by WBL is therefore implausible.
- [67]
[67] On the other hand, Mr Rai’s version of events coheres with the evidence.
- [68]
[68] As a matter of background and context, it is undisputed that Mr Seah and Mr Tan had known Mr Rai for several years before the acquisition of Plot A. Mr Tan states that he met Mr Rai in 2005 through their mutual friends and introduced him to Mr Seah in 2007 or 2008. While this casts some doubt on Mr Rai’s contention that he had been friends with Mr Seah since 2006, it is clear that Mr Rai shared a close personal friendship with the two men before the acquisition of Plot A. Mr Rai would join their social drinking and karaoke sessions from time to time. Mr Seah described them as “good friends” and “brothers”, and Mr Tan similarly said that Mr Rai trusted him “as a friend” at the time of entering into the investment.
- [69]
[69] It was also undisputed that Mr Seah and Mr Tan had a close working partnership that was known to Mr Rai. Mr Seah and Mr Tan had known each other since 2007, and they were very close friends who met regularly for drinking sessions. When Mr Tan left the police force in 2010, Mr Seah gave him a monthly allowance of $6,000 to $8,000 to support his family for several months, possibly “even a year or more, until [he made] the first buck”. Mr Seah also offered him various employment and business opportunities, and when Mr Tan decided that he could not “value-add” to Mr Seah’s existing businesses, he told Mr Seah of his plan to try to start businesses in Cambodia. Mr Tan began working in Cambodia and sourcing for business opportunities there as early as the end of 2010.
- [70]
[70] It was in this context that, in 2010 and 2011, Mr Rai visited Cambodia several times on social visits, sometimes individually and sometimes together with Mr Seah and Mr SCH. During these trips to Cambodia, they observed that Phnom Penh was developing rapidly and they began to discuss the possibility of investing in Cambodian land together and looking at potential sites. Plot A was identified during one such trip in the first half of 2011, and after some consideration Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Rai selected Plot A for their investment around mid-2011. Mr Rai was unable to produce his old passport or any other documents (such as flight tickets) showing the dates of his trips to Cambodia in 2010 and 2011, but his explanation that he did not retain copies of these documents from ten years ago is plausible. Mr Rai’s account is also corroborated by Mr Seah’s passport records, which show that Mr Seah visited Cambodia from 27 February to 2 March 2011, 9 to 11 September 2011, and 6 to 9 October 2011; and Mr LTL, who recalls that he visited Cambodia with Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr Tan, Mr LEN and Mr SCH on or around 6 October 2011 to view Plot A. The day after Mr Seah left Cambodia on 9 October 2011, WBL signed the sale and purchase agreement for Plot A on 10 October 2011.
- [71]
[71] Concurrently, while the prospective investors were considering potential sites for their investment, they would also have needed to consider how to go about purchasing the land they selected. Ms Vanseka Sok (“Ms Sok”), the managing partner of a law firm in Cambodia with about ten years’ experience of practice in Cambodian land law, banking and finance law and regulatory compliance, gave evidence that Cambodian law does not permit foreign nationals to own land in Cambodia, and that a Cambodian company is entitled to own land in Cambodia only if at least 51% of its shares are held by a Cambodian national. Therefore, the Singapore investors would have had to purchase Plot A through a Cambodian company with at least 51% of its shares owned by a Cambodian national. Mr Rai, Mr Seah and Mr LTL were all well aware of this requirement; indeed, Mr Seah testified that “[e]veryone” knew this before Plot A was acquired. WBL was therefore incorporated in Cambodia in May 2011 with Mr Rithy holding 51% of its shares and Mr Tan holding the remaining 49%.
- [72]
[72] At the time of its incorporation, WBL’s business objectives were general and varied, ranging from “[c]onsultant service on financial and commercial sectors” and “[h]ospital and medical clinics” to “[b]uying, [s]elling and leasing land and housings”. It was only later, in 2016, that WBL’s “purposes of exploitation” were narrowed to focus only on real estate activities, and specifically the development of building projects. This is consistent with Mr Rai’s characterisation of WBL as merely a “corporate vehicle” for the investors’ business ventures in Cambodia. At the time Plot A was acquired, WBL was evidently not an established or specialised land investment company. Instead, as Mr Tan conceded, WBL appears to have been incorporated as a general purpose vehicle which was on standby to invest in property and perhaps also explore other areas of business if the opportunity arose.
- [73]
[73] Mr Seah and Mr Tan contend that WBL cannot have been incorporated as a mere corporate vehicle to serve the investors’ objectives because WBL had other projects apart from The Bridge. In particular, WBL was also involved in the development of “The Peak”, which was a similar type of development in the same district and which targeted a similar sector of potential buyers, at a time when The Bridge was facing reduced demand for its units. Mr Seah and Mr Tan suggest that the investors would have taken issue with this if WBL had merely been their corporate vehicle for land investment in Cambodia. However, The Peak was launched towards the end of 2015. WBL’s only other project referred to by the defendants was “The Palm”, which WBL embarked on in 2015 or 2016. These two projects were undertaken by WBL several years after the acquisition of Plot A in October 2011, and the defendants produced no proof of any other project embarked on by WBL any earlier than The Peak and The Palm. I am therefore unable to accept the defendants’ contention that WBL’s other projects show that it was not initially incorporated as a corporate vehicle to support the investors’ intentions of investing in land in Cambodia.
- [74]
[74] The Cambodian Investment Funds Document, which was distributed by Mr Tan on or around 1 December 2011, further supports Mr Rai’s account. This document stated that a total fund of US$9.52m (the sum of the contributions made by Mr Seah, Mr Rai, Mr SCH, Mr LEN, Mr TLL and Mr LTL to the acquisition of Plot A) had been “set up for investment into Cambodia market by a group of subscribers to these funds”. It went on to state that decisions on investment opportunities would be made solely by Mr Tan, the director of WBL, which was described as “the company handling these funds”. Mr Tan confirmed on the stand that this accurately captured the arrangement between the parties.
- [75]
[75] Thereafter, Plot B was identified as another potential investment site and it was purchased in March 2012. Mr Rai states that from late 2011 onwards, he, Mr Seah and Mr SCH were monitoring the situation to see if Plot B would become available for sale, and that sometime in May 2012 Mr Tan informed the three men that Plot B had become available. Mr Tan disagrees, saying that Plot B was identified by Mr SCH when he went to Cambodia in 2012 and that he (Mr Tan), on behalf of WBL, then approached the individual investors who had invested in Plot A as well as other potential individual investors to invest in Plot B on the same terms as the investment in Plot A. Even on Mr Tan’s account, however, it is clear that the acquisition of Plot B was not driven by WBL, but instead by Mr SCH, one of the Singapore investors. As with Plot A, there is no documentary evidence of any communication from WBL to the investors informing them of this new investment opportunity and asking them if they were interested in subscribing to the fund. Both accounts are consistent with Mr Rai’s contention that the intention to acquire Plot B was formed between him, Mr Seah, and Mr SCH so that they could amalgamate it with Plot A in furtherance of their initial investment, and that WBL was once again merely the corporate vehicle for the Singapore investors to acquire the land in accordance with Cambodian legal requirements.
- [76]
[76] What began as a capital appreciation project later became a development project in 2013, when it was found to be more profitable to develop the Land instead of selling it. In July 2013, Oxley Holdings and WBL entered into the JVA to develop the Land into The Bridge. Mr Seah and Mr Tan claim that Mr Tan and Mr Rithy came up with the idea to develop the Land because, while the price of the Land had appreciated and a profit could be made if the Land was sold, the area surrounding the Land was developing and had the potential to become a financial centre, and so significantly more profits could be made if WBL were to develop the land instead of simply selling it. According to Mr Seah and Mr Tan, Mr Tan and Mr Rithy had merely asked Mr Seah to introduce potential property developers because of his large network of business contacts. Mr Tan then informed the individual investors of the proposal that the Land be jointly developed by WBL and Oxley Holdings, and gave them the option of cashing out their investment if they did not wish to proceed. On the other hand, Mr Rai contends that the decision to develop the Land was made after discussions between himself, Mr Seah, Mr Tan and Mr SCH in late 2012 and early 2013. While Mr Rai left it to Mr Seah to select a property developer and Mr Tan was designated to negotiate the terms of the joint venture with Oxley Holdings’ Mr Ching, Mr Seah and Mr Tan asked for Mr Rai’s help in drafting and preparing the JVA as he was the only lawyer in the group of investors. Mr Rai then asked his brother, Mr DKR, to assist him on an informal basis as he had little experience in preparing such agreements.
- [77]
[77] The evidence supports Mr Rai’s account of the JVA between Oxley Holdings and WBL being driven by the Singapore investors, and not by WBL.
- [78]
[78] The first draft of the JVA dated 26 April 2013 was prepared by Mr DKR based on what Mr Rai had told him about the intended structure of the joint venture. This is corroborated by Mr Rai’s e-mail to Mr Tan dated 29 May 2013 with a covering message addressed to Mr Ching, stating that he was “enclosing the draft agreement for [his] perusal” and asking Mr Ching to “hand this agreement to [his] lawyers in Singapore and ask them to liaise with [Mr DKR]”. Although Mr Tan claimed in his AEIC that Oxley Holdings’ lawyers had prepared the first draft of the JVA and Mr Rai was merely asked to “assist in the review” of the same, Mr Tan admitted during cross-examination that he had no evidence to show that Oxley Holdings’ lawyers had indeed prepared the first draft, and that there was no evidence of Oxley Holdings’ lawyers producing any draft on their own. He eventually agreed that his AEIC needed to be corrected to reflect that Oxley Holdings’ lawyers were merely responding to drafts supplied to them by Mr Tan. These drafts from Mr Tan were, in turn, prepared or amended by Mr DKR. This is borne out by the drafts exchanged between the parties. Following the first draft of the JVA dated 26 April 2013, a second draft of the JVA dated 17 June 2013 was prepared with the amendments tracked. This second draft was sent by Mr Vincent Lim, Oxley Holdings’ lawyer, to Mr Tan and Mr Ching (copying Mr Rithy) on 17 June 2013, and Mr Tan then forwarded it to Mr Rai on the same date asking if he could “help to check if this amended contract is fine”. Mr Rai then handed Mr DKR a hard copy of this second draft and they discussed the changes made, with Mr DKR hand-writing some further proposed amendments on the document. Mr Rai accepted these proposed amendments and added a further amendment. Mr DKR then amended the soft copy of the draft JVA accordingly and handed a third draft dated 28 June 2013 to Mr Rai. It is not disputed that the final version of the JVA signed by Oxley Holdings and WBL on 15 July 2013 is substantially similar to the third draft of the JVA prepared by Mr DKR.
- [79]
[79] The fact that Mr Tan turned to Mr Rai, instead of WBL or Oxley Holdings’ lawyers, for help with the drafting of the JVA is more consistent with Mr Rai’s contention that the joint venture was driven by the Singapore investors, and not by WBL. I accept Mr Rai’s submission that if WBL or Mr Rithy was indeed the primary promoter of the investment or if the investment was driven by these Cambodian parties, one would have expected Mr Rithy to have been involved in directing lawyers to draft and negotiate the JVA. Further, the contents of the JVA are more consistent with the investment being driven by the Singapore investors and not the Cambodian parties. All four drafts of the JVA provided that it would be governed by Singapore law and included an arbitration clause in favour of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre.
- [80]
[80] The Bridge Investment Agreement is also consistent with Mr Rai’s account. Although this document was under the WBL letterhead and was addressed to each individual investor, it was dated 31 December 2013, more than five months after the JVA was entered into on 15 July 2013. While cl 2 of the Bridge Investment Agreement states that WBL entered into the JVA with Oxley Holdings “with the consent of all the subscribers of this fund”, there is again no evidence of any communications from WBL to each subscriber seeking their consent to the JVA. The purpose of the Bridge Investment Agreement, according to Mr Tan, was to document the investment with the respective shares of each investor in the project, so that if anything should happen to Mr Tan himself, they would be able to prove the extent of their investments. Mr Rai’s version of events differs in that he claims that the Bridge Investment Agreement was drafted on his request after he was hospitalised and “at the brink of death”, as evidence of how much he had invested so that his wife could handle his financial affairs if anything happened to him. However, what is not disputed is that the Bridge Investment Agreement was created to retrospectively document each investor’s investment so that they would have written evidence of their respective contributions to the Investment Fund in the event that something befell Mr Tan or any of the investors themselves. This points to the investment arrangement having been driven from the bottom up by the Singapore investors, rather than from the top down by WBL in the same way that it would have handled any other subscription arrangement.
The alleged Oral Understanding
- [81]
[81] In this context, I deal with the various positions that Mr Rai has taken in respect of the Oral Understanding. In my view, it is clear that there was an oral understanding of some sort between Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr Tan and Mr SCH about the investment in Cambodia prior to the acquisition of Plot A in October 2011. As I have noted at [66] and [75] above, there is no contemporaneous evidence of any written communications between WBL and the individual investors around the time Plot A and Plot B were acquired, save for the Cambodian Investment Funds Document in December 2011 which merely recorded the contributions already made by the investors towards the acquisition of Plot A. The absence of any written documentation of the investors’ contributions also formed part of the impetus for the Bridge Investment Agreement in December 2013, which was intended by Mr Tan to protect the investors in the event that something befell him (see [80] above). There is also no evidence of any written agreement between the investors themselves. The lack of written documentation coheres with both the relatively informal nature of an investment venture undertaken by a group of friends, and Mr Seah’s modus operandi in his business dealings, which was to rely on oral agreements when doing business with his friends.
- [82]
[82] That this was Mr Seah’s modus operandi is evidenced most clearly by his relationship with Mr Tan. After Mr Tan left the police force, he and Mr Seah came up with a profit-sharing arrangement whereby Mr Seah would provide the capital, Mr Tan would perform the work on the ground, and the two men would then share the profits equally. This profit-sharing arrangement underpinned several business ventures that Mr Seah and Mr Tan entered into in Cambodia from early 2011 onwards, such as a home appliances company known as Sear Corporation and a company known as Kerry Worldbridge Transport Ltd. Mr Seah said there was “nothing written” on this profit-sharing arrangement. This was despite the fact that Mr Seah’s capital contributions were substantial: around US$1m to US$2m for Sear Corporation and at least US$4m to US$5m for Kerry Worldbridge Transport Ltd.
- [83]
[83] In the case of the investment in the Land, it is undisputed that the Singapore investors (Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr SCH, Mr LEN, Mr TLL and Mr LTL) all contributed substantial sums of more than US$1.1m each towards the acquisition of Plot A. Mr Rai’s contribution of US$1.904m was made in three instalments beginning on 10 October 2011, the date of the sale and purchase agreement for Plot A. Absent any written arrangement for the transfers of these sums of money, the very fact of the investors’ substantial contributions towards the purchase price of Plot A indicates that there must have been some sort of prior oral understanding as to how much each investor would contribute and what each would receive in return. Mr Seah and Mr Tan, who deny the existence of the alleged Oral Understanding, provide no explanation for how this group of Singapore investors came to invest in the Land in Cambodia, and adduce no evidence to show that the investors made their respective contributions pursuant to a contractual relationship with WBL. Some written evidence would be expected if the investment arrangement was indeed made based on such an arm’s-length contractual relationship between the investors and a foreign company like WBL. Instead, the dearth of written evidence is consistent with Mr Rai’s position that the investment arrangement was a business venture between trusted friends.
- [84]
[84] Mr Seah and Mr Tan argue that Mr Rai’s alleged Oral Understanding is “riddled with inconsistencies” and that his version of events should therefore be rejected, especially as Mr Rai relies solely on his own testimony to prove the existence of the Oral Understanding.
- [85]
[85] The first inconsistency relates to when and how the Oral Understanding was formed.
(a) In Mr Rai’s pleadings, Mr Rai said the Oral Understanding was formed at a meeting which took place at the Cape Inn Hotel in or around September or early October 2011, at which Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Tan were present. After the Oral Understanding was formed, Mr Rai, Mr Seah and Mr Tan then met with Mr Rithy in September or early October 2011 to discuss the investment in the land in Cambodia, and Mr Rithy agreed to join Mr Rai, Mr Seah and Mr SCH as partners to the Oral Understanding which had already been formed. Thus, the Oral Understanding was formed at the Cape Inn Hotel meeting before Mr Rithy subsequently joined as a partner under the Oral Understanding alongside Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Rai.
(b) However, in Mr Rai’s AEIC, he said that the Oral Understanding was formed over two critical meetings, with the first taking place at the Cape Inn Hotel between Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Tan between June and September 2011, and the second taking place between Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Tan, either in Singapore or Cambodia.
- [86]
[86] The second inconsistency relates to the terms of the Oral Understanding. As pleaded by Mr Rai in his Statement of Claim as it stood before the trial, the terms of the Oral Understanding were as follows:
(a) The group would set up an investment fund for the purpose of land development in Cambodia.
(b) The arrangement between the parties was to be a partnership for the specific objective of acquiring, developing and realising the land investment in Cambodia, using the moneys from the Investment Fund as capital.
(c) Each member of the group would contribute to the Investment Fund and his share in the partnership assets and proceeds would be in accordance with the amount of their contribution to the Investment Fund.
(d) Mr Rithy, Mr Seah and Mr Rai would identify the target land in Phnom Penh, Cambodia to acquire for the partnership.
(e) Mr Seah would be the custodian of the Investment Fund and would collect and administer all partners’ contributions to the Investment Fund for the purchase of land and arrange for the remittance of the moneys. The partners agreed that Mr Seah was the person responsible and accountable to Mr Rai and Mr SCH. As the custodian of the Investment Fund, it was an implied term of the Oral Understanding that Mr Seah had the following legal obligations:
(f) With the other partners’ consent, Mr Seah engaged Mr Tan to assist him in discharging his duties and obligations outlined at [86(e)] above.
(g) Mr Seah, Mr Tan and Mr Rithy were jointly entitled to a management fee of 10% of the profit (after deducting all costs and tax) and after the return of capital to each partner, this return of capital being in accordance with their share of the contribution to the Investment Fund. The remaining 90% of the profit was to be divided among the partners in accordance with their respective shares of the contribution to the Investment Fund.
(h) Mr Seah, Mr Tan and/or Mr Rithy would, at all times, render a true and full account of the use of the moneys from the Investment Fund and the profits earned therefrom. This includes the moneys used to purchase the land; the costs and expenses of developing the land; the sale proceeds from the sale of the land development; and the profits due to each of the partners. According to Mr Rai, this was an implied term in law in the Oral Understanding.
- [87]
[87] However, Mr Rai’s AEIC stated that at the first meeting at the Cape Inn Hotel between June and September 2011, Mr Tan informed Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Rai that Plot A was available for purchase and that a sum of around US$9.5m would be needed to acquire it. Mr Seah, Mr SCH and Mr Rai then agreed that the investment would be locked in for a minimum period of two years and that the distribution of profits would be in proportion with each person’s respective contributions, namely, 20% from Mr Rai, 10% from Mr SCH and the balance 70% from Mr Seah and his friends. The first and second defendants point out that this was a departure from Mr Rai’s pleadings where the target land was not identified at the point when the Oral Understanding was allegedly formed; there was no mention of the investment fund being US$9.5m; and there was no mention of the respective contributions of the partners. Further, in contrast to Mr Rai’s pleadings, Mr Rai’s AEIC minimised Mr Rithy’s role from someone who was tasked with identifying the target land to someone who had no role save for that of a mere front, with Plot A instead having been identified by Mr Seah, Mr Rai and Mr SCH, and Mr Rithy not contributing to the Investment Fund at all.
- [88]
[88] On 10 August 2021, the third last day of the trial, Mr Rai applied to make three categories of amendments to his Statement of Claim, most of which I allowed when the application was heard on 13 August 2021:
(a) amendments made in the interests of consistency with his evidence at trial that the initial intention of the parties was limited to land investment in Cambodia, and did not yet extend to land development;
(b) amendments made in the interests of consistency with the evidence of his expert witness, Ms Sok, on Cambodian law on withholding tax and capital gains tax; and
(c) amendments arising from the documents he and his solicitors received from Mr Ching on 27 July 2021 pursuant to a subpoena to produce documents.
What was Mr Rithy’s role?
- [91]
[91] An assessment of Mr Rithy’s role is appropriate because Mr Tan and Mr Seah’s defences assert that Mr Rithy was the controlling voice of WBL. This was the basis on which Mr Tan argued that he owed no fiduciary obligations to Mr Rai despite his positions as director and shareholder or WBL and as director of Oxley Diamond.
- [92]
[92] Mr Rai describes Mr Rithy’s role as being to “front” the purchase of the Land for the Singapore investors, and points out that Mr Rithy was not assisting with the identification of the target land or contributing anything else apart from being a front.
- [93]
[93] Mr Seah and Mr Tan, on the other hand, argue that it is “incredulous” that Mr Rithy would agree to risk his credibility and strong reputation, as well as the goodwill he had built around the Worldbridge brand, by being “a mere front for a group of foreigners, in return for a three-way share in 10% of the profits”. They rely on the fact that Mr Rithy was a person of great influence and reputation in Cambodia and the Worldbridge brand was established long before WBL was incorporated. Mr Rai knew in 2011 that Mr Rithy was “powerful” and “appeared to have strong political connections in Cambodia”; and Mr Ching testified that even before Oxley Holdings entered into the JVA with WBL in July 2013, he was aware that Mr Rithy had established a successful business in the logistics sector under a company bearing the Worldbridge name.
- [94]
[94] In my view, the evidence suggests that Mr Rithy was not a mere front or rubber stamp for the investment. I accept that Mr Rithy is a powerful and influential person in Cambodia and that he had made a name for himself even before any association with the Singapore investors. It is undisputed that Mr Rithy contributed US$542,470 towards the acquisition of Plot B. Mr Ching also testified that it was Mr Rithy and Mr Tan who were negotiating the JVA with Oxley Holdings on WBL’s behalf, and that when Mr Ching visited Cambodia in 2012 or 2013, it was Mr Rithy who showed him the various plots of land and shared information with him about their potential. Mr Ching said that he agreed to enter into the JVA with WBL primarily because of Mr Rithy, whose successful businesses in the logistics sector Mr Ching was already aware of. Mr Ching’s impression was that Mr Rithy played the “main role” while Mr Tan played the “supporting role”, because the Singapore investors needed a “local partner” who had extensive knowledge of Cambodia and was able to solve any problems that arose, and it was “[i]mpossible” for Mr Rithy to have just been a rubber stamp.
- [95]
[95] Nevertheless, the fact that Mr Rithy was not merely a front or rubber stamp does not mean that Mr Seah and Mr Tan had marginal roles. As the Singapore investors were aware, they could only purchase the Land through a Cambodian company with at least 51% of its shares held by a Cambodian national. They would have needed a local partner in Cambodia, not only to satisfy this requirement of Cambodian law, but also to contribute local knowledge of the Cambodian market. Mr Rithy was that local partner. This does not mean that Mr Seah or Mr Tan (or both) were not a driving force behind the investment arrangement, or that they did not take on the role of custodian of the Singapore investors’ funds. Mr Ching’s dealings with WBL in 2012 or 2013 may have been primarily with Mr Rithy, but Mr Rai, Mr TLL and even Mr Seah all testified that they did not deal with Mr Rithy and that Mr Rithy did not feature in their decision to invest in the Land.
- [96]
[96] To the contrary, both Mr Seah and Mr Tan played substantial roles, which I assess below. I deal with Mr Tan first and then Mr Seah.
What was Mr Tan’s role?
- [97]
[97] Mr Rai submits that Mr Tan owed him fiduciary obligations in the care and management of his interests in the acquisition of the Land and the development of The Bridge. This submission was on the basis that Mr Tan was paid, either directly (through the 10% “director fees” provided for in cl 3 of the Cambodian Investment Funds Document) or indirectly (as a 49% shareholder of WBL, which was to be paid 10% of the net profit from The Bridge as management fees under cl 6 of the Bridge Investment Agreement), for his role in managing the investment and development by being on the board of directors of WBL and Oxley Diamond. Mr Tan was specifically designated this task by Mr Rai and Mr Seah because he was based in Cambodia.
- [98]
[98] On Mr Rai’s pleaded case, Mr Tan’s fiduciary obligations to him arose from the Oral Understanding between them. I have found that some sort of oral understanding plainly existed between Mr Rai, Mr Seah, Mr Tan and Mr SCH regarding their investment in Cambodia prior to the acquisition of Plot A: see [81]–[90] above. While there may be inconsistencies in the details of the Oral Understanding as pleaded by Mr Rai, Mr Tan’s fiduciary obligations can nevertheless be established based on two crucial facts: first, Mr Rai and the other investors entrusted their moneys to Mr Tan to handle in the context of his role in managing the investment; and second, Mr Rai and the other investors depended on Mr Tan to act in their interests in managing the investment, including by providing them with material information relating to the investment.
(1) Entrustment of investment moneys to Mr Tan to manage
- [99]
[99] It is not disputed that Mr Rai handed a total of US$5,394,252 in cash cheques to Mr Seah for onward transmission to Mr Tan and WBL, as his contribution towards the acquisition of Plot A and Plot B. Based on the Bridge Investment Agreement, this constituted a 31.2% share of the investment and entitled Mr Rai to 31.2% of the net profits generated. It is also not disputed that Mr Tan received Mr Rai’s contributions and used them in funding and managing the investment. In exchange for his work in managing the investment, Mr Tan was entitled to a share of 10% of the net profit, either directly or indirectly (as explained at [97] above). The scope of Mr Tan’s role and discretion was wide: under cl 2 of the Cambodian Investment Funds Document, decisions on investment opportunities and the amount of investment for each project were to be “solely decided” by Mr Tan.
(2) Dependence on Mr Tan to act in the investors’ interests in managing the investment
- [100]
[100] The evidence also supports Mr Rai’s submission that, to him and the other Singapore investors, Mr Tan was the face of WBL. He was the person entrusted with a broad mandate to manage and administer their investment in Cambodia, and relied upon to keep them informed about the same. All of the investors dealt primarily with Mr Tan, not Mr Rithy. This was confirmed by Mr Rai, Mr TLL, Mr LTL and even Mr Seah:
(a) Mr Rai emphasised that Mr Rithy was not in charge of the investment, and that the people he was dealing with were Mr Tan and Mr Seah.
(b) Mr TLL said that the investors had agreed for Mr Tan to “run” the investment, and that as far as he was concerned, Mr Tan was the one managing this project in Cambodia. Mr TLL also said he had “never spoken to [Mr] Rithy”.
(c) Mr LTL said that he never spoke personally with Mr Rithy and his impression was that Mr Tan, who was based in Cambodia, would be looking after the investment. He said that it might have been Mr Seah who first told him that Mr Tan would be looking after the investment, and thereafter Mr Tan confirmed this impression. Mr LTL also said that he “kn[e]w for a fact that Mr Tan would be … looking after the investment for the investors” and that he “ha[d] to trust him that he’s not going to … syphon away the money”.
(d) Mr Seah testified that in the only person he dealt with and communicated with in this investment was Mr Tan, and that he “[did not] care about the rest”. It was Mr Tan who “manage[d]” the investment, and Mr Seah “never talked much to [Mr] Rithy”.
- [101]
[101] It is also telling that, when Mr Tan was asked what led to the creation of the Bridge Investment Agreement in December 2013, he explained that he wished to document the respective shares of all the investors because he was concerned that they would be unable to prove the extent of their investments in the project if anything untoward were to happen to him (see [80] above). This reveals that Mr Tan viewed himself as being responsible for protecting the interests of the Singapore investors, because they had dealt primarily (if not exclusively) with him regarding their investment in Cambodia.
- [102]
[102] Mr Tan who was the group’s man on the ground in Cambodia in dealing with Mr Rithy and the affairs of WBL. Mr Rai, being based in Singapore and having no independent means of obtaining information relating to his investment in Cambodia while he was in Singapore, depended fully on Mr Tan to provide him with such information, and also depended on Mr Tan to properly manage the investment on a day-to-day basis and to look after his interests in doing so. Mr Rithy himself deferred to Mr Tan where the management of WBL’s accounts was concerned. When Mr Rai first contacted Mr Rithy to ask him to send over a statement of the accounts via e-mail, Mr Rithy said he would “find out the whole story with [Mr Tan]” and that he “need[ed] to consult with [Mr Tan] for all story”. However, Mr Rithy did not get back to Mr Rai on the accounts.
(3) Conclusion on Mr Tan’s fiduciary obligations
- [103]
[103] I therefore find that, in accepting his appointment as director of WBL and later Oxley Diamond, as well as his role as the person managing the investment in Cambodia on behalf of the Singapore investors, Mr Tan voluntarily placed himself in a position where he assumed responsibility in respect of the conduct of the investment and undertook to act in the interests of the investors, including Mr Rai. These circumstances reflect all the hallmarks of a fiduciary obligation as elucidated by the Court of Appeal in Tan Yok Koon. Equity imposed fiduciary obligations upon Mr Tan in respect of his responsibilities to Mr Rai, including a fiduciary obligation to account for the moneys Mr Rai invested and the profits of the investment.
- [104]
[104] In the light of my finding that Mr Tan owes fiduciary obligations, it is not necessary for me to decide Mr Rai’s contention that Mr Tan owed these duties as an agent. While an agent-principal relationship is one of the settled categories of fiduciary relationships, within which there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that fiduciary duties are owed, this does not mean that all such relationships are invariably fiduciary relationships. Equally, fiduciary duties may be owed even if the parties’ relationship falls outside of the settled categories, provided that the circumstances and the nature of the parties’ relationship justify the imposition of such duties: Turf Club Auto Emporium at [43]. The label of an agent is not itself definitive, and the question is whether a fiduciary obligation has been established on the facts of the case. In the present case, in any event, the scope of Mr Tan’s duties as an agent was not defined neatly within a contractual document but was instead a factual matter; the duties conferred on Mr Tan under cl 2 of the Cambodian Investment Funds Document, which related only to the land investment in Plot A, were evidently not exhaustive of the duties Mr Tan in fact undertook to the investors and the authority that he in fact exercised.
What was Mr Seah’s role?
- [105]
[105] In considering whether Mr Seah undertook fiduciary obligations, it is necessary to assess the role which he voluntarily assumed. It is not disputed that he undertook to act as a conduit for the transfer of money to and from WBL for the Singapore investors. Mr Seah’s evidence is that he handled the remittances between WBL and the Singapore investors out of administrative convenience (see [31(a)] and [36] above). At trial, Mr Seah maintained that he was “kind enough to help consolidate all these funds [from the investors] and then remit them over, and [he] had to bear all the bank charges for the remittances”. This was corroborated by Mr TLL, who said that he “only ha[d] one reason” for passing his contribution in cash to Mr Seah – that he “want[ed] convenience” and it was easier for Mr Seah, as someone “doing business”, to remit the money on behalf of all the investors. Similarly, Mr LTL testified that his understanding was that Mr Seah was collecting all the investors’ contributions out of administrative convenience.
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