General Division of the High Court · Decided 21 January 2022
Ethoz Capital Ltd v Im8ex Pte Ltd and others
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 12 · Case no. General Division of the High Court — Originating Summons No 30 of 2021 (Registrar’s Appeal No 112 of 2021)
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] In 1996, two ladies financed the purchase of their hawker stall by a 15-year term loan from Hong Leong Finance Ltd (“HLF”). The loan was secured by a mortgage over the stall. Interest on the loan was 5.5% per annum for the first two years, and 6.75% per annum for the rest of the term. The ladies defaulted on the loan within the first year. HLF recalled the loan and went to court to seek possession of the stall; it also charged default interest at 18% per annum.
- [2]
[2] The High Court denied HLF judgment, instead allowing the ladies to keep the stall on the basis that they resume paying the monthly instalments: Hong Leong Finance Ltd v Tan Gin Huay and another [1998] SGHC 318. The court also commented that the 18% per annum default interest rate smacked of a penalty.
- [4]
[4] The Court of Appeal also held that the default interest of 18% per annum was a penalty. It was “eminently an extravagant increase from the rate of 5.5% for the first two years of the term loan and 6.75% thereafter and was not referable to the true amount of the loss suffered by [HLF] following the breach by the [ladies].”
- [5]
[5] Some 23 years later, the first defendant (“Im8ex”) borrowed a total of $6.3 million from the plaintiff (“Ethoz”) by way of four 15-year term loans (“the Facilities”). The Facilities were secured by mortgages over four properties, including the homes of the second defendant (“Mr Chua”) and the third defendant (“Mr Tan”). Interest on the Facilities was at the rate of 3.75% flat per annum, which is the equivalent of an effective interest rate of 6.444% per annum (in the region of the loan interest rates in Hong Leong). However, default interest was at the rate of 0.065% per day, compounded monthly, ie, an effective rate of 26.08% per annum (more than 8% higher than the 18% per annum which the Court of Appeal found to be a penalty in Hong Leong).
- [6]
[6] Ethoz’s counsel argued that Hong Leong was outdated and should not be followed. I disagreed, and found the default interest here to be a penalty.
- [7]
[7] Ethoz also claimed that if Im8ex should default at any time, Ethoz could demand immediate payment not only of the balance of the outstanding loan, but also the balance of 15 years’ worth of interest (amounting to 56.25% of the loan). I found that any purported entitlement to interest for a future period, was a penalty.
- [8]
[8] I further found that Ethoz had misrepresented to Im8ex that the Facilities were “better” than previous loans taken by Im8ex from Ethoz for the same principal sum of $6.3 million (“the Prior Facilities”), which the Facilities had re-financed. This was untrue:
(a) the Facilities’ loan interest rate was worse;
(b) the prepayment regime was worse; and
(c) the consequences of default (including accelerated payment of future interest, and a higher default interest rate) were worse.
- [9]
[9] As Im8ex had entered into the Facilities in reliance on Ethoz’s misrepresentations, Ethoz could not enforce the Facilities to the extent that they were worse than the Prior Facilities. In particular, Ethoz could not demand payment of future interest (of up to 15 years’ worth) and thereby prevent Im8ex from paying off the Facilities and redeeming the mortgaged properties.
- [10]
[10] I allowed Im8ex to redeem the Facilities and the mortgaged properties, by paying the balance of the loan amount (“the Advance”), together with interest at the contractual rate of 3.75% flat per annum prior to the date of redemption, ie, without another 13 years’ worth of future interest, and without default interest.
- [11]
[11] Ethoz has appealed, and these are my grounds of decision.
Background
Procedural background
- [12]
[12] This matter came before me on a registrar’s appeal – an assistant registrar (“AR”) had granted Ethoz judgment for possession of the four mortgaged properties, and for the amounts it had claimed.
- [13]
[13] The AR regarded himself bound by the High Court decision in Ethoz Capital Ltd v T-Pacific Pte Ltd and others HC/RA 350/2019, HC/OS 938/2019 (1 April 2020) [High Court] (“T-Pacific”), a case between Ethoz and another borrower, involving a loan on similar terms.
- [14]
[14] In the present case, at first instance Im8ex did not challenge Ethoz’s claim for default interest. Had this been challenged, the AR would not have been bound by T-Pacific (which concerned default interest of 0.0273% per day ≈ 10.28% per annum) to grant Ethoz’s claim for default interest under the Facilities, which was at the higher rate of 0.065% per day ≈ 26.08% per annum: it was open to the AR to have found that to be a penalty, on the authority of Hong Leong in relation to 18% per annum default interest.
- [15]
[15] I respectfully declined to follow T-Pacific insofar as that case decided that upon default, Ethoz was entitled to immediate payment of interest for the whole term of the loan, including future interest.
- [16]
[16] Moreover, the evidence before me (with further affidavits having been filed after the AR’s decision) showed that Ethoz had misrepresented to Im8ex that the Facilities were “better” than the Prior Facilities when they were not. There was no issue of misrepresentation in T-Pacific.
- [17]
[17] On appeal before me, Ethoz took the position that if I should strike down its claims for 15 years’ worth of interest and/or for default interest, the matter need not go to trial; the court could just substitute a lower figure. That is what I did: I found that the clauses purporting to allow Ethoz to claim future interest, and default interest at 0.065% per day ≈ 26.08% per annum to be penalties, and thus unenforceable. They were also unenforceable because of Ethoz’s misrepresentations.
- [18]
[18] All three defendants were collectively represented by one solicitor at first instance and through the filing of the registrar’s appeal; but thereafter the defendants gave notice of their intention to act in person, following which a new solicitor was appointed only for Im8ex and Mr Chua. Mr Tan did not appear in person for the appeal hearing either. I was informed that there were concerns about his mental health, but no one was appointed as a representative of his. The defendants’ positions were however aligned: Im8ex and Mr Chua thus shouldered the burden of the appeal.
The Prior Facilities
- [19]
[19] The Facilities refinanced the Prior Facilities, which were for a short term of 12 months, for a total principal sum of $6.3 million; secured by mortgages over properties, and guarantees:
(a) a $1,000,000 loan at an interest rate of 6.25% effective per annum in September 2018 (specifically referring to properties at Alexandra View, Bayshore Road, and Hoe Chiang Road);
(b) a $3,150,000 loan at an interest rate of 6.25% effective per annum in September 2018 (specifically referring to the three properties mentioned above); and
(c) a $2,150,000 loan at an interest rate of 6.5% effective per annum in January 2019 (specifically referring to a property at Taman Permata).
- [20]
[20] The Prior Facilities were governed by facility letters and facility agreements (the “Prior Facility Letters” and “Prior Facility Agreements”, respectively). The mortgages over the properties were on an “all monies” basis, covering all monies owing or remaining unpaid to Ethoz under or in connection with the Prior Facilities (and later, the Facilities).
- [21]
[21] The properties at Alexandra View and Hoe Chiang Road were tenanted out; the Bayshore Road property was Mr Chua’s home; the Taman Permata property was Mr Tan’s home.
The Facilities
- [22]
[22] In or around July 2019, Ethoz and Im8ex began discussions on a possible renewal of the Prior Facilities. This resulted in the Facilities that are the subject of the present action, which were secured by mortgages over the same four properties, and guarantees from Mr Chua and Mr Tan:
(a) a $1,425,000 loan in November 2019 (specifically referring to the Bayshore Road property);
(b) a $1,725,000 loan in November 2019 (specifically referring to the Alexandra View property);
(c) a $1,000,000 loan in November 2019 (specifically referring to the Hoe Chiang Road property); and
(d) a $2,150,000 loan in January 2020 (specifically referring to the Taman Permata property).
- [23]
[23] The Facilities were for the same total principal amount of $6.3 million as the Prior Facilities. The Facilities were, however, for a long term of 180 months, ie, 15 years, at an interest rate of 3.75% flat per annum, whereas the Prior Facilities were for a short term of 12 months at interest rates of 6.25% or 6.5% effective per annum. The Facilities were governed by the Facility Letters and Facility Agreements that are in issue here.
- [24]
[24] I now address the following:
(a) Total Interest;
(b) default interest;
(c) misrepresentation; and
(d) redemption.
Total Interest
- [25]
[25] In the Facility Agreements, the phrase “Total Interest” is used in Clause 7(B) as follows:
- [26]
[26] Total Interest as specified in Schedule 3 of each Facility Agreement is a specific sum that is the total of all the monthly interest payments for 15 years, which at the contractual interest rate of 3.75% flat per annum amounts to 3.75% x 15 = 56.25% of the Advance. Schedule 3 is a table of instalment payments, with columns for “Reducing Principal”, “Monthly Principal”, “Monthly Interest” and “Monthly Instalment”.
- [27]
[27] Im8ex defaulted in payment within the first year of the 15-year term, and on 3 September 2020 Ethoz gave notice citing Clauses 5(A) and 14(B), purporting to make the balance of the Advance and Total Interest immediately due and payable.
- [28]
[28] Ethoz relied on the phrase in Clause 7(B) of the Facility Agreements: “The Total Interest for the Advance as specified in Schedule 3 shall be deemed earned and accrued in full upon the drawdown of the Advance”. Ethoz also relied on T-Pacific which involved a loan on similar terms: the loan amount was $2.3 million, the term was 10 years, the loan interest rate was 3.75% flat per annum, and the default interest rate was 0.0273% per day ≈ 10.28% per annum. The court said the “starting position” was Clause 7 of the facility agreement (specifically, Clause 7(B)), and decided that it “fix[ed] the minimum interest that the plaintiff stands to earn under the Agreement”, making the borrower liable for the full ten years’ worth of interest from the date of drawdown ([3]–[4] of T-Pacific).
- [29]
[29] After that interpretation of Clause 7(B), the court turned to Clauses 6(B) and 5(A)(1) and decided that:
(a) In the case of prepayment under Clause 6(B), the borrower would need to pay the balance of the Advance and the Total Interest, ie, “interest computed thereon” meant Total Interest ([6]–[7] of T-Pacific).
(b) In the case of default of payment under Clause 5(A)(1), Ethoz could treat the balance of the Advance and Total Interest as immediately due and payable, ie, “interest thereon” in Clause 5(A)(1) meant Total Interest ([8]–[10] of the judgment). The court said this would be the harmonious reading of the entirety of Clause 5(A)(1), as well as Clause 7(B) and Schedule 3.
- [30]
[30] The court thus decided that, on the borrower’s default of payment, Ethoz was entitled to immediate repayment of the Advance and the Total Interest. This interpretation of Ethoz’s facility agreements was followed in Ethoz Capital Ltd v Thistle Energy Pte Ltd and another HC/RA 118/2021, HC/OS 1127/2020 (10 August 2021) [High Court] (“Thistle”).
- [31]
[31] I respectfully disagreed with those interpretations of Ethoz’s facility agreements.
- [32]
[32] First, Clause 7(B) does not, in itself, entitle Ethoz to immediate payment of the Advance and Total Interest upon the borrower’s default of payment. Ethoz recognised as much, in citing Clauses 5(A)(1) and 14(B)(2) as well.
- [33]
[33] Instead of first interpreting Clause 7(B) as entitling Ethoz to the Total Interest as “the minimum interest that [it] stands to earn under the Agreement”, and then using that interpretation to constrain the interpretation of Clauses 5 and 6, I considered it more appropriate to analyse the effect of Clause 7(B) in various contexts:
(a) instalment payments in accordance with Clause 5 and Schedule 3;
(b) prepayment under Clause 6;
(c) default in payment under Clause 5; and
(d) Events of Default under Clause 14.
- [34]
[34] That analysis then informed my decision on whether Ethoz’s claim to Total Interest was a penalty in the context of:
(a) default in payment under Clause 5; or
(b) non-payment as an Event of Default under Clause 14.
Total Interest in the context of instalment payments
- [35]
[35] Clause 5 of the first Facility Agreements provided as follows:
- [36]
[36] The second, third, and fourth Facility Agreements also contained the same clause, save that the quantum of Monthly Instalments for each Facility Agreement was different.
- [37]
[37] By Clause 5(A)(1) of the Facility Agreements, Im8ex covenanted to repay to Ethoz the Advance and “interest thereon” by 180 equal instalments, until the Advance and “interest thereon” were fully repaid. The phrase “Total Interest” is not used in Clause 5; instead, the phrase “interest thereon” is used four times in Clause 5(A)(1), and once in Clause 5(B).
- [38]
[38] Clause 5(A)(1) provided that “[t]he respective amounts of principal and interest payable on each Instalment Date is set out in the Schedule 3 – Table of Instalment Payments …” and, as noted above at [26]: the phrase Total Interest as specified in Schedule 3 is a specific sum that is the total of all the Monthly Interest payments for 15 years, amounting to 56.25% of the Advance.
- [39]
[39] There was then Clause 7 which specified the rate of interest on the Advance as 3.75% flat per annum (Clause 7(A)), and stipulated that such interest shall be paid monthly in instalments on each Instalment Date as set out in Schedule 3 (Clause 7(B), set out at [25] above).
- [40]
[40] On the terms of the Facility Agreements, if the instalments were paid in accordance with Schedule 3 for the whole 15-year term of the loan, Ethoz would have received the full amount of Total Interest, and its entitlement to Total Interest would be fairly uncontroversial.
- [41]
[41] The deeming provision in Clause 7(B), that the Total Interest “shall be deemed earned and accrued in full upon [drawdown]” served to protect Ethoz from a challenge to the Monthly Interest component of the Monthly Instalments.
- [42]
[42] First, each Monthly Instalment (with its Monthly Interest component) was paid in advance: Clause 5(A) read with Schedule 3. The first Monthly Instalment was to be paid on the date of the Advance pursuant to Clause 5(A)(1) (and indeed, that payment was a drawdown condition under Clause 4(A)(3)), the second Monthly Instalment in advance of the second month, and so on. If interest on the Advance accrued from day to day, Im8ex might dispute Ethoz’s entitlement to be paid Monthly Interest, ahead of Im8ex having the use of the Advance for the relevant period. That difficulty was avoided by deeming the Monthly Interest component to have been earned and accrued upon drawdown.
- [43]
[43] Second, and relatedly, each Monthly Instalment was for the same amount, but the breakdown of the instalments into “Monthly Principal” and “Monthly Instalment” varied from instalment to instalment. The Monthly Principal amounts went up over time, and the Monthly Interest amounts went down over time. Taking the third Facility for $1,000,000 as an example, the total Monthly Interest in the first 12 Monthly Instalments totalled $72,306, some 7.23% of the Advance of $1,425,000, whereas the total Monthly Interest in the last 12 Monthly Instalments was just $2,694, some 0.27% of the Advance.
- [44]
[44] If Im8ex were to prepay the Facility after 12 months, it would already have paid $72,306 in Monthly Interest, but interest on the Facility at the contractual rate of 3.75% flat per annum for that period was just $37,500. The deeming provision in Clause 7(B) allowed Ethoz to assert that because the Monthly Interest comprised in the agreed Monthly Instalments for the first 12 months was “earned and accrued” upon drawdown, Im8ex was not entitled to any refund or rebate of interest. This was reinforced by the proviso in Clause 6(B)(5) that Im8ex “shall not be entitled to any return of interest paid prior to the payment”, and by Clause 7(B) providing that Im8ex was not entitled, upon prepayment, to any rebate of “interest paid prior to such prepayment”. Clause 6(B)(5) still preserved the possibility of a return of “interest payable on the Advance” at Ethoz’s sole discretion.
Total Interest in the context of prepayment
- [45]
[45] Clause 6(B) of the first two Facility Agreements provided as follows:
- [46]
[46] That Clause was the same for the third and fourth Facility Agreements, save that the period in Clause 6(B) after which Im8ex could prepay, was six months and not three months.
- [47]
[47] Like Clause 5 (which uses the phrase “interest thereon”), Clause 6 did not use the phrase “Total Interest” in the context of prepayment. Instead, prepayment entailed Im8ex paying:
(a) “the Advance and interest computed thereon in full (and not in part only) on any Interest Payment Date together with”;
(b) “such additional amounts as may be necessary to compensate the Lender for any costs or losses (including funding losses) directly or indirectly resulting from such prepayment”; and
(c) “a prepayment fee of one point five per cent (1.5%) flat of the amount of the Advance prepaid”.
[emphasis in original omitted; emphasis added in italics]
- [48]
[48] The phrase “interest computed thereon” in Clause 6 is not synonymous with “Total Interest” in Clause 7(B). Ethoz could easily have used the phrase “Total Interest” in Clause 6 if it intended “interest computed thereon” to mean “Total Interest”, and indeed in Clause 5 as well where it used “interest thereon” instead. It does not necessarily follow that “interest computed thereon” in Clause 6 in the context of prepayment, or “interest thereon” in Clause 5 in the context of payment or default of payment, must mean “Total Interest” (which Ethoz would have received had the instalments dutifully been paid for the 15 years). These are different scenarios, and the meaning of the various “interest” phrases may be shaped by the context.
- [49]
[49] It was open to the parties to stipulate that, in the event of prepayment or default of payment, Im8ex would not need to pay the Total Interest, but only a lesser sum in terms of interest. I found that they did so by way of Clause 6.
- [50]
[50] I scrutinised the phrase “interest computed thereon” in Clause 6. What was there to “compute” in relation to interest on the Advance, when a specific figure was already stated as Total Interest in Schedule 3? I found that “interest computed thereon” meant interest on the Advance prior to prepayment, at the contractual rate of 3.75% flat per annum. What that was, would not be immediately apparent by looking at Schedule 3, hence the need for it to be “computed”. Alternatively, “interest computed thereon” meant the total of the Monthly Interest payments prior to the date of prepayment. But “interest computed thereon” did not mean Total Interest, it meant interest for the period prior to prepayment.
- [51]
[51] That interpretation fitted harmoniously with the scheme of Clauses 6 and 7 in relation to interest that was “payable” or, had already been “paid”. As I noted above at [44]:
(a) the proviso in Clause 6(B)(5) stated that Im8ex “shall not be entitled to any return of interest paid prior to the payment” [emphasis added];
(b) Clause 7(B) states that Im8ex is not entitled, upon prepayment, to any rebate of “interest paid prior to such prepayment” [emphasis added]; and
(c) Clause 6(B)(5) preserved the possibility of a return of “interest payable on the Advance” [emphasis added] at Ethoz’s sole discretion.
- [52]
[52] Nothing in Clause 6 itself provided for acceleration of all instalment payments in a prepayment scenario. Nor did the deeming proviso in Clause 7(B) purport to make Total Interest immediately payable in all contexts. Instead, Clause 5(A)(1) expressly provided that “[t]he respective amounts of principal and interest payable on each Instalment Date is set out in the Schedule 3 – Table of Instalment Payments …” [emphasis added]. The general position was thus: the Monthly Interest amounts comprised in the Monthly Instalments were not all payable upon drawdown; they were payable on the respective Instalment Dates. Only the first Monthly Instalment (and the Monthly Interest comprised in it) was payable upon drawdown: see [42] above.
- [53]
[53] Moreover, the use of the phrases “interest paid prior to the [pre]payment” [emphasis added] in Clause 6(B)(5) and “interest paid prior to such prepayment” [emphasis added] in Clause 7(B) focused on interest that had already been paid prior to prepayment, ie, the Monthly Interest in the Monthly Instalments that had already been paid. Im8ex had no entitlement to any return or rebate of interest, in relation to the Monthly Interest that it had already paid prior to prepayment, but under Clause 6(B)(5) Ethoz could nevertheless (in its sole discretion) make the prepayment “subject to a return of interest payable on the Advance”.
- [54]
[54] The phrase “interest payable”, like “interest paid”, referred only to interest payable prior to prepayment, and did not extend to future interest. Pursuant to Clauses 5, Schedule 3, and Clause 7, the Monthly Interest in Monthly Instalments after the date of prepayment was not payable prior to prepayment. In a prepayment scenario, those future Monthly Instalments (and the Monthly Interest comprised in them) would never become payable in accordance with Clause 5, Schedule 3 and Clause 7; instead, Im8ex would have made prepayment of “the Advance and interest computed thereon”, and redeemed the Facilities and the security for the Facilities. As such, there was no need for future interest to be addressed in the various provisions regarding return or rebate of interest paid or payable prior to prepayment. The phrase “interest payable” is wider than “interest paid”, for “interest payable” would encompass Monthly Interest in Monthly Instalments prior to the date of prepayment, that had been defaulted upon, and so were “payable” but had not been “paid”; the focus nevertheless remains on interest payable or paid up to the date of prepayment, and not future interest.
- [55]
[55] This focus on interest paid or payable prior to prepayment is understandable, for (as noted above at [43]) the Monthly Interest in Schedule 3 was front-loaded such that on any Instalment Date prior to maturity of the loans, Im8ex would have paid more in interest (by way of Monthly Interest comprised in the Monthly Instalments) than if interest at the contractual rate of 3.75% flat per annum were computed on the Advance for the period since drawdown. It was thus stipulated that Im8ex was not entitled to any return or rebate of interest paid, but Ethoz could still grant a discretionary return of such interest.
- [56]
[56] Consider, for example, prepayment of the third Facility for $1,000,000 at the 12-month mark. At that point, the first 12 Monthly Instalments would have been paid or payable by Im8ex, and if all those instalments had duly been paid, then according to Schedule 3 Im8ex would have paid Monthly Interest totalling $72,306 (see [43] above), and Monthly Principal totalling $31,860.72; leaving $968,139.28 as the Reducing Principal. Prepayment would entail Im8ex paying the balance of the Advance, ie, the Reducing Principal of $968,139.28, and interest computed on the Advance at the contractual rate of 3.75% flat per annum for the 12-month period prior to prepayment. That interest would amount to $37,500. Im8ex would already have paid more in interest ($72,306), but in view of Clause 6(B)(5) and Clause 7(B), Im8ex was not entitled to any return or rebate of interest paid. However, under Clause 6(B)(5) Ethoz could still grant a discretionary return of interest payable on the Advance, ie, the $72,306 in total Monthly Interest for the first 12 months.
- [57]
[57] In T-Pacific, the court held that the discretionary return of interest payable at Ethoz’s sole discretion under Clause 6(B) supported the interpretation that the full measure of interest accrued under Clause 7(B) is the consideration payable to Ethoz for granting the loan (see [7] of T-Pacific). I respectfully disagreed. The borrower had indeed agreed to repay Ethoz the Advance and “interest thereon”, in consideration of the Facility granted by Ethoz (Clause 5(A)(1)), but interest was only payable in accordance with Schedule 3. The Monthly Interest in Monthly Instalments after the date of prepayment was not payable prior to prepayment. Thus, the discretionary return of interest under Clause 6(B) would not apply to those future Monthly Interest payments. This indicated that “interest computed thereon” in Clause 6(B) does not mean “Total Interest”. It necessarily followed that Ethoz’s entitlement to Total Interest was dependent on the circumstances.
- [58]
[58] In The Angelic Star [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 122 (“The Angelic Star”), the relevant clause provided that “the loan, together with all other monies due to the lenders by the owners, shall immediately become payable [upon default in payment]”. The English Court of Appeal interpreted “all other monies due” to mean “all other monies due at the time of the happening of an event of default”, and not “all other monies which would otherwise become due … in the future”. If it were interpreted as covering future interest, it would have been a penalty (see further [71]–[72] below). Likewise, “interest payable” in Clause 6(B)(5) should be interpreted to mean “interest payable prior to prepayment”, and not Total Interest, ie, the sum of all Monthly Interest payments, whether payable prior to prepayment, or which would otherwise become payable in the future.
- [59]
[59] The same reasoning supports the interpretation of “interest computed thereon” in Clause 6(B) as meaning interest on the Advance at the contractual rate for the period prior to prepayment. It should not be interpreted to mean Total Interest, for that would have a component of interest only payable in the future.
- [60]
[60] Other aspects of Clause 6 also support not interpreting “interest computed thereon” in Clause 6(B) to mean Total Interest. If “interest computed thereon” meant Total Interest, then any prepayment could result in Im8ex paying more than the whole of the Advance and 15 years’ worth of interest, for:
(a) under Clause 6(B) Im8ex would also have to “compensate [Ethoz] for any costs or losses (including funding losses) directly or indirectly resulting from such prepayment”;
(b) if prepayment were made within 12 months of drawdown, under Clause 6(B)(4) Im8ex would have to pay a 1.5% prepayment fee on the amount of the Advance prepaid; and
(c) if Im8ex failed to give three months’ prior written notice of prepayment pursuant to Clause 6(B)(1), it would also have to pay a fee of an amount equivalent to the next three months’ interest due to be paid on the Advance.
- [62]
[62] Indeed, the reference to “an amount equivalent to the next three (3) month’s interest due to be paid on the Advance” in Clause 6(B)(1) itself indicates that prepayment did not involve paying Total Interest (encompassing both Monthly Interest already payable, and Monthly Interest only payable in future). That phrase recognises that the “next 3 month’s interest due to be paid” was not “payable” yet, and upon prepayment would never become payable: hence the stipulation to pay an amount “equivalent to” those interest payments. In any case, it makes no sense to have required Im8ex to pay a full 15 years’ worth of interest, and the equivalent of another three months of interest payments, totalling more than 15 years’ worth of interest in all, to prepay a 15-year loan (if Im8ex should do so without giving due notice).
- [64]
[64] The Facility Agreements had express stipulations for acceleration of payments not otherwise payable yet, which I turn to consider – but these stipulations were only in the context of default, ie, Clause 5(A)(1) and Clause 14(B)(2), and not in the context of prepayment under Clause 6.
Total Interest in the context of default of payment
- [65]
[65] Clause 5(A)(1) provided that in default of payment Ethoz “may treat the whole of the Facility or the balance thereof for the time being owing and unpaid together with interest thereon and all other sums due and owing under this Agreement as immediately due and payable without any demand”.
- [66]
[66] Ethoz contended that the phrase in Clause 5(A)(1), “the whole of the Facility or the balance thereof for the time being owing and unpaid together with interest thereon” meant “the Advance and the Total Interest” (which is the phrase used in Clause 14(B)(2)). The court in T-Pacific accepted that “interest thereon” in Clause 5(A)(1) was synonymous with “Total Interest” in Clause 7(B) and Schedule 3. As I noted above (at [48]–[49]), however, it does not necessarily follow that all references to “interest” in the Facility Agreements must mean “Total Interest” per Clause 7(B) and Schedule 3, especially where Ethoz did not use the phrase “Total Interest”, but instead “interest computed thereon” in Clause 6(B) in the context of prepayment, and “interest thereon” in Clause 5(A)(1) in the context of default in payment. A consistent and harmonious reading of different clauses addressing different matters does not require that different phrases in those different clauses all be given the same meaning (and I thus declined to follow T-Pacific at [10]).
- [67]
[67] Clause 5 did not use the phrase “Total Interest”. Instead, Clause 5 used the phrase “interest thereon” five times. Clause 5(A)(1) provides that in consideration of the Facility, Im8ex agreed to repay “the Advance and interest thereon” in 180 equal instalments, until “the Advance and interest thereon” were fully repaid; the instalments were to be paid monthly until “the Advance and interest thereon” were fully repaid. “Total Interest” could well have been substituted for “interest thereon” in the above contexts, all of which dealt with full payment in accordance with the instalment schedule.
- [68]
[68] Clause 5(B) on the Final Instalment Date, however, provides that Im8ex shall repay “the Advance and interest thereon” in full to Ethoz on or before the Final Instalment Date. It does not follow that “Total Interest” should also be substituted for “interest thereon” in that context, because payment on or before the Final Instalment Date would encompass both payment over 15 years, and prepayment. As I analysed in the previous section, Im8ex was not obliged to pay Total Interest in prepaying the Facilities.
- [69]
[69] There was then the crucial phrase in Clause 5(A)(1) allowing Ethoz, upon default of payment by Im8ex, to “treat the whole of the Facility or the balance thereof for the time being owing and unpaid together with interest thereon … as immediately due and payable” (which I refer to as the acceleration provision in Clause 5(A)(1)).
- [70]
[70] The separate reference to “interest thereon” indicates that the phrase “the whole of the Facility or the balance thereof” referred to the Advance or the balance thereof. That was accepted in T-Pacific, but the court interpreted “interest thereon” to mean “Total Interest”.
- [71]
[71] In the absence of Clause 7(B), I would not have interpreted “interest thereon” in the acceleration provision in Clause 5(A)(1) to allow for acceleration of Monthly Interest payments for a future period, and thus not payable yet. In The Angelic Star, the court interpreted the acceleration provision there to only allow acceleration of the whole principal amount lent, and any interest payments already due, but not interest for a future period (hence not due yet).
- [72]
[72] The English Court of Appeal held that if a loan agreement provides for acceleration of instalment payments on default, that is not a penalty provided that, in addition to principal, it claims no more than accrued interest and not interest for the unexpired balance of the original period of credit. Sir John Donaldson MR said, “[c]learly a clause which provided that in the event of any breach of contract a long term loan would immediately become repayable and that interest thereon for the full term would not only be still payable but would be payable at once would constitute a penalty” [emphasis added]. The court declined to interpret the phrase “[t]he loan, together with all other monies due to the lenders by the owners, shall immediately become payable” as covering future interest: it only covered the principal sum, and interest prior to default. Applying the same reasoning, “interest thereon” in the acceleration provision in Clause 5(A)(1) should be interpreted as interest on the Advance prior to default, and not interest for the remainder of the term, ie, Total Interest.
- [73]
[73] The Angelic Star was applied in ZCCM Investments Holdings plc v Konkola Copper Mines plc [2017] EWHC 3288 (Comm) (“ZCCM”) to the acceleration of instalment payments under a Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement allowed KCM to pay various sums (together with accrued interest) to ZCCM in instalments, but there was a provision for acceleration of payment on default. The court held at [34]: “An accelerated payment clause in a loan agreement entitles the lender to immediate repayment of the sums that he has lent: ie to the repayment of his own money.” [emphasis added].
- [74]
[74] Ethoz contended that the deeming provision in Clause 7(B) made all the difference here: with the full 15 years’ worth of interest on the Advance being deemed accrued upon drawdown, 1.5625 times the Advance became immediately due from Im8ex, albeit payable only in instalments – unless accelerated upon default pursuant to Clause 5(A)(1) and/or Clause 14(B)(2), that is.
- [75]
[75] The deeming provision in Clause 7(B) served to protect Ethoz’s entitlement to advance payments of Monthly Interest, and also to any Monthly Interest that had been paid, or had become payable, in accordance with Schedule 3 (see [41]–[44] above). I do not however accept that it makes Im8ex liable for the Total Interest if it should default. While Clause 7(B) says that Total Interest shall be deemed earned and accrued in full upon drawdown, the numerous references to “interest” in the contractual documents indicate that Total Interest had not lost its character as “interest”, ie, payment in respect of the use of funds for a period of time:
(a) each Facility Letter was for a “term loan facility” with a “Principal Amount” and an “Interest Rate”;
(b) paragraph 10 of the Facility Letters on prepayment stated that Im8ex could “prepay the Facility in full”, but that did not say that prepayment would entail Im8ex paying 15 years’ worth of interest on top of the Advance, ie, the Total Interest; indeed, there was no reference to Total Interest in the Facility Letters;
(c) the Facility Letters did not say that if Im8ex should default, it could be required to pay the Advance plus the Total Interest; there was just a reference to default interest;
(d) each Facility Agreement was described as a “secured term loan facility agreement”;
(e) the table of instalments in Schedule 3 to the Facility Agreements had separate figures for “Total Principal” and Total Interest”, and for “Reducing Principal”, “Monthly Principal”, and “Monthly Interest”;
(f) Clause 7(A) of the Facility Agreements stipulated the rate of interest on the Advance;
(g) Clause 5(A)(1) of the Facility Agreements referred to payment of “the Advance and interest thereon”, and stated that the respective amounts of principal and interest payable on each Instalment Date are set out in Schedule 3;
(h) the acceleration provision in Clause 5(A)(1) provided that in default of payment of any instalment, Ethoz may treat “the whole of the Facility or the balance thereof for the time being owing and unpaid together with interest thereon … as immediately due and payable”;
(i) Clause 6 of the Facility Agreements referred to prepayment of the Advance and “interest computed thereon” upon three months’ notice, with payment of a fee of “an amount equivalent to the next three (3) month’s interest due to be paid on the Advance” for failure to give notice;
(j) Clause 6(B)(5) of the Facility Agreements provided for a potential return of “interest payable on the Advance” at Ethoz’s sole discretion, with a proviso that Im8ex “shall not be entitled to any return of interest paid prior to the payment”; and Clause 7(B) similarly provided that Im8ex was not entitled, upon prepayment, to any rebate of “interest paid prior to such prepayment”; and
(k) the acceleration provision in Clause 14(B)(2) of the Facility Agreements provided that, following an Event of Default, Ethoz might declare “all amounts due and owing under the Facility, including the Advance and the Total Interest and any default interests, fees and any other sum then payable under this Agreement to be immediately due and payable, whereupon they shall become so due and payable.”
- [76]
[76] I do not accept that Total Interest lost its identity as “interest”, such that it was aggregated with the Advance once and for all upon drawdown, with Im8ex thereby liable to pay Ethoz 1.5625 times the Advance in all circumstances. In particular, as I held above (at [62]), Im8ex could prepay the Advance and “interest computed thereon” (meaning interest at the contractual rate for the period prior to prepayment) without having to pay the Total Interest.
Total Interest in the context of Events of Default
- [77]
[77] The phrase “Total Interest” was however used in the acceleration provision in Clause 14(B)(2). Where an Event of Default had occurred (including non-payment under Clause 14(A)(1)), under Clause 14(B)(2) of the Facility Agreements Ethoz could give notice to make “[a]ll amounts due and owing under the Facility, including the Advance and the Total Interest … immediately due and payable”.
- [78]
[78] Ethoz contended that since the Total Interest was “deemed earned and accrued in full” upon drawdown (Clause 7(B)), it was “due and owing” from the time of drawdown, albeit only payable (subject to acceleration) in accordance with Schedule 3. Similarly, Clause 14(B)(2) expressly referred to Total Interest, including that among the “amounts due and owing” which Ethoz could accelerate and make immediately due and payable. I accepted that this is how the acceleration provision in Clause 14(B)(2) should be interpreted.
- [79]
[79] I found, however, that this was a penalty (and the acceleration provision in Clause 5(A)(1) would be too, if that should be interpreted to encompass Total Interest).
Was the acceleration of Total Interest a penalty?
- [80]
[80] Ethoz relied on both Clause 5(A)(1) and Clause 14(B)(2) to accelerate payment of all remaining instalments, ie, the balance of both the Advance and Total Interest.
- [81]
[81] Ethoz contended that Clause 7 allowed it to get around the restriction in The Angelic Star against the acceleration of future interest. It argued that the stipulation, “The Total Interest for the Advance … shall be deemed earned and accrued in full upon the drawdown of the Advance” made 15 years’ worth of interest “accrued interest”, and so applying The Angelic Star and ZCCM, it was entitled to immediate payment of the Advance plus Total Interest, ie, 1.562 times the Advance, if Im8ex should default at any time.
- [82]
[82] Ethoz drew an analogy with Wallingford v Mutual Society (1880) 5 App Cas 685 (“Wallingford”). There, the defendant was a member of a society which allowed the borrowing of money by members bidding repayment amounts, with the loan going to the highest bidder. The borrower was then allowed to repay the amount he had bid, in instalments.
- [83]
[83] The House of Lords held that it was not a penalty for the total sum due to be immediately payable upon default. The defendant had chosen to borrow a sum of money on the basis of him naming a sum to be added to the principal and repaid. None of their Lordships described that premium (the difference between the total sum, and the amount borrowed) as being in the nature of interest.
- [84]
[84] In essence, Ethoz’s contention was that although the Facilities appeared to be 15-year term loans with interest at a stipulated rate, Clause 7(B) transformed them into contracts whereby Im8ex had agreed to pay Ethoz 1.5625 times the amount borrowed, no matter what: whether Im8ex kept up the instalments for 15 years, or it made prepayment, or it defaulted in payment.
- [85]
[85] I did not accept that the effect of the deeming provision in Clause 7 is to entitle Ethoz to the Total Interest in all circumstances. In particular, I did not accept that Im8ex could only prepay the Facilities by paying 1.5625 times the Advance. This distinguishes the present case from Wallingford, where the borrower was, in all circumstances, obliged to pay the repayment amount that he had bid: he did not have the option of paying a lesser sum in the event of prepayment.
- [86]
[86] Ethoz was not entitled to Total Interest in all circumstances: in the event of prepayment, only loan interest for the period prior to prepayment would have to be paid. Contrary to T-Pacific, I thus do not regard Total Interest as “the minimum interest that the plaintiff stands to earn under the Agreement”. The portion of Total Interest referable to a future period, was still future interest, for Im8ex could avoid paying it by making prepayment.
- [87]
[87] In the case of non-payment, the effect of the acceleration provision in Clause 14(B)(2) (and that in Clause 5(A)(1) if interpreted the same way) was to oblige Im8ex to make immediate payment of interest for the full term, which the court in The Angelic Star considered would be a penalty, for including future interest.
- [88]
[88] In Denka Advantech Pte Ltd and another v Seraya Energy Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2021] 1 SLR 631 (“Denka”), the applicability of the principles in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co, Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co, Ltd [1915] AC 79 (“Dunlop”) was affirmed, and the Court of Appeal reviewed the application of those principles. Denka decided that in Singapore, the penalty rule does not apply to situations outside of breach of contract (see [92]–[93]). In other words, the penalty rule is confined to the sphere of secondary obligations and does not apply to primary obligations (at [92]). However, the court acknowledged that the threshold of a breach of contract may be thought of as being too easy to circumvent by clever drafting (at [95]), and in that regard, “[t]he problem of drafting is dealt with in the ways that courts have always dealt with problems of construction – by prioritising substance over form, bearing in mind all the circumstances of the case in line with the contextual approach to contractual interpretation”.
- [89]
[89] In the present case, default of payment under Clause 5(A) was a breach of contract: the primary obligation was to make instalment payments in accordance with Schedule 3, and that had been breached. Likewise, the Event of Default relied upon to trigger Clause 14(B)(2) was a breach of contract, namely non-payment under Clause 14(A)(1): “the Borrower does not pay in the manner provided in this Agreement any sum payable under it when due”.
- [90]
[90] The obligation to make immediate payment of all future instalments is thus a secondary obligation arising upon breach of a primary obligation by Im8ex. Payment of the Advance plus Total Interest (totalling 1.5625 times the Advance) was not a primary obligation, for Im8ex could make prepayment without having to pay Total Interest. Im8ex thus did not owe Ethoz a debt of 1.5625 times the Advance from the time of drawdown, for if Im8ex made prepayment at any time, it would only pay a lesser sum in interest, not Total Interest. The penalty rule thus applies to the payment of the Advance plus Total Interest.
- [91]
[91] If Im8ex defaulted in payment, and Ethoz could accelerate payment of all instalments, Im8ex would find itself having to pay 15 years’ worth of interest although it had only had the use of the Advance for a short period of time. That contrasts sharply with Im8ex being entitled to prepay the Facilities, in which event the interest Im8ex would have to pay, would merely be loan interest for the period prior to prepayment.
- [92]
[92] The payment of future interest in the event of breach is not a genuine pre-estimate of damage Ethoz would suffer from Im8ex’s non-payment, it is a penalty, as recognised in The Angelic Star (see also Denka at [151]–[152]). Indeed, Im8ex did not seek to justify the payment of future interest as a genuine pre-estimate of damage. Rather, it argued that the Penalty Rule just did not apply, because it contended that the Total Interest was payable in all circumstances, but I rejected that.
- [93]
[93] The “single lump sum” test recognised in Denka at [303] also points to the acceleration of future interest being a penalty: there is a presumption that when “a single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of one or more or all of several events, some of which may occasion serious and others but trifling damage” [emphasis in original], it is a penalty.
- [94]
[94] Here, Ethoz would get future interest for the remainder of the term, whether Im8ex was slightly late in paying one instalment, or the default was more serious – such as a complete failure to repay the Advance. That attracts the “single lump sum” presumption.
- [95]
[95] In similar vein, the acceleration of future interest has the effect of penalising Im8ex more for a breach early in the term, as compared to later on, when that is not referable to the damage suffered by Im8ex. So, for instance:
(a) if Im8ex defaulted in payment after one year, and thereafter repaid the Advance in full together with loan interest for that year, Ethoz would demand payment of the remaining 14 years of Monthly Interest; but
(b) if Im8ex defaulted in payment after 14 years, and thereafter repaid the Advance in full together with loan interest for 14 years, Ethoz would only demand payment of the final’s year’s Monthly Interest.
- [96]
[96] In both scenarios, if the Advance is then fully repaid with loan interest up to that point, Ethoz suffers no greater loss after 14 years, than after one year: it would have received the Advance back, together with loan interest for the period that the Advance was taken. Yet Im8ex would have to pay Total Interest in both scenarios, whether it took the Advance for just one year, or for 14 years.
- [97]
[97] The “greatest loss principle” (Denka at [254]) also points to the acceleration of future interest being a penalty. The principle, stated in Dunlop, is that a clause would be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is “extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach” [emphasis in original].
- [98]
[98] Here, the greatest loss that Ethoz could have suffered from Im8ex’s non-payment, would happen if (after taking the Advance), Im8ex completely failed to pay anything. In that event, Ethoz would be out-of-pocket for the whole amount of the Advance (save for the amount of the first Monthly Instalment, which Im8ex ought to have paid as a condition precedent to drawdown). In that scenario, Im8ex would contend that it was entitled to 1.5625 times the Advance (ie, the Advance plus fifteen years’ worth of interest) from Ethoz, with default interest besides.
- [99]
[99] As compensation for the loss of use of funds, however, the court typically awards interest in judgments at the rate of 5.33% per annum. Thus, without any acceleration provisions, if Ethoz sued for the unpaid Advance, it would get judgment for the amount of the Advance and interest thereon. But (absent contractual stipulation), the rate of interest awarded would be just 5.33% per annum, and if Im8ex paid the judgment debt, that would stop interest running. Ethoz could seek interest at the contractual rate of 3.75% flat per annum ≈ 6.444% effective per annum (calculated below at [148]), but that would not be much more than the court’s usual rate of 5.33% per annum. The court would not award Ethoz 1.5625 times the Advance, let alone that plus default interest of 26.08% per annum as well.
- [100]
[100] The acceleration of future interest would thus oblige Im8ex to pay more than the greatest loss Ethoz could have suffered from not being repaid the Advance.
- [101]
[101] On a related note, 1.5625 times the Advance would also be more than what Ethoz could have recovered at common law, for non-payment of the Advance by Im8ex (see Denka at [266]).
- [102]
[102] For the above reasons, I found the clauses which purported to accelerate payment of Total Interest upon default, to be unenforceable penalties.
Default interest
- [103]
[103] Clause 15 of the Facility Agreements provides that in the event of non-payment, Im8ex would have to pay interest on the overdue sum(s) at the rate of 0.065% per day, such interest calculated daily with monthly rests; and such interest which is due but unpaid would be added to the relevant outstanding amount on a monthly basis and would itself bear interest at the default interest rate.
- [104]
[104] With such monthly compounding, 0.065% per day rate of default interest is equivalent to an effective rate of some 26.08% per annum. On a conservative basis of 30-day months, the first month’s interest would be 0.065% per day x 30 days = 1.95% of the overdue sum, and with monthly compounding the total amount to be paid after 12 months is 1.019512 = 1.2608. After a year, default interest would thus amount to 26.08% of the overdue sum at the time of default.
- [105]
[105] Ethoz contended that, upon acceleration, the unpaid balance of both the Advance and Total Interest would be overdue and attract default interest. Thus, Ethoz’s claim was for the unpaid balance of 1.5625 times the Advance, and default interest at an effective rate of 26.08% on top of that, ie, with some extent of interest upon interest.
- [106]
[106] In T-Pacific, the default interest rate was 0.0273% per day ≈ 10.28% per annum. The court allowed Ethoz’s claim to default interest on that basis, stating at [19], “I also do not think that cl 15, which imposes default interest of 0.0273% per day, or about 9.96% per annum, would fall foul of the penalty rule.” The court did not consider the monthly compounding of default interest (yielding an effective rate of 10.28% per annum), but simply reckoned the rate as “about 9.96% per annum”, calculated on a simple interest basis. Either way, that rate would be lower than the default interest of 18% per annum declared to be a penalty in Hong Leong.
- [107]
[107] The default interest rate here, 0.065% per day ≈ 26.08% per annum (or 23.725% per annum without monthly compounding), is some two and a half times higher than that in T-Pacific, and some 8% more than the 18% per annum default interest rate in Hong Leong. T-Pacific is thus not an authority that the default interest rate in the present case is not a penalty.
- [108]
[108] Thistle concerned the same default interest rate as in this case, ie, 0.065% per day, which was allowed by the court. But it does not appear that in that case there was any discussion of the default interest rate, which differed from that in T-Pacific, and was higher than that in Hong Leong. I thus did not derive any assistance from Thistle in my analysis of the default interest rate in the present case.
- [109]
[109] Moreover, neither T-Pacific nor Thistle, concerned misrepresentations by Ethoz – here, I found that Ethoz had misrepresented to Im8ex the effect and contents of the terms of the Facilities (see below at [137]–[220]).
- [110]
[110] I rejected Ethoz’s submission that Hong Leong should not be followed because it was allegedly outdated.
- [111]
[111] While Hong Leong was decided in 1999, some 22 years before the present case, the loan interest in Hong Leong (which the court compared to the default interest rate of 18% per annum) was 5.5% per annum for the first two years, 6.75% per annum for the rest of the term. That was in the same region as the interest rate on the Facilities of 3.75% flat per annum ≈ 6.444% effective per annum.
- [112]
[112] Moreover, Hong Leong was decided with reference to the principles in Dunlop, recently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Denka.
- [113]
[113] One of those principles is: “[4(b)] It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been paid”, which Lord Dunedin regarded as a corollary to “[4(a)] It will be held to be penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach.”
- [114]
[114] Those principles were cited in Hong Leong at [18], and at [19] the court had this to say about a stipulation for default interest: “… a provision to pay a larger sum of money upon the failure to pay the stipulated sum within a stipulated time. Such a provision traditionally is the clearest and the classic example of a penalty.” Thus, the court stated at [20]: “… a provision in an agreement for payment of a higher rate of interest in the event of default of payment of a sum due would appear to possess all the attributes of a penalty, and as such, it is prima facie unenforceable”. The court concluded at [27]:
- [115]
[115] In support of its contention that Hong Leong should not be followed, Ethoz cited CLAAS Medical Centre Pte Ltd v Ng Boon Ching [2010] 2 SLR 386 (“CLAAS”) at [63] and [67], where the Court of Appeal accepted that the burden rests on the defendant to show that a provision is a penalty, and he fails if the evidence before the court does not support this. The court did not, however, thereby depart from Hong Leong (which it cited at [66] for acceptance of the “genuine pre-estimate of loss” test).
- [116]
[116] Both CLAAS and Hong Leong were decided based on the principles in Dunlop. CLAAS was not a case about default interest like Hong Leong was, it concerned a liquidated damages clause for breach of a restrictive covenant. The court did not find that to be a penalty, for in the circumstances of that case, it could be a genuine pre-estimate of damages.
- [117]
[117] Hong Leong is not inconsistent with the proposition that it is for the defendant to show that a provision is a penalty, on the evidence before the court. That evidence was sufficient in Hong Leong, but it was not in CLAAS.
- [118]
[118] While the legal burden is on the defendant to show that a provision is a penalty, the evidence may be such as to shift the evidential burden to the plaintiff to justify the provision as a genuine estimate of loss.
- [119]
[119] One instance of this, is when the provision is a stipulation for default interest. In Hong Leong, the Court of Appeal considered that a provision for default interest was prima facie unenforceable, that the default rate was an “extravagant increase” from the loan interest rates, and that was not referable to the true amount of the loss the lender suffered from the borrowers’ non-payment – it was out of all proportion in comparison with the greatest loss that could have followed from that breach – see [114] above. When the circumstances are such that a provision is prima facie unenforceable, the evidential burden is then on the plaintiff to justify the provision.
- [120]
[120] I applied the principles in Hong Leong in relation to the default interest rate in the present case. The default interest rate of some 26.08% per annum as compared to the usual contractual rate of some 6.444% per annum is even more “manifestly extravagant” an increase than that in Hong Leong from the loan interest rates of 5.5% per annum and 6.75% per annum, to the default interest rate of 18% per annum. The default interest rate of some 26.08% is also higher than the 18% per annum found to be a penalty in Hong Leong.
- [121]
[121] Ethoz cited CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd v Polimet Pte Ltd and others [2017] SGHC 22 where a default interest rate of 2% per month (or 24% per annum) in Convertible Bond Subscription Agreements (“CBSAs”) was found not to be a penalty. The court noted that the plaintiff had adduced unchallenged evidence that private equity funds, similar to mezzanine funds such as the fund that owned the plaintiff, typically target an internal rate of return of between 20% and 25% per annum. The plaintiff thus contended that the defendant’s default caused a lost opportunity to deploy the funds for other investments which could conceivably have generated such annualised returns.
- [122]
[122] There is no equivalent evidence from Ethoz in the present case. All that was said on the point was (in para 9 of Mr Ng’s third affidavit):
- [123]
[123] That contrasts sharply with the specificity of the evidence of the plaintiff in CIFG regarding the targeted internal rate of return. Here, Ethoz simply recited the Dunlop test, “genuine estimate of the Plaintiff’s loss”, also mentioning “business considerations (including the loss of use of funds)”, bereft of details. The court is not obliged to accept a lender’s bare assertion that a default interest provision (which Hong Leong regarded as prima facie unenforceable) is a genuine estimate of loss.
- [124]
[124] Moreover, the default interest rate of 26.08% here is higher than the 24% in CIFG.
- [125]
[125] CIFG can additionally be distinguished because there, the court emphasised that it was dealing with a negotiated contract between properly advised parties of comparable bargaining power; there was no dispute that the terms of the CBSAs were specifically negotiated, the Initial Shareholder defendants were advised by an advisory company and a banking executive, and the terms were not unilaterally imposed by the plaintiff’s owner, KC. All of that is different in the present case: Im8ex did not have as much bargaining power as Ethoz (see para 35 of Mr Chua’s third affidavit); the contractual documents were not specifically negotiated – they were drafted by Ethoz; Im8ex and the individual defendants were not advised; and the terms of the Facilities were unilaterally imposed by Im8ex. Moreover, Ethoz had misrepresented to Im8ex that the Facilities were “better” than the Prior Facilities which the Facilities refinanced (which I discuss below).
- [126]
[126] Ethoz’s other refrain was that Im8ex had not provided any evidence that the default interest rate was a penalty. However, there is sufficient evidence in the present case, as there was in Hong Leong, for the court to conclude that the default interest rate is a penalty. If Ethoz’s point is that it was not Im8ex that provided the evidence (but Ethoz itself), what matters is not who provided the evidence, but whether the evidence before the court is sufficient – and it is.
- [127]
[127] Here, as in Hong Leong, the court had information about the loans in question, including the loan interest rate and the default interest rate. The loans were also secured – in Hong Leong, over a hawker stall; here, over four properties, with personal guarantees from Mr Chua and Mr Tan. In evaluating the consequences of default, it is relevant that the contract provided for security. Here, the provision of security was a condition precedent to drawdown (Clause 3 of the Facility Agreements read with Schedule 1, paras 9–20). Moreover, the principal amounts of the various loans were limited to the amount stated in the contractual documents, or between 71.67% and 75% of the fair market value of the respective properties, whichever is lower (Clause 1(a) of the Facility Letters). The parties thus expected Ethoz to be fully secured for the principal amount of the Advance, and indeed Ethoz was: Im8ex was able to raise enough to pay the balance of the Advance and loan interest to date, by selling one of the properties and using the remaining three as collateral for a loan from a new financier. The fact that Ethoz was expected to be secured for at least the amount lent, is relevant in deciding whether a 26.08% per annum default interest rate is a genuine estimate of Ethoz’s loss from default in payment.
- [128]
[128] One added feature of the present case, is that the Facilities refinanced Prior Facilities granted by Ethoz to Im8ex for the same total principal sum of $6.3 million, secured by the same four properties, and also secured by guarantees. The Prior Facilities had a lower default interest of 0.0273% per day ≈ 10.28% per annum, as compared to the Facilities at 0.065% per day ≈ 26.08% per annum. That huge increase in the default interest rate (an increase of some 16% per annum, or over two and a half times more) is not proportionate to the slight increase in the loan interest rate of the Facilities as compared to the Prior Facilities.
- [129]
[129] Of the three Prior Facilities, two (for a total of $4,150,000) were at an effective rate of 6.25% per annum, the third (for $2,150,000) was at an effective rate of 6.50% per annum. For the whole principal amount of $6.3 million, that is equivalent to a blended effective interest rate of 6.34% per annum, ie, ($4,150,000 x 6.25%) + (2,150,000 x 6.5%) / $6.3 million.
- [130]
[130] The Facilities, for the same total principal amount of $6.3 million at a flat rate of 3.75% per annum (which as noted below at [148] is equivalent to an effective rate of some 6.444% per annum), were at a slightly higher interest rate.
- [131]
[131] The large increase in the default interest rate is thus not explicable with reference to the slight increase in the loan interest rate from the Prior Facilities to the Facilities. Indeed, Ethoz had misrepresented to Im8ex that the Facilities were at a lower interest rate than the Prior Facilities, when in fact the interest rate of the Facilities was higher.
- [132]
[132] Presumably, Im8ex would describe the Prior Facilities’ default interest rate of 0.0273% per day ≈ 10.28% per annum (as it did the Facilities’ default interest rate of 0.065% per day ≈ 26.08% per annum) as a genuine estimate of its loss, taking into account business considerations (including the loss of use of funds). But if 10.28% per annum were a genuine estimate of Ethoz’s loss, that would itself indicate that 26.08% per annum was not also a genuine estimate of Ethoz’s loss. And it still begs the question: why the dramatic increase?
- [133]
[133] All that I can infer from the facts of the present case, and the decisions in T-Pacific and Thistle, is that Ethoz may have increased the default interest rate across the board, comparing 2018 facilities (like that in T-Pacific and the Prior Facilities in this case) to 2019 facilities (like that in Thistle, and the Facilities in this case). But that still begs the question: why?
- [134]
[134] Ethoz did not answer that question. It put forward nothing in the external environment, or in the relationship between Ethoz and Im8ex, or specific to Ethoz, or specific to Im8ex, to justify the increase in the default interest rate.
- [135]
[135] I found the Facilities’ default interest at the rate of 0.065% per day ≈ 26.08% per annum to be a penalty.
- [136]
[136] The default interest is even more so a penalty if (contrary to my holding above) Ethoz’s claim for accelerated Total Interest upon default in payment is not a penalty, for Ethoz would already be receiving 1.5625 times the Advance, and the default interest would be calculated on the unpaid balance of that (with a principal component and an interest component).
Misrepresentation
Ethoz’s representations
- [137]
[137] Mr Chua dealt primarily with one Ms Ong Xing Pei (“Ms Ong”) from Ethoz in negotiating the Facilities on behalf of Im8ex. At paras 36 and 37 of Mr Chua’s third affidavit, filed on 30 June 2021, he said:
(a) Ethoz offered to renew the Prior Facilities.
(b) He agreed in principle to renew those loans but told Ethoz not to increase the interest rate (his WhatsApp message of 24 October 2019, 2:39:38pm to Ms Ong said, “Pls don’t increase the interest”; Ms Ong replied on 24 October 2019, 2:51:25pm, “We have proposed to my mgmt the same terms as last year”).
(c) On or around 12 November 2019, Ms Ong and her superior visited him and told him that Ethoz had a better offer of loans for Im8ex: they said the interest rate was lower, ie, 3.75% flat per annum instead of 6.25% effective per annum or 6.50% effective per annum, and the term of the loans was longer, ie, 180 months (15 years) instead of 12 months. From para 9 of Mr Chua’s first affidavit filed on 8 March 2021, Ms Ong’s superior would have been team leader Mr Edmund Chow (“Mr Chow”) who settled the terms of the loan. At that meeting, they handed Mr Chua the first two Facility Letters; the Facility Agreements followed shortly after.
- [138]
[138] The affidavit filed by Ethoz in response, was not from Ms Ong or Mr Chow, but from its Executive Vice President Mr Ng Boon Tee (“Mr Ng”) (who filed all of the affidavits from Ethoz in this action). He asserted at para 14 of his third affidavit, dated 21 July 2021, that the Prior Facilities were irrelevant. However, he went on in para 15 to set out Ethoz’s account of the background facts, “for completeness”. He acknowledged at para 15(3) that “the initial intention was to extend facilities to [Im8ex] on similar terms as that in the Prior Facilities (without any increase on the interest rate levied)” but Ethoz “subsequently proposed to extend fresh facilities on fresh terms as set out under the Facility Letters and Facility Agreements instead, which provided for repayment over 180 months and charged an interest rate of 3.75% flat per annum.”
- [139]
[139] Further, Mr Ng said at para 15(4) of his third affidavit, that Im8ex had the opportunity to review each of the Facility Letters and Facility Agreements, and to obtain legal advice if it so wished, prior to signing the same.
- [140]
[140] Mr Ng did not dispute Mr Chua’s assertion that Ethoz had represented to him that the Facilities were on better terms than the Prior Facilities, and, specifically, that the interest rate was lower ie, 3.75% flat per annum instead of 6.25% effective per annum or 6.50% effective per annum.
- [141]
[141] Indeed, Ethoz’s counsel submitted that the Facilities were on better terms than the Prior Facilities, specifically, because the Facilities were at a lower interest rate:
(a) at the hearing of HC/SUM 2951/2021, Im8ex’s application to adduce Mr Chua’s third affidavit as further evidence (which I granted), Ethoz’s counsel submitted with reference to paras 36 and 37 of Mr Chua’s third affidavit, that Im8ex knew the Facilities were on different terms than the Prior Facilities, it knew it was being offered lower interest; and
(b) at the hearing on 13 August 2021, he submitted that the lower interest was a quid pro quo for the acceleration provisions in the Facilities making a full 15 years’ worth of interest payable if Im8ex were to default.
Ethoz’s representations were false
- [142]
[142] On the evidence, Ethoz had misrepresented to Im8ex that the Facilities were on better terms than the Prior Facilities. The Facilities were not on better terms. Specifically:
(a) the loan interest rate of the Facilities was higher than that of the Prior Facilities (when it was represented to be lower);
(b) the prepayment regime was worse under the Facilities; and
(c) the consequences of default (including accelerated payment of future interest, and a higher default interest rate) were worse under the Facilities.
Interest rate
- [143]
[143] The Facilities were not at a lower interest rate than the Prior Facilities, contrary to what Ethoz had represented to Im8ex.
- [144]
[144] Of the three Prior Facilities, two (for a total of $4,150,000) were at an effective rate of 6.25% per annum, the third (for $2,150,000) was at an effective rate of 6.50% per annum. For the whole principal amount of $6.3 million, that is equivalent to a blended effective interest rate of 6.34% per annum, ie, (($4,150,000 x 6.25%) + ($2,150,000 x 6.5%)) / $6.3 million.
- [145]
[145] The Prior Facilities were on an effective interest basis, whereas the Facilities were on a flat rate basis. How does the blended effective rate of 6.34% per annum under the Prior Facilities compare to the rate under the Facilities?
- [146]
[146] I use the third of the Facilities, for the principal sum of $1,000,000, to illustrate. Interest of 3.75% flat per annum for 180 months (15 years) means that a total of 3.75% x 1,000,000 x 15 would be paid in interest, ie, $562,500 (which is the Total Interest stated in Schedule 3). Although the outstanding principal amount decreases over time (as shown by the “Reducing Principal” column in the same schedule), that does not affect the interest payable, which is at a flat rate on amount of the Advance, ie, $1,000,000.
- [147]
[147] On an effective interest rate basis, however, interest would be calculated on a decreasing principal amount over the term of the loan. Thus, a flat interest rate is the equivalent of a higher effective interest rate, if the principal amount is reduced by instalment payments over time.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.