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Grounds publishedDecided 25 Aug 2022

General Division of the High Court

Writers Studio Pte Ltd v Chin Kwok Yung

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[2022] SGHC 205Case no. Suit No 1017 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff filed Suit No 1017 of 2020 on 22 October 2020, claiming against the defendant for damages (including punitive damages) for losses suffered as a result of the defendant’s conduct and/or inappropriate behaviour and/or breach of his implied contractual duties and/or breach of his duty of care. The plaintiff also claims damages for losses suffered as a result of the defendant’s breaches of a non-disclosure agreement (the “NDA”) and/or his duty of confidentiality.

  3. [2] On 11 May 2021, parties consented to a bifurcated trial. The trial fixed before me is only in respect of liability, with the quantum of damages to be awarded (if liability is established) to be determined another time.

  4. Facts

  5. The parties

  6. [3] The plaintiff, Writers Studio Pte Ltd (“Writers Studio”), is in the business of providing education support services to students in primary school. Oh Yee Yin, Carean (“Ms Oh”) is the managing director of Writers Studio.

  7. [4] The defendant, Chin Kwok Yung (“Mr Chin”), is a tuition teacher, teaching English, Mathematics and Science. Mr Chin was engaged as a tuition teacher by Writers Studio sometime in early 2018 and conducted both group and private tuition. Parties dispute the nature of their working relationship. Mr Chin’s position is that he was an employee of Writers Studio at all material times (ie, pursuant to an implied contract of service). Writers Studio’s position is that Mr Chin was not an employee but was instead a freelancer (ie, he was engaged pursuant to a contract for service).

  8. [5] Writers Studio created another office called Innova Studios where Mr Chin taught Science and Mathematics. Mr Chin was appointed as the “Centre Head” and sole teacher for Innova Studios.

  9. Background to the dispute

  10. Mr Chin’s engagement with Writers Studio

  11. [6] As mentioned at [4], Mr Chin started working as a tutor with Writers Studio in early 2018. At that time, no written contract was provided to Mr Chin for him to sign and he only conducted English lessons on two days a week. On 1 March 2018, Mr Chin received his first pay cheque from Writers Studio for the sum of $1,223.20.

  12. [7] As early as 30 October 2019, Mr Chin requested to “sit down and have a [formal] talk on [his] future with Writers [S]tudio”. He further offered to “find a legal firm” if Ms Oh needed him to “draft a contract for [his] service with Writers [S]tudio”. Ms Oh replied that she already “[had] a contract” under “teacher mode” and “[n]ot partnership”. Nevertheless, parties did not come to any agreement on a written contract. In early 2020, the parties’ relationship soured.

  13. [8] On 25 April 2020, Mr Chin signed a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”). At 10.31am, Ms Oh messaged Mr Chin over WhatsApp stating that Writers Studio “requests all staff to sign a contract or non-disclosure today within the next 3 hours. Signing on WhatsApp or digitally is fine”. In that same message, Ms Oh further elaborated that it was “due to a security breach”. Mr Chin eventually signed the document “without seeking legal advice”.

  14. [9] For completeness, I note that parties disagree on the reason for the urgent request to sign the NDA. At trial, Ms Oh consistently stated that the reason for the urgent request was due to a security breach. Mr Chin, however, believes that Writers Studio “was aware of [his] hectic schedule and deliberately chose 25 April 2020 to demand the signing of the NDA” as he “had back-to-back classes” on Saturdays. However, I emphasise at this juncture that such disagreement on the factual circumstances surrounding the signing of the NDA is ultimately irrelevant to the dispute as it is not the defendant’s case that the NDA was not binding on him.

  15. [10] The NDA contained the following salient terms, including a definition for “Confidential Information”:

  16. [11] On 29 April 2020, Mr Chin asked Ms Oh if she could “hire [him] full time” as he was working “6 days for Writers [S]tudio and 1 day for [his private students]” by then. Ms Oh merely replied with a winking face emoji: “😉”. Mr Chin continued to request for a written contract in the first half of 2020 to protect his financial interests in the face of proposed pay cuts and reduced benefits.

  17. [12] On 2 June 2020, Ms Oh and Mr Chin negotiated various terms of Mr Chin’s engagement by way of emails sent at 1.40am (by Ms Oh) and 10.37am (by Mr Chin). Mr Chin thereafter sent a WhatsApp message to Ms Oh to inform her of the same at 10.46am, to which Ms Oh replied that she would “check the email”. The two continued to discuss various terms such as the minimum notice period and minimum teaching rate over email.

  18. [13] Following their correspondence over email and WhatsApp, on the same day, Ms Oh and Mr Chin agreed to the terms of Mr Chin’s engagement by Writers Studio by way of an email chain (the “Agreement”). The terms offered by Ms Oh included the following:

  19. [14] In the end, no “black and white document” was drawn up under cl 8. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Mr Chin replied to Ms Oh, later in the day at 3.53pm, agreeing to various terms:

  20. [15] Significantly, there were no further replies from Ms Oh to that email on that day. Ms Oh and Mr Chin did correspond over WhatsApp thereafter, which I elaborate upon in the next paragraph. However, for completeness, I highlight at this juncture that it was only on 18 September 2020 that Ms Oh replied to the same email chain. In that reply, she stated, “Here [are] the contractual terms we agreed on by email”.

  21. [16] Later that day (ie, on 2 June 2020), from 9.06pm to 9.20pm, Ms Oh and Mr Chin corresponded by way of WhatsApp concerning potential contributions to Mr Chin’s Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) account:

  22. It is not disputed that at all material times, Writers Studio did not make any contributions to Mr Chin’s CPF account.

  23. The souring of relationship between Mr Chin and Writers Studio

  24. [17] Apart from the late payment of Mr Chin’s remuneration and the dispute over Writers Studio’s lack of provision of materials for the Science class which led to Mr Chin’s breaking point on 16 September 2020 (on which I elaborate below), two points of contention relating to communications that soured the relationship between Ms Oh and Mr Chin were the request by Writers Studio for Mr Chin to transfer his personal phone number ending with “4599” to Writers Studio and Mr Chin’s subsequent communication with Writers Studio’s clients privately.

  25. [18] As to the former, Mr Chin explained at the trial that his second number ending “4599” (the “4599 Number”) was of sentimental value as he had received it on his “18th birthday” to commemorate the birth of his sister’s child. Mr Chin explains that a variation of the phrase “I am an uncle” in Chinese, spoken as “shi wo jiu jiu” sounds like “4599”. For some reason, the 4599 Number was never transferred to Writers Studio despite the agreement to attend at an M1 outlet to effect transference. Ms Oh’s position on the matter is that, despite the number not being registered under Writers Studio, it still belonged to Writers Studio because Mr Chin “has said that it belongs to the company”. On 3 November 2020, Mr Chin gave an undertaking to the Court (the “Undertaking”) that he would, inter alia, terminate the 4599 Number within five days in summons no 4627 of 2020 (“SUM 4627”). That Undertaking put an end to the matter (ie, the failure to effect transference) and is therefore not an issue before me. I need not say more on the matter.

  26. [19] The latter point of contention, however, remains before me. Mr Chin sought Writers Studio’s permission to contact his students privately. This is in contrast with Writers Studio’s policy that “the teachers have to contact the parents using a landline located in our office”. Mr Chin likewise knew that Writers Studio had “quite a strict policy against using a personal or private line to contact the clients or the clients’ parents”. Pursuant to such a policy, Mr Chin was to contact the students through Writers Studio’s landline before there was any agreement to use the 4599 Number. Writers Studio eventually ceded to Mr Chin’s multiple requests to contact his students privately on 13 November 2019, on the condition that Ms Oh was to be included in group chats. It was in that context that he had agreed to transfer his 4599 Number to Writers Studio for it to be used as a company number. In that way, Mr Chin could protect his own personal interests (by mitigating the risk of being backstabbed or having words put in his mouth) and Writers Studio could include that company number on their brochures promoting Innova Studio and/or Writers Studio.

  27. [20] What is in dispute is whether Mr Chin was given the latitude to contact students and/or their parents (the “Clients”) using the 4599 Number only, or whether he could do so using either of his personal numbers. While Writers Studio takes the former position, Mr Chin takes the latter. Nevertheless, Mr Chin admitted that there is no evidence that he was allowed to use his other personal number to contact the Clients (the “9693 Number”).

  28. Mr Chin’s ceasing to work at Writers Studio

  29. [21] On 16 September 2020, Mr Chin ceased to work at Writers Studio. However, parties disagree on whether Mr Chin had resigned (as Ms Oh contends) or whether he had been terminated by Writers Studio (as Mr Chin contends). Writer’s Studio’s position is somewhat inconsistent – as counsel confirmed at the trial, Writers Studio’s claim is not even that Mr Chin had resigned. None of Writers Studio’s claim against Mr Chin turns on this factual dispute and I thus need not say any more on the issue.

  30. [22] Two issues that led to the parties parting ways was Writers Studio’s late payment of his fees and failure to share certain teaching materials with him. In respect of the first issue, it is not disputed that Writers Studio had paid Mr Chin late on more than one occasion. Mr Chin’s position is that his salary was “supposed to be paid on the 7th of each month”, which is in accordance with cl 4a of the Agreement. Writers Studio failed to pay Mr Chin his salary in time on the following occasions:

  31. (a) August 2018 (only paid after 23 September 2018);

  32. (b) October 2018 (only paid after 5 December 2018);

  33. (c) May 2019 (only paid after 3 July 2019); and

  34. (d) August 2020 (only fully paid on 17 September 2020).

  35. [23] On 12 September 2020, Writers Studio suspected that Mr Chin was taking some worksheets as his own. Ms Oh received messages from Writers Studio’s typist, Michelle Phu (“Ms Phu”), informing her that “[n]ormally, Travis don’t want to put the header on the doc” and asked confirmation from Ms Oh that they were to “use [I]nnova [S]tudio as header right?” [emphasis added]. Based on the WhatsApp messages between Ms Oh and Ms Phu, Mr Chin had been requesting the typist to send him the Microsoft Word versions of the worksheets that Ms Phu had prepared for him, and to remove Innova Studio’s header from the documents. Ms Oh instructed the typist not to send Mr Chin the materials that he had requested as the documents belonged to Writer’s Studio and was confidential information under the NDA.

  36. [24] On 16 September 2020, Mr Chin was scheduled to teach classes from 3.00pm to 9.00pm. Prior to his 3.00pm class, he “once again requested” for his salary and teaching materials for the classes but “no assistance was given”. In support, Mr Chin (“Travis” in the transcript) relies on a conversation over WhatsApp from 3.08pm to 3.33pm:

  37. The conversation continued, from 3.34pm to 3.38pm:

  38. At 4.15pm, Mr Chin followed up with “[a]pologies. To give late notice[.] Can cancel all my 5pm and 7pm classes pls [f]or today”.

  39. [25] Lee Pak Sing (“Rwinn”), an administrative staff of Writers Studio, thereafter informed Ms Oh (“Carean” in the transcript) of the same at 4.35pm:

  40. [26] Based on the audio recording captured by the closed-circuit television camera (“CCTV”), Mr Chin had made the following remarks to another staff, Soo Foong Peng Elaine (“Ms Soo”), at about 4.51pm in the presence of some students:

  41. [27] At 4.59pm, Mr Chin had the following conversation with his students:

  42. [28] Sometime at about 7pm, Mr Chin conveyed similar statements to his students present at that time:

  43. [29] The following day, “an official confirmation” was sent to Mr Chin that “there [were] no classes” that day. Mr Chin thereafter asked for confirmation of his termination on 17 September 2020, for which no further correspondence was forthcoming from Writers Studio. On 19 September 2020, Writers Studio issued a termination letter to Mr Chin. While this may have led to the disagreement as to whether Mr Chin had resigned or had his employment terminated by Writers Studio, as mentioned at [21], nothing turns on this.

  44. [30] In summary, on 16 September 2020, Mr Chin had:

  45. (a) informed his students that he had not been paid his remuneration;

  46. (b) encouraged his students to inform their parents that Writers Studio had not paid him his remuneration;

  47. (c) ended his 3.00pm class early;

  48. (d) cancelled his 5.00pm and 7.00pm classes on short notice; and

  49. (e) declared to the students that he was resigning.

  50. In this judgment, I refer to these acts as his “Conduct”. Mr Chin agreed that he had “behaved unprofessionally on 16th September 2020” and such behaviour had caused Writers Studio “to suffer damage”.

  51. Other disputes between the parties arising thereafter

  52. [31] Three further disputes arose after Mr Chin had resigned. The first relates to teaching materials generated by the parties such as worksheets, PowerPoint slides and notes for Mr Chin’s classes. Writers Studio also engaged a typist to help Mr Chin convert his handwritten notes into typed documents. While Writers Studio demands that such materials should be returned, according to Mr Chin, all such teaching materials in his possession were returned on 21 and 22 September 2020. Writers Studio demanded, by way of its solicitor’s letter, that the following materials to be returned by Mr Chin:

  53. [32] Through his solicitors, Mr Chin refuted Writers Studio’s allegation that certain documents were missing (ie, not returned) and highlighted that it “did not specify what documents were missing”. Even up to and at the trial, Writers Studio did not particularise the missing documents which it sought to recover from Mr Chin. Instead, Ms Oh merely referred to the same list reproduced above. Ms Oh elaborated that what was given back to Writers Studio was “bits and pieces of worksheets, and they are not even in the complete whole [sic]” and asserted that “he took the documents that the typist has typed, right, and it is in his possession”.

  54. [33] The second dispute relates to Mr Chin’s continued teaching of one student, [B], in breach of his Undertaking to the Court. This issue was raised at the trial and is not pleaded in the statement of claim. The Undertaking was for Mr Chin to “not initiate contact with any of [Writers Studio’s Clients] whom [he] taught whilst he was employed by [Writers Studio] except for the six students identified in para 4 of the 2nd affidavit of [Ms Oh] dated 12 October 2020” and “[e]xcluding [Mr Chin’s] students whom he taught before he joined [Writers Studio’s] employ”. Ms Oh’s affidavit filed in support of SUM 4627 included six addresses, of which only students living at five of these addresses were identified by Writers Studio. The student who resided at the second address (“the second student’s address”) was not identified by Writers Studio. According to Mr Chin, [B] resides at that address. However, according to Writers Studio, since that student was not named as one of the students excluded from the Undertaking, Mr Chin had breached the Undertaking.

  55. [34] The third dispute relates to Mr Chin’s inappropriate behaviour with Writers Studio’s students. Sometime in October 2020, another mathematics tutor with Writers Studio who took over Mr Chin’s mathematics classes, Ting Kwai Meng (“Mr Ting”), was “very alarmed” by what the students had told him about Mr Chin’s classes. In that regard, Mr Ting recorded a conversation with himself, the students and other employees of Writers Studio:

  56. On 10 November 2020, the Singapore Police Force called Mr Chin to give his statements on a report made against him for such conduct. I refer to Mr Chin’s alleged touching and/or alleged inappropriate communication (including interactions) with his students as “Inappropriate Behaviour”.

  57. Issues over CPF contributions and impact on Writers Studio’s case

  58. [35] As mentioned at [16] above, parties did not agree for Mr Chin to be considered a contracted employee for whom Writers Studio had to make CPF contributions. Nor did Mr Chin negotiate to be considered as such. Both parties understood that Writers Studio did not have to pay CPF contributions to a freelancer and Mr Chin was at all material times engaged “privately”. Mr Chin also agrees that he ultimately gave Writers Studio the “choice” to contribute to his CPF. Nevertheless, at the trial before me, the issue of CPF contributions was hotly debated.

  59. [36] Mr Chin contacted the CPF Board regarding Writers Studio’s lack of CPF contributions “since the beginning, as an employee” only after his resignation from Writers Studio. The CPF Board commenced an investigation into the matter and informed Writers Studio of such investigation by way of letter.

  60. [37] Although Ms Oh could not remember the specific date on which Writers Studio was notified of CPF’s investigation, Ms Oh did receive the letter prior to Writers Studio’s Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) dated 21 September 2021. It was only in that last version of Writers Studio’s pleaded case that Mr Chin was allegedly engaged pursuant to a contract. That is in stark contrast to its earlier versions of the Statement of Claim dated 2 November 2020 and 23 March 2021 respectively, wherein Writers Studio referred specifically to Mr Chin’s employment contract with it. Nevertheless, Ms Oh testified that she had always used the word “employee” in a “colloquial sense”.

  61. The parties’ cases

  62. Writers Studio’s pleaded case

  63. [38] Writers Studio claims for:

  64. (a) Damages (to be assessed) for losses suffered as a result of Mr Chin’s Conduct and/or Inappropriate Behaviour and/or breach of his implied contractual duties.

  65. (b) Punitive damages (to be assessed) for Mr Chin’s Conduct and/or his Inappropriate Behaviour and/or breach of his duty of care owed to Writers Studio.

  66. (c) Damages (to be assessed) for the losses suffered as a result of Mr Chin’s breaches of the NDA and/or duty of confidentiality.

  67. I elaborate on each of the duties as pleaded by Writers Studio in turn.

  68. [39] Writers Studio pleads that there is “no written contract” between the parties. Nevertheless, the “following terms were implied into [Mr Chin’s] engagement”: (a) a duty of obedience “to comply with [Writers Studio’s] orders” (namely, to “comply with the schedule of classes set out” and teach such classes); and (b) a duty of fidelity and good faith (namely, to be “professional in the carrying out of his duties, to and to [sic] ensure that [Writers Studio’s] confidential information is not abused by him during his engagement and after his termination”). It was only in its later pleading that Writers Studio avers that Mr Chin breached such duty of fidelity and good faith by his “usage of social media platforms and mobile gaming applications to contact and/or interact with the Clients” in that it is “wholly unprofessional for [Mr Chin] to do so”. Writers Studio made no averments as to whether the duty of obedience was breached by Mr Chin, save that he had ended his 3.00pm class prematurely and refused to teach the 5.00pm and 7.00pm classes on short notice on 16 September 2020. Nevertheless, Writers Studio does not plead that Mr Chin breached the implied duty of obedience as such.

  69. [40] Writers Studio also avers that Mr Chin owed it a duty of care “by virtue of the fact that [Mr Chin] was engaged to provide tutoring services” to its Clients. That duty of care entailed Mr Chin “conduct[ing] himself n [sic] a manner which could be expected of a reasonable tutor to young children”.

  70. [41] As for Mr Chin’s duty of confidentiality, Writers Studio avers that Mr Chin was “well aware of his confidentiality obligations”. Such confidentiality obligations include Mr Chin refraining from contacting Writers Studio’s Clients privately (save for in certain situations such as that elaborated at [19] above). This is because Writers Studio considers its Clients’ contact details as confidential information. Writers Studio avers that Mr Chin breached such duty by his “habitually [giving] out his mobile number” to Writers Studio’s Clients in his classes and “encouraged them to contact him privately”. Writers Studio’s Clients did so and “communicate[d] with [Mr Chin] privately”. Mr Chin also “had been contacting [the] Clients through social media platform(s)”. These alleged breaches were discovered on 12 September 2020. Furthermore, by “failing to return” the 4599 Number to Writers Studio, Mr Chin “had been in breach of the NDA as he had accessed and/or used the Confidential Information” through the 4599 Number.

  71. [42] However, as against the conditions under which Mr Chin was allowed to communicate with Writers Studio’s Clients privately, Writers Studio’s averments are inconsistent. In the earlier part of its pleadings, Writers Studio avers that Ms Oh “had to be added into a WhatsApp group chat with the Client and/or be made aware of the communications”. In the later part of its pleadings, Writers Studio avers that the “only form of client communication [it] had approved for [Mr Chin’s] usage was via WhatsApp group chats with the Clients and Ms Oh”.

  72. [43] Writers Studio also pleads that it had discovered “further breaches” by Mr Chin from 23–29 September 2020. In particular, Writers Studio found that Mr Chin had visited five addresses (ie, the six addresses, save for the the second student’s address) which correspond with the addresses of Writers Studio’s Clients who had withdrawn following Mr Chin’s termination. Writers Studio “strongly believe[s] that [Mr Chin] has been conducting tuition” at those addresses and “would have only gotten these addresses and/or contact information through his employment with [Writers Studio]”. As such, Writers Studio applied for an injunction vide SUM 4627.

  73. [44] Mr Chin’s confidentiality obligations also extended to “the materials created by [Writers Studio], and/or materials used in teaching at [Writers Studio’s] premises”. The materials provided to Mr Chin “bore [Writers Studio’s] letterhead”. Also on 12 September 2020, Writers Studio discovered that Mr Chin “had been requesting for the typist to send him the Microsoft Word versions of the worksheets” and to “remove” Writers Studio’s and Innova Studio’s header from such documents. Writers Studio’s typist was thus informed to not send such materials to Mr Chin as the documents “belonged to [Writers Studio]” and is “confidential information under the NDA”.

  74. [45] To clarify, Writers Studio adopts a slightly different meaning for the abbreviation “Conduct”. Writers Studio’s definition of “Conduct” includes Mr Chin’s statement that Writers Studio did “not provide him with any materials despite the fact that [it] provide[d] the materials to [Mr Chin] on a weekly basis” as well as Mr Chin’s declaration to “relief teachers present that he was resigning” [emphasis added] in addition to only his students. For completeness, Writers Studio avers that it terminated Mr Chin on 19 September 2020 “due to his Conduct”. Nevertheless, as Writers Studio did not address those specific sub-points as such (ie, these specific statements made to specific persons and how such statements to such individuals caused any loss to Writers Studio), I gather that Writers Studio’s true contention is in respect of Mr Chin’s other acts which I abbreviated at [30] above.

  75. [46] Writers Studio pleads that it suffered loss of goodwill and/or reduction in business due to Mr Chin’s Conduct and/or Inappropriate Behaviour and/or breach of duty of care. It avers that its business is “based firmly on their reputation and goodwill with their clients”. Mr Chin’s conduct in “defaming” Writers Studio and/or “poaching” and/or “approaching [Writers Studio’s Clients]” and/or Conduct and/or Inappropriate Behaviour and/or breach of duty of care damaged Writers Studio’s reputation “and caused them to suffer irreparable financial harm”. Writers Studio avers that 39 students “including the Primary 6 students who would have engaged [it] to prepare for Secondary 1” had withdrawn since Mr Chin’s termination on 19 September 2020, as compared to 11 students who had withdrawn in 2019. Such an “unprecedented” rate of withdrawal is “due solely to [Mr Chin’s] [c]onduct”.

  76. Mr Chin’s pleaded case

  77. [47] Mr Chin denies Writers Studio’s amendment to the statement of claim that he is not an employee but was instead engaged as a contractor. Rather, Mr Chin pleads that there is an “implied contract of service” between the parties pursuant to which he was employed as an employee. However, the terms of employment were “deliberately not put into writing” as Writers Studio “wanted to keep [Mr Chin’s] contractual relationship with [it] vague” so as to enable it to “unilaterally change terms of [his] employment”.

  78. [48] According to Mr Chin, the parties’ “agreement and arrangement” was that he “had the right not to attend, not to extend and/or reject classes”. It was also “an implied term” of his employment that “salary was to be paid on the 7th of each month”. As such, by failing to pay his salary on time on multiple occasions, Writers Studio “is in breach of its implied employment contract”. Mr Chin’s employment was eventually terminated on 19 September 2020. Mr Chin’s pleading, however, goes no further to particularise the denial of the “implied contractual duties” which Writers Studio pleaded (see [39] above). Nor does it particularise the denial of a duty of care owed to Writers Studio (or any breach of such duty).

  79. [49] Mr Chin denies his Conduct, save for the early dismissal of the 3.00pm class and cancellation of his 5.00pm and 7.00pm classes on 16 September 2020. In respect of those classes, Mr Chin avers that he did so as he “was feeling unwell and thus had to end his lessons early and cancel the rest of his scheduled classes for the day”. Mr Chin also denies any Inappropriate Behaviour and avers that he “did not molest, touch[,] [interact] and/or [communicate] with [Writers Studio’s] Clients inappropriately”. In particular, Mr Chin avers that he has “never made sexual comments and/or describe[d] sexual matters to the students while teaching in class and/or touch[ed] the students inappropriately”.

  80. [50] Mr Chin denies that he owed a duty of confidentiality and that he breached such duty. Mr Chin avers that Ms Oh was “inconsistent on her position on what was confidential information and whether [he] could use” such information. In particular, Writers Studio told Mr Chin that he could “contact the clients on his own”, “take all the clients” and “even added [his] private [numbers] together in WhatsApp group chat with parents”. The 4599 Number had also been printed on brochures and “circulated to the public” by Writers Studio. Writers Studio’s clients’ contact details “lost its quality of confidentiality” when they “reached out to contact [Mr Chin] voluntarily disclosing and making available their contact details”. Therefore, once the Clients “initiated contact” in such a manner, Mr Chin “would not be in breach of the NDA in maintaining contact” with the Clients.

  81. [51] Mr Chin denies any breach of the NDA. As against the first manner of breach (ie, editing Writers Studio’s teaching materials as mentioned at [44] above), Mr Chin avers that he had “only requested for the typist to remove the header … as they were causing formatting issues” which is “different from removing Innova’s Studio [sic] logo”. As for the Clients’ social media and mobile game accounts, these are “not confidential information protected by the NDA”.

  82. Substantive issues to be determined

  83. [52] As mentioned at the outset, the trial before me is bifurcated and I only need to determine liability. The following issues arise for my determination:

  84. [53] I address each issue in turn.

  85. Issue 1: the parties’ contractual relationship and the nature of Mr Chin’s engagement with Writers Studio

  86. The parties’ contractual relationship

  87. [54] It is not in dispute that Mr Chin had entered into an engagement of some form with Writers Studio; it is also not disputed that this engagement has not been captured in writing. However, before I can proceed to determine the exact nature of this engagement, I note that Mr Chin has pleaded the presence of an implied contract between the parties. There are two points of concern arising from this. The first is that the fact that the contract is not put into writing does not automatically militate against the existence of an express contract. The second is that the pleadings confusingly flit between references to implied contracts and implied contractual duties and terms, which are distinct concepts. The former is concerned with making out the existence of a contractual relationship; the latter is concerned with making out the terms of an existing contract. In light of the looseness with which the descriptor “implied” has been used in Mr Chin’s pleadings, I think it appropriate to briefly allude to the legal principles governing the concept of an implied contract.

  88. [55] In the law of contract, contracts can be implied from a course of conduct; dealings between the parties; from their correspondence or from all other circumstances. However, “all the requirements for the formation of a contract, viz, offer and acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relations, and certainty of terms must be satisfied before the court will imply the existence of a contract”: Cooperatiehahahave Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA (trading as Rabobank International), Singapore Branch v Motorola Electronics Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 63 at [46] citing Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1192 at [49]–[51]. Such an implied contract could also, conceptually, take the form of a collateral contract: Eng Chiet Shoong and others v Cheong Soh Chin and others and another appeal [2016] 4 SLR 728 (“Eng Chiet Shoong”) at [29]. That being said, an implied contract will only be found in very limited circumstances, based on necessity and having regard to the intentions of the parties. The precise facts and circumstances of each case will therefore be important: Eng Chiet Shoong at [29].

  89. [56] The policy consideration behind such a high threshold is clear – that commercial certainty must be ensured in the business context. As the Court of Appeal observed in Ang Sin Hock v Khoo Eng Lim [2010] 3 SLR 179 at [76]:

  90. Analysis and findings

  91. [57] Notably, neither party made any submissions as to the subsisting contract between parties at the material time although they both agree that there was no written contract governing their relationship. In any event, I did not think it necessary to consider whether a contract needs to be implied. It is clear that there was an oral contract in existence because Mr Chin had been teaching in Writers Studio and the latter had been paying him for the work.

  92. [58] In my judgment, it is sufficiently clear that at the material time, Mr Chin was engaged by Writers Studio pursuant to their Agreement which is recorded in the email chain between Ms Oh and Mr Chin (see [13]–[16] above). Ms Oh’s initial email constituted the terms of engagement offered by Writers Studio, while Mr Chin’s reply constituted an acceptance to some of those terms (by expressly indicating “agree”) and a counteroffer to others (by proposing slightly different terms). Even though no reply to Mr Chin’s counteroffers were immediately forthcoming, I take that Ms Oh accepted Mr Chin’s counteroffers for two reasons.

  93. [59] First, Ms Oh replied to that same email thread on 18 September 2020 that those were the “contractual terms [they] agreed on by email”. Secondly, parties also conducted themselves in accordance with the terms which Mr Chin had set out in his email. For example, Mr Chin and Ms Oh proceeded on the basis that Mr Chin was to be paid 45% of the tuition fees collected (see cl 1 which Mr Chin agreed to). Furthermore, and in accordance with cl 4a of Mr Chin’s email, parties operated on the understanding that Mr Chin was to be paid by the 7th of every month. At trial, Ms Oh also accepted that if Mr Chin did not receive his pay by the 7th of every month, then such payment would be considered “late”. On the evidence before me, it is sufficiently clear that such a term (ie, the date by which Mr Chin was to be paid) is an express term and not an implied term in an implied contract as Mr Chin pleads.

  94. [60] In light of my finding that an express oral contract existed between the parties, the next question is whether under this contract, Mr Chin had been engaged as an employee or as a freelancer.

  95. Employment relationships

  96. [61] Whether a person is an employee (as opposed to a freelancer) depends on the totality of the factual matrix of any given case. In contractual terms, the issue is whether a person is engaged under a contract of service (in which case a person would be considered an employee) or only a contract for service (in which case that person would be considered an independent contractor). There is no single test or factor which is decisive of the issue (Kureoka Enterprise Pte Ltd v Central Provident Fund Board [1992] SGHC 113 (“Kureoka”)). In Kureoka, Chan Sek Keong J (as he then was) found the following factors relevant in the case before him:

  97. (a) the factor of control over the worker’s services;

  98. (b) the rendering of services personally without being able to use a substitute;

  99. (c) the worker’s responsibility for investment in, or management of, the business or financial risk in it;

  100. (d) the worker’s right to price the value of services to clients;

  101. (e) the worker’s opportunity to deploy individual skill and personality;

  102. (f) the contractual right to terminate the worker’s services;

  103. (g) whether the worker is performing services as a person of business on his/her own account; and

  104. (h) the mutuality of obligation between the parties.

  105. [62] The Court of Appeal in BNM (administratrix of the estate of B, deceased) on her own behalf and on behalf of others v National University of Singapore and others and another appeal [2014] 4 SLR 931 (“BNM”) also confirmed that the control test is “not the only test for determining whether a contractor is an independent contractor, nor is it even necessarily the decisive factor” (at [28]). In BNM, the Court of Appeal found the following factors relevant in finding that a company provided a contract for services to the respondent (at [31]–[32]):

  106. (a) that the company bore the responsibility for paying the worker’s wages;

  107. (b) that the company had the responsibility for scheduling the worker’s roster;

  108. (c) that the company had the power to dismiss worker from employment;

  109. (d) the company’s supervision and oversight of the worker in his/her duties;

  110. (e) the company’s responsibility for training the worker in the use of equipment;

  111. (f) the company’s power and authority to dictate how the worker discharged his/her duties;

  112. (g) the company’s responsibility for providing the worker’s equipment;

  113. (h) the company’s undertaking of the financial risks of running its business;

  114. (i) the company selected the worker for deployment at the respondent’s premises;

  115. (j) the company provided services to other institutions apart from the respondent’s; and

  116. (k) the company retained the profits from its business and took out its own insurance.

  117. The parties’ submissions

  118. [63] Writers Studio takes the position that Mr Chin was, at all material times, not an employee and makes two points in that regard. First, it submits that the following facts show that Mr Chin was an independent contractor:

  119. (a) Mr Chin had the freedom to: (i) set his own teaching schedule and/or working hours, (ii) set the fees to be charged for each student and/or class taught and (iii) continue teaching private lessons to his own clients outside of Writers Studio’s premises.

  120. (b) Mr Chin’s remuneration was based on the number of students and/or classes taught at Writers Studio (including earning a percentage of the revenue earned from his group classes).

  121. (c) Mr Chin did not receive a basic salary or any leave benefits.

  122. (d) Mr Chin left open the issue of whether he should receive CPF from Writers Studio.

  123. [64] Second, Writers Studio submits that the use of the word “employment” in its pleadings was, as Ms Oh had testified, intended to refer to “employment” in a colloquial sense. Writers Studio relies on Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 9 (LexisNexis, 2019) at para 100:

  124. [65] Mr Chin submits that he was nevertheless an employee, based on the following factors:

  125. (a) Mr Chin drew a “salary” and had to teach the classes which Writers Studio had given to him.

  126. (b) The email negotiations on 2 June 2020 (see [13]–[14] above) “allude to the terms which one can expect of typical employer-employee relationships”.

  127. (c) Writers Studio maintained that Mr Chin is an employee in “various correspondences, pleadings and even on affidavit up until the CPF Board commenced investigations”.

  128. (d) The non-payment of CPF is a neutral factor which was part of Writers Studio’s intention to keep Mr Chin’s status as an employee “ambiguous”.

  129. Analysis and findings

  130. [66] While the determination of an employee-employer relationship is informed by the totality of the factual matrix of the case, one reasonable starting point is to consider the contractual relationship between the worker and the entity that engaged that worker.

  131. [67] Considering the terms of the parties’ Agreement, I find that Mr Chin was engaged as an independent contractor under an employment for service. Contrary to Mr Chin’s submissions, whether the parties used the word “salary” instead of “remuneration” is not indicative of an employee-employer relationship. The terms in the Agreement likewise do not indicate a contract of service but rather, a contract for service:

  132. (a) Mr Chin did not earn a fixed salary but was remunerated with 45% of the tuition fees of the students whom he taught at Writers Studio.

  133. (b) Mr Chin paid rent for the rooms at Writers Studio’s premises when he taught private students.

  134. (c) There was no term conferring Writers Studio the right to terminate Mr Chin’s engagement (and, to the contrary, Mr Chin could simply quit teaching if he wished to do so).

  135. (d) Teaching materials prepared by Mr Chin remained his own property (and not Writers Studio’s property).

  136. (e) Mr Chin received no benefits from Writers Studio (such as paid leave, medical benefits and dental benefits unlike Writers Studio’s other employees ).

  137. [68] Furthermore, Mr Chin set his own teaching schedule subject to Writers Studio’s approval. In particular, Mr Chin could give Writers Studio a schedule which he could commit to, and parties would mutually agree on such timings which worked for both of them. The degree of control which Writers Studio exercised over Mr Chin’s services was, at best, limited.

  138. [69] My conclusion is also supported by the parties’ correspondence at the time they were confirming Mr Chin’s contract. The contemporaneous evidence between the parties (see [16] above) clearly demonstrate that both Ms Oh and Mr Chin appreciated that Writers Studio need not contribute to a freelancer’s (ie, independent contractor’s) CPF. When asked specifically about that, Mr Chin was happy to let Writers Studio decide whether to keep engaging him as a freelancer without the need to make any CPF contributions. In this regard, Mr Chin had “left the CPF issue” to Writer’s Studio and their arrangement was not changed.

  139. [70] For completeness, I make one final point on Writers Studio’s pleadings and Ms Oh’s testimony regarding the use of the word “employment”. I agree with Mr Chin’s position that Writers Studio initially pleaded that Mr Chin was an employee only to support its own case that he owed certain duties (such as the duty of obedience, fidelity and good faith). Such litigation tactics also explain why Writers Studio made such changes so late in the day to delete most references to an “employment” contract (save for one reference ) – by then, it simply was no longer to Writers Studio’s advantage to plead that Mr Chin was its employee due to the CPF Board’s investigations.

  140. [71] However, after changing its pleaded case, Writers Studio did not bother to make any consequential amendments to its pleadings. In particular, despite now pleading that Mr Chin is not an employee, it pleaded that he nevertheless owed duties of obedience, fidelity and good faith without further particulars of how such duties arose in the circumstances of the present case. I consider this point further below.

  141. Issue 2: whether Mr Chin caused loss to Writers Studio by breaching a duty of obedience and duty of fidelity and good faith

  142. [72] The duties of obedience, fidelity and good faith are not implied in law into contracts for services. Any such duties may only be implied in fact.

  143. The parties’ case

  144. [73] Writers Studio submits that it pleaded the following terms “should be implied into [Mr Chin’s] engagement”: a duty of obedience (ie, to “comply” with Writers Studio’s “professional standards and client contact protocol”); and a duty of fidelity and good faith (ie, to be “professional in the carrying out of his duties” and “ensure” that Writers Studio’s “confidential information is not abused by him during his engagement and after his termination”) . Even though Writers Studio appreciates that the “implied duties typically apply to employment contracts”, they are “necessary for the business efficacy of the contract for service” between parties. In particular, if Mr Chin was “allowed to flout” Writers Studio’s professional standards, it would suffer “damage, and the quality of the teaching services provided by [Mr Chin] would be poor and unacceptable”. The alleged duties are thus to be implied in fact. Writers Studio relies on Mr Chin’s Conduct and Inappropriate Behaviour to substantiate its claim.

  145. [74] Mr Chin’s position is that “any assertion of a duties [sic] would need to be implied” as there was “no written contract (save for the NDA) between the parties”. Mr Chin submits that there is no implied duty of obedience, good faith and fidelity if he is not an employee.

  146. [75] It is common ground that there is no implied term for a duty of obedience and duty of fidelity and good faith in law since there is no employer-employee relationship in the present case. Such duties are implied terms in law in employment contracts (Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as E D & F Man International (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663 (“Man Financial”) at [193]). As such, the applicable legal principles for an implied term in fact are relevant.

  147. [76] The Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp”) set out a three-step test for implying a term in fact (at [101]):

  148. (a) Step 1. Ascertain how the gap in the contract arises. Implication will be considered only if the court discerns that the gap arose because the parties did not contemplate the gap (ie, there is a “true” gap).

  149. (c) Step 3. Consider whether the specific term to be implied is one to which the parties, having regard to the need for business efficacy, would have responded “Oh, of course!” had the proposed term been put to them at time of the contract. If it is not possible to find such a clear response, then, the gap persists and the consequences of that gap ensue.

  150. [77] In Sembcorp, the Court of Appeal explained that “not all gaps in a contract are “true” gaps in the sense that they can be remedied by the implication of a term” and in that respect, there are at least three ways in which a gap could arise (at [94]):

  151. However, it is only in scenario (a) where it would be “appropriate for the court to even consider if it will imply a term into the parties’ contract” (at [95]).

  152. [78] Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, I turn to consider whether the alleged duties of fidelity, obedience and good faith may be implied in fact in the present case.

  153. Analysis and findings

  154. [79] I begin with two preliminary observations on Writers Studio’s pleaded case. From the outset, I find Writers Studio’s submissions to be somewhat disingenuous. In particular, Writers Studio gives the impression that it had pleaded that a duty of “obedience” meant the duty to “comply” with Writers Studio’s professional standards and client contact protocol (see [73] above). That is a deviation from its pleaded case that a duty of “obedience” meant compliance with “the schedule of classes set out” and to teach such classes (see [39] above). This demonstrates to me that Writers Studio is not even clear of its own case and shifted the goal posts as part of its own litigation strategy.

  155. [80] My second observation is that Writers Studio does not even plead the contract into which such alleged terms are to be implied in fact. The three-step test summarised above assumes and necessarily hinges on the existence of some subsisting contract between the parties before the first step can even be considered. Without the proper identification of any contract (such as an oral contract) between the parties, the three-step test is simply inapplicable. In my judgment, this is fatal, and sufficient to dispose of Writers Studio’s claim for breach of such implied terms.

  156. [81] For completeness, I consider whether the duties of obedience, fidelity and good faith are implied terms in the parties’ Agreement. In my judgment, this issue must be answered in the negative. Based on the parties’ contemporaneous correspondence, I accept that there is a “true” gap in relation to the alleged duties. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded by Writers Studio’s argument that the alleged duties to be implied pass the business efficacy test. Writers Studio’s argument that such duty must be implied to prevent Writers Studio from suffering damage and to ensure the “quality” of teaching services were acceptable to it is not the test to determine business efficacy. I am also of the view that the alleged duties to be implied flatly fail the officious bystander test. These alleged implied terms are not entirely clear. Consequently, I am of the view that had such unclear terms been put to parties at the time of contracting, the response would not have been an emphatic “Oh, of course!”.

  157. [82] Even if such duties were implied in fact, the facts upon which Writers Studio seeks to substantiate its claim for breach of the same (ie, the Conduct and Inappropriate Behaviour) are insufficient to make out its case. I elaborate on this at [115] below. As for the breach by failing to comply with Writers Studio’s client contact protocol, Writers Studio made its submissions in relation to the NDA, which I consider at Issue 4 below.

  158. Issue 3: whether Mr Chin caused loss to Writers Studio by breaching a duty of care

  159. [83] Apart from its claim in contract, Writers Studio also claims against Mr Chin in the tort of negligence. The specific acts complained of are Mr Chin’s alleged Conduct and Inappropriate Behaviour – which also found Writers Studio’s claim for punitive damages against Mr Chin.

  160. [84] Where Singapore is concerned, the locus classicus remains the Court of Appeal decision in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck”). In the present case, applying the Spandeck framework, I was satisfied that there was legal proximity between the parties which justified the imposition of a prima facie duty of care. Further, there were no policy reasons which militated against the imposition of a duty of care. I explain.

  161. [85] In Spandeck, the Court of Appeal set out a two-stage test to determine whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care. The two-stage test is preceded by the threshold requirement of factual foreseeability which is concerned with the “requirement of reasonable foreseeability from a factual perspective” [emphasis in original] (Spandeck at [75]–[76] citing Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric (practising under the name and style of W P Architects [2007] 1 SLR(R) 853 at [55], AYW v AYX [2016] 1 SLR 1183 (“AYW”) at [51]).

  162. [86] The threshold question of factual or reasonable foreseeability, ie, whether the defendant ought to have known that the claimant would suffer from the defendant’s carelessness, is a requirement which would be fulfilled in almost all cases as the two parties are likely to be in some degree of physical relationship (Spandeck at [75]–[76]). In the present case, I was satisfied that this threshold requirement of factual foreseeability was crossed. I therefore move on to consider the first stage of the Spandeck framework. Here, the key question is whether there is sufficient legal proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant. The focus of the inquiry at this stage is the closeness of the relationship between the parties which includes physical, circumstantial and causal proximity, supported by the twin criteria of voluntary assumption of responsibility and reliance (Spandeck at [77] and [81]; Go Dante Yap v Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG [2011] 4 SLR 559 (“Go Dante Yap”) at [19]–[20], Animal Concerns Research & Education Society v Tan Boon Kwee [2011] 2 SLR 146 (“Animal Concerns”) at [29]–[74]),

  163. [87] In the present case, Writers Studio submits that Mr Chin “should be found to owe a duty of care” to them since it had “entrusted” the “young and impressionable” students to Mr Chin . Writers Studio argues, citing Spandeck, that there is a “clear proximity” between the parties and there are “strong policy considerations that support the imposition of a duty of care”. I make one observation about the manner in which Writers Studio has presented this argument in its written submissions. While it is perfectly fine to state the elements of the Spandeck framework, more attention should be paid to the facts of the cases adduced in support of one’s argument that the court should find that a duty of care is owed in the present case. The Spandeck framework is not a magic spell, the mere invocation of which, without more, will automatically compel the court to find that a duty of care is owed.

  164. [88] That much is clear from Spandeck itself. In that case, the Government of Singapore (the “Government”) had awarded the appellant a contract to redevelop a medical facility at an army camp. Pursuant to the contract, the respondent was appointed as the superintending officer of the project and was responsible for certifying interim payments in respect of the appellant’s work done. While the contract precluded the appellant from claiming against the Government damages for the failure or delay of the respondent in certification, the contract did provide that the appellant had the right to claim the amounts which were under-certified and interest thereon by commencing arbitration proceedings against the Government.

  165. [90] To unpack this a little, the Court of Appeal in Spandeck arrived at its decision in the following manner: in Pacific Associates, the court there made a finding that there was no legal proximity based on certain material facts. The same material facts were also present in Spandeck, and so this justified a finding that there was no legal proximity and thus no prima facie duty of care owed.

  166. [91] Here, the facts are slightly different from that in Spandeck – in that case, the appellant and respondent had no direct contractual relationship, whereas in the present case, Writers Studio had engaged Mr Chin as an independent contractor under an employment for service (above at [67]). The more appropriate decision for comparison, in my view, would be the decision in Go Dante Yap. In that case, the appellant had opened two accounts with the respondent bank. Both accounts were handled by one Ms Ching, who was employed by the respondent. In opening the accounts, the appellant executed three sets of contractual documents which, amongst other things, gave the appellant the final say in deciding what securities to purchase or sell. Ms Ching entered into 16 investments on the appellant’s behalf, and met the appellant on a monthly basis to review the performance of the investments and their projected returns. The investments were subsequently liquidated, but the appellant suffered significant losses on three of the investments as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis. The appellant sued the respondent, alleging, amongst other things, that the respondent owed him a duty of care to advise him on his investments.

  167. [92] The Court of Appeal found, when it heard the appeal, that there was clearly legal proximity between the parties: Go Dante Yap at [31]. As the court reasoned (at [34]–[35]):

  168. [93] In my view, Go Dante Yap can be sufficiently analogised to the present case. In Go Dante Yap, the court ruled (at [24], citing Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555 (“Lister”) at 572–573) that “in contracts under which a skilled or professional person agrees to render certain services to his client in return for a specified or reasonable fee, there is at common law an implied term in law that he will exercise reasonable skill and care in rendering those services”. The court further noted that “it is trite law that a bank in carrying out the instructions of its customer is under an implied contractual duty to exercise skill and care”. This implied contractual duty to exercise skill and care therefore meant that, as the court reasoned (at [34]), there was an assumption of responsibility by the respondent to take care to avoid or prevent injury, loss or damage to the appellant.

  169. [94] In the present case, I would take the view that there was an implied term in the contract that Mr Chin would exercise reasonable skill and care in rendering services to Writers Studio. In Lister, the court reasoned (at 572–573) that it was an implied term of the contract that the appellant would perform his duties with the proper care because:

  170. [95] It was therefore apparent to me, from the passage above, that the court in Lister had found that there was an implied contractual term of a skilled person to exercise reasonable skill and care in the context of an employer-employee relationship. Where employees are concerned, it is trite law that there is an implied term “in the employer’s favour that the employee will serve the employer with good faith and fidelity, and that he or she (the employee) will also use reasonable skill and care in the performance of his or her duties pursuant to the employment contract: Man Financial at [193]. In the present case, while I have found that Writers Studio had engaged Mr Chin qua independent contractor, I am of the view that such a term should also be implied in law where independent contractors are concerned. Terms implied by law reflect considerations of fairness and policy (Chua Choon Cheng and ors v Allgreen Properties Ltd and another appeal [2009] 3 SLR(R) 724 at [68]). To hold that there is no such term of reasonable skill and care implied in law where the tutor is hired qua independent contractor would be to draw a fine and unsustainable distinction. In my view, where a tutor is hired by a tuition centre to teach young children, there must be an implied term of reasonable skill and care in the contract between the tutor and the tuition centre regardless of the nature of the tutor’s engagement.

  171. [96] I would also observe that the role in which Mr Chin was engaged by Writers Studio was akin to that of a professional providing services to a client such that a term of reasonable skill and care should be implied. While structured as a business arrangement (see [67] above), the reality was that Mr Chin was hired as a tutor who specialised in teaching English, Mathematics and Science, to teach classes.

  172. [98] In the present case, I would similarly hold that Mr Chin had voluntarily assumed responsibility in the relevant sense by accepting the appointment from Writers Studio to teach its students. Similarly, Writers Studio had placed reliance on Mr Chin’s expertise – they had placed their students under his tutelage and let him run his classes as he saw fit.

  173. [99] For the reasons above, I therefore find that there was sufficient legal proximity to found a prima facie duty of care in the present case. I turn now to consider the second stage of the Spandeck test. Here, the court considers whether any policy considerations which are applicable to the factual matrix negate that prima facie duty of care, and must be careful to differentiate “such considerations from the requirement of proximity in the first stage” of the Spandeck framework: Spandeck at [83] and [85]. The rationale for this, as explained by the Court of Appeal in See Toh Siew Kee v Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd and others [2013] 3 SLR 284 at [89]–[90], was that the raison d’être of the tort of negligence is to render interpersonal justice – cogent policy considerations must therefore be adduced to “displace the prima facie” position that interpersonal wrongs should be remedied.

  174. [100] In essence, what this means is that while the law of tort deals with interpersonal wrongs, in certain situations, policy reasons may militate against the imposition of a duty of care, and that these interpersonal wrongs be dealt with by other means. For example, the availability of alternative statutory remedies and processes is a policy reason militating against the imposition of a duty of care (The Law of Torts in Singapore at [05.077]–[05.078]). The reason for this is that the plaintiff can seek relief for interpersonal wrongs through statutory remedies and processes. Another example of a policy reason militating against the imposition of a duty of care would be the existence of a contractual relationship. In Spandeck (at [111]–[113]), the court ruled that even if there was proximity between the parties, the policy reason weighing against imposing a duty of care was the existence of a contract which clearly defined the rights between parties.

  175. [101] In the present case, while there was a contractual relationship between Writers Studio and Mr Chin, I did not think that this negated the imposition of the prima facie duty of care. The situation here was quite different from that in Spandeck. The court in that case took the view that “a duty of care should not be superimposed on a contractual framework” (Spandeck at [114]). The reason for this, however, was because the appellant had freely entered into the contract which provided that claims against the Government had to be brought in arbitration. The court therefore held that because parties sought to regulate their relationship via contract which stipulated that in the event of under-certification, that would be dealt with through arbitration, there should not be imposed on the respondent a duty which the appellant had chosen not to make a contractual one: Spandeck at [96], [101] and [114].

  176. [102] In the present case, while Mr Chin was engaged by Writers Studio pursuant to a contract, it is evident that parties had not clearly sought to define the boundaries of their contractual relationship. The contract was silent as to what was expected of Mr Chin when it came to the delivery of his lessons and his conduct as a tutor. For this reason, I find that the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties did not negate the imposition of a prima facie duty of care. Unlike Spandeck, where parties had clearly regulated and defined the boundaries of their contractual relationship to exclude the imposition of a tortious duty of care (see Animal Concerns at [71]), parties here had not done so.

  177. [103] I would further hold that there were also policy reasons leaning in favour of the imposition of a duty of care (Animal Concerns at [86]). It is important that tutors engaged to teach young children are not only held accountable to the students whom they teach, but also the tuition agencies who have hired them to conduct the classes.

  178. [104] For the reasons above, I find that Mr Chin owed Writers Studio a duty of care.

  179. Breach of a Duty Owed

  180. [105] While I have found that Mr Chin owed a duty of care to Writers Studio, I do not find that Mr Chin had breached that duty of care owed. The standard of care is the objective standard of a reasonable person using ordinary care and skill. As stated in Blyth v The Company of Proprietors of The Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Exch 781 at 784:

  181. The parties’ submissions

  182. [107] Writers Studio argued that Mr Chin breached such a duty of care by virtue of his Conduct on 16 September 2021 and by his Inappropriate Behaviour. This, in turn, caused them to suffer financial losses because students withdrew, and they were drawn into a criminal investigation arising out of Mr Chin’s Inappropriate Behaviour. As a consequence, Writers Studio’s reputation and standing as a tuition centre suffered.

  183. [108] Mr Chin, however, in his submissions, does not directly deal with the alleged duty of care owed. Even though he admitted at the trial that he had “behaved unprofessionally on 16th September 2020” and “caused [Writers Studio] to suffer damage”, he highlights that Writers Studio finally paid his remuneration “only after the incident on 16 September 2020” well after the day on which he was supposed to have been paid (ie, 7 September 2020). Furthermore, he did not resign and Ms Oh was “unable to provide any evidence that [Mr Chin] asked the students to demand for his alleged owed salary/remuneration”. As such, according to Mr Chin, it can only be shown that he had only told the students that he was not being paid, and as a result of which (together with his “mental state at the time”), he wanted to end the classes slightly earlier. Mr Chin submits that it was Writers Studio’s “unprofessional and poor treatment” that caused him to “act out” on 16 September 2020.

  184. Analysis and findings

  185. [109] I am, however not persuaded that Writers Studio had proved that Mr Chin breached such a duty of care. Regardless of Mr Chin’s admission at trial, the determination for any breach is ultimately to be made by this Court. I consider each of the alleged complaints in turn.

  186. [110] In relation to Mr Chin’s alleged Inappropriate Behaviour (see [34] above), Writers Studio seeks to rely on what his former students were recorded to have said. While the recording and Mr Ting’s testimony supports the finding that Mr Chin’s former students had made those statements, neither the recording nor Mr Ting’s testimony could support a finding as to the truth of those statements. In my judgment, such evidence is a classic form of hearsay evidence which is inadmissible unless one of the limbs under s 32 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) can be invoked. For example, in Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 (‘Gimpex’), the Court of Appeal held (at [84]) that a report, the admissibility of which was disputed, was hearsay evidence. The defendants in that case sought to have the report admitted on the basis that one Nonot, who was allegedly the maker of the report, had testified at trial (Gimpex at [80]). The court, however, took the view that the report was hearsay evidence as it was factually unclear whether Nonot had signed the report. Moreover, even if Nonot was the maker of the report, he had not been personally involved in the entire process of sampling, testing and loading the coal. He hence could not testify as to whether the statements in the report about the quality of the coal were true as he had no first-hand knowledge of the facts (Gimpex at [83]–[84]). In a similar vein, Mr Ting here was, by his own admission, not the one who conducted the recording and did not know if any prior discussions had not been captured by the recording. He also had no first-hand knowledge of the facts contained in the recording, and thus could not have testified as to the truth of those facts. The recording is hence hearsay evidence. I also do not see how any of the limbs in s 32(1) of the Evidence Act apply such that the recording may be admitted into evidence.

  187. [111] Even if I am wrong on this, I did not think that this recording, even if admitted, could have been given any weight. In Gimpex, the report had been found to be admissible under s 32(1)(b)(iv) of the Evidence Act but the court then exercised its discretion to exclude the report in the interests of justice under s 32(2) of the Evidence Act, as the report was not shown to have a minimal degree of reliability (at [120]). Similarly, while Mr Ting claims that he had conducted the recorded discussion in an “appropriate” manner, he responds to the children’s allegations in recording with lines such as “why he like [sic] your nipple so much” and “then ask him go back and squeeze the wife lah.” Counsel for Mr Chin has also highlighted that Mr Ting also made references to sexual remarks allegedly made by Mr Chin, before the same remarks were raised by the children in the recording. Owing to the manner in which the recorded discussion had been conducted, its reliability as a record of the children’s recollection of Mr Chin’s Inappropriate Behaviour towards them is hence highly suspect.

  188. [112] I would further note that the reports filed with the Singapore Police Force, which were alluded to by Writers Studio, are also not before me. Even if they were, they do not necessarily prove the truth of the statements alleged.

  189. [113] As to Mr Chin’s Conduct on 16 September 2020 (see [30] above), I did not think that he had breached any duty of care owed to Writers Studio. In determining whether Mr Chin had acted below the objective standard of a reasonable person using ordinary care and skill, the Conduct must be understood in its proper context. In particular, the undisputed fact that Writers Studio paid Mr Chin late on multiple occasions up to 16 September 2020 is relevant and cannot be ignored. Stated thus, as of 16 September 2020, Writers Studio was in a continued breach of its contractual obligation to pay Mr Chin. In view of Writers Studio’s continuing breach, it is not unreasonable for Mr Chin feel frustrated to the point that he dismissed his 3.00pm class early and cancelled the later 5.00pm and 7.00pm classes. Bearing this in mind, and taking into account the fact that his students saw him packing up and ending class early, and those students asking him what had happened, it can hardly be said that it was unreasonable of Mr Chin to have explained to his students that he was “quitting” because he was not being paid. It cannot – in these circumstances – be for Writers Studio to push Mr Chin over the edge by its own conduct and then turn around to claim that he had breached his duty of care.

  190. [114] In my judgment, it would be a travesty of justice if Mr Chin, being made to work without his remuneration under financial pressures, cracks under such pressure by his Conduct and be held liable in negligence.

  191. [115] For the same foregoing reasons, even if Writers Studio could show that there is an implied term of a duty of fidelity and good faith (see Issue 2 above), I would have held that there would not have been a breach of the same.

  192. Issue 4: whether Mr Chin caused loss by breaching the NDA and/or duty of confidentiality

  193. The parties’ submissions

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