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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Nov 2023

General Division of the High Court

Swift Maids Pte Ltd and another v Cheong Yi Qiang and others

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[2023] SGHC 317Case no. Suit No 238 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Both plaintiffs, Swift Maids Pte Ltd and Swift Maids Resources Pte Ltd (collectively referred to as “Swift Maids”), are foreign domestic worker (“FDW”) employment agencies. They share the same directors and shareholders, and their businesses, whilst structured under two companies, were operated as if there was only one business under a single brand name “Swift Maids”. They bring this action against the first defendant, Mr Cheong Yi Qiang (“Mr Cheong”), for breach of his employment contract with Swift Maids Pte Ltd, breach of confidentiality obligations and breach of fiduciary duties. Mr Cheong, who is also referred to variously as “Yi Qiang”, “Daniel” or “Dan”, was employed as a general manager at Swift Maids Pte Ltd.

  3. [2] The plaintiffs also claim against the second to fifth defendants for their alleged dishonest assistance of Mr Cheong’s breach of fiduciary duties. The second and fifth defendants – Recruitbee Employment Pte Ltd (“Recruitbee Employment”) and Recruitbee Helpers Pte Ltd (“Recruitbee Helpers”) (collectively referred to as “Recruitbee”) – are engaged in the same line of business as Swift Maids, namely as FDW employment agencies. The third defendant, Ms Toh Suling, Stephenie (“Ms Toh”), was a customer of Swift Maids. She also did some work for Swift Maids as a freelance designer, and dealt with Mr Cheong in relation to various design projects while he was working at Swift Maids. The fourth defendant, Ms Thin Thin Aung (“Ms Aung”), is a Burmese national and a former employee of Swift Maids. After she ceased her employment with Swift Maids, she continued to supply biodata of FDWs to them for a period of time. Mr Cheong and Ms Toh were, at various times, registered directors and shareholders of Recruitbee. Ms Aung similarly claims to have been a director and shareholder of Recruitbee, even though she was not registered as such. In addition, the plaintiffs claim against all the defendants for unlawful means conspiracy in setting up and operating Recruitbee to re-direct the plaintiffs’ business and employees to Recruitbee through the use of information which the plaintiffs claim to be confidential.

  4. [4] At the heart of this suit is the role that Mr Cheong had allegedly played in the wrongful gain that the defendants allegedly made at Swift Maids’ expense. In this regard, the plaintiffs allege that Mr Cheong had taken and made unauthorised use of their confidential information, and that he had provided and caused such confidential information to be misused by the other defendants. It is the plaintiffs’ case that Recruitbee, being new to the market, could not have achieved its level of performance without the benefit of using Swift Maids’ confidential information. The plaintiffs’ pleaded case at the outset was that all of Recruitbee’s business ought to have been transacted by Swift Maids, and that the defendants wrongfully gained an estimated amount of $744,359.31 by diverting such business from Swift Maids to Recruitbee. In their closing submissions, however, the plaintiffs accepted that not all of the defendants’ alleged profits were wrongfully gained. Instead, they took the position that the defendants’ wrongful gains were limited to profits allegedly made through the taking and misuse of Swift Maids’ confidential information.

  5. [5] After considering the evidence and the parties’ submissions, I find that Mr Cheong was in breach of various obligations under his employment contract. The plaintiffs, however, fail on their other causes of action against Mr Cheong, their causes of action against the other defendants, and their causes of action against Mr Cheong and the other defendants collectively. The plaintiffs have made a litany of allegations against Mr Cheong and the other defendants, and pleaded, in quite blunderbuss fashion, a breach of any conceivable duty related to the allegations. Although I find the plaintiffs’ key witnesses to be straightforward and truthful while on the stand, there are significant gaps in the plaintiffs’ evidence, which the plaintiffs have sought to bridge by their assertions of what, to their minds, must have happened. Clearly, the plaintiffs cannot succeed on that basis. It is trite that he who asserts must prove, and this, the plaintiffs have simply failed to do.

  6. Facts

  7. The parties

  8. [6] Swift Maids was founded by Mr Loh Jit Yong (“Mr Loh”), who is a director and shareholder of Swift Maids. Mr Hu Xijian (“Mr Hu”) is another director and shareholder of Swift Maids. At the time of the trial, Mr Lit Jun Hao (“Mr Lit”) was the general manager of Swift Maids, having assumed that position from 1 July 2020. Mr Loh, Mr Hu and Mr Lit were all called as key witnesses for the plaintiffs. Three employees of Swift Maids – Mr Ismadi bin Jami Eksan (“Mr Ismadi”), Ms Del Rosario Vivian Enano (“Ms Vivian”) and Ms May Thazin Kyaw (“Ms May”) – also gave evidence for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs called a further witness, Ms Nur Nadia binte Nazarudin (“Ms Nadia”), to give evidence for them. Ms Nadia was a former employee of Recruitbee Employment, who had attended a job interview for a role with Swift Maids, and whose conversation with Mr Loh and Mr Hu during that job interview was recorded without her knowledge or consent.

  9. [7] Recruitbee Employment was incorporated on 23 March 2019. On the date of Recruitbee Employment’s incorporation, Mr Cheong and Ms Toh were its registered directors. While Ms Aung asserts that she was a founder of Recruitbee Employment, she was not registered as its director at the time of its incorporation. She asserts, however, that Mr Cheong had “lent his name” to her and acted as her “nominee director”. In this regard, she explained in her affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) that Mr Cheong had offered her the use of his name for the incorporation of Recruitbee Employment because she had some reservations about trusting Ms Toh with her business interest at the initial phase of her partnership with Ms Toh. At the trial, Ms Aung further explained that she could not meet the requirements for a foreigner to be registered as a shareholder or director of a company in Singapore.

  10. [8] Recruitbee Helpers was incorporated on 15 August 2021 to continue Recruitbee Employment’s business after the latter’s employment agency licence was suspended by the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”). On the date of Recruitbee Helpers’ incorporation, Ms Toh and Mr Teo Wei Qiang (“Mr Teo”) were its registered directors. According to Mr Cheong, he was also involved in incorporating Recruitbee Helpers, although he was only registered as its director on 27 August 2021.

  11. [9] Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Recruitbee Employment were initially represented, but their counsel ceased to act for them on 3 August 2022. Thereafter, Mr Cheong and Ms Toh were self-represented, and Recruitbee Employment was unrepresented. Ms Aung was represented by counsel throughout these proceedings. The fifth defendant, Recruitbee Helpers, did not enter an appearance. Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Ms Aung gave evidence at the trial. They did not call any other witnesses.

  12. Background

  13. Relationship of Mr Cheong, Ms Aung and Ms Toh with Swift Maids

  14. [10] Sometime in July 2017, Ms Aung started working for both Swift Maids Pte Ltd and HR Oceanic Pte Ltd, another one of Mr Loh’s companies which is not involved in this suit. In or around mid-December 2017, she was transferred to work for only Swift Maids Pte Ltd. Ms Aung did not have a written contract of employment, and her responsibilities included processing biodata of FDWs, general marketing and providing counselling services to FDWs. She was also tasked to set up an office in Peninsula Plaza, and was in charge of the renovation of Swift Maids’ office at Far East Shopping Centre together with the general manager at that time.

  15. [11] Mr Cheong joined Swift Maids later than Ms Aung, on 21 March 2018. Unlike Ms Aung, Mr Cheong had a written employment contract. It was made between him and Swift Maids Pte Ltd, and dated 21 March 2018. While Mr Cheong’s employment contract was made with Swift Maids Pte Ltd, it is not in dispute that he had served as general manager for Swift Maids as a whole, and that he was responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of Swift Maids.

  16. [12] Ms Aung tendered her resignation from Swift Maids on 3 July 2018, a few months after Mr Cheong joined Swift Maids. After her resignation, she remained in contact with Mr Cheong and continued to have dealings with Swift Maids as a supplier of biodata for Burmese FDWs. As for Mr Cheong, he tendered his resignation from Swift Maids on 6 February 2020, and his last day of service was 6 March 2020, nearly two years after he started working for Swift Maids.

  17. [13] Ms Toh first encountered Swift Maids as a customer. In September 2018, Ms Toh used the services of Swift Maids Pte Ltd to hire an FDW for her family. In the same month, an events and advertising company for which Ms Toh worked as a freelance project manager was engaged by Mr Cheong to help carry out branding and design works for Swift Maids. In March 2019, Mr Cheong engaged Ms Toh to carry out further works involving the re-designing of Swift Maids’ logo, name cards, signage board and corporate folder.

  18. Setting up of Recruitbee Employment

  19. [14] Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Ms Aung gave evidence on how Recruitbee Employment came to be set up. According to Mr Cheong and Ms Aung, Ms Aung told Mr Cheong that she was looking for Singaporean partners to join her in opening an FDW employment agency in Singapore. Based on the account given by Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Ms Aung, Mr Cheong introduced Ms Toh to Ms Aung as a potential partner for Ms Aung’s endeavour sometime at the end of 2018 or the beginning of 2019. It is the evidence of Ms Toh and Ms Aung that on 14 March 2019, Ms Aung, Ms Toh and Mr Teo, who was an investor introduced by Mr Cheong, entered into a shareholders’ agreement stipulating that Ms Aung held 53 shares, Ms Toh held 30 shares and Mr Teo held 17 shares, out of a total of 100 shares in Recruitbee Employment. Although Recruitbee Employment was incorporated on 23 March 2019, its first branch was officially opened in Kovan only on 15 July 2019, with the first employee being one Ms Renie Chua (“Ms Chua”).

  20. Swift Maids’ troubles in 2020

  21. [15] In 2020, Swift Maids ran into some operational difficulties.

  22. [16] Mr Loh gave evidence that around March 2020, three suppliers of biodata, namely Ms Aung, Ms Shima and Ms Suliyani, ceased to supply biodata to Swift Maids. Then, between June and July 2020, three experienced sales staff, Ms Doreen Peh (“Ms Peh”), Ms Tilia Teo (“Ms Teo”) and Ms Alice Lim (“Ms Lim”), resigned in quick succession, and thereafter joined Recruitbee Employment. Mr Loh’s evidence is that the resignation of these three staff members left Swift Maids shorthanded, and Swift Maids had to temporarily close down one of its branches.

  23. [17] More broadly, the plaintiffs complain that from March 2020 onwards, during the Covid-19 circuit-breaker period, Swift Maids did not experience the booming business that it had expected. The plaintiffs’ case is that after the borders were closed, the bulk of the business would necessarily be from the transfer of FDWs already working in Singapore, as new FDWs were unable to come into Singapore to work. In this regard, Mr Loh explained that established employment agencies like Swift Maids had a market advantage because of their large base of customers (ie, employers of FDWs) and FDWs, who had previous dealings with them, and who would be willing to do business with them again. But Swift Maids’ anticipation of booming business did not materialise. Instead, Recruitbee Employment, which was newly set up at that time, saw significantly higher than average placement numbers as compared with FDW employment agencies that were started at around the same time. The plaintiffs attribute this to their business being diverted to Recruitbee Employment, and later to Recruitbee Helpers. It is Mr Loh’s evidence that “many FDWs chose to be transferred with [Recruitbee Employment] instead of with the Plaintiffs”.

  24. Allegations of wrongful conduct by Mr Cheong as general manager

  25. [18] Aside from allegations of wrongful acts that involved all the defendants, the plaintiffs also allege that Mr Cheong, alone, committed further wrongful acts.

  26. [19] The first set of wrongful acts that the plaintiffs allege against Mr Cheong relates to five invoices purportedly issued by a deregistered sole-proprietorship, Pixelate, which had been set up by Mr Cheong (the “Pixelate invoices”). The plaintiffs paid out a total amount of $21,245 in reliance on the Pixelate invoices. At the time the payments were made, the plaintiffs did not know that Pixelate was previously owned by Mr Cheong.

  27. [20] The second set of allegedly wrongful acts relates to a fund transfer of $8,190 by the plaintiffs to Mr Cheong for the purposes of making advance payment to Ms Suliyani. The plaintiffs allege that Mr Cheong had misappropriated this sum.

  28. [21] The third and final set of allegedly wrongful acts relates to 28 transport claims (the “wrongful transport claims”) amounting to $522.66 that were made by Mr Cheong, and paid out by the plaintiffs to Mr Cheong, from April 2019 to February 2020. The plaintiffs allege that these trips were carried out by Mr Cheong for Recruitbee Employment’s purposes.

  29. Issues to be determined

  30. [22] The issues in this suit can be divided into three broad categories, namely: (a) issues relating to the claims against Mr Cheong alone; (b) issues relating to the claims against Mr Cheong and the other defendants together; and (c) issues relating to the claims against the other defendants.

  31. [23] In relation to Mr Cheong alone, the issues are as follows:

  32. (a) whether Mr Cheong was in breach of duties expressly stipulated in the employment contract between him and Swift Maids Pte Ltd, and whether Mr Cheong was in breach of an implied term of the contract obliging him to serve with good faith and fidelity;

  33. (b) whether Mr Cheong was in breach of any duty of confidence; and

  34. (c) whether Mr Cheong was in breach of any fiduciary duties owed to Swift Maids.

  35. [25] As against the second to fifth defendants, the issue is whether they rendered dishonest assistance in relation to the purported breaches of fiduciary duties that Mr Cheong allegedly owed to the plaintiffs.

  36. [26] There is a fair degree of overlap in the different claims made by the plaintiffs. In relation to the claim for unlawful means conspiracy, the plaintiffs pleaded that the unlawful acts carried out by the defendants in combination with each other involve Mr Cheong’s breaches of various terms in his employment contract (which are separately actionable against Mr Cheong alone), and the misuse of confidential information belonging to the plaintiffs (which is also separately actionable against Mr Cheong alone). As for the action against the second to fifth defendants for dishonest assistance, it is predicated on the claim that Mr Cheong owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs, which he had allegedly breached. As to how Mr Cheong had breached these fiduciary duties, the plaintiffs rely on allegations that they made to support their other claims against Mr Cheong.

  37. The claims against Mr Cheong

  38. [27] I turn first to consider each of the duties that Mr Cheong had allegedly breached, save for the alleged breach of his fiduciary duties, which I will analyse alongside the claims against the other defendants.

  39. [28] I start by observing that the plaintiffs have relied mostly on the same factual complaints against Mr Cheong in support of the different heads of claims against him. In this case, it is not always entirely clear which particulars the plaintiffs are relying on to establish the breach of each duty and how the particulars pleaded co-relate to the different duties, as the facts relevant to the breach of each duty are not clearly delineated.

  40. Mr Cheong’s involvement in the setting up and operations of Recruitbee Employment

  41. Plaintiffs’ case

  42. [29] The plaintiffs submit that Mr Cheong had breached the express terms spelling out his duties under his employment contract with Swift Maids Pte Ltd, and that Mr Cheong had also breached an implied contractual term to serve with good faith and fidelity. The premise of the plaintiffs’ case is that Mr Cheong had been centrally involved in the setting up and operations of Recruitbee Employment, even while he was still working for the plaintiffs. Further, as Mr Cheong was involved in Recruitbee Employment from its inception, and he continued to be involved after he resigned from Swift Maids, the inference must be that he was invested in growing Recruitbee’s business.

  43. Mr Cheong’s defence

  44. [30] Mr Cheong argues that his involvement in the setting up of Recruitbee Employment was limited, and that he merely assisted Ms Aung by “offering to lend his name” to a friend in need. This came about after Ms Aung had expressed some reservations about trusting Ms Toh with her business interest at the initial phase of her partnership with Ms Toh. In the light of those concerns, Mr Cheong purportedly agreed to “lending [his] name for [Recruitbee Employment’s] incorporation purpose”. As for his performance while he was under the employ of Swift Maids, Mr Cheong relies on the fact that Swift Maids had, in or around the end of 2019 to early 2020, offered him a 20% share of their profits for the financial year 2019, payable in monthly instalments over a calendar year beginning from June 2020, provided that he continued to be employed with Swift Maids. He argues that he had done well and puts emphasis on Mr Loh’s confirmation during cross-examination that Mr Loh was satisfied at that time that Mr Cheong had fulfilled his commitments and duties to the plaintiffs. On this basis, Mr Cheong submits that there had been no breach of his employment contract.

  45. Analysis and findings

  46. [31] The plaintiffs refer to cll 8, 11, 12 and 13 of the contract of employment between Mr Cheong and Swift Maids Pte Ltd in their claim against Mr Cheong. The clauses provide as follows:

  47. [32] It is, however, not clear in the plaintiffs’ case which specific limbs of those clauses were allegedly breached in relation to Mr Cheong’s involvement in the setting up and operations of Recruitbee Employment. Be that as it may, there is sufficient evidence for me to find that Mr Cheong had at least breached cll 8.3, 8.4 and 13.4 of his employment contract - in failing to “devote substantially [his] time, attention and whole skills to the services and affairs of [Swift Maids Pte Ltd] and use [his] utmost endeavours to promote its interest”, in being “connected or engaged with any other company business or concern without prior approval or consent by [Swift Maids Pte Ltd] in writing”, and by being “interested in” the business or activity of providing FDWs and related services. I now explain my findings.

  48. (1) Clauses 8.3 and 8.4

  49. [33] After sowing the first seed for the establishment of Recruitbee Employment by connecting Ms Toh and Ms Aung at around the end of 2018 or the beginning of 2019, Mr Cheong involved himself in a whole series of matters relating to Recruitbee Employment while he was still employed by Swift Maids. The evidence that follows reveals the role that he had played, from the incorporation of Recruitbee Employment to its operation as a going concern.

  50. [34] First, Mr Cheong was registered as one of the directors of Recruitbee Employment when it was incorporated on 23 March 2019. His name was removed on 1 April 2019, but later reinstated from 20 May 2019 to 16 August 2019. Even if Mr Cheong was merely assisting Ms Aung by “offering to lend his name” to a friend in need, as he claims, that does not change the fact that he was involved in the setting up of Recruitbee Employment. He was also registered as a shareholder of Recruitbee Employment from 23 March 2019 to 11 November 2019, holding 53 out of 100 shares.

  51. [35] Second, Mr Cheong agreed for his name to be included in Recruitbee Employment’s employment agency licence application, and for his name to be used to open a bank account for Recruitbee Employment.

  52. [36] Third, when Recruitbee Employment required an injection of funds to be set up, Mr Cheong introduced Mr Teo as an investor. Mr Teo subsequently invested $30,000 in Recruitbee Employment in March 2019.

  53. [37] Fourth, Mr Cheong accompanied Ms Toh and her friend to Myanmar from 31 May to 1 June 2019, where they met Ms Aung. During that trip, there was a meeting with one Mr Augustine from a digital marketing firm, Salween Studio, to discuss website and marketing matters for Recruitbee Employment. It is the evidence of Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Ms Aung that only Ms Toh and Ms Aung discussed Recruitbee Employment’s business with Salween Studio, and that Mr Cheong was not involved in the discussions relating to Recruitbee Employment. Mr Cheong claims that he had instead taken the opportunity to discuss Swift Maids’ marketing issues with Mr Augustine, as Salween Studio was also a service provider for Swift Maids for website-related matters. Their evidence is, however, contradicted by two e-mails from Mr Augustine. Following that meeting, Mr Augustine sent an e-mail dated 2 June 2019 to Mr Cheong, copied to Ms Aung. The e-mail was addressed to Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Ms Aung, and included Social Media Management Service proposals for “Recruit Bee (Myanmar) Co Ltd” and “Recruit Bee (Singapore) Co Ltd”. Then on 14 June 2019, Mr Augustine sent another e-mail to Mr Cheong with a copy to Ms Aung. This second e-mail was also addressed to Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Ms Aung. It contained updated service proposals and confirmed the availability of office space for “Recruit Bee Myanmar”.

  54. [38] Having considered the circumstances, I do not find the evidence of Mr Cheong, Ms Toh and Ms Aung credible. In my view, even if it were true that Mr Cheong discussed Swift Maids’ business with Mr Augustine during that visit, I do not believe that he was not involved in the discussion of Recruitbee Employment’s business. Mr Cheong’s and Ms Aung’s assertion, that Mr Augustine was careless or confused, and that he had mistakenly sent materials relating to Recruitbee Employment to Mr Cheong, was not supported by any satisfactory explanation. It is clear from the face of the e-mails that the trio had discussed with Mr Augustine the services to be provided to Recruitbee Employment, and that Mr Augustine was following up on their discussion. There is no reason why the e-mail would be sent and addressed to Mr Cheong if it were true that he was not involved in the discussion of Recruitbee Employment’s business. As such, it is my view that this is another instance of Mr Cheong’s involvement in the business of Recruitbee Employment. That having been said, it is apposite at this juncture to record that Salween Studio was Ms Aung’s contact, and it was Ms Aung who had introduced Salween Studio to Mr Cheong when he joined Swift Maids. Therefore, although I am satisfied that in respect of dealings with Salween Studio, Mr Cheong was involved in the business of Recruitbee Employment while he was still employed by Swift Maids, it is not a finding that there was any misuse of Swift Maids’ business contacts or information by Mr Cheong or any of the other defendants.

  55. [39] Fifth, Mr Cheong had been a part of Recruitbee Employment’s staff recruitment efforts. Around October 2019, Mr Cheong was involved in interviewing Ms Nadia when Ms Toh requested his assistance. There is also in evidence an e-mail dated 26 March 2019 sent by one “Emily” to Mr Cheong’s Swift Maids e-mail address. Mr Cheong’s evidence is that he had never met Ms Emily before, and that he could not recall anything about this incident. I find, on balance, that Mr Cheong was involved in recruiting for Recruitbee Employment, particularly given the lack of a cogent explanation from Mr Cheong when he was confronted with the e-mail from Ms Emily.

  56. [40] Sixth, there is evidence that in October 2019, Mr Cheong had booked an air ticket for an FDW placed by Recruitbee Employment, purportedly in response to Ms Toh’s request for assistance. After he placed the e-booking, he forwarded it from his Swift Maids e-mail account to his Recruitbee Employment e-mail address at “dan@recruitbee.com.sg”.

  57. [41] Based on the above evidence showing Mr Cheong’s involvement in the setting up and operations of Recruitbee Employment, it is my judgment that Mr Cheong had breached cll 8.3 and 8.4 of his employment contract.

  58. (2) Clause 13.4

  59. [42] Further, I find that Mr Cheong had breached the non-competition provision in cl 13.4 of his employment contract. In this regard, I note that cl 13 is not a model of clarity. Although the parties did not raise any issues or make any submissions in relation to that clause, I will briefly touch on my interpretation of cl 13.4, which is a provision which prohibits Mr Cheong from being “… in any way interested in any such business or activity whether as principal, agent, shareholder, or otherwise; or be associated or engaged in or any way concerned [sic] [himself] in such activity”. Specifically, I will consider the meaning of the words “any such business or activity” in cl 13.4, which also appear in cl 13.5.

  60. [43] I construe the words “any such business or activity” in cll 13.4 and 13.5 to refer to the “business” or “activity” of “providing foreign domestic workers and related services”, which phrase is referred to in cll 13.6 and 13.7, following the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 (“Zurich”) at [131] (citing Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification (Oxford University Press, 2007)) that “the exercise [in interpretation] is one based on the whole contract or an holistic approach. Courts are not excessively focused upon a particular word, phrase, sentence, or clause. Rather the emphasis is on the document or utterance as a whole” [emphasis in original]. Therefore, contractual terms “must always be interpreted in their internal context, which includes other provisions, and the document as a whole” (MCH International Pte Ltd and others v YG Group Pte Ltd and others and other appeals [2019] 2 SLR 837 at [36], citing Zurich at [53]).

  61. [44] While the phrase “any such business or activity” in cll 13.4 and 13.5 is not expressly defined, similar expressions appear in cl 13.6 (“business or activity”) and cl 13.7 (“activity or business”). In each of cll 13.6 and 13.7, the reference is to the business or activity of “providing foreign domestic workers and related services”. Since there is nothing in the rest of cl 13 that specifically describes canvassing, soliciting or approaching for orders (see cl 13.2), or interfering with the continuance of goods or services (see cl 13.3), as a “business” or “activity”, the words “any such business or activity” in cll 13.4 and 13.5 should be construed to refer to the business or activity of “providing foreign domestic workers and related services”.

  62. [45] Based on this reading, cl 13.4 imposed a duty on Mr Cheong not to be interested or engaged in, or associated or concerned with, the business or activity of providing FDWs and related services. I pause to note at this juncture that, per cl 13.1, the obligations in cl 13 were specifically circumscribed temporally and applied only during the term of Mr Cheong’s employment. Given that Mr Cheong was involved in the setting up and operations of a competing business while he was still under the employ of Swift Maids, including significant participation such as his registration as a director and shareholder of Recruitbee Employment, I find him to be in breach of cl 13.4 of his employment contract.

  63. (3) Implied duty of good faith and fidelity

  64. [46] In addition to the express terms found in the employment contract, employees are also typically bound by an implied term in the favour of their employer, obliging the employee to serve the employer with good faith and fidelity: Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as E D & F Man International (S) Pte Ltd) v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663 at [193].

  65. [47] I find that Mr Cheong had also breached the implied duty of good faith and fidelity when he crossed the line into “actual competitive activity (which is not permissible)” [emphasis in original] (Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v Lui Andrew Stewart [2012] 4 SLR 308 (“Smile Inc”) at [67]), by involving himself in the operations of Recruitbee Employment. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Smile Inc held at [81] that there would have been a breach of duty if the employee in that case, who was a dentist, had “obtained a licence from the Ministry of Health” and “in his free time, treated patients under the auspices of [the competitor business], in direct competition with [his employer]” or “engaged in active solicitation of his patients when he was under the employ of [his employer]”. The employee in that case was found not to have been in breach, as he appeared to have only engaged in the setting-up process of a competitor firm for about three months at the tail end of his employment with his employer (at [79]–[80]), and the competitor firm of the employee had not obtained a licence to commence servicing clients while the employee was still employed by his employer (at [81]).

  66. [48] Contrary to Mr Cheong’s assertion in his further written submissions that Smile Inc supports Mr Cheong’s defence because of factual similarities between Smile Inc and the present case, I find that the salient facts in the present case are very different from those in Smile Inc. Here, Mr Cheong provided his name for inclusion in Recruitbee Employment’s employment agency licence application. After the licence was obtained and Recruitbee Employment was in operation, Mr Cheong was involved in recruitment for Recruitbee Employment and other operational matters. The booking of the air ticket for a Recruitbee Employment FDW is an instance of Mr Cheong servicing a competitor’s client and patently acting in competition with Swift Maids’ business. He even had a working Recruitbee Employment e-mail address, to which he forwarded the e-booking of the said air ticket from his Swift Maids e-mail account.

  67. (4) Evidence of Mr Cheong’s involvement in Recruitbee Employment after his resignation from Swift Maids

  68. [49] For completeness, I note that the plaintiffs have adduced evidence of Mr Cheong’s involvement in Recruitbee Employment’s operations after his last day of work with Swift Maids. In my judgment, Mr Cheong’s involvement in Recruitbee Employment’s business after he left the employ of Swift Maids does not constitute a breach of his contractual duties, which do not subsist post-resignation save for his contractual duty of confidentiality under cl 12.2 of his employment contract. I will consider cl 12.2 in the next section, together with his duty of confidence in equity.

  69. Mr Cheong’s duty of confidence

  70. [50] I turn now to examine the plaintiffs’ allegations that Mr Cheong had wrongfully taken and misused Swift Maids’ confidential information, to which he had access, for the purpose of making unlawful gains for Recruitbee.

  71. Plaintiffs’ case

  72. [51] The plaintiffs argue that Mr Cheong breached the following duties that he owed to the plaintiffs: (a) a contractual duty of confidentiality under his employment contract; (b) a duty of confidence in equity; and (c) a duty not to misuse confidential information as a fiduciary. They submit that the confidential information relevant to this suit comprises their customers’ contact information, FDWs’ contact information, FDWs’ biodata and suppliers’ contact information (collectively referred to as the “Confidential Information”).

  73. [52] The plaintiffs argue that Mr Cheong came into possession of the Confidential Information in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. The Confidential Information was kept in Swift Maids’ Integra system (the “Integra system”), which was an online platform that Swift Maids used to store and maintain all contact information and details of customers, FDWs and suppliers. Swift Maids’ sales records and profit margins were also kept in the Integra system. As general manager, Mr Cheong had master access to it and had the ability to extract the entirety of the database. According to the plaintiffs, that left the plaintiffs vulnerable to potential misuse of the Confidential Information.

  74. [53] The plaintiffs also point to Mr Cheong’s use of his personal handphone while carrying out his duties. Because of that, they allege that Mr Cheong had the contact details of FDWs who dealt with Swift Maids, as well as the contact details of their customers and suppliers.

  75. [54] The plaintiffs allege that Mr Cheong had used the Confidential Information that he had taken to solicit and/or divert Swift Maids’ customers, FDWs and suppliers to Recruitbee. The plaintiffs also allege that Mr Cheong had disclosed, divulged and/or delivered their Confidential Information to Ms Toh, Ms Aung and the employees of Recruitbee to do the same.

  76. [55] Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that Mr Cheong, as general manager, had failed to stop some of Swift Maids’ staff members from using their personal handphones while conducting Swift Maids’ business. As a consequence of this failure, Ms Peh, Ms Teo and Ms Lim were able to store the Confidential Information in their personal handphones and thereby misuse the Confidential Information for the benefit of Recruitbee Employment.

  77. Mr Cheong’s defence

  78. [56] Mr Cheong submits that the plaintiffs have failed to adduce any evidence that he took any information from the Integra system. He highlights that the plaintiffs did not even contact Swift Maids’ vendor for the Integra system to ascertain whether any data was exported from the system.

  79. [57] In his defence, Mr Cheong pleaded that he did not use his “personal mobile phone number” to contact Swift Maids’ customers, FDWs and suppliers. However, under cross-examination, Mr Cheong testified that he had used his personal handphone in carrying out his duties as Swift Maids’ general manager, but with Swift Maids’ Subscriber Identity Module (“SIM”) card as a second SIM card in his personal handphone. His evidence is that his personal handphone was a “dual SIM” phone that allowed for two SIM cards to be used at the same time. It is undisputed as between the parties that the plaintiffs’ company handphones and SIM cards only arrived at the company on 21 May 2018. Mr Cheong, who had joined the plaintiffs on 3 March 2018, had used his personal handphone and personal SIM card for Swift Maids’ business before then. According to Mr Cheong, after the company SIM cards had arrived, he inserted a company SIM card into his personal handphone and continued using his personal handphone for Swift Maids’ business. Mr Cheong also pleaded in his defence that he did not retain any information of customers, FDWs or suppliers in his personal handphone after he left Swift Maids’ employ. As for customers or FDWs who contacted him on his personal handphone after his resignation, he informed them that he had already left and told them to contact the Swift Maids’ office number directly. He also did not save their contact numbers.

  80. [58] As against the claim that Mr Cheong failed to stop Swift Maids’ staff members from using their personal handphones while conducting Swift Maids’ business, Mr Cheong submits that he had complied with Mr Loh’s instructions to change the phone number stated on the stationery used by the staff members to the office phone number, and had further proposed other solutions to deal with the problem of staff members refusing to use only the office phone number for their work. As for Ms Peh, the one staff member identified by the plaintiffs to have persisted in using her personal handphone number, Mr Cheong denied that he should be held responsible. Mr Cheong’s case is that he had duly instructed Ms Peh to use the office phone number, but she had stubbornly refused to do so because she complained that she could not close any deal after hours if she was confined to using the shared company handphone.

  81. Applicable Law

  82. [59] I start by considering the law on the breach of confidence. The leading authorities are the Court of Appeal decisions in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting and others [2020] 1 SLR 1130 (“I-Admin”) and Lim Oon Kuin and others v Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 280 (“Lim Oon Kuin”).

  83. [60] I-Admin was a case involving two companies in the business of supplying, amongst other things, payroll-related services (at [4] and [6(c)]). The first respondent in I-Admin was a former employee of the appellant company (at [6(a)]). Whilst still employed by the appellant company, the first respondent had worked with the second respondent, who was a former employee of the appellant company’s subsidiary, to develop a new payroll software (at [6(b)] and [7]). The first and second respondents thereafter incorporated the third respondent company to market the new payroll software, and they resigned to work for the third respondent company (at [8]). Prior to their resignation, the first and second respondents had accessed and downloaded confidential materials belonging to the appellant company, including source codes, databases, business development and client-related materials, and materials related to the appellant company’s operations (at [14]).

  84. [61] In analysing the appellant company’s claim in the law of confidence against the respondents, the Court of Appeal, at [61], set out the applicable test in situations where a plaintiff’s interest to avoid wrongful loss is engaged:

  85. [62] Applying this framework, the Court of Appeal first found that it was undisputed that the appellant company’s materials were confidential in nature (at [63]). The Court of Appeal then found that the first and second respondents had specifically acquired the appellant company’s confidential materials to be reviewed and potentially used for the third respondent company’s benefit (at [64]). On the facts of that case, the first and second respondents were found to have acquired, circulated, and referenced the appellant company’s materials without permission (at [63]). They knew that they were not allowed to be in possession of the appellant company’s confidential materials (at [64]). As the respondents had done nothing to displace the presumption that their conscience was negatively affected, the Court of Appeal found that the respondents’ possession and referencing of the appellant company’s confidential materials constituted acts in breach of confidence (at [64]). The first respondent alone was found to have committed a further breach by downloading a database file from the appellant company’s systems by retaining and abusing confidential log-in credentials to access the appellant company’s systems on multiple occasions after leaving the appellant company’s employ (at [65]).

  86. [63] The Court of Appeal in Lim Oon Kuin elaborated upon the situations in which the I-Admin approach would be applicable. At [39], the Court of Appeal endorsed the observation made by Professor Ng‑Loy Wee Loon (“Prof Ng‑Loy”) in Law of Intellectual Property of Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2021) (“Law of Intellectual Property”) at para 41.3.9, emphasising that the I-Admin modified approach was to be applied in cases involving alleged harm to the plaintiff’s “wrongful loss interest”, while in cases involving alleged harm to the plaintiff’s “wrongful gain interest”, the traditional approach set out in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 (“Coco v Clark”) should be applied. Later in the judgment at [41], the Court of Appeal further endorsed the following proposition advanced by Prof Ng-Loy:

  87. [64] The significance of the Court of Appeal’s endorsement of Prof Ng-Loy’s comments in Lim Oon Kuin is that the I-Admin modified approach is to apply where the plaintiff’s “wrongful loss interest” is engaged in cases involving unauthorised acquisition of the confidential information (Lim Oon Kuin at [41]).

  88. [65] More recently, in Shanghai Afute Food and Beverage Management Co Ltd v Tan Swee Meng and others [2023] SGHC 34 (“Shanghai Afute Food”), the learned Judge synthesised the comments of the Court of Appeal in I-Admin and Lim Oon Kuin at [100], as follows:

  89. [66] I note that in a recent decision in Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and another v Lim Suk Ling Priscilla and others [2023] SGHC 241 (“Amber Compounding Pharmacy”), the learned Judge had occasion to revisit his holding above, and clarified that a plaintiff is entitled to plead and claim on the basis of both the wrongful gain interest and the wrongful loss interest in an action for breach of confidence (Amber Compounding Pharmacy at [16] and [30]).

  90. [67] While the plaintiffs have also contended that Mr Cheong had owed obligations of confidence in his capacity as a fiduciary, the relevant law on fiduciary obligations will be discussed in a later part of this judgment together with the broader issue of whether Mr Cheong owed any fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs.

  91. [68] With these principles in mind, I turn to assess the evidence adduced in the present suit.

  92. Analysis and findings

  93. [69] The plaintiffs have made two interlinked claims concerning Mr Cheong’s breaches of his confidentiality obligations. First, there is an allegation concerning the manner of Mr Cheong’s breach – the plaintiffs pleaded that Mr Cheong had taken and misused the Confidential Information, and that he had also disclosed, divulged or delivered the Confidential Information to the other defendants. Second, there is an allegation concerning the purpose of Mr Cheong’s breach – the plaintiffs argue that the purpose of Mr Cheong’s breach was so that the Confidential Information could be used to solicit and/or divert Swift Maids’ customers, FDWs and suppliers to Recruitbee. These interlinked allegations against Mr Cheong personally are inextricably tied to the allegations made by the plaintiffs against the defendants collectively in their action for unlawful means conspiracy, because the plaintiffs have essentially relied on the same factual complaints in advancing their claims. The findings in this section will therefore also be applicable when considering the plaintiffs’ claim against all the defendants for unlawful means conspiracy.

  94. [70] The plaintiffs have made little distinction between their action against Mr Cheong for breach of his duty of confidence in equity and their action against Mr Cheong for breach of his contractual duty of confidentiality in their closing submissions, and have leaned mainly on the legal framework relevant for determining the obligations of confidence in equity. As the law is clear that these are distinct causes of action and should not be conflated (Adinop Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd and another [2019] 2 SLR 808 (“Adinop”) at [37]), I will proceed to analyse them separately. I turn first to consider whether Mr Cheong had breached his duty of confidence in equity since that is the focus of the plaintiffs’ submissions.

  95. (1) Equitable duty of confidence

  96. (A) The applicable test and burden of proof

  97. [71] The plaintiffs’ position is that the I-Admin modified approach applies in this case, and accordingly, the legal burden of proof is on Mr Cheong to prove that his conscience was unaffected.

  98. [72] The question of which approach should apply should be answered with reference to the interest that the plaintiffs are seeking to protect. As I explain below, the plaintiffs have pleaded a case based on the protection of their “wrongful gain interest”, where Mr Cheong is alleged to have made unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information and thereby gained a benefit (see Shanghai Afute Food at [100(a)(i)]). This is clear from the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim (Amendment No 3) (“Statement of Claim”), where they pleaded that Mr Cheong had “utilised the [Confidential Information] to canvass, solicit, and/or approach customers and suppliers and/or FDWs of the Plaintiffs, and caused them to conduct business with Recruitbee instead of the Plaintiffs”. The plaintiffs also pleaded that Mr Cheong had “disclosed, divulged, authorized or permitted delivery” of the Confidential Information to “Stephenie Toh and Catherine [Aung] as well as employees of Recruitbee, who are persons not properly entitled to such information, and [utilised] the same for his and Recruitbee’s benefit”. At paragraph 39(b)(iv) of the Statement of Claim, the plaintiffs further pleaded that “[t]he Defendants therefore must give an account of profits, in respect of their wrongful gain”. This wrongful gain was quantified at paragraph 39(b) as “an unfair benefit amounting to approximately $744,359.31 to date”. Similarly, their closing submissions were in respect of the alleged unauthorised use and disclosure of the Confidential Information by Mr Cheong and the benefit gained by the defendants as a result of such unauthorised use and disclosure. At paragraph 61 of the plaintiffs’ closing submissions, the plaintiffs echoed their pleadings in submitting that “the taking and misuse of the Plaintiffs’ confidential information for the Defendants’ wrongful gain would necessarily cause injury to the Plaintiffs, through the solicitation of business that could have, and has arisen from such misuse”. Having alleged that there had been unauthorised use and disclosure of their Confidential Information to cause Recruitbee to reap a wrongful gain, it is for the plaintiffs to prove those allegations.

  99. [73] It is not the plaintiffs’ pleaded case that they are seeking to vindicate their “wrongful loss interest” for the protection of “the confidentiality of the information per se” (Shanghai Afute Food at [100(a)(ii)]). It was only in the plaintiffs’ supplementary written submissions dated 26 September 2023 that the plaintiffs made mention, for the first time, that they “seek to protect both their wrongful gain interest … and their wrongful loss interest” [emphasis added]. For context, the plaintiffs’ supplementary written submissions were tendered after closing submissions and replies were exchanged, in response to the court’s invitation to the parties to make submissions, if any, on various authorities, including Lim Oon Kuin, Shanghai Afute Food and Asia Petworld Pte Ltd v Sivabalan s/o Ramasami and another [2022] 5 SLR 805 (“Asia Petworld”), which were not analysed in the parties’ earlier submissions. In these supplementary written submissions, the plaintiffs argue that their wrongful loss interest has been engaged by Mr Cheong’s alleged “wrongful and/or unauthorised acquisition of the Plaintiffs’ confidential information” through his use of his personal handphone and phone number in conducting Swift Maids’ business. However, Mr Cheong’s use of his personal handphone and phone number in conducting Swift Maids’ business was, in the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim and closing submissions, all along tied to his alleged misuse and unlawful disclosure of the Confidential Information to give Recruitbee a wrongful profit.

  100. [74] The learned Judge’s hortatory words in Writers Studio Pte Ltd v Chin Kwok Yung [2022] SGHC 205 (“Writers Studio”) at [135] bear repeating here: “counsel should take care to plead with specificity, whether they are proceeding on the basis of the ‘wrongful loss’ or ‘wrongful gain’ interest”. In this suit, having pleaded a claim that seeks to protect their “wrongful gain interest”, where Mr Cheong is alleged to have made unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information and thereby reaped a wrongful gain, the legal burden rests squarely on the plaintiffs to prove their case under the traditional approach in Coco v Clark (Lim Oon Kuin at [39]). The legal burden is not on Mr Cheong to prove that his conscience was unaffected. Similarly, in Writers Studio, the learned Judge observed that the plaintiff in that case had framed its pleadings based on the requirements set forth in Coco v Clark, and held that the plaintiff there was not entitled to rely on the I-Admin modified approach and must “let the chips lie where they have fallen” (Writers Studio at [134]–[135]). For completeness, however, I will also provide an analysis based on the application of the modified approach in I-Admin at [97]–[109] below.

  101. [75] I turn now to consider the requirements of the traditional approach in Coco v Clark. In applying the traditional approach in Coco v Clark, I find that the plaintiffs have fallen short in discharging their legal obligation to prove their assertions that there had been unauthorised use and/or disclosure of the Confidential Information and that the defendants had made unlawful gain at the plaintiffs’ expense.

  102. (B) Information possessed the necessary quality of confidence, and imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence

  103. [76] I first consider if the Confidential Information “has the necessary quality of confidence about it” and if it had been “imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence”. These requirements are common to both the Coco v Clark and the I-Admin approaches, and the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving these requirements.

  104. [77] Mr Cheong rightly did not contest that the Confidential Information was “imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence”. The relationship of employer and employee, which entails good faith, loyalty and fidelity, establishes the circumstances required by this element (Asia Petworld at [38]).

  105. [78] As for whether the plaintiffs’ information possesses the necessary quality of confidence, it is, as observed by the court in Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd v Yee Heng Khay (alias Roger) [2021] SGHC 168 (“Angliss”) at [39], citing Wee Shuo Woon v HT SRL [2017] 2 SLR 94 at [31], dependent on whether it would be just in the circumstances to require the party against whom a duty of confidentiality is alleged to treat the information as confidential. A pertinent factor is whether the information has entered the public domain, or whether “it remains relatively secret or relatively inaccessible to the public as compared to information already in the public domain”: Angliss at [39], citing Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd and another [2014] 2 SLR 1045 (“Invenpro”) at [130(a)]. In instances where information is in the public domain, the number of times the information has been made available and the extent to which the information is readily accessible to interested members of the public are relevant considerations (Angliss at [39], citing Invenpro at [130(a)]). Although the parties did not put in issue whether the Confidential Information “has the necessary quality of confidence about it”, I will make some brief observations.

  106. [79] I accept, as the plaintiffs argue, that the database of contact information of customers, FDWs and suppliers, as well as biodata of FDWs who had dealings with the plaintiffs, as stored in the plaintiffs’ Integra system, taken as a whole, is protectable confidential information. The value of a database like this lies in the possession of the totality of the information that is developed and curated from years of business dealings (Angliss at [41], citing Invenpro at [130(e)]).

  107. [80] In my view, however, not every individual component “has the necessary quality of confidence about it”. In so far as the biodata of FDWs are concerned, these will lose their quality of confidence, if, for example, they are posted on online portals through which employment agencies advertise for placements of FDWs with employers. Ms Nadia alluded to online portals, like “Net Maid” or “Best Maid”, when she was on the stand. It is evident from Ms Vivian’s testimony that Swift Maids used the “Net Maid” portal for its business when she made reference to the “Net Maid” portal in relation to a post containing the biodata of an FDW allegedly solicited from Swift Maids to Recruitbee Employment.

  108. [81] As for the other categories of information, the analysis may differ depending on the time frame. So while Mr Cheong was still employed by Swift Maids, the information he possessed as an employee could be classified as “confidential”, firstly, if this information was explicitly protected by his employment contract, and, secondly, if it would have been a breach of the duty of good faith and fidelity that he owed as an employee, while the employment subsisted, to have used it for his own purposes or to have disclosed it to a competitor (Asia Petworld at [42], citing Tang Siew Choy and others v Certact Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 835 (“Tang Siew Choy”) at [16], which in turn cited Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1986] 1 All ER 617 (“Faccenda Chicken”) at 625–627).

  109. [83] In any event, even assuming that all the components of the Confidential Information are protectable, the plaintiffs will still not succeed because they have not been able to satisfy the final limb of the Coco v Clark test, which requires proof of “unauthorised use” of confidential information.

  110. (C) Unauthorised use of the information and detriment to the plaintiffs

  111. [84] I begin with an observation about the anaemic state of the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning Mr Cheong’s breaches of his confidentiality obligations. The plaintiffs have not been able to identify a single customer or a single FDW whom Mr Cheong or the other defendants had re-directed to Recruitbee using the Confidential Information. As for suppliers, they did not do more than point to the fact that three suppliers of FDW biodata, one of whom is Ms Aung, had stopped supplying biodata to Swift Maids. There is nothing else to substantiate their claim that Mr Cheong had used the Confidential Information to divert their suppliers to Recruitbee. Indeed, they could do no better than refer to the placement numbers of Recruitbee. All that is before the court is therefore the plaintiffs’ conjecture that Mr Cheong could have and must have used the Confidential Information for Recruitbee’s purposes, or that Mr Cheong could have and must have disclosed, divulged or communicated the Confidential Information to the other defendants, who must have used such information for Recruitbee’s purposes, stacked on top of the plaintiffs’ belief that Recruitbee could not have succeeded on its own steam.

  112. (I) Re-direction of employers and FDWs

  113. [85] The plaintiffs pleaded that Mr Cheong had used the Confidential Information to “canvass, solicit, and/or approach customers and suppliers and/or FDWs of the Plaintiffs, and caused them to conduct business with Recruitbee instead of the Plaintiffs,” and to contact the plaintiffs’ customers and FDWs to facilitate the placement of FDWs through Recruitbee. They also pleaded that due to the unauthorised use of the Confidential Information, there were “many instances of poaching of the Plaintiffs’ customers” and that “a number of customers who had previously employed FDWs through the Plaintiffs, have since employed FDWs through Recruitbee”. Despite those allegations and their claim that an estimate of more than 470 FDWs placed by Recruitbee ought to have been placed by them, they did not identify any of them or their employers as having been re-directed to Recruitbee. Furthermore, despite having the contact information of customers and FDWs in the Integra system at their disposal, they either did not attempt to find or could not find even a single identifiable FDW or employer whom they could name as having been approached and persuaded by Mr Cheong or the other defendants to take their business to Recruitbee.

  114. [86] In this regard, Ms Vivian gave evidence that one Ms Dince Adriana Feonale (“Ms Feonale”) was hired through Recruitbee Employment instead of Swift Maids, just when Ms Vivian was about to close the deal for Swift Maids. Ms Vivian’s view that Recruitbee Employment had placed Ms Feonale was formed solely on the basis of a posting of Ms Feonale’s biodata by Recruitbee Employment on the “Net Maid” web portal. It is the plaintiffs’ case that this was “concrete evidence” that the Confidential Information had been misused by the defendants, given that, inter alia, the only other agency who had Ms Feonale’s biodata on the “Net Maid” portal was Recruitbee Employment, which was barely five days into its operation then. The plaintiffs claim that Mr Cheong “must have … misused the Plaintiffs’ confidential information to call up the customer and persuade them [sic] that hiring through Recruitbee Employment would be a better deal for them instead”.

  115. [87] In my view, this incident is insufficient to prove unauthorised use of any Confidential Information by Mr Cheong or the other defendants. Based on the evidence of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, Ms Suliyani, who supplied Ms Feonale’s biodata to Swift Maids, was “also supplying biodata to four to five agencies in Singapore”. Ms Toh similarly testified that suppliers of biodata of FDWs supply “to many agencies in Singapore”, that she could name one that Ms Suliyani supplied to in Bedok, and that at any one point in time, more than one employment agency may have marketed an FDW’s biodata. It is also Ms Aung’s evidence that Ms Suliyani supplied to more than one employment agency, and that biodata belonging to an FDW may have been posted by multiple employment agencies on web portals like “Net Maid”. Further, it is not in dispute that Ms Suliyani was supplying biodata of FDWs to Recruitbee. According to Ms Toh, Ms Suliyani started supplying to Recruitbee Employment when it started operation in July 2019. Given that Ms Suliyani supplied to multiple FDW employment agencies, Ms Feonale’s biodata could have been made available by Ms Suliyani, and not by Mr Cheong, to Recruitbee. The plaintiffs did not call Ms Suliyani to give evidence that she had not provided Ms Feonale’s biodata to Recruitbee Employment. If there is such evidence from Ms Suliyani, there would be some basis for the plaintiffs’ allegation that Mr Cheong had provided the biodata to Recruitbee Employment. I mention for completeness that there is even no evidence that Ms Feonale was hired through Recruitbee Employment as the plaintiffs have alleged, much less that Mr Cheong had called the customer to persuade the customer to hire Ms Feonale through Recruitbee Employment. Ms Vivian did not ascertain from Ms Feonale’s employer or Ms Feonale herself which employment agency eventually placed her. It came out during Ms Toh’s cross-examination that Ms Feonale was apparently not hired through Recruitbee Employment and that there was no record of her placement. That was also Ms Aung’s evidence when she was cross-examined.

  116. [88] Another of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, Ms May, gave evidence of an incident where a customer had called and mentioned “Swift Maids Toa Payoh branch”. Swift Maids did not have a branch in Toa Payoh, but Recruitbee Employment had a branch in Toa Payoh. Ms May’s evidence is relevant to the plaintiffs’ submission that customers or FDWs would not trust Recruitbee Employment enough to do business with them since Recruitbee Employment was a newcomer. That trust barrier was allegedly overcome by Mr Cheong taking and misusing Swift Maids’ Confidential Information for the defendants to reach out to the customers and the FDWs who had dealings with Swift Maids, and to divert them to Recruitbee Employment “by deceiving them into thinking that Recruitbee Employment is an extension of the Plaintiffs”. According to the plaintiffs, that could have been done by informing the customers and FDWs that Swift Maids had a new branch in Toa Payoh. Specifically, for FDWs, the defendants or the staff members of Recruitbee Employment “could have called” and solicited their business.

  117. [89] I am similarly unable to conclude based on this incident that Mr Cheong had made unauthorised use of the Confidential Information to approach and mislead Swift Maids’ customers for the purpose of diverting them to Recruitbee, as the account given by Ms May is bereft of details. Ms May did not know the name of the customer who called. There is also no information on how that customer came to call Swift Maids’ number and mentioned “Swift Maids Toa Payoh Branch”. Other than the plaintiffs’ version, there could be other explanations. In fact, Ms May testified that while there were other calls from customers trying to look for Ms Teo and Ms Lim after they resigned from Swift Maids, there was only one call where an employer had asked for “Swift Maids Toa Payoh branch”. When questioned during cross-examination, Ms May also clarified that she had never received any calls from customers, FDWs or suppliers where she was told that they had been contacted by any of the defendants or the employees of Recruitbee and had been asked to deal with Recruitbee instead. Ms May’s evidence is inadequate to prove that Mr Cheong or the other defendants had made unauthorised use of the Confidential Information, or that they were involved in an insidious ploy to masquerade Recruitbee as an extension of Swift Maids and re-direct Swift Maids’ business to Recruitbee.

  118. (II) Re-direction of suppliers

  119. [90] As for the suppliers of biodata of FDWs, the plaintiffs have identified three suppliers who were allegedly re-directed to Recruitbee with the use of the Confidential Information. They are Ms Suliyani, Ms Shima and Ms Aung.

  120. [91] The plaintiffs rely only on the fact that supply ceased after Mr Cheong left Swift Maids’ employ. As the supply could have stopped for other reasons, it is for the plaintiffs to prove that Mr Cheong had in fact caused the cessation of supply and that he had used the Confidential Information to divert the supply to Recruitbee. There is, however, insufficient evidence to show that.

  121. [92] The plaintiffs complain that Ms Suliyani had “abruptly stopped supplying to the Plaintiffs and became uncontactable” after Mr Lit’s conversation with her regarding a $8,190 pre-payment that Swift Maids had disbursed through Mr Cheong. This formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ suspicion that Mr Cheong had misused the portion of the Confidential Information concerning Ms Suliyani to cause her supply to be re-directed from Swift Maids to Recruitbee. But as I have noted, there could be other reasons why she did not continue to supply to Swift Maids. In fact, it is Mr Lit’s evidence that after his second conversation with Ms Suliyani, Swift Maids did not continue to take biodata of FDWs from Ms Suliyani because “[a]t that point of time, it was during the COVID period. [Stay-Home Notice] is still in place. So, we have not take [sic] any.” As for Ms Suliyani supplying to Recruitbee, it is Ms Aung’s evidence, which is corroborated by Ms Toh, that she was the one who gave Ms Suliyani’s contact information to Ms Chua. As may be seen from [10] above, Ms Aung was involved in many aspects of Swift Maids’ business operations. She appears to have been a competent employee who was able to multi-task, and was even put in charge by Swift Maids to set up a new branch in Peninsula Plaza. Swift Maids’ set-up is not a big one, and their employees were required to take on different tasks and work closely with each other to meet the demands of daily operations. It is therefore not unreasonable for Ms Aung to have been acquainted with Ms Suliyani and to be able to connect Recruitbee with Ms Suliyani.

  122. [93] As for Ms Shima, Mr Hu testified that he was “friends” with Ms Shima. Ms Shima ran her own employment agency and Mr Hu had “often” dropped by her outlet for coffee. It is Mr Hu’s evidence that Ms Shima shared with him that she had supplied FDW biodata to Recruitbee “after the 1st defendant left”. But no evidence was given as to why Ms Shima stopped supplying biodata to Swift Maids. It is quite telling that despite Mr Hu being “friends” with Ms Shima, he did not get any indication from Ms Shima that Mr Cheong had approached her to re-direct her supply of FDW biodata from Swift Maids to Recruitbee. Ms Toh’s evidence is that Recruitbee started receiving FDW biodata from Ms Shima in July or August 2020. According to Ms Toh, Ms Aung had provided Ms Shima’s contact information to Ms Chua earlier to approach Ms Shima but Ms Shima did not want to supply to Recruitbee as she found Recruitbee to be too small. She only started supplying to Recruitbee after Ms Peh, Ms Teo and Ms Lim joined Recruitbee, and after Ms Peh had spoken with Ms Shima. I find Ms Toh’s evidence in this regard to be reasonable, given that Ms Shima had a working relationship with Ms Peh, Ms Teo and Ms Lim, and would therefore be open to working with Recruitbee.

  123. [94] I turn finally to the supply of FDW biodata by Ms Aung, which may be swiftly disposed of. Ms Aung tendered her resignation from Swift Maids on 3 July 2018. The date of the last invoice in evidence rendered by Ms Aung to Swift Maids in relation to Ms Aung’s supply of biodata for Burmese FDWs was 20 April 2020 although there is evidence of her dealings with Swift Maids even in September 2020. According to Ms Aung, she had supplied biodata to Swift Maids until October 2020 but decided to stop because she was allegedly unhappy with Swift Maids’ manner of dealing with her and their treatment of FDWs. Any argument that she stopped supplying because Mr Cheong had used the Confidential Information to re-direct her supply of biodata to Recruitbee does not make much sense. Plainly, it is Ms Aung’s prerogative to supply to her own employment agency.

  124. [95] I consider it significant that Ms Suliyani supplied biodata of FDWs to employment agencies aside from Swift Maids, and that Ms Shima ran her own employment agency. In other words, neither Ms Suliyani nor Ms Shima worked exclusively with Swift Maids. As for Ms Aung, she had a vested interest in Recruitbee. On the facts, I am only able to conclude that Ms Suliyani, Ms Shima and Ms Aung had stopped supplying biodata of FDWs to Swift Maids after Mr Cheong left Swift Maids’ employ. I am, however, unable to come to the conclusion that Mr Cheong had, whether before or after he resigned from Swift Maids, somehow used the Confidential Information to divert the supply to Recruitbee and caused the cessation of supply to Swift Maids. Further, as I have found above at [82], the contact information relating to Swift Maids’ suppliers would form part of Mr Cheong’s working knowledge and experience, and would in any case not be protectable confidential information after Mr Cheong’s resignation from Swift Maids.

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