General Division of the High Court · Decided 16 September 2022
CSW v CSX
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 223 · Case no. Registrar’s Appeal from the State Courts No 132 of 2014 · 31 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] If a former wife ceases to rent accommodation because she has bought a place to stay, does she lose her entitlement to maintenance from her ex-husband?
Background
- [3]
[3] The parties were married in February 2006. The application for divorce was made in May 2012, when they had been married for some 6 years 3 months. The divorce was granted by an interim judgment in August 2013, made final in January 2015.
- [4]
[4] There are two children of the marriage, born in November 2006 and June 2008. They are now around 16 and 14 years old. The parties were granted joint custody of the children; the husband was given care and control, the wife was given access. The extent of the wife’s access was increased on appeal in October 2014.
Grounds of the variation application
Whether maintenance should be rescinded (or reduced) because the wife’s income had increased
The original maintenance orders
- [10]
[10] The link between maintenance to the wife, and her maintenance of the children, was expressly recognised by the High Court on appeal. In increasing maintenance from $300 to $600, the judge said:
Principles relating to variation of maintenance orders
- [13]
[13] The husband submitted that “there is a material change of circumstances in that [the wife’s] income has increased substantially [to $4,798 per month] since the Ancillary matter hearing/appeal in 2014 [when it was $3,200 per month].” That was the basis for the extreme argument in the husband’s request for further arguments: “Her income increment (S$1,598.00) is more than enough to contra the S$600 per month.”
- [14]
[14] However, the wife’s income is only one aspect of the overall financial position of both parties. The husband implicitly recognised this, in also addressing in his submissions his income, and the parties’ expenses. That was a fuller but still incomplete picture of the parties’ overall financial position. I elaborate below.
The husband’s income
- [15]
[15] The husband’s variation application was based on the wife’s income having increased since 2014. But the husband’s income had also increased since then:
(a) In his affidavit of 7 December 2012, he had declared his monthly income as $8,250 gross, $5,195.90 net.
(b) His income tax notice of assessment for year of assessment 2021 stated his employment income for that year as $109,490, ie, $9,124.17 a month (gross). I note that his payslip for June 2021 stated his total earnings for that month as $7,484.67 gross, $6,277.67 net. In the text of his affidavit, he stated that his monthly income was $6,277.67. That was selective: it was his net monthly income as stated in his payslip; it did not give the full picture of his income.
(c) In summary, the husband’s monthly income had risen from $8,250 gross, $5,195.90 net (in 2014), to $9,124.25 gross, $6,277.67 net (in 2021). That was an increase of around $1,000 a month both on a gross basis and on a net basis.
- [16]
[16] The husband’s position was thus:
(a) he should no longer have to pay the wife $600 a month in maintenance because her income had increased by more than $600 a month; and
(b) his income having increased by some $1,000 a month did not mean he should continue paying her $600 a month in maintenance, or any maintenance.
- [17]
[17] The husband cannot have it both ways: he cannot say that the wife’s increase in income is relevant to rescinding her maintenance, but his increase in income is irrelevant to continuing her maintenance. The increase in the husband’s income is relevant: BZD at [12]–[14].
The husband’s expenses
- [18]
[18] The husband said that he incurred some $4,340.43 in monthly expenses, excluding payment of maintenance to the wife. His net monthly income is $6,277.67, almost $2,000 more than his stated monthly expenses. The husband did not say that from that surplus, he could not afford to continue paying the $600 in monthly maintenance to the wife and maintaining the children when they were in his care.
The wife’s expenses
- [19]
[19] The wife said that she had the following monthly expenses (based on the component figures in her affidavit dated 21 September 2021):
- [20]
[20] With her monthly income of $4,798, those expenses of some $6,517.47 left her with a deficit of almost $2,000, of which $600 was defrayed by the monthly maintenance from the husband.
- [23]
[23] The husband’s position was that the wife’s MediSave, income tax, the whole of her car-related expenses, home-related expenses, and various other expenses should be regarded as business expenses, and as such, completely excluded from consideration. This was flawed:
(a) The wife’s MediSave and income tax are not business expenses: they are items she must pay as an individual contributing to MediSave, and as an individual taxpayer.
(b) As the wife stayed at her home, as did the children for one night every weekend, the wife could not treat the whole of her home-related expenses as business expenses, nor could she thus regard her car-related expenses, or the other expenses which the husband asserted were business expenses, all of which had at least some element of personal, non-business use.
(c) The husband applied double standards: he sought to exclude the wife’s car-related expenses, but he included his own; in similar vein, he sought to exclude the wife’s expenses on food and beverage (away from home), handphone, holiday travel, utilities, internet broadband, replacement of household appliances, home repairs, town council fees, and home protection scheme cover. By seeking to exclude all of these as the wife’s “business expenses”, the husband contended that the wife’s expenses were only $297.40 + $112.50 + $637.50 + $647.35 (totalling $1,694.75); moreover, that excluded various items of the children’s expenses that he asked to be dealt with on a cost-sharing basis.
The parties’ overall financial position
- [26]
[26] The husband addressed the parties’ income and expenses, but he did not go beyond that to address the parties’ overall financial position today and how that compared to what it was in 2014.
Accommodation expenses
- [30]
[30] The husband argued that as the wife was no longer paying rental (because she had purchased her home), he should no longer be required to pay her maintenance. The husband’s argument was that maintenance could be used towards rental of accommodation, but maintenance could not be used towards the purchase of accommodation (whether directly towards the purchase price, or towards mortgage loan payments).
- [31]
[31] That argument was rejected by Debbie Ong J in UEB v UEC [2018] SGHCF 5 at [5]–[10]. Ong J upheld the first instance decision which factored the wife’s monthly housing instalments into the reasonable expenses for determining maintenance. I respectfully agree with Ong J’s reasoning, which I would summarise as follows:
(a) the law on maintenance does not contain any absolute prohibition against the use of maintenance funds to acquire assets (at [6]);
(c) both money that goes towards rent and money that goes towards a mortgage loan ensure that a wife and child have a roof over their heads; it would not be appropriate for maintenance purposes to make distinctions merely by the way in which property is being held, such as whether a wife lives as a tenant, or owns a property subject to a mortgage: both are accommodation expenses which can be taken into consideration for maintenance purposes (at [7]);
(d) if, however, a wife has purchased a property (rather than renting one), the court may consider the fact that the wife owns the property and thus has some financial resources in the form of an asset (at [7]);
(e) it is not inappropriate for the court to consider a wife’s mortgage loan payments, for this reflects her overall financial burdens (at [9]); and
(f) if the monthly mortgage instalment were higher than the monthly market rental for a particular property, a reasonable sum (which may be lower than the actual mortgage instalment) may be considered as the reasonable accommodation expenses (at [9]).
- [32]
[32] It would be illogical if monthly maintenance can be used for rental, but not towards the purchase of accommodation, when there is no such restriction on the use of lump sum maintenance. There is nothing preventing the court from regarding mortgage payments as accommodation expenses for the purpose of determining maintenance. Indeed, for the court to do so would be consonant with the principles regarding maintenance.
- [33]
[33] In assessing maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife, the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the financial needs, obligations, and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future: section 114 of the Women’s Charter. That would include a wife’s need to pay for accommodation, whether that payment is in the form of rental or mortgage payment.
- [34]
[34] The rationale behind the law imposing a duty on a man to maintain his former wife is to even out any financial inequalities between the spouses, taking into account any economic prejudice suffered by the wife during marriage: Tan Sue-Ann Melissa v Lim Siang Bok Dennis [2004] 3 SLR(R) 376 at [27]. The overarching principle is that of financial preservation: to maintain the wife at a standard that is, to a reasonable extent, commensurate with the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage: ATE v ATD and another appeal [2016] SGCA 2 (“ATE”) at [31], citing Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506 at [22] and [26].
- [35]
[35] If a former wife has ceased to pay rental but instead is making mortgage payments, and there has been no material improvement in her overall financial position merely by her becoming a homeowner, it would run counter to the above objectives to exclude her mortgage payments in reckoning her reasonable expenses: that would place her in a worse position than she had been whilst paying rent.
- [38]
[38] In the present case, however, the husband did not point to any improvement in the wife’s financial position because of her purchasing her own accommodation. Instead, he was fixated on her income having increased.
- [40]
[40] The husband cited BZD – albeit only at the stage of further arguments – contending that the Court of Appeal had “upheld the [High Court’s] removal of the rental component [of the former wife’s maintenance]”. That is a clear misreading of the case.
(a) a sum of $6,400 per month comprising $3,500 for her personal expenses, $2,500 for rent, and $400 for maid expenses; and
(b) a sum of $600 per month being maintenance contribution for the children for the period they were with her (at [3]).
- [42]
[42] The wife subsequently purchased two properties. She stayed in one of them and rented out the other (at [4], [16]).
- [44]
[44] The wife did not appeal against the decision as regards rental and maid expenses (at [8]). It is plainly incorrect to say that the Court of Appeal had upheld the High Court’s removal of the rental component when that was not appealed against.
- [47]
[47] Far from upholding the first instance decision removing the rental and maid components of maintenance, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion – that there was no material change in circumstances such as to justify the removal of the other two components of maintenance – casts doubt on the first instance decision removing the rental and maid components. But since there was no appeal against those aspects, the Court of Appeal simply did not deal with them.
- [49]
[49] In so far as the first instance decision in BZD was based on excluding mortgage payments from reckoning as accommodation expenses, for the reasons given above I would decline to follow it.
Whether maintenance should be rescinded altogether
- [50]
[50] In any event, even if I were persuaded that there had been a material change in circumstances justifying a reduction in the husband’s maintenance obligations, I would not have rescinded maintenance altogether. This would entail depriving the wife of even nominal maintenance.
Whether periodic maintenance should be converted to lump sum maintenance
- [54]
[54] After I gave my decision in May 2022, both parties requested further arguments. Those requests gave rise to the issue of whether the periodic maintenance of $600 per month should be converted to lump sum maintenance.
- [57]
[57] At the hearing of further arguments, the parties’ positions were far apart.
- [60]
[60] In Ong Chen Leng v Tan Sau Poo [1993] 2 SLR(R) 545 (“Ong Chen Leng”) at [35], the court had used the formula which the wife here relied on, but in that case the parties were married for 23 years (here they were married for only some 6 years). Moreover, applying the formula there resulted in maintenance equivalent to a further 17 years on a straightline basis, whereas here it would be 27.55 years (on top of the husband having already paid maintenance for 8 years since 2014). The same formula was used in Wan Lai Cheng v Quek Seow Kee and another appeal and another matter [2012] 4 SLR 405 at [89]–[91], but that too involved a long marriage (36 years), and applying the formula resulted only in a multiplier of 9 years.
- [64]
[64] I was moreover not persuaded that, in the present case, a multiplier of 27.55 as suggested by the wife was appropriate. Neither was I persuaded that the husband’s figure of $27,900 (representing a multiplier of 3.875) was appropriate. On a straightline basis, that would represent maintenance till the wife was just 51, and the children, 20 and 18.
Conclusion