General Division of the High Court · Decided 19 September 2022
JSD Corp Pte Ltd v Tri-Line Express Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 227 · Case no. District Court Appeal No 9 of 2022
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Background
- [2]
[2] The background facts can be stated simply. The appellant, JSD Corporation Pte Ltd, is in the business of renting, repairing, and servicing aircraft and air transport equipment. The respondent, Tri-Line Express Pte Ltd, is in the business of providing freight services. In October 2017, the appellant and the respondent entered into an agreement (“the Agreement”) for the respondent to deliver several vehicles and spare parts from Queensland, Australia to Singapore. These vehicles and spare parts are as follows:
(a) one used 1973 BMW 3.0Si Saloon (“1973 BMW”)
(b) one used 1976 BMW 3.0L Saloon (“1976 BMW”)
(c) one used 1977 BMW 3.0Si Saloon (“1977 BMW”)
(d) one used 1968 Daimler Sedan (“Daimler”)
(e) one tray of vehicle spare parts.
- [3]
[3] The respondent delivered the vehicles on 23 January 2018. However, the vehicles arrived damaged because they had not been properly secured in their containers during transportation. The respondent thereafter sued the appellant for eight unpaid invoices, two of which were for the transportation of the vehicles. The appellant filed a counterclaim in respect of the damage caused to the vehicles. The appellant claimed for:
(a) $12,960 for the costs incurred in repairing some of the damage to the vehicles (“the incurred repair costs”);
(b) $21,271 for the cost of repairs for the outstanding damage to the vehicles (“the outstanding repair costs”); and
(c) $39,840 for the diminution in value of the vehicles, that is, the fall in value of the vehicles even after being fully repaired (“the diminution in value”).
- [5]
[5] Since the respondent has not cross-appealed on its liability for breach of this implied term, I proceed on the basis that such an implied term existed and was breached. However, despite not having cross-appealed on its liability, the respondent curiously submitted that it “views its agreement with [the appellant] for the carriage of the vehicles from Australia to Singapore as not subject to the implied term as decided by the [DJ]”. I ascribe no weight to the respondent’s submission in this regard.
Whether the appellant is entitled to outstanding repair costs
Breakdown of the appellant’s claims
As the DJ noted, these figures for the outstanding repair costs are based on the figures provided by the single joint expert engaged by the parties. The appellant has pleaded that the repairs have not been carried out because of its inability to obtain spare parts and the inhibitive costs.
- [10]
[10] For ease of exposition, I take it from the appellant’s case that there are three states that the vehicles were/are in: (a) the undamaged (or pristine) state, which is the vehicles at the point of purchase; (b) the damaged state, which is the vehicles after they were damaged during transport but before being repaired; and (c) the repaired state, which is the vehicles after all the repairs, including the outstanding repairs, have been carried out. The single joint expert was only asked to assess the difference in value between an undamaged vehicle and a repaired vehicle. There was unfortunately no evidence led as to the value of the vehicles in their damaged states. This would have been helpful in assessing the difference in value between an undamaged vehicle and a damaged one, which could be relevant in ascertaining if the decision to repair the vehicles was reasonable.
The DJ’s decision
Accordingly, the DJ held that, as a proposition of law, if a plaintiff is claiming for outstanding repair costs when the damaged property has not been repaired, then the court must first be satisfied that the property “will be repaired” before awarding damages for the same. I should note that Lo Lee Len and Jones were both tort cases but were cited by the appellant for its claim in contract. As I will explain below, there is an uneasy inconsistency between tort and contract cases that discuss the relevance of the intention to effect the repair.
The parties’ arguments on appeal
Parties’ cases filed in May and June 2022
- [15]
[15] The respondent does not make any serious argument on the law in its respondent’s case filed on 9 June 2022. Instead, it restricted its arguments on appeal to the correctness of the figure of $21,271. It argues that the appellant has not fully justified this figure with reference to any supporting evidence.
Additional issues
(a) Whether the appellant acted reasonably in choosing to repair the vehicles, as opposed to seeking a market replacement, given that the appellant had bought the vehicles at below market value, and that the outstanding repair costs of S$21,271 is close to the total price he paid for all the vehicles?
- [17]
[17] On issue (a), the appellant submitted that it acted reasonably in choosing to repair the vehicle. It submits that on the facts of the present case, the original purchase price of the vehicles is not relevant to the quantum of damages being claimed, even as it admitted that the vehicles were purchased at a discount below market value. In support of this submission, the appellant cited, among others, the English Court of Appeal decision of Dominion Mosaics and Tile Co v Trafalgar Trucking Co Ltd and another [1990] 2 All ER 246. In that case, which (again) concerned a claim in tort, the plaintiffs had originally purchased the damaged carpet-holding machines at a special discounted price of £13,500. The defendants’ negligence caused fire which destroyed those machines. At first instance, the trial judge held that the plaintiffs were limited to the price they had paid, ie, £13,500. The English Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge on this point. Taylor LJ held that the proper approach was to award the plaintiff the market value of the machines, which he valued at £65,000 in the absence of any contrary evidence.
- [19]
[19] The appellant proceeded to cite several cases in which it said the Singapore courts have taken a position that the intention to repair is not relevant, such as the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chia Kok Leong and another v Prosperland Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 484 (“Chia Kok Leong”) and Family Food Court (a firm) v Seah Boon Lock and another (trading as Boon Lock Duck and Noodle House) [2008] 4 SLR(R) 272. These cases concern an altogether different situation involving a claim by a third party who is not a party to an original contract, but all tangentially raise the issue of an intention to repair.
- [21]
[21] The respondent’s case at the hearing before me was simply that I should award a “fair and reasonable” quantum of damages in consideration of the entire factual matrix. This included the fact that the freight charges were much less than the appellant’s present claims. Otherwise, the respondent did not make any serious or useful submissions on the law.
My decision: the appellant is entitled to some of the outstanding repair costs
- [23]
[23] As I will explain below, central to my conclusion is the case of Ruxley. In this regard, it is trite that the objective test of reasonableness laid down in Ruxley is meant to function as a legal constraint on recovery by the plaintiff for loss of the performance interest and to curb what would otherwise be a windfall accruing (see generally, Alexander Loke, “Damages to Protect Performance Interest and the Reasonableness Requirement” [2001] SJLS 259 (“Loke”), at 259–260 and 263–266). With that in mind, the question that lies at the heart of the present case is the relevance (if any) of the appellant’s intention to carry out the outstanding repairs as analysed within the objective test of reasonableness set out in Ruxley.
What is the relevance of a party’s intention to carry out outstanding repairs in a claim for the costs of such repairs?
(1) The different measures of loss in damage cases
- [26]
[26] As a starting point, it bears mentioning that the present case is an example of a case where the plaintiff’s existing property is damaged during transport by a carrier, which I shall term as “damage cases” for convenience. The basic measure of damages remains the same as in all contract cases: such damages should put the plaintiff in the position it would have been had the breach not taken place and the contract been properly performed (see Robinson v Harmann (1848) 1 Ex 850). Thus, in damage cases, the measure is such damages as would put the plaintiff in the position had the property been delivered undamaged. The loss that has crystallised upon damage is thus the difference in value between the undamaged property and the damaged property.
(2) The two ways in which a party’s intention to effect the cure are relevant
(A) Intention to effect the cure as a prerequisite for claiming the cost of cure
(B) Intention to effect the cure as a factor in considering the reasonableness of choosing the cost of cure
(3) Intention to carry out outstanding repairs should be a factor to be considered when claiming the cost of cure
(A) Precedent
(I) The Singapore decisions mentioning Ruxley
- [39]
[39] It was within this specific context that the Court of Appeal entertained the question raised on whether it must be shown by the promisee (the condominium developer) that it “has already carried out the repairs or intends to do so before he is entitled to claim for substantial damages” (at [57]). The answer was a “no” (at [57]):
However, as is apparent from the passage quoted above, the Court of Appeal in Chia Kok Leong was careful in limiting its views to the “broad ground” exception that was relevant in three-party contract cases. Nevertheless, the court also held that there was evidence, in any event, that the condominium developer intended to use the damages obtained to repair the building and the MCST expected the condominium developer to carry out the rectifications (at [58]). At most, what can be discerned from this case is that in such three-party cases, the intention to cure is irrelevant when invoking the “broad ground” exception.
- [40]
[40] The next case is Family Food Court, which was also a three-party case. The Court of Appeal first noted that the objective test of reasonableness in Ruxley will apply to the performance interest claimed in a three-party scenario, and that “[t]here has hitherto been some controversy as to whether or not the plaintiff/promisee must demonstrate that it has an intention to utilise the damages sought to realise the performance interest which was the subject matter of the contract” (at [53]). It then went on to revisit the koi pond example that was mentioned in Chia Kok Leong, and endorsed the principles formulated therein by noting that the approach taken in that case was “calculated to arrive at a just and fair result between the parties” (at [53]). But again, these comments were made in the context of breaches of third-party beneficiary contracts.
As I have mentioned above at [36], it is only where the cost of repair is greater than the diminution in value, that the reasonableness test in Ruxley (and the need to consider intention to cure) would apply. That scenario did not arise in the koi pond hypothetical raised.
(II) The authorities concerning negligent damage caused to chattels
- [50]
[50] Beyond Singapore, there are authorities which suggest that Ruxley might not be directly applicable to the case at hand as we are dealing with two very different scenarios. The case of Ruxley itself dealt with a contract for services resulting in a defective building, as did Yap Boon Keng (mentioned above at [48]). However, the present case deals with the different factual situation of negligent damage caused to chattels (specifically, the vehicles).
- [52]
[52] In contrast, the present case concerns a distinct factual matrix relating to the proper measure of loss for a chattel that has been damaged by a negligent act. The authors of Chitty 34th Ed recognise this difference by caveating what was mentioned above about cases like Ruxley with a footnote (at footnote 236 to para 26-04):
The above footnote suggests that the true measure of loss for negligent damage to chattel cases is the diminution in value and the cost of cure/repair is no more than evidence of that fall in value. It follows that no election needs to be made between the diminution in value and the cost of cure, and the intention to cure becomes irrelevant. This may be why, despite this being a contract claim, the appellant cited tort cases such as Lo Lee Len and Jones, but perhaps without making clear this important characteristic in its arguments.
- [53]
[53] While the present case is premised on the breach of an implied contractual term to take reasonable care instead of a pure tortious claim, there is no reason why the principles stated above should be applied any differently in so far as the award of damages are concerned. For one, generally speaking, the Court of Appeal pointed out in Go Dante Yap v Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG [2011] 4 SLR 559 at [20] that a contractual duty of care can, but not always, give rise to an identical duty of care in tort. Further, as was observed by the High Court in Yip Holdings Pte Ltd v Asia Link Marine Industries Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 131 (“Yip Holdings”) (at [12], citing Andrew Burrows (“Burrows”), Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2004) (“Andrew Burrows 3rd Ed”) at p 232): “[w]hether for torts or breach of contract, the general compensatory aims dictate that the plaintiff should be put into as good a position as if its property had not been damaged”. More specifically, Burrows’ point is that, in tort, the aim of compensatory damages is to put the plaintiff in a position he would have been in had the tort not been committed. In contract, the aim of compensatory damages is to put the plaintiff in a position he would have been in had the contract been performed. These two aims can converge if property damage occurs in a case where there could potentially be liability in both tort and contract. Indeed, Yip Holdings was a case founded on an apparent breach of a contractual duty to take care when moving the crane concerned (see the High Court decision on liability in Yip Holdings Pte Ltd v Asia Link Marine Industries Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 136 at [109]–[111]).
- [54]
[54] In this connection, the appellant had cited in its written submissions an extract which suggests how damages are to be assessed for tortious conduct affecting goods and why the failure (or lack of intention) to effect repairs is not relevant (see James Edelman, McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2021) (“McGregor on Damages 21st Ed”) at para 37-007). While the appellant did not explain why this passage, which appears in the chapter on “Torts Affecting Goods: Damage and Destruction”, applies to its claim for breach of contract, I accept that the principles are potentially applicable in the present case for the reasons I have given above (at [52]). The citation by the appellant was truncated, and thus I provide a fuller extract here:
It therefore appears from Chitty 34th Ed and McGregor on Damages 21st Ed that a separate rule exists for negligent damage caused to chattels, and the lack of repairs (even in the future) is not fatal to the claim for the cost of repairs. Indeed, this formed the basis of the appellant’s case in support of its claim for the outstanding repair costs although its case was a claim in contract.
Thus, from this passage, where a chattel is damaged by the negligence of another, the measure of loss is the diminution in value that the chattel has suffered. The practical means of calculating that diminution in value is to ask how much the reasonable cost of repairs would be to put the chattel back into its original state. Importantly, the court held that the plaintiff is not obliged to repair the chattel to recover the direct loss suffered. It would follow from these propositions stated in Coles v Hetherton that the intention to effect repairs is thus irrelevant in relation to negligent damage to chattel cases.
- [58]
[58] The critical question, then, is whether there should be a difference in the approaches between these two types of cases – defective works from a service contract like Ruxley and negligent damage to chattels cases like Coles v Hetherton. In my view, it would be unprincipled to maintain such a distinction where the compensatory aims of contract and tort converge. The lodestar should then always be that of the objective reasonableness of the award of damages, in which the intention to cure is one relevant factor that must be considered. There should not be a special carve out rule for negligent damage to chattels. I elaborate on this below.
(III) Reconciling the different authorities
- [61]
[61] For completeness, while Aerospace Publishing was about private archives and not cars, I do not think that the nature of the chattel changes the analysis materially. Indeed, as noted by the English Court of Appeal in Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 (at 1071) (“Darbishire v Warran”), this area of law in assessing damages was first developed from damage to ship cases by collision, but that was no obstacle to extending the principle to other situations:
As such, the principles were said to be of universal application and no distinction should be made based on the type of chattel: “there is no special measure of damages applicable to a ship different from the measure of damages applicable to any other chattel. The nature of the thing damaged may give rise to more difficult questions in the assessment of damages, but it does not change the assessment in any way [emphasis added]”. (see McGregor on Damages 21st Ed at para 37-002, citing The Kingsway [1918] P 344 at 356).
- [64]
[64] How then do we reconcile all the above cases? What I have found most useful was to refer to the views expressed in Kramer 3rd Ed. Under the heading “The Broad Application of this Test beyond Construction Cases”, Kramer explains (at para 4-161) that the Ruxley test of reasonableness (which encompasses the need to discern whether there was an intention to cure as one factor) is applicable to a broad range of contexts, beyond the factual matrix of Ruxley involving a construction contract:
Thus, the reasonableness test in Ruxley is generally applicable across the board to a myriad of cases (see also, the citations in the passage cited which have been omitted) and is not necessarily restricted to the construction context. There is no special standalone framework which applies to cases involving negligent damages to chattels such as vehicles, contrary to what the other authorities dealing with damage to chattels suggest (see above at [52]–[57]).
Therefore, a true diminution in value claim would be measured by looking at the worth of the car in its damaged state against the present market value, which may not necessarily be the same as the cost of repairs (or even the replacement costs minus the scrap value of the damaged car). I thus do not think it is safe to assume that the cost of repairs is prima facie the sole and correct measure of the plaintiff’s loss. Even in cases like Yap Boon Keng where no opposing figure for a diminution in value was placed before the court, the court may still find that the cost of repairs is not reflective of the actual loss suffered.
- [66]
[66] Burrows then goes on to bolster the point made above (at [64]) that the Ruxley test of reasonableness is applicable across a multitude of cases (whether concerning personal or real property, etc), where the intention to cure would be relevant to the analysis (see Andrew Burrows 4th Ed at p 213):
(IV) Intention to cure as one factor as part of the reasonableness test
(B) Principle
- [75]
[75] While the law of contract is at times thought to be very complex, it is, at its core, based on common sense and reasonable conduct. So, it is with the issue at hand. Consider a party who has already spent money on repairs. He is then awarded damages to compensate him for the money spent. He, however, decides to spend the damages on other things, rather than apply them to make up for the money spent on repairs. It is in this context that the courts have stated that they are not concerned with how the plaintiff uses an award of damages.
(C) Policy
- [79]
[79] However, as against this supporting policy, there is the countervailing policy that the consideration of a party’s intention to effect the cure would be inconsistent with the principle that, once an award for damages has been made, how the plaintiff spends it is res inter alios acta. This tension is often cited as a reason as to why intention to use damages in a particular manner should have no relevance at all (see the English Court of Appeal decision in Dean v Ainley [1987] 1 WLR 1729 at 1737–1738). Therefore, the Australian courts have largely not considered the plaintiff’s intention to effect the cure (see the Australian High Court decision of Bellgrove v Eldridge (1954) 90 CLR 613). Thus, it has been said that “the award of [damages for rectification of building defects] is not conditional upon the building owner having first done the necessary work, upon the building owner undertaking to the court to do so or upon the building owner proving that the building owner will do so” (see the Supreme Court of South Australia decision of De Cesare v Deluxe Motors Pty Ltd (1996) 67 SASR 28 at 30). This approach is seen as being neater and avoids a delicate examination of the plaintiff’s intention to effect the cure, which may sometimes prove to be difficult on the facts.
- [81]
[81] Another perspective is that considering the subjective intention of the plaintiff is important to give effect to the concept of the consumer surplus – which can be defined as the excess utility or subjective value obtained from a good over and above the utility associated with its market price (see Phang at 364–365). This policy is further elaborated upon by Rowan as such, with reference to the case of Radford (at 632):
Thus, as an additional policy reason, it becomes natural to consider the intention to effect the cure as part of the overall reasonableness inquiry, as it would enable one to give effect to the consumer surplus (though this point should not be overstated).
(D) Summary
The author’s view, that the plaintiff who is unable to prove that prospective repairs will be carried out is prima facie limited to a claim for diminution in value as opposed to the cost of cure, supports my view that the intention to cure is a weighty factor in the overall analysis.
- [83]
[83] More specifically, when discerning whether there is an intention to cure by the plaintiff, various indicators would be relevant. For example, the amount of time that the plaintiff has left the damage or defect unremedied (see London Fire at [633]), and whether certain steps have been taken to seek any replacement (see the English High Court decision of Nordic Holdings Ltd v Mott Macdonald Ltd [2001] EWHC 455 (TCC) at [107]). This is ultimately a matter of judgment founded on the particular facts of each case.
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