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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Jan 2022

General Division of the High Court

Koh Chew Chee v Liu Shu Ming and another

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[2022] SGHC 25Case no. Suit No 143 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] On 30 May 2017, the Plaintiff entered multiple contracts to purchase, from the Defendants, five condominium units in the Philippines (the “Units”). By these contracts, the parties also agreed that the Defendants would lease the Units back from the Plaintiff for an initial period of three years. Although, as I will set out, the same documents evidence both the sale and leaseback together, I will refer to them separately as the “Sales” and “Leaseback Agreements”, and where necessary, collectively as the “Contracts”.

  3. [2] The Plaintiff did not enter into the Contracts for residential purposes, but as an investor. For context, the Defendants operate a business in the Philippines which provides condominium units to travellers for short-term accommodation; they describe this business using the portmanteau, “condotel”. Around 2016, it appears that they were looking to expand. They thus sought out investors – such as the Plaintiff eventually came to be – to purchase such condominium units, and lease them back at a rate which amounted, approximately, to a 6–7% annual return on the principal purchase price.

  4. [3] The Plaintiff found this rate of interest attractive and, as already stated, she became an investor, putting in almost S$1.5m to purchase the five Units. Beyond the hook of the interest rate, however, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendants also agreed to repurchase the Units at the end of the three-year leaseback period, for a sum no less than the principal purchase price she paid (the “Alleged Buyback Term”). Put simply, the Plaintiff is saying that the Defendants promised capital protection.

  5. [4] Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, all investments, even those that purport to protect one’s principal investment, come with risks. Here, the risk was failure of performance on the part of her counterparties. On the Plaintiff’s account, after she completed payment for the Units in August 2018 pursuant to the Sales, the Defendants failed to transfer title to her. Further, from September 2019, they also fell behind on the rental payments. These failings culminated in October 2019, when the Plaintiff discovered that the Defendants’ condotel business was in bad financial shape, and more jarringly, that they had taken out multiple loans secured by mortgages over the Units for which she had paid.

  6. [5] An attempt at resolution was made in November 2019, but that was not successful. Therefore, the Plaintiff terminated the Contracts in December 2019, and by March 2020, her cause papers had been served on the Defendants. She advances two alternative causes of action. The first is for the Defendants’ breach of the Contracts. That is, their failure to transfer title to the Units in accordance with the Sales; and their non-payment of rent under the Leaseback Agreements. For these breaches, she seeks to recover damages representing two heads of loss. One, the sum she would have regained had the Defendants not acted in breach of contract and thus been obliged to pay to repurchase the Units; and two, the rental she would have earned if the Leaseback Agreements had continued. She additionally seeks an account of profits made by the Defendants, if any, “as a consequence of their diversion and wrongful utilisation” of the money paid in satisfaction of the purchase price of the Units.

  7. [6] The Plaintiff’s alternative cause is for fraudulent misrepresentation. She avers that the Defendants made many false representations to induce her to enter the Contracts. The most salient of these is that they would repurchase the Units (the “Buyback Representation”). Had the Defendants not given such assurance, the Plaintiff avers, she “would not [have been] interested” in the Contracts as it is simply not her “investment philosophy to purchase properties as investments”. In respect of this cause of action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover the sum of money she paid, less payments she received from the Defendants under the Leaseback Agreements, ie, the money required to restore her to the position in which she would have been, had the misrepresentations not been made.

  8. [7] The defence to the claim for misrepresentation is straightforward. The Defendants have simply put the Plaintiff to proof of the representations and their alleged fraud. That in respect of the claim for breach of contract, however, is more particular. The Defendants advance two positive defences. First, that the Plaintiff did not make full payment of the purchase price for the Units, and therefore, she was not entitled to receive title. Second, even if the Plaintiff is found to have had made full payment, she dragged her feet and ultimately never gave them instructions as to whom title should be transferred. It therefore was not the case that the Defendants failed to transfer title in breach of contract, but rather, that her own inaction prevented them from executing a transfer.

  9. [9] I now give the reasons for my decision, beginning with the facts as well as my findings, where necessary, on the relevant facts in dispute. Thereafter, I will set out my decision on the Plaintiff’s primary claim for breach of contract, and lastly, that in respect of her claim for misrepresentation.

  10. Background

  11. [10] The Plaintiff is an accountant by training, and has been in the business of providing consultancy services in the education industry since 1995. Her husband, Vincent Lim Hui Eng (“Mr Lim”), is also a businessperson.

  12. [11] The Defendants, Liu Shu Ming (the “First Defendant”) and Tong Xin (the “Second Defendant”), are married, and together, they operate a number of companies, including one in the Philippines – as mentioned above – which rents out condominium units as hotel rooms (the “Business”). The company through which they operate this business is MaxStays (Philippines) Inc (“MaxStays”). The Defendants are both directors of MaxStays, as well as majority and minority shareholders, respectively. As I will explain momentarily, the operation of the Business underlies the Contracts which form the subject of this suit.

  13. [12] The First Defendant also gave evidence that he teaches classes relating to business and public management. These appear to be conducted within the ambit of Masters’ programmes offered by Nanyang Technological University, as well as by the First Defendant independently. It was in the context of the latter, sometime in June 2016, that Mr Lim first came to meet the Defendants.

  14. [13] After attending the First Defendant’s class, Mr Lim kept in touch with him, and they would occasionally meet. During one of these meetings, Mr Lim avers, the First Defendant informed him about the bullish demand for short-term accommodation in the Philippines. Specifically, that he had been operating the Business, and was looking for investors to buy and lease back condominium units so that the Business could expand. Mr Lim shared this opportunity with the Plaintiff, though they were both sceptical.

  15. [14] The Plaintiff subsequently met the Defendants in late August 2016, during an annual dinner in which her husband’s company participates. At this event, the Plaintiff says, the Second Defendant gave some details about the operation of the Business, and the returns which investors received. Essentially, she said that investors would purchase properties in the Philippines, and thus incur the upfront principal purchase price. Thereafter, they would lease the units back to the Defendants for a sum which would amount, approximately, to a 6–7% annual return on that price. With these units in hand, the Defendants would then go about running the Business. Pertinently, the Plaintiff does not aver that the Second Defendant raised the possibility of a buyback at this stage.

  16. [15] At this point, the Plaintiff expressed interest, and on her and Mr Lim’s evidence, the Defendants later extended an invitation to their office, where they put up a detailed proposal. The Plaintiff and Mr Lim attended this meeting at the Defendants’ office on 29 November 2016. They both allege that the First Defendant made numerous misrepresentations at this meeting. However, I will only return to this aspect of the parties’ dispute at [175] below.

  17. [16] The alleged content of this meeting aside, its salient outcome is, in fact, quite straightforward. Whatever it was that was said there, the Plaintiff and Mr Lim were sufficiently convinced by the Defendants’ presentation to make a trip to the Philippines to view the properties used in the Business. They did so on 29 May 2017, and on the next day, having viewed the properties, the Plaintiff (in her sole name) agreed to purchase and lease back five condominium units: two in a development called “Venice Luxury Residences”, and another three in “Fort Victoria”. These are the “Units” mentioned at [1] above.

  18. Terms of the Contracts

  19. [17] The Plaintiff avers that the Contracts were entered, orally, pursuant to three key terms: (a) that the Defendants would sell her each of the Units for a certain price (the Sale); (b) that they would lease the Units from her for three years initially (the Leaseback Agreement); and (c) upon the expiry of the leaseback period, (i) if the market price of the Units had fallen, that they would buy back the Units from her at the principal purchase price paid, but (ii) if their market price had gone up, that they would permit her to sell the Units on the open market (the Alleged Buyback Term).

  20. [18] The first two terms are not seriously in dispute as they were captured in writing signed on 30 May 2017. Such writing takes the form of a “leaseback guarantee” and a “receipt”, a sample of which I set out here:

  21. [19] There are two important observations which need to be made about this document. First, I am cognisant that it does not reflect an agreement to purchase per se. However, the Defendants do not dispute that they contracted with the Plaintiff to sell the Units to her, and lease them back.

  22. [20] Second, the documents which evidence the other four Contracts are substantially the same, save for differences in description and price. However, there is a salient distinction between the “Receipt” component of the two Venice Luxury Residences units and the three Fort Victoria units. As can be seen from [18] above, the “Receipts” for the Venice Luxury Residences units acknowledge the receipt of 10% of the “all-in purchase price”, and state that the balance 90% is to be paid in two tranches in Singapore dollars. Though no payees are named, the context plainly implies that the payees are the Defendants.

  23. [21] By contrast, the “Receipts” for the three Fort Victoria units provide that the final tranche of payment is to be made in Philippine Pesos (₱) directly to the developer. On this, the Defendants had fully paid for the two Venice Luxury Residences units, but had only paid the deposit for the three Fort Victoria units.

  24. [23] Their dispute, in essence, arises from a difference as regards what they each say is the conversion rate which should be applied to the final tranche of ₱16,093,035.80 payable for the three Fort Victoria units (this being the sum of ₱5,489,643.17, ₱5,119,304.41 and ₱5,484,088.21). On the Plaintiff’s part, she claims merely to have followed the First Defendant’s instructions to transfer the sum of S$407,979.55, which was calculated by the First Defendant himself to be the equivalent of ₱16,093,035.80, based on the prevailing exchange rate of around S$1 is to ₱39.45 on 9 July 2018. The Defendants, in opposition, claim that this rate was used “erroneously”, and aver that the parties had orally agreed to fix an exchange rate of S$1 to ₱35, which would account for the shortfall of around S$51,000. I will set out the evidence in support of their cases from [38] below. For now, I return to the last (alleged) term of the Contracts, the buyback.

  25. [24] By the Alleged Buyback Term, the Plaintiff is effectively saying that the Defendants agreed not only to provide her a comfortable 6–7% annual return, but also to protect her principal investment. This alleged aspect of the Contracts was not recorded in writing, and it is rigorously disputed by the Defendants. Specifically, they submit that such a significant term would have been included in the written evidence of the Contracts (see [18] above), and that the Plaintiff lacks evidence to prove that the term was agreed upon orally.

  26. [25] The starting point for this issue is, naturally, the Plaintiff’s burden of proof. In this regard, I begin by pointing to the Court of Appeal’s decision in OCBC Capital Investment Asia Ltd v Wong Hua Choon [2012] 4 SLR 1206, where the importance of documentary evidence in proving an oral agreement was firmly emphasised:

  27. [26] With this in mind, I turn to the pieces of evidence on which the Plaintiff relies to establish that the Alleged Buyback Term formed part of the Contracts. By way of positive proof, she has the following.

  28. (a) First, the First Defendant’s admission at trial that he may have raised the matter of a buy back on 29 November 2016 meeting, but only as “general information”.

  29. (c) Third, a WeChat message sent from the First Defendant to Mr Lim, on 14 January 2019. In this message, he responded to a query made by Mr Lim on the market value of the Units. The Plaintiff submits that the “only reason” which can explain this exchange, is the existence of the Alleged Buyback Term.

  30. (d) Fourth, another WeChat message sent on 12 August 2019 by the First Defendant in which he thanked the Plaintiff for her “support and understanding” in response to her instructions to sell off the five Units to willing buyers. The Plaintiff avers that she permitted such sale out of goodwill because the Defendants were facing financial difficulties, and submits that the fact that the First Defendant thanked her in response, “reveals his acknowledgment that [her] request to sell the Units was a kind offer to alleviate his financial difficulties” and served as a “way out of his obligation” to buy back the Units.

  31. (e) Last, her own averment that she would not have entered into the Contracts without the Defendants’ Buyback Representation because she does not believe in purchasing properties as investments, and also has no friends, family, or business in the Philippines.

  32. [27] The Plaintiff also relied on a few pieces of evidence which, in my view, did not prove her case, but rather negatived the Defendants’. Although I appreciate the utility of this type of negative proof in some cases, it does not assist me here. The Plaintiff is asking that I find an oral contract which includes the Alleged Buyback Term. This requires that I identify a statement by which the Defendants can be said to have been offering to enter, not only to the Sale and the Leaseback Agreement, but also, the Alleged Buyback Term. Even if the Plaintiff is right in attacking the Defendants’ credit, this does not aid my task.

  33. [28] I therefore return to the positive evidence set out above. In light of [26(a)], I accept that the Defendants mentioned something about the potential buyback of the Units. The question is whether they had raised it as a possibility to be discussed, or whether they had guaranteed such repurchase. In my view, the evidence does not show that the Defendants guaranteed repurchase. There are notable difficulties with the evidence on which the Plaintiff relies (set out at [26(b)]–[26(e)] above).

  34. [29] In respect of that set out at [26(b)], the Plaintiff’s usage of the word “acquire” is inaccurate. In the First Defendant’s Facebook post, he wrote that the goal for the Business was to “operate 200 guest rooms within one year and 2,400 guest rooms within five years”. It is feasible for the Defendants to have operated this number of units, by leasing them from investors, without needing to acquire them through buyback agreements.

  35. [30] I turn to [26(c)]. The WeChat exchange between Mr Lim and the First Defendant is equivocal, and I do not think it only has one explanation. The actual text of the First Defendant’s message is significant in this regard. Mr Lim first queried whether there had been any appreciation in the value of the Units. The First Defendant then responded: “the property prices remain stable and some are even weakening. The company plans to go public before the end of next year. By then, it may buy back the previously sold properties. If you plan to divest, you can consider selling them back to us then” [emphasis added]. The link the First Defendant draws between “the company” (presumably MaxStays) going public, and the buyback, suggests that he did not understand it to be an obligation. This is consistent with the position the Defendants take in this suit, and could reasonably account for the mention of a “buyback” during the parties’ meeting on 29 November 2016.

  36. [31] Next, the inference which the Plaintiff seeks to draw in respect of the First Defendant’s response set out at [26(d)] does not account for another real plausibility. Apart from the Alleged Buyback Term, the Leaseback Agreements were also potential sources of financial stress if the Business was performing poorly. A 6–7% annual return on a principal sum of around S$1.5m is not a trifling sum. It amounts to around S$90,000 annually, which in turn means that the Defendants needed at least to make this amount of profit using the Units in their condotel Business, just to stay in the black. Offering to sell the Units to buyers who would not be party to leaseback agreements would, in my view, also have been an alleviation of the Defendants’ financial difficulties.

  37. [32] Lastly, I am not convinced that the Plaintiff’s assertion set out at [26(e)] carries much weight. I accept that, without a buyback agreement, the Contracts entailed greater risk, which was likely exacerbated by the fact that the Plaintiff had no familiarity with the Philippine real property market. However, without any evidence relating to how she actually invests, there is little I can make of her claim that she would not have undertaken such risk. Investors’ appetite for risk varies with their experience, and her present statement may not reflect how she viewed the opportunity at the material time. Indeed, as stated at [14] above, when the Second Defendant first described to the Plaintiff how the Business operated, and the returns she could expect to receive should she choose to invest, it does not appear that anything was said about a buyback or capital protection. Yet, this was sufficient to attract the Plaintiff’s interest in the opportunity, such that she attended the meeting on 29 November 2016. This suggests that capital protection might not have been the “hook”, so to speak.

  38. [33] In any event, beyond the foregoing evidential issues, the Plaintiff – on her pleaded case – faces another, greater difficulty in proving that the Contracts included the Alleged Buyback Term. Even if I accept her characterisation of the evidence in its entirety, the most that this would show is that the Defendants, on 29 November 2016, made the Buyback Representation and thus guaranteed that the Plaintiff’s capital would be protected. The Plaintiff does not aver that the Defendants repeated this representation before she orally agreed to enter the Contracts on 30 May 2017. She simply asserts, without particularity, that she relied on the representations made on 29 November 2016, in deciding to enter the Contracts. The substantial time gap already calls into question how far she could have been relying on those representations. However, even if we put this aside, her assertion is still difficult to accept for one key reason.

  39. [34] It is the Plaintiff’s case that, after she orally accepted the Contracts, the Defendants immediately pulled out written documents for her to sign (ie, five versions of that set out at [18] above). As I have shown, these documents did not contain the Alleged Buyback Term. If this term was so crucial to her entry into the Contracts, one expects that – after seeing that the written documents did not contain such a term – the Plaintiff would at least have queried whether it remained on the table. She did not do so, and this leads me to the conclusion that the Buyback Representation was not operating on her mind because it had not been guaranteed in such terms. It could have been raised as a possibility (see [30] above), but the Plaintiff’s inaction in the face of the documents she was being asked to sign makes it difficult to conclude that anything more certain had been promised. Indeed, the Plaintiff had only known the Defendants for a few months at this point in time, and they would have been dealing at relative arms-length. Given the amount of money involved, it is curious that she – a seasoned businesswoman – required so little documentation of them (also cross-reference [180] below in respect of the Plaintiff’s misrepresentation claim).

  40. [35] I therefore find that the Plaintiff has not proven the Alleged Buyback Term. I address the performance of her payment obligations next.

  41. Performance of the Sales

  42. Plaintiff’s payment of the purchase price

  43. [36] It will be recalled from [16] above, that the parties entered into the Contracts on 30 May 2017. It will also be seen from [18] and [20] that, in respect of the Venice Luxury Residences units, the Plaintiff was to make payment to the Defendant in two tranches, on 8 and 20 June 2017. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff completed these payments, albeit a little late, on 13 June and 4 July 2017, respectively. I note that the Defendants have not, in their pleadings or submissions, taken any issue with the delay in respect of the Venice Luxury Residences units. As such, I take it that they did not view such delay as being of any significance to their obligations under the Sales.

  44. [37] I turn then to the three Fort Victoria units. The portions of the “Receipts” evidencing the Plaintiff’s payment obligations for these units are reproduced at [21] above. The Plaintiff was obliged to pay the Defendant a sum in Singapore dollars by 8 June 2017, and the balance in Pesos directly to the developer by 1 August 2018. The sum due on 8 June 2017 was paid on 13 June 2017, together with the sums due for the two Venice Luxury Residences units.

  45. [38] As regards the ₱16,093,035.80 owed directly to the developers of the Fort Victoria units, some confusion arose as to when the sum was actually due to the developers. On 9 July 2018, the First Defendant instructed her – through a WeChat message – to transfer either ₱16,093,035.80 or S$407,979.55 to his Philippine or Singapore bank account by 15 July 2018. The First Defendant’s message reads:

  46. [39] The Plaintiff was surprised by this request because the “Receipts” for these units indicated that the deadline for payment was 1 August 2018, directly to the developer. The First Defendant’s response was that he had mistakenly dated the “Receipts”, and that the payment was in fact due to the developers on 1 July 2018. He also informed the Plaintiff that the delays might result in late payment interest, though he would try to “secure a waiver” from the developer. The Plaintiff had difficulty gathering the necessary funds, and eventually, was only able to remit S$407,979.55 on 7 August 2018.

  47. [40] The Defendants have taken some issue with this delay, though it is not entirely clear what they wish for me to make of it. They aver that, “despite their request for the Plaintiff to pay the sum of [₱]16,093,035.80 by 15 July 2018, she only did so on 7 August 2018”. However, they do not further aver that the developer required interest payments, nor is there evidence from the Defendants that they could not complete the purchase of the three units because of the delay. Quite to the contrary, in fact, the Defendants’ position from 8 August 2018 was that they were ready, willing and able to transfer title to the Units to the Plaintiff or her nominee, but that she failed to provide the particulars needed to facilitate the transfer. The implication of this must be that the Defendants did not face any issues in completing the purchase, for if they did, I do not see how they could have been ready, willing and able to transfer title.

  48. [41] The only outstanding issue then, in respect of whether the Plaintiff made full payment of the purchase price for the Fort Victoria units, is the applicable exchange rate between Singapore dollars and Philippine Pesos. As stated at [23] above, the Defendants’ position is that the parties had agreed to use a fixed rate of S$1 is to ₱35, and this is the reason that there is a shortfall of S$51,824.28 between the sum paid by the Plaintiff (S$1,468,895.69) and the total purchase price (S$1,520,719.97). Before I go on to examine the evidence, however, it is important to note that the figures in the parties’ pleadings and submissions are not entirely consistent and have minor deviations within a few dollars. There are four notable inconsistencies.

  49. [42] First, the parties pleaded that the total purchase price of the Units was S$1,520,719.97. However, the figure derived from the writing which evidences the Contracts shows that the sum should have been S$1,520,717 (being the sum of S$290,850, S$300,241 (for the two Venice Luxury Residences units), S$316,588, S$296,748, and S$316,290 (for the three Fort Victoria units)). It is unclear how, and from where, the parties derived the extra S$2.97.

  50. [43] Second, the Defendant pleads that the shortfall between the sum that the Plaintiff paid, and the total purchase price is S$51,824.28. However, if the total purchase price, is – as I have stated – S$1,520,717, the shortfall should only be S$51,821.31 (ie, S$1,520,717 less S$1,468,895.69). The same S$2.97 remains unaccounted for, though it seems likely that the Defendants simply deducted S$1,468,895.69 from S$1,520,719.97 without actually calculating the shortfall using the alleged exchange rate of S$1 to ₱35.

  51. [44] Third, if the Defendants had actually calculated the shortfall by applying the rate of S$1 is to ₱35 in respect of the final ₱16,093,035.80 payment due to the developer of the Fort Victoria units, they would have obtained S$51,821.47 (ie, ₱16,093,035.80 divided by 35 to convert the sum to Singapore dollars, and less S$407,979.55, which is the sum the Plaintiff was instructed to pay), not S$51,824.28. Even then, S$51,821.47 does not square off with the S$51,821.31 calculated in the paragraph above. Though S$0.16 may appear de minimis, there should be no balances or excesses if, as the Defendants aver, the parties were dealing with a fixed exchange rate.

  52. [45] Last, the Plaintiff pleads that the total sum she paid was S$1,468,895.69, but in her written closing submissions, S$1,468,897.60 is used. I note that this was the figure pleaded in the Plaintiff’s first statement of claim, prior to its amendment on 25 June 2020, but no explanation was given as to the discrepancy in the numbers between the two statements of claim.

  53. [46] There is little which I can make of these inconsistencies given that both parties have made errors. Accordingly, except for the sum of S$1,468,895.69, which the parties agree in their pleadings is the sum the Plaintiff actually paid, I will, as far as possible, obtain the necessary figures from the primary materials rather than the parties’ pleadings and written submissions.

  54. [47] I return then to the Defendants’ allegation that the parties agreed to fix the exchange rate at S$1 is to ₱35. The key piece of evidence on which they rely to establish this agreement is a WeChat message sent by the First Defendant on 20 September 2017 to the Plaintiff. It reads:

  55. [48] I do not, however, accept this as evidence of an oral agreement between the parties that payment of the final tranche of ₱16,093,035.80 was to be fixed at a rate of S$1 is to ₱35. There are three main considerations which support my view. First, the First Defendant himself conceded, during cross-examination, that there was no agreement; he simply imposed the rate.

  56. [49] Second, in the Defendants’ written closing submissions, they submit that the parties’ agreement was made totally in writing, and “no oral agreement exist at all”. They have taken this position to challenge the existence of the Alleged Buyback Term. However, by doing so, they have put the shoe on the other foot. If their case is that their entire agreement with the Plaintiff was captured by the documents titled “Lease Back Guarantee” and “Receipt” (see [18] above), and those documents do not include a fixed rate of exchange, it cannot also lie in their mouth to claim that the parties had orally agreed upon such rate.

  57. [50] Third, in her written closing submissions, the Plaintiff scrutinises the context of the First Defendant’s message to make the point that the parties were discussing something else entirely. In essence, she explains that the message pertains to payments due to one “Mr Renz”. Mr Renz, on her and Mr Lim’s evidence, is the Defendants’ accountant, whom they introduced to the Plaintiff to assist her in the incorporation of a nominee company in the Philippines. This company was to receive title to the Units on behalf of the Plaintiff as there seems to have been some beneficial tax consequences from such an arrangement. The nominee company was incorporated as LK Strategic Hub (Philippines) Inc (“LK (Philippines)”) on 5 October 2017, and on the Plaintiff’s case, Mr Renz was to be paid for his services in this regard. The First Defendant was thus acting as an intermediary between the Plaintiff and Mr Renz.

  58. [51] It is in this context that the Plaintiff says the First Defendant sent the message on 20 September 2017 that mentions the S$1 to ₱35 exchange rate. Having considered the evidence, I accept her explanation. There are two points that support this. The first is the timing of the message. As far as payment of the purchase price for the Units are concerned, September and October 2017 are on no man’s land. Full payment for the Venice Luxury Residences units and the first tranche of payment for the Fort Victoria units had been made in June 2017. The second tranche of the payment for the latter was not due until either July or August 2018 (see [38]–[39]). The Defendants offer no explanation as to why the parties might have been discussing this next tranche of payment some ten months in advance, and this substantially weakens their claim that the message is evidence of an oral agreement on exchange rate.

  59. [52] The second point in support of my finding are the subsequent messages exchanged between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant. Five days after the 20 September 2017 message, the First Defendant sent the Plaintiff his Philippine bank account details. Then, on 30 September 2017, the Plaintiff responded that she had been “bus[y] these few days” and that she would “do internet transfer later”. Finally, on 18 October 2017, the First Defendant informed her that “Mr Renz ha[d] asked [him] for payments many times”, and asked whether he – the First Defendant – should inform Mr Renz to contact the Plaintiff directly. In response, the Plaintiff stated: “He has given me his bank detail already[.] Will transfer to him[.] Don’t worry”. The First Defendant acknowledged this with an “Ok”. These responses suggest to me that the earlier messages pertaining to payment were in fact connected to sums due to Mr Renz; and the fact that the parties’ exchanges coincide closely with the incorporation of LK (Philippines) on 5 October 2017 further solidifies this.

  60. [53] I therefore find that the parties did not have an oral agreement to apply a fixed S$1 is to ₱35 exchange rate on the ₱16,093,035.80 payment due for the three Fort Victoria units. Consequently, I also find that the Plaintiff completed payments for all five Units under the Contracts and that the Defendants were thus obliged to transfer title in them to her or her nominee.

  61. [54] Before moving on, however, I note that the written evidence captures the total purchase price of the Units in Singapore dollars. Indeed, as stated, on the face of the documents, the Plaintiff seems obliged to pay S$1,520,717 (see [42] above); yet, the Plaintiff accepts that she only paid S$1,468,895.69. Thus, there is a prima facie shortfall. That said, I do not think that this detracts from my finding above that she completed full payment.

  62. [55] As can be seen from [21], although the total purchase price for each Fort Victoria unit is expressed in Singapore dollars, the last tranche of the payment obligation is reflected as a sum in Pesos owing directly to the developer. From this, we can glean that, what ultimately matters – insofar as completing the sale of the Units is concerned – is that the developer received the ₱16,093,035.80 it was owed. The Philippine developer would have had no concern or use for Singapore dollars, and the Plaintiff, conversely, would have had no reason to pay the Defendants a larger sum in Singapore dollars when it could have paid the developers directly in Pesos. Indeed, when cross-examined on whether the Plaintiff could simply have paid the developers directly using the prevailing exchange rate to get around the alleged fixed exchange rate agreement, the First Defendant agreed that she could.

  63. [56] Therefore, the fact that the Plaintiff made the final tranche of payment in Singapore dollars, not Pesos, does not suggest that she failed to make full payment of the purchase price. Contrariwise, her act was in compliance with the First Defendant’s instructions on 9 July 2018 (see [38] above), where he took on the role of intermediating payment. Accordingly, upon his receipt of the S$407,979.55, one can expect that he would have converted this sum to Pesos to make immediate payment to the developer. This expectation is particularly fair given that, on the First Defendant’s own evidence, there was already a delay in the payment (see [39]). If the S$407,979.55 was insufficient, at that point, to satisfy the ₱16,093,035.80 owing, one expects that he would have informed the Plaintiff as such. However, there are no messages informing the Plaintiff that her payment was short. In fact, I reiterate [40]. If the Defendants were ready, willing and able to transfer title, I do not see how there could have been an issue regarding the Plaintiff’s failure to make full payment.

  64. [57] With the above findings in mind, I now turn to whether the Plaintiff gave the Defendants adequate instructions to transfer title.

  65. Defendants’ failure to transfer title to the Units

  66. [58] Title to the Units was never transferred to the Plaintiff. In their Defence, the Defendants accept that they were obliged to transfer title once the Plaintiff “confirmed and informed” them of the nominee(s) to whom she wished for title to be transferred. Having considered the evidence, I find that the Plaintiff had indeed confirmed her desired nominee and provided the Defendants with the information needed for transfer to be effected. Their failure to do so to-date, as such, was in breach of the Sale components of the Contracts.

  67. [59] In my view, three questions are relevant. First, who was the Plaintiff’s nominee; second, when did she confirm to the Defendants that such nominee is to be the title recipient; and what information she provided so as to effect the transfer. I address these three questions concurrently and, in light of the parties’ fierce dispute over this issue, with detailed reference to their contemporaneous exchanges on WeChat.

  68. [61] However, on 5 August 2018, in light of the fact that no steps had been taken to transfer title to LK (Philippines), she asked Mr Renz whether it would be possible for title to be transferred to a Singapore-registered company instead, to a company called Strategic Eduhub Pte Ltd (“SEPL”). Her change of mind is attributable to a desire for “more flexibility” in hers and Mr Lim’s “growth plan”. I also note as an aside that, though payment for the Fort Victoria units had not yet been completed at this time (see [39] above), the Plaintiff’s query was relevant to the Venice Luxury Residences units for which payment was completed more than a year earlier in July 2017 (see [36]).

  69. [62] Mr Renz responded the next day that he would check with the First Defendant. On 7 August 2018, the Plaintiff then came to understand that the First Defendant had some concerns with her change of mind, and thus she sent him a message on WeChat saying: “Understand that there is concern on putting property under a Singapore registered company. Appreciate your revert as soon [possible]. thx”.

  70. [63] The same day, the First Defendant responded that he would “check the procedures to transfer the properties to a foreign company”, and asked for time to obtain information on the “advantages and disadvantages [of] register[ing] under Singapore company”. The Plaintiff’s response was firm that she did not need more information. On the same day, she replied: “Think our decision is quite clear. To register all properties under a Singapore registered company. Thx”. To this, the First Defendant said, “Ok, please provide the name of the company you want to transfer to”. At this point, she indicated that that name of the company had been “[g]iven to the Corp sec”, referring to Mr Renz, but nevertheless restated that SEPL was her desired nominee.

  71. [64] The First Defendant expressly accepted her instructions, but still tried to convince her to reconsider her election. That is, that there would be advantages to having title to the Units be transferred to LK (Philippines) rather than SEPL. Still on the same day, the parties then exchanged:

  72. [65] The Plaintiff did not respond to this last message, and on the next day, 8 August 2018, she asked the First Defendant to provide an update on the transfer: “How is the step of transferring property to be under our SG company”. The First Defendant replied with, “We have asked the developers to advise us the documents required to register the properties under foreign company, once we got will revert to you”.

  73. [66] The First Defendant, however, seemed adamant that transfer ought to be made to LK (Philippines). On 14 August 2018, he reraised the issue, citing “a lot of differences” between a transfer to LK (Philippines) and to SEPL, tax being one of them. The Plaintiff explained that she still wished for the transfer to be made to SEPL. Notwithstanding this, the First Defendant prepared and sent a document to the Plaintiff which compared the differences between a transfer to LK (Philippines) and to SEPL.

  74. [67] On the Plaintiff’s account, at this point, she “realised that the Defendants would only continue to ignore [her] instructions to transfer title [to] the Units to [SEPL]”. Thus, on 25 August 2018, the Plaintiff informed the First Defendant very definitively that transfer is to be made to LK (Philippines), and that she would be transferring ownership of this company “to a Singapore registered firm”, seemingly to give indirect effect to her intention to hold title to the Units under a Singapore-registered company. When she pressed him for an update on the same day, the First Defendant responded that he was “waiting for her final decision”. Leaving no room for any ambiguity, the Plaintiff replied that it was “final” that title was to be transferred to LK (Philippines). She then asked that he “liaise w[ith] Mr Renz direct[ly]”, and stated her hope that the transfers will be completed within three months. The First Defendant seems to accept in his affidavit evidence-in-chief that the Plaintiff’s election on 25 August 2018 was final, but he avers that she asked for the transfer to be made to “LK EduHub Singapore”, and that he was unable to do so because the particulars of this company were not provided. He seems to have erroneously merged the two companies, and there is little that needs to be made of this.

  75. [68] Indeed, the foregoing shows quite clearly that the Plaintiff had, on 25 August 2018, instructed the transfer of title to LK (Philippines). Further, given that Mr Renz was the corporate secretary for this company, it was in my view, sufficient for her to have asked the First Defendant to take up the technical requirements for the transfer with him. Thus, although the “what” question (see [59] above) was not addressed with much specificity, I do not think that this was necessary. If the Defendants had lacked the necessary documents or information to effect a transfer to LK (Philippines), and such documents or information could not be provided by Mr Renz, I expect that they would have sought the Plaintiff’s input, but there is no evidence that they did.

  76. [69] This then takes me to the Defendants’ contentions. They make two key factual points. First, that the First Defendant informed the Plaintiff on 14 August 2018 that a board resolution from the Plaintiff’s nominee was required to initiate the transfer, but no resolution was ever provided. Second, that when asked to sign a “Buyer Information Sheet” in July 2021, the Plaintiff refused to do so.

  77. [70] The first is not an accurate representation of the facts. Although the First Defendant did inform that a board resolution was required, the request was made before the Plaintiff’s final election for title to be transferred to LK (Philippines). At this time, her operative election was still for the transfer to be made to SEPL, and the actual exchange between the parties demonstrates this:

  78. [71] It is plain from this exchange that the parties were, when the requirement for a board resolution was raised by the First Defendant, discussing the transfer to SEPL. In fact, it will be seen from the last of this series of messages that the First Defendant, at this point, reraised the issue of whether transfer should be made to SEPL or LK (Philippines). It was only after this, as stated at [67] above, that the Plaintiff – in response to his persistence – firmly and finally stated on 25 August 2018 that the transfer was to be made to LK (Philippines).

  79. [72] This exchange therefore does not support the Defendants’ claim that the Plaintiff failed to provide a necessary resolution in respect of her eventual and final election for title to be transferred to LK (Philippines). In fact, an aspect of their exchange actively cuts against the Defendants’ position. When the Plaintiff queried whether the Defendants had gotten in touch with her company secretary – seemingly of SEPL – the First Defendant said, “Please provide your company secretary email for us to contact directly”. This supports my finding (at [68] above) that it was sufficient for the Defendants to be in contact with Mr Renz in respect of the transfer to LK (Philippines).

  80. [73] This brings me then to the Defendants’ second point, that the Plaintiff wrongfully refused to sign a “Buyer Information Sheet” in July 2021. I reject this roundly. By 27 December 2019, the Plaintiff terminated the Contracts, and the parties were in the midst of preparing for trial, which commenced before me on 19 August 2021. This attempt at curing their failure to transfer title was, to say the least, a little late. In any event, it was hardly beneficial for the Plaintiff to allow title to the Units to be transferred to her at this late stage.

  81. [74] On 15 October 2019, she first discovered from the First Defendant (via a WeChat message) that the Units had been mortgaged, and such mortgages remained undischarged. In 2020, through searches conducted by the Plaintiff’s then-lawyers, she found out that there were multiple mortgages over the Units. Some had been created before the Contracts, in 2012 and 2015; but others had been created in late 2018, by which time, the Defendants should have been taking steps to transfer title to the Plaintiff. When questioned about this at trial, the First Defendant suggested that he would have been able to redeem the mortgages:

  82. [75] I am prepared to assume, for the Defendants’ benefit, that the Contracts did not prohibit them from encumbering the Units. However, even on that basis, the First Defendant’s assertion is unbelievable. In the same 15 October 2019 WeChat message, the First Defendant also explained that he was facing great financial strain. He stated that he could not keep up with the rental payments because, if he did, “there [would not] be enough to settle the mortgage”. Since then, global events have restricted travel, and the Business would have been impacted accordingly. It therefore seems highly unlikely that, had the Plaintiff completed the “Buyer Information Sheet” in July 2021, that the Defendants would have been able to transfer to her unencumbered title to the Units.

  83. [76] I therefore reject the Defendants’ contentions and reiterate my finding at [68] that they were obliged, from 25 August 2018, to take the necessary steps to transfer title to the Plaintiff. Having found that the Defendants did not comply with the terms of the Sale, I turn next to the Leaseback Agreements.

  84. Arrears under the Leaseback Agreements

  85. Arrears for the initial three-year period

  86. [77] As can be seen at [18] above, the term under the Leaseback Agreement, at least initially, was three years (or 36 months). As to the two Venice Luxury Residences units, the Plaintiff pleads that ten of those 36 months, at a total rate of S$2,955 per month, remains unpaid. For the other three Fort Victoria units, she pleads that nine months, leased for a total of S$4,646 per month, is owing. This amounts to S$29,550 and S$41,814, respectively, or S$71,364 in total, and the Defendants admit in their Defence that such sums are owing.

  87. Alleged extensions of the Leaseback Agreements

  88. [78] I turn then to the contentious issue, which is whether the parties agreed orally to vary the Contracts to extend the leaseback period for a further two years. On the basis that such variation was made, the Plaintiff claims a further 23 and 24 months of rental respectively, for the Venice Luxury Residences units and the Fort Victoria units. The Defendants deny such variation and therefore their liability for such additional rent payments.

  89. [79] The Plaintiff alleges that this variation came about as follows. As stated at [74]–[75] above, the Plaintiff discovered in October 2019 that the Defendants mortgaged the Units, and were unable to continue making rent payments. The Plaintiff was displeased and called for a meeting. On 16 November 2019, she and Mr Lim met the First Defendant (the Second Defendant was not present) (the “November 2019 Meeting”). The Plaintiff secretly recorded this meeting, and the recording as well as its transcript were adduced as evidence before me. This recording suggests that the First Defendant was agreeable to renting the Units for an additional period of two years. For context, I set out the notable portions of their conversation:

  90. [80] The exact meaning of their exchange requires some interpretation. From the First Defendant’s statements, it appears to me that he was agreeing to two alternative ways to move forward with their Contracts.

  91. (a) First, he said the following: “after the black and white, then in 12 months after your submission, you will get the title deed … [until then] I’ll continue to rent from you, [but] if title is transferred, there will be no buyback”. By this, the First Defendant seems to be saying that, if the Plaintiff wished to have the title to the Units, she would need to indicate this to him, and within 12 months, he would effect a transfer. Whilst the transfer was being effected in these 12 months, he would continue to lease the Units from her, although, if she preferred this, the Units would not be bought back from her.

  92. (b) Second, he then said: “if no transfer, another 3 years is required … you have had 2 years … [after] 5 years … I can buy them back from you”. In my view, the reference to the need for a “transfer” is important because, in the first part of the conversation quoted, the First Defendant accepts that the Units belonged to the Plaintiff, which was why rent was being paid at all. On that basis, if she did not require title to be formally transferred, he was agreeable to extending the Leaseback Agreement by two years, and further, that he was also agreeable to buying the Units back from her at the end of the total five-year period.

  93. [81] The Plaintiff’s pleaded case is that the parties agreed to extend the period of the leaseback period by two years, and that the Defendants would repurchase the Units at the end of the total five-year period. There is no suggestion that they had agreed to extend the leaseback period for the purported 12 months it would take for the Defendants to effect a transfer of title. Her position therefore is that the parties agreed to the second alternative; and as such, I do not consider whether the parties varied the terms of the Contracts on the first alternative. As regards the second, however, I find that the alleged variation fails for want of valid consideration on the part of the Plaintiff.

  94. [82] Before turning to the issue of consideration, however, I first note that the Defendants’ case is that the variations proposed were not genuine offers; they were false compromises made to placate the Plaintiff who had put on a “drama” for the purposes of her secret recording. I do not accept this. The validity of offers is determined objectively. Here, the words plainly convey an objective intention to be bound, and the claim that he was trying to pacify the Plaintiff is not convincing. If he was in the wrong, and needed to propose a compromise, then that intention takes centre stage. Any ancillary intention to pacify would be just that, ancillary. If, however, he was not in the wrong, then it begs the question why he would need to pacify the Plaintiff at all.

  95. [83] I therefore find that the First Defendant’s promises were real. On this basis, he proposed to: (a) extend the leaseback period by two years; and (b) buy back the Units at the end of the five-year lease period. Both of these promises are plainly valuable. I need not say anything about (a). As to (b), given my view that the Alleged Buyback Term did not exist, this would also be a new benefit to the Plaintiff. The question then, is what consideration she gave in exchange.

  96. [84] In the circumstances, as no additional money was paid by the Plaintiff, there seems only to be two forms of consideration that she could have given: (a) forbearance to sue on a valid claim; or (b) foregoing her right to receive legal title to the Units. It is trite that the former would be good consideration, and it is clear that the latter could also be valid. This is because, if the Plaintiff forgoes her right to receive legal title, she suffers the detriment of having her interest reduced to an equitable one.

  97. [85] In any event, notwithstanding the legal acceptability of these two forms of consideration, I find that the Plaintiff, factually, did not actually provide them in exchange. As regards (a), if no time for forbearance is specified, the court will infer that the undertaking was to do so for a reasonable time (David Foskett, Foskett on Compromise (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th Ed, 2019) at para 3-03, citing Fullerton v Provincial Bank of Ireland [1903] AC 309; also see Projection Pte Ltd v The Tai Ping Insurance Company Ltd [2000] SGHC 146 at [40], which cites an older edition of Foskett for the same purpose).

  98. [86] Reasonableness, of course, is open-ended. However, there is on the facts of this case, no need for any finely balanced analysis. On 27 December 2019, frustrated with the First Defendant’s refusal to capture any alleged variation in writing, the Plaintiff terminated the Contracts and demanded the payment of rental arrears as well as the purchase price of the Units. By 9 March 2020, her writ and statement of claim had been served. Given the value of benefits which were proposed, particularly the buyback, these few months can scarcely be said to be a reasonable amount of forbearance.

  99. [87] This takes me then to possibility (b). The parties’ conversation (see [79] above) does not show that the Plaintiff agreed to forgo the right to ask for legal title to be transferred to her. Indeed, the fact that she claims damages in this suit for the Defendants’ failure to transfer legal title suggest that such right was not compromised in exchange for the First Defendant’s promises.

  100. [88] On these bases, I find that the parties did not effect a variation of the Contracts at the November 2019 Meeting to extend the Leaseback Agreements. Connectedly, the absence of an effective variation also means that no buyback agreement was subsequently added to the Contracts.

  101. [89] Before I leave these facts, however, I note that in the Plaintiff’s written closing submissions she argues alternatively that, the First Defendant agreed to extend the Leaseback Agreements by two years following a meeting between the First Defendant and Mr Lim on 21 March 2019. However, she only pleads that an extension arose from the November 2019 Meeting.

  102. [90] Counsel for the Plaintiff will be well aware that “pleadings delineate the parameters of the case and shape the course of the trial. They define the issues before the court and inform the parties of the case that they have to meet. They set out the allegations of fact which the party asserting has to prove to the satisfaction of the court and on which they are entitled to relief under the law” [emphasis added] (V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 at [36]). By referring only to the November 2019 Meeting, the Defendants have not had a proper opportunity to respond in respect of the alleged March 2019 extension. This is particularly so given that they only had counsel at the stage of pleadings. They acted in-person during the preparation of their AEICs, and continued to do so at trial and for submissions. I therefore decline to consider the Plaintiff’s newly furnished allegation.

  103. Plaintiff’s contractual claim

  104. [91] Having set out and resolved most of the relevant factual issues arising in this matter (save for some pertaining to other misrepresentations the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants made at their first formal meeting on 29 November 2016: see [15] above; which I return to at [175] below), I now turn to the legal issues. I begin with those arising from the Plaintiff’s contractual claim.

  105. [92] For the Defendants’ breach of contract – specifically, their failure to transfer title to the Units pursuant to the Sale and make rental payments under the Leaseback Agreements – the Plaintiff seeks two remedies:

  106. (a) Damages of S$1,771,552.97 comprising: first, S$1,520,719.97, this being the price at which the Defendants were supposedly obliged to buyback the Units; and second, S$250,833 in rental arrears which would have been earned had the Defendants not acted in breach.

  107. [93] Before turning to the issues proper, however, there are two preliminary matters I should clarify and reiterate. First, although the Plaintiff pleads that the Defendants were obliged to repurchase the Units at S$1,520,719.97, the more relevant figure is S$1,468,895.69, this being the price she actually paid (see [54]–[56] above). Second, given my finding that the parties did not validly agree to extend the Leaseback Agreement (see [77] and [88]), the extent to which the Defendants can be held liable for rental arrears is only S$71,364.

  108. [94] With these points in mind, I now consider the two issues which must be answered in determining the Defendants’ liability for damages. First, whether the Defendants’ committed repudiatory breaches of the Contracts, such that the Plaintiff was justified in terminating the Contracts on 27 December 2019 to sue for damages. Second, the extent to which the Plaintiff has proven the losses she claims in respect of this cause of action.

  109. Defendants’ breach of the Contracts

  110. [95] The first question is relatively straightforward, though it requires some analysis of the character of the Contracts. Specifically, whether they should be understood as five composite contracts for the purpose of the Plaintiff’s capital investment, just with sale and lease elements; or, whether they should be seen as five sales and, separately, five agreements to lease the Units.

  111. [96] This distinction is salient because, if the Contracts are seen as separate sales and leases, not only will the validity of the Plaintiff’s termination of each need to be considered separately, such analysis will need to be undertaken with regard to the particular rules relating to these types of contracts. For example, the requirement that parties to the sale give notice demanding completion; or the requirement that the right to forfeit for non-payment of rent is expressly reserved (see, eg, Alwee Alkaff v Syed Jafaralsadeg and others and another action [1997] 3 SLR(R) 419 at [23]–[24]). Even more complicatedly, if the Contracts are understood as comprising distinct sales and leases, this begs the question as to which law governs each of these components, the lex situs of the Units (Philippine law), or Singapore law.

  112. [97] Thus, it is more appropriate to characterise the two components of the Contracts as parts of a broader commercial investment. This is supported by the fact that: (a) the components of the Contracts are evidenced within single documents (see [18] above); and more pertinently, (b) these documents do not contain any of the terms or details ordinarily seen in contracts for the sale of real property, or leases. This stark lack of detail suggests strongly that the parties did not intend for the Contracts to operate within the usual, more rigid realm of these types of contracts. Instead, they appear to have understood the Contracts as loose collections of obligations which facilitated the Plaintiff’s investment in the Business. I will therefore analyse them as such.

  113. [98] On this basis, I find that the Defendants’ obligation to transfer legal title in the Units to the Plaintiff were conditions of the Contracts, the breach of which entitled her to terminate and sue for damages. I arrive at this view because the Plaintiff’s obtainment of a proprietary interest in the Units forms an essential part of the Contracts’ character. Without obtaining such interest, the Plaintiff’s payment to the Defendants would be akin to an outright, unsecured loan, which is certainly not what the parties intended.

  114. Measure of the Plaintiff’s damages

  115. [99] This brings me then to the second, considerably more difficult question: the extent to which the Plaintiff has proven the damages she seeks to recover for the Defendants’ breach of contract.

  116. The standard expectation measure: Difficulties in this case

  117. [100] I alluded to such difficulty at [8] above, and it arises because the Plaintiff seeks to recover her principal investment of around S$1.5m on the sole basis that the Alleged Buyback Term existed, either upon the formation of the Contracts or arising out of the November 2019 Meeting. Relying on this factual premise, the Plaintiff submits that, applying the standard expectation measure of damages, she is entitled to recover the purchase price of the Units because this is the price the Defendants “would have [had to pay her] to buy back the Units”. In other words, if the Defendants had performed the Contracts, she would have obtained this sum. This is entirely orthodox.

  118. [101] Absent a buyback agreement, however – as I have found at [35] and [88] above – it is not clear whether the Plaintiff can directly recover the sum she paid on the basis of a breach of contract. Indeed, without the buyback agreement, we are simply dealing with the Defendants’ failure to deliver title to real property. The normal measure of damages in respect of such a breach is to take the market value of the property at the time for completion (or some other suitable date), less the contract price if it has not already been paid (see Engell v Fitch (1869) LR 4 QB 659 at 665; Min Hong Auto Supply Pte Ltd v Loh Chun Seng [1993] 1 SLR(R) 642 at [82]).

  119. [102] The use of this measure in these cases is well-settled and orthodox in its protection of the innocent contracting party’s interest in the performance of the contract (see James Edelman, McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2021) (“McGregor”) at paras 27-005–27-006; Adam Kramer, The Law of Contract Damages (Hart Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2017) (“Kramer”) at paras 4-02–4-03; The Law of Damages (Andrew Tettenborn gen ed) (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2010) (“Tettenborn”) at paras 23.02–23.03). It is difficult, however, to apply to the present case. It could technically be applied; but it requires the Plaintiff to prove the market value of the Units. However, as stated, her case hinges entirely on the existence of the Alleged Buyback Term, and so no valuation of the Units was prepared or tendered as evidence.

  120. [104] I could, in the face of this, nevertheless assume that the value of the Units is that which the Plaintiff paid, but that would be to coat a conceptual question with evidential veneer. In his chapter on damages in Chitty on Contracts (Hugh Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2021) (“Chitty”), Professor Beale observes that, though an innocent party has multiple interests which an award of damages for breach of contract can serve to protect – expectation, reliance, and restitution interests, or in some instances, even an interest in disgorgement (which is also raised here) – the expectation of performance is the primary interest to be guarded. In his own words, “it must be emphasised that contract damages are normally assessed on the ‘expectation’ measure and do not protect the restitution interest or the reliance interest as such” (para 29-023). The issue of which of these interests can or should be protected in a given case is primarily a conceptual question which entails at least some thoughtful characterisation. If I were to assume without proof that the market value of the Units is that which the Plaintiff paid, I would be protecting her restitution interest under the guise of her expectation of performance. There are at least two issues with this.

  121. [105] One, a central principle of contract damages is that the innocent party should not be put in a better position than if the contract had been performed (Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 at 855). If I assume that the market value of the Units is that which the Plaintiff actually paid and award damages on that basis, when added to her earned rental as well as claim for rental arrears, she would be turning a profit. Therefore, such an assumption would not only unjustifiably relieve her of the burden of proving her expected profits, but do so at the risk that she might be overcompensated. This is because, given the lack of proof, it cannot be said with any certainty that the value of the Units has gone above, or at least maintained at the sum paid.

  122. [106] Two, the Plaintiff could have mounted an alternative claim for unjust enrichment. Indeed, in the circumstances, a claim grounded on failure of basis seems feasible. As such, if I were to assume the value of the Units, I would also effectively be granting the Plaintiff a restitutive remedy without holding her to demonstrate that there was indeed a total failure of basis (as well as the other elements for a claim in unjust enrichment).

  123. [107] As Professor Edwin Peel observes in The Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2020) (“Trietel”), a plaintiff’s “right to claim restitution is limited, in particular by the rule that he can (in general) recover money paid under the contract only if there has been a total failure of [basis]” (para 20-035). Where a plaintiff has a claim for breach of contract, “to allow him to claim restitution in respect of any breach would cut across this principle, particularly where he had made a bad bargain by paying [the defendant (“D”)] more than [D’s] performance was worth” (para 22-008; also see Chitty at para 29-029). Further, given the UK Supreme Court’s (“UKSC”) firm decision in One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris-Garnder [2019] AC 649 (“One Step”) re-characterising Wrotham Park damages as compensatory, not restitutionary (the position in Singapore is the same in this regard: see Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 (“Turf Club Auto”) at [267] and [271]), any justification supporting the grant of a restitutionary remedy for breach of contract – even if indirectly – is arguably weaker than ever.

  124. [108] This thus leaves the Plaintiff in a bind. All she can prove, insofar as her expectation of performance is concerned, is that the Defendants would have had to pay her the rental arrears of S$71,364. She cannot prove that she would have been able to recoup the purchase price from selling the Units.

  125. The alternative reliance measure: A conceptual overview

  126. [109] Having said the foregoing, I am aware that there are cases which have allowed innocent parties to recover the purchase price they paid as a form of “wasted expenditure” within the ambit of reliance damages. The oft-cited case is McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377, where the High Court of Australia allowed the plaintiff to recover the price he had paid to purchase the wreck of a non-existent oil tanker, in addition to the other expenditure he incurred in preparing for the salvage. Other examples include Harling v Eddy [1951] 2 KB 739 and CCC Films (London) v Impact v Quadrant Films [1985] QB 16 (“CCC Films”), amongst numerous others (see, eg, Chitty at para 29-029; Trietel at para 20-031).

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