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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Dec 2022
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General Division of the High Court

The Agency for Policy Coordination on State Property of Mongolia and others v Batbold Sukhbaatar and others

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[2022] SGHC 318Case no. Suit No 1145 of 2020 (Summons No 5541 of 2020)9 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. Procedural history

  3. [2] This matter involved a claim of corruption against a former prime minister of Mongolia brought in the name of three agencies of the Mongolian government by the Metropolitan Prosecutor’s Office of Mongolia (“MPOM”). MPOM initially instructed an international law firm King & Spalding International LLP (“K&S”) to pursue proceedings in various jurisdictions, one of which was Singapore. K&S instructed a Singapore law firm, Rev Law LLC (“Rev Law”).

  4. [5] On 15 July 2022, I granted Rev Law’s application for their discharge as solicitors for the plaintiffs. The basis for this application was that K&S, and hence, Rev Law, had ceased to receive instructions from the prosecutors in Mongolia. A partner in K&S attested to the efforts made to obtain meaningful instructions, and also suggested that the lack of meaningful instructions resulted from the first defendant’s attempts to procure the dismissal of the court actions by means other than meeting the case against him on the merits, namely by engaging directly with persons employed within the plaintiffs or at the office of the prosecutors.

  5. [6] As the plaintiffs remained unrepresented and took no further steps, the fifth and sixth defendants took out an application for the action against them to be dismissed. This was granted on 9 September 2022. The case against them having been disposed of without trial, the fifth and sixth defendants renewed their application for an inquiry as to damages. The application came on for hearing before me on 7 November 2022.

  6. Issue

  7. [10] I will consider this issue in two parts:

  8. (a) the general rule for non-recoverability of costs as damages and its rationale; and

  9. (b) whether there is an exception where an undertaking as to damages is being enforced.

  10. The general rule

  11. [11] The general rule has been expressed by the Court of Appeal in Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other appeals [2015] 1 SLR 496 (“Maryani Sadeli”) at [20] to [21], as follows:

  12. [12] This case was not initially cited to me, and I requested counsel for the fifth and sixth defendants to address me on it.

  13. [13] The Court of Appeal in Maryani Sadeli encapsulated its rationale at [27], following a discussion of Devlin LJ’s judgment in the English Court of Appeal decision of Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306, as follows:

  14. [14] The Court of Appeal further noted two additional policies, namely “the need to achieve finality in litigation as well as the need to suppress parasitic litigation” [emphasis in original] (Maryani Sadeli at [32]; see also Then Khek Koon and another v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other suits [2014] 1 SLR 245 (“Then Khek Koon”) at [179] and [183]).

  15. The assessment of damages in relation to costs incurred by a party, if available in principle as a substantive right, would, by contrast, consider reasonableness principally in terms of whether the costs actually incurred were reasonable in terms of the market for advocates of the appropriate expertise and experience in relation to the matter concerned, including the matter’s value, complexity and importance.

  16. Possible exception where there has been an undertaking as to damages

  17. [23] The fifth and sixth defendants contend that the undertaking makes all the difference. But it is hard to see why this should be so as a matter of principle. The undertaking operates as if it were a contract between the applicant for an injunction and the respondent to it that the applicant would not prevent the respondent from doing that which the respondent was restrained from doing by the terms of the injunction, a principle most recently restated in the Privy Council decision on appeal from the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal in Ennismore Fund Management Ltd v Fenris Consulting Ltd [2022] UKPC 27 (“Ennismore”) at [54].

  18. Conclusion