General Division of the High Court · Decided 4 May 2023
Xu Yuanchen v Public Prosecutor and another appeal
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 123 · Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9073 of 2022/01
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] The appellants are appealing against their respective convictions and sentences. With respect to the criminal defamation charges, they argue that the impugned publication did not defame members of the Cabinet and that they lacked knowledge that the publication would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet. In addition, the appellant in HC/MA 9073 of 2022/01 (“the first appellant”), Mr Xu Yuanchen, raises issues regarding the constitutionality of ss 499 and 500 of the Penal Code (“the criminal defamation provisions”). With respect to the CMA charge, the second appellant argues that he had the email account owner’s consent to use the account for the purpose of sending out the relevant email.
Background
- [3]
[3] The first appellant was, at the material time, the director of The Online Citizen Pte Ltd (“TOC”), a company which runs the socio-political website “www.theonlinecitizen.com” (“the TOC website”). He was the chief editor of the TOC website. The second appellant was a regular contributor to the TOC website who wrote and submitted several opinion pieces to the TOC editorial team.
- [4]
[4] On 4 September 2018, at an Internet cafe located in Chinatown, the second appellant sent an email which he had written titled “PAP MP apologises to SDP” (“the Email”) from the email account “willysim71@yahoo.com.sg” (“the Yahoo Account”) to “theonlinecitizen@gmail.com”, an email account used by the TOC team. He intended for the contents of the Email to be published on the TOC website.
- [5]
[5] The Yahoo Account was registered not in the second appellant’s name but rather in the name of one Mr Sim Wee Lee (“Mr Sim”), who was the second appellant’s acquaintance at the time. The alleged unauthorised use of the Yahoo Account to send the Email was thus the subject of the CMA charge.
- [6]
[6] On the same day, the first appellant approved the publication of the Email on the TOC website. It was published in the form of a letter from “Willy Sum” titled “The Take Away From Seah Kian Ping’s Facebook Post” (“the Article”). The Article read as follows:
- [7]
[7] The subject of the criminal defamation charges was the phrase “corruption at the highest echelons” (“the Disputed Phrase”) in the fourth paragraph of the Article (“the Paragraph”). The appellants were charged for making or publishing an imputation which stated that there was “corruption at the highest echelons”, knowing that such imputation would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet of Singapore.
- [8]
[8] On 18 September 2018, the Info-communications Media Development Authority (“IMDA”) issued a direction pursuant to s 16(1) of the Broadcasting Act (Cap 28, 2012 Rev Ed) to the first appellant to remove the Article from the TOC website. He complied with this direction and the Article was taken down on the same day.
The criminal defamation charges
The parties’ cases below
- [9]
[9] The Prosecution submitted before the District Judge below (“the Judge”) that on an objective interpretation of the Paragraph, it was clear that the imputation of there being “corruption at the highest echelons” concerned the members of the Cabinet. Since the first sentence of the Paragraph alleged that the “present PAP leadership severely lacks innovation, vision and the drive to take us into the next lap”, the Prosecution argued that the second sentence of the Paragraph provided illustrations of these shortcomings, including “policy and foreign screw-ups” and “tampering of the Constitution”. The Disputed Phrase “corruption at the highest echelons”, which followed these illustrations, was thus similarly an imputation concerning members of the Cabinet. This was argued to have been a serious imputation alleging illegal, fraudulent, or dishonest conduct by the members of the Cabinet, which the appellants knew would harm their reputation.
- [10]
[10] The second appellant’s defence in the court below had several facets:
(a) First, by prosecuting the second appellant and not the Lee siblings, who allegedly made similar representations, the Attorney-General had violated the second appellant’s right to equality before the law as enshrined in Art 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”);
(b) Second, the criminal defamation charge was defective because it lacked material particulars as to the exact identity of the persons harmed;
(c) Third, the reference in the criminal defamation charge to “members of the Cabinet of Singapore” was in essence referring to the Government of Singapore, which was not a “person” with a reputation protected under s 499 of the Penal Code.
(d) Fourth, the Disputed Phrase “corruption at the highest echelons” did not refer to the members of the Cabinet, and instead referred to elite members of society;
(e) Finally, the second appellant could rely on the defence provided by the Second Exception to s 499 of the Penal Code, which protects the expression of opinions, made in good faith, concerning the public conduct of public servants.
- [11]
[11] The first appellant argued that the Disputed Phrase, read in the context of the Article, did not refer to individual members of the Cabinet of Singapore. Rather, there were other interpretations of what the Disputed Phrase was referring to, including the Government in general, elite members of society, the Oxley Road dispute involving the Lee family (“the Oxley Road Dispute”), or the Central Executive Committee of the People’s Action Party (“the PAP CEC”). The first appellant gave evidence that he understood the Disputed Phrase to be referring to the Oxley Road Dispute; hence, he argued that he could not have known that the Disputed Phrase would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet.
The decision below
- [13]
[13] The Judge found the criminal defamation charges to be made out and accordingly convicted the appellants of them. He observed that the imputation of there being “corruption at the highest echelons” clearly concerned members of the Cabinet. He accepted the Prosecution’s argument that the first sentence – ie, “[t]he present PAP leadership severely lacks innovation, vision and the drive to take us into the next lap” – was the thesis statement of the Paragraph, and that the second sentence referred to illustrations to support the first sentence, including “policy and foreign screw-ups”, “tampering of the Constitution”, as well as the Disputed Phrase “corruption at the highest echelons”. He agreed with the Prosecution that the “present PAP leadership” would be understood by an ordinary reasonable Singaporean to refer to the leaders of the prevailing People’s Action Party (“PAP”) Government, namely the members of the Cabinet of Singapore who were responsible for policies and the day-to-day administration of the affairs of the State.
- [14]
[14] Next, the Judge considered that the ordinary reasonable person would know that allegations of foreign policy screw-ups and tampering of the Constitution were matters which involved decisions made by the Cabinet. Since these examples referred to the Cabinet, the following phrase “corruption at the highest echelons” would also be understood by the ordinary reasonable person to be an imputation concerning members of the Cabinet. Thus, this imputation of corruption would be understood to refer to illegal, fraudulent, or dishonest conduct by members of the Cabinet – a serious allegation which the appellants knew would harm the reputation of these members.
- [15]
[15] The Judge also noted that a previous article published on the TOC website dated 30 July 2018, titled “Current Ministers are administrators of a system – not politicians or statesmen” (“the 30 July 2018 Article”), expressly equated the “current PAP leaders” with the members of the Cabinet by setting out a group photograph of the Cabinet members captioned “[m]ost expensive cabinet in the world (Not the furniture type)” and then criticising the “current PAP leaders” in the main text of the article. In his view, the temporal proximity between the 30 July 2018 Article and the present Article showed that the first appellant, as sole administrator and chief editor of the TOC website, must have known that the “present PAP leadership” reference in this Article would be construed by readers to refer to members of the Cabinet. Besides the first appellant’s own knowledge, the Judge also cited the 30 July 2018 Article as support for the view that the “present PAP leadership” in the Paragraph would objectively be understood as referring to members of the Cabinet.
The offence of criminal defamation
- [17]
[17] Sections 499 and 500 of the Penal Code read as follows:
- [18]
[18] The term “person” is defined under s 11 of the Penal Code as including “any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not”. This is in line with Explanation 2 to s 499 of the Penal Code:
- [19]
[19] Thus, there are three elements to the offence of criminal defamation under s 499 of the Penal Code:
- [20]
[20] There are several exceptions to the offence under s 499. The Second Exception, which protects opinions made in good faith respecting the public conduct of public servants, is pertinent in this case as the second appellant relies on it. This exception will be discussed in greater detail at a later section.
- [21]
[21] There are several differences between the offence of criminal defamation under s 499 of the Penal Code and civil defamation. First, whilst the burden of proof in civil suits is on the balance of probabilities, the burden of proof with respect to criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. Second, the consequences of making out an offence of criminal defamation are more serious than that for civil defamation. Damages are typically granted for successful civil defamation suits, whereas under s 500 of the Penal Code a person found guilty of criminal defamation may be punished with imprisonment for a term of up to two years, or with a fine, or with both.
- [22]
[22] Third, there is a key difference between who the subject of defamation may be in civil defamation as compared to criminal defamation. For civil defamation, where the offending words refer to a class or body of persons as opposed to a specific individual, a successful claim may still be made out if the ordinary reasonable person can conclude that the statement is capable of being interpreted as referring to the individual: Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 (“Review Publishing (CA)”) at [53].
- [23]
[23] However, for criminal defamation, there is no such requirement that the relevant statement be capable of being interpreted as referring to an individual. Both s 11 of the Penal Code and Explanation 2 to s 499 establish that criminal defamation is not limited to imputations concerning individuals and may still be made out where the relevant imputation concerns a company or an association or collection of persons.
The issues to be determined
- [24]
[24] The following issues arise for consideration with respect to the criminal defamation charges:
Whether the criminal defamation charges were defective for lack of particulars
- [25]
[25] The second appellant submits that the criminal defamation charge against him was defective because it lacked material particulars as to the exact identity of the persons allegedly targeted by the Disputed Phrase. Essentially, the second appellant argues that since the membership of the Cabinet changes from time to time, it is incumbent on the Prosecution to frame the charge as including the precise names of the members of the Cabinet who were allegedly defamed.
- [26]
[26] Section 124(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) stipulates the details which must be included in a criminal charge. It reads as follows:
- [27]
[27] As observed earlier at [23], the effect of s 11 of the Penal Code and Explanation 2 to s 499 of the Penal Code is that the victims of an offence under s 499 – ie, the allegedly defamed persons – need not be individual persons and may be an association, collection, or body of persons. Thus, contrary to the second appellant’s contention, it is not incumbent on the Prosecution to frame the charge as including the precise names of the members of the Cabinet who were allegedly defamed. The term “members of the Cabinet” refers to a sufficiently specific collection or body of persons and comes within Explanation 2 to s 499 as well as the definition of a “person” under s 11. Hence, in the context of s 499, framing the alleged victims of the criminal defamation charge as “members of the Cabinet” is “reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of what the accused is charged with”, as is required under s 124(1) of the CPC. There is therefore no reason to find that the criminal defamation charges were defective.
Whether, and in what way, the Disputed Phrase referred to members of the Cabinet
The applicable interpretive approach
- [28]
[28] The following principles for determining the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly defamatory words are distilled from Microsoft Corp and others v SM Summit Holdings Ltd and another and other appeals [1999] 3 SLR(R) 465 (“Microsoft Corp”) at [53]:
(a) The court decides what meaning the words would have conveyed to an ordinary, reasonable person using his general knowledge and common sense. The test is an objective one: it is the natural and ordinary meaning as understood by an ordinary, reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal.
(b) The meaning intended by the maker of the defamatory statement and the sense in which the words were understood by the party alleged to have been defamed are irrelevant. Extrinsic evidence is also not admissible in construing the words; the meaning must be gathered from the words themselves and the context of the entire passage in which they are set out.
(c) The court is not confined to the literal or strict meaning of the words, but takes into account what the ordinary, reasonable person may reasonably infer from the words. The ordinary, reasonable person reads between the lines.
Application to the facts
- [29]
[29] The Paragraph in which the Disputed Phrase appears reads as follows:
- [30]
[30] The focus of the criminal defamation charges was on the Disputed Phrase “corruption at the highest echelons”. Each of the criminal defamation charges read in similar form. The first appellant’s charge reads:
- [31]
[31] Similarly, the second appellant was charged as follows:
(1) The parties’ arguments on appeal
- [32]
[32] Both appellants argue that the Judge erred in finding that the Disputed Phrase referred to members of the Cabinet. The first appellant argues that there was no defamation of members of the Cabinet since no reference to members of the Cabinet was made in the Article or the Disputed Phrase. Furthermore, the Disputed Phrase was open to multiple interpretations and could have referred to elite members of society, scandals at Keppel Corporation, or the entire system of governance in Singapore.
- [33]
[33] The second appellant argues that viewed as a whole, the reference to the “highest echelons” in the Disputed Phrase could not have been referring to the same body of persons as the “PAP leadership” in the first sentence of the Paragraph. The illustration referring to the “highest echelons” could not have been the same as the primary subject the “PAP leadership” itself; otherwise, there would have been no need to use a different term if the author’s intention was to refer to the same subject. Furthermore, the example of “tampering of the Constitution” as one of the PAP leadership’s shortcomings could not have been directed at members of the Cabinet, since pursuant to Art 5(2) of the Constitution, constitutional amendments are not passed by members of the Cabinet alone but rather by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament.
- [34]
[34] The Prosecution’s argument on appeal is largely similar to that raised in the proceedings below. It may be summarised as follows:
(a) In the first sentence of the paragraph, the author alleges that the “present PAP leadership severely lacks innovation, vision and the drive to take us into the next lap”. As a matter of common sense and plain language, this sentence contains the thesis statement of the Paragraph.
(b) The second sentence then sets out a variety of illustrations to justify the proposition made in the first sentence that the “present PAP leadership” lacks innovation, vision, and drive. These illustrations include “policy and foreign screw-ups” and “tampering of the Constitution”, which are both matters within the remit of the Executive and more specifically within the purview of the members of the Cabinet.
(c) The Disputed Phrase “corruption at the highest echelons” in the second sentence is likewise an illustration of the thesis statement in the first sentence. It logically follows that this was an imputation concerning the members of the Cabinet.
(d) This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in the context of governance in Singapore, an ordinary reasonable person would understand the phrase the “present PAP leadership”, in the manner it was used in the Paragraph, to be referring to the leaders of the prevailing PAP Government; namely, the members of the Cabinet. Since the members of the Cabinet are responsible for all policies and the day-to-day administration of affairs of the State, allegations of “policy or foreign screw-ups” or “tampering of the Constitution” would naturally be construed as being levelled at the members of the Cabinet. Accordingly, the following illustration of there being “corruption at the highest echelons” would also be understood by an ordinary reasonable person as being levelled at the members of the Cabinet.
(e) The fact that the “present PAP leadership” refers to the members of the Cabinet is also evident from the other articles published on the TOC website, specifically the 30 July 2018 Article which allegedly equated the “current PAP leaders” with the members of the Cabinet.
(2) The decision
- [35]
[35] As a preliminary point, the Prosecution’s reliance on the 30 July 2018 Article to shed light on the meaning of the phrase “present PAP leadership” in the Paragraph is misplaced. When assessing the meaning of the allegedly defamatory words, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible, and the meaning must be gathered from the words themselves and the context of the passage in which they are set out: Microsoft Corp at [53]. The 30 July 2018 Article constitutes such inadmissible extrinsic evidence and cannot be used in the interpretive exercise.
- [36]
[36] The Paragraph requires interpretation as to:
- [37]
[37] As regards the first point, the ordinary, reasonable person would indeed read the “present PAP leadership” in the first sentence of the Paragraph as referring to members of the Cabinet. Read alone, the phrase “present PAP leadership” may refer to different bodies of persons other than the members of the Cabinet – for example, members of the PAP CEC. However, read in the context of the paragraph, the phrase “present PAP leadership” would naturally be equated by the ordinary, reasonable person with the present PAP Government’s leadership, ie, members of the Cabinet. The key to this interpretation is the reference, in the second sentence of the Paragraph, to “multiple policy and foreign screw-ups” and “tampering of the Constitution”. These are matters of State which would reasonably be read as being primarily within the purview of the main decision-making body of the Executive – ie, the Cabinet – as opposed to that of bodies such as the PAP CEC, which is an internal party structure. The second appellant argues that constitutional amendments are approved not by the members of the Cabinet, but rather by the votes of two-thirds of Parliament. However, an ordinary, reasonable person would not be focused on the strict legal requirements for passing constitutional amendments, but rather on the body of persons which, in practice, makes the decision to pursue these amendments; that is, the Cabinet. Indeed, the ordinary, reasonable person reads between the lines, as opposed to being confined to the literal or strict meaning of the words: Microsoft Corp at [53].
- [38]
[38] This analysis informs the assessment of the ordinary, reasonable person’s reading of the phrase “present PAP leadership” in the first sentence. Since the illustrations of the perceived failures of the “present PAP leadership” in the second sentence are matters which are primarily within the purview of members of the Cabinet, the reasonable inference is that the “present PAP leadership” is a reference to the body of persons responsible for those perceived failures – ie, the members of the Cabinet. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the Singaporean context, the ordinary, reasonable person would be cognisant that members of the Cabinet would invariably be key members of the PAP, and thus would be apt to associate the “present PAP leadership” with the members of the Cabinet.
- [39]
[39] As for the relationship between the “present PAP leadership” and “corruption at the highest echelons”, it is difficult to accept the Prosecution’s position that the Disputed Phrase “corruption at the highest echelons” would be interpreted by the ordinary, reasonable person as an allegation levelled at members of the Cabinet.
- [40]
[40] Though I accept the Prosecution’s argument that the second sentence of the Paragraph gave illustrations of perceived failures which occurred under the purview of the members of the Cabinet, such as “multiple policy and foreign screw-ups” and “tampering of the Constitution”, it does not follow that “corruption at the highest echelons” means, as the Prosecution argues, that the members of the Cabinet were themselves corrupt. Indeed, the more natural interpretation, as argued for by the first appellant, is that alongside the other failures, corruption occurring at the highest levels was another instance of a failure of action or omission by the Cabinet. In other words, there is a crucial distinction between saying that members of the Cabinet were in some way responsible for the rise of “corruption at the highest echelons” under their watch and saying that the Cabinet members were corrupt. To my mind, there is more than a reasonable doubt that the objective meaning of the text was that the members of the Cabinet were themselves corrupt.
- [41]
[41] What the ordinary, reasonable person would have read the Paragraph as imputing is that “corruption at the highest echelons” arose under the “present PAP leadership” – ie, members of the Cabinet – because of their allegedly poor leadership. The Paragraph clearly characterises the various alleged failures described in the second sentence, including “corruption at the highest echelons”, as events which had occurred as a result of the leadership failures referred to in the first sentence, specifically a severe lack of innovation, vision and drive. Whether “the highest echelons” referred to the establishment, the “great and good”, or some other segment is not entirely clear, but what matters is that there was an imputation within the Paragraph that members of the Cabinet were responsible, because of their incompetence or failures, for the emergence of serious and substantial corruption in Singapore.
Whether the appellants knew that the Disputed Phrase would harm the reputation of the members of the Cabinet
The applicable law
- [42]
[42] Under s 499 of the Penal Code, the applicable mens rea to be shown is that the accused published the relevant imputation concerning a person “intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person”.
- [43]
[43] Explanation 4 of s 499 elaborates on how an imputation may be said to harm a person’s reputation. It reads as follows:
Application to the facts
- [44]
[44] The criminal defamation charges against the appellants are for “knowing that such imputation [ie, the Disputed Phrase] would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet of Singapore”. Hence, the focus of the inquiry here is on whether the appellants knew that the imputation of “corruption at the highest echelons” would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet in a manner falling within Explanation 4 of s 499.
(1) The parties’ arguments on appeal
- [45]
[45] The second appellant submits that the Judge erred in finding that he had reason to know that harm would be caused to the reputation of members of the Cabinet. Since the Disputed Phrase was allegedly not a reference to members of the Cabinet, the second appellant argues that he did not have either actual or constructive knowledge that harm would be caused to members of the Cabinet. Furthermore, the second appellant submits that the Judge did not consider, or failed to give sufficient weight to the following matters: first, his alleged intention for the Disputed Phrase to refer to “the cream of the crop of society”; second, his statements during examination-in-chief that when writing the Article, he had in mind the scandals involving the high echelons of the Keppel Corporation management, the Football Association of Singapore, and the Lee siblings’ joint statement about a member of the Cabinet. Thus, the second appellant argues that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether he had actual or constructive knowledge that the reputation of members of the Cabinet would be harmed by his actions.
- [46]
[46] The first appellant also argues that he did not have knowledge that the Article would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet. First, he submits that he did not know that the Disputed Phrase referred to members of the Cabinet. Instead, he thought that the Disputed Phrase referred to the Oxley Road Dispute. Next, the first appellant advances three related arguments to show that no harm was occasioned to the reputation of members of the Cabinet, and hence that he would not have known that such harm would result. The arguments are as follows:
(a) First, there was nothing to show that the reputation of individual members of the Cabinet was harmed. There was no complaint made and no civil suit started by the allegedly defamed members of the Cabinet. Furthermore, the Prosecution was unable to particularise which members of the Cabinet had been defamed and failed to call any members of the Cabinet to testify.
(b) Second, it was unclear if the Prosecution was alleging that it was the Cabinet as an entity or individual members of the Cabinet who had been defamed. The first appellant argues that the Prosecution vacillated on this position as it was afraid of contravening the principle in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] 2 WLR 449 (“Derbyshire”) that a government body cannot sue for defamation.
(c) Third, the word “corruption” in the Disputed Phrase could refer to moral corruption, as opposed to there being illegal, fraudulent, or dishonest conduct by members of the Cabinet.
The first appellant submits that these three arguments show that no harm was occasioned to the reputation of members of the Cabinet, with the corollary being that he would not have known that any such harm would result.
- [47]
[47] The Prosecution argues that both appellants knew that the “present PAP leadership” would be construed as a reference to members of the Cabinet. First, the Prosecution submits that the second appellant conceded in cross-examination that his references in the Article to “multiple policy and foreign screw-ups” and “tampering of the Constitution” were necessarily references to matters determined by the members of the Cabinet. The Prosecution argues that crucially, the second appellant made a reference to the “PAP leadership cabinet” when answering, in cross-examination, a question relating to which body made decisions on those matters. It argues that this represents a “Freudian slip” which establishes that the second appellant clearly understood the phrase “present PAP leadership” to be a reference to the members of the Cabinet. The second appellant therefore knew that the allegations in the first and second sentences of the Paragraph, including the Disputed Phrase, would be construed as concerning the members of the Cabinet.
- [48]
[48] The Prosecution further contends that the 30 July 2018 Article was evidence that the first appellant, as the chief editor of the TOC website, knew that the reference to the “present PAP leadership” in the Article would be construed as a reference to the members of the Cabinet. The Prosecution also argues that the first appellant conceded in cross-examination that the first sentence of the Paragraph was inextricably linked to the second sentence. Thus, he knew that the matters in the second sentence, including the Disputed Phrase, would be linked to the members of the Cabinet.
- [49]
[49] Lastly, the Prosecution submits that the appellants knew that an imputation of corruption, which insinuates illegal, fraudulent, or dishonest conduct on the part of those in power, would harm the reputation of the members of the Cabinet. Thus, the Judge correctly found that the appellants knew that the imputation of “corruption at the highest echelons” would harm the reputation of the members of the Cabinet.
(2) The decision
- [50]
[50] There are two sub-issues here:
- [51]
[51] The Prosecution cannot rely on the 30 July 2018 Article as evidence that the first appellant knew that the “present PAP leadership” would be equated with members of the Cabinet. The link between the 30 July 2018 Article and the present Article is tenuous. The articles are written on different dates and by different authors. Although the main subject-matter of the articles may be similar – ie, criticising the leaders of the PAP – the present Article must be viewed in its own context. It cannot be inferred, based on the usage of the phrase “current PAP leaders” in a different article by another author, that the first appellant would think the present Article used the phrase “present PAP leadership” in the same manner, just because he was the editor of the TOC website and would have reviewed both articles close in time to each other.
- [52]
[52] Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the appellants knew that the phrase “present PAP leadership” would be construed as a reference to members of the Cabinet. The first appellant agreed in cross-examination that he was aware that the Cabinet was responsible for all government policies and the running of day-to-day affairs, and that “ordinary folks would probably say that a cabinet will be … responsible for all the policies when introduced”. Thus, he knew that the failures discussed in the second sentence of the Paragraph, which concerned matters of State, would be construed as matters which were under the purview of the members of the Cabinet.
- [53]
[53] The first appellant went on to acknowledge the link between the first and second sentences of the Paragraph, agreeing that when read together, the sentences suggested that the “PAP leadership” played a part in the “apparent lack of respect from foreign powers”. He also acknowledged that members of the Cabinet were part of the PAP leadership. Thus, I am satisfied that he knew that the linkage of the “present PAP leadership” to matters which were under the purview of the members of the Cabinet would lead the “present PAP leadership” to be construed as a reference to the members of the Cabinet.
- [54]
[54] The second appellant conceded in cross-examination that the illustrations in the second sentence of the Paragraph involved matters determined by the Cabinet. He also conceded that in the Paragraph, what he meant to say was that as a result of the PAP leadership lacking innovation, vision and drive, the failures listed in the second sentence occurred. Thus, by claiming that the “present PAP leadership” was responsible for certain failures, and then listing failures which he knew were under the purview of the members of the Cabinet, it is evident that the second appellant knew that the “present PAP leadership” would be construed as referring to members of the Cabinet.
- [55]
[55] Furthermore, the second appellant acknowledged, with respect to the illustrations mentioned in the second sentence, that “the lines here are pretty blurred when it comes to the separation of powers, as in PAP leadership cabinet [sic]”. I agree with the Prosecution that this statement showed that to the second appellant, the PAP leadership and the members of the Cabinet were groups which blurred into each other. This bolsters the conclusion that he knew the “present PAP leadership” would be construed as a reference to members of the Cabinet.
- [56]
[56] The second sub-issue is whether the appellants knew that the imputation of there being “corruption at the highest echelons” would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet. As found above at [40]–[41], the imputation of there being “corruption at the highest echelons” is not to be read as an allegation that the members of the Cabinet were themselves corrupt. Rather, it was an imputation that the members of the Cabinet were responsible for the emergence of “corruption at the highest echelons”, in the sense that it occurred on their watch as a result of their incompetence.
- [57]
[57] On this reading, the appellants’ arguments that they thought “corruption at the highest echelons” referred to corruption external to the members of the Cabinet do not aid them. Rather, these arguments are in line with the present interpretation – ie, that the appellants knew they were saying that because of the incompetence of the members of the Cabinet, “corruption at the highest echelons” had arisen in whatever forms they had in mind. Examples of these alleged instances of corruption include the Oxley Road Dispute (cited by the first appellant), as well as the alleged scandals involving Keppel Corporation, the Football Association of Singapore, and the Lee siblings’ joint statement regarding a member of Cabinet (cited by the second appellant).
- [58]
[58] Explanation 4 to s 499 of the Penal Code provides that “[n]o imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others … lowers the character of that person in respect of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person”. The imputation contained in the Disputed Phrase satisfies this threshold for finding harm to a person’s reputation. The word “corruption” is defined in the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Diana Lea and Jennifer Bradbery ed) (Oxford University Press, 10th ed, 2023) as “dishonest or illegal behaviour, especially of people in authority”. The word “echelon” is defined in The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Lesley Brown ed) (Oxford University Press, 1993) as “a particular level in any organization”. Thus, the imputation is that as a result of the incompetence of members of the Cabinet, dishonest or illegal behaviour had been allowed to emerge amongst people in authority in certain high-ranking segments of Singaporean society. This allegation is one which strikes at the question of the Cabinet members’ competence to run the country. It clearly lowers the character of members of the Cabinet in respect of their position as political leaders and certainly lowers their credit in general. Thus, the appellants, knowing that this was the nature of the imputation, did in fact make the imputation with the knowledge that it would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet.
- [59]
[59] Taking next the three related arguments which the first appellant advances to show that he had no knowledge that the imputation would harm the reputation of members of the Cabinet, none of these are made out. First, he argues that there was no evidence that the reputation of individual members of the Cabinet was harmed, since no complaint was made nor was any civil suit started by the defamed members, none of them were called by the Prosecution to testify as to the harm they suffered, and the Judge did not specify the harm caused by the imputation. This argument cannot stand. Section 499 of the Penal Code does not require actual harm to the person’s reputation to be shown. Rather, the provision stipulates intention or knowledge on the accused’s part that the imputation would harm the allegedly defamed person’s reputation. It may be that in most cases, actual harm to the person’s reputation would result, but the provision does not require such evidence of actual harm to be shown. In any case, it is not necessary that there be a complaint, civil suit, or testimony from the defamed persons before harm results from the imputation. Explanation 4 of s 499 provides the threshold for such a finding, namely that the imputation would lower the credit of the allegedly defamed persons or their character in respect of their calling. This threshold has been crossed here.
- [60]
[60] Next, the first appellant argues that the Prosecution vacillated on its position on whether it was the Cabinet as an entity or individual members of the Cabinet who were defamed as it was afraid of contravening the Derbyshire principle that a government body cannot sue for defamation. This argument does not touch the analysis under s 499 of the Penal Code. As elaborated earlier at [23], the effect of s 11 of the Penal Code and Explanation 2 to s 499 is that the offence of criminal defamation under s 499 allows for the allegedly defamed “person” to be an association, collection, or body of persons. Thus, the line which the first appellant seeks to draw between the Cabinet as an entity and the members of the Cabinet is not relevant. The crucial point is that the term “members of the Cabinet” refers to a sufficiently specific collection or body of persons, which falls within the acceptable limits of s 499 of the Penal Code.
- [61]
[61] As for Derbyshire, the proposition advanced in that case was that a government body cannot sue for defamation in the civil context. Lord Keith held at 459 that “under the common law of England a local authority does not have the right to maintain an action of damages for defamation” [emphasis added]. There is no relevance between this principle, which relates to a government body suing for civil defamation, and the present case, which involves criminal proceedings instituted by the AG, not the allegedly defamed persons, concerning criminal defamation under s 499 of the Penal Code.
- [62]
[62] Lastly, the first appellant submits that the word “corruption” in the Disputed Phrase could refer to moral corruption, as opposed to there being illegal, fraudulent, or dishonest conduct by members of the Cabinet. This argument has reduced relevance given the finding that the imputation is that members of the Cabinet were responsible for the emergence of “corruption”, as opposed to being corrupt themselves. In any case, based on the political context of the Paragraph and its focus on alleged grave governmental failures, it is difficult to accept that “corruption” would have referred to some more minor form of moral impropriety as opposed to bona fide corruption in the form of illegal, fraudulent, or dishonest behaviour by those in power.
Whether the appellants may avail themselves of the Second Exception under s 499 of the Penal Code
- [63]
[63] The second appellant relies on the Second Exception to s 499 of the Penal Code. The Second Exception and the Explanation to Exceptions under s 499 read as follows:
- [64]
[64] The second appellant submits that the Judge erred in rejecting his reliance on the Second Exception. The second appellant argues that since he did not have the members of the Cabinet in mind when he wrote the Article, there was no duty on his part to make any effort to ascertain the truth of facts which he had no intention to refer to. Furthermore, the lack of a subjective intention to refer to the members of the Cabinet meant that he could not have been actuated by malice in writing the Article. Thus, the presumption of good faith under the Explanation to Exceptions was not displaced, and the Judge therefore erred in rejecting his reliance on the Second Exception.
- [65]
[65] There are two issues to be clarified here:
- [66]
[66] As regards the first issue, guidance may be taken from case law relating to the defence of fair comment in civil defamation. Although this defence relates to civil defamation, there is no reason – and indeed the appellants do not contend otherwise – why the principles from this body of case law relating to statements of fact versus opinion should not be applicable to s 499 of the Penal Code as well.
- [67]
[67] Under the defence of fair comment, a statement of opinion is one which comes with clear indications, from the context in which it appears, that it is the author’s own view or interpretation of matters rather than a statement of fact: Review Publishing (CA) at [146]–[147]. A statement of opinion must not be intermingled with a statement of fact such that the reader cannot distinguish between what is opinion and what is fact: Review Publishing (CA) at [147]. The identification of a statement of opinion or fact is a question of fact for the court’s determination and is dependent upon the nature of the imputation conveyed, and the context and circumstances in which it is published: Review Publishing (CA) at [144].
- [68]
[68] Applying these principles, the imputation made by the appellants is clearly a statement of fact. The first and second sentences of the Paragraph read as follows:
- [69]
[69] There is no clear indication, from the context of these sentences, that the allegation of “corruption at the highest echelons” was the author’s own view or interpretation rather than a statement of fact. Instead, the author appears to be making a definitive statement of fact that there have been “multiple policy and foreign screw-ups, tampering of the Constitution, corruption at the highest echelons and apparent lack of respect from foreign powers” under the “present PAP leadership” ever since the demise of Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Hence, the imputation here – ie, that “corruption at the highest echelons” occurred under the watch of members of the Cabinet due to their incompetence – was a statement of fact rather than a statement of opinion. The appellants therefore cannot rely on the Second Exception under s 499 of the Penal Code.
- [70]
[70] Given this finding, it is not strictly necessary to address the second issue pertaining to good faith under s 499. Nevertheless, I note that it is doubtful whether the second appellant acted in good faith. Contrary to what the second appellant argues, I have found (at [54]–[57]) that he knew the phrase “present PAP leadership” would be construed as a reference to members of the Cabinet and “corruption at the highest echelons” would be construed as something which had occurred on the watch of members of the Cabinet due to their incompetence. Thus, the second appellant’s argument that he had no duty to make any effort to ascertain the truth of his allegations cannot stand.
- [71]
[71] The factors for ascertaining whether an accused person acted in good faith under the Exceptions to s 499 of the Penal Code are the nature of the imputation, the circumstances under which it was made, whether there was malice, whether any enquiry was made before making the imputation, and whether there were reasons to accept the accused’s story that due care and attention were taken and he or she was satisfied that the imputation was true: Harbans Singh Sidhu v Public Prosecutor [1971-1973] SLR(R) 610 at [11]. On the facts, there was nothing in the Article or the second appellant’s testimony which indicated that he had made any enquiry to satisfy himself that the imputation was true. Instead of being a considered account which was composed with due care and attention to the facts, the imputation appeared to be a broad attack on members of the Cabinet which stemmed from the second appellant’s own unhappiness with them and his personal conviction that their poor leadership was to blame for the various alleged failures. Hence, it cannot be said that the second appellant acted in good faith.
Whether the criminal defamation provisions were unconstitutional
The parties’ arguments on appeal
- [72]
[72] On appeal, the second appellant does not continue with his arguments at trial that the AG’s decision to prosecute him violated Art 12 of the Constitution. Thus, only the first appellant makes submissions relating to constitutional issues. The first appellant advances essentially the same arguments as he did in the proceedings below, chiefly that:
The decision
(1) Article 14(2)(a) applies to the criminal defamation provisions
- [73]
[73] Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of speech and expression in Singapore. Article 14(2)(a), however, provides for the type of restrictions which may be imposed on this right. The two provisions read as follows:
- [74]
[74] The first appellant’s argument is that since Art 14(2)(a) states that “Parliament may by law impose … such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient”, the relevant laws permitted under Art 14(2)(a) must have been introduced, debated, and enacted by Parliament. As pre-independence laws such as the criminal defamation provisions were not introduced, debated and enacted by Parliament as such, they were not imposed by Parliament and Parliament could not have considered them to be “necessary or expedient” for any of the purposes listed under Art 14(2)(a). The criminal defamation provisions are therefore not valid restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression falling within the scope of Art 14(2)(a).
- [75]
[75] The difficulty with this argument is that Art 14(2)(a) does not require that Parliament must have introduced, debated, and enacted such laws. Pre-independence laws which have been retained by Parliament may also be said to be “imposed” by Parliament, since their continued operation takes place only with Parliament’s approval. Indeed, Parliament is not excluded from assessing and considering laws which were enacted before independence. The text of Art 14(2)(a) does not stipulate that Parliament cannot consider such laws to be “necessary or expedient” for the purposes enumerated under Art 14(2)(a). Thus, the analysis for the constitutionality of pre-independence laws under Art 14 is no different from that for post-independence laws – ie, via the framework under Art 14(2)(a).
- [76]
[76] The criminal defamation provisions, despite being pre-independence laws, do satisfy the requirements of Art 14(2)(a). They have been continuously retained by Parliament as part of the body of Singapore criminal law throughout the numerous reviews and amendments of the Penal Code conducted since independence. Indeed, Parliament constantly reviews and updates the provisions within the Penal Code. Some provisions are amended, whilst new provisions are introduced and provisions which are no longer necessary are repealed. Thus, in the Second Reading of the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 2007, Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee emphasised the detailed review of the Penal Code which had been conducted then (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Reports (22 Oct 2007), vol 83 at col 2175):
(2) Proportionality analysis does not apply in Singapore constitutional law
(A) Proportionality analysis
- [80]
[80] The first appellant argues that since Art 14(2)(a) should not apply to pre-independence laws such as the criminal defamation provisions, proportionality analysis should be applied instead to determine if the provisions are constitutionally valid. Given the finding at [75] that Art 14(2)(a) is in fact applicable to pre-independence laws, it is not strictly necessary, on the first appellant’s case, to consider his submissions relating to proportionality analysis. However, since it could be argued that proportionality analysis should apply in spite of Art 14(2)(a), this issue will be examined.
- [81]
[81] The doctrine of proportionality analysis is a specific legal test used for determining whether governmental acts or laws are justified under limitation clauses in constitutional provisions. It has been described as comprising four components (see Aharon Barak, The nature and function of proportionality, in Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) (“Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations”) at p 131 and Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, Proportionality and Constitutional Governance, in Proportionality Balancing and Constitutional Governance: A Comparative and Global Approach (Oxford University Press, 2019) (“Proportionality Balancing and Constitutional Governance”) at p 35):
(a) First, the “proper purpose” test, which requires that the proposed limitation of a constitutional right serves a constitutionally authorised purpose.
(b) Second, the “rational connection” test, which requires a rational nexus to exist between the proposed limitation and the purpose pursued.
(c) Third, the “necessity” test, which requires that the limitation does not impair the constitutional right more than necessary for the achievement of the purpose pursued.
(d) Fourth, the “balancing” test (also known as “proportionality in the strict sense”), which requires the court to balance the benefits gained by fulfilling the pursued purpose against the impairment caused to the constitutional right. This balance must be determined by the court to be proportionate – ie, the benefits gained by the proposed limitation must justify the impairment to the right.
If a proposed limitation fails any of these four sub-tests, it will be constitutionally invalid under proportionality analysis.
(B) Lack of applicability to Singapore constitutional law
- [82]
[82] Proportionality analysis has been adopted, to varying degrees, in several jurisdictions around the world (see Vicki Jackson, “Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality” (2014) 124(8) Yale Law Journal 3094 at 3094). The doctrine is perhaps most prominently applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It has also been applied in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Canada (see Professors Stone Sweet and Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Constitutional Governance at pp 70–72).
- [83]
[83] However, the adoption of proportionality analysis in other jurisdictions does not determine its applicability in Singapore. The established position in Singapore is that proportionality analysis has never been part of our constitutional law: Chee Siok Chin and others v Minister for Home Affairs and another [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 (“Chee Siok Chin”) at [87].
(C) Proportionality analysis contradicts the separation of powers
- [84]
[84] Besides the forgoing difficulty, adoption of proportionality analysis would contradict the principle of separation of powers, which is well-established in Singapore constitutional law: Jolovan Wham at [27]. The separation of powers is inherent in our Constitution: Art 38 of the Constitution vests the legislative power of Singapore in the Legislature (comprising the President and Parliament); Art 23(1) vests the executive power in the President (and exercisable by the Cabinet or any Minister authorised by the Cabinet); and Art 93 vests the judicial power in the courts. Essentially, the Legislature is charged with making laws, the Executive with governing the country according to those laws, and the Judiciary with the responsibility for adjudicating individual cases by pronouncing on the meaning of the laws: Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General and another matter [2016] 1 SLR 779 (“Tan Seet Eng”) at [90].
- [86]
[86] Deference to the Legislature in the evaluation of the substantive merits of laws is evident in Singapore case law: see Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 AC 648 at 673–674; Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [49]; Lim Meng Suang at [82]. In Lim Meng Suang, concerning the former s 377A of the Penal Code, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA explained the importance of courts refraining from assuming the legislative function of reviewing the extra-legal merits of legislation. He observed that it would be a violation of the separation of powers for courts to engage in the determination of extra-legal considerations and matters of social policy (at [189]):
- [87]
[87] Thus, respect for the separation of powers generally precludes courts from engaging in reviews of the substantive merits of legislative acts, which would necessarily entail courts engaging in the determination of matters involving extra-legal polycentric considerations of policy, politics, and ethics: matters which are rightfully the province of the Legislature rather than the Judiciary.
- [88]
[88] The scrutiny befitting the courts’ role is defined by the enumerated rights and other provisions of the Constitution. Adopting a proportionality doctrine rewrites the Constitution, arrogating to the courts a limitation on the breadth of action of the Legislature that is not contemplated by the text of the Constitution. If the courts were to do so, they would be grafting a concept alien to the text. The true life of the text lies in its proper interpretation, not in the improper infusion of the subjective wishes of unelected officials, lawyers, or academics. If the constitutional framework is to be changed, there are proper mechanisms to be used; the courts cannot be invoked for that.
(3) The applicable approach under Art 14
- [89]
[89] The applicable approach under Art 14 to determine the validity of a restriction on the right to freedom of speech and expression was set out in Jolovan Wham and stems solely from the text of Art 14(2)(a). The three-step framework in Jolovan Wham at [29]–[32] (and as applied in The Online Citizen Pte Ltd v Attorney-General and another appeal and other matters [2021] 2 SLR 1358 at [55]) is as follows:
(a) First, the court must assess whether the legislation restricts the constitutional right under Art 14 in the first place;
(b) Second, if the legislation restricts the constitutional right, the court must determine whether Parliament considered the restriction to be “necessary or expedient” in the interests of one of the enumerated purposes under Art 14(2)(a). In making that assessment, the court may have regard to the relevant legislation, parliamentary material, contemporary speeches as well as documents to determine whether Parliament had considered it “necessary or expedient” to restrict the constitutional right in question, or more generally to assess the purposes for which Parliament passed the relevant legislation. It is not necessary for Parliament to have expressly referred to the restriction of the relevant constitutional right: the court may infer from the general purposes for which Parliament passed the relevant legislation that it had considered it “necessary or expedient” to restrict the constitutional right in question.
(c) Third, the court must analyse whether, objectively, the restriction of the constitutional right falls within any of the enumerated purposes under Art 14(2)(a). This must be established by showing a nexus between the purpose of the restriction and one of the enumerated purposes.
- [90]
[90] The Court of Appeal in Jolovan Wham further elaborated at [33] that “[i]n the final analysis, it is imperative to appreciate that a balance must be found between the competing interests at stake”. The first appellant argues that the requirement of a “balance” here resembles the balancing exercise undertaken in proportionality analysis. However, the “balance” referred to in Jolovan Wham appears to be quite different from the balancing exercise in proportionality analysis. The Court of Appeal in Jolovan Wham, in holding that “a balance must be found between the competing interests at stake”, followed that statement by noting that “the idea of achieving a balance between a constitutional right and a constitutionally permitted derogation is not novel to our law” [emphasis added]. It went on to cite the cases of Chee Siok Chin at [2] and Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 373 (“Ting Choon Meng”) at [120] as support for the presence of this idea in Singapore law.
(4) The criminal defamation provisions are constitutionally valid under Art 14(2)(a)
Conclusion on the criminal defamation charges
- [93]
[93] For the reasons above, the convictions of the two appellants on the criminal defamation charges were upheld, though on different reasoning from that of the court below. This difference in reasoning did not call for the amendment of the charges or the calling of new defences; it was only in relation as to how the elements were made out on the facts found by the court. The charges against the two appellants did not have to and did not actually go into how the defamatory effect was made out. Taking the charge against the first appellant as an example, it read:
The charges against the two appellants can stand unaltered even on the finding of this court that the defamatory effect was not that there was corruption within the Cabinet but that the Cabinet had allowed such corruption to arise at the highest echelons external to itself.
The CMA charge
The parties’ cases below
- [94]
[94] Before the Judge below, the Prosecution submitted that the second appellant had used Mr Sim’s Yahoo Account without authority for the purpose of sending out the Email on 4 September 2018.
- [95]
[95] The Prosecution’s characterisation of the relevant events was as follows:
(a) Mr Sim created the Yahoo Account prior to meeting the second appellant, having met him sometime in 2005 to 2006. Sometime between 2006 to 2008, he gave the second appellant the account and password details for the Yahoo Account as he needed the second appellant’s help to craft emails relating to his bankruptcy matter. He did this as he was bad with computers, writing emails, and writing in English. The second appellant subsequently helped Mr Sim with writing emails to the relevant departments for his bankruptcy, Housing Development Board (“HDB”) and traffic matters. Mr Sim essentially left it to the second appellant to draft and send out these emails.
(b) During the period when the second appellant was using the Yahoo Account to send emails on Mr Sim’s behalf, Mr Sim came to realise that certain other emails had also been sent out from the Yahoo Account without his knowledge. Mr Sim spoke to the second appellant on a few occasions and made it clear to him that he should not use Mr Sim’s personal accounts to send emails to other addressees without his permission. However, Mr Sim did not change the password to his Yahoo Account as he still needed the second appellant’s help to craft emails relating to the bankruptcy, HDB and traffic matters on his behalf and also because he trusted the second appellant as a friend.
(c) Sometime in 2015 to 2016, Mr Sim realised that he could not access the Yahoo Account. He asked the second appellant for the password, but he claimed not to have it either. Mr Sim only managed to regain access to his Yahoo Account on 21 December 2018 with the assistance of the police, using another account, willysim71@gmail.com (“the Gmail Account”), which was linked to the Yahoo Account. Prior to that, he did not think of using the Gmail Account to change the password to the Yahoo Account.
(d) Mr Sim had not authorised the second appellant to use the Yahoo Account to send the Email, and he only found out that the second appellant had done so when the police raided Mr Sim’s house in connection with the Email.
- [96]
[96] In contrast, the second appellant argued that Mr Sim had given him blanket permission to use the Yahoo Account for his purposes. The second appellant’s narrative was that Mr Sim did not want the Yahoo Account anymore and he had told Mr Sim that he would be using the account for writing articles. He claimed that Mr Sim never told him to stop writing articles using the Yahoo Account. The second appellant further argued that this narrative was largely consistent with his statements, ie, that he had helped Mr Sim to write appeals relating to summonses, arrears and traffic offences; that Mr Sim had never objected to him using the Yahoo Account for other purposes; and that Mr Sim had even given him feedback regarding his usage of the Yahoo Account for other purposes.
- [97]
[97] The second appellant also contended that Mr Sim never took active steps to recover his account even after finding out that the second appellant had allegedly sent emails without his permission. He argued that Mr Sim could have recovered his account if he genuinely wanted to, with the corollary being that Mr Sim had given consent for him to access the Yahoo Account for all purposes.
The decision below
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