General Division of the High Court · Decided 9 May 2023
Teo Chu Ha (alias Henry Teo) v Public Prosecutor and other appeals
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 130 · Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9011 of 2021/01
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Complex corruption cases often involve transnational elements, necessitating the co-operation of governments and investigative agencies. This case, involving gratification of more than S$2 million, is no exception. Moneys paid to secure contracts for Chinese companies to service a Singaporean company operating in China were funnelled into Singapore, eventually being used to purchase Singaporean property. This is an opportunity to consider some of the salient features arising from such offences, such as the scope of jurisdiction of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”), evidentiary issues under the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“EA”) and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (Cap 190A, 2001 Rev Ed) (“MACMA”), the scope of s 44(1) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A, 2000 Rev Ed) (“CDSA”) , as well as the applicability of the decision in Goh Ngak Eng v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGHC 254 (“Goh Ngak Eng”) to offences under s 5 of the PCA.
- [2]
[2] Mr Teo Chu Ha @ Henry Teo (“Henry”) and Ms Judy Teo Suya Bik (“Judy”) were each convicted, after trial, of 50 charges under s 5(a)(i) read with s 29(a) of the PCA (“PCA Charges”) and one charge under s 44(1)(a), punishable under s 44(5)(a) of the CDSA, read with s 109 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) (“CDSA Charge”) (collectively, “Charges”).
Background facts
Undisputed facts
- [5]
[5] Henry and Judy are siblings. They were 69 and 66 years of age respectively when the Charges were proffered against them and 72 and 68 years old when they were sentenced by the DJ.
- [6]
[6] Judy was based in Shanghai between 2002 and 2012. During this time, she was employed by Twin Palms Sdn Bhd (“Twin Palms”), a company owned by her ex-boyfriend Mr Ong Eng Kiow (“Joseph”). In this capacity, Judy purportedly provided consultation and interpretation services to various Chinese companies.
- [7]
[7] Henry joined Seagate Technology International (“Seagate”) in 2000 and held the role of Senior Director of Logistics. He was additionally a member of the Seagate committee which oversaw two tenders for the provision of transportation services to ferry Seagate’s goods in China in 2006 and 2009 (“the 2006 Tender” and “the 2009 Tender” respectively).
- [8]
[8] Three trucking routes were the subject of the 2006 Tender. Broadly, the first route (“Group 1 Route”) was awarded to Shanghai Long-Distance Transportation Co (“SLT”) and China Shipping Air Cargo Co Ltd. The second route (“Group 2 Route”) was awarded to SLT and the third (“Group 3 Route”), to Feili International Transport Co Ltd (“Feili”).
- [9]
[9] The award of these three routes was effected via three contracts dated 1 December 2006, viz, the Seagate Technology/Shanghai Long-Distance Transportation Co Logistics Services Provider Agreement, the Maxtor Technology (Suzhou) Co Ltd/Shanghai Long-Distance Transportation Co Logistics Services Provider Agreement and the Seagate Technology/Feili International Transport Co Ltd Logistics Services Provider Agreement (“the 2006 Tender Contracts”). The 2006 Tender Contracts spanned 24 months with the option of a one-year extension. They were extended for one year on 1 December 2008 and an additional two months on 1 December 2009.
- [10]
[10] Next, in September 2009, Seagate held the 2009 Tender. This similarly involved the provision of transportation services for three trucking routes. One route was awarded to SLT (“Group B Route”) while the remaining two were awarded to Feili (“Group A and C Routes”). Again, Seagate entered into individual contracts with SLT and Feili to give effect to the results of the 2009 Tender (“the 2009 Tender Contracts”). The 2009 Tender Contracts were effective between 1 February 2010 and 31 January 2013 but were terminated sometime in 2012 when Henry was investigated for offences under the PCA.
- [11]
[11] Between April 2007 and November 2010, SLT and Feili paid moneys into a Bank of China (“BOC”) bank account that belonged to Joseph (“Joseph’s BOC Account”). One Gu Meihua made 25 payments aggregating RMB1,877,135 to Joseph’s BOC Account between 6 April 2007 and 20 October 2009 on behalf of SLT while one Gu Honghua made 25 payments aggregating RMB9,491,890.44 to Joseph’s BOC Account between 21 November 2008 and 19 November 2010 on behalf of Feili. A breakdown of these 50 payments is set out in Annex A.
- [12]
[12] SLT and Feili paid these moneys into Joseph’s BOC Account pursuant to agreements they individually signed with Twin Palms in October 2006 (“the Agreements”). The Agreements broadly stipulated that in consideration of Joseph assisting SLT and Feili to secure contracts for the provision of trucking services with Seagate, SLT and Feili would pay Twin Palms 10% of the invoice value of these trucking services. Henry drafted the Agreements while Judy helped to secure the signatures of SLT and Feili’s representatives.
The Prosecution’s case
- [13]
[13] The Prosecution’s case was that Henry and Judy conspired to corruptly enrich themselves via the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts. Pursuant to this conspiracy, Henry provided Judy with Seagate’s confidential information that he acquired by virtue of his positions as Senior Director of Logistics and member of the 2006 and 2009 Tender committees. Judy in turn utilised this information to assist SLT and Feili to successfully secure the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts.
- [14]
[14] Following from the above, the Agreements were shams and concealed the true state of affairs between Henry and Judy on one hand and SLT and Feili on the other. The moneys SLT and Feili transferred to Joseph’s BOC Account were not payments for Joseph helping SLT and Feili secure the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts but bribes for the confidential information Judy provided to SLT and Feili.
- [15]
[15] Henry and Judy used Joseph as a conduit for Judy to receive bribes from SLT and Feili. At all material times, Judy had control of Joseph’s BOC Account. She was able to withdraw moneys from Joseph’s BOC Account using the corresponding ATM card and Joseph’s passbook. In this manner, Judy transferred moneys from Joseph’s BOC Account into her own BOC account (“Judy’s BOC Account”).
- [16]
[16] Separately, sometime on or before July 2009, Henry conspired with Judy to withdraw S$703,480 (which constituted bribe moneys) from Judy’s BOC Account to fund the purchase of a condominium unit in Singapore (“the Property”). Henry utilised Judy’s ATM card to withdraw the said sum from Judy’s BOC Account and deposited these moneys into his personal accounts between July 2009 and September 2010. The Property was purchased in Judy’s name in 2012. This formed the subject matter of the CDSA Charge.
- [17]
[17] The Prosecution’s case largely rested on the following:
(a) Four investigative statements recorded from Henry under s 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“1985 CPC”) on 1 December 2010 at about 4.20pm (“P38”), 2 December 2010 at about 11.54am (“P39”), 6 December 2010 at about 7.04pm (“P44”) and 9 December 2010 at about 3.00pm (“P45”).
(b) Three investigative statements recorded from Henry under s 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“2012 CPC”) on 27 April 2015 at about 2.15pm (“P43”), 17 April 2015 at about 2.40pm (“P42”) and 2 November 2016 at about 10.15am (“P102”).
(c) Four investigative statements recorded from Judy under s 22 of the 2012 CPC on 5 January 2011 at about 3.10pm (“P47”), 12 January 2011 at about 3.18pm (“P48”), 24 August 2016 at about 10.00am (“P100”) and 24 August 2016 at about 3.45pm (“P101”).
(d) Emails Henry and Judy exchanged between 29 August 2005 and 17 September 2006 (“the Emails”).
(e) Bank statements from the BOC, Shanghai Branch (“BOC Statements”).
(f) Statements recorded from Hu Zhiquan (“Hu”) and Jiang Hong (“Jiang”), representatives of SLT, by Shanghai Zhabei District People’s Procuratorate (“SLT Statements”).
The Defence
- [18]
[18] The Defence contended that the DJ had no jurisdiction to try the PCA Charges in so far as Henry’s acts of abetment as well as Judy’s receipt of the moneys subject of the PCA Charges occurred outside Singapore. It followed that the sum subject of the CDSA Charge was not “benefits of criminal conduct” within the meaning of s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA and the CDSA Charge was similarly not made out.
- [19]
[19] Additionally, the Defence submitted that: (a) P38 was involuntarily provided and recorded under oppressive circumstances; (b) the affidavits of Joseph and Feili’s employee, Chen Ming-Chieh Simon (“Simon”) – two persons who did not testify at the trial – ought to be admitted under s 32(1)(j) of the EA; and (c) the documents the Prosecution obtained pursuant to a request made under the MACMA, namely the BOC Statements and the SLT Statements, were inadmissible as they had not been authenticated under ss 8(3) and 42(3) of the MACMA or alternatively, should be excluded under s 32(3) of the EA.
- [20]
[20] Once the evidential matrix was properly ascertained, the Defence submitted that the information Henry conveyed to Judy could not be said to be confidential. Likewise, there was no conspiracy between Henry and Judy to corruptly receive gratification from SLT and Feili; any moneys SLT and Feili paid to Joseph’s BOC Account constituted remuneration for Twin Palms referring businesses to SLT and Feili. Thus, the sum subject of the CDSA Charge was not bribe moneys nor Judy’s benefits from her criminal conduct. Rather, they stemmed from the monthly salary Judy received from Twin Palms and her own savings.
- [21]
[21] In support of the aforesaid, the Defence, inter alia, pointed to the fact that Henry and Judy discussed their plans to set up a company providing trucking services in China in the Emails before the 2006 Tender was first mooted in August 2006, Henry did not have the authority to unilaterally determine the award of the 2006 and 2009 Tenders, and the moneys paid into Joseph’s BOC Account did not correspond to 10% of the value of services SLT and Feili provided Seagate.
- [22]
[22] The Defence further sought to rely on Henry and Judy’s cautioned statements recorded under s 23 of the 2012 CPC. Two cautioned statements were recorded from Henry on 27 June 2017 at 10.30am (“D12”) and 12.10pm (“D13”) respectively. Similarly, Judy provided two cautioned statements on 27 June 2017 at 10.53am (“D18”) and 12.07pm (“D19”).
The DJ’s decision
- [23]
[23] The DJ’s full grounds of decision are set out in Public Prosecutor v Teo Chu Ha @ Henry Teo and another [2021] SGDC 196.
Conviction
- [24]
[24] Preliminarily, the DJ held that the District Court had jurisdiction to try the PCA and CDSA Charges. Henry sent confidential information belonging to Seagate to Judy and withdrew the moneys subject of the CDSA Charge while he was in Singapore. Even if Henry had performed these acts outside Singapore, s 37(1) of the PCA provided that the provisions of the PCA had extra-territorial application over Singaporean citizens. In this vein, there was no basis to interpret s 37(1) of the PCA as a provision conditioned by s 108B of the Penal Code, such that any conduct abetted must be committed in Singapore. There is nothing in the PCA that suggested s 37(1) of the PCA should be so interpreted and the Defence’s proposed interpretation would neuter the legislative intent animating s 37(1) of the PCA.
- [25]
[25] The DJ next found that Henry provided P38 voluntarily without any threat, inducement or promise and in the absence of oppressive circumstances. In so far as neither Henry nor Judy challenged this finding on appeal, it suffices to note that the DJ placed emphasis on the fact that Henry did not raise any complaints during the recording of the statement, made a significant number of amendments that were inconsistent with his claim to have been unable to concentrate while providing the statement, lied in asserting that Sathiabalan s/o M Veerapillai (“Sathia”) acted aggressively towards him during the recording of P38 given that Sathia was not even present during this time, and chose not to make any amendments to the statement when he was accorded the opportunity to do so the following day.
- [26]
[26] In relation to the BOC Statements, the DJ held that they were admissible under s 8(3) of the MACMA read with s 32(1)(b)(iv) of the EA. These documents were obtained via a formal inter-State request made under the MACMA, were duly authenticated and formed part of the records of a business that was kept by the BOC. Whilst the BOC Statements disclosed both missing and illegible pages, this did not justify exclusion under s 32(3) of the EA. At best, the missing and unreadable pages affected the evidential weight to be placed on the documents.
- [27]
[27] The DJ likewise found that the SLT Statements were admissible under s 8(3) of the MLA read with s 32(1)(j)(iii) of the EA. He accepted that Hu and Jiang were outside Singapore and officers from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) had taken all reasonable steps to procure their attendance at trial. Pertinently, CPIB officers had sought the assistance of the Chinese authorities to contact Hu and Jiang and also attempted to directly contact Hu and Jiang via phone and email to no avail.
- [28]
[28] Relatedly, the DJ held that Joseph’s affidavit was admissible under s 32(1)(j)(iii), but not ss 32(1)(j)(i) or 32(1)(j)(iv) of the EA. He found that Joseph was outside Singapore and the Defence had shown it had taken all reasonable steps to persuade Joseph to attend the trial. These included Judy and the Defence counsel’s attempts to contact Joseph via phone and email respectively. In the latter regard, Ong had replied to these emails and indicated that he was unable to testify at the trial. Nothing in this appeal turns on the DJ’s finding that Joseph’s affidavit was inadmissible under ss 32(1)(j)(i) or 32(1)(j)(iv) of the EA.
- [29]
[29] Contrastingly, the DJ declined to admit Simon’s affidavit into evidence under ss 32(1)(j)(iii) and 32(1)(j)(iv) of the EA. Whilst Simon was outside Singapore, the Defence had failed to demonstrate that it was not practicable to secure his attendance at the trial. Judy had never informed Simon of the trial dates nor served him a subpoena. The Defence had also failed to prove that Simon was a competent but non-compellable witness within the meaning of s 32(1)(j)(iv) of the EA. In any event, the DJ considered that Simon deliberately avoided coming to Singapore and would have excluded his affidavit under s 32(3) of the EA.
- [30]
[30] Turning to the PCA Charges, the DJ identified the following factual and legal issues for his determination:
(a) Whether there was a conspiracy between Henry and Judy for Judy to corruptly receive gratification from SLT and Feili.
(b) Whether the information Henry sent to Judy constituted confidential information.
(c) Whether Judy provided SLT and Feili with confidential information.
(d) Whether the moneys SLT and Feili paid to Joseph’s BOC Account were for legitimate business services rendered by Twin Palms.
(e) Whether Judy received gratification as a reward for assisting SLT and Feili secure the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts through the provision of confidential information.
(f) Whether the elements of the PCA Charges, including whether there was an objectively corrupt element and guilty knowledge, were established.
- [31]
[31] He found that the Prosecution had proved all the elements of the PCA Charges beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted Henry and Judy on the PCA Charges:
(a) To begin, the conspiracy between Henry and Judy for Judy to corruptly receive gratification from SLT and Feili was supported by the Emails, P38, P47 and P48. The Emails evinced that Henry and Judy initially planned to set up a company to obtain business from Seagate (and for Judy to represent and conceal Henry’s interest in the company) but later discussed using an existing company and a General Sales Agent to obtain commissions for any business deals between Seagate and third parties they successfully facilitated. As for P38, P47 and P48, these illustrated, inter alia, that Henry suggested to Judy that they should enter a General Sales Agreement (“GSA”) with SLT and Feili to ensure that Henry and Judy would receive 10% of the value of contracts SLT and Feili successfully entered into with Seagate.
(b) The information Henry sent to Judy, which included the prices Seagate paid its suppliers for various trucking routes, constituted confidential information. This was supported by the testimony of Seagate’s employees and the Emails in which Henry informed Judy that it was imperative for her to keep said information confidential.
(c) That Judy in turn conveyed the confidential information to SLT and Feili was evinced by emails Judy sent to Simon and Joseph, her admissions in P101 and the fact that the information SLT and Feili eventually submitted to Seagate in connection with the 2006 and 2009 Tenders mirrored the information Henry provided to Judy.
(d) Whilst Henry and Judy contended that the moneys subject of the Charges were for legitimate business services rendered by Twin Palms, this flew in the face of emails illustrating that Henry and Judy intended for Twin Palms to be a mere conduit in their corrupt scheme, Henry’s admission in P38 that he had to use proxies to prevent SLT, Feili and Seagate from discovering that he was helping SLT and Feili clinch trucking contracts with Seagate behind the scenes, and that the Defence provided no explanation for why Henry drafted the GSA between Twin Palms and Feili or why the moneys were paid into Joseph’s BOC Account. The DJ thus found that SLT and Feili paid the moneys subject of the Charges in consideration of the confidential information Judy provided them.
(e) Going one step further, the DJ was satisfied that the moneys SLT and Feili paid into Joseph’s BOC Account were in substance paid to Judy (in contradistinction to Joseph and Twin Palms). Notably, Hu and Jiang both stated that the commissions were paid to Judy and Judy herself admitted that she had control over Joseph’s BOC Account and could withdraw the moneys within as she desired.
(f) It followed that the moneys paid to Judy via Joseph’s BOC Account was Judy’s reward for assisting SLT and Feili successfully secure the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts. Judy herself acknowledged the quid pro quo nature of the arrangement in P100.
(g) Considering Henry and Judy’s intentions underlying their receipt of the moneys from SLT and Feili, the transactions were tainted with an objectively corrupt element. Indeed, given that both individuals knew that it was wrong for Henry to disclose Seagate’s confidential information to Judy to assist SLT and Feili secure the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts and thus went to great lengths to conceal Henry’s involvement in Judy’s dealings with SLT and Feili, Henry and Judy knew that what they did was corrupt by ordinary and objective standards.
- [32]
[32] With regard to the CDSA Charge, this necessitated consideration of the following issues:
(a) Whether the scope of ss 44(1)(a) and 44(5)(a) of the CDSA is limited to secondary offenders and whether Henry and Judy constitute primary or secondary offenders.
(b) Whether Henry and Judy conspired for Judy to corruptly receive gratification for herself.
(c) Whether the moneys Henry withdrew from Judy’s BOC Account represented benefits of criminal conduct.
(d) Whether Henry and Judy knew that Judy was a person who engaged in criminal conduct and that their arrangement would facilitate the control of Judy’s benefits of criminal conduct.
- [33]
[33] The DJ was similarly satisfied that the Prosecution had proved all the elements of the CDSA Charge beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) He rejected the Defence’s contention that the logic of Yap Chen Hsiang Osborn v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 319 (“Osborn Yap”) – namely that s 47(1) of the CDSA did not cover a secondary offender who does not himself commit the offence from which the proceeds were originally derived but launders the proceeds of another person’s crime – applied with equal force to s 44 of the CDSA such that the latter provision only governed secondary offenders. In the DJ’s view, s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA “contemplates an arrangement between a primary offender and a secondary offender”. Given that the gratifications were received by Judy, Judy was a primary offender and Henry was a secondary offender in respect of the CDSA Charge.
(b) Henry and Judy conspired to be in an arrangement which facilitated the control of Judy’s benefits of criminal conduct on behalf of Judy. Notably, the PCA Charges against Judy had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(c) The moneys Henry withdrew from Judy’s BOC Account represented benefits of criminal conduct. In P100, Judy admitted that she would transfer the moneys SLT and Feili deposited into Joseph’s BOC Account to Judy’s BOC Account. Whilst she claimed that some of the moneys which Henry withdrew from Judy’s BOC Account did not stem from SLT or Feili, she conceded that this sum of moneys “should not be very huge”.
(d) Finally, Henry and Judy knew that Judy was a person who engaged in criminal conduct and their arrangement would facilitate the control of Judy’s benefits of criminal conduct. Henry and Judy conspired for Judy to corruptly receive gratification from SLT and Feili and did not dispute that the purpose of Henry withdrawing the moneys from Judy’s BOC Account was to purchase the Property.
Sentence
- [34]
[34] Beginning with the PCA Charges, the DJ found that six aggravating factors common to both Henry and Judy were disclosed on the facts, namely, that parties: (a) received a significant amount of gratification (see [11] above); (b) engaged in a long period of offending; (c) exhibited a high degree of planning and premeditation; (d) committed transnational offences; (e) seriously undermined Seagate’s procurement process; and (f) committed the offences for personal gain.
- [35]
[35] He considered that there were two additional aggravating factors unique to Henry. Henry had recent antecedents for offences under s 6(a) of the PCA and abused his position as Senior Director of Logistics and member of the 2006 and 2009 Tender Committees to obtain and disclose confidential information belonging to Seagate. Thus, he found that Henry ought to receive a higher sentence.
- [36]
[36] While the Defence submitted that the delay in prosecuting Henry and Judy and the advanced ages of the accused persons militated in favour of a non-custodial or a short custodial sentence, the DJ held that this was, at best, a mitigating factor. The Prosecution had demonstrated how investigations against Henry and Judy, which involved the Mutual Legal Assistance process, were ongoing since 2010.
- [37]
[37] That said, the DJ declined to follow the Prosecution’s proposed sentencing bands, viz, imprisonment terms of one to four months, five to seven months, ten to 12 months and upwards of 12 months for gratification amounts of less than S$10,000, between S$10,000 and S$30,000, between S$50,000 and S$80,000 and above S$90,000 respectively. The Prosecution did not account for the gaps (for bribes between S$30,000 and S$50,000 and between S$80,000 and S$90,000) in its proposed sentencing bands and did not provide reasons for departing from these sentencing bands in calibrating the appropriate sentence to be imposed on Henry and Judy.
- [38]
[38] Having regard to the amount of gratification received, the DJ considered that the sentencing ranges for the PCA Charges should be as follows:
- [39]
[39] Further accounting for the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sentencing precedents, the DJ imposed sentences of between one and ten months’ imprisonment on Henry and Judy in respect of the PCA Charges. A breakdown of these sentences is set out at Annex B.
- [40]
[40] With regard to the CDSA Charge, the DJ considered that the sentencing framework for offences under s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA involving the laundering of cash proceeds of offences committed in Singapore set out in Huang Ying-Chun v Public Prosecutor [2019] 3 SLR 606 (“Huang Ying-Chun”) was equally applicable to the present case. As the present case involved a significant sum of S$703,480, a transnational element, a serious predicate offence of corruption, accused persons who had actual knowledge of the predicate offences and the CDSA offence was committed over a year, the DJ considered that the CDSA offence involved moderate harm and low to medium culpability, with an indicative sentence of between ten and 60 months’ imprisonment and a starting point of 25 months’ imprisonment. Again, accounting for the delay in prosecution and the advanced ages of the accused persons, he imposed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment in respect of the CDSA Charge on Henry and Judy.
Issues to be determined on appeal
- [43]
[43] Parties raise a litany of issues on appeal. These can be distilled into the following:
(a) Whether the DJ had jurisdiction to try the PCA and CDSA Charges.
(b) Whether the Charges were legally defective. Subsumed within this inquiry is whether the Prosecution provided sufficient particulars to the appellants in the PCA Charges and whether the appellants fell within the legal ambit of the CDSA Charge.
(c) Whether the DJ’s decision to convict Henry and Judy on the PCA Charges is against the weight of the evidence. This necessitates consideration of, inter alia, whether the DJ erred in admitting the BOC Statements into evidence.
(d) Whether the DJ’s decision to convict Henry and Judy on the CDSA Charge is against the weight of the evidence.
(e) Whether the sentences imposed by the DJ in respect of the CDSA and PCA Charges are manifestly inadequate or manifestly excessive.
- [44]
[44] I set out the parties’ submissions where appropriate and deal with each issue in turn, bearing in mind that the appellate court is not to reassess the evidence as the trial judge would, but is, in an appeal against conviction, restricted to considering whether: (a) the judge’s assessment of witness credibility is plainly wrong or against the weight of evidence; (b) the judge’s verdict is wrong in law and therefore unreasonable; and (c) the judge’s decision is inconsistent with the material objective evidence on record (Pram Nair v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 1015 at [55]).
- [45]
[45] Similarly, in an appeal against sentence, an appellate court will be slow to disturb a sentence imposed except where it is satisfied that: (a) the trial judge erred with respect to the proper factual basis for sentencing; (b) the trial judge failed to appreciate the material before him; (c) the sentence was wrong in principle; or (d) the sentence was manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate (Public Prosecutor v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 at [12]).
Whether the DJ had jurisdiction to try the PCA and CDSA Charges
- [46]
[46] I begin with the question of whether the DJ had jurisdiction to try Henry and Judy, who are both Singaporean citizens, on the PCA and CDSA Charges.
- [47]
[47] The thrust of the appellants’ submission is that s 37(1) of the PCA has to be read in conjunction with, and subject to, ss 108A and 108B of the Penal Code such that the court has no jurisdiction over an individual who abets “from outside Singapore, principal conduct that also took place outside Singapore”. For ease of reference, I set out the relevant provisions below:
- [48]
[48] I am unable to accept this submission. First of all, there is no evidence that Henry and Judy conceived the conspiracy subject of the PCA Charges entirely outside Singapore. This is essentially the end of the matter as, even on the appellants’ case, the court has jurisdiction over an individual who abets in Singapore, an offence under the PCA committed outside Singapore. Nevertheless, I briefly explain why I consider there to be no basis to interpret s 37(1) of the PCA as a provision constrained by ss 108A and 108B of the Penal Code.
- [49]
[49] It is not disputed that s 29 of the PCA deems a person who abets, within the meaning of the Penal Code, the commission of an offence under the PCA, to have committed the offence. Section 107 of the Penal Code in turn defines the acts (or omissions) that constitute an abetment and should be read with ss 108A and 108B of the Penal Code which provide that a person abets an offence within the meaning of the Penal Code where he abets, in Singapore, an offence outside Singapore or, outside Singapore, an offence in Singapore. The justification for ss 108A and 108B of the Penal Code – which carve out specific exceptions to Singapore’s strict territorial approach for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction – is clear. These provisions seek to address the internationalisation of crime and the enforcement lacuna that arises when one excludes jurisdiction on the basis that criminal acts occurred partly outside Singapore (see Wong Yuh Lan v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2012] 4 SLR 845 at [24]–[25]; Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2184).
- [50]
[50] But the above did not therefore mean that Parliament could not or did not go further in providing for extra-territorial jurisdiction under the PCA where acts of abetment and the predicate offence both occur outside Singapore. On the contrary, the plain language of s 37(1) of the PCA, when read in context of the legislative purpose of the statute, points to Parliament intending to do so via the provision. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 (“Taw Cheng Kong”), “the language of s 37(1) of the PCA is very wide, and the section is capable of capturing all corrupt acts by Singapore citizens outside Singapore, irrespective of whether such corrupt acts have consequences within the borders of Singapore or not” (at [64]). This “all-encompassing ambit” of s 37(1) of the PCA furthers the legislative object of the PCA, namely, the control and suppression of corruption, including extra-territorial corruption (see Taw Cheng Kong at [63] and [75]; Tan Seng Kee v Attorney-General and other appeals [2022] 1 SLR 1347 at [323]).
- [51]
[51] In relation to the CDSA Charge, Henry depositing the moneys into his bank accounts in Singapore pursuant to the appellants’ conspiracy that are the subject of the charges provides sufficient basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the appellants. Though the following issue is academic in light of this finding, I state, for completeness, that I do not accept the appellants’ contention that the court’s jurisdiction to try them on the CDSA Charge stands and falls with its jurisdiction to try the PCA Charges. Even assuming that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the PCA Charges, it enjoyed jurisdiction over the appellants in respect of the CDSA Charge. Criminal conduct for the purpose of s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA extends to doing or being concerned in any act constituting a foreign serious offence.
Whether the Charges were legally defective
- [52]
[52] The appellants next contend that the PCA Charges and the CDSA Charge are legally defective, albeit for different reasons.
Whether the PCA Charges disclosed sufficient particulars
- [53]
[53] The PCA Charges are purportedly defective because it is unclear which of Seagate’s corporate entities employed Henry and whether the information Henry obtained originated from Seagate Singapore International Pte Ltd or Seagate’s entities in Suzhou (“Seagate Suzhou”) or Wuxi (“Seagate Wuxi”). Further, the PCA Charges erroneously state that SLT and Feili entered the 2006 and 2009 Contracts with Seagate when the counterparties to the contracts were Seagate Suzhou and Seagate Wuxi.
- [54]
[54] It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that an accused person must know what he is charged with (Viswanathan Ramachandran v Public Prosecutor [2003] 3 SLR(R) 435 at [24]). The charge must contain details of the time and place of the alleged offence and the person, if any, against whom or the thing, if any, in respect of which it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of what he is charged with (see s 159(1) of the 1985 CPC; s 124(1) of the 2012 CPC; Public Prosecutor v BZT [2022] SGHC 91 at [229]).
- [55]
[55] I reproduce one of the PCA Charges for illustrative purposes:
- [56]
[56] Read carefully, I do not consider the PCA Charges to be legally defective. The PCA Charges clearly aver that Henry provided Judy confidential information he obtained by virtue of his position as a Senior Director of Logistics of Seagate, in contradistinction to Seagate Suzhou or Seagate Wuxi. There is, in fact, no mention of the latter two entities in any of the PCA Charges.
- [57]
[57] Next, whether the information Henry conveyed to Judy was the property of or originated from Seagate, Seagate Suzhou or Seagate Wuxi is immaterial and need not have been specified in the PCA Charges. Bearing in mind the elements of an offence under s 5(a)(i) read with s 29(a) of the PCA (see [93]–[95] below), and that a charge should apprise an accused person of the case he has to meet, what is important, and intimated by the PCA Charges, is that Henry provided confidential information in Seagate’s possession to Judy, Judy then conveyed this information to SLT or Feili, and the information assisted SLT or Feili in securing the 2006 or 2009 Tender Contracts. This is also given Seagate’s position that confidential information encompasses information provided by third parties, so long as it was given to Seagate in confidence. As I go on to explain, Henry and Judy themselves regarded such information to be confidential (see [106] and [115] below).
- [58]
[58] Finally, I disagree with the appellants that the PCA Charges incorrectly stated that the counterparty to the 2006 and 2009 Contracts was Seagate, when the contracting parties are, in fact, Seagate Suzhou or Seagate Wuxi. The documentary evidence shows that Seagate is the contractual party to the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts.
Whether the appellants fall within the legal ambit of the CDSA Charge
- [59]
[59] As for the CDSA Charge, the appellants submit that the CDSA Charge is not made out as a matter of law because s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA can only meaningfully apply to secondary offenders (ie, persons who do not commit the offence from which the proceeds were originally derived but launder the proceeds of another person’s crime). However, Henry and Judy were both primary offenders or persons who laundered the benefits of their own criminal conduct. This is purportedly supported by the decision in Osborn Yap and the fact that s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA discloses the same mens rea – knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe – as s 47(1) of the CDSA.
- [60]
[60] On the other hand, the Prosecution submits that there “should be no restrictions as to whether s 44 [of the] CDSA applies only to primary or secondary offenders”. It points to the structure and language of s 44 of the CDSA. Section 44 of the CDSA does not set out “separate provisions for offenders who launder their own benefits of criminal conduct and those who launder another person’s benefits” and is “worded very differently from s 47” of the CDSA.
- [61]
[61] The purposive interpretation of a legislative provision involves three steps (Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37]–[53]):
(a) First, the court should ascertain possible interpretations of the provision, having regard to the text of the provision as well as the context of the provision within the written law as a whole. This is done by determining the ordinary meaning of the words and could be aided by rules and canons of statutory construction.
(b) Second, the court should ascertain the legislative purpose of the statute. Legislative purpose should ordinarily be gleaned from the text itself. Extraneous material may be considered in the situations set out under s 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed).
(c) Third, the court should compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purpose of the statute. An interpretation which furthered the purpose of the written text was to be preferred to one which did not.
- [62]
[62] Applying these principles, I hold that where individual B’s benefits of criminal conduct are at issue, and individuals A and B enter into an arrangement that goes towards the purpose(s) set out in either s 44(1)(a) or s 44(1)(b) of the CDSA, s 44(1) of the CDSA can only apply to individual A (and not individual B). That said, in so far as the CDSA Charges proffered against Henry and Judy are read with s 109 of the Penal Code, ie, they aver that Henry and Judy conspired for Henry to assist Judy to retain her benefits from criminal conduct, they are legally unobjectionable.
- [63]
[63] I reproduce s 44(1) of the CDSA below:
- [64]
[64] The text of the provision is significant. To begin, the header of s 44(1) of the CDSA, viz, “[a]ssisting another to retain benefits from criminal conduct” intimates that the provision proscribes conduct on the part of individual A which is facilitative of individual B retaining benefits from criminal conduct attributable to individual B. In particular, the word “retain” implies that the benefits from criminal conduct subject of the charge are ascribable to individual B at the point individual A enters into or is otherwise concerned in the arrangement. Consistent with this, ss 44(1)(a) and 44(1)(b) both explicitly link the benefits of criminal conduct to individual B by referring to these benefits as “that other person’s”. In the scenario posited at [62] above, it would do violence to the language of the statute if individual B were charged under s 44(1) of the CDSA; the “benefits of criminal conduct” cannot be meaningfully said to be individual A’s since individual A is wholly uninvolved in the genesis of and may never obtain any portion of these benefits.
- [65]
[65] I also consider it significant that the mens rea of an offence under s 44(1) of the CDSA is not limited to actual knowledge but extends to having reasonable grounds to believe. In other words, it suffices, in respect of an offence under s 44 of the CDSA, for the Prosecution to prove that individual A has reasonable grounds to believe that the moneys he was dealing with were the benefits of criminal conduct, that the arrangement would facilitate the retention and control of such benefits of criminal conduct and that individual B had engaged in criminal conduct or benefited from it (see Ang Jeanette v Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 SLR 1 (“Ang Jeanette”) at [72]). This mens rea requirement makes sense only if a charge under s 44(1) of the CDSA is brought against someone other than individual B. This is given that individual B, who engaged in the relevant criminal conduct, would invariably know that the moneys were the benefits of criminal conduct and that he had engaged in or benefited from criminal conduct.
- [66]
[66] It could be argued that the gradation of mens rea allows for charges under s 44(1) of the CDSA to be brought against both individuals A and B, but, where individual B is concerned, a charge would invariably rely on the knowledge limb. However, this interpretation is rendered untenable by the plain language of the provision, as discussed at [64] above. Such an interpretation also sits uncomfortably with the language of the provision which suggests that the person who enters into or is otherwise concerned in the relevant arrangement would either know or have reasonable grounds to believe that the matters mentioned in the provision are satisfied.
- [67]
[67] The interpretation of s 44(1) of the CDSA I have set out at [62] above is consistent with and furthers the purposes of the CDSA, namely, “to deprive criminals of the ability to enjoy the fruit of their criminal conduct and to protect the good names of Singapore’s financial institutions and its status as a financial hub” (Osborn Yap at [40]). In so far as the net of criminal liability captures individual A, s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA promotes the statute’s purpose of “prevent[ing] ill-gotten gains from being laundered into other property so as to avoid detection” (see WBL Corp Ltd v Lew Chee Fai Kevin and another appeal [2012] 2 SLR 978 at [31]). While it might be argued that construing s 44(1) of the CDSA in a manner which encompasses individual B might more effectively deprive criminals of the fruit of their criminal conduct, such an interpretation is not one the words of the provision can bear. Purposive interpretation is not a basis for rewriting a statute. Judicial interpretation must be done with a view toward determining the provision’s purpose and object as reflected by and in harmony with the express wording of the legislation (Tan Cheng Bock at [50]). Further, it must be remembered that s 44 of the CDSA is simply one provision under Part VI of the CDSA. There are other provisions, such as ss 46(1) and 47(1) of the CDSA, that the Prosecution can wield to effectively prosecute individual B.
- [68]
[68] The legislative history to the CDSA was comprehensively set out by V K Rajah JA in Ang Jeanette. For present purposes, it suffices to note the following. The CDSA amalgamated the Drug Trafficking (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 84A, 1993 Rev Ed) (“1993 DTA”) and the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A, 1990 Rev Ed). Section 44 of the CDSA can be traced to s 41(1)(a) of the 1993 DTA. Notably, whereas s 41(1)(a) of the 1993 DTA required an accused to know that he was facilitating another person’s retention or control of that person’s benefits of drug trafficking, s 44(1) of the CDSA allowed an accused to be convicted on the strength of evidence showing that he had “reasonable grounds to believe” that the proceeds were derived from drug trafficking or serious crimes.
- [69]
[69] Parliament specifically expanded the mens rea under s 44(1) of the CDSA to facilitate the prosecution of money laundering offences. As then Minister for Home Affairs, Mr Wong Kan Seng, observed during the Second Reading of the Drug Trafficking (Confiscation of Benefits) (Amendment) Bill (which was the precursor to the Act that introduced the CDSA), the introduction of the standard of reasonable grounds of belief “would facilitate enforcement because in practice, proof of actual knowledge is difficult to produce” (see Ang Jeanette at [27]–[35]; Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Reports (6 July 1999) vol 70 at col 1734). These remarks dovetail with my observations at [65] and confirm that s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA bears the meaning I have set out at [62] above. In my view, the introduction of “reasonable grounds to believe” as a mens rea in s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA to ameliorate enforcement difficulties made the most sense if the provision applies only to individual A. If the Prosecution is able to prove that the moneys subject of a charge under s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA stemmed from criminal conduct on individual B’s part, it would have no difficulty proving that individual B knew that the moneys were his benefits of criminal conduct and that he had engaged in criminal conduct or benefited from it. An offender who launders the benefits of his own criminal conduct must, ex hypothesi, have actual knowledge of the nature of the property he or she is dealing with.
- [70]
[70] For completeness, I deal with the Prosecution’s contention that s 44(1) of the CDSA can meaningfully apply to individual B since this provision, unlike s 47 of the CDSA, does not distinguish between a primary and secondary offender. I am unable to accept this submission. The fact that s 44(1) of the CDSA does not explicitly distinguish between a primary and secondary offender (as defined in Osborn Yap) is, in and of itself, neutral. The Prosecution reads too much into what s 44(1) of the CDSA does not say when what the provision does say renders its proposed interpretation untenable.
- [71]
[71] I do not consider the English authorities cited by the Prosecution to be persuasive. The Prosecution relies on R v Anwoir [2009] 1 WLR 980 (“Anwoir”) and R v W(N) [2009] 1 WLR 965 (“R v W(N)”) – which both concerned s 328(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c 29) (“UK POCA”) – to support its position that an individual who enters an arrangement to launder his own benefits of criminal conduct can be prosecuted under s 44(1) of the CDSA.
- [72]
[72] In Anwoir, Anwoir, McIntosh, Meghrabi and Elmoghrabi were tried on five counts of being a party to an arrangement regarding the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person, contrary to s 328 of the UK POCA. The first count charged Anwoir, Meghrabi and McIntosh with an offence relating to the sum of £740,000 in cash paid into Meghrabi’s accounts for the benefit of McIntosh and his associates which were used for various property transactions. The Prosecution contends that in so far as “there is evidence that these mon[eys] came from drug dealings and VAT fraud and that McIntosh himself was convicted of drug offences”, and the English Court of Appeal upheld the convictions of the offenders on the first count, it implicitly recognised that both primary offenders (ie, McIntosh) and secondary offenders (ie, Anwoir and Meghrabi) may be prosecuted under s 328 of the UK POCA. In a similar vein, whilst the English Court of Appeal acquitted the defendants on charges under s 328 of the UK POCA on the basis that the Prosecution failed to prove that the moneys stemmed from criminal conduct in R v W(N), the fact that one of the defendants (who was involved in the criminal conduct from which the proceeds stemmed) was charged with an offence under s 328 of the UK POCA showed that both primary and secondary offenders may be prosecuted under this provision.
- [73]
[73] Neither Anwoir nor R v W(N) supports the Prosecution’s position. First, the weight of R v W(N) is diminished by the fact that the defendants were eventually acquitted of the charges under s 328 of the UK POCA. I would be cautious of concluding that a primary offender may fall within the scope of s 328 of the UK POCA by virtue of the fact that he was charged with this offence.
- [74]
[74] More significantly, even if I assume in favour of the Prosecution that a primary offender may be prosecuted under s 328 of the UK POCA, the scope of this provision significantly differs from, and hence sheds limited light on the ambit of s 44(1) of the CDSA.
- [75]
[75] I set out s 328 of the UK POCA for context:
- [76]
[76] “[C]riminal property” for the purpose of s 328 of the UK POCA is not linked to a particular individual. Even if individual B had obtained the criminal property, there is nothing in the language of s 328 of the UK POCA which renders the prosecution of individual B inapt. To elaborate, under s 328 of the UK POCA, where individuals A and B enter an arrangement for individual A to use individual B’s criminal property to purchase property, individual B can still be said to have entered into an arrangement which facilitates individual A’s use of criminal property. Section 44(1)(a) of the CDSA, however, goes further than s 328 of the UK POCA in specifying that the arrangement facilitates the retention or control by or on behalf of another, of that other person’s benefits of criminal conduct. The difference in the wording of s 328 of the UK POCA and s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA distinguishes the cases of Anwoir and R v W(N).
- [77]
[77] Notwithstanding the above, I accept the Prosecution’s submission that where individuals A and B conspire for individual A to be concerned in an arrangement pursuant to which individual A would facilitate individual B’s control of his or her benefits of criminal conduct, both individuals may be charged with an offence under s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA read with s 109 of the Penal Code.
- [78]
[78] The appellants contend that this is legally impermissible since Parliament did not specifically criminalise the actions of individual B via s 44(1) of the CDSA. They suggest that to read s 44(1) of the CDSA with an abetment provision would extend the provision “by circular means”. I am unpersuaded by this submission. Section 109 of the Penal Code can be read with s 44(1) of the CDSA because s 40(2) of the Penal Code provides that the “offence” in s 109 (and other sections) “denotes a thing punishable under the [Penal Code] or under any other law for the time being in force” (see Public Prosecutor v Choi Guo Hong Edward [2007] 1 SLR(R) 712 at [17]). Even though individual B may not be prosecuted under s 44(1) of the CDSA, there is no impediment to him or her being prosecuted under s 44(1) of the CDSA read with s 109 of the Penal Code because the nub of the charge is now different. Assuming that, as in the present case, the latter charge concerns an abetment by conspiracy, this charge now proscribes the agreement between individuals A and B for individual A to enter into or be otherwise concerned in an arrangement under which individual A would facilitate the retention or control of individual B’s benefits of criminal conduct. It hence stands apart from individual B’s role (if any) in the arrangement. To put it another way, that individual B may have some involvement in the arrangement does not detract from the distinct wrong he or she commits by way of the conspiracy.
- [79]
[79] Drawing the threads together, in so far as the CDSA Charge avers that Henry and Judy conspired for Henry to be concerned in an arrangement which facilitated the control of Judy’s benefits of criminal conduct amounting to S$703,480 and Henry withdrew moneys from Judy’s BOC Account in Singapore pursuant to the conspiracy, I find it to be legally unobjectionable.
Whether the DJ’s decision to convict Henry and Judy on the PCA Charges was against the weight of the evidence
- [80]
[80] I now deal with the propriety of the DJ’s decision to convict the appellants on the PCA Charges. This involves the determination of an evidentiary sub-issue, namely whether the DJ erred in admitting the BOC Statements into evidence.
Whether the DJ erred in admitting the BOC Statements into evidence
- [81]
[81] The appellants submit that the BOC Statements were impermissibly admitted into evidence for the following reasons. First, the BOC Statements are purportedly bankers’ books that fall within Part IV of the EA. The requirements set out in ss 172 and 173 of the EA which have to be met before bankers’ books may be admitted into evidence were, however, unsatisfied. Second, the BOC Statements did not comply with ss 8(3) and 42(3) of the MACMA. Third, the BOC Statements were inadmissible under s 32(1)(b) of the EA because the Prosecution failed to call the persons who made the statement of relevant fact or the person who supplied the information forming the basis of the statement of relevant fact within the meaning of s 32(1)(b) of the EA as witnesses. Fourth, the BOC Statements ought to have been excluded under s 32(3) of the EA. They contained missing and illegible pages, were not properly authenticated and were unaccompanied by an explanation of how they were retrieved. Fifth, the Prosecution failed to comply with s 32(4) of the EA.
- [82]
[82] I do not accept these contentions and deal with them in turn. To begin, the BOC Statements do not fall within the scope of Part IV of the EA for two reasons. One, not all the documents forming the BOC Statements constitute “ledgers, day books, cash books, account books and all other books used in the ordinary business” of a bank. “Bankers’ books” has a specific meaning. It is limited to transactional records concerning a customer. Documents that a bank may generate or obtain whether for its own purposes (such as checking on the creditworthiness of a customer) or for regulatory compliance (such as identification documents for an individual customer) do not, without more, form part of their transactional records (see La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Company Ltd v Zhang Lan and others [2022] SGHC 89 at [37]). Exhibit P90, which is a table of contents generated by the BOC to contextualise exhibits P91 to P94, is not a transactional record.
- [83]
[83] Two, under s 170 of the EA, “bank” means any company carrying on the business of bankers in Singapore under a licence granted under any law relating to banking. It is not disputed that the BOC Statements were produced by the Shanghai branch of the BOC. Indeed, before the DJ, counsel for the appellants, Mr Too Xing Ji, “fully concede[d]” that the BOC Statements were produced by a “foreign bank”. His position was that the court should introduce evidential safeguards akin to those set out in Part IV of the EA where a party sought to adduce documents from a foreign bank. On appeal, the appellants seek to show that the BOC carries on the business of bankers in Singapore. I do not accept this. None of the appellants’ claims pertaining to the corporate structure of the BOC are supported by evidence in the record of proceedings. The appellants seek in substance to adduce fresh evidence on appeal but have not taken out the necessary application to do so.
- [84]
[84] Next, the appellants submit that any evidence received by the Attorney-General pursuant to a request under ss 8(1) or 8(2) of the MACMA must be duly authenticated under s 42 of the MACMA. As this was not done, the BOC Statements ought to have been excluded from evidence. On the other hand, the Prosecution contends that s 8(3) of the MACMA is not constrained by the authentication requirement set out in s 42(2). Rather, s 8(3) of the MACMA is a specific, standalone provision on the admissibility of evidence received pursuant to requests made under ss 8(1) or 8(2) of the MACMA.
- [85]
[85] It is unnecessary for me to decide if ss 8 and 42 of the MACMA bear the relationship the Prosecution advances. Even assuming, in favour of the appellants, that evidence received pursuant to ss 8(1) or 8(2) of the MACMA is subject to the authentication requirement set out in s 42, exhibits P90 to P94 were duly authenticated. These documents were provided under cover of exhibit P50, which contains a seal and certification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), and a reference that the documents were obtained by the PRC authorities in response to Singapore’s request. In this connection, I also see no reason to doubt CPIB investigation officer Mr Bay Chun How’s testimony that he had received exhibit P50 from the PRC authorities via the Attorney-General’s Chambers and pursuant to a request for mutual legal assistance made by the CPIB.
- [86]
[86] I do not accept the appellants’ further contention that the BOC Statements were not properly authenticated as the PRC authorities only affixed a seal on exhibit P50 and not on each of the BOC Statements. There is nothing in the MACMA which suggests that a foreign official may not collectively authenticate a number of documents. This is also bearing in mind that the purpose of the MACMA is to facilitate the provision and obtaining of international assistance in criminal matters, and to enhance the legal arsenal available to fight transnational crime (see BSD v Attorney-General and other matters [2019] SGHC 118 at [4]; Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Reports (22 February 2000) vol 71 at col 981).
- [87]
[87] The appellants then argue that the Prosecution’s failure to call the persons who produced the BOC Statements as witnesses demands its exclusion. With respect, this is misguided. It is not necessary to identify the particular individual(s) who made the statements in the BOC Statements for the purpose of s 32(1)(b) of the EA provided that the court is satisfied that the statement was made by “a” person “in the ordinary course of a trade, business, profession or other occupation” (Esben Finance Ltd and others v Wong Hou-Lianq Neil [2021] 3 SLR 82 at [87]). Indeed, s 32(1)(b) of the EA was specifically amended to ameliorate the difficulties that accompanied the exclusion, from evidence, of business records compiled by a third-party record keeper using information supplied by a transactor (see Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 (“Gimpex”) at [90]–[95]).
- [88]
[88] I deal with the appellants’ final two contentions in tandem. I do not find that the Prosecution failed to comply with s 32(4) of the EA, which provides that evidence may not be given under s 32(1) of the EA unless a party complies with the notice requirements prescribed under s 428 of the 2012 CPC. The relevant notice requirements are set out in the Criminal Procedure Code (Notice Requirements to Admit Hearsay Evidence) Regulations 2012 (“Regulations”).
- [89]
[89] It is not disputed that the Prosecution served the requisite notice on the Defence on 27 March 2019. Whilst the appellants contend that notice was only served on the same day the Prosecution sought to admit the BOC Statements, I do not consider this to be fatal. Section 32(4) of the EA and the Regulations do not prescribe a minimum period of notice, but merely that notice be provided before evidence is given, contain certain information and be presented in a certain form. Furthermore, if non-compliance with the notice requirement in s 32(4) of the EA may be cured by the court (see Gimpex at [135]–[139]), then compliance (albeit at the last minute) with s 32(4) of the EA cannot, ipso facto, constitute grounds for excluding the BOC Statements. In my view, any allegation that notice was served shortly before evidence given should be assessed under the court’s discretionary jurisdiction to exclude hearsay evidence under s 32(3) of the EA.
- [90]
[90] In this regard, I see no reason to interfere with the DJ refusing to exercise his discretion to exclude the BOC Statements under s 32(3) of the EA. The appellants say that this was erroneous since the BOC Statements contained missing and illegible pages and the Prosecution did not explain how they were retrieved. I disagree. That the BOC Statements were incomplete did not therefore mean that its contents were inaccurate. On the contrary, the appellants do not dispute the accuracy of the BOC Statements. Judy relied on the BOC Statements to compile a separate document she claims shows that the moneys in Joseph’s BOC Account stemmed from legitimate sources. I note also that the information contained in the BOC Statements is internally and externally consistent. For instance, the entries in exhibits P93 (bank deposit slips), P94 (phone banking records) and P33 (email from Jeffrey Toh) match the information in exhibit P92. In these circumstances, to exclude the BOC Statements because they are incomplete would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Additionally, the weight of the evidence shows that the BOC Statements were properly obtained. These statements were provided by the PRC authorities pursuant to a MACMA request (see [85] above).
- [91]
[91] Any prejudicial effect occasioned to the appellants by the admission of the BOC Statements was therefore limited. It did not outweigh the significant probative value of the BOC Statements. These statements established the quantum of moneys SLT and Feili paid to Joseph’s BOC Account.
- [92]
[92] In sum, I uphold the DJ’s decision to admit the BOC Statements into evidence.
Whether the DJ’s finding that there was a conspiracy between Henry and Judy for Judy to corruptly receive gratification from SLT and Feili as a reward for Judy advancing the business interests of SLT and Feili vis-à-vis Seagate is against the weight of the evidence
- [93]
[93] The four elements of an offence under s 5 of the PCA are: (a) the giving or receipt of gratification; (b) as an inducement (or reward) for any person doing (or forbearing to do) anything in respect of any matter; (c) there was an objective corrupt element in the transaction; and (d) the gratification was given or received with guilty knowledge (Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed Hanib v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2022] SGHC 101 at [107]).
- [94]
[94] The first element, viz, the giving or receipt of the gratification is concerned with the actus reus of the offence and is complete even if the recipient has not yet had any opportunity to show favour to the giver in relation to the recipient’s affairs. The second element relates to the causal or consequential link between the gratification and the act the gratification was intended to procure (or reward) while the third pertains to whether that act was objectively dishonest in the entire transaction. These two elements are conceptually different but part of the same factual inquiry. The question is whether the recipient received the gratification believing that it was given to him as a quid pro quo for conferring a dishonest gain or advantage on the giver in relation to his principal’s affairs. The fourth and final element relates to knowledge and, in particular, whether the accused knew or realised what he did was corrupt by the ordinary and objective standard (Tey Tsun Hang v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 1189 at [13], [16]–[17], [26]).
- [96]
[96] The appellants do not dispute that the moneys subject of the PCA Charges were paid into Joseph’s BOC Account. They, however, submit that the DJ’s finding that Henry and Judy conspired for Judy to corruptly receive gratification from SLT and Feili as a reward for assisting these parties secure the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts is against the weight of the evidence.
- [97]
[97] The appellants first claim that the DJ erred in according weight to the Emails. They say that the Emails were sent months before Seagate decided to hold the 2006 Tender, and thus at a time when Henry and Judy did not and could not have known that Seagate was going to hold a tender for the provision of trucking services in the PRC. Consistent with this, the contents of the Emails are purportedly unrelated to the 2006 Tender. For example, the business structure envisaged by Henry and Judy in the Emails, namely, to set up companies in the PRC to benefit from Seagate’s business, was fundamentally different from that which eventually materialised.
- [98]
[98] I find insufficient basis to intervene with the DJ’s finding in this regard. The elephant in the room which the appellants have conveniently ignored is their investigative statements. Indeed, the many arid objections raised by the appellants in relation to the court’s jurisdiction, the legal propriety of the PCA and CDSA Charges, and the admissibility of the BOC Statements may, to a certain extent, be said to be borne of an awareness that they had essentially admitted to the PCA Charges in their investigative statements. In these statements, the appellants admit to conspiring to corruptly assist SLT and Feili secure the 2006 and 2009 Tender Contracts by leveraging on Henry’s position as Senior Director of Logistics and member of the 2006 and 2009 Tender committees in exchange for bribes paid to Judy. I will refer extensively to the investigative statements recorded from Henry and Judy and hence set out what I consider to be the salient aspects momentarily.
- [99]
[99] Before doing so, I pause to note that, on appeal, Henry no longer disputes that he provided P38 voluntarily. To recap, he claimed to have provided P38 involuntarily and under oppressive circumstances in the proceedings below. These claims, which spanned allegations that he was harassed and deprived of sleep and rest when he provided P38 and that Sathia became aggressive when he expressed his desire to amend P38, were rejected by the DJ (see [25] above). I mention this for two reasons.
- [100]
[100] First, for completeness, I see no reason to interfere with the DJ’s finding that Henry provided P38 voluntarily and in the absence of oppressive circumstances. Henry’s claims to have been completely unable to concentrate during the recording of P38 are betrayed by the numerous, significant amendments he made to the statement. These showed him to possess a clarity of mind fundamentally inconsistent with his claim to have been in a “zombie”-like state. Similarly, Henry’s claim that Sathia “became aggressive” when he wished to amend aspects of P38 was showed up by the fact that Sathia was not even present at the recording of the statement. Henry also had no answer to the fact that he chose not to make any amendments to P38, but made amendments to a different statement, when he was accorded the opportunity to amend both statements one day after P38 was recorded. Second, Henry’s claims in the above regard showed him to be a witness of poor credibility.
- [101]
[101] Returning to Henry and Judy’s investigative statements, these revealed the following:
(a) In 2006, Seagate decided to hold an open tender for the provision of trucking services in the PRC. Seagate had hitherto relied on two companies for trucking services in the PRC, but this arrangement left much to be desired in terms in terms of price and the quality of service rendered.
(b) The committee tasked to oversee the 2006 Tender comprised representatives of various Seagate departments, including Henry, who represented the Logistics Department. Each department could nominate vendors to participate in the tender.
(c) Henry informed Judy of the 2006 Tender and that she might want to “look for good transport companies in [the PRC,] introduce them [to] Seagate and earn[] a commission from this”. Henry admitted that he “also wanted to gain some benefits from this”. Thereafter, Judy acquainted herself with representatives from SLT and Feili and sent their contact details to Henry.
(d) Seagate subsequently invited SLT and Feili to make a formal presentation of their services, with a view to shortlisting companies to participate in the 2006 Tender. In this connection, Henry vetted SLT and Feili’s presentation slides because he “want[ed] them to have a better chance of winning the contract”. Both companies were invited to participate in the 2006 Tender.
(e) Following discussions with Judy, SLT and Feili agreed to pay Judy 10% of revenue they earned from Seagate. At this point, Henry suggested that he and Judy should enter into a GSA with SLT and Feili to ensure that the companies could not “refuse to pay [them] the commission … if they got the contracts from Seagate”. Judy thus approached Joseph who agreed to facilitate the siblings’ plan; Joseph would receive moneys from SLT and Feili in Joseph’s BOC Account and hand his “saving passbook” to Judy to allow her “to withdraw the money[s] as and when she wants”. Joseph never asked for a share of the moneys. He was roped in as a “proxy” by Henry and Judy “because [the siblings] did not want it to be so apparent that [Henry] was doing an official business with [his] own sister” and Seagate would not have condoned Henry’s “conflict of interest”. Henry drafted the GSA because he was more educated than Judy and instructed Judy not to reveal his involvement in the scheme to SLT and Feili.
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