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Grounds publishedDecided 30 Nov 2023

General Division of the High Court

Beltran, Julian Moreno and another v Terraform Labs Pte Ltd and others

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[2023] SGHC 340Case no. Originating Claim No 247 of 2022 (Registrar’s Appeals Nos 185 and 186 of 2023)

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The appeals before me, HC/RA 185/2023 (“RA 185”) and HC/RA 186/2023 (“RA 186”), were against the decision of the learned Assistant Registrar (“the AR”) dismissing HC/SUM 235/2023 (“SUM 235”) and HC/SUM 1427/2023 (“SUM 1427”) (collectively, “the Stay Applications”), whereby the defendants applied to stay this action (“the Suit”). The first defendant (“Terraform”) applied on the basis that there was an arbitration agreement between it and the claimants, while the other defendants applied on case management grounds.

  3. [2] I dismissed the appeals, issuing brief grounds on 28 September 2023. On 1 November 2023, I dismissed Terraform’s further arguments and affirmed my earlier decision.

  4. [3] The appeals engage interesting questions, in the context of a representative action, involving the incorporation of an arbitration agreement in contracts formed online; the application of the relevant legal test for the purposes of granting a stay in favour of arbitration; and the circumstances under which a litigant may be said to have taken a “step in the proceedings” for the purposes of s 6(1) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IAA”) in the context of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”). These are my full grounds of decision.

  5. Background

  6. [4] The claimants are individuals who purchased algorithmic stable cryptocurrency tokens named TerraUSD (“UST”) issued by Terraform. Terraform is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of developing software and applications which run the Terra blockchain. Terraform also operates the Terra ecosystem (“the Terra Ecosystem”), which provides a platform for Terraform’s development and sale of decentralised financial products and services. The central feature of the Terra Ecosystem is UST. The Terra Ecosystem includes a number of other projects, platforms and applications that build atop the Terra blockchain. One of these is the Anchor Protocol, a lending and borrowing platform where users can stake their UST in consideration for promised returns calculated on an annualised yield basis.

  7. [5] The second defendant, Kwon Do Hyeong (“Kwon”), is the co-founder, shareholder, director and Chief Executive Officer of Terraform. The third defendant, Nikolaos Alexandros Platias (“Platias”), has been described as a co‑founder and Head of Research of Terraform, and one of the co-founders or creators of the Anchor Protocol. The fourth defendant, Luna Foundation Guard Ltd (“Luna”), is said to be an organisation supporting the growth of the Terra Ecosystem by building reserves to buttress the stability of UST.

  8. The Suit

  9. [6] The Suit is a representative action filed on 7 September 2022 by Julian Moreno Beltran (“Beltran”) and Douglas Gan Yi Dong (“Gan”) (collectively, “the Representative Claimants”), on behalf of themselves and 375 other individuals.

  10. [7] The claimants seek relief against the defendants for, inter alia, making several misrepresentations that they claimed induced them to purchase UST, stake UST on the Anchor Protocol, and hold UST while its value plummeted. As a result, the claimants suffered significant losses. The relevant representations (“the Representations”) were:

  11. (a) first, that UST was stable by design, as it was pegged to a fiat currency;

  12. (b) second, that the Terra protocol and its underlying token economics would be able to maintain the price stability of UST regardless of market size, volatility, or demand through an algorithm that would allow an arbitrage process to happen with UST’s sister token, LUNA, thereby guaranteeing that UST would always return to the US$1 peg;

  13. (c) third, that UST holders would be able to protect the value of their UST holdings, given that UST holders would always be able to exchange 1 UST for US$1 worth of LUNA on the Terra protocol;

  14. (d) fourth, that the Anchor Protocol was a principal-guaranteed stablecoin savings product where UST holders could enjoy the stability of holding a stablecoin while earning passive income;

  15. (e) fifth, that the purchasers of UST will earn up to 20% Annualised Percentage Yields if they staked their UST on the Anchor Protocol; and

  16. (f) sixth, that Luna would be the final backstop in protecting the UST-USD price peg as it had built up a substantial reserve of funds, denominated in Bitcoin.

  17. [8] I shall refer to the first to third Representations collectively as the “Terra Representations”. The claimants allege that the first to second Representations were made in a white paper published in April 2019 (“the Terra White Paper”) by, inter alia, Kwon and Platias. The Terra Representations (including the third Representation) allegedly also appeared on Terraform’s website (“the Terra Website”).

  18. [9] On the claimants’ pleaded case, they were induced by the Terra Representations to purchase UST, and this constituted a contract between the claimants and Terraform on the terms of the Terra Representations. Alternatively, the claimants plead that the Terra Representations amounted to a unilateral contractual offer to the world at large, which they accepted when they purchased UST.

  19. [10] As for the fourth and fifth Representations (“the Anchor Representations”), the claimants refer to the website of the Anchor Protocol (“the Anchor Website”) and another white paper published in July 2020 (“the Anchor White Paper”) by, inter alia, Platias. The claimants also reference a social media post made by Kwon, in which he promoted the Anchor Protocol’s yields on UST.

  20. [11] In respect of the sixth Representation (“the Luna Representation”), the claimants refer to announcements published on various websites (but emanating from the defendants), promoting Luna and its role and actions in building up reserves to ensure the stability of UST.

  21. [12] On the claimants’ pleaded case: eight of the claimants plead that they were only induced by the Terra Representations; 195 claimants were induced by the Terra Representations and the Anchor Representations; and 174 claimants (including Beltran and Gan) were induced by all the Representations. It is pleaded that the claimants in the second and third groups (ie, other than the eight claimants in the first group) entered into a second contractual agreement with Terraform on the terms of the Anchor Representations.

  22. [13] In May 2022, the value of UST plummeted. The claimants allege that in reliance on the Representations, they held onto their UST. The claimants claim that they suffered loss and damage in the sum of US$65,646,750.29, being the sum equivalent to the diminution in value between the US$1 peg for UST and the value of UST held by the claimants and/or the price at which the claimants sold their UST below the US$1 peg.

  23. The arbitration clauses in the websites

  24. [14] For the purposes of the present appeals, it was undisputed that both the Terra and Anchor Websites (collectively, “the Websites”) contained terms requiring disputes to be resolved by arbitration.

  25. [15] The Terra Website contained terms and conditions accessible via a hyperlink entitled “Terms of Use” (“the Terra Terms of Use”). Clause 13 of the Terra Terms of Use provided that any dispute involving the Terra Website or the Terra Terms of Use shall be resolved by arbitration:

  26. [16] Similarly, the Anchor Website contained terms and conditions accessible via a hyperlink entitled “Terms of Service” (“the Anchor Terms of Service”). Clause 18 of the Anchor Terms of Service provided that any dispute shall be resolved by arbitration:

  27. [17] I shall refer to these clauses collectively as “the Arbitration Clauses”.

  28. [18] It was common ground that the Arbitration Clauses were wide enough to encompass the claims pleaded in the Suit. What was in issue was whether they applied to the claimants. I consider this in greater detail below at [120]–[161].

  29. Lead-up to the filing of the Stay Applications

  30. [19] On 9 November 2022, Terraform filed a Pre–Case Conference Questionnaire which stated, inter alia, that it intended to challenge the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of arbitration agreements said to have been entered into between Terraform and the claimants, based on the Arbitration Clauses.

  31. [20] On 24 November 2022, Terraform filed its Defence. Significantly, the Defence was not limited to Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge, but included its defence on the merits of the claims as well as a Counterclaim for various declarations. The Defence however, contained a reservation that it was filed “without prejudice” to Terraform’s contention that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and its filing was “not to be construed as a submission to the jurisdiction of the Court”. A similar reservation was pleaded in respect of the Counterclaim. I shall refer to these reservations collectively as “the Reservations”. I set out the reservation in the Defence in full:

  32. [21] Kwon and Luna (who were represented by the same solicitors as Terraform) filed similar defences, addressing both the jurisdictional challenge and the merits, with similar reservations. On 23 December 2022, Platias filed his defence, addressing only the jurisdictional challenge, without prejudice to his right to file a defence on the merits should the jurisdictional challenge fail.

  33. [22] Parties engaged in a series of correspondence, spanning several case conferences, in which the timelines for (a) the claimants to give further and better particulars (“F&BPs”) of their Statement of Claim (“SOC”) (which had previously been requested by the defendants); and (b) the defendants to file and serve their jurisdictional challenges, were negotiated, and extended.

  34. [23] First, at a case conference on 9 December 2022, in view of an agreed extension of the time within which the claimants were to respond with their F&BPs, and a corresponding agreed extension of the timeline for the defendants to file and serve their jurisdictional challenges, the learned Senior Assistant Registrar (“the SAR”) gave directions for the defendants to file and serve their jurisdictional challenges by 19 January 2023.

  35. [24] On 27 December 2022, following a further agreed extension of time for the claimants’ F&BPs, the court issued directions extending the deadline for the filing and serving of jurisdictional challenges to 30 January 2023.

  36. [25] Only Platias complied with the directions, filing SUM 235 on 30 January 2023, which asked for a case management stay on the basis of, inter alia, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the claimants and Terraform. On the same day, the solicitors representing Terraform, Kwon and Luna wrote to the SAR seeking a further extension of time to file their jurisdictional challenges by 27 February 2023, citing the complexity and length of the claimants’ F&BPs (which had been issued on 12 January 2023) as the reason for their request. Following a number of letters from parties to the court on 30 January 2023 and the days after, the court granted, on 7 February 2023, a further extension of time for the filing of the defendants’ jurisdictional challenges, pending directions from the court at the next case conference scheduled for 8 February 2023 (“the 8 Feb Case Conference”).

  37. [26] On 6 February 2023, instead of filing their application to challenge the court’s jurisdiction, Terraform, Kwon and Luna filed a “Request for Permission to File Application” to the Registrar of the Supreme Court (“the Request Application”), which sought the court’s leave to file an “omnibus application” seeking a number of reliefs, including F&BPs, the production of the claimants’ representative action agreements (“RAAs”), and the striking out and/or stay of the Suit on various grounds.

  38. [27] Later the same day, Terraform, Kwon and Luna filed a summons seeking, inter alia, F&BPs, the production of the RAAs, and the stay or striking out of the Suit on various grounds (“the SAPT Summons”). The SAPT Summons is the “omnibus” application that Terraform sought to make in its Request Application. I deal with the Request Application and SAPT Summons in detail below at [79]–[116].

  39. [28] At the 8 Feb Case Conference, the learned SAR indicated that the Registry would reject the Request Application and SAPT Summons, and granted a further extension of time, until the date of the next case conference or as given in further directions of the court (whichever later), for Terraform, Kwon and Luna to file their jurisdictional challenges.

  40. [29] On 1 March 2023, Terraform, Kwon and Luna filed SUM 1427 for a stay of the Suit. On 11 May 2023, SUM 1427 was amended to clarify that Terraform was seeking a stay in favour of arbitration whereas Kwon and Luna were seeking “case management” stays on the basis that the claims in the Suit against Kwon and Luna were closely related and/or ancillary to the claims against Terraform.

  41. The AR’s decision

  42. [30] The AR dismissed Terraform’s application for a stay on the ground that it failed to make out a prima facie case that a valid arbitration agreement existed between it and the claimants.

  43. [31] The AR held that the question was whether the Arbitration Clauses had been validly incorporated into the contracts formed between Terraform, on the one hand, and the claimants who visited the Websites on the other, so as to form a valid arbitration agreement between them. This would be the case if a user of the Websites would have actual or constructive notice of the Arbitration Clauses, which in turn depended on whether the Websites provided such user with a legitimate opportunity to learn that his or her use was subject to the Terms of Use/Service.

  44. [32] In that regard, the AR found that:

  45. (a) the relevant hyperlink for the Terra Terms of Use was “tucked away at the bottom of the website such that it lacked prominence”, and a reasonably prudent user would not have had notice thereof, owing to the “relative obscurity” of that hyperlink;

  46. (b) similarly, the Anchor Terms of Service could not be found on the Anchor Website’s homepage, and could only be found on the “dashboard” of the Anchor Website (“the Dashboard”), which was a separate tab within the Website;

  47. (c) further, it did not matter that users of the Websites may arguably have been sophisticated users looking for information on the Terra Ecosystem, as opposed to simple e-commerce customers looking to buy everyday items. In contrast to the argument that users of the Websites should have expected there to be terms and conditions, a countervailing argument could be made that given the nature of the product promoted by the Websites, the Terms of Use/Service should have been prominently displayed to users; and

  48. (d) ultimately, arbitration clauses must be expressly brought to the attention of the other contracting party. In the circumstances, the facts did not show that a reasonably prudent user would have actual or constructive notice of the Terms of Use/Service. Hence, the Arbitration Clauses were not properly and adequately incorporated and there was no prima facie valid arbitration agreement between the claimants and Terraform.

  49. [33] In the alternative, the learned AR held that even if a valid arbitration agreement could be shown to exist prima facie, Terraform had taken multiple steps in the proceedings and so had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

  50. [34] Finally, she dismissed the “case management stays” of the other defendants as they were premised on Terraform obtaining a stay in favour of arbitration.

  51. Issues to be determined

  52. [35] The issues on appeal were:

  53. The first issue: did Terraform take a step in the proceedings?

  54. The applicable law

  55. The law on a “step in the proceedings”

  56. [36] Under s 6(1) of the IAA, any party to an arbitration agreement “may, at any time after filing and serving a notice of intention to contest or not contest and before delivering any pleading (other than a pleading asserting that the court does not have jurisdiction in the proceedings) or taking any other step in the proceedings, apply to that court to stay the proceedings so far as the proceedings relate to that matter” [emphasis added].

  57. [37] What constitutes a “step in the proceedings” has been considered in several authorities. The starting and basic point is that an act which indicates an intention that the court proceedings should proceed instead of arbitration is a “step in the proceedings”: Carona Holdings Pte Ltd and others v Go Go Delicacy Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 460 (“Carona Holdings”) at [47] and [50], citing Austin and Whiteley Limited v S Bowley and Son (1913) 108 LT 921 at 921 and Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Yuval Insurance Co Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357 at 361 respectively.

  58. [38] Such intention may be shown where the acts of the defendant, or his solicitors, is objectively inconsistent with the making and maintaining of a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction: Carona Holdings at [60], citing Global Multimedia International Ltd v Ara Media Services [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 1160 at [27]. In other words, an act will be taken to be a “step in the proceedings” where it cannot be explained, except on the assumption that the defendant accepts that the court should be given jurisdiction, or that any objection to the court’s jurisdiction has been waived or has never been entertained: Reputation Administration Service Pte Ltd v Spamhaus Technology Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 342 (“Reputation Administration”) at [20], citing Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2019] 1 SLR 779 (“Shanghai Turbo”) at [44] and Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (“Zoom Communications”) at [43].

  59. [39] Thus, an act which goes toward the advancement of a jurisdictional challenge will not constitute a “step in the proceedings”. For example, a request for F&BPs or production of documents for the purpose of deciding whether to bring a jurisdictional challenge will not be a “step”: Carona Holdings at [91], citing Fathers of Confederation Buildings Trust v Pigott Construction Co Ltd (1974) 44 DLR (3d) 265; Reputation Administration at [31]. However, in so far as the requested particulars or documents go beyond that purpose, and indicate that the defendant intends to defend the court proceedings, such request would be considered a “step in the proceedings”: see Carona Holdings at [87], citing The Dufferin Paving Co Ltd v The George A Fuller Co of Canada Ltd [1935] OR 21 (“Dufferin”) at 24.

  60. [40] Certain acts may appear to engage the court’s powers, but are nevertheless not inconsistent with a jurisdictional challenge. For example, an act which merely parries a blow by the plaintiff does not constitute a “step in the proceedings” (see Carona Holdings at [49], citing Roussel-Uclaf v G D Searle & Co Ltd and G D Searle & Co [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 225 at 231) – this consideration is particularly important in the context of a defendant resisting an injunction. Such an act is not inconsistent with a jurisdictional challenge as it is meant to safeguard the defendant’s position pending the determination of the jurisdictional challenge.

  61. [41] Similarly, an application relating to the propriety of the proceedings in limine, or at the threshold, may appear to engage the court’s powers but is not in fact inconsistent with a jurisdictional challenge. For example, in Maniach Pte Ltd v L Capital Jones Ltd and another [2016] 3 SLR 801 (“Maniach”), the court held that a striking-out application – which was filed on the basis that the claimant had failed to obtain leave under the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) before commencing proceedings against a company which was the subject of a judicial management application – was not a “step in the proceedings” (Maniach at [81]). This decision may be explained on the basis that the issue of leave had to be resolved before the question of a stay could be addressed. Without leave to commence the proceedings, the company could not rightfully be before the court.

  62. [42] I note that in Maniach, the court found (at [81]) that “the Company’s prayer to strike out these proceedings on grounds of a procedural defect cannot amount to a step … [m]aking that application did not put in play the merits of [the] claim” [emphasis added]. The court held further (at [93]) that the striking‑out application “did not cross the line which separates a procedural act which is not a step in the proceedings from one which is” [emphasis added].

  63. [44] Thus, a truer compass may be found in the statement in Carona Holdings (at [55]) that a “step in the proceedings” will be deemed to have been taken if the defendant “employs court procedures to enable him to defeat or defend [the] proceedings on their merits” [emphasis in original retained; emphasis added]. The focus is not on whether the act itself goes toward the merits of the action, but whether it enables, or advances, a future engagement of the merits of the action.

  64. [45] Consistent with the above principles, an equivocal act will not be considered a “step in the proceedings”: Carona Holdings at [60]. This refers to an act which may be consistent with either acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction or the maintenance of a jurisdictional challenge. Having said that, although a party may assert that its actions were intended to support its jurisdictional challenge, the court must look beyond such claims and examine the substance of the action. Parties should not be allowed to equivocate or hedge their actions – they should be decisive in whether they are insisting on arbitration in preference to litigation, and disingenuous reservations will be disregarded: Carona Holdings at [93].

  65. [46] Overall, the court’s assessment of whether an act constitutes a “step in the proceedings” should be conducted in a practical and commonsensical way which considers the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s act: Carona Holdings at [52].

  66. A “step in the proceedings” under the ROC 2021

  67. [47] All the authorities cited above were decided before the enactment of the ROC 2021. The ROC 2021 introduces a new regime on the filing of defences on jurisdiction. For clarity, the applicable legal principles relating to a “step in the proceedings” remain the same, but the application of these principles to the new statutory context under the ROC 2021 may produce different results.

  68. (1) The ROC 2021 regime on the filing of defences on jurisdiction

  69. [50] The ROC 2021 addresses these issues by allowing a defendant to file a defence contesting jurisdiction only (“a Defence (Jurisdiction)”): see O 2 r 5(2) and O 6 r 7(4). With that filing, no judgment in default of a defence can be entered: O 6 r 7(7). Further, filing a Defence (Jurisdiction) is expressly provided to not amount to a submission to the court’s jurisdiction: see O 2 r 5(4) and O 6 r 7(6). Section 6(1) of the IAA was also amended to state that delivering “a pleading asserting that the court does not have jurisdiction in the proceedings” will not preclude parties to an arbitration agreement from applying to stay the court proceedings.

  70. (a) first, a defendant who is served must file and serve a defence to the originating claim after the SOC is served on it: see O 6 r 7(1). The defence must be in Form 13: see O 6 r 7(3). Form 13 sets out a menu of options for the defendant depending on the nature of the challenge it intends to bring;

  71. (b) second, the court is required to fix a case conference after the filing of an originating claim or an originating application: see O 2 r 6(1);

  72. (c) third, at the case conference, if a Defence (Jurisdiction) has been filed, the court must first deal with the objection to its jurisdiction: see O 9 r 7(1). In that regard, short timelines are imposed with respect to the challenge: the court must direct the defendant to file and serve the necessary application for the jurisdictional challenge with the supporting affidavit within 14 days after the date of the case conference, direct the claimant to file and serve any affidavit in reply within 14 days thereafter, and (unless the court otherwise orders) fix the hearing of the application on a date no later than 14 days after all affidavits have been filed and served: see O 9 r 7(2) and O 2 r 6(7). The words in italics emphasise the intention for jurisdictional challenges to be dealt with and disposed of quickly; and

  73. (d) where the jurisdictional challenge fails, the court will give directions to file a defence contesting the merits of the claim (“a Defence (Merits)”): see O 2 r 7(1). As such, the defendant will have the opportunity to deal with the merits of the claimants’ pleaded case and bring any counterclaim it intends to institute, after its jurisdictional objection has been dealt with.

  74. [53] This is reinforced by O 6 r 7(6), which states that “[a] defence filed under [O 6 r 7(4)] is not treated as a submission to jurisdiction”. This can only be a reference to a Defence (Jurisdiction).

  75. [55] Terraform’s argument also ignores the issues with the predecessor to the ROC 2021 highlighted at [48]–[49] above and undermines what O 6 r 7(4) was plainly intended to do. It should also be interpreted and understood in the context of O 3, which I elaborate on at [63] below.

  76. [57] Terraform argued that O 3 r 2(4) of the ROC 2021 puts a party at risk of having its pleadings rejected by the court if they are not prepared in accordance with the applicable rules or practice directions. But that is not a legitimate concern as O 3 r 6(1) expressly provides that the “[f]orms as set out in the practice directions must be used with such variations as the circumstances require” [emphasis added]. More importantly, a Defence (Jurisdiction) complies with O 6 r 7 and Form 13 and will not be rejected.

  77. [58] Indeed, at the hearing before the AR, counsel for Terraform conceded that Terraform “may have been wrong” in filing a paragraph-by-paragraph response pursuant to Form 13. In so far as Terraform had made an error in its interpretation of ROC 2021 and Form 13, that does not assist it. The “transitional learning phase” for the ROC 2021, during which the courts would be generally more sympathetic when dealing with non-compliance occasioned by lack of familiarity with the ROC 2021, ended on 30 June 2022: see Newspaper Seng Logistics Pte Ltd v Chiap Seng Productions Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC(A) 5 at [11]. Further, as elaborated above at [51], not only is it clear that a Defence (Jurisdiction) need not be filed with a Defence (Merits), it is also expressly provided that a Defence (Merits) may be filed after the jurisdictional challenge is dealt with: see O 2 r 7(1). There is therefore no ambiguity nor jeopardy for defendants. Platias correctly filed only a Defence (Jurisdiction) (see above at [21]) – there is no reason Terraform could not have similarly done so. In any event, whether Terraform or its solicitors may have misunderstood ROC 2021 is irrelevant as the court must assess whether a party had taken a “step in the proceedings” on an objective basis: Carona Holdings at [60].

  78. (2) Reservations

  79. [59] The authorities decided pre-ROC 2021 make clear that a reservation is a relevant factor which should be taken into consideration in assessing whether a step taken by a party can be objectively construed as a “step in the proceedings”. Thus, it was held in Australian Timber (at [22], citing Chong Long Hak Kee Construction Trading Co v IEC Global Pte Ltd [2003] 4 SLR(R) 499 (“Chong Long”) at [13]) that “an act, which would otherwise be regarded as a step in the proceedings, will not be treated as such if the applicant has specifically stated that he intends to seek a stay or expressly reserves his right to do so”.

  80. [60] However, even in the pre-ROC 2021 context, the making of a reservation was not by itself determinative of the question of whether an act constituted a step in the proceedings. The court still had to consider whether such reservation was disingenuous (Carona Holdings at [93]), and whether notwithstanding the reservation, a party’s conduct clearly and unequivocally signified a submission to jurisdiction (Shanghai Turbo at [38]). The court in Shanghai Turbo (at [36]) was careful to note that the remarks in Australian Timber “did not lay down any blanket rule that no conduct would ever amount to a submission to jurisdiction if it was accompanied by a reservation of that party’s right to challenge jurisdiction” [emphasis in original].

  81. [61] Importantly, Australian Timber and Chong Long were decided in the pre-ROC 2021 context. As noted above at [48], there was no option pre‑ROC 2021 to file a Defence (Jurisdiction). In that context, the filing of a Defence (Merits) within the stipulated deadline, coupled with an express reservation, could be fairly construed as a neutral step performed to protect the defendant’s position by preventing the entering of judgment in default. Such an act preserved the status quo, similar to an application for an extension of time to file a defence to avoid judgment in default being entered (Carona Holdings at [100]–[101]), and could be construed as a pre-emptive act of self‑defence, done in the interest of “parrying a blow from the plaintiff”: see International SOS Pte Ltd v Overton Mark Harold George [2001] 2 SLR(R) 777 at [6] and Shanghai Turbo at [41]).

  82. [62] However, under the ROC 2021, there is little, if any, reason for a defendant challenging jurisdiction to file a Defence (Merits) with a reservation. Indeed, as seen above at [51], the ROC 2021 expressly mandates that the jurisdictional challenge be (quickly) disposed of first before the merits of the action are dealt with, if necessary.

  83. [64] Thus, in relation to pleadings under the ROC 2021, reservations are no longer relevant or necessary. A party should simply file a Defence (Jurisdiction) without more. As for other contexts, eg, in affidavits, a reservation may be useful where an act is equivocal – ie, statements contained therein may be equivocal, and the defendant may include a reservation to make his position clear. However, it bears emphasising that a reservation is not a panacea – it will not save an act that is inconsistent with the bringing of a jurisdictional challenge from being a “step in the proceedings”.

  84. [65] Overall, under the ROC 2021 regime, defendants should focus their energies on the jurisdictional challenge and only take out applications that are necessary to advance it. Any other action inconsistent with the maintenance or advancement of a jurisdictional challenge should be considered a “step in the proceedings”. To hold otherwise would be to encourage the proliferation of other applications which contributed to the situation pre-ROC 2021, and which the ROC 2021 was introduced to solve: see Civil Justice Commission Report at p 14.

  85. Terraform’s various acts

  86. [66] The claimants submitted that the following acts by Terraform amounted to steps in the proceedings:

  87. (a) first, Terraform filed a defence on the merits and a counterclaim; and

  88. (b) second, Terraform filed the SAPT Summons seeking substantive remedies relating to the merits of the action. These included (i) the request for F&BPs; (ii) the application for production of the RAAs; and (iii) the striking-out application.

  89. Filing a defence on the merits and a counterclaim

  90. [67] Terraform’s defence contained not only its jurisdictional challenge but also its defence on the merits of the Suit and a counterclaim for various declarations, coupled with the Reservations (see [20] above).

  91. [68] As discussed above, Terraform argued that it was obliged under O 6 r 7(3) of the ROC 2021 to file its defence as a paragraph-by-paragraph response to the claimants’ SOC, in accordance with Form 13, and that it was also obliged under O 6 r 7(7) to file a defence or risk entry of judgment in default of defence.

  92. [70] Terraform argued further that the defence and counterclaim was not a “step in the proceedings” as it was prefaced with the Reservations. Terraform pointed out that in light of the Reservations, it could not be said that it intended to ask the court to determine the dispute and to abandon its right to arbitrate.

  93. [71] For the reasons stated above at [48]–[58], Terraform’s filing of a Defence (Merits) was a “step in the proceedings”. No such defence was required under the ROC 2021 regime, and this act affirmed the correctness of the court proceedings and demonstrated Terraform’s willingness to accede to the court’s jurisdiction on the matter: see Australian Timbers at [19]. The Reservations included in Terraform’s defence do not change this conclusion, as there is no longer any reason to file a Defence (Merits) coupled with a reservation: see above at [59]–[64]. Any alleged misunderstanding of the ROC 2021 regime on Terraform’s part is irrelevant: see above at [58].

  94. [72] In its further arguments, Terraform argued that a statement that a defence is filed “without prejudice to the application … to stay all proceedings in Singapore” effectively preserved a party’s right to seek a stay. It relied on Capital Trust Investments Ltd v Radio Design TJ AB [2002] 2 All ER 159, where the English Court of Appeal held (at [59]–[60]) that an application for summary judgment was not a step because the applicant had made it clear that the application was advanced only if its stay application was unsuccessful. But this decision only undermines Terraform’s position as it was a case where the defendant had filed an application dealing with the merits only as a “fallback”. As discussed below at [108]–[115], that was not the case here. In so far as Terraform is arguing that pleading a reservation is a licence to make all manner of applications without prejudicing its jurisdictional challenge, that is plainly misconceived.

  95. [73] In further arguments, Terraform argued that it was not certain of its position on jurisdiction since there was a lack of information in the SOC on the claimants and the alleged contracts formed with Terraform. Hence, when it filed its defence on 24 November 2022, it did so without the benefit of information needed to confirm its position on jurisdiction (since the claimants’ F&BPs were only served on 13 January 2023). At this stage, Terraform had yet to determine its ability to bring a jurisdictional challenge, and considered that it might be unable to apply for a stay even after receipt of the F&BPs. If that eventuality materialised, and Terraform’s defence did not address the merits, it would have filed no proper defence to the claimants’ claims and would be at risk of judgment in default and/or face difficulty defending the claims in court. Hence, Terraform’s filing of the defence and counterclaim was a “neutral procedural step” done merely to preserve the status quo and to protect its interests in court pending the receipt of the F&BPs.

  96. [74] These arguments are misconceived. First, it is for a defendant to decide if it has a proper basis to challenge jurisdiction. It would be a rare case for the defendant to be unable to do so based on the pleaded cause of action. Second, even if a defendant requires better particulars or information from the claimant to enable it to make that decision, there is no reason why it cannot file a Defence (Jurisdiction) and seek leave or directions from the court to make applications strictly confined to that issue: see Reputation Administration at [31], where the court noted that a defendant faced with uncertainty as to its jurisdictional challenge should take steps to resolve such uncertainty, rather than filing a Defence (Merits). As will be seen below, that is not what Terraform did. Third, if the defendant later determines that there is no basis to challenge jurisdiction, there is nothing to stop it from informing the court that it is not proceeding with the challenge (or withdrawing it if already filed) and obtaining directions to file a Defence (Merits). The risk of judgment in default as argued by Terraform simply does not exist.

  97. [75] Even if I am wrong with respect to the defence, there is clearly no reason for Terraform to have filed a Counterclaim. That is plainly an acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the dispute. In this regard, I reiterate that parties should be decisive in whether they are insisting on arbitration in preference to litigation, and disingenuous reservations will be disregarded: Carona Holdings at [93]. In the circumstances, the Reservations did not detract from Terraform’s contradictory act in filing a Counterclaim.

  98. [76] Terraform relied on O 6 r 8(1), which states that “[i]f the defendant intends to counterclaim against the claimant, the defendant must file and serve the counterclaim with the defence”. This cannot be read as an obligation on a defendant, seeking to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, to file their intended counterclaim along with their Defence (Jurisdiction). Such a construction would render O 6 r 7(4) and O 2 r 5(2) (which introduce the Defence (Jurisdiction)) redundant. Form 13, which Terraform relies on, also does not assist it as it only requires Terraform to plead the jurisdictional basis on which it is asking the court to try the counterclaim.

  99. [77] Terraform’s argument that it filed a Defence (Merits) and counterclaim because it was unsure, as a result of the claimants’ (poorly) pleaded case, if it could put forth a jurisdictional challenge, is also not supported by the facts. Pertinently, this argument appears to have only been raised in Terraform’s further arguments. It was not raised in Terraform’s (initial) submissions before me or the AR. Neither did Terraform’s defence and counterclaim include any statement to the effect that the Reservations were on account of Terraform’s uncertainty over its jurisdictional challenge. Rather, Terraform’s argument all along was that the Defence (Merits) was filed because Terraform believed that O 6 r 7(4) of the ROC 2021 allowed it to, and Form 13 obliged it to. Further, in an affidavit dated 28 February 2023 – well after Terraform’s Defence and Counterclaim was filed – Mr Arrash Christopher Amani (“Mr Amani”), Terraform’s Head of Operations and Community, emphasised that in the Pre‑Case Conference Questionnaire submitted on or around 9 November 2022, Terraform stated definitively that “[b]oth [Terraform’s] Terms of Use and the Anchor website’s Terms of Service contain inter alia an obligation to refer disputes to arbitration, as well as a prohibition against class or representative proceedings. The [claimants] (and/or any members of their purported groups) are therefore not entitled to bring or continue with representative proceedings in the Singapore court in relation to their claims for alleged misrepresentations found on [the Terra Ecosystem]” [emphasis added]. In the same affidavit, Mr Amani noted that Terraform filed its defence on 24 November 2022, in which (a) they challenged the court’s jurisdiction on, inter alia, the fact that the claimants were bound by an arbitration agreement; and (b) a reservation was included. Tellingly, Mr Amani did not express any uncertainty over the validity of this jurisdictional challenge. Hence, Terraform’s (further) argument that it was unsure of its position appears to be an afterthought. In any event, even if Terraform was unsure, the answer was not to file a Defence (Merits) and a Counterclaim, but to take steps to address its uncertainty (see [74] above).

  100. [78] Even if I am wrong in relation to Terraform’s conduct in filing its defence on merits and counterclaim, the subsequent steps it took made plain that it had taken steps in the proceedings.

  101. Applying for permission to file the Request Application and SAPT Summons

  102. [79] As noted above at [26]–[27], Terraform, Kwon and Luna filed the Request Application and the SAPT Summons, the latter of which sought various reliefs, including (a) F&BPs, (b) production of documents, and (c) a stay or striking out of the Suit. The claimants argued that these reliefs related to the merits of the Suit and showed a willingness to accept the jurisdiction of the court.

  103. [80] The fact that the Request Application (which enclosed the SAPT Summons) was merely a request does not mean that it was not a “step in the proceedings”. The Request Application was filed in the afternoon of 6 February 2023, and was followed almost immediately by the filing of the SAPT Summons the same day, before the Request Application itself even came up for consideration. On 8 February 2023, the SAR indicated that the Registry would reject both the Request Application and the SAPT Summons, and the court later recorded both as having been rejected.

  104. [81] The SAPT Summons was not a mere request – it was a proper application. As I discuss below, it involved matters that were clearly unrelated to Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge and would only have been necessary if Terraform accepted that the court had jurisdiction. In the circumstances, the Request Application could not be separated from the SAPT Summons and regarded as a mere request.

  105. [82] In any event, it is doubtful that the characterisation of an application as a request can save it from constituting a “step in the proceedings”. There is no principled reason why a request cannot be viewed as an affirmation of the correctness of the court proceedings, or an act which advances the hearing of the matter in court, which would result in it being considered a “step in the proceedings”: see Australian Timber at [19] and Carona Holdings at [93]. The determination will depend on the specific facts and circumstances involving the application.

  106. [83] Further, it does not matter that that the Request Application and the SAPT Summons were rejected. As noted in L Capital Jones Ltd and another v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 312 (“L Capital Jones”) at [83], even an application that is withdrawn, or one which the party no longer wishes to proceed with, cannot change the fact that a step has been taken in the proceedings. In the present case, the Request Application and the SAPT Summons were rejected by the court; it is therefore not the case that Terraform decided not to pursue the applications contained within the SAPT Summons. Thus, there was an even stronger argument here that the Request Application and the SAPT Summons demonstrated a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

  107. (1) F&BPs

  108. [84] An application to the court for F&BPs may be considered a “step in the proceedings”: see Carona Holdings at [101], referencing S P Chua Pte Ltd v Lee Kim Tah (Pte) Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 793 at [17]. However, an application for F&BPs will not constitute a “step in the proceedings” if it was sought to guide the defendant as to whether he should allow the action to proceed in court, or apply for a stay of proceedings: Carona Holdings at [91]. Applying these principles, a vital question was whether the F&BPs sought by Terraform went beyond what was necessary to ascertain the applicability of the Arbitration Clauses to the claims in the Suit.

  109. [85] In the SAPT Summons, Terraform applied for two sets of particulars of the SOC – (a) in “Annex A”, F&BPs in response to some of the F&BP requests made by Terraform, Kwon and Luna on 10 November 2022 (Terraform had complained that the claimants omitted to respond to some of these requests in their F&BPs response served on 13 January 2023); and (b) in “Annex B”, a new set of F&BPs comprising seven instances of particulars of the SOC. A number of these requests were clearly not relevant to the issue of jurisdiction.

  110. [86] First, a considerable number of the Annex A requests were plainly not relevant to Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge on the grounds of a prima facie arbitration agreement. For example:

  111. (a) para 5 of Annex A requested for the claimants to “state with proper particularity the facts and circumstances by which it is alleged that the contents of the [Terra Website] and the [Terra White Paper] … constituted an intention on the part of [Terraform] to create legal relations with the world”. This related to the issue of whether a contract was concluded between Terraform and the claimants such that the claimants could claim for breach of contract. This had nothing to do with whether the Arbitration Clauses applied – Terraform argued that an arbitration agreement “may be in the form of a separate agreement”;

  112. (b) similarly, para 24 of Annex A requested for the claimants to “state with proper particularity the facts and circumstances by which it is said that [Terraform] had an intention to create legal relations with [the claimants]” [emphasis added];

  113. (c) para 10 of Annex A requested for the claimants to “state with proper particularity how Anchor is regarded in fact or in law to be subsidized by [Terraform and Luna]”. This appeared relevant to the merits of the claimants’ claims under the tort of deceit, and in particular, the pleading that the Anchor Representations were false because “[i]n respect of the 5th Representation: Anchor was artificially subsidized by [Terraform and Luna], and in fact had no actual way to keep up the 20% APY [ie, Annualised Percentage Yields] in the long run”;

  114. (d) para 12 of Annex A requested for the claimants to state “[t]he precise manner in which Basis Cash may be said to be analogous to UST” and to particularise the “same reasons” why Basis Cash is said to have “failed for the same reasons as” UST did. This appeared relevant to the claimants’ claims under the tort of deceit against Terraform and Kwon, on the basis of their pleaded case that Terraform and Kwon “knew, or ought to have known, that the algorithm could not ensure UST’s price peg given that an analogous algorithmic stablecoin scheme, ‘Basis Cash’, was attempted by [Kwon] unsuccessfully. In fact, ‘Basis Cash’ had failed for the same reasons as UST”. This allegation pertained to both Terraform and Kwon, since the claimants’ pleaded case was that “[a]s [Kwon] was the director and therefore the controlling mind of [Terraform], [his] knowledge can be attributed to [Terraform]”;

  115. (e) para 26 of Annex A requested for the claimants to “state with proper particularity which of the matters pleaded at paragraphs 12 to 25 [of the SOC] are said to constitute the alleged conspiracy”. This request pertained to the claims of tortious conspiracy to injure and the pleaded case of the claimants that “the [defendants] (or any two or more together) wrongfully and with intent to injure the Claimants by unlawful means, conspired and combined together to commit fraudulent misrepresentations on the Claimants causing injury to the Claimants”; and

  116. (f) similarly, para 27 of Annex A requested for the claimants to “state with proper particularity which of the matters pleaded at paragraphs 12 to 27 [of the SOC] are said to constitute the alleged conspiracy”. This also pertained to the claims of tortious conspiracy to injure in the Suit, and the claimants’ pleaded case that “the 1st to 3rd Defendants (or any two or more together) wrongfully and with intent to injure the Claimants by unlawful means, conspired and combined together to defraud the Claimants and to conceal such fraud and the proceeds of such fraud from the Claimants”.

  117. [87] These requests clearly did not concern Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge. The requests in (a)–(b) related to the merits of the claim for breach of a contract formed between Terraform and the claimants; the requests in (c)–(d) related to the merits of the claim in deceit; and the requests in (e)–(f) related to the merits of the claim in conspiracy. Such requests would only be necessary on the assumption that Terraform accepted the court’s jurisdiction and intended to engage it over the merits of the Suit.

  118. [88] Terraform argued, in relation to Annex A, that the court “should not take an unnecessarily narrow view of what can and cannot be asked in [F&BPs] for a jurisdictional challenge”. They submitted that even if a request may not clearly relate to jurisdiction, it may have relevance to the overall case which a party wishes to bring in its jurisdictional challenge, or may be necessary for the party to determine if the asserted claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, or are needed to tie the claimants’ hands to make sure that they do not change their case once the jurisdictional challenge is brought. Terraform gave the example of its request for particulars as to whether the claimants had deposited UST on Anchor (at paras 6(g) and 8(h) of Annex A) – it argued that this request was “directly relevant to its jurisdictional challenge, even if this may not have been immediately obvious at the outset”. In this regard, Terraform in the Request Application stated that “the responses … by the Claimants to [Terraform’s] requests for F&BP are relevant to the grounds on which [Terraform] challenge[s] jurisdiction … and [Terraform] consider[s] it to be more efficient and consistent with the Ideals for the application for F&BP to be determined at the same time” [emphasis added].

  119. [90] Terraform also argued that it had made the Annex A requests on behalf of Kwon and Luna who were fully entitled to address the claimants’ claims in court (since they did not claim to be party to an arbitration agreement with the claimants). This argument was not made in any affidavit, but only in written submissions before the AR and at the oral hearing before me. It was a non-starter. The requests were made also on behalf of Terraform and there was no reason for it to have joined in those requests if they were not intended for it. More importantly, it was clear that Terraform would directly benefit from the responses to the requests.

  120. [91] For the reasons noted above at [86]–[87], some of the Annex A particulars were clearly sought for the purpose of enabling Terraform to respond to the merits of the claimants’ pleaded case. The Annex A requests clearly went beyond the scope of what was necessary for the purpose of the jurisdictional challenge, and constituted a “step in the proceedings”.

  121. [92] In relation to Annex B, many of the F&BP requests centred on ascertaining the amounts which the claimants paid for their UST, the number of UST they purchased and sold, as well as the profit they made from their UST deposits on the Anchor Protocol. The aim of such requests appeared to be to ascertain the quantum for which Terraform may be liable to the claimants. For example:

  122. (a) para 1(a) requested for the claimants to “state in precise numerical terms” the amount paid for their UST, while para 1(d) requested for “the prevailing exchange rate” applied for each purchase of UST;

  123. (b) para 1(b) requested for the claimants to state “the precise number of UST purchased in each tranche”, while para 5(a) requested for “the precise number of UST sold in each tranche”; and

  124. (c) para 5(a) also requested for the precise consideration received for each UST sold and “the prevailing exchange rate” applied for each sale of UST, while para 6, similar to paras 6(g) and 8(h) of Annex A, requested for “a full account of the yield, earnings and/or profit received from such deposits on Anchor”.

  125. [93] Similarly, para 23 of Annex A requested for the claimants to state “precisely what ‘fiat currency or equivalent’ the [claimants] would have kept the precise sum in”. This request was in relation to the claimants’ claim in the SOC that if they had not purchased UST, they would likely have kept the purchase sum in “fiat currency or equivalent”. It appeared only relevant to the quantum of damages Terraform might be liable to the claimants.

  126. [94] Terraform’s act of requesting for particulars relating to the quantum of damages was inconsistent with its jurisdictional challenge. There was no reason why such information was needed unless Terraform intended to engage the court’s jurisdiction to assess the quantum of damages. Thus, such act constituted a “step in the proceedings”.

  127. (2) Application for striking out

  128. [95] An application to strike out proceedings on the basis that it is unmeritorious is an act that signifies a submission to the court’s jurisdiction to resolve the dispute on the merits: L Capital Jones at [78].

  129. [96] In the SAPT Summons, Terraform sought to strike out and/or stay the Suit on various bases:

  130. (a) that the claimants’ pleaded claims are lacking in material averments and/or particulars and/or disclose no reasonable cause of action;

  131. (b) that there is a lack of common interest or sufficient common interest between the claimants such that the action does not generate judicial economy, save costs, and/or it is otherwise inconsistent with the Ideals under O 3 r 1 of the ROC 2021 for the action to continue as representative proceedings, and the claims of all claimants other than the Representative Claimants be struck out or stayed;

  132. (c) that the Representative Claimants are not in possession of and/or have not been authorised to bring these representative proceedings by written consents given by each of the other claimants;

  133. (d) that some or all of the claimants are party to an arbitration agreement, and the claims of all such claimants be stayed pursuant to s 6 of the IAA; and

  134. I deal with each of these bases in turn.

  135. [97] Basis (a) comprises two limbs – that the pleaded claims (i) are lacking in material averments and/or particulars; and (ii) disclose no reasonable cause of action. The first limb was clearly inconsistent with Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge – it was an invitation for the court to exercise its jurisdiction over the action by assessing whether the pleaded claims contained sufficient particularity.

  136. [98] In so far as an argument could be made, in relation to the first limb of basis (a), that a lack of particulars in the pleaded claims affected the propriety of the Suit as a representative action, and hence this basis for striking out went to the court’s jurisdiction over the Suit (and therefore was not inconsistent with Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge) – that is incorrect. To be clear, Terraform did not make this argument, but nevertheless I address it as it has implications for bases (b) and (c) of the striking‑out application.

  137. [99] In the first place, many of Terraform’s requests for F&BPs were not sought for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Suit was rightly brought as a representative action; for example, Terraform sought particulars relating to quantum of damages as well as the elements of deceit and conspiracy (see [87] and [94] above). In any case, and on a more fundamental level, a striking‑out application on the basis that the Suit was not properly brought as a representative action is inconsistent with a jurisdictional challenge. It is not a preliminary or threshold issue like the “fundamental procedural defect” in Maniach (at [84]) – even if the Suit was not properly brought as a representative action, the Representative Claimants are still rightfully before the court as far as their own claims are concerned. They will simply not be able to represent the other claimants. More importantly, if Terraform is contesting jurisdiction on the basis of the Arbitration Clauses, there is no reason for it to ask the court to determine the propriety of the Suit as a representative action. On the contrary, that expressly invites the court to exercise jurisdiction over the Suit.

  138. [100] Hence, bases (b) and (c), which essentially challenged the propriety of the Suit as a representative action, were inconsistent with the jurisdictional challenge and therefore constituted a “step in the proceedings”. This was particularly evident in the case of basis (b), where Terraform was asking the court to strike out the action on the grounds of a lack of common interest between the claimants. This entails asking the court to (a) examine the claims of each claimant (or class of claimants); (b) compare the significance of the common issues between the claimants with the significance of the issues which differed as between them; and (c) consider whether it was expedient for the court to determine all the claims in the Suit: see Koh Chong Chiah and others v Treasure Resort Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 1204 (“Treasure Resort”) at [29], [60] and [86]. Thus, asking the court to find a lack of common (or sufficiently common) interest, such that the representative action should be discontinued, was asking the court to assume jurisdiction over the Suit and was incompatible with a desire to arbitrate.

  139. [101] In relation to the second limb of basis (a), ie, that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed, this basis for striking out relates directly to the merits or elements of the relevant cause(s) of action – it requires the court to examine the allegations in the pleadings and determine if there is a cause of action which has some chance of success: see Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 at [21]. Terraform did not argue that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed because there was a fundamental procedural defect with the bringing of the Suit (as opposed to a deficiency on the merits). In any event, there was no such defect here – as explained above at [99], the issue of the propriety of the Suit as a representative action does not constitute such a defect. In the circumstances, the application to strike out the Suit on the basis that there was no reasonable cause of action could only have related to the merits of the claim. It therefore constituted a “step in the proceedings”.

  140. [102] I observe that in any event, Terraform did not explicitly argue that the striking-out application in the SAPT Summons related only to its jurisdictional challenge. Rather, Terraform’s position on the whole was that the applications in the SAPT Summons were “fallback” applications which its intended jurisdictional challenge took precedence over. I address this argument below at [108]–[115].

  141. [103] For completeness, bases (d) and (e) were not “steps in the proceedings”: (d) was the basis of Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge and (e) appeared related to (d) in that it was presumably asking for the Suit to be struck out or stayed on case management grounds because all or some of the claimants may be subject to an arbitration agreement.

  142. (3) Application for production of documents

  143. [105] In its further arguments, Terraform raised the additional point that the requirement for written consents “is a purely procedural requirement under O 4 r 6(3) of the ROC 2021”. Terraform argued that since the issue of compliance with court rules cannot be referred to arbitration, seeking relief from the court in respect of this requirement was not inconsistent with choosing to arbitrate, and could not be considered a “step in the proceedings”.

  144. [106] I consider that the application for production of the RAAs was a “step in the proceedings”. As noted above at [99], the issue of the propriety of the Suit as a representative action was not necessary to advance the application to stay the Suit in favour of arbitration or preserve the right to do so. Indeed, whether the Representative Claimants had obtained proper written consents to bring the Suit on behalf of the claimants was irrelevant to whether the claim should be arbitrated. There was no reason for Terraform to seek the RAAs if it was bringing a jurisdictional challenge. The application was therefore inconsistent with Terraform’s jurisdictional challenge and constituted a “step in the proceedings”.

  145. [107] In any case, Terraform’s argument that the requirement for written consents dealt with a purely procedural issue rather than one relating to merits was only raised in further arguments. Prior to that, Terraform only relied on the general argument that the applications in the SAPT Summons were “fallback” applications in case the jurisdictional challenge failed.

  146. (4) The reliefs sought in the Request Application and SAPT Summons were not fall-back applications

  147. [108] I did not accept Terraform’s argument that the reliefs sought in the Request Application and SAPT Summons were merely “fall-back” applications to its jurisdictional challenge, and therefore did not amount to a “step in the proceedings”. In this regard, Terraform relied on Zoom Communications at [45], where the court held that the “making of a stay application on improper forum grounds as a fall--back would not prejudice the primary application challenging the existence of the Singapore courts’ jurisdiction”, where the applications were intended to “fall to be considered in a cascading sequence, and not together”.

  148. [109] This argument failed on the plain wording of the Request Application and the SAPT Summons.

  149. [110] First, the SAPT Summons prayed for F&BP orders “pending determination of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants’ application to strike out or stay proceedings” [emphasis added] and prayed for orders for the RAAs to be produced “pending determination” of the same. The clear intention was for these applications to be heard and disposed of first, not as an alternative to the application for a stay in favour of arbitration.

  150. [111] Second, as noted above at [96], the SAPT Summons prayed for a stay or striking out of the Suit on several grounds. These included, inter alia, the “stay in favour of arbitration”, alongside other substantive grounds on the merits (eg, that no reasonable cause of action had been disclosed). These varied grounds were being invoked either conjunctively or disjunctively, as evidenced by the use of the words “and/or” in the SAPT Summons. This was irreconcilable with the interpretation that the “stay in favour of arbitration” was the primary ground for a stay, with the other grounds being prayed for only in the alternative.

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