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Grounds publishedDecided 29 Dec 2023

General Division of the High Court

Marten, Joseph Matthew and another v AIQ Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others

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[2023] SGHC 361Case no. Suit No 939 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] HC/S 939/2018 started as a dispute between two major shareholders of the 1st Defendant, AIQ Pte Ltd (“AIQ”); namely, the 1st Plaintiff – Marten Joseph Matthew (“Joe”) – and the 3rd Defendant, Goh Soo Siah (“GSS”). The dispute initially arose from these two shareholders’ disagreement over their respective funding responsibilities for AIQ and its subsidiary, the 2nd Defendant, The Carrot Patch Pte Ltd (“TCP”). As AIQ became mired in financial difficulties, the dispute between the two shareholders spilled over into other areas, with the directors of AIQ being drawn into the fray as well. Joe was eventually removed as a director of both companies. Shortly thereafter, he and the 2nd Plaintiff – Thames Global Enterprises Ltd (“Thames”, a company registered in the British Virgin Islands) – commenced the present suit against GSS and AIQ’s directors (the 4th to 7th Defendants). The Plaintiffs alleged, in gist, that the 3rd to 7th Defendants had oppressed their interests as minority shareholders of the two companies and that they had also conspired to injure the Plaintiffs by unlawful as well as lawful means. The companies, AIQ and TCP, were joined as nominal defendants to the Plaintiffs’ action.

  3. [2] At the conclusion of the trial, I dismissed the Plaintiffs’ action. I now set out my reasons in these written grounds.

  4. Facts

  5. The parties

  6. [3] AIQ, which was previously known as iQnect Pte Ltd, dealt with the development and sale of artificial intelligence and the offering of offline-online-offline integrated solutions. AIQ’s core business included the development of software, including a visual recognition technology software meant for use in Android or iOS based mobile devices. AIQ’s main assets were the visual recognition technology (the “VRT”) that was being developed and the intellectual property rights thereto. TCP, its subsidiary, was in the business of operating a co-working space.

  7. [4] Joe is a registered shareholder of TCP. In the present suit, he also claimed to be the beneficial owner of the shares in AIQ held by Thames. In gist, on 14 December 2017, Joe had transferred to Thames his entire shareholding in AIQ. According to Joe’s claims at trial, Thames was wholly owned by him and held its 27.42% shareholding in AIQ as a “nominal shareholder”, with Joe owning the entire beneficial interest in those shares. I add that although the term used in the Plaintiffs’ pleadings was “nominal shareholder”, the Plaintiffs made it clear in their submissions that they meant to refer to Thames as a “nominee shareholder”, in the sense in which the latter term was used in cases such as Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd [2004] 2 BCLC 191 (“Atlasview”).

  8. [5] Joe was also a director of AIQ, as well as its Chairman, and a director of TCP , up till the point when he was removed from these positions on 28 May 2018 and 29 March 2019 respectively.

  9. [6] GSS is a shareholder of AIQ. GSS presently holds 50.04% of shares in AIQ.

  10. [7] The 4th Defendant Goh Boon Huat (“Leslie”), was appointed as a director of AIQ on 27 September 2016 and as a director of TCP on 12 May 2017. Leslie is GSS’ son and his nominee on the AIQ board.

  11. [8] The 5th Defendant, Marcus Sunny Tan Sen Kit (“Marcus”), joined AIQ as a consultant in February 2017. He was appointed as AIQ’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) on 6 March 2017. He was subsequently appointed as a director of AIQ on 17 March 2017 and as a director of TCP on 12 May 2017. Marcus is GSS’ nephew and Leslie’s cousin.

  12. [9] The 6th Defendant, Loo Kian Wai (“Kian Wai”) initially joined AIQ as a finance and human resources director in April 2017. He was subsequently promoted to become AIQ’s vice-president (“VP”) of finance and human resources in July or August 2017, eventually becoming the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) in October 2017. Kian Wai was appointed as a director of both AIQ and TCP on 20 November 2017.

  13. [10] The 7th Defendant Seah Ting Han Jeffrey (“Jeffrey”) started providing advisory services to AIQ in mid-2015 and eventually entered into a formal “Advisor Agreement” with AIQ on 18 October 2016. He was appointed as a director of AIQ on 9 January 2017 and as a director of TCP on 12 May 2017.

  14. Background to the dispute

  15. [11] As noted earlier, Joe and Thames brought the present suit against the other significant shareholder in AIQ (GSS) and the directors (Leslie, Marcus, Kian Wai and Jeffrey), claiming that they (Joe and Thames) were victims of minority oppression, and conspiracy by both unlawful and lawful means. The facts relied on by Joe and Thames in support of their claims have been set out in detail in their Statement of Claim. Not surprisingly, the Defendants disputed the Plaintiffs’ version of events and pleaded their own version. The Defendants also raised objections to the case advanced by the Plaintiffs at trial, on the ground that the latter had – in their closing submissions – departed from their pleaded case. To provide context, therefore, I outline below the background facts and the undisputed timeline of key events, before summarising the parties’ pleaded cases.

  16. [12] As a start-up which was incorporated in Singapore on 17 February 2014, AIQ relied on investors to fund its business operations. Over the years post incorporation, it raised such funds by acquiring more shareholders. AIQ had a portfolio of patents acquired from a company called Logovision; and these were eventually consolidated into two patents which constituted what came to be known as the secured patents (at [14] below). Joe became a director of AIQ from 14 July 2014. At that time, the other major shareholder of AIQ besides Joe was one Carl Johan Freer (“Carl Freer”) (who was the owner of Logovision), whose son Adam Carl-Johan Agerstam (“Carl Johan”) was appointed as a director in AIQ.

  17. [13] Sometime in 2015, Joe was introduced to Leslie (the 4th Defendant). After a meeting at which they discussed AIQ’s business and future potential, Joe was informed that GSS (Leslie’s father) was interested in investing in the company. GSS subsequently acquired a shareholding of about 5.86% in AIQ . At that point, the company was said to be valued at US$75 million (although there does not appear to have been any official valuation report as such).

  18. [14] Eventually, the potential acquisition of AIQ by a company called Powa Technologies (“Powa”) fell through, and Carl Freer left AIQ. Left to fund AIQ by himself, Joe approached GSS through Leslie, to ascertain if GSS was willing to co-fund AIQ. This led to AIQ entering into a convertible loan agreement with GSS on 19 July 2016 whereby GSS agreed to provide a loan of US$1 million to AIQ (“Convertible Loan Agreement”). In tandem with this Convertible Loan Agreement, two supplemental agreements were entered into: a supplemental deed to the Convertible Loan Agreement dated 30 November 2017, and a deed of patent charge dated 15 December 2017 (“Deed of Patent Charge”). The Deed of Patent Charge contained inter alia the following key terms:

  19. (a) AIQ assigned GSS a first legal charge over its patents as a continuing security for any debts due under the Convertible Loan Agreement (“Secured Patents”);

  20. (b) This was to be a continuing security until the Convertible Loan Agreement was repaid in full or until GSS discharged the Deed of Patent Charge in writing;

  21. (c) The various specified events of default included inter alia the failure of AIQ to pay any principal, interest or other sum payable under the Convertible Loan Agreement on the day on which such payment was due and payable;

  22. (d) Upon the occurrence of an event of default, GSS or his nominees would have (as they saw fit in their absolute discretion) the authority to sell, dispose of or realise all or any parts of the Secured Patents towards the discharge of the costs thereby incurred and the debts owed.

  23. [15] TCP was incorporated in Singapore on 12 May 2017.

  24. [16] On 2 October 2017, Joe and GSS executed a document known as the Share Transfer Deed. The Share Transfer Deed contained inter alia the following key terms:

  25. (a) Joe was to transfer to GSS 235,000 AIQ shares for consideration of the sum of $1;

  26. (b) GSS and AIQ agreed that the sum of $3,979,694.19 previously advanced by Joe to AIQ (the “JMM Loan”) was to be accepted and reflected in AIQ’s books and records as a “loan payable to [Joe] absolutely and without any deduction or set-off whatsoever”. AIQ’s board confirmed that it had, “together with the CFO of [AIQ]”, verified “that the JMM Loan [was] fully payable without any deduction to [Joe]”;

  27. (c) AIQ’s board “confirms” that there would be no deduction of the JMM Loan on account of any acts or omissions, whether negligent or otherwise, for the acts of Carl Freer and Carl Johan; and

  28. (d) The board “agree to accept” a pre-determined treatment for past transactions by AIQ which had been flagged by the company’s auditors as being problematic; namely, the “Medical Application Purchase” and the “FilmFunds Transaction”.

  29. [17] On 3 October 2017, Joe transferred 235,000 AIQ shares to GSS for the consideration of $1, pursuant to the terms of the Share Transfer Deed. As part of the arrangements for the transfer of shares, Joe was also to transfer another 100,000 AIQ shares that he had been holding on trust for one MacFadden back to the latter. Following the share transfers, Joe held 765,000 shares (44.75% shareholding) in AIQ while GSS had 315,908 shares (18.48% shareholding).

  30. [18] Sometime on 25 January 2018, emails were sent to Joe and GSS by Kian Wai, asking both parties to provide bridging loans to AIQ and TCP. Both companies were then facing severe cash flow problems and were struggling to repay their debts. Joe responded by offering to sell GSS his entire shareholding in AIQ and TCP for a total of US$3.8m – an offer which was rejected by GSS. Further email correspondence discussing a potential buy out by GSS of Joe took place over the course of the following week, but no agreement was reached.

  31. [19] On 30 January 2018, an invitation to subscribe in the share capital increase of AIQ was sent by AIQ to all its shareholders (“Rights Issue”). The subscription price of the Rights Issue was $0.28 per share. Joe sent a letter to the directors via email on 31 January 2018 to express his concerns about the Rights Issue. On 4 February 2018, Marcus responded via email to Joe’s stated concerns. In turn, Joe sent another email on 6 February 2018 responding to Marcus.

  32. [20] AIQ proceeded with the Rights Issue. On 26 February 2018, AIQ informed its shareholders in a letter that a total of 1,080,000 shares had been taken up in the Rights Issue over two rounds of subscription. These shares were allotted or issued on 16 March 2018. Following the issuance of the shares, GSS became the majority shareholder of AIQ, with a shareholding of 1,395,908 shares (50.04% shareholding) in AIQ while Joe’s shareholding remained at 765,000 shares (27.42% shareholding) in AIQ.

  33. [21] On 10 May 2018, a notice was sent to all shareholders – including Joe – of an EGM to be held on 28 May 2018 (“28 May 2018 EGM”). The resolutions put up for the EGM included a resolution calling for a special audit by an independent third-party of AIQ’s accounts and transactions for the financial years 2014 and 2015 (“Special Audit”) and resolutions calling for the re-election of AIQ’s board of directors (including Joe). Joe wrote to the AIQ directors, through his lawyers, on 11 May 2018 and 22 May 2018, stating his objections to the 28 May 2018 EGM notice and the proposed resolutions. The directors did not reply to his lawyers’ letters.

  34. [22] At the 28 May 2018 EGM, Joe was not re-elected as a director of AIQ. He was therefore removed from the AIQ board. The Special Audit was approved as well at the 28 May 2018 EGM.

  35. [23] The Special Audit was carried out by a company named TRS Forensics Pte Ltd (“TRS Forensics”). A report was produced at the end of the Special Audit (“Special Audit Report”), and a summary of the results was sent to all shareholders on 14 August 2018. The findings reported in the Special Audit Report are dealt with below (at [444444]–[445445]).

  36. [24] On 29 March 2019, TCP held its first Annual General Meeting (“29 March 2019 AGM”). The resolutions put forward at this AGM included resolutions for the re-election of all directors, including Joe. Joe – who did not attend the AGM – was not re-elected as a director. He was removed from the TCP board despite his protests.

  37. [25] By this time, AIQ had run into significant financial difficulties due to the lack of funding from its shareholders. On 19 June 2019, GSS informed AIQ that he was giving notice of his demand for repayment of the outstanding sum of US$1,124,864.00 under the Convertible Loan Agreement. This sum of US$1,124,864.00 comprised the principal amount of US$1m and the outstanding interest of US$124,864.00. No payment being forthcoming from AIQ, GSS’ lawyers served a statutory demand on the company on 16 December 2019, demanding payment of the sum of US$1,124,864.00. After AIQ failed to comply with the statutory demand, it was wound up on 5 June 2020. Joe did not resist the winding-up application. The liquidator whom Joe nominated was appointed as AIQ’s liquidator – instead of the liquidator nominated by GSS.

  38. [26] Prior to the winding-up of AIQ, AIQ had on 23 October 2019 assigned its Secured Patents to GSS. Marcus signed the agreement to assign the Secured Patents (“Assignment Agreement”) on behalf of AIQ.

  39. [27] On 16 December 2019, TCP was similarly served by GSS’ lawyers with a statutory demand for the repayment of loans amounting to $572,127.18. As TCP failed to comply with the statutory demand, it too was wound up on 5 June 2020. Again, Joe did not resist the winding-up application. The liquidator whom Joe nominated was also appointed as TCP’s liquidator.

  40. The parties’ pleaded cases

  41. [28] I next summarise the parties’ pleaded cases.

  42. Plaintiffs’ pleaded case

  43. [29] In their Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs pleaded two causes of action against the 3rd to 7th Defendants: first, a cause of action in minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”); and second, the common law tort of conspiracy with intent to injure and/or to cause loss to the Plaintiffs.

  44. Key allegations of the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case

  45. [30] Much of the Plaintiffs’ case rested on two central propositions. The first was that a mutual understanding and agreement existed between Joe and GSS (“Understanding and Agreement”), which – according to the Plaintiffs – was entered into sometime in early 2017. According to the Plaintiffs, this Understanding and Agreement was intended by Joe and GSS to govern the future conduct and management of AIQ and TCP, and formed the basis on which Joe and GSS were to continue funding AIQ. The terms of the Understanding and Agreement were said to include the following:

  46. (a) From January 2017 until the point in time when AIQ became financially independent, Joe and GSS would bear AIQ’s costs and expenses, with GSS bearing two-thirds of these costs and expenses and Joe bearing one-third (“2:1 Funding Agreement”);

  47. (b) Joe would receive full financial information about AIQ’s business and its progress;

  48. (c) Joe would remain a director and the Chairman of AIQ for which he would continue to receive his agreed remuneration;

  49. (d) Joe and GSS’ nominees would be directors of AIQ and would participate in the conduct of AIQ’s business;

  50. (e) GSS’ nominee-directors would utilise the funding provided to advance the development and sale of artificial intelligence and the offering of offline-online-offline integrated solutions (“Principal Object”), particularly the development and commercialisation of AIQ’s VRT;

  51. (f) TCP was to be incorporated so that it would become an additional source of revenue for AIQ, and also so that it would provide AIQ with a talent pool to recruit from and to look to for the generation of business ideas;

  52. (g) Joe would receive full financial information about TCP’s business and its progress; and

  53. (h) Joe and GSS’ nominees would be directors of TCP and would participate in the conduct of the business of TCP.

  54. [31] The Plaintiffs also pleaded that “(b)y reason of the Understanding and Agreement and close business relationship”, Joe (through Thames) and GSS were “in a quasi-partnership as the largest shareholders of [AIQ] and the only parties continuing to fund [AIQ]” as at 2017.

  55. [32] The second proposition underlying the Plaintiff’s case concerned GSS’ role in AIQ and TCP: the Plaintiffs claimed that GSS played a far bigger role than that of a shareholder in AIQ. According to the Plaintiffs, GSS was a shadow director of AIQ and TCP who exercised control over the two companies through the directors, ie, the 4th to 7th Defendants.

  56. [33] In gist, the Plaintiffs claimed that the 3rd to 7th Defendants had teamed up to drive Joe out of AIQ and to obtain the Secured Patents for themselves. Per the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case, this campaign against Joe started with GSS covertly usurping control of the AIQ board by getting the 4th to 7th Defendants appointed as directors . Having been so appointed, the 4th to 7th Defendants then acted in accordance with GSS’ instructions and directions. Their actions allegedly included the following: excluding Joe from the day-to-day management of AIQ and TCP; spending funds meant for AIQ on TCP expenses instead; pressuring Joe to transfer some of his AIQ shares to GSS for nominal consideration; denying Joe’s right to inspect the books and records of AIQ and TCP; refusing to pay Joe his outstanding salary; and refusing repayment of the loans made by Joe to AIQ.

  57. [34] While the 4th to 7th Defendants were carrying out these alleged acts against Joe, GSS himself was alleged to have breached the Understanding and Agreement with Joe by reneging on the 2:1 Funding Agreement. Without funding, AIQ floundered. Sometime in late January to early February 2018, the Rights Issue was carried out for the stated purpose of raising funds for AIQ’s financial needs – despite Joe having pointed out various concerns. It was this Rights Issue which caused substantial wrongful dilution to Joe’s AIQ shareholding.

  58. [35] Subsequent to the Rights Issue, Joe was removed as a director of AIQ at AIQ’s EGM on 28 May 2018 – despite the presence of procedural irregularities. The same EGM also approved the resolution calling for a Special Audit. According to the Plaintiffs, the 3rd to 7th Defendants procured the Special Audit Report for the purpose of using it to level accusations against Joe, thereby compelling him to leave AIQ and Singapore altogether. At TCP’s EGM on 29 March 2019, Joe was also removed as a director of TCP – despite the meeting being inquorate.

  59. [36] In a final blow to the Plaintiffs, GSS applied to wind up AIQ and TCP on 5 June 2020. Per the Plaintiffs’ case, this was done for the purpose of causing further prejudice to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs charged that it was the 3rd to 7th Defendants who had actually caused AIQ to cease commercial efforts and thus to fail. As part of AIQ’s winding-up, the 3rd to 7th Defendants also caused AIQ to dispose of the Secured Patents to GSS, so that he could continue to commercialise the VRT without Joe being involved.

  60. [37] Per the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case, this series of acts – and each individual act – was oppressive vis-à-vis the Plaintiffs within the meaning of s 216 of the Companies Act. Further, these acts constituted a breach by GSS of the Understanding and Agreement and also constituted a conspiracy by the 3rd to 7th Defendants to breach the Understanding and Agreement. In gist, the Plaintiffs alleged that GSS had conspired and combined with the 4th to 7th Directors wrongfully and with intent to injure the Plaintiffs, and/or that they had conspired and combined together with the sole or predominant intention of injuring the Plaintiffs.

  61. [38] The Plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered the following losses as a result of the above actions by the 3rd to 7th Defendants:

  62. (a) Loss of investment capital in the form of equity capital paid by Joe as his initial investment in AIQ, due to AIQ’s liquidation;

  63. (b) Impairment of Joe’s ability to recover from AIQ outstanding loan amounts, due to AIQ’s liquidation;

  64. (c) Impairment of Joe’s ability to recover outstanding salary owed to him by AIQ, due to AIQ’s liquidation;

  65. (d) Damage done to Joe in the form of dilution of his AIQ shareholding and substantial loss in the value of his shares;

  66. (e) Costs and expenses incurred by the Plaintiffs in pursuing their claims for the repayment of outstanding loans and the payment of Joe’s outstanding salary;

  67. (f) Costs and expenses incurred by Joe and business or investment opportunities lost by him in having to leave Singapore to avoid the embarrassment and reputational damage caused by the publication of the Special Audit Report.

  68. [39] I have set out at [30]–[36] the two key themes in the Plaintiffs’ pleaded narrative because I found it useful to bear these in mind when considering the Plaintiffs’ case at the end of the trial. The Plaintiffs put forward multiple allegations against the 3rd to the 7th Defendants in their pleadings as well as in their closing submissions; and the ostensible complexity created by the multitude of allegations was not helped by the Plaintiffs apparently deciding to change their position on crucial parts of their case only in closing submissions (see eg [215]–[217], [283]–[284] below). What did not change in closing submissions, however, was the Plaintiffs’ insistence on an overarching narrative which posited an Understanding and Agreement between Joe and GSS, and depicted the latter as a shadow director who controlled the actions of AIQ’s and TCP’s Directors.

  69. [40] I should add that this overarching narrative also applied to the Plaintiffs’ case in unlawful means and lawful means conspiracy.

  70. 3rd Defendant’s (GSS’) pleaded case

  71. [41] GSS denied the two central propositions underlying the Plaintiffs’ case in minority oppression. First, GSS denied the existence of an “Understanding and Agreement” between him and Joe as pleaded by the Plaintiffs (at [30] above). GSS also asserted that although he and Joe were the largest shareholders of AIQ as at 2017 and although they were the only two shareholders providing funding to AIQ at that time, there was no “close” business relationship between them; much less a “quasi-partnership”.

  72. [42] Second, GSS asserted that he had never been a “shadow director” of AIQ and TCP – nor had he acted together with the 4th to 7th Defendants to injure the Plaintiffs’ interests in the two companies. At all material times, he was simply an investor and shareholder in AIQ and the 4th to 7th Defendants were not accustomed to act in accordance with his directions or instructions. While he had nominated Leslie to AIQ’s board of directors, Joe remained the Executive Chairman of AIQ between July 2014 and 28 May 2018. It was Joe, therefore, who was in charge of AIQ during that period of time. As for TCP’s board of directors, GSS played no part in nominating the 4th to 7th Defendants to the TCP board, nor did he have any knowledge of the matters relating to TCP’s shareholding.

  73. [43] In fact, according to GSS, as he was not involved in the management of AIQ and TCP, he had no knowledge of most of the matters alleged by the Plaintiffs. These included the following allegations:

  74. (a) That there was deliberate exclusion of Joe from the management and commercial direction of AIQ and TCP;

  75. (b) That funds meant for AIQ had been diverted to TCP instead;

  76. (c) That Joe was denied access to TCP’s financial information;

  77. (d) That Joe had to file an application in HC/OS 624/2018 under ss 199(3) and 199(5) of the Companies Act to inspect and take copies of AIQ’s and TCP’s accounting and other records (“Inspection Application”), which was resisted by the 4th to 7th Defendants;

  78. (e) That the 4th to 7th Defendants denied Joe payment of his outstanding salary; and

  79. (f) That the 4th to 7th Defendants also denied Joe the repayment of outstanding loans owed by AIQ to him.

  80. [44] In respect of the remaining allegations, GSS contended that the acts complained of by the Plaintiffs – such as the EGM which led to Joe’s removal from the AIQ board – were all above-board and that there was no ulterior motive behind these acts. There was thus no basis for the Plaintiffs to claim that they were victims of minority oppression, let alone a conspiracy to injure them.

  81. 4th-7th Defendants’ pleaded cases

  82. [45] As for the 4th to 7th Defendants, they did not plead to the Understanding and Agreement. They also denied that GSS was a shadow director of AIQ and TCP and/or that they had been accustomed to acting in accordance with his instructions. At all material times from the date of their respective appointments as AIQ directors, they had acted independently, and in the best interest of AIQ, in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities. Further, the 4th to 7th Defendants denied that they had combined or agreed (whether with each other or with any other Defendant) to cause loss to the Plaintiffs pursuant to a conspiracy or at all.

  83. [46] In respect of the individual acts of oppression alleged by the Plaintiffs, the 4th to 7th Defendants contended that many of these alleged acts had in fact been carried out in the best interests of AIQ (eg the Rights Issue was carried out to raise much needed fresh capital for AIQ’s operational expenses) , and/or that the alleged acts had not in fact occurred (eg the 4th to 7th Defendants had already met Joe’s request for information relating to AIQ and TCP). In any case, according to the 4th to 7th Defendants, the Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that they had suffered any loss or damage.

  84. Issues to be determined

  85. [47] The following issues arose for my determination:

  86. (a) Whether the Plaintiffs had the locus standi to bring the present action for minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act;

  87. (b) Whether Joe’s actions were relevant to the court’s assessment of whether there was “commercial unfairness” for the purposes of the claim for minority oppression;

  88. (c) If the Plaintiffs had requisite locus standi to bring the action under s 216 of the Companies Act, whether their claim of minority oppression was made out;

  89. (d) Whether there was a conspiracy between the 3rd to 7th Defendants to injure and/or cause loss to the Plaintiffs by unlawful means;

  90. (e) Whether there was a conspiracy between the 3rd to 7th Defendants with the sole or predominant intention to injure the Plaintiffs and/or cause loss to the Plaintiffs by lawful means.

  91. [48] I consider these issues in seriatim.

  92. Pleadings: General principles

  93. [49] At the outset, the 3rd to 7th Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiffs’ closing submissions departed from their pleaded case in a number of significant ways. In these written grounds, I will explain my findings in respect of the Plaintiffs’ alleged attempts to deviate from their pleaded case. For ease of reference, I first summarise below the principles which I bore in mind in considering the Defendants’ objections.

  94. [50] As a general rule, a “court may not make a finding or give a decision based on facts not pleaded and a finding or decision so made will be set aside” (Wei Ho-Hung v Lyu Jun [2022] 2 SLR 1066 at [62]–[63]; China Construction (South Pacific) Development Co Pte Ltd v Shao Hai [2004] 2 SLR(R) 479 (“China Construction”) at [26]; Lu Bang Song v Teambuild Construction Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2009] SGHC 49 (“Lu Bang Song”) at [16]). Facts that are material to a party’s claim or a party’s defence must be pleaded (Multi-Pak Singapore Pte Ltd (in receivership) v Intraco Ltd and others [1992] 2 SLR(R) 382 (“Multi-Pak”) at [22]–[23]). The definition of “material” in this context has been explained by the High Court in UJT v UTR and another matter [2018] 4 SLR 931 (“UJT v UJR”) (at [48]):

  95. [51] The above principle is also encapsulated in O 18 r 7(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) which states:

  96. [52] The rationale behind this principle is to prevent surprises from arising at trial by defining the issues in dispute between the parties (Lu Bang Song at [17]; UJT v UJR at [48]) and also to provide the opposing party with adequate opportunity to prepare and present his own case, by informing the opposing party in advance of the case to be met (China Construction at [26]; Multi-Pak at [22]–[23]).

  97. [53] Departure from this general principle is normally permitted only in limited circumstances. Although a court retains the discretion to allow an unpleaded point to be raised, this is done chiefly when no prejudice is caused to the other party in the trial or where it would be clearly unjust for the court to withhold its permissions (Malayan Banking Bhd v ASL Shipyard Pte Ltd and others [2019] SGHC 61 (“Malayan Banking”),at [42]–[43]).

  98. Whether the Plaintiffs had locus standi to bring proceedings under s 216 of the Companies Act in respect of the alleged oppression of their rights as members of the 1st Defendant (AIQ)

  99. [54] I first address the preliminary issue of locus standi. This arose in respect of the allegations of oppression of the Plaintiffs’ rights as members of AIQ.

  100. [55] The Plaintiffs’ locus standi to bring the AIQ-related claims of oppression was put in issue by the 3rd to 7th Defendants in their closing submissions. They contended that Joe lacked the locus standi to bring the AIQ-related claims because Joe ceased to be a member of AIQ after transferring his shares to Thames on 14 December 2017. As at the date when the present suit was filed on 25 September 2018, therefore, Joe had no standing to pursue the oppression claim under s 216 of the Companies Act insofar as it related to AIQ.

  101. [56] As for Thames, the Defendants contended that it too had no locus standi to bring the AIQ-related claims of oppression, despite being a registered member of AIQ as of 25 September 2018. This, according to the Defendants, was because the AIQ-related allegations of oppression concerned acts which were said to have been commercially unfair to Joe. These allegations had nothing to do with Thames; and Thames could not claim that it had been oppressed. In particular, Thames could not claim to have been oppressed by breaches of the purported Understanding and Agreement when – on the Plaintiffs’ own case – Thames was not a party to the agreement.

  102. [57] Initially, the Plaintiffs attempted to ward off the Defendants’ challenge to their locus standi by arguing that the point had never been pleaded in their respective defences and should therefore not be raised in closing submissions. I rejected this objection. An examination of the parties’ pleadings showed that the Plaintiffs had pleaded at para 10 of their Statement of Claim that they were seeking relief under s 216 of the Companies Act “in their respective capacities as beneficial shareholder and registered shareholder of the [AIQ], and [Joe] in his capacity as the beneficial and registered shareholder of [TCP]”. In response, GSS and the 4th to 7th Defendants had in their respective Defences pleaded a denial of this particular paragraph of the Statement of Claim. GSS had further pleaded that “[i]n particular, [GSS] denies that the Plaintiffs are entitled to seek relief under section 216 of the Companies Act”.

  103. [58] In any event, given that locus standi was a threshold issue, I was disinclined to dismiss the point solely on the technical basis that it had not (according to the Plaintiffs) been expressly pleaded by the Defendants. It was incumbent on the Plaintiffs to address fully the issue of locus standi, and even more fundamentally, to ensure that they had the requisite standing to bring the present action in respect of AIQ.

  104. [59] As the issue of the Plaintiffs’ locus standi was not fully addressed in the closing submissions, I directed parties to file further submissions on this issue (amongst others). I summarise below the parties’ further submissions on the locus standi issue before explaining my decision.

  105. Chronology of the Plaintiffs’ shareholding changes in AIQ

  106. [60] By way of background, I reproduce substantially below a table provided by the Plaintiffs which shows the timeline of the oppressive acts alleged against the 3rd to 7th Defendants, as well as the status of the Plaintiffs’ shareholding at the relevant times.

  107. Joe’s standing to bring the oppression claim

  108. Parties’ positions

  109. [61] I address first the issue of Joe’s locus standi to bring suit in respect of the AIQ-related allegations of oppression. All parties were agreed that as a starting point, a claimant wishing to bring a minority oppression suit under s 216 Companies Act must be a registered member of the company: non-registered beneficial shareholders do not have standing to bring a suit under s 216.

  110. [62] All parties were also agreed that there were two exceptions to this general rule. Firstly, s 216(7) Companies Act provides that s 216 applies to a person who is not a member of the company but to whom shares in the company have been transmitted by operation of law as it applies to members of a company. Parties were agreed that s 216(7) had no application in the present case.

  111. [63] Secondly, there is case law which establishes that a defendant to a minority oppression suit brought by a non-member may be estopped from relying on the claimant’s lack of locus standi if the defendant is guilty of unconscionable or inequitable conduct (Kitnasamy s/o Marudapan v Nagatheran s/o Manogar [2000] 1 SLR(R) 542 (“Kitnasamy”) at [26]–[27]; and Owen Sim Liang Khui v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 113 (“Owen Sim”) at 135). In the present case, the bone of contention between the Plaintiffs and the 3rd to 7th Defendants centred on whether such an estoppel arose in Joe’s favour.

  112. [64] The Plaintiffs argued that such an estoppel did arise in their favour in the present case. This, according to the Plaintiffs, was based on the 3rd to 7th Defendants’ conduct in having continued to treat Joe as the shareholder of AIQ despite their being aware that he had transferred his shares to Thames. For example, they had continued to approach Joe directly when seeking to raise funds for AIQ. In the circumstances, it would have been apparent to the 3rd to 7th Defendants that Joe’s participation in the affairs of AIQ remained unaffected by the transfer of his shareholding to Thames; and this extended to the Understanding and Agreement. According to the Plaintiffs, therefore, the 3rd to 7th Defendants had effectively represented that they would continue to treat Joe and Thames as “one and the same”. This meant that they were now estopped from asserting that Joe and Thames should be treated separately for the purpose of assessing their interest and locus standi.

  113. [65] The 3rd to 7th Defendants argued, on the other hand, that the estoppel exception did not apply in this case. In Kitnasamy and Owen Sim, the claimants were not registered members of the companies in question because of the actions and omissions of the respondents. It was this specific factor that caused the respondents to be estopped from challenging the appellants’ locus standi. Indeed, the court in each of these two cases concluded that it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the respondents to do so. In contrast, in the present case, Joe had transferred his AIQ shares to Thames and ceased to be a member of AIQ of his own volition; the 3rd to 7th Defendants were not involved in Joe’s decision nor in the transfer of the shares in any way. Having transferred his shares to Thames of his own accord, there was no basis for Joe to complain of inequitable conduct on the part of the 3rd to 7th Defendants. As the court in Lim Seng Wah and another v Han Meng Siew and others [2016] SGHC 177 (“Lim Seng Wah”) (at [13]) pointed out, “where a registered shareholder has freely disposed of his shares … he will no longer have locus standi once he has ceased to be registered as a member”.

  114. My Decision

  115. [66] Having considered parties’ submissions, I concluded that Joe had no locus standi to bring minority oppression proceedings against the 3rd to 7th Defendants insofar as the allegations of oppression related to his rights as a shareholder of AIQ. My reasons were as follows.

  116. [67] As all parties have acknowledged in their submissions, for the purposes of minority oppression proceedings under s 216 of the Companies Act, only a party who is a registered member of the company as at the time of commencing the proceedings has locus standi to seek relief under s 216 of the Companies Act. Sections 216(1) and (7) of the Companies Act make provision as to who may apply for relief under s 216; namely, any member of the company or any person who is not a member but to whom shares in the company have been transmitted by operation of law:

  117. [68] The term “member” is defined in s 19(6) of the Companies Act:

  118. [69] Read together, the above provisions make it clear that locus standi to bring a claim in oppression depends on the would-be claimant being a registered member of the company. This condition applies even if the would-be claimant is the beneficial owner of shares held by registered shareholders of the company (Tan Chin Hoon and others v Tan Choo Suan and others [2010] SGHC 340 (“Tan Chin Hoon”) at [54]). This is because trusts (whether express, implied or constructive) are not recognised under the Companies Act by virtue of s 195(4), which states that:

  119. [70] Joe was not a registered member of AIQ at the point the present suit was commenced. Joe would need, therefore, to show that he fell within one of the recognised exceptions to the statutory requirement of registered membership. As all parties were agreed that the exception in s 216(7) did not apply to Joe, I do not address s 216(7) in these written grounds. Instead, Joe argued that the 3rd to 7th Defendants were estopped from denying his locus standi to pursue the AIQ-related oppression claim, per the exception allowed by the courts in Kitnasamy and Owen Sim.

  120. [71] In Owen Sim, the first respondent was a private company. The appellant was a registered shareholder of the company who held 1,500 shares. The company wrote to the appellant alleging that he owed it a sum of RM111,734.60. Although the appellant denied owing this sum, the company took action against him by passing a board resolution to sell his shares in satisfaction of the alleged debt. The proceeds from the sale of the shares proved insufficient to satisfy the alleged debt, and the company continued to press the appellant to pay the balance. The appellant brought a minority oppression action under s 181 of the Companies Act 1965. At first instance, the company’s application to strike out the petition was allowed by the trial judge, who cited as one of his reasons the appellant’s lack of standing to bring the action.

  121. [72] On appeal, the Malaysian Federal Court disagreed with the trial judge’s reasoning. The court accepted, as a starting point, the general rule that a petitioner bringing an action under s 181 had to be able to “demonstrate that his name appeared on the company’s register of members at the date of presentation of the petition”. If this could not be done, then the petitioner had no standing. However, the Federal Court stressed that this was merely a general – and not a universal – rule; and that there were cases where it would be unjust to apply the general rule. The Court gave the following example:

  122. [74] In Kitnasamy, the appellant and the first respondent (“Nagan”) shared a decade-long friendship. The second respondent (“Siva”) was Nagan’s uncle. The appellant had experience in track-laying works from his job as a piling and civil engineering contractor. Nagan had approached the appellant and informed him that there was a project for track-laying works for the new North-East MRT line. A joint venture (“TUS”) consisting of Tekken Corporation (“Tekken”), Union Construction Co Ltd and Singapore Piling and Civil Engineering Pte Ltd was seeking to secure the project. The appellant, Nagan and Siva agreed that they would be equal partners if they were successful in obtaining a subcontract from TUS in relation to the project, and that the appellant would be made a director and shareholder in the company to be used as the vehicle for carrying out the project. However, Siva failed to transfer the shares to the appellant. A search that was subsequently done at the Registry of Companies (“RCS”) showed the appellant to be registered as a director, but not a shareholder, of the company. When the appellant queried the company’s auditor, he was told that the RCS would update the records after the annual returns were filed, and that 33,333 shares had been issued and registered in his name.

  123. [75] Sometime after the company secured the project, the appellant received a notice calling for an extraordinary general meeting for the purpose of removing him as a director. He applied to court for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondents from proceeding, arguing inter alia that their conduct was oppressive. The case went on appeal after the first-instance judge refused to grant the interlocutory injunction. One issue which arose on appeal was whether the appellant had locus standi to sue under s 216. The Court of Appeal (“CA”) acknowledged (at [25]) that under s 216, only a member or a holder of a debenture of a company was entitled to seek relief, and that a registered shareholder was a member. It was essential for this purpose that a shareholder’s name be on the register. That being said, while the RCS search did not show that the appellant was a registered shareholder of the company, this was not conclusive. The CA pointed out that the appellant had been informed that he was a registered shareholder and that the RCS records would be updated after the annual returns were filed. Referencing Owen Sim, the CA noted (at [26]) that the Federal Court had held in that case that “under certain circumstances, it would be possible for a person whose name was not on the register of members to petition under s 181 of the Companies Act 1965 (the Malaysian equivalent of our s 216)”. Noting that this exception operated on the basis that the respondents would be estopped from raising an objection to the petitioner’s locus standi, the CA held (at [27]) that the respondents in Kitnasamy were estopped from asserting that the appellant was not a member. The CA pointed out that the appellant had agreed to become a shareholder of the company and had rendered invaluable services to it: it was entirely the default of those responsible for the administration of the company (including the respondents) that the appellant’s name had not been entered in the register of the company. The appellant’s belief that he was a member was reinforced not only by what the company’s auditor told him, but also by the fact that he had been sent the notice of the EGM and a proxy form – ie, documents which were only despatched to members.

  124. [76] From the above, it may be seen that the facts of the present case were clearly distinguishable from the facts of Kitnasamy and Owen Sim. Unlike the respondents in Kitnasamy and Owen Sim whose inequitable conduct was found to have resulted in the appellants not being registered members, the 3rd to 7th Defendants in this case had no part to play in Joe ceasing to be a registered member of AIQ.

  125. [78] In the present case, the Plaintiffs contended that the 3rd to 7th Defendants had treated Joe “as if” he was the registered shareholder of AIQ, and that Joe himself had acted on the basis that he – “being one and the same as Thames” – would for all intents and purposes continue to be the registered shareholder. In these circumstances, the Plaintiffs argued, it would be unconscionable of the 3rd to 7th Defendants to object at this juncture to Joe’s standing to sue under s 216 of the Companies Act.

  126. [79] In my view, the present case simply did not fit within the narrow confines of the estoppel exception allowed in Kitnasamy and Owen Sim. To reiterate, the present case was one where Joe had voluntarily transferred his AIQ shareholding to Thames: Joe did not cease to be a member of AIQ as a result of anything done (or omitted to be done) by the 3rd to 7th Defendants. In fact, it should be highlighted that it was Joe himself who had “long requested” and insisted that the 3rd to 7th Defendants effect the transfer of his AIQ shares to Thames, his “children’s trust”. There was no basis, therefore, for the Plaintiffs to accuse the 3rd to 7th Defendants of unconscionable conduct in relation to Joe’s present status as a non-member.

  127. [80] In coming to the above conclusion, I found support in the High Court’s judgment in Lim Seng Wah (at [12]–[13]). In that case, Chua JC (as he then was) distinguished Kitnasamy on the basis that the appellant in Kitnasamy “was for all intents and purposes a shareholder except that the company had not registered him as one”. As such, the respondents – who had failed to effect the registration – could not challenge the appellant’s locus standi of the applicants. Chua JC also cited with approval the statement in R Hollington QC, Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2013) at para 9-15, that “where a registered shareholder has freely disposed of his shares … he will no longer have locus standi once he has ceased to be registered as a member” [emphasis added in bold italics]. This was because (at [13]):

  128. [81] Finally, it must be pointed out that having voluntarily transferred the AIQ shares to Thames, if Joe was (as he claimed) the sole beneficial owner of these AIQ shares, he could have arranged for Thames to transfer the shares back to him prior to seeking relief under s 216 for the alleged oppression of his rights as an AIQ shareholder. After all, s 216 plainly requires that a claimant be a registered member. For reasons best known to the Plaintiffs, they failed to take any steps to resolve the issue of Joe’s locus standi before filing the suit. The procedural bind they have ended up in is, unfortunately, entirely of their own making.

  129. Thames’s standing to bring the oppression claim

  130. Parties’ positions

  131. [82] I address next Thames’ locus standi to seek relief under s 216 of the Companies Act in respect of the AIQ-related allegations of oppression.

  132. [83] Prima facie, Thames, as the registered member of AIQ, has locus standi to seek relief under s 216. However, the 3rd to 7th Defendants contended that Thames lacked locus standi in the present suit. Per the 3rd to 7th Defendants, Thames had no basis to complain about its rights as a member being oppressed, because on the Plaintiffs’ own case, the oppressive acts were directed at Joe and not Thames. Moreover, some of the oppressive acts had allegedly been carried out against Joe after Thames became the registered shareholder in place of Joe. Thames could not complain of having suffered commercial unfairness as a result of the alleged acts of oppression. Since Thames and Joe were not one and the same entity, the interests of Thames and Joe were not one and the same. In this connection, the Defendants cited inter alia the case of Suying Design Pte Ltd v Ng Kian Huan Edmund [2020] 2 SLR 221 (“Suying Design”) (at [123]), where the CA held that ultimately “the conduct complained of under s 216 must affect the member in his capacity as member” [emphasis added].

  133. [84] Further, per GSS, insofar as the Plaintiffs’ allegations of oppression were premised on breaches of the Understanding and Agreement, this was (according to the Plaintiffs themselves) an agreement entered into only as between Joe and GSS. The Plaintiffs did not allege that Joe had entered into the Understanding and Agreement as Thames’ agent or representative; nor was it ever part of the Plaintiffs’ case that Thames had become a party to the Understanding and Agreement upon becoming an AIQ shareholder. Since Thames was not a party to the Understanding and Agreement, it followed that Thames could have no legitimate expectations under the Understanding and Agreement; and it therefore could not rely on any alleged breaches of the Understanding and Agreement in support of its minority oppression claim.

  134. [85] According to the 4th to 7th Defendants, Thames’ inability to demonstrate that its interests as shareholder had been prejudiced was fatal to its attempt to seek relief under s 216 of the Companies Act, because “an applicant under [s 216] has to show that he is an aggrieved shareholder, i.e. that the conduct complained of is commercially unfair to him”: see Lim Seng Wah (at [20]) ; also Chow Kwok Ching v Chow Kwok Chi and others [2008] 4 SLR(R) 577 (“Chow Kwok Ching”) (at [89]), where the court held that s 216(1)(a) required the oppression complained of to affect the complainant and not only another shareholder who is not also a complainant.

  135. [86] The Plaintiffs, for their part, did not dispute the proposition that in bringing proceedings under s 216 in its own name, Thames was required to show that it had suffered prejudice to its interests which amounted to commercial unfairness. Indeed, the Plaintiffs could not dispute this proposition, given the clear state of the authorities: see Lim Seng Wah and Chow Kwok Ching. However, the Plaintiffs argued that as the registered shareholder, Thames was merely holding the AIQ shares as Joe’s nominee; that Joe remained the beneficial owner of the AIQ shares; and that Thames’s interests were thus co-extensive with Joe’s. On this basis, the Plaintiffs contended, it would be artificial for the court – when assessing the s 216 claim brought in Thames’ name – to ignore the oppressive acts committed by the 3rd to 7th Defendants against Joe in the period prior to Thames becoming a registered shareholder.

  136. [87] In support of the above proposition, the Plaintiffs cited inter alia Atlasview. In Atlasview, at [38], the court – in refusing to allow an application to strike out proceedings brought under s 459 of the UK Companies Act 1985 (which is in pari materia with the local s 216 Companies Act provision) – found it “well arguable” that the “interests” of a nominee shareholder under s 459 of the UK Companies Act 1985 could include “the economic and contractual interests of the beneficial owners of the shares”. The Plaintiffs argued that since Thames was a “nominee shareholder” for Joe, Thames’ interests, for the purposes of its s 216 claim, should be capable of including Joe’s “economic and contractual interests”.

  137. [88] Further, the Plaintiffs argued, in seeking relief under s 216 of the Companies Act, a member of the company was able to rely on oppressive acts that had been done before he became a member of the company: Lim Seng Wah at [23], Lloyd v Casey [2002] 1 BCLC 454 (“Lloyd”) at [50], and Tyrion Holdings Ltd v Claydon [2015] NZHC 428 (“Tyrion Holdings”) at [23]. As such, in bringing a suit under s 216, Thames could rely on the oppressive acts committed against Joe in the period before it became a member of AIQ. According to the Plaintiffs, not allowing Thames to rely on the oppressive acts committed during Joe’s time as a shareholder for the purposes of Thames’s own oppression claim would amount to imposing an “arbitrary” restriction on the scope of the term “interests” in s 216 of the Companies Act and lead to absurd results. It would mean that no matter how unfairly the 3rd to 7th Defendants had treated Joe, Joe would “have an interest but no locus standi”, whereas Thames would “have locus standi but no interest”, such that neither of them would be able to seek relief. This, according to the Plaintiffs, was an arbitrary result which the parliamentary draftsman could not have intended.

  138. [89] The Plaintiffs’ assertion that Thames held the AIQ shares as a bare nominee or trustee for Joe was disputed by the 4th to 7th Defendants, who sought to point to evidence refuting this assertion. The 4th to 7th Defendants also highlighted the case of Re Edwardian Group Ltd, Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd and Anor v Singh and Ors [2018] EWHC 1715 (“Estera Trust”). In Estera Trust, one of the issues in contention was whether a trustee holding shares in a company on behalf of a beneficiary could assert that its own interests as a member had been prejudiced, on the basis that the beneficiary’s personal interest in remaining in management had been prejudiced. The court in Estera Trust held that since the trusts were discretionary trusts and not bare trusts, the beneficiary’s personal interests could not be conflated with the interests of the trustee. The 4th to 7th Defendants contended, accordingly, that the principles espoused in Atlasview were only applicable in a situation where the registered shareholder was a bare nominee or trustee, as both the registered shareholder’s and the beneficial shareholder’s interests would be aligned and co-extensive in such a situation. If, however, the registered shareholder turned out to not be a bare nominee (as with the discretionary trustee in Estera Trust), the beneficial shareholder’s personal interests would no longer be aligned with those of the registered shareholder; and in such a situation, it followed that the registered shareholder would not be able to bring an oppression claim asserting the beneficial shareholder’s personal interests as its own.

  139. My Decision

  140. [90] While the 3rd to 7th Defendants accepted that a member seeking relief under s 216 could in principle rely on oppressive acts that had been done before he became a member of the company, they disputed Thames’ standing to bring a s 216 claim in respect of acts done to Joe prior to the transfer of his shares to Thames. More generally, they disputed Thames’ standing to bring a s 216 claim in respect of acts done to Joe which did not prejudice Thames’ interests as the registered member. This included acts which – according to the Plaintiffs – constituted breaches of the Understanding and Agreement between GSS and Joe. In this connection, the 4th to 7th Defendants also disputed the Plaintiffs’ assertion that Thames’ interests as the registered member were wholly aligned and co-extensive with Joe’s interests as the alleged beneficial owner of the shares.

  141. [91] Before I address the parties’ arguments, I examine the relevant authorities and outline the key legal principles established by these authorities which were relevant to my consideration of Thames’ locus standi to bring the AIQ-related oppression claims.

  142. (1) The law relating to locus standi to bring a minority oppression claim under s 216 Companies Act

  143. (A) A registered member can bring an oppression suit in respect of oppressive acts against the beneficial owner of the shares if he is a nominee for the beneficial owner

  144. [92] In Lim Seng Wah, Chua JC (as he then was) pointed out, at [20], that “the common thread underlying [s 216 of our Companies Act] is that of unfairness”, with “[t]he common test [being] that of ‘a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play which a shareholder is entitled to expect’”. In his view, this meant that “an applicant under s 216 has to show that he is an aggrieved shareholder, ie, that the conduct complained of is commercially unfair to him” [emphasis in original]. In Lim Seng Wah, the plaintiffs (“Mr Lim”) and (“Mr Heah”) had sold their shares to a third party (“Mr Kwok”) after failing to sell the shares to the other shareholders. However, the defendants (“Mr Han”) and (“Mr Wang”), who were the directors of the company, did not approve the transfer of the plaintiffs’ shares to Mr Kwok. Finding themselves unable to exit the company, the plaintiffs commenced an action under s 216 of the Companies Act against the defendants. Unexpectedly, Mr Han and Mr Wang entered into a “Share Sales and Purchase Deed” whereby they undertook to transfer the plaintiffs’ shares to Mr Kwok by a certain date – and agreed, in addition, to buy the same shares from Mr Kwok for $19.5m, subject to the latter successfully persuading the plaintiffs to file a notice of discontinuance of their action. The transfer of the shares by the plaintiffs to Mr Kwok was thereafter registered; and Mr Kwok became the shareholder in place of the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs did not discontinue their action; and the purchase of Mr Kwok’s shares by the defendants did not materialise. Mr Kwok then applied to be joined as a plaintiff to the oppression action; and in so doing, he sought to rely on the claims made by Mr Lim and Mr Heah – as well as the evidence they had already adduced in court. One of the issues in contention before the court was whether Mr Kwok should be allowed to be joined as a plaintiff to the oppression action.

  145. [93] Chua JC found (at [160]) that the defendants’ misconduct had been commercially unfair to Mr Kwok because notwithstanding the fact that the conduct complained off had taken place before Mr Kwok became a shareholder of the company, the overpayment of directors’ fees and the payments to SVF – which were the oppressive acts complained of – had “significantly reduced the funds available to the Company”. In the circumstances, the defendants’ misconduct was commercially unfair to Mr Kwok.

  146. [94] In the present case, in respect of Thames’ locus standi to bring proceedings under s 216, the key question of principle in contention was whether a registered member could sue for oppression in respect of oppressive acts done to the beneficial owner of the shares. While the parties were not able to point me to any relevant local case law on this issue, a number of English authorities were put forward. These appear to establish that a registered member may bring such proceedings if he is a nominee shareholder holding the shares on a bare trust, because in such a situation, the interests of the registered member are regarded as being co-extensive and wholly aligned with the beneficial owner’s interests. I refer to the cases of Atlasview, Lloyd, Rock Nominee and Estera Trust, which I examine below.

  147. [96] Mr Barton, his wife and JGR issued two sets of proceedings. One was an action for breach of contract; the other was a petition under s 459 of the UK Companies Act 1985 which provided:

  148. [97] The respondents applied to strike out the s 459 petition and the action for breach of contract. In respect of the s 459 petition, it was argued inter alia that as Mr Barton and his wife were not members of a company within s 22 of the UK Companies Act 1985 and held no shares by operation of law within the meaning of s 459(2), they had no locus standi to bring the petition and should accordingly be struck out as petitioners.

  149. [98] As for JGR, the respondents argued that although JGR was registered as a member of the company, it was but a bare nominee. As such, having no economic interest in the value of the Brightview shares registered in its name, it could not complain of any prejudice to its “interests” under s 459. The respondents highlighted that the dispute arose from an alleged breach of the investment agreement to which JGR is not a party. In essence, it was a dispute between Mr Barton and Mr Shalson. The respondents argued that JGR was not a nominee for Mr Barton, and that Brightview was not a quasi-partnership: therefore it could not be permitted to “carry” or otherwise rely on the Bartons’ complaints to maintain the s 459 petition in its name (at [35] of Atlasview).

  150. [99] Jonathan Crow KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, agreed that Mr Barton and his wife had no locus standi to bring the action for minority oppression, reasoning (at [31]) that the “right to petition the court under s 459 is conferred only on members and those to whom shares have been transferred by operation of law”; “neither Mr nor Mrs Barton” fell within those categories. In addition, a procedural provision such as CPR 19.2(2)(a), which gave the court the power to add parties, did not assist the petitioner’s case. CPR 19.2(2)(a) was “confined to cases where it was desirable” for the party to be added so that the court could “resolve all the matters in dispute in the proceedings”. Given that a dispute under s 459 could not be said to have arisen at the suit of a person who was not a member, CPR 19.2(2)(a) could not be invoked to support the joinder of a non-member as a party.

  151. [100] As to JGR’s locus standi vis-à-vis the s 459 petition, however, Jonathan Crow KC declined to strike out JGR’s claim on the basis that it was a nominee shareholder. Noting that the interests which s 459 was capable of protecting included matters going beyond the legal owner’s economic interest in the shares registered in his name (at [36], citing O’Neill and another v Phillips and others [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (“O’Neill v Phillips”) at 1110–1101), he observed that the phrase “legitimate expectations” may “embrace matters such as an understanding as to the governance of the company, including an understanding that someone other than the registered shareholder should be involved in management” (citing the obiter remarks of Hoffmann J in Re a company (No 003160 of 1986) [1986] BCLC 391 at 396). He held, moreover, that the respondents’ arguments amounted to “imposing an arbitrary restriction on the scope of the word ‘interests’ in s 459” (at [36] of Atlasview):

  152. [101] In particular, Jonathan Crow KC observed (at [37]) that while this specific point had never been argued or decided, it was “striking” that numerous cases had been argued and decided on the assumed basis that “a nominee shareholder [was] fully entitled to complain under s 459 about any diminution in value of the shares registered in its name, and that its ‘interests’ [were] for these purposes co-extensive with the interests of the beneficial owner” (Atlasview at [37] citing Estill v Cowling Swift & Kitchin [2000] Lloyd’s Rep PN 378 at [101], Arrow Nominees Inc v Blackledge [2000] 1 BCLC 709 at 711, Lloyd at [48]–[49], and Rock Nominees Ltd at [2]–[3]). Ultimately, in his view (at [38]), it was “well arguable” for the purposes of the striking out application that the ‘interests’ of a nominee shareholder under s 459 was “capable of including the economic and contractual interests of the beneficial owners of the shares”.

  153. [102] For completeness, I make two other observations. First, in Atlasview, Jonathan Crow KC did state that although all he had to do was consider “whether it [was] properly arguable that the ‘interests’ of a nominee shareholder under s 459 [were] capable of including the economic and contractual interests of the beneficial owners of the shares”, if he had been obliged to decide on the point, he would have found that it was correct.

  154. [103] Second, I note that although Atlasview was cited locally by the High Court in Tan Chin Hoon (at [56]), it was not cited for the proposition that “a nominee shareholder [was] fully entitled to complain under s 459 about any diminution in value of the shares registered in its name, and that its ‘interests’ [were] for these purposes co-extensive with the interests of the beneficial owner”. This was because in Tan Chin Hoon, the plaintiffs were no longer registered as shareholders of the company by the time the oppression proceedings under s 216 Companies Act were brought; and the court held (at [54]) that their claims to beneficial ownership of the shares held by two of the defendants did not assist them since trusts – whether express, implied or constructive – were not recognised under s 195(4) Companies Act.

  155. [104] Turning to Lloyd, this was a case where the 1st respondent and the petitioner had formed a company, with the 1st respondent holding 51% of the shares and the petitioner holding 44%. The 1st respondent was appointed as the managing director, while the petitioner continued with his existing employment outside the company formed. As part of an agreement to conceal the petitioner’s shareholding from his existing employer, his 44% shareholding was held in trust for him by the 1st respondent. By 1990, the company had grown significantly and needed larger premises. The 1st respondent began to arrange for monies – partly from the company’s bank account – to meet the needs of the company. The 1st respondent also paid himself remuneration of £456,417 between 1992 and 1996, with the petitioner receiving in excess of £55,000 during that same period of time. Eventually, the petitioner became dissatisfied with the 1st respondent’s management of the company; and at his request, the 44% shareholding held on trust for him was transferred back to him by the 1st respondent in 1997. Shortly after, the petitioner started an oppression claim under s 459 of the UK Companies Act 1985, alleging unfairly prejudicial conduct by the 1st respondent in the form of unequal distributions, excessive payments by the company, and excessive contributions to a pension scheme.

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