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Grounds publishedDecided 14 May 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Chen Song v Public Prosecutor and other appeals

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[2024] SGHC 129Case no. General Division of the High Court — Magistrate’s Appeal Nos 9263 of 2021, 9113, 9150, 9204 and 9243 of 2022

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] In 2019, Parliament significantly amended the provisions in relation to the offences of careless driving and dangerous driving in the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“previous RTA”). These amendments introduced a new scheme of enhanced penalties based on a tiered harm structure, further differentiated by the type of offender involved (ie, whether the offender is a first-time offender, repeat offender, serious offender or serious repeat offender as defined by the Road Traffic Act 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“present RTA”). The unique architecture of the RTA poses new challenges to the way such offences have traditionally been prosecuted and punished under the previous RTA and the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”). For ease of discussion, we will refer to the previous RTA and the present RTA collectively as the RTA unless it is necessary to draw a distinction between them.

  3. [2] In the five appeals before us, the appellants were convicted of careless driving offences punishable under the grievous hurt or hurt provisions in the RTA. The appellants in HC/MA 9263/2021/01 (“MA 9263”), HC/MA 9113/2022/01 (“MA 9113”), HC/MA 9150/2022/01 (“MA 9150”) and HC/MA 9243/2022/01 (“MA 9243”) were each charged with an offence of driving without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration causing hurt under ss 65(1)(a) and 65(1)(b) respectively, punishable under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA. The appellant in HC/MA 9204/2022/01 (“MA 9204”) was charged with an offence of driving without due care and attention causing grievous hurt under s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA.

  4. [3] In Sue Zhang (Xu Zheng) v Public Prosecutor [2023] 3 SLR 440 (“Sue Chang”), this court previously set out a sentencing framework for careless driving offences causing grievous hurt under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA based on the two-stage, five-step sentencing framework (the “Logachev-hybrid approach”) in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 609 (“Logachev”). However, a sentencing framework for careless driving offences causing hurt simpliciter under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA has yet to be promulgated.

  5. [4] What emerges from the survey of the five appeals before us is the absence of a unified approach guiding the lower courts in determining the appropriate sentence for careless driving offences punishable under ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA. While the Sue Chang framework is now the prevailing sentencing framework for careless driving offences causing grievous hurt punishable under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA, it is unclear how this framework should affect sentencing for careless driving offences causing hurt punishable under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA; it is also unclear how the framework coheres with the structure of the RTA more broadly. In MA 9204, the lower court was bound to apply the Sue Chang framework given that the appellant was convicted on a charge of careless driving causing grievous hurt. In MA 9243 and MA 9150, the lower courts adapted the Sue Chang framework and applied it in the context of their careless driving causing hurt charges. In MA 9263, the lower court applied the sentencing framework adopted by the District Court in Public Prosecutor v Cullen Richard Alexander [2020] SGDC 88. Finally, in MA 9113, the lower court adapted the sentencing framework set out in Wu Zhi Yong v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 587 (“Wu Zhi Yong”). This divergence in sentencing approaches is wholly undesirable and antithetical to the goals of consistency and certainty.

  6. [5] The consolidated hearing of these appeals thus presents an opportunity for us to consider these provisions collectively and to provide guidance on the applicable sentencing approach to be adopted for these offences. Given the scope of these appeals, we appointed Mr Yong Yi Xiang (“Mr Yong”) as young independent counsel to assist us with determining the appropriate sentencing frameworks for ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA.

  7. [6] Prior to the hearing of the appeals, we directed the parties and Mr Yong to consider the following questions:

  8. (a) Whether the sentencing framework laid down in Sue Chang for offences punishable under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA should be affirmed and whether it can and should be adapted for offences punishable under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA.

  9. (b) Given the legislative scheme under s 65 of the RTA, where the prescribed penalty is dependent on the harm caused by the offence, what should the court’s approach be in cases where the offence causes grievous hurt to the victim, but the offender is charged with and convicted of an offence for causing simple hurt under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA?

  10. [7] At the hearing on 18 July 2023, a key question that arose was whether the levels of harm as reflected in the punishment provisions were discrete or non-discrete categories of harm. In particular, we queried whether the category of “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA was definitionally wide enough to cover instances where grievous hurt has been caused. We therefore directed that the parties and Mr Yong address us on the following additional issues:

  11. (a) What is the meaning of “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA?

  12. (b) If “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA means any physical injury other than grievous hurt and death (ie, that the categories of harm are discrete), what are the appropriate sentencing frameworks for ss 65(3) and 65(4) of the RTA?

  13. [8] As we shall see, it is the answers to these key issues which form the backbone of our decision on the appropriate sentencing framework to be adopted for ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA.

  14. Background to the appeals

  15. [9] We begin by setting out the facts and the decisions reached by the lower court in each respective appeal.

  16. Background to Chen’s appeal in MA 9263

  17. [10] The appellant in MA 9263 is Mr Chen Song (“Chen”). On 28 December 2020, at about 10.40am, Chen was driving a motor car along Seletar North Link towards the direction of Seletar West Link. He failed to give way to oncoming traffic with the right of way when executing a right turn at a non-signalised T-junction near a construction site. This resulted in a collision with the victim who was riding a motorcycle. Chen admitted to having seen the victim riding towards him from a distance of about 200 to 300m away before he executed the right turn. At the time of the accident, the weather was clear, road surface was dry, the visibility was clear, and the traffic flow was light.

  18. [11] As a result of the accident, the victim was conveyed to the Khoo Teck Puat Hospital (“KTPH”) and warded for a period of 14 days. The victim also received 45 days of hospitalisation leave (inclusive of the period of hospitalisation) from 28 December 2020 to 11 February 2021. The medical report from KTPH dated 24 February 2021 stated that the victim suffered the following injuries:

  19. (a) Extensive mesenteric injury in the right lower quadrant and haematoma along the entire mesenteric root, associated with moderate haemoperitoneum and small right retroperitoneal haematoma. Intraoperative findings revealed a large tear in the ileal mesentery with active bleeding from two arterial branches and associated moderate haematoma, with a separate mesenteric contusion and small haematoma at zone I in lesser sac. Post-operative recovery was complicated by: (i) post-operative ileus (ie, obstruction of the intestine which necessitated the insertion of a nasal tube); (ii) left-sided pneumonia, requiring him to be placed on oxygen support; and (iii) surgical-site wound infection. This injury resulted in surgical procedures which included the removal of parts of the victim’s small and large intestines.

  20. (b) A right acromioclavicular joint dislocation, for which he underwent interval elective right acromioclavicular joint stabilisation.

  21. (c) A left wrist contusion.

  22. [12] The front portion of the victim’s motorcycle was completely crushed. The top left portion of the front windscreen of Chen’s motor car was shattered and scratched. The front left passenger door had scratches, dents and was crumpled all the way down to the skirting. The left side mirror of the motor car was broken. The rear left portion of the motor car was also scratched and dented.

  23. [14] Chen was sentenced to 3 weeks’ imprisonment and 16 months’ disqualification from holding or obtaining all classes of driving licence (“DQAC”) from the date of his release. The court held that the custodial threshold had been crossed (Chen Song GD at [29]). Chen’s culpability was found to be low as there were no additional culpability-enhancing factors such as speeding, drink-driving, etc. Further, in determining the level of harm suffered, the court took into account the injuries as set out at [11] above (Chen Song GD at [35]–[40]). The court considered that the victim was given 45 days of hospitalisation leave from the date of the accident, which was a fairly lengthy period. Within that period, he was warded in hospital for 14 days. There was also extensive damage caused to both vehicles, in particular, the victim’s motorcycle.

  24. [15] In arriving at the final sentence, the court also took into account Chen’s timeous plea of guilt, the fact that he was a first-time offender, his co-operation with the authorities and his genuine remorse (Chen Song GD at [61]).

  25. Background to Chua’s appeal in MA 9113

  26. [16] The appellant in MA 9113 is Mr Chua Ting Fong (“Chua”). On 5 November 2020, at about 6.30pm, Chua was driving his motor car along the Pan Island Expressway (“PIE”) towards Tuas near the 28.5km mark. He failed to keep a proper lookout while changing from lane 2 to lane 1 and collided into the victim who was riding a motorcycle on lane 1. At the time of the accident, the weather was fine, the road surface was dry, the visibility was good, and the traffic volume was heavy. Chua’s in-car camera only captured him changing lanes and the victim’s location prior to the collision. The in-car camera failed to capture the collision.

  27. [17] As a result of the accident, the victim was conveyed to the National University Hospital (“NUH”) by ambulance. The victim was warded in the surgical high dependency unit from 5 to 16 November 2020 (11 days) before being discharged with 41 days of hospitalisation leave. The medical reports from NUH stated that the victim sustained the following injuries which were treated conservatively:

  28. (a) Traumatic brain injury in the form of a subarachnoid haemorrhage and extradural hematoma.

  29. (b) Left-sided facial fractures (minimally displaced) with fractures seen involving left orbital lateral wall and floor (with orbital extraconal haematoma), left maxillary sinus lateral wall and left frontal sinus outer table. These fractures were also associated with left eye indirect traumatic optic neuropathy, subconjunctival haemorrhage and commotio retina.

  30. (c) Left eyebrow stellate laceration and multiple superficial facial abrasions. In respect of these injuries, the victim underwent wound debridement and toilet and suture of the left eyebrow laceration and scrub down of the facial abrasions.

  31. (d) Multiple superficial abrasions over the left shoulder, chest wall, right hand dorsum, fingers, bilateral knees, left big toe, and second toe.

  32. (e) Two enamel-dentine fractures to the teeth.

  33. [18] The victim’s motorcycle sustained scratches and was dented on the left front mudguard and left handlebar. Chua’s motorcar sustained scratches on the right rear portion.

  34. [20] Chua was sentenced to 4 weeks’ imprisonment and 3 years’ DQAC from the date of his release. In arriving at the appropriate sentence to impose, the district judge was guided by the “sentencing bands” approach in Wu Zhi Yong for offences under s 64(1) punishable under s 64(2C)(a) read with s 64(2C)(c) of the RTA (Chua Ting Fong GD at [36]–[37]). The district judge calibrated the sentencing bands in Wu Zhi Yong downwards to account for the range of sentences for offences under s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA.

  35. [21] On the facts of the present case, the district judge found that Chua’s culpability was on the higher end of low as he had failed to check his blind spots for oncoming traffic before changing lanes along an expressway. He had also failed to ensure that there was a safe distance between his motor car and the other passing traffic before changing lanes (Chua Ting Fong GD at [48]–[49]). The district judge also found that the harm caused fell on the lower end of serious harm. This was so given that the victim had suffered traumatic brain injury, which was an injury to a vulnerable part of the body. He had also sustained fractures to his face, injuries affecting the left eye area, two enamel-dentine fractures and abrasions on other parts of his body. He had to be closely monitored in the high dependency unit for 11 days and was given 41 days of hospitalisation leave (inclusive of the period of hospitalisation) (Chua Ting Fong GD at [50] and [52]). The court also considered that the potential harm in the present case was serious as the offence was committed during heavy evening traffic along a major expressway with a speed limit of 90km/h (Chua Ting Fong GD at [54]).

  36. [22] The district judge was of the view that the present case fell within the middle band of the re-calibrated Wu Zhi Yong sentencing framework. This band was appropriate for offences involving a higher level of seriousness with more than one offence-specific aggravating factor present and where the offender’s culpability falling typically in the medium range. The sentencing range for this band was between 1 to 6 months’ imprisonment and disqualification for a period of between 12 to 14 months. The district judge was of the view that the starting point for Chua’s case should be slightly above the lowest end of this band, ie, a starting point of 2 months’ imprisonment. Taking into account the offender-specific factors, including the fact that Chua was untraced, pleaded guilty, assisted with the investigations, and provided a written apology and $5,000 as voluntary compensation to the victim, the court held that the appropriate custodial sentence was 4 weeks’ imprisonment (Chua Ting Fong GD at [56] and [57]). As for the period of disqualification, she was of the view that an upward calibration to 3 years from the indicative range set out in the framework above was warranted, as it was in the public’s interest to remove such a driver from the roads for a substantial period of time (Chua Ting Fong GD at [58]).

  37. Background to Lim’s appeal in MA 9150

  38. [23] The appellant in MA 9150 is Mr Lim Eng Ann (“Lim”). On 8 July 2020, at about 3.02pm, Lim was driving a motor taxi out from a car park in the vicinity of Yishun Ring Road. As Lim exited the carpark, he stopped at the stop line. Lim proceeded to execute a right turn while the victim crossed the road from Lim’s right to left. The victim had been standing in the middle of the road in Lim’s direct line of sight for about 25 seconds prior to the collision. He failed to keep a proper lookout ahead and his motor taxi collided into the victim along Yishun Ring Road towards Yishun Avenue 2 Lamppost 4F. The impact caused the victim’s head and body to hit the bonnet of Lim’s motor taxi before the victim fell to the ground. At the time of the accident, it was raining, the road surface was wet, visibility was clear, and the traffic volume was light. The in-car camera in Lim’s motor taxi captured the accident.

  39. [24] The victim was conveyed to KTPH by ambulance. On examination, the victim suffered from significant left hip pain and was unable to access his right hip range of motion. He had some mild tenderness over his left femur shaft, and he was unable to access his left knee range of motion due to hip pain. He was diagnosed with a left hip intertrochanteric fracture and left knee tibia plateau fracture. He underwent surgical fixation of his left hip on 11 July 2020 and surgical fixation of his left proximal tibia on 15 July 2020. The victim was warded for 15 days from 8 to 23 July 2020 in KTPH. He was subsequently transferred to Yishun Community Hospital and warded for 29 days before being discharged on 21 August 2020. He was given 210 days of medical leave from 8 July 2020 to 3 February 2021 (inclusive of the period of hospitalisation). No visible damage was found on Lim’s motor taxi.

  40. [26] The court sentenced Lim to a fine of $2,000 and 15 months’ DQAC from the date of his release (Lim Eng Ann GD at [55]). In arriving at the appropriate sentence to impose, the court was guided by the sentencing framework set out in Sue Chang for offences under s 65(1) punishable under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA (Lim Eng Ann GD at [39]).

  41. [27] At the first step, the court found that the harm caused was in the moderate range in view of the two types of fractures suffered by the victim, the surgical fixation he underwent, and the length of his hospitalisation and medical leave. As for Lim’s culpability, the district judge agreed with the Prosecution and the Defence that it was low as the accident occurred out of a momentary lapse of attention when he failed to keep a proper lookout ahead and collided into the victim as he executed a right turn (Lim Eng Ann GD at [42]).

  42. [28] At the second step, the court was of the view that the custodial threshold had not been crossed, although the fine imposed should be on the upper range provided for under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA (Lim Eng Ann GD at [43]). At the third step, the district judge held that the appropriate starting point should be the maximum fine of $2,500. At the fourth step, the district judge calibrated the quantum of the fine downwards to $2,000, taking into account Lim’s plea of guilt, lack of antecedents, co-operation with authorities and assistance to the victim.

  43. Background to Raman’s appeal in MA 9243

  44. [30] The appellant in MA 9243 is Mr Mohd Raman Bin Daud (“Raman”). On 9 December 2021, at or about 2.57pm, Raman was driving his motor car out of a multi-storey car park near Block 34A Bedok South Avenue 2 towards Bedok South Avenue 2. Raman failed to stop at the stop line of the exit of the car park, and did not keep a proper lookout for oncoming traffic before making a left turn towards Bedok South Avenue 2. There was nothing obstructing Raman’s view in front of him and the victim was clearly visible cycling along Bedok South Avenue 2 across the breadth of Raman’s car from his right to his left for about 4 seconds. His motor car collided with the victim who fell off his bicycle and onto the road. Raman’s motor car ran over the victim’s bicycle. He stopped his motor car, attended to the victim and called the police for assistance. At the time of the accident, the weather was fine, the road surface was dry, and the traffic volume was light. Raman’s in-car cameras captured the accident.

  45. [31] The victim was conveyed to Changi General Hospital (“CGH”) by ambulance. The medical report from CGH dated 8 February 2022 (“CGH Medical Report”) stated that the victim sustained a left distal tibia fibula open fracture and a right index finger proximal interphalangeal joint laceration with tendon exposure as a result of the accident. The victim underwent debridement and surgical fixation of the left tibia fibula open fracture and debridement of the right index finger on 9 December 2021. The victim was warded at CGH for 12 days, from 9 to 21 December 2021. He was transferred to Saint Andrew’s Community Hospital on 21 December 2021, and was subsequently discharged on 20 January 2022 (ie, he was warded for 42 days). The victim underwent physiotherapy and occupational therapy. The CGH Medical Report stated that the surgical wounds sustained by the victim had healed and the fracture was healing well. As of 28 November 2022, the victim still suffered from pain in his leg and was due to attend a follow up appointment scheduled on 15 December 2022.

  46. [32] The victim’s bicycle sustained significant damage, with its right handlebar being ripped off and its front wheel twisted.

  47. [33] Raman was charged with one count of driving without due care and attention causing hurt under s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was convicted accordingly. The Prosecution sought a sentence of at least 4 weeks’ imprisonment and 18 months’ DQAC. The Defence argued that the maximum fine and the shortest period of disqualification should be imposed.

  48. [34] The court sentenced Raman to 4 weeks’ imprisonment and 18 months’ DQAC from the date of his release. In arriving at this sentence, the district judge applied the sentencing framework set out in Sue Chang. The district judge’s grounds of decision can be found in Public Prosecutor v Mohd Raman bin Daud [2022] SGDC 296 (“Mohd Raman bin Daud GD”).

  49. [35] At the first step of the Sue Chang framework, the court found that the harm caused was within the moderate range given the extent of the victim’s injuries and his substantial period of hospitalisation (Mohd Raman bin Daud GD at [40]). As for Raman’s culpability, the court found that it was at the higher end of the low category as he had failed to stop at the stop line to check for oncoming traffic before executing a left turn onto the main road (Mohd Raman bin Daud GD at [41]). At the second step, the court found that the indicative sentence range lay between a fine and a custodial sentence (Mohd Raman bin Daud GD at [44]). At the third step, the court held that the appropriate starting point should be a period of two months’ imprisonment (Mohd Raman bin Daud GD at [46]). At the fourth step, taking into account the fact that Raman pleaded guilty, rendered immediate assistance to the victim, co-operated with the authorities and faced dated driving-related antecedents, the district judge calibrated the sentence downward to 4 weeks’ imprisonment (Mohd Raman bin Daud GD at [47]).

  50. Background to Erh’s appeal in MA 9204

  51. [37] The appellant in MA 9204 is Mr Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan (“Erh”). On 30 August 2021, at about 6.56pm, Erh was driving his motor car along lane 1 of the three-lane PIE towards Tuas. Due to heavy traffic, the car travelling in front of Erh braked and came to a stop. Erh abruptly switched lanes from lane 1 to lane 2, failing to keep a proper lookout. This led to a collision between Erh’s motor car and the victim who was travelling on his motorcycle in lane 2. At the time of the accident the weather was clear, the road surface was dry, and the traffic flow was heavy.

  52. [38] As a result of the accident, the victim was conveyed to Tan Tock Seng Hospital (“TTSH”) by ambulance. The victim sustained the following injuries: (a) traumatic amputation of the right little finger; and (b) a right-sided clavicle fracture. A terminalisation of the right little finger was performed. The victim was discharged from the hospital on 31 August 2021, and given hospitalisation leave from 30 August 2021 to 8 September 2021, which was subsequently extended to 26 October 2021 (ie, a total of 57 days’ medical leave).

  53. [39] The victim’s motorcycle sustained the following damage:

  54. (a) cracks, scratches and dents at the front of the motorcycle;

  55. (b) dangling front head lamp;

  56. (c) scratches on the front mudguard;

  57. (d) broken left handle;

  58. (e) dented right handle grip stopper; and

  59. (f) scratches on the right of the rear box.

  60. [40] Erh’s motor car sustained dents on the left rear door and scratches on the left front door.

  61. [42] The court sentenced Erh to 10 weeks’ imprisonment and 5 years’ DQAC from the date of his release. In arriving at this sentence, the court applied the sentencing framework set out in Sue Chang. The district judge’s grounds of decision can be found in Public Prosecutor v Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan [2022] SGDC 251 (“Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan GD”).

  62. [43] At the first step of the Sue Chang framework, the court found that the harm caused was on the lower end of the serious category as the victim had suffered a traumatic amputation of his right little finger and a right-sided clavicle fracture. A terminalisation of his right little finger was performed, and he was hospitalised for 1 day and given 57 days’ medical leave (inclusive of the hospitalisation). The district judge also took into consideration the property damage to the victim’s motorcycle and the high level of potential harm that could have been caused given that the accident occurred during heavy evening traffic along a major expressway (Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan GD at [34]–[35]). In terms of culpability, the district judge found that Erh’s culpability was at the higher end of the low category as he had failed to keep a proper lookout before abruptly changing lanes along the expressway with heavy traffic (Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan GD at [31]). At the second step, she held that the indicative sentencing range was between 4 to 8 months’ imprisonment (Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan GD at [37]). At the third step, the district judge identified the appropriate starting point as 4 months’ imprisonment (Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan GD at [38]). At the fourth step, the district judge appeared to take into account the fact that Erh had pleaded guilty and was untraced in calibrating the sentence downwards to 10 weeks’ imprisonment.

  63. [44] The court rejected the Prosecution and the Defence’s submissions that a SDO was appropriate in the circumstances. She observed that deterrence and the protection of the public were the main sentencing considerations in view of the seriousness of the offence and the degree of harm caused to the victim. She noted that Erh was not a younger accused person, the offence was not regulatory in nature and there was no evidence that he had any mental condition that contributed to the offending conduct (Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan GD at [46]).

  64. Overview of appeals

  65. [45] The table below summarises the background to the respective appeals before us.

  66. Case no

  67. Charge

  68. Brief facts

  69. Sentence imposed

  70. MA 9263

  71. s 65(1)(b) punishable under s 65(4)(a)

  72. Chen failed to give way to oncoming traffic with the right of way when executing a right turn, colliding into the victim motorcyclist. The victim sustained injuries such as extensive mesenteric injury which required surgical intervention, including the removal of parts of the victim’s small and large intestines. He also suffered from serious post-operative complications. He received 45 days of hospitalisation leave (inclusive of a 14-day hospitalisation period).

  73. [3] weeks’ imprisonment and 16 months’ DQAC

  74. MA 9113

  75. s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(4)(a)

  76. Chua failed to keep a proper lookout while changing lanes and collided into the victim who was a motorcyclist. The victim sustained injuries such as traumatic brain injury and facial fractures as a result of which he was warded in the surgical high dependency unit for 11 days, and received 41 days of hospitalisation leave. The victim’s injuries were treated conservatively.

  77. [4] weeks’ imprisonment and 3 years’ DQAC

  78. MA 9150

  79. s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(4)(a)

  80. Lim failed to keep a proper lookout when making a right turn as he exited the carpark and collided into the victim who was crossing the road. The victim had been standing in the middle of the road in Lim’s direct line of sight for about 25 seconds prior to the collision. The victim sustained a left hip intertrochanteric fracture and a left knee tibia plateau fracture and underwent surgical fixation. He was given 210 days of hospitalisation leave (including a 15-day hospitalisation period). The victim was transferred to a community hospital to undergo rehabilitation after being discharged from the hospital.

  81. Fine of $2,000 and 15 months’ DQAC

  82. MA 9243

  83. s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(4)(a)

  84. Raman failed to stop at the stop line at the exit of a car park and did not keep a proper lookout when executing a left turn. This resulted in a collision with the victim who was riding a bicycle. There was nothing obstructing Raman’s view in front of him and the victim was clearly visible. At one point, the victim was directly in front of Raman’s motor car, and yet he failed to apply his brakes to avoid the collision. The victim suffered injuries such as a tibia fibula open fracture and underwent surgical fixation. The victim was transferred to a community hospital for rehabilitation after being discharged from the hospital. He was warded for a total of 42 days.

  85. [4] weeks’ imprisonment and 18 months’ DQAC

  86. MA 9204

  87. s 65(1)(a) punishable under ss 65(3)(a) and 65(6)(d)

  88. As the car travelling in front of him braked, Erh abruptly switched lanes while driving on the expressway, failing to keep a proper lookout. This led to a collision with the victim who was riding a motorcycle. The victim sustained injuries such as the amputation of his right little finger and he was given 57 days of medical leave.

  89. [10] weeks’ imprisonment and 5 years’ DQAC

  90. Issues to be determined

  91. [46] As alluded to above, a number of issues arise for our determination arising out of the legislative framework and the parties’ submissions:

  92. (a) How should the provisions in s 65 of the RTA be interpreted? In particular:

  93. (i) Are the categories of “hurt” and “grievous hurt” dichotomous or non-dichotomous?

  94. (ii) Is the choice of the level of harm and by extension the choice of the punishment provision a matter of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion?

  95. (b) What is the appropriate sentencing framework for ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA?

  96. (d) When is it appropriate for an SDO to be imposed for careless driving offences under s 65 of the RTA?

  97. The 2019 RTA amendments

  98. [47] The formulation of a sentencing framework for careless driving offences punishable under ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) ought to be guided by the architecture of the new s 65 of the RTA and the legislative intention behind it. We thus begin by sketching out the key amendments to the RTA and the legislative intention which underpin these amendments.

  99. [48] Prior to the 2019 RTA amendments, s 65 of the previous RTA was framed as follows:

  100. [49] The provision sets out the range of penalties for first-time and repeat offenders of both limbs of the offence of careless driving (ie, driving without due care and attention and driving without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road). For first-time offenders, the prescribed penalties ranged from a fine not exceeding $1,000 up to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to both. For repeat offenders, the prescribed penalties ranged from a fine not exceeding $2,000 up to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to both.

  101. [50] The amendments to s 65 of the RTA which came into effect on 1 November 2019 following the passage of s 14 of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2019 (Act 19 of 2019) (the “Amendment Act”), greatly altered its structure and introduced enhanced prescribed punishment ranges. We reproduce the relevant portions of the current iteration of s 65 (with the key provisions we are concerned with bolded for ease of reference):

  102. [51] In Wu Zhi Yong, in the context of dangerous driving offences under s 64 of the RTA, the court observed (at [15]) that the Amendment Act envisaged a new scheme of penalties following a tiered structure calibrated according to the degree of harm caused. This observation is equally relevant in the context of careless driving offences under s 65 of the RTA. Sections 65(2) to 65(5) of the RTA prescribe specific ranges of penalties across four different categories of harm: death, grievous hurt, hurt and cases where no physical injury is caused. As observed in Sue Chang at [38], the maximum punishments which may be imposed for each category of harm increase concomitantly with the seriousness of the harm caused. Further, within each of these sub-provisions for the different categories of harm, the punishment provisions are tiered again according to whether the offender is a first-time offender, repeat offender, serious offender or serious repeat offender as defined in the RTA. As succinctly summarised by Mr Christopher de Souza during the Second Reading of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 13/2019) (“Amendment Bill”) on 8 July 2019, the amended RTA with separate punishment regimes for dangerous driving and careless driving, calibrates the punishments meted out according to “culpability, aggravating factor of drink-driving or some other serious offence, gravity of hurt caused, and whether or not the offender is recalcitrant” (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (8 July 2019), vol 94).

  103. [52] The impetus for the review and reform of both the careless driving and the dangerous driving provisions was explained by the Second Minister for Home Affairs, Mrs Josephine Teo (“Minister Teo”) at the Second Reading of the Amendment Bill. She highlighted, in particular, the need for stronger deterrence against irresponsible driving (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (8 July 2019), vol 94). This was to be achieved through: (a) enhancing the criminal penalties for irresponsible driving; and (b) tightening the regulatory regime against irresponsible driving.

  104. [53] Minister Teo also elaborated on the rationale behind the revised penal structure for irresponsible driving offences under ss 64 and 65 of the RTA, namely: (a) to consolidate irresponsible driving offences under the RTA; and (b) penalise irresponsible driving offences based on: (i) the circumstances of the driving; and (ii) the level of harm caused:

  105. [54] To provide context to Minister Teo’s stated objective of consolidating irresponsible driving offences under the RTA, we note that irresponsible driving offences were previously prosecuted under a range of provisions in the Penal Code and the previous RTA. These provisions included: ss 336, 337, 338 and 304A of the Penal Code in relation to rash and negligent acts resulting in differing degrees of harm and ss 64 and 65 of the previous RTA for dangerous driving and careless driving. The dangerous driving and careless driving offences in the RTA correspond broadly to the rash act and negligent act offences in the Penal Code. Parliament found it necessary to consolidate the prosecution of such offences under the RTA and also to enhance the punishments to provide for longer maximum imprisonment terms and higher maximum fines, where applicable, than the corresponding rash act and negligent act offences in the Penal Code.

  106. [55] While Parliament’s articulated objectives behind the amendments to the RTA are clear, the difficulty the courts face lies in navigating the complex interaction of the various provisions, given the numerous permutations under which an offender convicted of a careless driving offence may be punished. The challenge is not to view each provision in isolation, but to consider the structure of the provisions as a whole, to ensure both coherence in sentencing approaches as well as consistency with legislative intent. With this legislative background in mind, we turn to consider the fundamental question of how the punishment provisions in s 65 of the RTA relate to one another. This will invariably inform our decision on the appropriate sentencing framework for ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA.

  107. Interpretation of the provisions in s 65 of the RTA

  108. [56] In the present set of appeals, we are tasked with determining the appropriate sentencing framework for careless driving offences where either grievous hurt or hurt has been caused, punishable under ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) respectively. As we alluded to at [55] above, the critical issue that has to be resolved at the outset is the scope and interaction of the various punishment provisions in s 65. Primarily, the punishment provisions are tiered in accordance with four categories of harm: death (s 65(2)), grievous hurt (s 65(3)), hurt (s 65(4)) and no physical injury (s 65(5)). This raises the question of the proper interpretation of each of these categories of harm – importantly, whether they are discrete or non-discrete.

  109. [57] We start with the definition of “grievous hurt” in s 65(3) of the RTA. Section 64(8) of the RTA expressly defines “grievous hurt” with reference to the definition of the same term as contained in s 320 of the Penal Code, with the exclusion of death. The categories of “death” and “no physical injury” also leave no definitional ambiguity and are self-explanatory. There is, however, no clear definition for “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA. We therefore have to consider the precise scope of “hurt” and whether it is broad enough to encompass harm which could also be classified as “grievous hurt” for the purpose of s 65(3).

  110. [58] The principles of purposive interpretation are trite. In Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”), the Court of Appeal summarised the approach to purposive interpretation under s 9A of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) (at [37]) as follows:

  111. (a) First, ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole.

  112. (b) Second, ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the statute.

  113. (c) Third, compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute.

  114. Possible interpretations of “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA

  115. [59] The first step requires us to ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision by determining the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the legislative provision: Tan Cheng Bock at [38].

  116. [60] There are two possible interpretations of “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA:

  117. [61] Before we turn to consider the ordinary meaning of “hurt” preferred in s 65(4) of the RTA, we set out the parties’ positions on the possible interpretations briefly. The Prosecution urges us to accept the Penal Code Interpretation. Their primary argument is that the reference in s 64(8) of the RTA to s 320 of the Penal Code “imports” the reference to s 319 of the Penal Code for the definition of “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA, and further that, by necessary implication this should exclude death for the purposes of the RTA. Mr Yong had initially taken the same position in his written submissions but later preferred the Exclusive Interpretation at the hearing and in his further written submissions. The appellant in MA 9204 (ie, Erh) agrees that the Exclusive Interpretation is correct, while the appellants in MA 9263 and MA 9113 (ie, Chen and Chua) prefer the Penal Code Interpretation. Chen reasons that this accords with “the more natural meaning of hurt”, while Chua submits that the meaning of the word “hurt” is ambiguous and the extraneous material indicates that the Penal Code Interpretation is to be preferred. The appellants’ positions are perhaps not surprising in that except for Erh, whose charge was not reduced by the Prosecution for reasons that were not made known to us, all the other appellants had their charges reduced. This outcome would only have been possible if the Penal Code Interpretation was applied.

  118. [62] The ordinary meaning of “hurt” in s 65(4) must be derived from the context of s 65 and the broader RTA. From the form and substance of s 65 of the RTA, it can be seen that Parliament promulgated a categorisation-centric approach to sentencing for careless driving offences. As we explain below, the Exclusive Interpretation best comports with this approach.

  119. [63] We begin with the structure of s 65 of the RTA. The offence-creating provision is found in s 65(1) of the RTA, which reads as follows:

  120. That this provision is concerned with establishing liability is plainly reflected in the language used. It is stated that an offender “shall be guilty of an offence” of careless driving, where either of the two disjunctive elements provided for in ss 65(1)(a) and 65(1)(b) is fulfilled. Further, s 65(8) of the RTA defines a “repeat offender” as a person who has been convicted on at least one other earlier occasion of “any of the following offences” and in identifying the relevant prior offences, the offence of careless driving is identified as “an offence under subsection (1)” [emphasis added].

  121. [64] The punishment provisions for s 65(1) are separately found in ss 65(2) to 65(8) of the RTA. These provisions prescribe the applicable range of punishments which may be imposed following the conviction of an offender on a charge of careless driving based on certain offence-specific factors and personal attributes of the offender, including: (a) the type of harm caused (see ss 65(2), 65(3), 65(4) and 65(5)); (b) the culpability of the offender, specifically, where he has been charged concurrently with another offence under ss 67 or 70(4) (see the “serious offender” and “serious repeat offender” provisions); and (c) the recidivism of the offender (see the “repeat offender” and “serious repeat offender” provisions). Notably, this tiered penalty structure was only introduced by s 14 of the Amendment Act.

  122. [65] In sum, in terms of form, s 65(1) exists independently as an offence-creating provision while ss 65(2) to 65(8) collectively exhibit a tiered punishment structure guided by specific attributes. It is especially relevant that each of the punishment provisions are structured in the syntactic form “if [type of harm (ie, death, grievous hurt, hurt or no physical injury)] is caused to another person by the driving of a motor vehicle by the offender, the offender shall on conviction of an offence under subsection (1) – [be liable to a specified range of punishment]”. The “if [type of harm]” clause functions as a condition precedent to the latter punishment clauses. Put simply, each “if [type of harm]” clause functions to delineate discrete categories of harm flowing from which a specific range of penalties apply. This strongly lends support to the Exclusive Interpretation.

  123. [66] In terms of substance, the Exclusive Interpretation is also supported by the statutory context of s 65. As mentioned above at [57], “grievous hurt” in s 65(3) of the RTA is defined in s 64(8) of the RTA with reference to the definition of “grievous hurt” in s 320 of the Penal Code with the exception of death. However, there is no express definition of “hurt” in the RTA, with reference to s 319 of the Penal Code or otherwise. Parliament no doubt could have considered defining “hurt” in s 65(4) with reference to s 319 of the Penal Code, in the same way as “grievous hurt”. Yet, it is striking that Parliament did not do so. Conceivably, this was because Parliament intended to leave room for the courts to define “hurt”, without constraining them to the definition of “hurt” in the Penal Code. In our judgment, it is significant that s 64(8) of the RTA expressly excludes s 320(aa) of the Penal Code (ie, death) from the definition of “grievous hurt” in the RTA. This is unlike in the Penal Code, where “grievous hurt” includes the occasion of death. Indeed, the parties accepted at the hearing that the punishment provisions concerning “death” (s 65(2)) and “no hurt” (ie,“[i]n any other case” in s 65(5)) reflect exclusive categories of harm. It stands to reason that if two of the four categories of harm are exclusive in nature, the remaining two should be read in the same way. In our view, the express exclusion of the occasion of death from grievous hurt in s 65(3) and the identification of the categories of harm in ss 65(2) and 65(5) as exclusive only buttress the Exclusive Interpretation and the discrete nature of the categories of harm.

  124. [67] Therefore, in our view, it is clear and unambiguous that the Exclusive Interpretation reflects the ordinary meaning of “hurt” in s 65(4).

  125. Legislative purpose of the RTA and s 65 of the RTA

  126. [69] The legislative purpose of the RTA and s 65 of the RTA may be gleaned from internal sources as well as the extrinsic sources. The court is to prefer the internal sources in ascertaining purpose, over the extraneous material: Tan Cheng Bock at [43].

  127. [70] We begin with the main internal textual sources from which one may derive the purpose of s 65 of the RTA. The long title of the RTA reads as follows: “it is an Act for the regulation of road traffic and the use of vehicles and the user of roads and for other purposes connected therewith”. This, however, does not shed any light on whether the Exclusive Interpretation is to be preferred over the Penal Code Interpretation. Of more importance is the structure and wording of s 65. It is apparent from the manner in which s 65 is drafted that it is divided into two portions: (a) the offence-creating provision; and (b) the punishment provisions. The specific purpose of s 65(4) is to provide for the range of penalties applicable to an offence of careless driving that occasions hurt. It needs to be read in context of the other provisions in the RTA, especially the other punishment provisions. From the manner in which the other punishment provisions have similarly been framed, the Parliamentary intent behind s 65(4) of the RTA must have been to lay down a structured classification of the categories (or pre-conditions) which will guide the sentencing courts to applying the applicable range of punishment. It would defeat the purpose of the structured classification of the categories to define “hurt” in s 65(4) as encompassing also “grievous hurt” in s 65(3), and in this way the Exclusive Interpretation better serves the legislative intent behind the tiered structure of punishment. It appears that it is through this categorisation-centric tiered approach that Parliament intended to levy the appropriate punishment on the notional careless driving offender to meet the broader purpose of the regulation of road traffic and the use of vehicles.

  128. [71] Turning to the extraneous material, we find it helpful to construe s 65 (and indeed s 65(4)) in light of the relevant parliamentary debates on the RTA.

  129. [72] We have discussed the Parliamentary debates in detail earlier in the judgment (see [50]–[53] above). The 2019 amendments to the RTA were intended to introduce stiffer penalties and to deter the incidence of irresponsible driving on our roads. This was practically implemented through the introduction of a tiered punishment structure for careless and dangerous driving offences under ss 64 and 65 of the RTA, with enhanced penalties for such offences.

  130. [74] In our judgment, on a purposive interpretation of the meaning of “hurt” in s 65(4) of the RTA, the Exclusive Interpretation should be adopted. That being said, it is apposite to emphasise at this juncture that while the definitions of “grievous hurt” and “hurt” are exclusive based on type, the categories are not exclusive in terms of severity. In other words, it is possible for some injuries classified as falling within “hurt” under s 65(4) to be more severe than some injuries categorised as “grievous hurt” under s 65(3). The possible overlap between the severity of an injury falling within “hurt” and the severity of an injury falling within “grievous hurt” is provided for by the overlap in the statutorily-prescribed ranges of punishment in ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA. The sentencing court should therefore be careful to consider the classification of the offence based on the type of hurt, but also the calibration of the selected sentence within the punishment range for the specific type of hurt based on its severity.

  131. Prosecutorial discretion under s 65 of the RTA

  132. [75] We now turn to consider how adopting the Exclusive Interpretation in respect of the punishment provisions, in particular, ss 65(3) and 65(4) of the RTA, practically impacts the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

  133. [76] It is apparent from a survey of the reported decisions that the Prosecution has on occasion reduced charges from the offence of careless driving causing grievous hurt under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA to the offence of careless driving causing hurt under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA. In light of the amendments to the RTA, we find it opportune to reconsider the legitimacy of this practice – specifically, whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion can extend to the determination of the applicable punishment provision faced by an offender in preferring the charge against him or her.

  134. The role of the Attorney-General as the Public Prosecutor and prosecutorial discretion

  135. [78] The statutory source of prosecutorial discretion conferred on the Attorney-General is provided for under Art 35(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Constitution”). The Attorney-General wields the “power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence”. He is the Public Prosecutor and has “the control and direction of criminal prosecutions and proceedings under [the Criminal Procedure Code] or any other written law”: s 11(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is guided at all times by the public interest in the application of the rule of law: Kevin Y L Tan and Thio Li-ann, Constitutional and Administrative Law in Singapore: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Academy Publishing, 2021) at para 7.004; Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Law Society of Singapore, The Code of Practice for the Conduct of Criminal Proceedings by the Prosecution and the Defence (2013) at para 5.

  136. [79] The scope and content of prosecutorial discretion is wide. It includes whether to commence proceedings against an accused person for a criminal offence, and the choice of charge against an accused person, for instance, with the most serious offence that the facts might disclose or with a less serious one: see Lee Keng Guan v Public Prosecutor [1977–1978] SLR(R) 78 at [27]–[28].

  137. [80] While there is significant latitude in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the courts have also recognised that there are limits. Specifically, it is subject to judicial review in two situations: (a) where the prosecutorial power is abused, ie, where it is exercised in bad faith for an extraneous purpose; or (b) where its exercise contravenes constitutional protections and rights: Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 (“Ramalingam”) at [17]; Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 (“Phyllis Tan”) at [149].

  138. [81] Where the exercise of prosecutorial discretion has exceeded its limits (see [80] above), the courts may intervene based on its constitutionally-conferred authority pursuant to Art 93 of the Constitution. This does not amount to an intrusion into the ambit of the Attorney-General’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion as Public Prosecutor because he has acted in excess of the limits of the discretion conferred by the Constitution: Phyllis Tan at [144].

  139. The role of the courts and judicial discretion in sentencing

  140. [82] Judicial power which is vested in the courts by Art 93 of the Constitution is constitutionally equal in status to the prosecutorial power vested in the Attorney-General pursuant to Art 35(8) of the Constitution: Ramalingam at [43].

  141. [83] In Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 (“Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu”), then-Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong (“Chan CJ”) considered the scope and nature of judicial power vis-à-vis the punishment of offenders. Chan CJ observed that the judicial discretion to determine the sentence to impose on an offender is conferred through statute, in accordance with the range of sentences prescribed by the legislature: Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu at [40] and [45].

  142. The interplay of prosecutorial discretion and judicial discretion under s 65 of the RTA

  143. [84] The nature of the prosecutorial discretion under s 65 of the RTA has to be examined in the context of its statutory construction.

  144. [85] Within s 65 of the RTA, the Prosecution has the discretion to “institute, conduct or discontinue” proceedings against an offender under s 65(1). This discretion, however, does not extend to the choice of the subsections pertaining to punishment, which confer upon the sentencing courts the discretion to select the appropriate sentence within the applicable range of sentences. Whether the conditional attributes (ie, the type of hurt, the presence of aggravating factors such as specific or repeat offenders) are satisfied is a matter of fact. Subsequent to the classification of the offence by the conditional attributes, the courts are conferred the power to adjudicate and determine the appropriate sentence within the prescribed range of punishment.

  145. [86] In the context of the criminal justice system, given the constitutionally demarcated roles of the Attorney-General (as the Public Prosecutor) and the courts, it is clear that the function of the Prosecution centres on determining whether to charge, and if so, what the appropriate charge is based on the public interest, while the courts’ role is in the adjudication of the matter to determine whether there ought to be a conviction and to select a sentence based on the scope of sentencing discretion accorded by Parliament in the statutorily-prescribed punishment provisions. It therefore falls to the construction of the statute criminalising the specific conduct to determine how the discretion is operationalised. The contours of the discretion conferred on the Attorney-General as prosecutorial discretion and the discretion conferred on the courts as judicial discretion are defined by the legislature’s decision in what conduct to criminalise, the elements of the offence which would satisfactorily prove the criminal conduct and the prescribed sentence for the criminal conduct, as discerned through the wording of the statute.

  146. [87] The nature and scope of prosecutorial discretion as defined in s 65(1) of the RTA is consistent with the respective roles of the constitutional organs in the regulation of criminal conduct. The Legislature has the power to prescribe punishment, whilst the Judiciary wields the power to exercise such sentencing discretion as conferred by statute to select the appropriate punishment: Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 173 (“Prabagaran”) at [60]; Teo Ghim Heng v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1240 (“Teo Ghim Heng”) at [125]. In line with the principle of separation of powers, the Executive may not undertake roles pertaining to the exercise of sentencing discretion that would fall within the remit of the Judiciary, the effect of which would be to curtail the invocation and exercise of sentencing powers conferred on the Judiciary by statute: Teo Ghim Heng at [125]; Prabagaran at [61], referencing Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 at 226–227). To allow the Prosecution the ability to choose between ss 65(3) and 65(4) is tantamount to an encroachment into the powers of the courts in sentencing by determining the range of punishment applicable to the offender. Thus, in the context of s 65 of the RTA, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is complete once the Prosecution decides to prosecute the offence under s 65(1) of the RTA. The imposition of the appropriate sentence within the statutorily-prescribed ranges of punishment is a matter of sentencing for the courts.

  147. [88] A distinction can be drawn between s 65 of the RTA and other penal provisions where the hurt that is caused is an element of the offence in itself. For example, for the offences of voluntarily causing hurt under s 321 of the Penal Code and voluntarily causing grievous hurt under s 322 of the Penal Code, the hurt caused forms the actus reus of the offences and the intention to cause that hurt forms the mens rea of the offences.

  148. Section 321 of the Penal Code is reproduced below:

  149. Section 322 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

  150. Given the fact that the type of hurt caused is an element of the offence in these provisions, the prosecutorial discretion borne by the Prosecution extends to the choice of which provision (and type of hurt) it may proceed with against an offender. Additionally, this is a function of the definition of “hurt” in s 319 of the Penal Code which is broad enough to include harm which could also be regarded as “grievous hurt” under s 320 of the Penal Code, which is defined by the designation of a specific subset of “hurt” as grievous. Under the Penal Code regime, grievous hurt is a subset of hurt (s 320) and death is one manifestation of grievous hurt (s 320(aa)). The manner in which the definitions of “hurt” and “grievous hurt” are laid down in the Penal Code provides for overlapping categories of types of hurt. In the RTA regime, however, it is clear that the categories of “hurt” are mutually exclusive definitions.

  151. [89] At the hearing, Deputy Attorney-General Tai Wei Shyong (“DAG Tai”) argued that the Prosecution engaged in similar charging practices of reducing charges in the context of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (2020 Rev Ed) (“MDA”), where there also exists a tiered punishment regime albeit based on the quantity of the drug trafficked. In this regard, the Second Schedule of the MDA contains a range of applicable punishments for drug traffickers which is calibrated by the quantity and type of the drug trafficked. Notwithstanding the punishment structure in the MDA, it is accepted that the Prosecution is able to amend the quantity of the drug trafficked which is proceeded on in the charge, with the effect of reducing a capital charge to a non-capital charge. We thus make a few observations on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion vis-à-vis judicial discretion in the context of offences under the MDA.

  152. [90] As we have explained above at [84]–[87], the construction of the statute informs the scope and ambit of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in charging vis-à-vis judicial discretion in sentencing. In the MDA, the offence-creating provision for trafficking (s 5(1) of the MDA) and the punishment provisions (s 33(1) of the MDA read with the Second Schedule to the MDA, and s 33B of the MDA) are separate. Flowing from our analysis above, it may seem apposite to define prosecutorial discretion in the context of the MDA as being whether the charge for drug trafficking under s 5(1) is preferred over another suitable charge such as drug possession under s 8. This would parallel the scope of prosecutorial discretion in s 65 of the RTA, which is based on whether the charge for careless driving under s 65(1) is preferred over another charge such as dangerous driving under s 64(1).

  153. [91] The Court of Appeal has previously settled the appropriateness of this practice in Ramalingam and stated as follows (at [65]):

  154. [92] We draw two distinctions between the ambit of prosecutorial discretion between drug trafficking under the MDA and careless driving under the RTA. As this court observed at the hearing, it is a matter of prosecutorial discretion to decide the quantity of drugs the Prosecution seeks to charge the offender for. This involves the permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion to state within the charge a quantity below the amount attracting capital punishment (eg, “not less than 14.99g of methamphetamine”) where a higher quantity of drugs was in fact seized by the Central Narcotics Bureau. By preferring such a charge under the MDA, the Prosecution exercises its discretion not to charge for the rest of the quantity of the drugs seized. In contrast, under the prevailing charging practice for careless driving offences under s 65(1) of the RTA, the charge is based on harm that amounts to grievous hurt but cites instead the punishment provision which applies to hurt simpliciter. This is equivalent to invoking the provision for a different punishment under a different “hurt” limb. By way of an illustration, the facts underpinning the charge against Lim in MA 9150 involve, inter alia, “left hip intertrochanteric fracture and left knee tibia plateau fracture” which amount to grievous hurt under s 64(8) of the RTA. The charge brought against Lim reads “hurt was caused to the said [victim], by such driving, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 65(1)(a) of the [RTA] punishable under Section 65(4)(a) of the [RTA]”. This is put in issue because the Prosecution then relies in the Statement of Facts on facts going toward one punishment provision (ie, injuries amounting to grievous hurt) but invokes another punishment provision that comes into effect by a different set of facts (ie, injuries amounting to hurt).

  155. [93] The other key distinguishing factor lies in the categorisation within the tiered punishment provisions in the MDA and the RTA. It must be highlighted that the categories in the Second Schedule of the MDA exist on a continuous range (ie, weight or quantity of drug), while the categories of harm within s 65 of the RTA are discrete, exclusive categories (ie, by type of harm). Under the MDA, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to proceed on a lower quantity of drugs for a charge of drug trafficking would still be factually consistent with the higher quantity of drugs in fact seized. For instance, the phrase “not less than 14.99g of methamphetamine” accurately describes any quantity of drugs involved when it is equivalent to or exceeding 14.99g. In contrast, under the RTA, if the Prosecution opted instead to proceed on a careless driving causing hurt charge under s 65(4) on the type of harm that is properly classified as grievous hurt, this results in the uneasy situation where the facts underpinning the charge do not support the punishment provision invoked. This is because the categories of “hurt” and “grievous hurt” are discrete and mutually exclusive in the type of harm each category contains. In other words, flowing from the Exclusive Interpretation, hurt is not a subset of grievous hurt under the RTA regime; a reduced quantity of the drug is a subset of the actual quantity of the drug under the MDA regime.

  156. [94] Therefore, we take the view that there is no inconsistency between the scope of prosecutorial discretion in the context of drug trafficking offences under the MDA and the delineated scope of prosecutorial discretion in s 65 of the RTA. As a matter of logic, it also cannot be that the prosecutorial discretion to reduce charges is limited to only one harm category (ie, grievous hurt to hurt). This is so given that a charge of careless driving causing death cannot be reduced to a charge of careless driving causing grievous hurt, as this is curbed by the unequivocal exclusion of “death” from the definition of “grievous hurt” in the RTA pursuant to s 64(8). A charge of careless driving causing hurt similarly cannot be reduced to a charge of careless driving causing no injury. For the reasons we explain at [92]–[93] above, the Exclusive Interpretation necessarily precludes such a practice. As a further point, we note the arbitrariness and artificiality of framing a charge which invokes the punishment provision for “hurt” (ie, s 65(4)(a)) where the underlying facts instead disclose injuries amounting to “grievous hurt” (which is a separate, non-overlapping category of “hurt”). This is particularly since the Prosecution owes a duty to the court to ensure that all relevant facts of the offence and the offender are placed before the court at the stage of sentencing. Indeed, DAG Tai conceded at the hearing before us that the Prosecution would not have the discretion to reduce charges from careless driving causing grievous hurt to careless driving causing hurt simpliciter if the Exclusive Interpretation was the correct interpretation.

  157. [95] We should stress that our analysis above should strictly be confined to the specific context of the RTA. It is because of the way that Parliament has reshaped the RTA through the 2019 amendments, that the Prosecution’s discretion is limited only to deciding whether to prosecute under s 65(1) of the RTA. The Parliamentary intent in the context of the RTA (see [70] above) is to levy punishment proportional to the careless driving offence to meet the broader legislative purpose of road use regulation. As the table (see [45] above) illustrates, however, there does not appear to be an explicable relationship between the sentences imposed for the offences in the present appeals and the respective levels of culpability and harm identified. The Exclusive Interpretation fosters a greater degree of consistency and certainty in the sentencing of careless driving offenders, and therefore furthers the legislative intent behind the RTA.

  158. The appropriate sentencing frameworks for careless driving offences punishable under ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA

  159. [96] Having concluded that the Exclusive Interpretation applies, the next question that comes to mind is: how, if at all, does this affect the choice of the type of sentencing approach to adopt for careless driving offences punishable under ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a)?

  160. Sentencing frameworks – General principles

  161. [97] We start by setting out some general principles concerning the use of sentencing frameworks.

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