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Grounds publishedDecided 24 Jan 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Rajesh Harichandra Budhrani v INTL FCStone Pte Ltd and others

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[2024] SGHC 18Case no. Suit No 295 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The present claim and counterclaim arose from a margin call which was made by the defendants on the plaintiff, Mr Rajesh Harichandra Budhrani (“Mr Budhrani”) in March 2020, amidst a rapidly falling silver futures market. This led to a series of events culminating in this action.

  3. Undisputed facts

  4. Parties to the dispute

  5. [2] Mr Budhrani was a client of UOB Bullion and Futures Limited (“UOBBF”) since 20 November 2007. He entered into a Bullion Margin Trading Agreement dated 20 November 2007 (“Margin Trading Agreement”) and a Client Agreement dated August 2016 (“Client Agreement”) with UOBBF in respect of margin trading in silver futures (collectively, “the Agreements”). The Margin Trading Agreement encompasses a Customer Agreement among other documents.

  6. [3] Mr Budhrani is an accredited investor. He is experienced in trading in silver futures contracts (hereinafter referred to interchangeably as “silver”, “lots” and “contracts”) since 2007. The Agreements with UOBBF were novated to INTL FCStone Pte Ltd (“INTL FCStone”) on 7 October 2019. The events that gave rise to this claim and counterclaim occurred before INTL FCStone changed its name on 17 July 2020 to “StoneX Financial Pte Ltd”, by which it is now known.

  7. [4] INTL FCStone is a Singapore-incorporated company dealing in capital markets products and exchange-traded derivatives contracts. Ms Chandrawati Alie (“Ms Alie”) and Ms Song Oi Lan (“Ms Song”) were employees of INTL FCStone at all material times. Both Ms Alie and Ms Song’s job scopes involved executing trade orders for clients, including Mr Budhrani. At the material time, they reported to Mr Lee Lian Tuck (“Mr Lee”), the Head of Listed Derivatives (Asia).

  8. [5] I refer to INTL FCStone, Ms Alie and Ms Song collectively as the “defendants”.

  9. Background to the dispute

  10. [7] A client’s margin trading account may run into two types of deficits. First, where the equity falls below the maintenance margin, a trading account is in a “margin deficit”. Second, where the equity is negative, in other words, where the realised and unrealised losses exceed the cash value in the account, a trading account is in an “account deficit” or an “equity deficit”. This also means that the owner of that trading account owes INTL FCStone a debt of that quantum. INTL FCStone’s policy allowed it to liquidate a client’s open positions and require the client to pay the consequent shortfall to INTL FCStone when that client’s margin ratio fell below 20%.

  11. [8] Each silver futures contract deals with 5,000 troy ounces of silver. It is priced in United States dollars and cents per troy ounce.

  12. [9] Prior to 13 March 2020, Mr Budhrani held 88 lots of silver futures. In the early hours of 13 March 2020, Mr Budhrani was speaking to an employee of INTL FCStone, one Mr Jeremy Goh, about a possible margin call. A margin call is a call issued by INTL FCStone for collateral in the form of cash or other property (clauses 1.25.1 and 1.25.11 of the Client Agreement).

  13. [10] On 14 March 2020, INTL FCStone sent Mr Budhrani two daily statements by email indicating that there was a margin call for US$398,527.60. On 16 March 2020, INTL FCStone sent Mr Budhrani another email titled “… Margin Call 13/03/2020 *DAY 1*”, which states as follows:

  14. [11] The reference to “SSI” is to INTL FCStone’s Standard Settlement Instructions. Over the course of 16 March 2020, the price of silver fell significantly. Mr Budhrani, Ms Alie and Ms Song had various phone conversations during which, among other things, Mr Budhrani gave instructions to sell his contracts and received updates when the said contracts were sold. A summary of the times at which his contracts were sold is set out below:

  15. Number of contracts

  16. Approximate time of sale

  17. Abbreviations

  18. 20

  19. 5.22pm

  20. the “20 Contracts”

  21. the “39 Contracts”

  22. the “66 Contracts”

  23. 9

  24. Between 5.22pm and 5.36pm

  25. the “9 Contracts”

  26. 10

  27. 5.53pm

  28. the “10 Contracts”

  29. 27

  30. 10.26pm

  31. the “27 Contracts”

  32. [12] On 16 March 2020 at 10.30pm, Mr Budhrani was informed by Ms Alie that the last 27 of his 66 Contracts had been sold. She also informed him that he had a deficit of US$277,000. Thereafter Mr Budhrani claimed that Ms Alie had advised him, wrongly, that he could “break even … to get out without any deficit” and that he was “forced” to sell all his 66 contracts.

  33. [13] Mr Budhrani subsequently commenced this claim on 31 March 2020.

  34. The parties’ cases

  35. Mr Budhrani’s case

  36. The margin call and the Oral Agreement

  37. [14] According to Mr Budhrani, the margin call was only made on 16 March 2020, rather than 14 March 2020, as the defendants claim. Mr Budhrani also claims that the defendants breached an oral agreement by causing or procuring his sale of the 66 Contracts by 16 March 2020: he entered into the said oral agreement with INTL FCStone on 16 March 2020, which provided that he could settle the margin call by 18 March 2020 (the “Oral Agreement”). Mr Budhrani also says that he gave consideration for the Oral Agreement by providing for funds to be paid.

  38. The 66 Contracts

  39. [15] Mr Budhrani claims that he gave instructions to the defendants to sell the 20 Contracts on 16 March 2020 at around 5.22pm as a result of the defendants’ undue influence, duress, misrepresentation and/or breach of their duty of care.

  40. (a) Mr Budhrani says that the defendants exercised actual undue influence over him by unlawfully and illegitimately requiring him to immediately liquidate his contracts by 16 March 2020. In particular, he highlights that the defendants were aware that:

  41. (i) he was in fear of defaulting on the Margin Trading Agreement and Client Agreement and did not want to do so;

  42. (ii) he did not want to, consequent upon such default, incur negative consequences in relation to his other margin trading accounts with other brokers;

  43. (iii) he did not want to have a negative credit standing as a result of such default; and

  44. (iv) he did not want the defendants to liquidate these contracts.

  45. As a consequence of this, he consented to the liquidation of the 20 Contracts.

  46. (b) Mr Budhrani’s case is that the defendants exerted pressure over him, which amounted to compulsion of his will, and that this pressure was illegitimate. Accordingly, he was subject to duress. He consented to the liquidation of the 20 Contracts as a consequence.

  47. (The parties use the term “illegitimate pressure” to refer to both duress and undue influence, and I adopt that usage.)

  48. (c) Mr Budhrani claims, “[f]urther or alternatively”, a conspiracy in that “the [d]efendants each acting individually or in combination or in concert or as a common enterprise exercised duress and/or in concert with [Mr Lee] exercised undue influence over” him.

  49. (d) Mr Budhrani says that Ms Alie and Ms Song falsely represented that his equity (see [112] below) was in deficit of US$127,000 and a sale of 16 contracts would remove the deficit (the “5.22pm Representations”). Instead, neither a sale of 16 nor 20 contracts would have “in any way made a difference to the said deficit”. These representations were made fraudulently. Mr Budhrani relied on these representations and gave instructions for the sale of the 20 Contracts. Consequently, he suffered loss and damage.

  50. (e) Mr Budhrani also states that the defendants owed him a duty of care in tort or as an implied term of their contractual relationship to, inter alia, inform him of the true value of his losses, take reasonable care to satisfy themselves of the accuracy of their representations and act as reasonably competent and prudent brokers in making their representations. The defendants negligently and/or grossly negligently breached these duties of care. As a result, Mr Budhrani suffered loss and damage.

  51. [16] Next, Mr Budhrani claims that the sale of the 9 Contracts at about 5.35pm was a consequence of the defendants’ exercise of undue influence and/or duress over him, and repeats [15(a)]–[15(c)] above.

  52. [17] Mr Budhrani also says that the sale of the 10 Contracts on 16 March 2020 at about 5.53pm was made pursuant to the defendants’ undue influence, duress or misrepresentation:

  53. (a) Mr Budhrani says that his instructions to sell the 20 Contracts were given when he was subject to undue influence and/or duress, and repeats [15(a)]–[15(c)] above.

  54. (b) Mr Budhrani claims that INTL FCStone and Ms Song falsely represented that a sale of 37 contracts would result in his equity improving to positive without bringing in additional funds to his account, and that a sale of the said 37 contracts at the prevailing price of US$13.195 – US$13.20 would result in his account having a balance of about US$60,000 (the “5.53pm Representations”). Instead, there would be a deficit of at least US$226,442 after such a sale. These representations were made fraudulently. Mr Budhrani was induced by these representations and instructed the defendants to sell the 10 Contracts. Mr Budhrani consequently suffered loss and damage.

  55. (c) Mr Budhrani also states that the defendants owed him specific duties of care which they negligently or grossly negligently breached, and repeats [15(e)] above.

  56. [18] Mr Budhrani’s case is that the sale of the 27 Contracts at around 10.26pm was a result of the defendants’ exercise of undue influence and/or duress over him, and/or their misrepresentation to him.

  57. (a) Mr Budhrani says that his instructions to sell the 27 Contracts were given when he was subject to undue influence and/or duress, and repeats [15(a)]–[15(c)] above.

  58. (c) Mr Budhrani also states that the defendants owed him specific duties of care which they negligently or grossly negligently breached, and repeats [15(e)] above.

  59. The 18 March and US$80,000 Representations

  60. [19] Mr Budhrani further claims that the defendants, “each acting individually or in combination or in concert or as a common enterprise”, falsely represented that he had until 18 March 2020 (the “18 March Representation”) to settle the margin call and that he could arrange a transfer of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone (the “US$80,000 Representation”). According to him, the true position was that the defendants encouraged him to remit moneys to settle the margin call despite knowing that the Risk team of INTL FCStone had no intention of allowing him to settle the margin call by 18 March 2020. Mr Budhrani acted in reliance on the defendants’ fraudulent representation and arranged payment of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone. Mr Budhrani suffered loss and damage therefrom.

  61. The defendants were in breach of the Agreements

  62. [20] Mr Budhrani further avers that the defendants breached the Agreements. Specifically, he says that “pursuant to [the Agreements] it was agreed that [INTL FCStone] would act as a broker for [him]. The essence of the agreement … was an execution service only contract (‘Execution Only Contract’)”. He says that the parties made the Execution Only Contract, under which the defendants had no right to interfere with Mr Budhrani’s decisions in respect of the disposal and retention of his contracts. The defendants breached the Execution Only Contract by causing or procuring Mr Budhrani to sell the 66 Contracts by 16 March 2020, notwithstanding that he had until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call.

  63. [21] Mr Budhrani pleads that, as the employer of Ms Alie and Ms Song, INTL FCstone is vicariously liable for damage to him caused by Ms Alie and Ms Song’s actions or omissions, carried out in the course of their employment.

  64. [22] Mr Budhrani also avers that there was no default on his part such that INTL FCStone was entitled to liquidate the contracts in his account. He contends that the 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations were not ad hoc and informal projections but were instead statements of fact intended to induce him to act. If they are regarded as opinion, they were falsely represented as being based on facts. He also denies that he knew or ought to have known the quality of the information.

  65. The defendants’ case

  66. The margin call and the Oral Agreement

  67. [23] The defendants maintain that the margin call was properly issued to Mr Budhrani via email on 14 March 2020. They deny that any oral agreement was formed on or about 16 March 2020 between Mr Budhrani and INTL FCStone. Mr Budhrani did not provide any consideration for any agreement.

  68. [24] The defendants point out that clause 5 of the Customer Agreement and clauses 1.46.1 and 1.46.2 of the Client Agreement provide that these agreements cannot be varied or waived save in writing. Furthermore, the officers whom Mr Budhrani spoke to on 12 and 13 March 2020 did not have, or hold themselves out to have, authority to bind INTL FCStone to contracts. INTL FCStone also did not hold them out as having any such authority, nor the authority to communicate that it entered into any contracts. The defendants deny that INTL FCStone breached its obligations under the Oral Agreement by deciding that Mr Budhrani was to settle the margin call as soon as possible. They also deny that their demand for the liquidation of the contracts and/or satisfaction of the Margin Call by 16 March 2020 breached the aforesaid obligations.

  69. The 66 Contracts

  70. [25] In relation to all 66 Contracts, the defendants deny subjecting Mr Budhrani to duress or undue influence, for the following reasons:

  71. (a) Mr Budhrani was an experienced investor and an accredited investor.

  72. (b) According to the Margin Trading Agreement and the Client Agreement, Mr Budhrani represented, warranted and undertook that any orders placed with INTL FCStone and any dealings in relation to his account were solely and exclusively based on his own judgment after his independent appraisal and investigation into the associated risks.

  73. (c) INTL FCstone had acted in exercise of its rights under the Margin Trading Agreement and the Client Agreement which cannot be regarded as improper pressure or undue influence upon Mr Budhrani.

  74. (d) Mr Budhrani had been informed that he had to liquidate his contracts because his equity had fallen below 20% of the initial margin (the “20% Policy”), and he accordingly sold his contracts of his own volition, making his own decisions as to the number of contracts to sell and the price to sell them at.

  75. The defendants deny informing Mr Budhrani that he had to liquidate the 66 Contracts by 16 March 2020 and thereby exercising duress and/or undue influence over Mr Budhrani.

  76. [26] The defendants deny that they and/or Mr Lee made any misrepresentation to Mr Budhrani to cause him to sell the 66 Contracts.

  77. [27] The defendants also deny that they owed Mr Budhrani any duty to act with a degree of skill, care and diligence to be expected of reasonably competent and prudent brokers to, inter alia, satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the 5.22pm, 5.53pm, 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations.

  78. [28] The defendants deny that the 5.22pm, 5.53pm, 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations were negligent or grossly negligent, or that they were false or wrong. The defendants further deny that they knew or ought to have known that Mr Budhrani would be induced by and would rely on the 5.22pm, 5.53pm, 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations, and they deny that Mr Budhrani did in fact rely on the said representations.

  79. [29] Specifically, in respect of the 20 Contracts, the defendants deny that the 5.22pm Representations were misrepresentations. On their case, Ms Alie made the 5.22pm Representations having taken into account the funds that Mr Budhrani had said he would bring in to address the shortfall in the margin required to hold his contracts. The defendants deny that the 5.22pm Representations were false, that they were made fraudulently, and that Mr Budhrani acted in reliance on them. Further, Mr Budhrani did not rely and/or is estopped from claiming that he relied on the 5.22pm Representations, because, inter alia, he had:

  80. (a) represented and warranted that he had not wanted financial advice from INTL FCStone and would reject any and all offers for such advice and was solely responsible for determining the merits of each transaction he instructs INTL FCStone to execute (clause 1.22 of the Client Agreement);

  81. (c) agreed that INTL FCStone assumed no responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of any trading and investment information provided to him (clause 29 of the Customer Agreement; clause 1.30.2 of the Client Agreement).

  82. The defendants also deny that Mr Budhrani suffered loss and damage as a consequence.

  83. [30] As for the 10 Contracts, the defendants also deny that the 5.53pm Representations were misrepresentations. Ms Song told Mr Budhrani that if he brought in funds to address the initial margin requirement for 37 contracts, he would have a positive balance of around US$60,000, after taking into account that his equity was negative US$226,442. Mr Budhrani therefore knew or ought to have known that the 5.53pm Representations were made on the basis that he would bring in funds to cover the initial margin requirement of “[US$]290,000 plus”. The defendants deny that the 5.53pm Representations were false, that they were made fraudulently, and that Mr Budhrani acted in reliance on them. They say that Mr Budhrani did not rely and/or was estopped from relying on them for the reasons explained above at [29]. The defendants also deny that Mr Budhrani suffered loss and damage as a consequence.

  84. [31] Next, in relation to the 27 Contracts, the defendants deny making the 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations to induce Mr Budhrani to dispose of the 27 Contracts. Instead they say that Mr Budhrani represented to the defendants over telephone conversations and emails that he would bring funds into his account to address the shortfall in margin required to hold his contracts. When Ms Song made the 6.33pm Representation and Ms Alie made the 8.46pm Representation, they had taken into account the funds that Mr Budhrani said he would bring into the account to address the margin shortfall. The 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations were not false, nor were they made fraudulently or recklessly. The defendants say that Mr Budhrani knew or ought to have known that the 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations were made on that basis. They also say that Mr Budhrani was aware that any information provided was subject to quickly-changing market prices. Thus he knew or ought to have known that the 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations were no more than ad hoc and informal projections or opinions, not representations of fact, which were not intended to be relied on. They plead that Mr Budhrani did not rely and/or is estopped from claiming that he relied on the 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations. In this regard, Ms Song points further to clauses 1.22, 1.30.2 and 1.34 of the Client Agreement, and clauses 22, 29 and 32 of the Customer Agreement. Mr Budhrani did not thereby suffer any loss or damage.

  85. The 18 March and US$80,000 Representations

  86. [32] The defendants deny that they made the 18 March and US$80,000 Representations individually or in combination or in concert or as a common enterprise. They dispute Mr Budhrani’s claims that the aforementioned representations were false, were made fraudulently, that Mr Budhrani arranged payment of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone in reliance on the truth of these representations, and that he consequently suffered loss and damage.

  87. The Agreements were not breached

  88. [33] The defendants deny that they acted in breach of an Execution Only Contract. INTL FCStone acted as broker in a strictly non-advisory capacity and the services rendered to Mr Budhrani were execution-only services without the provision of any advice. They point out that the Agreements obliged Mr Budhrani to provide additional margin as they required in their absolute discretion within one business day of being informed of a margin call or a margin deficit. INTL FCStone was prepared to give Mr Budhrani up to three business days to provide the requested funds before taking any steps to liquidate or square off his contracts, provided that his equity did not fall below 20% of his initial margin. INTL FCStone was entitled to take all necessary steps to protect its financial interests before the deadline given to Mr Budhrani to meet the margin call (clause 1.6.1(b) of the Client Agreement) and sell or buy any or all securities or commodities outstanding in Mr Budhrani’s account (clause 10 of the Customer Agreement).

  89. [34] The defendants deny causing or procuring Mr Budhrani’s liquidation of the 66 Contracts by 16 March 2020. They disagree that INTL FCStone is vicariously liable for the alleged acts or omissions by Ms Alie and Ms Song stated above.

  90. INTL FCStone’s Counterclaim

  91. [35] INTL FCStone counterclaims for loss and damages of US$198,222.60, and interest thereon, arising from Mr Budhrani’s breach of the Agreements. Mr Budhrani denies any liability for this counterclaim.

  92. Issues to be determined

  93. [36] As a preliminary issue, I consider if the parties are bound by the Agreements and whether the defendants are precluded from relying on them. Next, I address the issue of when the margin call was made, before I turn to the two claims concerning the margin call to examine:

  94. (a) whether the parties are bound by the Oral Agreement, which purportedly provides that Mr Budhrani could settle the margin call by 18 March 2020; and

  95. (b) whether the defendants misrepresented to Mr Budhrani that he had until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call and that he could arrange a transfer of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone.

  96. [37] Since Mr Budhrani’s case in relation to undue influence and duress rests on his assertion that the defendants acted in contravention of the Execution Only Contract, I go on to consider whether the defendants breached the Execution Only Contract provided for under the Agreements.

  97. [38] I turn then to Mr Budhrani’s claims in relation to the 66 Contracts, which requires me to determine:

  98. (a) whether he was in default in settling the margin call and, if so, what INTL FCStone was consequently entitled to do in relation to his account;

  99. (b) whether the defendants exercised undue influence and/or duress resulting in the liquidation of the 66 Contracts by 16 March 2020;

  100. (c) whether the defendants made misrepresentations by way of the 5.22pm Representations which induced him to liquidate the 20 Contracts;

  101. (d) whether the defendants made misrepresentations by way of the 5.53pm Representations which induced him to liquidate the 10 Contracts;

  102. (e) whether the defendants made misrepresentations by way of the 6.33pm and 8.46pm Representations which induced him to liquidate the 27 Contracts; and

  103. (f) whether the defendants owed him a duty of care and/or breached their duty to, inter alia, inform him of the true value of his losses, take reasonable care to satisfy themselves of the accuracy of their representations and act as reasonably competent brokers in making their representations, as concerns the 20 Contracts, the 10 Contracts and the 27 Contracts.

  104. [39] Finally, I consider INTL FCStone’s counterclaim.

  105. Whether the defendants are precluded from relying on the Agreements

  106. [40] Mr Budhrani objects to the defendants’ reliance on the Agreements. I am unpersuaded by Mr Budhrani’s arguments in this regard.

  107. [41] First, Mr Budhrani says that as there was a past course of dealing where he was never required to fully liquidate his contracts to settle margin calls, the defendants cannot rely on the Agreements. But he does not offer any explanation as to why a past course of dealing should necessarily mean that the defendants cannot rely on the Agreements. More importantly, he did not prove that there was such a course of dealing apart from making a bare assertion. It is not disputed that the Agreements were validly made between the parties.

  108. [42] Second, he points to the Oral Agreement. Given my finding at [63] below that the Oral Agreement was not made, this argument fails.

  109. [43] Third, Mr Budhrani claims that the defendants cannot rely on the Agreements because of the improper pressure, undue influence, fraud and/or breaches of duty they perpetrated. It is not clear what principle(s) of law he relies on for this proposition. In any case, as I go on to find below, there was no undue influence, duress, fraud or breach of duty on the defendants’ part. I therefore dismiss this argument.

  110. [44] Fourth, Mr Budhrani claims that the Agreements are not reasonable in the context of an individual customer entering into an agreement with a financial institution. He also says that the defendants cannot rely on them as they are subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) (the “UCTA”). He provides no explanation for how the UCTA operates to preclude the defendants’ reliance on the entirety of the Agreements. I deal with his case on specific clauses below:

  111. (a) Clause 1.30.2(e) of the Client Agreement reads:

  112. As none of my findings turn on the defendants’ reliance on this clause, it is not necessary for me to make a finding whether the defendants are precluded from such reliance. Nonetheless, in view of my finding that the defendants were neither negligent nor in breach of any contract, Mr Budhrani’s reliance on ss 2(2) and 3(2)(a) of the UCTA is groundless. His reliance on ss 3(2)(b)(i) and 3(2)(b)(ii) of the UCTA also does not assist him as the defendants do not claim to be entitled to render performance different from what was reasonably expected of them or to render no performance at all. I note that Mr Budhrani makes no such assertion either. Instead, he says that the defendants acted contrary to ss 3(2)(b)(i) and 3(2)(b)(ii) of the UCTA by “assum[ing] no responsibility”. Finally, I also note that Mr Budhrani does not challenge the evidence given by the defendants’ expert, Mr Tsvetan Nikolaev Beloreshki (“Mr Beloreshki”) that such a clause was consistent with industry practice.

  113. (b) Clause 1.34.1(f) of the Client Agreement reads:

  114. As I find that the defendants were not negligent or in breach of any contract both (a) generally; and (b) specifically in the one instance where this clause was relevant (at [120] below), Mr Budhrani’s reliance on s 3(2)(a) of the UCTA does not take him very far. In any case, preliminarily, I agree with the defendants’ submission that this was not a clause excluding or restricting liability but rather one which defined the scope of the parties’ respective legal obligations. Mr Budhrani also does not challenge Mr Beloreshki’s evidence that such a clause was consistent with industry practice.

  115. (c) Clause 29(v) of the Customer Agreement reads:

  116. This is the only clause which Mr Budhrani addressed in his written closing submissions. Even then, all he did was merely assert that it was not a reasonable clause. This submission does not at all explain why reliance on this clause is precluded by the UCTA. Once again, none of my findings herein turn on the defendants’ reliance on clause 29(v) of the Customer Agreement. I find that the defendants were neither negligent nor in breach of their contractual obligations, so Mr Budhrani’s reliance on ss 2(2) and 3(2)(a) of the UCTA does not help his case.

  117. Curiously, in his written reply closing submissions, Mr Budhrani later changes tack and argues that the “UCTA does not even come into play”. He says that the UCTA does not apply since the “substance of the contract between the parties involves the giving of ‘pricing information’” and “[t]here can be no exclusion clause … if such a clause removes the essence of the contract”. He does not explain why giving of such “pricing information” forms the “essence of the contract”, nor why this should inexorably render a clause inapplicable. The argument appears to be premised on Mr Budhrani’s subjective understanding of the remit of the Execution Only Contract. However, as I explain at [76]–[80] below, there was no Execution Only Contract. There is therefore no basis for this argument.

  118. [45] Fifth, Mr Budhrani submits that the defendants cannot rely on the Agreements because they are not applicable to the claims. He does not explain why inapplicability to the facts should preclude the defendants’ reliance on the Agreements generally, and I also reject this submission.

  119. [46] Finally, he pleads that Ms Song cannot rely on the Agreements because of clause 1.22.3(b) of the Client Agreement. It reads:

  120. Mr Budhrani does not however adequately explain why he makes this argument. In his written closing submissions, he appears to suggest that clause 1.22.3(c) does not apply because the defendants say they did not give any advice, but applicability is different from the question of reliance, and his submission deals with a wholly different clause from clause 1.22.3(b) of the Client Agreement. In my view, this clause does not operate to preclude Ms Song’s reliance on the Agreements.

  121. Whether the margin call was only issued on 16 March 2020

  122. [47] Mr Budhrani pleads that the margin call was not issued on 14 March 2020 but on 16 March 2020, for two reasons. First, he claims that no margin call could be made on a Saturday. He gives no reasons for or evidence in support of this assertion. Even if we accept that Saturday is not considered a business day, this does not necessarily mean that it must also be assumed that margin calls cannot be made on a Saturday. Second, Mr Budhrani says that the email dated 14 March 2020 attaching the daily statement dated 13 March 2020 (the “13 March DS”) was only received by him on the next business day (ie, 16 March 2020). Again, he has adduced no evidence in support of this statement. It is not clear why this was the case, given that there is no apparent dispute that the email was dated and sent on 14 March 2020 or that an email notification would suffice to constitute notice of a margin call. He also states that the defendants and Mr Lee admitted that the margin call was issued on 16 March 2020, but the cited testimony was given only by Mr Lee and says nothing of the date the margin call was made.

  123. [48] Mr Budhrani submits that the 13 March DS was not a margin call but just an “update on the financial information”, and relies on Lam Chi Kin David v Deutsche Bank AG [2011] 1 SLR 800 (“Lam Chi Kin David”) to submit that a margin call had to take the form of a letter intended to be a margin call, rather than a notification. But this contradicts his own pleaded case that the email attaching the 13 March DS was a margin call, albeit that he only purportedly received it on the next business day, ie, 16 March 2020.

  124. [49] In any case, Lam Chi Kin David does not assist Mr Budhrani. The court there did not say that notifications were generally insufficient to constitute a margin call, instead, it found that the two letters in contention there were notifications of the appellant’s collateral availability and the shortfall in his account, and were only for discussion purposes (Lam Chi Kin David at [20]). The court found another letter to be “a margin call as it was expressed to be so” and was an express notice to the appellant to either provide additional security or reduce his exposure (Lam Chi Kin David at [21]). The facts in our present case may be distinguished because clause 1.25.11 of the Client Agreement provides that a margin call can be made in any form in INTL FCStone’s sole discretion:

  125. In contrast, no similar clause was operative in Lam Chi Kin David. Furthermore, the 13 March DS states “MARGIN CALL 398,527.60DR”, which explicitly indicates that there was a margin call, and it is unclear if that was similarly the case in Lam Chi Kin David. I also note that the 13 March DS is, per clause 1.29.2 of the Client Agreement, deemed to be conclusive and binding against Mr Budhrani unless he makes any objection known within five business days of despatch of the statement. The 13 March DS is thus unlikely to have only been for discussion purposes.

  126. [50] I therefore agree with the defendants that the 13 March DS sent to Mr Budhrani via email on 14 March 2020 constituted the margin call. He was thus obliged to meet the margin call by the next business day, ie, 16 March 2020.

  127. Whether the parties are bound by the Oral Agreement for Mr Budhrani to settle the margin call by 18 March 2020

  128. [51] To briefly recapitulate, Mr Budhrani’s case is that the margin call was made on 16 March 2020. By entering into the Oral Agreement with INTL FCStone on or about 16 March 2020, he was granted an extension to 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call.

  129. [52] The defendants however deny that any oral agreement was formed on or about 16 March 2020 between Mr Budhrani and INTL FCStone.

  130. There was no Oral Agreement between the parties

  131. [53] In my view, Mr Budhrani and INTL FCStone did not make the Oral Agreement.

  132. [54] First, Mr Budhrani has adduced no evidence of the formation of the Oral Agreement. Mr Budhrani says that the Oral Agreement was reached on or about 16 March 2020. He does not plead the particulars of how this Oral Agreement was reached. In other words, he does not identify how his purported offer of the Oral Agreement was made and accepted by INTL FCStone. His Closing Submissions do not assist in this regard, as they focus instead on pointing out evidence which shows that the Oral Agreement exists, rather than evidence of its formation. Mr Budhrani puts forward four pieces of evidence which purportedly show that the Oral Agreement was made. I disagree that any of them prove his assertion.

  133. (a) He points out Mr Lee’s agreement that Ms Song “communicated to [him] that … [Mr Budhrani] was to be given until Wednesday to pay … [a]nd that [Ms Song] had agreed to that”. But this is hearsay evidence and, in any case, does not say anything as to whether and how INTL FCStone entered the Oral Agreement with Mr Budhrani.

  134. (b) Mr Budhrani highlights that Ms Song agreed with Mr Budhrani when he said that he “[had] T+3 … to pay”. In this regard, “T+3” refers to Mr Budhrani’s entitlement to three days to satisfy the margin call. However, the transcript of that conversation shows that Ms Song’s response was: “Yes, yes, but… Yes, that’s right but if… Can you mail it like, today? Fund in today. If you want to resolve the margin call then you’re supposed to fund in today.” [emphasis added]. This does not prove that the parties made or were bound by the Oral Agreement.

  135. (c) Mr Budhrani points out that Ms Song agreed at trial that Mr Budhrani had three days, until 18 March 2020, to satisfy the margin call. Presumably this refers to Ms Song’s agreement that she told Mr Budhrani that “as long as the money is on Wednesday, I think that will be fine.” However, this does not show that the parties made the Oral Agreement, and could similarly support the defendants’ position that INTL FCStone had granted Mr Budhrani an indulgence instead. It also does not show that INTL FCStone entered the Oral Agreement.

  136. (d) Ms Song’s statements to Mr Budhrani on 13 March 2020 are unhelpful for the same reasons stated above. Furthermore, those statements pre-date 16 March 2020, the date Mr Budhrani pleads the Oral Agreement was made.

  137. [55] In the absence of any cogent evidence demonstrating that the Oral Agreement was formed, I do not accept Mr Budhrani’s assertion that the parties entered into the Oral Agreement. It is therefore not strictly necessary for me to consider if Mr Budhrani gave consideration for the Oral Agreement. In any case, I am persuaded by the defendants’ submission that no consideration was provided. By arranging for funds to be paid, Mr Budhrani was simply doing what he was already contractually required to do under the Agreements, namely to bring in funds to meet the margin call. I disregard Mr Budhrani’s further contention that he provided consideration in the form of “buffer” funds over and above the amount of the margin call as this was not his pleaded case.

  138. [56] Second, Mr Budhrani has also not explained how the Oral Agreement is not precluded by the terms of the Client Agreement. The defendants say that no Oral Agreement can arise as it would be inconsistent with the Customer Agreement and the Client Agreement. Mr Budhrani was obligated to furnish additional margin within one business day of being informed of a margin call or a margin deficit (clause 1.25.4 of the Client Agreement), and this obligation cannot be varied or waived save in writing. However, the defendants do not explain how clause 5 of the Customer Agreement applies to the terms of the Client Agreement, and instead appear to state explicitly that it applies to “provision[s] of the Customer Agreement” [emphasis added]. Since Mr Budhrani claims that the Oral Agreement was “made”, I do not think clause 1.46.1 of the Client Agreement is relevant, since it applies to a waiver by way of “failure to exercise of enforce [and] delay in exercising or enforcing on the part of [INTL FCStone] of any right, power or privilege”. I agree, however, that clause 1.46.2 of the Client Agreement provides that the terms therein cannot be waived “[u]nless … expressly agreed in writing by [INTL FCStone]”. This is supported by Mr Lee’s evidence that employees of INTL FCStone did not have authority to make the Oral Agreement with Mr Budhrani and thereby bind INTL FCStone to the said agreement. Although Mr Budhrani submits that “all acts carried out by [Ms Songwere] authorised”, the cited testimony concerned authority to provide pricing information to clients, not employees’ authority to commit INTL FCStone to enter into binding contracts. Turning back to clause 1.46.2 of the Client Agreement, Mr Budhrani does not address this difficulty with his case. I also note that, although he does not make the following argument specifically, to the extent that he objects to the defendants’ reliance on the Client Agreement, his reasons for this objection include the Oral Agreement (at [42] above). Hence, such an argument would be circular. I find, therefore, that the Oral Agreement did not arise because it is excluded by the terms of the Client Agreement in force between the parties.

  139. [57] Third, Mr Budhrani relies on various other pieces of evidence to prove the existence of the Oral Agreement. I do not find them compelling.

  140. [59] Mr Budhrani also relies on another part of Mr Lee’s testimony, concerning the date on which the margin call was made, to prove that the Oral Agreement existed. But closer scrutiny of this reference to Mr Lee’s testimony reveals that it says nothing of the existence of the Oral Agreement. Instead, it deals with, first, the purpose of daily statements and, second, whether two emails dated 14 March 2020 constituted notification of a margin call.

  141. [60] Mr Budhrani also points out that Mr Lee agreed that Mr Budhrani had until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call and therefore the parties were bound by the Oral Agreement. However, the two sections of Mr Lee’s testimony which he relies on do not say anything about whether the parties agreed to or were bound by the Oral Agreement. The first quoted section, concerning what Ms Song purportedly agreed to, is dealt with at [54(a)] above. The second quoted section deals with how INTL FCStone discerns the first day of a margin call and when the countdown of a given number of days to settle a margin call begins.

  142. [61] Mr Budhrani also appears to rely on (a) his intention to retain his contracts; (b) the fact that he informed the defendants that he was arranging to transfer funds to his account; and (c) his arranging remittances of US$80,000 and $943,000, to prove the existence of the Oral Agreement. But even taking them into account as a whole, these points do not positively show that the Oral Agreement was already formed and in force as a binding agreement between the parties. At best, they demonstrate Mr Budhrani’s intention to retain his contracts and the subsequent steps he took. Evidently, he lacked sufficient accessible funds and had to arrange for fund transfers from overseas accounts, and also seek assistance from his father. All this was too late and to no avail amidst the market turmoil. He could not do so in time by 16 March 2020, given the complications arising from these funds not being transferred directly from any of his personal accounts.

  143. [62] Fourth, the defendants argue that the Oral Agreement did not arise because “any agreement to grant an extension of time to a customer is an indulgence, non-binding and subject to [INTL FCStone’s] rights to liquidate the customer’s positions”. While this appears to acknowledge that some understanding in the form of an agreement may have been reached between the parties, I do not think this amounts to a concession by the defendants that the Oral Agreement was made. That statement appears to be an elaboration of their pleading that “even if an extension was granted, it was not binding”. The express reference to the non-binding nature of the extension of time (if granted) suggests that the use of “agreement” was not in the legal sense, ie, it was not intended to engage the principles of contract law. The defendants’ submission is therefore consistent with their case that INTL FCStone’s allowance to Mr Budhrani of three days to fulfil the margin call (if the 20% Policy was not applicable) was no more than an indulgence, and not an entitlement which Mr Budhrani could enforce. As I shall explain in due course at [87]–[93] below, this indulgence was not unqualified. It would lapse if the equity in his account fell below 20% of his initial margin, whereupon INTL FCStone had the right to immediately terminate his positions.

  144. [63] By virtue of the foregoing, I find that Mr Budhrani and INTL FCStone did not make the Oral Agreement. Accordingly, I do not accept Mr Budhrani’s claim that the defendants breached the Oral Agreement.

  145. [64] Mr Budhrani asserts his right to have three days to meet the margin call not only by way of the Oral Agreement. He also claims that his entitlement to three days was provided for in a collateral contract, and a representation that gave rise to an estoppel. I deal with these further arguments below.

  146. There was no collateral contract

  147. [65] Additionally, Mr Budhrani says that the defendants are obliged to give him three days to settle the margin call, not just because of the Oral Agreement, but also because there was a collateral contract. According to Mr Budhrani, there was a collateral contract “upon which [Mr Budhrani] entered into the Novation Deed with [INTL FCStone]” (the “Novation Deed”). However, he does not plead the particulars of the collateral contract, such as its terms or how and when it was made. Materially, he also testified that:

  148. (a) he “assumed” he would have three days to meet a margin call when he entered into the Novation Deed with INTL FCStone;

  149. (b) “they did not promise [him that he would have T+3 to settle any margin call] when [he] signed the [N]ovation [D]eed”;

  150. (c) no one in INTL FCStone promised him, before he entered into the Novation Deed, that he would have three days to settle any margin calls; and

  151. (d) he did not tell anyone in INTL FCStone that he entered into the Novation Deed because, among other possible reasons, he assumed that he would have three days to meet the margin call.

  152. These candid concessions contradict his pleading that the collateral contract was the “bas[is] upon which [he] entered into the [N]ovation [D]eed”. Mr Budhrani’s case shifts in his written reply closing submission, and he says that the collateral contract “is a relationship that existed as at the time of the Novation Deed” – but this is also inconsistent with his testimony. He also does not plead that the said collateral contract was breached. It was only after the end of trial that he appears to submit that the collateral contract was breached, and, even then, the breach was asserted only by way of a heading in his written closing submissions and nothing was said as to why there was a breach. Accordingly, I find that there was no collateral contract which provided that Mr Budhrani was entitled to three days to settle the margin call. It follows that the defendants did not commit any breach of contract in this respect.

  153. There was no representation that gave rise to an estoppel

  154. [66] Mr Budhrani submits that even if the “representation” that he says gave rise to the Oral Agreement does not constitute a binding contract, it “would amount to an operative grace period from which the [d]efendants cannot resile”. I am not persuaded by this submission. First, this point is not included in any of his pleadings and he cannot be allowed to raise this now. Second, given my findings above, the evidence does not show that the defendants represented to Mr Budhrani that he had three days to settle the margin (ie, by 18 March 2020).

  155. [67] Finally, Mr Budhrani raises a new argument in his written reply closing submissions. He says that, since clause 1.25.11 of the Client Agreement provides that a margin call can be made in any form, including orally, therefore the defendants’ oral communication to Mr Budhrani between 14 and 16 March 2020 that he “had T3 to settle the margin call” is binding. This completely misunderstands the cited clause. Mr Budhrani never alleged in his pleaded case that the later phone communications between the defendants and Mr Budhrani had constituted the margin call, and his attempt to do so now is untenable.

  156. Whether the defendants misrepresented that Mr Budhrani had until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call and could arrange a transfer of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone

  157. [68] Mr Budhrani also claims that the defendants made the 18 March Representation and the US$80,000 Representation falsely. The defendants however deny that they made the 18 March and US$80,000 Representations.

  158. The 18 March Representation was not made

  159. [69] It is helpful to clarify the contours of the 18 March Representation as pleaded by Mr Budhrani. Mr Budhrani’s case is that the defendants made the 18 March Representation, namely, that he had until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call. But it is evident from his pleadings that the 18 March Representation, as Mr Budhrani understood it, also meant that he would not be made to liquidate his contracts by 16 March 2020, nor settle the margin call as soon as possible. In other words, based on his pleaded case, the 18 March Representation afforded him a completely unfettered right to have until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call.

  160. [70] In my view, the defendants did not make the 18 March Representation. Mr Budhrani does not identify exactly when and how the 18 March Representation was made. Nonetheless, as early as 13 March 2020, Ms Alie informed Mr Budhrani of the 20% Policy, by stating that “we will only activate to cut the position if let’s say, your margin really went to the deficit, whereby left only 20%” and that “you currently you may continue to hold the position, we just hope that the market won’t go against you tonight until your equity left only 20%. If it’s only 20%, then we will need to… need you to reduce some of the position to bring up the margin variable.” The fact that the 20% Policy overrode INTL FCStone’s three-day allowance for Mr Budhrani to settle the margin call was also repeatedly emphasised to Mr Budhrani. In a call beginning on 13 March 2020 at 3.11pm, Mr Budhrani asked “Um, you allow T+3 right for the…” and Ms Alie responded with “Yeah, correct, as long as the market won’t go beyond… you won’t left only 20%, the most you can go will be T[+3]” [emphasis added]. I therefore find that the defendants did not make the 18 March Representation.

  161. [71] In his closing submissions, Mr Budhrani did not make submissions on his pleading that the 18 March Representation constitutes actionable misrepresentation. Instead, he says that either it amounts to a contractual obligation (which I have dismissed above) or, failing that, the defendants are estopped from resiling from the 18 March Representation. This is an inconsistency in his case and calls into question his cause of action in relation to the 18 March Representation. As Mr Budhrani did not include any claim premised on promissory estoppel in his pleadings, he cannot be allowed to raise it so late in the day, especially not after the trial has concluded.

  162. [72] In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendants made the 18 March Representation to Mr Budhrani. Accordingly, it cannot be said that INTL FCStone made this fraudulent misrepresentation to Mr Budhrani.

  163. The US$80,000 Representation was not made

  164. [73] Mr Budhrani claims that, by making the US$80,000 Representation, the defendants falsely represented that he could arrange a transfer of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone. In my view, Mr Budhrani’s claim, properly understood, requires that the US$80,000 Representation be read with the 18 March Representation. His claim in misrepresentation is in respect of the two Representations jointly. What Mr Budhrani takes issue with is not the mere statement that he can arrange a transfer of moneys to INTL FCStone; his complaint is that the defendants made the US$80,000 Representation and, in connection with that, also represented that he would be given the three days to meet the margin call. This is evident from his statement that the defendants made the US$80,000 Representation “to try to assuage [INTL FCStone’s Risk team] to give [him] time … to meet the margin call”, despite that they were not going to allow him to three days to settle the margin call (ie, by 18 March 2020). I note, however, that after trial he submits that the US$80,000 Representation alone was a fraudulent misrepresentation, and shifts his focus to a distinct issue, namely, whether Ms Song had been in communication with the Risk team. As this is not part of Mr Budhrani’s pleaded case, I disregard it. He cannot pursue what is effectively a new cause of action now.

  165. [74] Having decided that the 18 March Representation was not made, it is strictly not necessary for me to consider the US$80,000 Representation, since it alone cannot sustain Mr Budhrani’s claim in misrepresentation. Nonetheless, I am doubtful whether the US$80,000 Representation was made. Mr Budhrani does not, in his pleadings, identify where or how the US$80,000 Representation was made. In his written closing submissions, however, he says that the phone conversation on 16 March 2020 at 5.59pm is “particularly relevant”. In that conversation, Mr Budhrani told Ms Song that he would arrange a transfer of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone, and Ms Song asked “Do you think you can actually liquidate the position? … how I wish I can link you off with the Risk, but I couldn’t do anything because it’s like, your account right, it’s doing at negative we’ve got no choice” [emphasis added]. When Mr Budhrani further enquired as to whether he would have three days to fulfil the margin call, she said “No, no, but it’s running a deficit. It is running on deficit.” [emphasis added]. Ms Song did, therefore, indicate that any allowance given for Mr Budhrani to settle the margin call in three days had been superseded by the 20% Policy. It seems to me that the defendants did not simply say that he could arrange a transfer of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone.

  166. [75] For the foregoing reasons, I find that the defendants did not misrepresent that Mr Budhrani had until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call and could arrange a transfer of US$80,000 to INTL FCStone.

  167. Whether the defendants breached the Execution Only Contract

  168. There was no Execution Only Contract between the parties

  169. [76] Mr Budhrani avers that the defendants breached the Margin Trading Agreement and Client Agreement. Specifically, he says that the defendants breached the Execution Only Contract by causing or procuring him to sell the 66 Contracts by 16 March 2020, notwithstanding that he had until 18 March 2020 to settle the margin call.

  170. [77] I find that the defendants were not in breach of their contractual obligation in this regard, because the obligation which Mr Budhrani says was breached did not, in fact, exist. Mr Budhrani misconstrues the nature of the agreement between the parties. By his conception of their agreement, ie, Execution Only Contract, he perceives the “execution only” concept as a limit on what the defendants were entitled to do, when in fact it is a limit on the services the defendants were obligated to provide to him, including any advice at all.

  171. [78] Mr Budhrani does not plead the specific clauses in the Agreements he relies on when he states that the essence of these agreements is “an execution service only contract [under which] the [d]efendants were only to take the orders in respect of the [c]ontracts from [Mr Budhrani]”. The defendants identify, inter alia, clause 1.22 of the Client Agreement which provides as follows:

  172. This clearly explains that INTL FCStone did not assume any advisory duties nor act as an advisor to Mr Budhrani. Therefore, if the Client Agreement is to be characterised as “execution only”, it means that Mr Budhrani was entitled to an “execution only” service from INTL FCStone. It does not mean that the conduct of INTL FCStone was constrained to only executing trades. Put another way, it was a fetter upon Mr Budhrani’s rights under his agreements with INTL FCStone, and not upon INTL FCStone’s rights under those agreements.

  173. [80] Based on the foregoing, the Execution Only Contract is not part of the agreement between the parties. There is therefore no need for me to consider if it was breached by the defendants. The parties’ contractual relationship is governed by the Agreements alone. Nonetheless, for the reasons set out below, I disagree with Mr Budhrani that the defendants caused or procured Mr Budhrani to sell the 66 Contracts by 16 March 2020. So, even if there was an Execution Only Contract between the parties, it would not have been breached.

  174. There was no relationship of agency based on the Execution Only Contract

  175. [81] Mr Budhrani submits that the defendants breached their “contractual duties as agent to [him]”, which duties include “perform[ing] in accordance with [his] instructions”. He says this breach arising from the alleged agent-principal relationship occurred because of two acts:

  176. (a) the defendants and Mr Lee’s unlawful interference with Mr Budhrani’s sole right to decide whether to hold, dispose of or in any way deal with any of his contracts, which right arose from the Execution Only Contract; and

  177. (b) the defendants and Mr Lee’s “duress/undue influence/illegitimate pressure” imposed upon Mr Budhrani.

  178. [82] However, Mr Budhrani pleads only that INTL FCStone was an agent for him based on an “execution only service”. He does not plead any breach of the agent-principal relationship, nor breach of “contractual duties as agent”, on INTL FCStone’s part. He cannot be allowed to include a new cause of action at such a late stage in the proceedings. Further, as I have found above that there was no Execution Only Contract between the parties, the basis for his assertion that INTL FCStone acted as his agent and breached its duties falls away.

  179. The 66 Contracts

  180. Whether Mr Budhrani was in default in settling the margin call

  181. [83] Mr Budhrani contends that the defendants should not have imposed illegitimate pressure on him to compel him to sell his contracts. The defendants, on the other hand, assert that Mr Budhrani had been in default in settling the margin call and they were thereby entitled to liquidate his contracts immediately. They aver that they had, in fact, been indulgent in allowing him to sell his contracts on 16 March 2020. It is therefore necessary to consider whether Mr Budhrani was in default and, if so, what INTL FCStone was entitled to do in relation to his account.

  182. Mr Budhrani was in default in settling the margin call and the defendants were entitled to liquidate his positions under the Client Agreement

  183. [84] According to Mr Budhrani, the defendants were not entitled to liquidate his positions nor compel him to liquidate his positions. He contends that doing so would be contrary to the Oral Agreement, the 18 March Representation and/or the collateral contract which allegedly provided that Mr Budhrani was entitled to three days to settle the margin call. However, I have found that the Oral Agreement and the 18 March Representation were not made, and there was no collateral contract as well.

  184. [85] In contrast, the defendants correctly point out that Mr Budhrani was in default because, at close of business on 16 March 2020, he failed to make payment of the margin call stated in the 13 March DS (clause 1.17.1(a) of the Client Agreement). He was obligated to furnish additional margin within one business day of being informed of a margin call or a margin deficit (clause 1.25.4 of the Client Agreement). Accordingly, INTL FCStone was entitled to liquidate the positions in his account (clause 1.17 of the Client Agreement). The relevant provisions are reproduced below:

  185. The defendants also rightly point out that, in any case, INTL FCStone was entitled to take all necessary steps to protect its financial interests, including to liquidate Mr Budhrani’s contracts (clause 1.25.12 of the Client Agreement, clause 10 of the Customer Agreement). I reproduce these clauses below:

  186. [86] Nonetheless, INTL FCStone was prepared to give Mr Budhrani up to three business days to meet the margin call, before taking steps to liquidate or square off his contracts. It was palpably clear that this was, in the defendants’ words, a “grace period and … not binding”. There is no basis for Mr Budhrani’s unreasoned assertion that this shows that the defendants were approbating and reprobating.

  187. The defendants were also entitled to liquidate Mr Budhrani’s contracts under the 20% Policy

  188. [87] A crucial point is that the grace period was only envisaged provided that the equity in Mr Budhrani’s account did not fall below 20% of his initial margin, in which case INTL FCStone had the right to immediately terminate Mr Budhrani’s positions and require him to pay the shortfall (ie, the 20% Policy) (clause 2.0.1 of the Client Risk Monitoring Procedures Manual). This clause reads:

  189. [88] I agree that the defendants were entitled to liquidate Mr Budhrani’s contracts pursuant to the 20% Policy.

  190. [89] Although Mr Budhrani denies both knowledge of the practice of the 20% Policy and the policy itself, he advances no reasons or evidence in support of his denials. Mr Budhrani says that the 20% Policy is part of INTL FCStone’s internal policy but not their contractual right, and relies on Mr Lee’s testimony at trial to support this contention. In my view, this is more a question of law than of fact. The issue should not be resolved solely by reference to Mr Lee’s testimony. Although Mr Lee agreed with Mr Budhrani’s counsel that the 20% Policy was not a contractual right, he consistently testified that INTL FCStone had the right to liquidate Mr Budhrani’s contracts. The defendants point out two clauses which support their legal right to enforce the 20% Policy:

  191. (a) Pursuant to clause 1.25.12 of the Client Agreement, INTL FCStone was entitled to take all necessary steps to protect its financial interests even if it had notified Mr Budhrani of a specific date or time by which he was required to meet the margin call.

  192. (b) Pursuant to clause 1.6.1(b) of the Client Agreement, INTL FCStone was entitled to terminate any outstanding transactions or other open positions in Mr Budhrani’s account or liquidate the same.

  193. Mr Budhrani’s only basis for disputing this is that the defendants are estopped from relying on the Client Agreement. I have rejected this argument above.

  194. [90] Mr Budhrani’s purported ignorance of the 20% Policy is not credible, given that there is objective evidence that he was informed of it on multiple occasions. Mr Budhrani also appears to have accepted at trial that he had been informed of the 20% Policy as early as 13 March 2020. Crucially, Mr Budhrani essentially makes only an assertion but does not explain why his purported lack of knowledge should be a bar to the existence and application of the 20% Policy.

  195. [91] The evidence shows that on 16 March 2020 at around 5.22pm (ie, the first alleged instance of wrongdoing by the defendants), the equity of Mr Budhrani’s account was already in a deficit of US$127,000. This must necessarily be below 20% of the initial margin, since it is negative. (I note that as early as 13 March 2020 at 12.55pm, Mr Budhrani’s equity was already negative.)

  196. [92] Accordingly, I find that the defendants were entitled to liquidate the contracts in Mr Budhrani’s account. I also note that, when Mr Budhrani was asked if INTL FCStone was entitled to forcibly liquidate his positions around 6.22pm on 16 March 2020, he did not object and instead declined to comment on INTL FCStone’s entitlements.

  197. [93] By 5.22pm on 16 March 2020, Mr Budhrani was in default of the Client Agreement and the 20% Policy was engaged, and INTL FCStone was entitled to immediately liquidate the contracts in his account. The fact that INTL FCStone decided not to exercise their legal right to liquidate Mr Budhrani’s contracts on 16 March 2020 does not mean that this right was not applicable or relevant.

  198. Mr Budhrani’s claims in duress and undue influence are untenable

  199. [94] The defendants point out that duress and undue influence are grounds for vitiating a contract and not causes of action, but Mr Budhrani “does not seek to set aside the 66 Contracts, which are in any case not between [INTL FCStone] and himself”. I agree that this is a barrier to Mr Budhrani’s claim for damages arising from the defendants’ alleged undue influence and duress over him. Should a finding of undue influence or duress be made, the effect is that the contract entered into is voidable (in respect of undue influence: Forde v Birmingham City Council [2009] 1 WLR 2732 at 2759; in respect of duress: Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 at 635–636; Contract Law in Singapore (Andrew B. L. Phang and Goh Yihan gen ed) (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd ed, 2021) at para 811). Mr Budhrani has not pleaded that a contract with the defendants would be voidable, nor has he explained how the sales of the 66 Contracts were contracts with the defendants which are now voidable. His last-ditch attempt to pursue an alternative claim in the tort of intimidation based on the pleaded facts must also fail. I consider these various claims below, but I will first briefly address his contention that the defendants owed him a duty of care and had breached their duty.

  200. The defendants did not owe Mr Budhrani a duty of care or breach their duty

  201. [95] Mr Budhrani maintains that the defendants owed him a duty to, inter alia, inform him of the true value of his losses, take reasonable care to satisfy themselves of the accuracy of their representations and act as reasonably competent brokers in making their representations (the “Duty of Care”). He claims that the defendants negligently and/or grossly negligently breached the Duty of Care, by making the 5.22pm, 5.53pm, 6.33pm and/or the 8.46pm Representations. The defendants deny that they owe Mr Budhrani any such Duty of Care, and any duties at all save for those expressly provided for in the Agreements, the Novation Deed and under law. There is also no implied term or duty imposed upon the defendants. I reject Mr Budhrani’s claims in this regard.

  202. [96] Mr Budhrani submits that the Duty of Care arises because Mr Budhrani and the defendants are “principal and agent”, since Mr Budhrani relies on pricing information given by the defendants. He further explains that “the provision of this pricing information forms the core of the relationship of the Execution Only Contract”. I reject this argument for several reasons. First, Mr Budhrani does not explain why his reliance on pricing information provided by the defendants must mean that the defendants were agents of Mr Budhrani. Second, Mr Budhrani is not entitled to rely on the information provided by the defendants (see [40] and [119]). Finally, to the extent that he relies on the Execution Only Contract to argue that there was a Duty of Care, I have found that the parties did not agree to the Execution Only Contract. I also disagree with some of the other reasons why he says there is a principal-agent relationship.

  203. [97] Furthermore, as I shall explain below, I find that the defendants did not make the 5.22pm Representations, the 5.53pm Representations, the 6.33pm Representation and/or the 8.46pm Representation. I dismiss Mr Budhrani’s allegation that the Duty of Care was breached.

  204. The 20 Contracts

  205. Whether the defendants exercised undue influence resulting in liquidation of the 20 Contracts

  206. (a) the defendants had the capacity to influence him;

  207. (b) the influence was exercised;

  208. (c) its exercise was undue; and

  209. (d) its exercise brought about the sale of the 20 Contracts.

  210. I find that the defendants did not exercise undue influence in requiring Mr Budhrani to liquidate the 20 Contracts on 16 March 2020.

  211. (1) The defendants did not have the capacity to influence Mr Budhrani

  212. [99] Mr Budhrani has not shown that the defendants had the capacity to influence him. He points out that the defendants were aware that he maintained margin trading accounts with other brokers and any margin call would potentially have negative consequences for these other accounts. However, this calls for conjecture as he led no evidence to prove this submission. He also did not explain why the potentially negative consequences of a margin call from the defendants would mean that the defendants had the capacity to influence him.

  213. [100] Mr Budhrani also says that he “succumbed to the exercise of … undue influence” because he was in fear of:

  214. (a) defaulting on the Agreements;

  215. (b) having a negative credit standing as a result of such default; and

  216. (c) liquidation of his contracts by the defendants.

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