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Grounds publishedDecided 26 Jul 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Kho Choon Keng v Lian Keng Enterprises Pte Ltd (Kho Patrick and another, non-parties)

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[2024] SGHC 191Case no. Companies Winding Up No 74 of 2023

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [1] The trials and tribulations of family-run businesses are all too often litigated in our courts. It is usually the case that such enterprises fail, not because of financial circumstances, but the deterioration of relationships of the family members who run them. Familiarity, it seems, does breed contempt. The business in this case suffered the same fate.

  2. Background facts

  3. Parties

  4. [2] The defendant, Lian Keng Enterprises Pte Ltd (“LKE”) was founded in 1980 by the late Mr Kho Beng Kang (the “Patriarch”). LKE is the ultimate holding company of 59 other companies in the Lian Huat group of companies (“the Group”) with investments and development projects in Singapore, Australia, and China. In this action, the salient ones are:

  5. (a) The Inn at Temple Street (“ITS”), a boutique 42-room hotel situated in Chinatown, Singapore. ITS is owned by Southern Cross Hotels Pte Ltd (“Southern Cross”), which is wholly (and indirectly) owned by LKE.

  6. (b) A shophouse at 81 Tras Street (“Tras Street Shophouse”), owned by 81 Tras Pte Ltd, which is wholly (and indirectly) owned by LKE.

  7. (c) Several residential and retail units located in The Centro – a mixed-use development in Tianjin, China. These units are owned by Tianjin APH Development Co Ltd (“Tianjin APH”), which is wholly (and indirectly) owned by LKE.

  8. (d) An industrial project in the Beichen district of Tianjin, China (“Beichen Development”), which remains under construction. LKE has invested around RMB80m in capital injections and loans. The land for the Beichen Development is owned by Tianjin Lian Huat Eco-Park Development Co Pte Ltd (“TJLH”), in which LKE has an indirect 60% stake.

  9. (e) LKE’s direct 64.51% stake in LionHub Group Limited (“LHB”), and its indirect 43.17% stake in Land & Homes Group Limited (“LHM”) – both real estate development companies publicly listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (“ASX”).

  10. [3] The claimant, Kho Choon Keng (“CK”) is the eldest son of the Patriarch. CK was born to the Patriarch’s second wife, Mdm Yap Kim Chee (“Mdm Yap”), and has two brothers, Kho Choon Joo (“Joo”) and Kho Choon Kian (“Kian”). CK is applying to wind up LKE pursuant to s 125(1)(f) and s 125(1)(i) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (“IRDA”).

  11. [4] The two non-parties opposing this action, Kho Chuan Thye Patrick (“Patrick”) and Dr Kho Sunn Sunn Patricia (“Patricia”), are CK’s step-siblings born to the Patriarch’s third wife, Mdm Saw Gek Hua (“Mdm Saw”). Mdm Saw also has an adopted son, Philip Kho Chuan Kok (“Philip”).

  12. [5] For ease of reference, a diagram of the Kho family members (the “Kho Family”) is set out below:

  13. [6] The current shareholding of LKE is:

  14. (a) CK – 49%;

  15. (b) Patrick – 49.2% (Patrick bought Philip's 0.2% share in July 2022);

  16. (c) Patricia – 1%; and

  17. (d) Mdm Saw – 0.8%.

  18. [7] The current board of LKE comprises CK, Patrick and Patricia. CK is the Executive Chairman and Patrick is an executive director of LKE. They are the only members of the family involved in the day-to-day management of the Group. Patricia is a non-executive director and maintains an active medical practice in Singapore as an oncologist.

  19. History of LKE

  20. [8] The Patriarch built his wealth trading nutmeg, and later ventured into real estate investments. This led to the incorporation of LKE on 8 August 1980 to consolidate his investments.

  21. [9] When LKE was incorporated, the Patriarch and CK were the only shareholders and directors. Presumably, this was because the Patriarch’s other children were below the age of majority at that time.

  22. [10] In 1981, the Patriarch allocated CK, Joo, Kian, and Patrick (the “Four Brothers”) 22.5% of the shares in LKE each, with the Patriarch holding the remaining 10% stake. According to CK, the Four Brothers held their shares “only in name” – they always handed the dividends they received to the Patriarch and were made to sign blank share transfer forms by the Patriarch, so that their shares could be transferred whenever he wanted.

  23. [11] It appears undisputed that the Patriarch exercised unquestioned control over LKE until he passed away in 1996. In 1995, after he was diagnosed with cancer, the Patriarch penned a handwritten note in Mandarin to the Four Brothers (“Statement of Wishes”). The relevant portions of the English translation of the Statement of Wishes (the accuracy of which parties did not dispute) state:

  24. [12] Following the Patriarch’s demise, his 10% stake in LKE was distributed according to his will as follows: (a) 1.8% each to the Four Brothers; (b) 1% to Patricia; (c) 0.8% each to Mdm Yap and Mdm Saw; and (d) 0.2% to Philip. This brought the shareholdings of the Kho family members as follows:

  25. (a) Mdm Yap and her children – 73.7%:

  26. (i) Mdm Yap – 0.8%;

  27. (ii) CK – 24.3%;

  28. (iii) Joo – 24.3%;

  29. (iv) Kian – 24.3%; and

  30. (b) Mdm Saw and her children – 26.3%:

  31. (i) Mdm Saw – 0.8%;

  32. (ii) Patrick – 24.3%;

  33. (iii) Patricia – 1%; and

  34. (iv) Philip – 0.2%.

  35. [13] Although the Patriarch did not assign any role in the Group to Joo in the Statement of Wishes, it was nonetheless addressed to Joo as well and, shortly after the Patriarch’s passing, the Four Brothers collectively decided that all of them would be directors of LKE.

  36. Joo and Kian’s winding up application in 2003

  37. [14] From 1996 to mid-2001, the Four Brothers managed the Group harmoniously. Their first major disagreement was in mid-2001 when they could not agree on whether one of LKE’s subsidiaries, Kengfu Investments II Pte Ltd, should proceed with a project in Tianjin, China. The Four Brothers were at a deadlock – Joo and Kian were against the project, with CK and Patrick in favour of it.

  38. [15] CK broke the deadlock by exercising his “casting vote”, under Art 82 of LKE’s Memorandum and Articles of Association (“LKE’s M&A”) as the Chairman of LKE.

  39. [16] This was the catalyst for numerous other disagreements and eventually led to Joo and Kian filing a winding up petition against LKE in HC/CWU 290/2003 (“2003 CWU”) on 21 November 2003. Around this period, CK again used his casting vote to appoint one Koh Kim Huat (“Koh”), who was not related to the family, and Patricia to LKE’s board of directors on 11 April 2003 and 8 September 2004 respectively.

  40. [17] The Four Brothers settled their dispute in 2005, with CK and Patrick buying Joo, Kian, and Mdm Yap’s shares in LKE (“2005 Buyout”). This resulted in CK and Patrick each holding 49% shares in LKE. The shareholding in LKE at this stage was therefore:

  41. [18] Joo and Kian resigned as directors of LKE in 2005, and the LKE board (then) comprised CK, Patrick, Koh, and Patricia.

  42. LKE post 2005 Buyout

  43. [19] To finance the 2005 Buyout, CK and Patrick took huge loans from LKE of about S$16m. These loans were later repaid when set off against dividends payable to CK and Patrick in 2008 and 2009.

  44. [20] LKE’s shareholding remained unchanged from 2005 till July 2022, when Patrick purchased Philip’s 0.2% share in LKE. Patricia resigned as a director of LKE in 2009 but was re-appointed in 2012, while Koh resigned in 2015. From July 2015, the board of LKE comprised CK, Patrick, and Patricia – and this remains the case today.

  45. [21] I delve into some detail the manner CK and Patrick managed LKE and the Group after the 2005 Buyout at [85]–[94] below. For now, it suffices to say that their relationship during that period was stable and their management of LKE and the Group was characterised by consensus and compromise.

  46. Breakdown in CK and Patrick’s relationship

  47. [22] In the years leading up to 2018, Patrick became increasingly vocal about his views on the Group. He told CK that “with [his] age catching up, [he has] to look after the interests of [his] family and therefore cannot continue to accommodate [CK] blindly”. During this lead-up period, the matters on which Patrick disagreed with CK included the following:

  48. (a) Patrick wanted to sell the land in the Beichen Development, which CK opposed;

  49. (b) Patrick wanted to refurbish ITS, but no agreement was reached, and this issue became one of CK's complaints in this action (see [123]–[175] below);

  50. (c) Patrick wanted to “immediately sell” the 34 residential units and one retail unit in The Centro, but CK only wanted to do so when the “price was right”; and

  51. (d) CK wanted to make further capital injections into LHM, which Patrick did not agree to.

  52. [23] This came to a head on 25 June 2018 when CK sent an email to Patrick setting out their differences and alluding to an amicable split (“CK’s 25 June 2018 Email”):

  53. [24] Upon clarification sought by Patrick, CK made his intention for a split clear on 2 July 2018 when he said:

  54. [25] Patrick was non-committal in his response:

  55. [26] There was no further communication on this issue. What followed was a series of other disputes, which I deal with in detail below.

  56. Parties’ cases

  57. CK’s case

  58. [27] CK submits that LKE is akin to a quasi-partnership, where it is important for CK and Patrick to work together with mutual trust and confidence, which has broken down. CK also argues that he had the following legitimate expectations (“the LEs”):

  59. (a) CK and Patrick would make decisions in LKE collectively and resolve business disagreements through informal discussions between themselves, without involving the other directors or resorting to formal Board meetings (“1st LE”);

  60. (b) CK would have a key role in management and his views would be considered and/or properly considered (“2nd LE”); and

  61. (c) consistent with LKE’s primary objective to declare dividends as a source of income for the members of the Kho family, dividends would be declared at CK’s request (“3rd LE”).

  62. [28] CK claims these LEs were breached because:

  63. (a) for the first time in 14 years, Patrick called for a formal board meeting in 2019 to use Patricia’s vote to push through his decision to refurbish ITS; and

  64. (b) CK’s views were not considered and/or properly considered on the following matters:

  65. (i) the decision to refurbish ITS;

  66. (ii) the failure to declare dividends for the financial years 2020 and 2021; and

  67. (iii) Patrick’s proposed five-year growth plan for LKE (“Growth Plan”) which Patrick and Patricia voted in favour of on 12 July 2021, which included a proposal to purchase the Tras Street Property.

  68. [29] CK also relies on Patrick’s allegedly confrontational conduct in relation to a loan CK took for the benefit of TJLH as further evidence of the breakdown in mutual trust and confidence between them.

  69. [30] Finally, the current state of CK and Patrick’s relationship is fractured and beyond repair – further evincing the breakdown in mutual trust and confidence.

  70. Patrick and Patricia’s case

  71. [31] Patrick and Patricia essentially refute CK’s claims at every level, and I will elaborate on their arguments under each issue.

  72. Winding up for directors’ unfair conduct under s 125(1)(f) IRDA

  73. [33] Section 125(1)(f) IRDA provides that the court may wind up a company if the directors have acted:

  74. (a) in the affairs of the company in their own interests rather than in the interests of the members as a whole; or

  75. (b) in any other manner which appears to be unfair or unjust to other members.

  76. [34] As will be evident from the discussion below, the first limb of s 125(1)(f) is not applicable. There is no evidence that Patrick and Patricia had preferred their own personal interests over those of the shareholders as a whole in any of the complaints raised by CK.

  77. [35] The term “unfair and unjust” in the second limb of s 125(1)(f) connotes some commercial morality or integrity which the law ought to uphold, on a consideration of all the circumstances (Re HL Sensecurity Pte Ltd (formerly known as HL Integral Systems Pte Ltd) [2006] SGHC 135 at [28]). It overlaps with the just and equitable ground under s 125(1)(i) IRDA, and the two are often raised in the alternative (Phua Kiah Mai v The Kheng Chiu Tin Hou Kong and Burial Ground [2022] SGHC 36 (“Phua Kiah Mai”) at [9] and [52]).

  78. [36] Given the overlap, I will focus in this decision on s 125(1)(i), which is broader in scope and, in any event, the main ground CK relies on.

  79. Just and equitable winding up under s 125(1)(i) IRDA

  80. The law

  81. [38] The words “just and equitable” are “words of the widest significance, and do not limit the jurisdiction of the Court to any case” (Chow Kwok Chuen v Chow Kwok Chi and another [2008] 4 SLR(R) 362 (“Chow Kwok Chuen”) at [14]). Caselaw has developed categories of cases which justify winding up under this ground, including:

  82. (a) where there has been a breach of a members’ legitimate expectations (Evenstar at [40]–[45]); and

  83. (b) where there is a breakdown in the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the members of the company (Ma Wai Fong Kathryn v Trillion Investment Pte Ltd and others and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 1046 (“Kathryn Ma”) at [28]).

  84. [39] These two categories are distinct grounds – each capable of independently invoking the just and equitable ground. For instance, in Evenstar, the Court of Appeal found that there was no breakdown in mutual trust and confidence (at [16]), but nonetheless wound the company up on the basis of a breach of the applicant’s legitimate expectations (at [42]–[45]). Nonetheless, they may overlap to the extent that a breach of legitimate expectations may, in some cases, also demonstrate or lead to a breakdown in mutual trust and confidence.

  85. [40] These two categories are predicated on the existence of a quasi-partnership, or a relationship that is akin to one (see Seah Chee Wan and another v Connectus Group Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 228 at [115]; Kathryn Ma at [28]–[29]). This is because the establishment of a quasi-partnership is what allows the court to look past the strict legal rights of the parties and impose equitable constraints on them (Ting Shwu Ping v Scanone Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 95 (“Ting Shwu Ping”) at [85] and [91]):

  86. [41] In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal has highlighted that “[m]ajority shareholders in quasi-partnership companies … are expected to keep their promises and assurances to minority shareholders. They are expected to take a broader and more generous view of their obligations having regard to what is fair to minority shareholders” (Evenstar at [45]; see also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (“Ebrahimi”) at 379–380).

  87. [42] In Chow Kwok Chuen, the Court of Appeal clarified that there was no strict need to establish a quasi-partnership. Instead, the key question is whether there existed a relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the shareholders such that “their absence is as critical as in a quasi-partnership”, and “[u]ltimately, whether equity should intervene in such a situation must necessarily depend on the justice of the case” (at [31]).

  88. [43] To demonstrate a breakdown in mutual trust and confidence, it is not enough to merely show that the parties did not see eye to eye on certain commercial decisions (Chow Kwok Chuen at [19]). It follows that the mere fact that a minority has been outvoted does not necessarily evidence a breakdown in mutual trust and confidence. On the other hand, there is no need to establish wrongdoing or oppressive or unfairly discriminatory conduct to invoke the courts’ just and equitable jurisdiction (Chow Kwok Chuen at [44]).

  89. Issues to be determined

  90. [44] Accordingly, the following key issues arise for determination:

  91. (a) whether LKE is akin to a quasi-partnership; and

  92. (b) whether there has been a: (i) breach of CK’s legitimate expectations in the conduct of LKE’s business; and/or (ii) breakdown in the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between CK and Patrick; such as to justify the winding up of LKE.

  93. Preliminary issue

  94. [45] Patrick submits that it is “impermissible” for CK to rely on his claim that LKE is a quasi-partnership and that he had the LEs, as these go beyond his case in his 1st Affidavit filed in support of this action. Patrick relies on Re Tourmaline Ltd [2000] 4 HKC 348 to argue that a winding up petition must precisely outline the matters complained of by the petitioner. The court is confined to the allegations in the petition, and the petitioner cannot expand his case by introducing the concepts of “quasi-partnership” and “legitimate expectations” without first amending the petition.

  95. [46] In response, CK points out that an affidavit in support of a winding up application only needs to state relevant facts and not the legal consequences following from those facts. CK argues that his affidavits and oral testimony contain the relevant facts to support the LEs, and there is no need for him to explicitly frame and use the words “legitimate expectation” which is a legal doctrine developed from case law.

  96. Whether “legitimate expectations” and “quasi-partnership” need to be specified in an affidavit supporting winding up

  97. [47] Until 1 April 2006, a winding up application was made by way of a petition containing both the relief sought and all the supporting facts (r 22 read with Forms 2 and 3 in the First Schedule of the Companies (Winding Up) Rules (Cap 50, R 1, 1990 Rev Ed) (“Winding Up Rules 1990”)). An affidavit was filed only to verify that the contents of the petition were true (r 26 read with Form 7 in the First Schedule of the Winding Up Rules 1990). In that context, it is trite that a petition must set out with precision and sufficient particulars the matters complained of or relied on by the petitioner, and the court will not travel beyond the allegations contained in the petition in adjudicating the matter (Re Fildes Bros Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 592 at 597G-598C). It follows that a sufficient case must be contained in the petition and defects or omissions in the petition cannot be cured by affidavits (see Re Wear Engine Works Co (1875) 10 Ch App 188 at 191).

  98. [48] A winding up application is now initiated by an Originating Application (“OA”) and supported by affidavits (rr 8(1)(b) and 18 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Corporate Insolvency and Restructuring) Rules 2020). The OA does not contain any particulars beyond the grounds on which winding up is sought, and all facts and matters in support of the application must therefore be contained in the supporting affidavits. The applicant cannot depart from the case as set out in his affidavit(s). However, unlike a petition, an affidavit should only contain the factual evidence of the deponent, and should not include, and indeed must avoid, legal arguments and legalese (JG8 LLC v QUWU Trading Ltd and another [2023] HKCU 4473 at [37]). In this regard, an affidavit only needs to state the relevant facts, and not the legal consequences which flow from them (Callite Pty Ltd v Adams [2001] NSWSC 52 at [12]; Hopetoun Kembla Investments Pty Ltd v JPR Legal Pty Ltd (2011) 286 ALR 768 at [72]). Further, the courts are more concerned with the substance of the allegations in the affidavit and not its form. In the circumstances, the applicant need not use legal words or phrases such as “legitimate expectations” or “quasi-partnership’ in his supporting affidavit – that is a matter for submission – but need only set out the facts on which those submissions may be advanced. As Patrick himself recognises in his closing submissions, the overarching concern is that the respondent should know, in time to prepare their case, the substantive allegations he must meet (see In Re Fildes Bros Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 592 at 598).

  99. [49] The key question therefore is whether CK has sufficiently set out the factual allegations which underpin his claim that LKE is a quasi-partnership and that he had the LEs.

  100. Whether CK’s affidavits are sufficient

  101. (1) LKE is akin to a quasi-partnership

  102. [50] As I will elaborate below at [66]–[70], the hallmark of a company that is akin to a quasi-partnership is the existence of a relationship of mutual trust and confidence. This was a central theme in CK’s affidavits in support of winding up. It is not necessary for CK to specifically use the term “quasi-partnership” in his supporting affidavits – that is a legal term of art that can be addressed in submissions. It suffices that the substantive allegations underlying the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence were brought to the attention of Patrick and Patricia, in time for them to prepare their case and meet those allegations.

  103. [51] That these allegations were brought to Patrick’s attention is evident from his 1st Affidavit, where he explicitly refutes CK’s claim on the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence:

  104. To put matters beyond doubt, Patrick then attempted to argue that LKE was no different from an ordinary private limited company, and referred to CK’s position in the 2003 CWU to make good his point.

  105. (2) 1st LE

  106. [52] The 1st LE as framed in CK’s Closing Submissions is:

  107. [53] In my view, this was sufficiently set out in CK’s affidavits. In his 1st affidavit in support of winding up (“CK’s 1st Affidavit”), CK stated:

  108. The fact that CK was complaining about a “departure” from informal discussions between himself and Patrick makes clear his position that there was an understanding or expectation that this arrangement would persist. Indeed, CK explicitly mentions in his 1st Affidavit that the current state of board meetings – where he is being invariably outvoted by Patricia and Patrick – “was not what … Patrick and [him] had agreed upon”.

  109. [54] Patrick had the chance to, and did in fact, address these allegations in his 1st affidavit:

  110. [55] In his reply affidavit, CK again says:

  111. [56] CK may not have specifically used the legal term “legitimate expectation” in his affidavits, but that is not necessary as a matter of law, nor was its absence prejudicial to Patrick and Patricia. CK’s affidavits sufficiently alleged the understanding he had with Patrick – that they would discuss matters informally without resorting to formal board meetings where Patricia would be involved. That Patrick was aware of the case he had to meet is evident from his counsel’s vigorous cross-examination of CK on these issues. Indeed, on the first day of CK’s cross-examination, Patrick’s counsel sought to establish that: (a) there was nothing wrong with calling a board meeting; (b) the fact that no board meetings were called between 2005 to 2019 did not mean that such a right had disappeared; and (c) since CK did not object to Patricia’s appointment as a director, he had no basis to complain about being outvoted at board meetings.

  112. [57] Further, this departure from the prior way that CK and Patrick managed the business came out consistently during the hearing. In CK’s cross-examination by Patrick’s counsel, he responded to the suggestion that he started creating disagreements after 8 November 2019 by saying:

  113. Similarly, CK engaged in the following exchange during his cross-examination by Patricia’s counsel:

  114. Notably, CK’s evidence of the lack of Patricia’s involvement in the management of LKE and its subsidiaries from 2005 to 2019 was unchallenged.

  115. [58] CK’s counsel similarly put to Patrick that he did not call any board meetings from 2005 to 2019 “because CK and [him] have always made business decisions through discussions and Patricia’s vote was not intended to be the swing vote”. All of this demonstrates how Patrick and Patricia were fully apprised of the factual basis of the 1st LE throughout the proceedings, and cannot claim to have been taken by surprise by it.

  116. (3) 2nd LE

  117. [59] The 2nd LE as framed in CK’s Closing Submissions is:

  118. [60] This LE was also, in my view, sufficiently brought to Patrick and Patricia’s notice such that they were aware of the case they had to meet. CK’s 1st Affidavit stated:

  119. [61] Patrick responded to the same in his 1st Affidavit:

  120. [62] At the hearing, Patrick and Patricia’s counsel spent substantial time exploring each business disagreement to show that CK’s views were properly considered.

  121. (4) 3rd LE

  122. [63] Finally, CK framed the 3rd LE in the following terms:

  123. [64] CK’s 1st Affidavit expressly refers to such an understanding:

  124. CK goes on to list examples from the past where LKE declared dividends upon either Patrick’s or CK’s request.

  125. [65] Patrick was aware of and did meet this case. In his response, Patrick explicitly refuted CK’s claim that the declaration of dividends was always an “objective” of LKE or that the two of them had a “practice” of asking for dividends when either of them had financial needs. Patrick went on to explain that the decision to declare dividends had always been considered in light of market conditions, the Group’s performance, and the Group’s needs.

  126. Whether LKE is a quasi-partnership or akin to one

  127. The law

  128. [66] The seminal exposition of what constitutes a quasi-partnership is set out by Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi at 379–380, partially cited in Perennial at [41]:

  129. [67] In the local context, “quasi-partnerships” (or a business akin to quasi-partnerships) are often established in respect of family businesses due to the circumstances in which they were formed and managed. For example, in Lin Choo Mee v Tat Leong Development (Pte) Ltd and Others and Other Matters [2015] SGHC 99, the court held (at [75]) that the family companies were akin to a quasi-partnership for three reasons: (a) the shares were and are closely held by family members; (b) the directors held their positions by virtue of blood ties rather than commercial considerations; and (c) the shareholders and directors held their shares and directorships by virtue of inheritance instead of by voluntary subscription.

  130. [68] One other relevant indicator of a quasi-partnership is the informal nature of its business operations. For instance, in See Eng Siong Ronnie v Sassax Pte Ltd and another [2020] SGHC 96 (“See Eng Siong Ronnie”) at [44], the court found that the company in question was a quasi-partnership due, in part, to the fact that the two shareholders and directors in that case “regularly discussed [business] over messaging applications rather than through formal email exchanges”.

  131. [69] However, the Court of Appeal has cautioned that the law does not automatically treat all family businesses as quasi-partnerships, nor does it assume that a relationship of mutual trust and confidence exists among all family members involved in the company's management (Kathryn Ma at [34]); see also Chow Kwok Chuen at [33] and Tan Bee Hong Blossom and another v Tan Seng Keow Doreen and others [2020] SGHC 89 (where the court found that the subject “family company” was not akin to a quasi-partnership).

  132. [70] Finally, the relevant time to assess whether a company is a quasi-partnership is at the time when the acts complained of occurred (Augusta Healthcare, Inc v Valley Health System CICA (Civil) Appeal No. 004 of 2022 at [43]). This is important because a company may not start out as a quasi-partnership but may evolve into one; conversely, a company may start out as a quasi-partnership but later cease to be one.

  133. Parties’ cases

  134. [71] CK argues that LKE is akin to a quasi-partnership because:

  135. (a) It is clear from the Statement of Wishes that the Patriarch founded LKE as the family’s investment vehicle to preserve and grow the family wealth and to take care of the future generations of the Kho family.

  136. (b) The Statement Wishes unequivocally expresses the Patriarch’s desire for the Four Brothers to “cooperate with one another more closely, tolerate one another and regard one and another with sincerity”. This document is highly significant, as all parties involved treated it with reverence and religiously abided by its contents.

  137. (c) From the 2005 Buyout to October 2019, CK and Patrick jointly managed LKE and made all decisions collectively through informal discussions between themselves, without resorting to Board meetings and without involving the other directors. CK provided several examples of business decisions during this period, which demonstrate the informal discussions which they had and explained how this was only possible because of the mutual trust and confidence they had.

  138. [72] Patrick, on the other hand, relies heavily on the position taken by CK in the 2003 CWU, namely that LKE operated on the basis of the shareholders’ and directors’ strict legal rights under the LKE M&A – which entitled him to use the casting vote as a tie breaker mechanism. Further, Patrick highlights that CK himself refuted Joo and Kian’s claim that LKE “would be run exclusively by the four brothers as a quasi-partnership on the basis of mutual trust and confidence”. CK did so by arguing that the absence of any assigned responsibilities for Joo in the Statement of Wishes “flies in the face of [Joo and Kian’s] contention that each of the [Four Brothers] had an equal right to manage the Company, in the nature of a quasi-partnership”. Patrick then argues that CK has not put forward any evidence that the decision making process at LKE changed after the 2005 Buyout.

  139. My decision

  140. [73] In my view, both CK and Patrick have to different extents missed the issue by placing excessive reliance on either the Statement of Wishes or the 2003 CWU. Both were superseded by later material events, especially the way LKE was managed after the 2005 Buyout.

  141. [74] I find the Statement of Wishes of limited relevance. I accept that it is strong evidence that the Patriarch intended for the Four Brothers to run LKE akin to a quasi-partnership, and the Four Brothers did run LKE in that manner. This is supported by the objective evidence, namely (a) the contents of the Statement of Wishes, which exhorts the Four Brothers to work together for the benefit, and to preserve the business for future generations, of the Kho family; (b) the equal allocation of shares by the Patriarch to the Four Brothers; (c) their involvement in the management of LKE; and (d) their practice of informal meetings and consulting one another on business matters. In this regard, LKE exhibited many of the same features as the subject company in Chow Kwok Chuen, which was found to be akin to a quasi-partnership (see Chow Kwok Chuen at [31]).

  142. [75] However, with the breakup of the Four Brothers following the 2005 Buyout, it is evident that the Patriarch’s wishes could no longer be achieved. Joo and Kian sold their shares and LKE was no longer going to be run for the benefit of all the Patriarch’s children and their respective families. LKE had assumed a different character, with CK and Patrick collectively owning 98% of LKE.

  143. [76] I also reject Patrick’s reliance on the position taken by CK in the 2003 CWU for two reasons:

  144. (a) CK did not assert that LKE was not a quasi-partnership in the 2003 CWU; and

  145. (b) in any event, CK’s position in the 2003 CWU was over 20 years ago, and what is relevant is how he and Patrick managed LKE after the 2005 Buyout.

  146. (1) CK’s position in the 2003 CWU

  147. [77] It is inaccurate to say that CK took the position in the 2003 CWU that LKE was not a quasi-partnership. To explain this, it is necessary to set out the parties’ respective cases in the 2003 CWU in some detail.

  148. [78] The 2003 CWU was brought by Joo and Kian on the basis that it was “just and equitable” to wind up LKE. Joo and Kian alleged, amongst other things, that:

  149. (a) CK’s exercise of the casting vote (see [15] above) was in breach of:

  150. (i) the Four Brothers’ “fundamental understanding of equal management” [emphasis added], wherein they would “manage the business together and make unanimous decisions on all major matters” ; and

  151. (ii) an express agreement for CK not to exercise his casting vote, and to have the same removed in LKE’s M&A.

  152. (b) There was a complete breakdown in the relationship of the Four Brothers.

  153. [79] CK and Patrick took the position that:

  154. (a) There was no right of equal management amongst the Four Brothers, as “[c]onsultation was agreed to, but no more”. This is borne out in the Statement of Wishes, where the Patriarch deliberately assigned the Four Brothers different roles in the Group with the instruction that “whoever is more experienced in running a business and in conducting the affairs of the company shall be appointed to take on major responsibilities”. In this regard, the Patriarch assigned CK the heaviest responsibilities, including appointing him Chairman of LKE. However, Joo was not assigned any role in the Statement of Wishes and this “flies in the face of [Joo and Kian’s] contention that each of the [Four Brothers] had an equal right to manage [LKE], in the nature of a quasi-partnership”.

  155. (b) CK was entitled to exercise the casting vote. The alleged agreement between the Four Brothers to remove the casting vote in LKE’s M&A was expressly subject to a review “in 3 months’ time”, and LKE’s M&A was never amended in such a manner.

  156. [80] Crucially, CK did not categorically deny the existence of a quasi-partnership. Rather, he was refuting Joo and Kian’s allegation that they had a right to “equal management”, and it was in that context that he said Joo and Kian had no basis to say that they had “an equal right to manage [LKE], in the nature of a quasi-partnership”.

  157. [81] CK’s evidence (which Patrick endorsed) was that he was entitled to exercise the casting vote because he saw himself as having additional or special rights as the eldest, most experienced of the brothers, who the Patriarch had entrusted to lead the Group. This is not inconsistent with LKE being run based on the basis of mutual trust and confidence between the Four Brothers or the existence of a quasi-partnership.

  158. [82] Nonetheless, the merits of the 2003 CWU were not determined, and it is not for me to make any findings in respect of the same. What is relevant is that nothing in CK’s evidence in the 2003 CWU precludes him taking the position in these proceedings that LKE was managed in a manner akin to a quasi-partnership.

  159. (2) CK’s evidence on the change in LKE’s decision-making process

  160. [83] More importantly, the position taken by CK in the 2003 CWU was over 20 years ago and does not represent how LKE was managed after the 2005 Buyout. In this regard, it is not accurate that CK did not advance any evidence that the decision-making process at LKE had changed. CK explained in his 1st Affidavit that:

  161. CK then went on to explain how they cultivated this relationship of trust and respect through their division of responsibilities, entrusting each other with their respective roles, and engaging in informal discussions on all business matters. CK built on this in his Reply Affidavit where he referred to specific instances where he had discussed business matters with Patrick informally – without recourse to a formal board meeting involving the other directors.

  162. [84] I therefore turn to the evidence of CK and Patrick’s relationship from the 2005 Buyout until the time their relationship started deteriorating. As explained earlier (at [70] above), this is the relevant time frame for the court to assess whether LKE was akin to a quasi-partnership.

  163. (3) LKE was akin to a quasi-partnership from 2005 to 2019

  164. [85] After the 2005 Buyout, CK and Patrick each held a 49% interest in LKE (see [17] above). All the other (minority) shareholders were their immediate family members – Patricia, Mdm Saw, and Philip (until 2022 – see [20] above) – who were bequeathed their shares. To finance their purchase of Joo and Kian’s shares, CK and Patrick took out huge loans (in the region of S$16m) from LKE, and therefore bore all the risks of that investment. None of the other shareholders participated in the 2005 Buyout and were content to hold their small stakes in LKE. Neither did they ask to step into management roles to fill the void left by the departing Kian and Joo.

  165. [86] Significantly, while Patricia (from 8 September 2004 to 29 September 2009, and 9 August 2012 to present) and Koh (from 11 April 2003 to 23 July 2015) were also on LKE’s board of directors, there is no evidence that they played any real or meaningful role at all. In fact, Koh and Patricia (in 2004) appeared to have been appointed primarily to strengthen CK and Patrick’s position in their fight against Kian and Joo. CK’s evidence was that he appointed Koh to “secure” the board. Shortly after, he asked Patricia to join the board to similarly “defend their own interests” against Joo and Kian. This is corroborated by Patricia’s evidence – where she said she was only appointed in 2004 because of the feud between the Four Brothers, and that CK “may require voting” in that context. She resigned on 29 September 2009, citing the inconvenience of signing resolutions while being based in Australia. When she relocated back to Singapore in 2012, she asked CK and Patrick whether she could be reappointed to the board so that she could be “aware of what’s happening in the company”. Crucially, there is no evidence that she was reappointed to the board to participate in management or to change the way decisions were made. Instead, Patricia was content with that arrangement and never once insisted that she be involved in, or consulted on, any matter.

  166. [87] Indeed, there is no evidence that either Patricia or Koh took part in any decision making at all, even on matters which should ordinarily be decided by the board (eg, the declaration of dividends). Nor were they even consulted on any issue. In this respect, CK’s testimony that Patricia was “never” involved in the management of LKE and its subsidiaries from 2005 to 2019 is unchallenged. From 2005 to 2019, all decisions concerning LKE were made solely by CK and Patrick after consulting with each other, without the involvement of Koh or Patricia.

  167. [88] It is also undisputed that neither CK nor Patrick called for any board meetings from 2005 to 2019; instead, all decisions were reached during informal meetings or discussions via text and email. Where CK and Patrick had different views, they compromised. In fact, it was Patrick’s evidence that he would usually “accommodate”, or “give in” to, CK. The following examples illustrate that working relationship.

  168. [89] In September 2010, CK proposed investing S$3m in the Beichen Development. Patrick initially expressed his reservations about the investment. CK offered to personally assume 60% of the risk (with the Group taking the remaining 40%). If the investment was successful, CK would share the upside equally. But if it failed, CK would “adjust [his] share equity in the [the Group] to compensate [Patrick]”. Patrick did not agree with this proposal as he felt it would “disintegrate” them, and it would not be “nice” for the Group to take CK’s shares if the Beichen Development failed. Patrick therefore compromised by agreeing to “take a punt on this project with SGD3m since [CK] [felt] so strongly about it”.

  169. [90] In early 2014, Patrick proposed a similar-sized investment of S$3m in two projects in London (“London Investment”). CK objected to the investment as he was not comfortable with the risks of LKE’s first foray into London. Patrick proposed to make the investment personally , but as he needed funds for the investment, he requested that LKE declare dividends. CK agreed to this.

  170. [91] Sometime in 2014, CK proposed investing in LHB, which was listed on the ASX. Patrick supported this investment as the Group had not previously invested in a publicly listed company. Shortly after, CK proposed investing in LHM (which was also listed on the ASX). Patrick voiced his concerns as he “felt that [they] were not ready to take on two [listed companies] with [their] limited resources”. However, Patrick ultimately accommodated CK, and the Group invested in both LHB and LHM.

  171. [92] One of the more significant accommodations is the “80:20 Arrangement” which came about in 2016. Patrick was again interested to explore investment opportunities in London – which CK was less enthusiastic about. Patrick therefore proposed the 80:20 Arrangement (ie, that either CK or himself could personally pursue opportunities the other was not comfortable with) with the Group taking a minority 20% stake. To provide the primary investor with the necessary funds, LKE would declare sufficient dividends. Under the 80:20 Arrangement, Patrick and CK incorporated ARC LH Investments Pte Ltd – which Patrick held an 80% stake in, and S.LH Corporation Pte Ltd – which CK held an 80% stake in (collectively, the “80:20 Companies”). The 80:20 Companies served as vehicles for CK and Patrick to pursue their own interests when they could not agree on new investments but ensured that the Group retained an interest via a minority stake. It was their way of managing their relationship.

  172. [93] They also trusted each other to manage different aspects of the Group’s businesses. For example, CK mainly took charge of the Group’s business in China, whilst Patrick oversaw the Group’s leasing activities in Australia. The understanding was that the brothers would consult each other and in the event they disagreed, reach an accommodation or compromise, which they always succeeded in doing prior to 2019. There was admittedly never any deadlock which raised the question of whether CK, as Chairman of LKE, could break using his casting vote; but importantly, CK did not throughout this period assert any right to do so. What is also critical is that CK and Patrick did not, prior to 2019, involve Koh and Patricia in their discussions, or even consult them.

  173. [94] It is clear from the foregoing that the LKE was akin to a quasi-partnership and managed on the basis of mutual trust and confidence between CK and Patrick from 2005 to 2019, with the other directors and (2%) shareholders having no say at all.

  174. CK’s legitimate expectations

  175. The law

  176. [95] Legitimate expectations act as an equitable constraint on a party’s exercise of a legal right (Re Astec (BSR) plc [1998] 2BCLC 556 at 588, cited in Evenstar at [40]). They are derived from: (a) strict legal rights as found in documents such as the company’s constitution or shareholders’ agreements; (b) informal understandings and assumptions from the parties’ interactions in cases of quasi-partnerships; or (c) informal understandings among shareholders independent of whether the company is a quasi-partnership: Thio Syn Kym Wendy v Thio Syn Pyn [2017] SGHC 169 at [44].

  177. [96] In O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 at 1101 (cited in Evenstar at [40]), Lord Hoffman suggested a useful “cross-check” to determine the existence of a legitimate expectation:

  178. [97] More recently, the High Court in Oon Swee Gek v Violet Oon [2024] SGHC 13 (“Violet Oon”) provided the following guidance (at [28]) in the context of a minority oppression claim under s 216 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CA”):

  179. [98] Consistent with the above principles, legitimate expectations must be grounded on a common understanding, as opposed to a purely subjective expectation (Lim Kok Wah and others v Lim Boh Yong and others and other matters [2015] 5 SLR 307 (“Lim Kok Wah”) at [121]–[122]).

  180. The 1st LE is established

  181. [99] CK’s 1st LE is that he and Patrick would make business decisions in LKE collectively through informal discussions, and that matters of disagreement would be resolved between themselves instead of being put to a vote at the Board, as was the practice over a long period of 14 years after the 2005 Buyout.

  182. [100] Patrick refutes the existence of the 1st LE and argues that:

  183. (a) CK’s case on the 1st LE has been inconsistent throughout this application, and his inability to articulate his case with clarity is the clearest indication that he did not have the LE.

  184. (b) CK’s evidence that he has “never” thought about what happens if Patrick does not defer to him if there is a disagreement shows that he did not have any LE about how he and Patrick would resolve business disagreements.

  185. (c) CK has not explained what the difference is between resolving matters through informal discussions and board meetings. The mode by which matters are discussed is irrelevant.

  186. (d) The fact that no board meetings were called from 2005 to 2019 does not mean that the directors had no right or lost the right to call a board meeting. No board meetings were called simply because there was no need for board meetings.

  187. [101] Patricia argues that CK has not explained what exactly she had agreed to. When Patricia rejoined LKE as a director in 2012, there was no discussion (much less agreement) between her and CK that she would have to “give in” or “accommodate” CK’s wishes.

  188. [102] I accept the existence of the 1st LE. At its core, the 1st LE sets out CK’s expectation on how LKE and the Group would be run. From 2005 to 2019, all decisions concerning the Group were made solely by CK and Patrick through consultations, with consensus and compromise at the heart of each decision. As I found above at [85]–[94], although Patricia was on LKE’s board, she was not, or expected to be, involved in any decision making and not even consulted on any issues. While CK conceded under cross-examination that with Patricia on the board he could be outvoted, this only reflected his acknowledgement of the legal consequence of her being a director.

  189. [103] It bears repeating that following the settlement of the 2003 CWU, it was only CK and Patrick who took loans to buy-out Kian and Joo such that they each held 49% of the shares in LKE each. Only CK and Patrick made decisions on behalf of LKE, to the exclusion of the other board members, Patricia and Koh. Following the 2005 Buy-out, LKE was effectively a “partnership” between CK and Patrick, and they consulted each other, and reached a consensus, on all decisions. Where they could not agree on new investments, the “80:20 Arrangement” acted as a method to ensure that the proposer of the investment would not be denied and the investment could proceed with the Group’s (minority) participation. It would be entirely contrary to the conduct of CK and Patrick over the years, and the reasonable expectations formed as a result, that CK’s involvement and influence would effectively be reduced to that of a minority on the board, particularly when Patricia was appointed with no understanding or expectation that she would be involved in LKE’s management at all. It would, in the words of Lord Hoffman in O’Neill, be “contrary to what the parties, by words or conduct, have actually agreed”.

  190. [104] For completeness, I do not accept Patrick and Patricia’s arguments:

  191. (a) First, CK has not been inconsistent with his stance on the existence of the 1st LE. As explained above at [52]–[58], CK has set out in sufficient detail the substantive allegations underlying the 1st LE in his affidavits in support of this winding up application. The 1st LE, as advanced, was not “complicated, qualified, hedged, vague, or ambiguous” (Violet Oon at [28]). I note that CK did over-state his position in his oral evidence, testifying that he expected Patrick to “defer” to his views, even if Patrick thought it was against LKE’s interests. But this, at best, was his “purely subjective expectation” which does not give rise to any legitimate expectation (Lim Kok Wah at [121]), and is in any event not the case he advanced. This evidence is also not inconsistent with or contradictory to the existence of the 1st LE.

  192. (b) Second, although CK initially testified that he “never thought” about what would happen if Patrick did not defer to him if there was a disagreement, he promptly explained that “well, if he disagreed … then I suppose we’d need to talk even more and need to find some middle ground to solve the problem”. This is consistent with his 1st LE – that he and Patrick would resolve any disagreements between themselves instead of calling a board meeting where Patricia would effectively act as the deciding vote.

  193. (c) Third, while the mode by which matters are discussed is not the most relevant issue, that is not the gravamen of the 1st LE. As explained earlier (at [102]), CK’s real grievance is that the calling of a formal board meeting would involve Patricia effectively acting as the deciding vote –that was never how CK and Patrick decided matters and resolved their differences in the past. Further, the mode is not entirely irrelevant as the fact that decisions were always made in informal settings is relevant to the issue of whether there was a “quasi-partnership” (See Eng Siong Ronnie at [44]).

  194. (d) Fourth, it is not true that there was no need for board meetings from 2005 to 2019. There were numerous instances of disagreement between CK and Patrick during this period, such as the London Investment and Beichen Development (see [89]–[90] above). These disagreements could have easily been resolved by putting the matter to a vote at a board meeting. But CK and Patrick chose not to do that but instead found compromises (see [93] above).

  195. (e) Fifth, Patricia did not have to verbally discuss or agree to any of the LEs. The crucial question is whether the parties had by “words or conduct” come to an understanding of how the affairs of LKE would be managed (see [96] above). As explained above, the clear conduct of the parties is that Patricia would not be involved in the management of LKE or the discussions between CK and Patrick. Patricia demonstrated by her conduct that she understood and accepted this; indeed, she did not even once ask to be involved.

  196. Modified version of the 2nd LE is established

  197. [105] CK’s 2nd LE is that he would have a key role in management and his views would be considered and/or properly considered. In support of his expectation to have a “key role in management”, CK points to the fact that he is the eldest son with the most experience and took over management of LKE after the Patriarch passed away – in accordance with the Statement of Wishes.

  198. [106] I do not accept such an ambiguous LE. As I explained (at [75] above), the Statement of Wishes is of limited relevance following the 2005 Buyout and the practice adopted thereafter by CK and Patrick. Further, the Statement of Wishes does not resolve the ambiguity of the phrase “key role in management”.

  199. [107] Insofar as CK is asserting an expectation that Patrick should always defer to him, that is his “purely subjective expectation” (see [98] above). Indeed, he did not take that position until his oral evidence, and he has not shown any evidence that this was a “common understanding” he shared with Patrick.

  200. [108] I only accept the 2nd LE to the extent that CK had a right to be involved in the management of LKE and to have his views properly considered (“Modified 2nd LE”).

  201. 3rd LE is not established

  202. [109] CK’s 3rd LE is that dividends must be declared if he requested them. He argues that this LE is found in the terms of the Statement of Wishes and is supported by the practice adopted by LKE. CK also relies on Patrick and Patricia’s concession during cross-examination that LKE was incorporated as the family’s investment vehicle to preserve and grow the family wealth and to take care of future generations of the Kho family.

  203. [110] For the reasons below, I reject the 3rd LE.

  204. (1) The Statement of Wishes is of little assistance

  205. [111] I do not place much weight on the terms of the Statement of Wishes. As explained above (at [75]), it had largely been rendered irrelevant when the Four Brothers split up in 2005. More importantly, the Statement of Wishes does not refer to the payment of dividends and when CK was asked to identify the passages he was relying on, he was unable to point to anything relevant.

  206. [112] The Statement of Wishes does little more than state the uncontroversial proposition that the main objective of LKE, as a commercial enterprise, is to create value for members of the Kho family (who are its shareholders). Even if that objective implicitly included the payment of dividends, there is nothing in the Statement of Wishes which suggests that dividends must be paid so long as CK or any family member asks for them. More importantly, the terms of the Statement of Wishes make it clear that the emphasis was on protecting the business empire and preserving the assets for both the current and future generations. Any payment of dividends would benefit the current members at the expense of future generations. It is therefore for the board of LKE to strike a balance, and any condition that a dividend must be paid simply because a member requests the same would be inconsistent with the Statement of Wishes.

  207. (2) LKE did not have a consistent practice of declaring dividends

  208. [113] LKE’s practice of declaring dividends also does not support CK’s case.

  209. [114] First, it is undisputed that LKE did not have a dividend policy. Dividends were not paid every year. The quantum of dividends when declared followed no formula or guideline, and no dividends were declared in 2006, 2007 and 2010.

  210. [115] On 3 January 2012, Patrick proposed to CK that they should “set a target for an annual dividend yield” and that “[they] can start with a target of 1% to 3% of the net assets of the group depending on how the group performs for the year”. But nothing came of this. I disagree with CK’s submission that the contents of Patrick’s proposal are consistent with his case “on the key objectives of LKE to declare dividends”. Patrick was only attempting to introduce structure and certainty to the issue of dividends, as he explained when he made his second proposal.

  211. [116] Patrick made another proposal to CK on 21 February 2017. In his email, Patrick wrote that “[o]ur dividends are ad hoc and subjective. We declare dividends based on our immediate cash requirements”, that “[w]e should have a dividend policy or target” and that “[w]e must be able to have the profits and the cash flow to declare dividends so that all shareholders can benefit and plan for their future and their children’s future”. Nothing came of this proposal as well. What is significant is that in discussing whether to adopt a dividend policy, there is no evidence of CK or Patrick suggesting that it must be paid if a member asks for it.

  212. [117] Second, CK’s oral evidence is inconsistent with the 3rd LE. Initially, he claimed that when a shareholder requests for dividends, LKE “just pays it out” and that LKE’s Financial Controller would “evaluate and analyse it” and let the directors know if it cannot be done. However, when pressed to clarify the process, CK was initially evasive but eventually accepted that:

  213. (a) where a shareholder requests dividends, the directors will have to consider several factors and strike the right balance;

  214. (b) striking the right balance involves judgment;

  215. (c) in seeking to discharge his or her fiduciary duties, each director must independently exercise his or her judgment; and

  216. (d) as part of the balancing exercise, the directors must consider economic cycles, global circumstances, family needs, and asset preservation and growth for future generations.

  217. In other words, it was not the case that LKE would pay dividends simply because a shareholder asked for the same. Indeed, CK accepts that the payment of dividends (and the amount) is “subject to the financial positions and the law”.

  218. [118] Third, the evidence shows that in some years, dividends were paid when CK or Patrick raised a specific need for funds:

  219. (a) It was Patrick’s unchallenged evidence that around S$13.5m was paid out in 2008 and 2009 to pay off the loans which CK and Patrick took to finance the 2005 Buyout (see [19] above).

  220. (b) In 2014, around S$7.8m was paid out to enable Patrick to make the London Investment (see [90] above).

  221. (c) In 2015, S$6.9m was paid out on CK’s request to enable him to purchase an apartment for his son in Australia as his son would be studying there.

  222. (d) In 2016, dividends exceeding S$16.8m were paid out to enable CK and Patrick to embark on their own investments under the 80:20 Arrangement (see [92] above).

  223. [119] These four instances over a period of 15 years do not, by themselves, give rise to a legitimate expectation that dividends must be declared simply because CK or a shareholder asks for it. Further, the specific need for funds in these four instances should be contrasted with the vague (and inconsistent) reasons offered by CK when asking for dividends in 2020 and 2021 (see [153]–[155] below).

  224. [120] Fourth, and crucially, CK’s own conduct was not consistent with his own case. When he asked Patrick and Patricia to approve the payment of S$10m of dividends for FY 2020, he did not assert any policy or understanding that he was entitled to dividends if he asked for them. Instead, he made appeals for Patrick and Patricia to be “considerate” and “humane”. When pressed on this, he claimed he could not insist on the (alleged) policy because Patrick and Patricia were “trying to collude together to override [his] decisions”, and there was therefore no point in insisting on payment. However, CK acknowledged that he had no evidence of such collusion. In any case, there was nothing to prevent CK from highlighting and insisting on the 3rd LE, if it existed. Indeed, as will be shown when discussing his other specific complaints below, CK was not shy to advance his views on various issues, even where he did not think they would be accepted.

  225. [121] I therefore find that the 3rd LE does not exist. However, this does not dispose of the issue on dividends, as the question remains whether CK’s request for dividends was properly considered or whether the manner and reasons for its rejection is evidence of a breakdown of trust and confidence between him and Patrick.

  226. [122] I now turn to consider each of specific matters CK complains of.

  227. Whether CK’s legitimate expectations were breached

  228. ITS and the Southern Cross Board Meeting

  229. [123] In brief, CK’s complaints with respect to ITS are:

  230. (a) Patrick’s calling of a board meeting to decide on the refurbishment of ITS (“ITS Refurbishment”) was a breach of the 1st LE; and

  231. (b) Patrick and Patricia’s failure to properly consider his views with respect to the ITS Refurbishment was a breach of the 2nd LE.

  232. (1) Background

  233. [124] The building which houses ITS was originally constructed in 1947 and converted into ITS in 1997. In 2011, S$500,000 was spent renovating ITS (“1st ITS Renovation”).

  234. (A) The decision to refurbish ITS

  235. [125] At a monthly finance meeting on 11 December 2017, Patrick proposed the ITS Refurbishment, as it was old and had received negative reviews. CK suggested that the management conduct a sensitivity analysis and look at the 1st ITS Renovation for comparison. At a monthly finance meeting on 13 February 2018, Patrick presented the sensitivity analysis. Patrick claims that because CK did not respond with any adverse comments, he appointed architects and submitted a written permission (the “WP”) to the Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”) without consulting or informing CK.

  236. [126] On 3 May 2018, pursuant to CK’s suggestion, a compilation of ITS’ past performance before and after the 1st ITS Renovation was presented at a monthly finance meeting. Sometime between 3 May 2018 and 7 July 2018, CK discovered Patrick’s appointment of the architects and submission of the WP to URA. CK was upset. He nonetheless agreed to sign a cheque to pay the architects, subject to the condition that no further expenses should be incurred.

  237. [127] On 1 August 2018, CK sent an email to Patrick suggesting to shelve the ITS Refurbishment plan for 6 months. On 11 August 2018, Patrick replied, stating that they should not let personal issues affect the normal business of the Group and reiterated the need for the ITS Refurbishment. On 21 August 2018, CK responded, recommending the sale of ITS. On 30 August 2018, Patrick disagreed with CK's suggestion to sell ITS, explaining that ITS was “too rundown and old” and that it would not fetch a good price. Patrick also emphasized the investment already made in the refurbishment plan and the potential waste if it were to be aborted.

  238. [128] As CK did not respond to this email, Patrick proceeded with the planning and assumed that CK was agreeable. However, in December 2018, CK refused to sign off on a reimbursement cheque for further URA fees, claiming that he had not been consulted. Patrick put the ITS Refurbishment on hold. On 26 July 2019, Patrick wrote to CK (with Patricia copied) asking specific questions and reasons for CK’s change of mind on the ITS Refurbishment, and proposing to move forward quickly if there were no further questions. CK did not reply to Patrick’s email of 26 July 2019.

  239. [129] On 2 August 2019, Patrick engaged CBRE to conduct a market feasibility report on the ITS Refurbishment plans. He did not inform CK he had done so. Patrick testified that he hoped to use the report to “convince” CK to accept his proposal for the ITS Refurbishment. However, he did not ask CBRE to consider CK’s suggestion of selling ITS. CK argues that Patrick should have run a marketing campaign to try to sell the ITS or ask CBRE to also consider CK’s idea of selling. Patrick testified that he did not do so because he did not believe ITS should be sold. He added that if CK was serious about his view, CK could have commissioned his own report.

  240. (B) Calling of the Southern Cross Board Meeting

  241. [130] On 24 October 2019, CBRE issued its report recommending the refurbishment of ITS (“CBRE Report”). The following day, Patrick called for a formal board meeting for Southern Cross to approve the ITS Refurbishment (“Southern Cross Board Meeting”), without consulting CK beforehand. This was the first time a formal board meeting in the Group had been called since 2005. The notice for the Southern Cross Board Meeting (with the CBRE Report attached) was sent by the company secretary to CK on 26 October 2019. CK replied to the company secretary on 3 November 2019 (copying Patrick and Patricia), expressing his grievances in relation to how the discussions for the ITS Refurbishment had played out. He also explained his preference to sell ITS instead of refurbishing it, and said he was reviewing the CBRE Report and would “revert in due course”. CK ended off his email by apologising that he could not attend the meeting “due to (his) other prior commitment”.

  242. [131] Patrick replied to CK’s email on 7 November 2019 to express his disagreement. Notably, he ended off with saying:

  243. [132] I note that Patrick personally reached out to Patricia to inform her of the board meeting before fixing the date, and ensured that she was available to attend. But he did not do the same in respect of CK although this was the first formal board meeting being called in 14 years, which evidences their deteriorating relationship.

  244. [133] Patrick did not reschedule the Southern Cross Board Meeting, and it took place as scheduled on 11 November 2019 with CK absent. The meeting lasted only 20 minutes, and Patrick and Patricia voted in favour of the ITS Refurbishment at a budget of S$3m. Significantly, the minutes of the meeting do not record any discussion of CK’s views as expressed in his 3 November 2019 email.

  245. (C) Continued discussions after the Southern Cross Board Meeting

  246. [134] Shortly after, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Singapore. The evidence shows that CK and Patrick continued to discuss the matter without reaching any consensus. On 6 April 2020, CK highlighted ITS’ low occupancy rates in light of the pandemic and suggested getting a fresh report from CBRE. Patrick responded on 13 April 2020, disagreeing with CK’s views, stating that low occupancy was the ideal time for refurbishment. However, he agreed to get a revised report from CBRE to account for pandemic-related developments. CBRE issued its revised report on 26 May 2020 (“Revised CBRE Report”) which recommended proceeding with the refurbishment. But again, CBRE was not asked to consider CK’s proposals.

  247. [135] In an email dated 12 May 2020 to Patrick (with Patricia copied), CK expressed serious reservations about the Revised CBRE Report – particularly that its recommendation was based on several assumptions. He reiterated his stance that the refurbishment plans should be halted, and they should consider other uses for ITS, such as converting it into shops and office space (which he stated that he had proposed earlier). Patrick responded on 30 May 2020 explaining why he did not agree.

  248. [136] On 30 March 2021, CK highlighted that ITS had incurred losses exceeding S$217,000 for the year 2020 and asked if Patrick maintained the view that ITS should be refurbished. In his response, Patrick expressed the view that the fact that ITS incurred losses did not detract from the rationale for the refurbishment. The whole point of the refurbishment was to improve ITS’ position in the market and to achieve higher revenue and profitability. In his view, the value of ITS would be higher in the long term and Southern Cross should not adopt a short-term outlook and sell ITS immediately.

  249. [137] However, the ITS Refurbishment was eventually put on hold as the construction tenders exceeded the $3m budget.

  250. (2) Whether there was a breach of the 1st and/or Modified 2nd LE

  251. [138] There is no dispute that CK and Patrick could not agree on the ITS Refurbishment. Neither of them suggested that the other’s view was not honest or sincerely held. I consider that this was a legitimate business disagreement.

  252. [139] However, the real issue is Patricia’s involvement in the decision and whether Patrick was making any genuine effort to engage CK or had used Patricia’s vote to advance his position. In this regard, Patrick and Patricia confirmed that they did not discuss CK’s views during the Southern Cross Board Meeting. They claim they were aware of those views and had considered them as they had read CK’s email of 3 November 2019. However, the question remains as to why Patrick and Patricia believed CK’s views did not warrant discussion. It is not Patrick and Patricia’s evidence that they had discussed those views before the meeting. As the CBRE Report did not consider the option of selling ITS, there was no expert or market evidence for Patrick and especially Patricia to consider whether CK’s suggestion was viable or even better. Patrick and Patricia did not even wait for CK to respond with his views on the CBRE Report before they resolved to proceed with the ITS Refurbishment. The matter was decided in a 20-minute meeting.

  253. [140] Significantly, it appears from the minutes of the Board meeting that Patricia did not express any views at all – she simply voted in favour of the ITS Refurbishment. Patricia testified that she did apply her mind and voted in favour of what she thought was the best proposal. However, it is not her evidence that she was aware of the history of ITS or had taken steps to understand the pros and cons of the various options, including CK’s suggestion of selling ITS. Neither is it her evidence that she had prior discussions with Patrick on the matter; she did not even ask any questions at the meeting. In other words, the evidence demonstrates that Patricia simply supported Patrick’s position without question, and thought it unnecessary to clarify matters with Patrick or CK. The manner the decision was made also shows that CK’s views were simply disregarded or not properly considered.

  254. [141] It is also relevant to consider why Patrick called a formal meeting in the first place instead of continuing to discuss and engage CK informally as they had done in the last 14 years. It was not an attempt to exclude CK from participating on the issue. As I noted above (at [131]), Patrick fixed the meeting after checking with CK’s secretary on his availability. Further, CK could also have participated by phone – although he said he was away from Singapore and claimed was busy, he did not explain why he could not re-arrange his schedule to call into the meeting. Indeed, CK’s evidence was that he “purposely” did not want to ask to reschedule the meeting “to see what the response would be”.

  255. [142] I find that Patrick called a formal meeting because he wanted to override CK’s objections and pass the necessary resolution using Patricia’s vote. He testified that he wanted to “move things along” because CK did not respond to his emails. . But he did not explain why the decision could not be postponed until CK had responded with his comments on the CBRE Report or at least given his views. When asked why he did not reschedule the meeting, Patrick claimed that “a lot of resources” had been expended to call the meeting. But these “resources” were minimal and merely involved Patrick instructing the secretary to prepare the notice of the board meeting and book the facilities. Patrick offered a contrived explanation, alluding to the efforts of himself, Patricia, and the secretary, in making arrangements and finding the time to attend the meeting. In his evidence, he questioned “why can’t [CK] accommodate us?”, which suggested his real grievance. Nonetheless, this material departure from the way CK and Patrick had managed LKE only served to undermine the trust and confidence between them. The use of Patricia’s vote in this manner was never intended by the parties, nor was it the way disagreements were resolved by CK and Patrick in the past. Patricia was not appointed to the board to participate in management, and certainly not to change the way decisions were made (as described at [102] above). Patrick’s act in calling a formal meeting and using Patricia’s vote to get his way entirely disregarded CK’s expectation on the way decisions would be made.

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