General Division of the High Court · Decided 29 January 2024
Phoa Eugene (personal representative of the estate of Evelyn Phoa (alias Lauw Evelyn Siew Chiang), deceased and personal representative of the estate of William Phoa, deceased) v Oey Liang Ho (alias Henry Kasenda) (sole executor of the estate of Wirio Kasenda (alias Oey Giok Tjeng), deceased) and others
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 22 · Case no. Suit No 1130 of 2020
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] HC/S 1130/2020 (this “Suit”) concerns the beneficial interests of the deceased Mdm Evelyn Phoa (“Evelyn”) in the shareholding of Supratechnic Pte Ltd (“Supratechnic”). In particular, this Suit concerns the claims of the estate of Evelyn (“Evelyn’s Estate”) and the estate of the deceased Mr William Phoa (“William” and “William’s Estate”) (collectively, “the Estates”) to such interests against the Kasenda family. The disputed interests centre around two lots of shares in Supratechnic that are allegedly held on trust for Evelyn. The parties have referred to these lots as “Lot B” and “Lot C” shares, respectively, and I adopt this nomenclature in this judgment. Importantly, this Suit is brought by the plaintiff, Mr Eugene Phoa (“Eugene”), in his capacity as the personal representative of the Estates, some 40 years after he first knew that there was a potential dispute with the defendants concerning the alleged trusts.
- [2]
[2] After taking some time to consider the matter, I dismiss Eugene’s claims in their entirety. As I will explain, Eugene’s claims fail for both procedural and substantive reasons. In relation to the procedural reasons, Eugene has no standing to pursue his claims as he had failed to extract the resealed foreign letters of administration for the Estates in Singapore. Further, Eugene’s claims are also time-barred or barred by laches. In relation to the substantive reasons, I find that Eugene’s claim against the Lot B shares fails because there is unrebutted evidence that those shares had been sold by Evelyn to the deceased Mr Wirio Kasenda (“Wirio”), who is the father of some of the defendants. I also find that Eugene’s claim against the Lot C shares fails because Evelyn agreed in 1977 to forgo her rights to the shares in consideration for monthly payments of $1,000.
The parties
The Phoas
- [3]
[3] I begin with a description of the parties involved in this Suit. It is apt to start with Evelyn, whose beneficial interests in shares of Supratechnic are the subject of the present dispute. Evelyn had been resident in Singapore until around September 1976, when she emigrated with some of her children to Canada. She was a very successful businesswoman. While in Singapore, she engaged in various business interests, especially in real estate. She passed away in Canada intestate on 7 November 1981.
- [4]
[4] At the time of her death, Evelyn was survived by her five children and one son-in-law, who are:
(a) her son, Eugene, the plaintiff;
(b) her son, the deceased Mr Wellington Phoa (“Wellington”), the sixth defendant, who passed away on 19 March 2021;
(c) her daughter, Ms Angeline Teh (alias Angeline Phoa) (“Angeline”), the seventh defendant;
(d) her then son-in-law and Angeline’s then husband, Dr Teh Yew Fui (“Dr Teh”);
(e) her son, the deceased Mr Benjamin Phoa (“Benjamin”), who passed away on 12 November 2007; and
(f) her son, William, who passed away on 4 April 2005.
- [5]
[5] Pursuant to the Canadian laws on intestacy, each of the five children were recognised as beneficiaries of Evelyn’s Estate, with each being entitled to an equal one-fifth share.
- [6]
[6] On 4 April 2005, William passed away, and Eugene was named as the personal representative in William’s Last Will and Testament.
- [7]
[7] On 11 October 2005, the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (Judicial District of Edmonton) authorised Eugene, Wellington, Angeline, and Benjamin to be the personal representatives of Evelyn’s Estate. William was not included because he had passed away by then.
- [8]
[8] On 12 November 2007, Benjamin passed away intestate, leaving his only child, Mr John Phoa (“John”), the eighth defendant, as his sole heir-at-law, and also the personal representative of his estate.
- [9]
[9] For ease of understanding, I reproduce the following graphical representation of the Phoas:
- [10]
[10] As I mentioned earlier (see [1] above), Eugene makes the present claims in his capacity as personal representative of the Estates. In respect of Evelyn’s Estate, Eugene claims to be the personal representative. In respect of William’s Estate, Eugene also claims to be the personal representative, in so far as William’s Estate is a one-fifth beneficiary of Evelyn’s Estate. In this regard, Eugene’s claims on behalf of the Estates are connected, in that should Evelyn’s Estate fail to establish any beneficial interest in the shares of Supratechnic, William’s Estate will accordingly not be entitled to any such interest.
- [11]
[11] Wellington, Angeline, and John are the sixth, seventh, and eighth defendants, respectively. In so far as they are all supportive of the claims against the substantive defendants, they are nominal defendants. However, for ease of instructing Singapore counsel and administrative expedience, Eugene has considered them “unwilling [p]laintiffs” and has included them to ensure that they are bound by the outcome of this Suit.
The Kasendas
- [12]
[12] The Kasendas are relatives of the Phoas. They are descendants of Wirio and the deceased Mdm Onny Kasenda (alias Onny Widjaja Wirio Kasenda) (“Onny”), who was Evelyn’s sister.
- [13]
[13] Wirio and Onny had several children. Although Eugene claims that Wirio and Onny had four biological children, the defendants claim that Wirio and Onny had six biological children. The identities of the two other children have not been made known, but it is unnecessary to ascertain their identities because they are not involved in this Suit. The four identified children and their relevant family members are as follows:
(a) their son, Mr Henry Kasenda (alias Oey Liang Ho) (“Henry”), the first defendant;
(b) their son, Mr Jimmy Kasenda (alias Oey Liang Gie) (“Jimmy”), the second defendant;
(c) their son, Mr Salman Kasenda (alias Oey Liang Hien) (“Salman”), the third defendant;
(d) their grandson and Salman’s son, Mr Joshua Huang Thien En (“Joshua”), the fifth defendant;
(e) their son, Mr Ridwan Kasenda (alias Oey Liang Ley) (“Ridwan”), the fourth defendant; and
(f) their daughter-in-law and Ridwan’s wife, Mdm Alin Kasenda (“Alin”).
- [14]
[14] Alin’s siblings were involved with Supratechnic as shareholders and/or directors at different points of time. Alin’s brother, Mr Heng Aik Boon, was a shareholder between 1995 and 2014 (or 2015), and a director between 1 June 2004 and 15 September 2014. Alin’s sister, Ms Audrey Heng, was a shareholder between 2004 and 2011 (or 2014).
- [15]
[15] When Wirio passed away on 24 February 1996, Henry was named as the sole executrix of Wirio’s estate. Onny passed away on or around 26 March 2009.
Supratechnic
- [16]
[16] Supratechnic is a private company incorporated in Singapore on 11 April 1968. The business of Supratechnic included the manufacture, assembly, and sale of marine engines, boats and other industrial machinery and equipment products.
- [17]
[17] At the time of its incorporation, the share capital of Supratechnic was $500,000 divided into 500 ordinary shares at $1,000 each. The original subscribers to the shares were as follows: (a) Wirio, for 100 ordinary shares (“Lot A”); (b) Tan Ping Gwan (“TPG”), for 100 ordinary shares (“Lot B”); and (c) Liem Sek Tjoan (“LST”), for 100 ordinary shares (“Lot C”). Therefore, there were 300 shares that were subscribed to in 1968, with the founding shareholders being Wirio, TPG, and LST.
- [18]
[18] On 11 March 2016, Supratechnic was acquired by USPI Investment Pte Ltd, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of USP Group Limited (“USP Group”), for more than $14m. Supratechnic had issued a total of 6,000 shares then. For convenience, I will describe this sale as being to “USP Group”.
- [19]
[19] The change in the number of shares from 1968 to 2016 is significant because, according to Eugene, this increase of 5,700 shares led to the “unlawful dilution” of Evelyn’s shareholding in Supratechnic. Eugene claims Evelyn’s beneficial interest in the shareholding of Supratechnic was decreased from 66.66% to 3.34% as a result of these shares. I will refer to this difference of 5,700 shares as the “Additional Shares”.
- [20]
[20] The Additional Shares may be split into two categories. The first category comprises 3,000 shares, which Eugene claims were paid for from the retained earnings of Supratechnic. Eugene claims that Evelyn’s Estate is entitled to this because the Kasendas agreed as such in 2004. The second category comprises 2,700 shares, which Eugene claims the Kasendas paid for using the profits of Supratechnic by improperly declaring them as directors’ remuneration. This effectively meant that the shares were paid for by existing shareholders of Supratechnic. Eugene says this forms part of the claim for non-payment of dividends, which he refers to as “De Facto Dividends”.
- [21]
[21] Further, Eugene claims that between January 1981 and December 1985, Supratechnic did not recommend or record any dividends. However, Supratechnic allegedly paid directors’ remuneration and fees to the Kasendas that appear grossly disproportionate to the financial performance of Supratechnic. I reproduce a table comparing the profits of Supratechnic with the directors’ remuneration and fees during this period:
The procedural history
- [22]
[22] Because Eugene has brought this Suit in his capacity as the personal representative of the Estates, and because Evelyn passed away intestate in Canada, it is relevant to set out the events relevant to the Canadian letters of administration.
- [24]
[24] On 5 December 2006, because Eugene was unable to ascertain the value of Evelyn’s Estate pending the resolution of a share dispute with the defendants, he wrote to the CED to request a postponement of estate duty until the question of beneficial ownership was resolved. By February 2008, despite the exchange of subsequent correspondence with the CED, the CED had not decided on the postponement that Eugene requested.
- [25]
[25] On 20 November 2020, Eugene commenced this Suit. However, by this time, he had yet to extract the resealed grant of the Canadian letters of administration. On 30 March 2022, the FJC informed Eugene’s present solicitors that they refused Eugene’s request for leave to extract the resealed grant of the Canadian letters of administration for Evelyn’s Estate.
- [26]
[26] On 18 August 2023, the CED issued the Certificate of Postponement. On 25 September 2023, the FJC allowed the extraction of the resealed grant of the Canadian letters of administration.
- [27]
[27] Having canvassed the parties’ backgrounds and the procedural history, I come to the parties’ general positions.
The parties’ general positions
Eugene’s claimed reliefs
- [28]
[28] In his pleaded case, Eugene seeks the following reliefs in this Suit:
(a) A declaration that prior to Evelyn’s death in 1981, she held a 66.66% beneficial interest in the total shareholding of Supratechnic;
(b) a declaration that Wirio (and/or Henry as his executor), and Jimmy were express trustees for Evelyn’s 66.66% beneficial interest in Supratechnic, and that all other defendants who became registered shareholders over time in respect of Evelyn’s 66.66% beneficial interest were constructive trustees for such interest;
(c) as against the first to fifth defendants, an account, and payment to Eugene, of all benefits received by them in respect of the Lot B and Lot C shares, including but not limited to all dividends declared by Supratechnic over the years, as well as any and all profits derived therefrom;
(d) as against the first to fifth defendants, an account, and payment to Eugene, of 66.66% of all benefits received in respect of the Additional Shares issued over the years, including but not limited to all dividends declared by Supratechnic over the years, as well as any and all profits derived therefrom;
(e) disgorgement by the relevant defendants of the sale proceeds to USP Group (representing 66.66% of the total sale proceeds), or such other percentage of the sale proceeds as the court thinks fit, as well as any and all profits derived therefrom;
(f) alternatively, equitable compensation for breach of trust; and
(g) alternatively, damages for wrong conversion upon the sale of shares to USP Group.
- [29]
[29] In support of the reliefs that he seeks, Eugene outlines the following narrative, which the defendants largely deny. Eugene’s case is primarily predicated on there being a trust over the Lot B and Lot C shares. Accordingly, should he fail to prove that such a trust exists, there is no need to discuss the breaches of trust which he alleges.
- [30]
[30] It will be convenient to divide the discussion below along the three lots of shares and incorporate the parties’ general positions within.
Lot A shares
- [31]
[31] According to Eugene, the Lot A shares were issued in the name of Wirio as the legal and beneficial owner. Subsequently, at a date following Supratechnic’s incorporation but before Evelyn departed Singapore for Canada, Wirio borrowed $100,000 from Evelyn. This loan was agreed upon on the basis that the Lot A shares were to stand as security for repayment of that loan. Therefore, Evelyn had a beneficial interest over the Lot A shares. However, Wirio later repaid the loan and thus Evelyn’s beneficial interest in the Lot A shares was relinquished and reverted to Wirio. As such, Eugene does not make a claim in respect of the Lot A shares in this Suit. The defendants therefore do not take a position in respect of the Lot A Shares.
Lot B shares
- [32]
[32] As for the Lot B shares, Eugene’s account is that these were first issued in the name of TPG as the legal and beneficial owner. In or around 1969 to 1970, TPG transferred his 100 shares to Mr Widjaja Hariman (alias Oei Hong Giam) (“Widjaja”). Subsequently, in or around 1974 to 1975, Widjaja sold these shares to Evelyn, with the intended arrangement being that Evelyn hold the shares on trust for Wirio. However, because of a rule that prohibited companies from having only one shareholder (ie, Wirio), the shares were registered in the name of Jimmy, who held them on trust for Evelyn. As a result, when Evelyn passed away in 1981, Jimmy held the Lot B shares on trust for the benefit of Evelyn’s Estate.
- [33]
[33] The defendants deny Eugene’s account in relation to the Lot B shares. According to them, Evelyn sold these shares to Wirio sometime in or around 1979. This is confirmed by a “Surat Keterangan” (the “Surat”), which Evelyn allegedly signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on or around 14 February 1981. Pursuant to the Surat, Evelyn supposedly declared that she sold 100 shares in Supratechnic to Wirio for the sum of $125,000 in three instalments of $30,000 and a final payment of $35,000. In addition to the Surat, the defendants point to other contemporaneous evidence that record the sale. These include: (a) Wirio’s letter dated 31 January 1983 (“Wirio’s January 1983 Letter”); and (b) Eugene’s letter dated 14 October 2003 (“Eugene’s October 2003 Letter”), where he stated that Evelyn had told him that she was prepared to sell the Lot B shares to Wirio for $100,000.
Lot C shares
- [34]
[34] As for the Lot C shares, Eugene’s account is that they were originally issued in the name of LST as the legal and beneficial owner. In or around 1971 to 1972, LST sold the Lot C shares to Evelyn. Evelyn then arranged for the Lot C shares to be registered in Wirio’s name to be held on trust for her, and it was Evelyn’s intention for those shares to be, at a later time, held on trust by Wirio for Dr Teh. Dr Teh would then, under the latter arrangement, hold the beneficial interest of the Lot C shares on trust for Evelyn. Wirio’s holding of the Lot C shares on trust for Evelyn was recorded in a Letter of Confirmation signed by Wirio on or around 15 February 1981 (the “February 1981 LOC”).
- [35]
[35] As such, when Evelyn died in 1981, Wirio held the Lot C shares on trust for the ultimate benefit of Evelyn’s Estate. Subsequently, again by Eugene’s account, any and all interests over the Lot C shares held by Dr Teh reverted directly to Evelyn’s Estate by way of a document entitled “Assignment of Trust Interest” that Dr Teh and Evelyn’s children executed on 18 April 2004.
- [36]
[36] The defendants do not dispute the February 1981 LOC. However, they say that Dr Teh had abandoned his alleged interest in the Lot C shares as he had attested to being unaware of such interest. In any event, the defendants argue that the purported assignment by Dr Teh to Evelyn’s children pursuant to the “Assignment of Trust Interest” was not valid to assign any interest because such interest was non-assignable, being contracts of a personal nature. Indeed, by the defendants’ account, the facts show that the parties did not contemplate that Wirio would hold the shares for anyone other than Dr Teh, as is clear from Wirio’s January 1983 Letter.
- [37]
[37] Further, the defendants say that given that Wirio’s 1983 January Letter shows an agreement with Evelyn to transfer the trusteeship over the Lot C shares to Dr Teh, and it was Evelyn who failed to procure the transfer of those shares to Dr Teh, Evelyn’s Estate cannot now insist that, despite such an agreement, Wirio continued to hold the Lot C shares on trust for Evelyn. This is wholly within the doctrine of contractual estoppel, or the principle that Evelyn’s Estate cannot take advantage of Evelyn’s own failure to procure the transfer of shares to Dr Teh.
Subsequent period after Evelyn’s death
- [39]
[39] As against this, the defendants argue that even if they had received those shares, none of them could be said to have received them with such knowledge of Evelyn’s alleged interest as to render their retention unconscionable. Ultimately, the defendants say that their actions from 2003 onwards must be considered against Eugene’s inaction and tardiness in pursuing Evelyn’s alleged interest in Supratechnic. It was reasonable for them to assume that the Phoas had decided not to proceed with any legal action, and there can be no basis to find that the defendants had acted improperly or dishonestly in relation to the alleged trust property.
Summary of pleaded cases
- [40]
[40] In summary, Eugene’s pleaded case in this Suit is as follows:
(a) The Lot B shares were held by Jimmy (from 1981 to 2009), Salman (from 2009 to 2016), or USP Group (from 2016 onwards) on trust for Evelyn’s Estate.
(b) The Lot C shares were held by Wirio, and later several members of the Kasenda family, on trust for Evelyn’s Estate.
(c) As trustees of the original Lot B and Lot C shares, Wirio and Jimmy each owed Evelyn duties as trustees. When Evelyn’s shareholding in Supratechnic was diluted by the unlawful issuance of the Additional Shares, Wirio and Jimmy committed “fraudulent breaches of trust”.
(d) The defendants, who issued or received the Additional Shares, are constructive trustees of the Additional Shares. They acted dishonestly in so far as they were aware or recklessly indifferent to the issuance of the Additional Shares.
(e) Upon the sale of all Supratechnic shares to USP Group, Evelyn’s Estate is entitled to 66.66% of the sale proceeds. Wirio and Jimmy (as trustees of the original Lot B and Lot C shares) and the defendants generally (as constructive trustees of the Additional Shares) committed breaches of trust and fiduciary duties by, among others, selling the shares to USP Group, converting 66.66% of the sale proceeds, and depriving Evelyn’s Estate of the use and possession thereof.
- [41]
[41] On the other hand, the defendants’ pleaded case is as follows:
(a) For the Lot B shares, by 15 February 1981, Evelyn had no legal or beneficial interest in them.
(b) For the Lot C shares, the alleged trust arrangement between Dr Teh and Evelyn is void. In any event, from 1972 until Wirio’s passing in 1996, Wirio held the Lot C shares on trust for Evelyn or Evelyn’s Estate, pursuant to an alleged agreement between Wirio and Evelyn in 1977.
(c) When deciding to issue the Additional Shares, the members and directors of Supratechnic acted honestly and based on what they considered to be the interests of Supratechnic.
(d) The claims against the defendants in respect of acts committed latest by 1993 are time-barred. Further, the claims against the defendants (save for Wirio and Jimmy) as constructive trustees are also time-barred.
(e) The alternative claim for conversion is time-barred.
Summary of the relevant documents
(a) An alleged agreement between Wirio and Evelyn in January 1977, where Wirio would pay $1,000 to Evelyn and/or her family each month. In exchange, Evelyn would forgo: (i) any updates in relation to the affairs of Supratechnic, including changes in the authorised share capital; (ii) any right to participate in the management or decision making process in Supratechnic; and (iii) entitlement to the profits and/or dividends that may be declared in respect of Supratechnic and any rights that may otherwise accrued to a registered shareholder of Supratechnic, such as any right of pre-emption pursuant to the articles of association of Supratechnic. The parties have referred to this as the “1977 Agreement”.
(b) The Surat dated 14 February 1981, where Evelyn allegedly declared that she sold 100 shares in Supratechnic to Wirio for the sum of $125,000. Eugene disputes the authenticity of the signature on the Surat, contending first that it was not signed by Evelyn because the signature did not match hers, but later admitting that he “cannot rule out the possibility that [Evelyn] did sign it”.
(c) The Letter of Confirmation dated on or around 15 February 1981, which Wirio signed and stated that he held 100 shares in Supratehnic on trust for Dr Teh. This was also signed by Angela as a witness. I have referred to this as the “February 1981 LOC” (see [34] above).
(d) An alleged agreement in 1981, where Wirio agreed with Evelyn to transfer the trusteeship over the Lot C shares to Dr Teh. According to the defendants, this agreement is evinced by: (i) Wirio’s January 1983 Letter; and (ii) the February 1981 LOC. I will refer to this as the “Agreement to Transfer Trusteeship”.
(e) A letter dated 13 January 1983 sent by Eugene to Wirio and Onny, where Eugene asked about their “understanding … of the agreement which [they] reached with [Evelyn] with regard to Supratechnic, particularly how much of it has been sold to [them] or to other people”. I will refer to this as “Eugene’s January 1983 Letter”.
(f) A letter dated 31 January 1983 sent by Wirio to Eugene, where Wirio stated, among others, that there had been agreements with Evelyn: (i) for Wirio to buy Jimmy’s shares in Supratechnic for $125,000 in 1979 (ie, the Lot B shares); (ii) for Dr Teh to be the owner of the Lot C shares; and (iii) for Wirio to pay $1,000 to the Phoas each month. I have referred to this as “Wirio’s January 1983 Letter” (see [33] above).
(g) A letter dated 14 October 2003 sent by Eugene to Wirio and his family, where Eugene stated that Evelyn had told him that she was prepared to sell the Lot B shares to Wirio for $100,000. I have referred to this as “Eugene’s October 2003 Letter” (see [33] above).
(h) A letter dated 22 November 2003 sent by Ridwan to Eugene, where Ridwan stated that Wirio “purchased the first 100 shares from [Evelyn] (out of [Evelyn]’s 200 … shares) in 1979 for S$125,000”.
(i) A document entitled “Assignment of Trust Interest” executed by Dr Teh and Evelyn’s five children on 18 April 2004, which stated that: (i) Dr Teh had held 100 shares in Supratechnic previously owned by Wirio on trust for Evelyn; and (ii) these shares would be assigned to Evelyn’s five children.
(j) A letter dated 3 December 2004 sent by Eugene’s former solicitors to, among others, the defendants, alleging that Wirio and Jimmy have committed breaches of trust.
(k) Two letters dated 8 August 2005 and 28 September 2005 sent by the defendants’ former solicitors, both of which denied Evelyn’s alleged interest in Supratechnic.
(l) An email dated 13 August 2011 sent by Ridwan to Wellington, where Ridwan stated that “[d]uring your last visit to Singapore, we showed you a document showing the sale of ‘100 Nos of shares’ by [Evelyn] to [Wirio]”. The defendants claim this recorded the fact that Wellington was shown the Surat when he met Ridwan and Salman in 2006 or 2007.
- [43]
[43] The parties make several references to the time between 2003 and 2011, as the parties were engaged in negotiations regarding the ownership of the Lot B and Lot C shares during this period.
The relevant issues
- [44]
[44] In addition to the substantive points raised as part of the parties’ general positions, the defendants also raise several procedural arguments against Eugene’s claims. In sum, taking these arguments on board with the substantive points, the relevant issues for my determination are as follows:
(a) whether Eugene has standing to pursue the claims in this Suit;
(b) whether Eugene’s claims are time-barred;
(c) whether Eugene’s claims are barred by laches;
(d) whether Eugene’s claim in relation to the Lot B shares succeeds;
(e) whether Eugene’s claim in relation to the Lot C shares succeeds; and
(f) whether Eugene’s claim in conversion succeeds.
- [45]
[45] As will be clear, issues (a) to (c) are procedural in nature, whereas issues (d) to (f) are substantive. However, given the nature of the procedural issues, the defendants need only to succeed in any one of them for Eugene’s claims in this Suit to be dismissed in their entirety. In the end, even though (as will be seen below) I decided in favour of the defendants in respect of the procedural issues, I will still deal with the substantive issues, in so far as it is necessary to dispose of the present case, given that the parties went through a full trial.
- [46]
[46] I begin my discussion with the procedural issues.
Whether Eugene has standing to pursue the claims in this Suit
The parties’ positions
- [47]
[47] The defendants’ position is that Eugene’s claims should fail because he did not extract the resealed grant of foreign letters of administration for either of the Estates in Singapore. The defendants rely on the Court of Appeal decision of Teo Gim Tiong v Krishnasamy Pushpavathi (legal representative of the estate of Maran s/o Kannakasabai, deceased) [2014] 4 SLR 15 (“Teo Gim Tiong”) for the legal principle that an administrator may sue only in an estate’s capacity after the extraction of the sealed grant of letters of administration. The defendants further rely on the High Court decision of Re Ong Soon Chuan [1999] 2 SLR(R) 380 (“Re Ong Soon Chuan”), as well as the Malaysian decision of Issar Singh, Son of Bhola Singh and another v Samund Singh, Son of Mayiah [1941] MLJ 28 (“Issar Singh”) and say that the above-mentioned principle also applies to foreign letters of administration. This means that, until and unless the foreign letters of administration are resealed and extracted in Singapore, the personal representative has no standing to sue in Singapore on behalf of the estate.
- [48]
[48] With the above legal principles in mind, the defendants submit that Eugene himself knew that until the foreign letters of administration were resealed and extracted in Singapore, he could not pursue the claims of the Estates. As it turned out, Eugene had sought the permission of the FJC to extract the resealed grant of foreign letters of administration for Evelyn’s Estate on 14 March 2022, more than a year after commencing this Suit on 20 November 2020. However, the FJC refused his request because he had not paid estate duty on Evelyn’s Estate or obtained a Certificate of Postponement from the CED. As such, Eugene has no standing to bring this action in his capacities as the personal representative of the Estates. Further, relying on Re Ong Soon Chuan, the defendants argue that Eugene’s failure to extract the letters of administration in Singapore before commencing action is not a mere procedural irregularity that can be cured by the court or a belated extraction.
- [50]
[50] With this background in mind, Eugene argues that as a starting point, the Singapore courts do not routinely require anterior verification processes before a plaintiff may commence a suit in a representative capacity. In particular, Eugene acknowledges that if a person dies intestate in Singapore, their estate vests in the Public Trustee and transfers only to the administrator upon the grant of the letters of administration. However, Eugene contends that there is nothing in the Probate and Administration Act 1934 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “PAA”) that extends this position “extra-territorially”. Thus, Eugene says that he has provided conclusive evidence on his representative capacity through the Canadian grant and is a properly authorised personal representative of the Estates. In the alternative, Eugene argues that if the court finds that he ought to have extracted the foreign letters of administration, then it should adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable time for him to do so in Singapore. In doing so, Eugene urges me to depart from a line of cases beginning from the English Court of Appeal decision of Ingall v Moran [1944] 1 KB 160 (“Ingall”), in which the English courts denied the plaintiffs’ claims because they did not obtain the appropriate letters of administration in the jurisdiction where the claims were brought.
My decision: Eugene does not have standing to pursue the claims in this Suit
- [51]
[51] In my judgment, Eugene does not have standing to pursue the claims in this Suit as the personal representative of the Estates. This is because he has knowingly failed to extract the resealed grant of foreign letters of administration for either of the Estates in Singapore. It is not open to Eugene to rely on the letters of administration he obtained in Canada on 11 October 2005, for the simple reason that foreign letters of administration are not the same as a Singapore one.
The applicable law
(1) The process for extracting a resealed grant of foreign letters of administration
- [52]
[52] In Phoa Eugene (personal representative of the estate of Evelyn Phoa (alias Lauw Evelyn Siew Chiang), deceased and personal representative of the estate of William Phoa, deceased) v Oey Liang Ho (alias Henry Kasenda) (sole executor of the estate of Wirio Kasenda (alias Oey Giok Tjeng), deceased) and others [2024] SGHC 16 (“Eugene Phoa (Summons)”), I explained (at [27]–[29]) the process for extracting a resealed grant of foreign letters of administration. It is helpful to set it out once again to provide the backdrop against which to understand the applicable law:
(2) The General Division of the High Court is bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Teo Gim Tiong and the related line of cases
- [53]
[53] I turn then to the Court of Appeal decision in Teo Gim Tiong, which I am bound by. In that case, Chao Hick Tin JA held that the respondent was not properly authorised to act for the estate concerned because she had not been granted letters of administration. In that case, the deceased had died intestate. The relevant statutory provisions were s 37(1) of the Probate and Administration Act (Cap 251, 2000 Rev Ed), which provided that where a person dies intestate, his real and personal estate vests in the Public Trustee, and s 37(4), which provided that the vesting ceases upon the grant of letters of administration in respect of the estate. Thus, upon the deceased’s death, Chao JA held that only the Public Trustee could act for the estate in any matter until there was a grant of letters of administration. The learned judge observed (at [21]), citing the Court of Appeal decision of Chay Chong Hwa and others v Seah Mary [1983–1984] SLR(R) 505 (at [8]), that “it is only when the grant is extracted that the person to whom the grant is made is finally clothed with the authority to deal with the estate”. As such, Chao JA decided (at [22]) that because it was necessary to first obtain letters of administration before commencing a claim, the respondent’s failure to do so meant that the claim was of no effect and a nullity, because the respondent had purported to act in a capacity that she did not in fact possess.
- [54]
[54] Importantly for present purposes, Chao JA regarded this principle as “well established” and cited Ingall in support (at [23]–[25]), which is a decision that Eugene has invited me to depart from. In Ingall, the plaintiff’s son was killed in an accident due to the defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff then issued a writ in the capacity of administrator of his son’s estate under s 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (c 41) (UK). Importantly, a claim on such a basis could be brought only by the person who was lawfully authorised to act for the estate. However, at the time when the writ was issued, the plaintiff had not yet obtained letters of administration. When the plaintiff was later granted letters of administration, he argued that he should be permitted, by the doctrine of “relation back”, to cure the incapacity under which he brought the initial claim. The English Court of Appeal rejected this argument on the basis that an administrator is not entitled to sue until letters of administration are granted, since “until such grant there is no certainty that there is an intestacy, nor that if there is an intestacy any particular person will be administrator” (at 168). As such, when Chao JA cited Ingall in Teo Gim Tiong, it is clear that he had approved of the reasoning within and considered that it supported the binding principle advanced in Teo Gim Tiong itself.
- [55]
[55] Eugene submits that the “substantial injustice” caused by Ingall has been cured in the UK by virtue of an amendment to the English Rules of Court to allow an amendment of capacity under the doctrine of “relation back”, though the same doctrine has not been introduced in Singapore. In my view, this does not assist his case, for two reasons. First, because of the Court of Appeal’s approval of Ingall in Teo Gim Tiong, I am bound to follow it. Second, if the doctrine of “relation back” has not been adopted in Singapore, it would not be right for me to depart from Ingall for the very reason that “injustice” is caused by the lack of recognition of this doctrine in Ingall. On balance, adopting Ingall is not only consistent with Teo Gim Tiong, but also consistent with the fact that the doctrine of “relation back” does not apply in Singapore.
- [56]
[56] Further, Chao JA in Teo Gim Tiong also referred to the English Court of Appeal decision of Finnegan v Cementation Co Ltd [1953] 1 QB 688 (“Finnegan”), which Eugene again asks me to hold was wrongly decided. I am unable to do that. In Finnegan, a workman died in an accident during his employment. His widow sued for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (c 93) (UK) and the Fatal Accidents Act 1864 (UK). The widow was granted letters of administration in Ireland but not in England, where the claim had been brought. The widow had brought her claim as “administratrix of the estate of [the workman], deceased”. Jenkins LJ held that the claim, in so far as it was brought in England and qua administratrix of the workman’s estate, was a nullity. The learned judge further disagreed with the widow’s argument that the claim could still be saved because she also brought the claim in her personal capacity. This is because the title-in-action and indorsement on the writ stated that the widow’s claim is in her capacity as an administratrix without any mention that she was claiming in her personal capacity. Thus, in a passage that Chao JA cited with apparent approval in Teo Gim Tiong (at [27]), Jenkins LJ said this (at 700–701):
- [57]
[57] Summing up the legal principles from these cases, Chao JA in Teo Gim Tiong held (at [30]) that these “were all cases in which the deceased had passed away before the action was instituted and the question was whether a plaintiff who had not yet obtained grant of administration could commence an action in the capacity of an administrator” [emphasis in original]. It is clear that the learned judge approved of this principle because he then relied on it to advance the relevant principle in Teo Gim Tiong, that this should also “apply to the situation where a person purported to continue an action on behalf of the plaintiff’s estate where the plaintiff passed away intestate before the action was concluded” (at [30]) [emphasis in original].
- [58]
[58] Chao JA further explained (at [32]) that this principle was grounded in public interest, and it should not matter if “there is no obvious dispute over who is entitled to be the personal representative of an estate”, as was the case in, among others, Ingall and Finnegan. In sum, the learned judge held that (at [32]):
- [59]
[59] The upshot of the above discussion is that, first, I decline Eugene’s invitation to depart from Ingall and the line of cases following it, including Finnegan. In my view, it is clear that the Court of Appeal approved of these cases and transposed them into its reasoning in Teo Gim Tiong. I am therefore bound by these English cases through the authority of Teo Gim Tiong. Second, barring any further argument, the legal principle that an administrator can sue only in such a capacity upon the grant of letters of administration applies squarely in the present case. However, on this second point, Eugene argues that I should distinguish these cases because none of them concerned the prior grant of foreign letters of administration. In my view, I do not think this is a valid distinction for the following reasons.
(3) Teo Gim Tiong cannot be distinguished on the basis that the present case concerns the prior grant of foreign letters of administration
- [60]
[60] First, Finnegan concerned the grant of foreign letters of administration. In that case, the widow was granted letters of administration in Ireland but not in England, where the claim was brought. Given that Ireland and England are two different jurisdictions, the Irish letters of administration could not be used in England until they were resealed and extracted in England. Similarly, in Issar Singh, which the defendants rely on, the Malaysian court held that for letters of administration granted in the UK or any other part of the British Dominions, “an [a]dministrator acquires his rights only on the date when the [foreign] [l]etters of [a]dministration are resealed”. This was cited with approval in Re Ong Soon Chuan (at [5]). As such, I can see the sense in the position taken in Re Ong Soon Chuan and Issar Singh in this regard.
- [62]
[62] Third, as Chao JA emphasises in Teo Gim Tiong, the legal principle, that a personal representative can only sue in such a capacity after the letters of administration are obtained, is grounded in public policy. As such, it should not matter even if the identity of the personal representative is undisputed. Therefore, in the present case, it does not matter that Eugene has obtained letters of administration in Canada with respect to the Estates, and that there is seemingly no dispute that he can so act in a Singapore action. This is because until and unless he has extracted the resealed grant of foreign letters of administration in Singapore, there remains some uncertainty, as Chao JA puts it in Teo Gim Tiong (at [32]), “that the case is even one of intestacy, nor that, if it is a case of intestacy, any particular person is the administrator” in relation to a claim in Singapore.
Eugene has commenced this Suit as a personal representative of the Estates
- [63]
[63] With the above legal principles in mind, I find that Eugene has commenced this Suit as a personal representative of the Estates and not in his personal capacity. I repeat the reasons I gave for reaching the same conclusion in Eugene Phoa (Summons) (at [56]–[63]), where I dismissed Eugene’s application for the court to appoint him as a personal representative of the Estates after trial had ended. That application raised the very same issue as in the present case. In summary, these reasons are as follows:
- [64]
[64] As such, the facts show that Eugene brought this Suit in his capacity as the personal representative of the Estates. Indeed, this was a position he consistently maintained in: (a) the Writ of Summons for this Suit, on 20 November 2020; (b) various affidavits, such as on 26 May 2021; (c) his Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 1), on 9 June 2022; and (d) his Closing Submissions on 26 July 2023.
- [65]
[65] Therefore, since Eugene has not extracted the resealed grant of the foreign letters of administration in Singapore, it follows that he does not have standing to bring this Suit as the personal representative of the Estates. While Eugene may argue that this is a mere technicality, I have explained above why this is really a rule of substance grounded in public policy. Further, while Eugene complains that the defendants have known of this fact since before he commenced this Suit, it remains Eugene’s burden to establish that he has the standing to commence this Suit. Indeed, a claimant’s legal standing to commence an action is of paramount importance to the sustainability of the action and a failure to establish this can result in an action being struck out due to its disentitlement to the reliefs sought (see Chye Hwa Luan at [19]–[26]). For instance, as the Court of Appeal observed in Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd (in liquidation) v Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 253 (at [15]), striking out is warranted when there is an absence of legal standing, such that proceedings ought not, and indeed could not validly, have been brought at all.
- [66]
[66] Therefore, in the present case, Eugene cannot say that the defendants kept this point until the end of trial. The defendants are not mounting a fresh defence, for which they bear the burden of proving. Instead, Eugene knowingly commenced this Suit despite not extracting the resealed letters of administration. Indeed, there seems to be evidence that he knew this could be an issue. Thus, it does not lie in his mouth to complain that the defendants did not bring this issue up early enough for him to respond.
- [67]
[67] Further, even if the defendants had not contested the issue of standing, a court must nevertheless be satisfied that parties have standing to bring and/or defend claims, because the parties before the court must be competent to advance their claims. In my view, it must be right that the court can require parties to establish that they have standing to bring and/or defend claims before the court.
- [68]
[68] For all these reasons, I find that Eugene does not have standing to commence the present Suit. This Suit is therefore a nullity from the start.
This is not a defect that can be rectified after trial
- [69]
[69] As for Eugene’s request that I stay the proceedings so that he can rectify matters with the CED and the FJC, I decline to do so. First, even if I were to stay the proceedings, the defect had occurred when Eugene commenced this Suit without extracting the resealed letters of administration. As such, it is too late for Eugene to do anything at this point of time. Indeed, as the High Court held in Re Ong Soon Chuan (at [5(c)]):
Thus, by this reasoning, Eugene never had capacity to begin this Suit. There is thus nothing for him to rectify since these proceedings were a nullity from the start.
- [70]
[70] Further, this is not a defect that can be cured by O 15 r 7(2) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (the “ROC 2014”). As the Court of Appeal opined in Teo Gim Tiong (at [39]), although the ROC 2014 had removed the distinction between nullities and irregularities, such that any mistake in practice or procedure would be regarded as an irregularity that could be rectified by the court, a defect as to standing to act on behalf of a deceased’s estate “was a substantive one that went to the root of the [party’s] right to act for the estate … and was not a mere omission or mistake in practice or procedure”.
- [71]
[71] In any event, even if it is possible for me to stay the proceedings, it must be recalled that the trial has ended, and parties have tendered their respective submissions. There is nothing left for the parties to do. All that remains is for the court to deliver its judgment. It would be highly prejudicial to the defendants, who have finished the trial, to now be confronted with a new application for proceedings to be stayed so that Eugene can shore up an unsatisfactory part of his case. While Eugene may again describe this as a “technicality”, he has chosen to run his case in a particular way, and he has to live with the legal consequences. Also, taken to its logical conclusion, if I were to stay the proceedings now, then it follows that the defendants can equally ask for the same to shore up what they now see as unsatisfactory aspects of their case after the trial. This cannot be right. Indeed, in Teo Gim Tiong, where the Court of Appeal granted a stay, the question was whether an offer to settle was validly accepted and could be enforced. The parties had not gone through an expensive and extended trial process.
- [72]
[72] For all these reasons, I find that Eugene has no standing to pursue his claims in this Suit. As such, for this reason alone, I dismiss his claims against the defendants entirely.
Whether Eugene’s claims are time-barred
The parties’ positions
- [73]
[73] Apart from the lack of standing, the defendants argue that Eugene’s claims for breaches of trust are also caught by the statutory limitations under ss 6(2), 6(7), and/or 22(2) of the Limitation Act 1959 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “LA”). In essence, the defendants say that because this Suit was commenced on 20 November 2020, only the alleged causes of action for breach of trust that accrued on or after 20 November 2014 would fall within the six-year limitation period. As such, because the alleged breaches of trust were committed outside of the limitation period, the defendants submit that Eugene’s claims are time-barred. More specifically, the defendants point out that, in so far as the alleged breaches are concerned, the last issuance of additional Supratechnic shares occurred in 1993, and the last dividends in respect of Supratechnic’s shares were allegedly declared in 2013. Both alleged breaches, which constitute the tail-end of the other breaches alleged by Eugene, therefore fall outside of the limitation period. More than that, the defendants say that Eugene has not discharged his burden of proving that he comes within the exceptions to the six-year limitation period as prescribed in ss 22(1), 24A(3)(b), and 29(1)(a) and (b) of the LA.
- [74]
[74] Further, in relation to Eugene’s alternative claim for conversion, the defendants argue that this claim is time-barred based on s 7(1) of the LA. This is because, on Eugene’s case, if there was conversion, the first conversion would have taken place when the defendants disavowed Evelyn’s alleged interest in the Supratechnic shares on 8 August 2005. Thus, since Eugene did not sue within the six years from that date, his alleged claim for further conversion by the sale of the shares to USP Group in 2016 is time-barred under s 7(2). Also, any title that Eugene may have had to the shares would also be extinguished by s 7(2) of the LA. In their Reply Submissions, the defendants extend the s 7(2) argument even further to say that Eugene’s entire case on limitation fails at the outset because s 7(2) has extinguished whatever title Evelyn might have had in the Supratechnic shares.
- [75]
[75] Eugene’s response is to rely almost exclusively on the exceptions under ss 22(1)(a), 22(1)(b), s 24A(3), and s 29(1) of the LA. First, with regard to s 22(1)(a) of the LA, Eugene argues that the defendants’ actions that resulted in breaches of trust were fraudulent or involved fraud. In particular, Eugene says that each of the defendants “was either a party to the breach, or privy”. Thus, Ridwan and Salman allegedly admitted to the Phoas’ interest in Supratechnic during negotiations in 2003. Yet, despite this admission, Ridwan and Salman continued to manage Supratechnic dishonestly and fraudulently in a manner that would breach their trustee duties.
- [76]
[76] Next, for s 22(1)(b) of the LA, Eugene points out that his primary claim is to recover the sale proceeds of the trust property which are in the possession of Ridwan, Salman, and Joshua. This therefore prima facie comes within the exception in s 22(1)(b), “where no limitation applies to an action by a beneficiary of a trust against the trustee seeking to recover proceeds of the trust property in the possession of a trustee”. I observe that Eugene has framed his reliance on s 22(1)(b) in a particular manner that mirrors only the “possession” limb of the provision. Indeed, this was how he had pleaded his reliance on this limb in his Reply, where he says that s 22(1)(b) applies as his “claim is to recover proceeds in the possession of the Kasendas Defendants” [emphasis added]. This has legal implications that I will explain below.
- [77]
[77] Further, if ss 22(1)(a) and 22(1)(b) do not apply, Eugene argues that he is still entitled, pursuant to s 29(1) of the LA, to a postponement of the time at which limitation starts to run. This is because s 29(1) is triggered by the defendants’ “fraudulent acts and fraudulent concealment of such acts”. Eugene points out that he could not and did not discover the extent of the fraud until the commencement of this Suit, and that he had made further discoveries during the trial. I pause to observe that there is a difference between discovering the fraud per se and discovering the extent of the fraud, and Eugene’s argument appears to be primarily premised on him being able to ascertain the true extent of the fraud after the commencement of this Suit. In the alternative, Eugene argues that s 24A(3) of the LA applies because further breaches were only discovered as recently as 2023, and so any applicable limitation period would expire only three years after the discovery of the breach resulting in damages.
- [78]
[78] Finally, Eugene argues that, in the event that the six-year limitation period pursuant to s 22(2) of the LA applies, this does not impact his claim for the recovery of a portion of the sale proceeds in 2016. Eugene’s position therefore is that each new breach constitutes a new action from which a new limitation period starts to run. Section 22(2) also “only prima facie prohibits claims from breaches [six] years from the date of commencement of the Canadian proceedings”, which commenced on 13 March 2018. In my view, leaving aside the imprecision of what it means to say that s 22(2) “prima facie prohibits” (as opposed to simply “prohibits”), it appears that Eugene is saying that his claims for breaches of trust from 2012 onwards are not time-barred because Evelyn’s Estate commenced the Canadian proceedings against the defendants in March 2018.
- [79]
[79] Interestingly, Eugene makes no argument in response to the defendants’ arguments regarding ss 6 or 7 of the LA.
The applicable provisions
- [80]
[80] Having set out the parties’ respective positions, I first set out the relevant provisions from the LA that the parties have relied on:
- [81]
[81] Having set out the provisions, I turn to address some preliminary points. First, Eugene does not respond to the defendants’ arguments regarding ss 6(2), 6(7), 7(1), and 7(2) of the LA. This suggests that he accepts that his claims are time-barred, albeit subject to any exceptions. More specifically, in so far as the defendants argue that Eugene’s alternative claim in conversion is time-barred by the operation of s 7(1) of the LA, Eugene has not addressed this point at all in either his Closing Submissions or his Reply Submissions. Indeed, it is curious that Eugene does not address his alternative claim in conversion at all, not just whether it is time-barred. Thus, I will take it that Eugene has abandoned his claim in conversion or, at the very least, has not advanced a proper case in support of his pleaded claim in conversion. This is sufficient for me to not only hold that Eugene’s alternative claim in conversion is time-barred, but that it is dismissed for lack of any substantiation in his submissions.
- [82]
[82] Second, as the defendants rightly point out, Eugene does not explicitly deny that his claims are time-barred. Instead, Eugene primarily contends that he should be able to rely on the exceptions under the LA. To this, Eugene does say, albeit only as a “final alternative”, that the six-year limitation period under s 22(2) has no impact on his claim for recovery of a portion of the sale proceeds of Supratechnic in 2016. Thus, to that limited extent, Eugene takes the position that that particular claim is not time-barred. To be fair to Eugene, I will consider this particular claim separately even though that was not the primary case that Eugene makes against the defendants’ arguments on limitation.
- [83]
[83] Third, Eugene has proceeded on the basis that s 22(1) of the LA applies to all of the defendants. Eugene originally did not address the distinction between “Class 1” and “Class 2” constructive trustees as set out in the Court of Appeal decision of Yong Kheng Leong and another v Panweld Trading Pte Ltd and another [2013] 1 SLR 173 (“Panweld”). It was only in his Reply Submissions that Eugene addressed this important distinction pointed out by the defendants in their Closing Submissions. Eugene insists that this distinction does not matter in this Suit. He explains his understanding that, in “modern trust jurisprudence and based on the endorsed descriptions of such classes” in the cases, “Class 1” refers to “institutional constructive trusts”, whereas “Class 2” relate to “remedial constructive trusts”. His case has been made on the basis of institutional constructive trusts, such that s 22(1) applies to all the defendants.
- [84]
[84] With respect, I am of the view that Eugene’s understanding is incorrect. To begin with, the distinction between “Class 1” and “Class 2” constructive trustees does not map onto the distinction between “institutional constructive trusts” and “remedial constructive trusts”. The latter distinction has its own controversies, and it is not necessary to discuss them in this case. It is also not clear if Eugene is right that his case has been solely made on the basis of institutional constructive trusts, since he refers to “valid express trusts” over the original Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C shares. This would have affected at least Wirio and Henry (as the executor of the former’s estate). For present purposes, the defendants are correct that this distinction between “Class 1” and “Class 2” constructive trustees is important to determine the applicable limitation period to trustees. Thus, as the Court of Appeal held in Panweld (at [46]):
In other words, as the defendants rightly point out, a “Class 1” constructive trust arises when a party voluntarily “assume[s] the duties of a trustee by a lawful transaction which was independent of and preceded the breach of trust”; whereas a “Class 2” constructive trust arises “as a direct consequence of an unlawful transaction which is impeached by the plaintiff”.
- [85]
[85] The significance of this in relation to the applicable limitation period to trustees is, as held by the Court of Appeal in Panweld (at [51]), that “only Class 1 constructive trusts fall within the ambit of [s 22 of the LA]”. Thus, “Class 1” constructive trustees, as well as express trustees, are subject to the six-year limitation period in s 22(2) unless any of the exceptions in s 22(1) apply (see Panweld at [49]). In contrast, “Class 2” constructive trustees are subject to the six-year limitation period in s 6(7) of the LA (see Panweld at [51] and [69]). This fundamental distinction therefore undermines Eugene’s argument that s 22(1) applies to all the defendants. This is because Eugene’s pleaded case is that Jimmy and Wirio are the express trustees of the Lot B and Lot C shares, respectively, whereas Ridwan, Salman, and Joshua are “constructive trustees of the Additional Shares” by reason of their “imputed” knowledge. Importantly, as the defendants point out, it is not Eugene’s pleaded case that Ridwan, Salman, and Joshua had “previously been impressed with any trust obligations” independent of the alleged constructive trust. Therefore, the effect of Panweld is clear: only Wirio and Jimmy are “Class 1” constructive trustees and subject to s 22 of the LA, whereas Ridwan, Salman, and Joshua are “Class 2” constructive trustees and are subject to s 6(7) of the LA instead. Thus, in so far as Eugene has not relied on the correct statutory exceptions against Ridwan, Salman, and Joshua, his claims against them, in so far as they are premised on “any matter which arose more than six years before the commencement of” the present Suit, are time-barred (see s 6(2) of the LA).
My decision: Eugene’s claims are time-barred
Sections 22(1) and 22(2) of the LA
- [86]
[86] With these three preliminary observations in mind, I turn first to consider whether Eugene can rely on s 22(1) of the LA to defeat the limitation defence mounted by the defendants. As I said earlier, Eugene cannot rely on s 22(1) against Ridwan, Salman, and Joshua. At the most, Eugene can only rely on s 22(1) against Wirio, Henry (qua executor of Wirio’s estate), and Jimmy. If Eugene cannot successfully invoke s 22(1), then s 22(2) will apply to bar his claims against Wirio, Henry, and Jimmy on the basis that “an action by a beneficiary … in respect of any breach of trust … shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued”.
- [88]
[88] The parties agree that “fraud” in this context means “dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people” (see Panweld at [52]–[53]). Yet, Eugene has failed to discharge his burden of adducing cogent evidence to satisfy the court that fraud has in fact taken place (see the Court of Appeal decision of Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 308 at [161]). In this regard, Eugene relies on the following acts of the defendants, which were allegedly done in full knowledge of the beneficial interest of Evelyn’s Estate, to make out his allegation of fraud: (a) increasing the number of shares registered to the defendants; (b) drawing out declared and De Facto Dividends, without any transfer to the Estates; (c) concealing and actively misleading the Phoas as to the number of shares and their worth during negotiations from 2003 to 2011; (d) concealing and failing to pay any sale proceeds (or dividends) to the Phoas in respect of beneficial interest admitted while the communications between 2003 and 2011 were ongoing; and (e) during the course of this Suit, continuously refusing to provide any information about their acts while in management of Supratechnic.
- [89]
[89] However, in so far as the evidence is concerned, Eugene has not adduced sufficient evidence to show that Wirio, Henry, and Jimmy were “dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people” and that they “realised that by those standards [their] conduct was dishonest” (see Panweld at [52]). First, Eugene’s pleaded particulars in relation to Wirio do not even concern him as they relate to matters after Wirio’s death. I would think that it is not possible to engage in dishonesty after having passed on. Second, in so far as Henry is concerned, Eugene has not advanced any evidence to show that Henry knew about the alleged trust arrangements between Wirio or Evelyn, and that the Supratechnic shares were the subject of a trust. On the stand, Henry testified that he did not discuss with Ridwan the communications between Ridwan and Eugene in 2003. Third, as for Jimmy, Eugene has likewise not advanced any evidence to show that Jimmy knew that he held the Lot B shares on trust for Evelyn. On the stand, Jimmy testified that he did not know the matters pertaining to Evelyn’s alleged interest in Supratechnic. He was also unable to recall anything about Supratechnic’s shares issuance. Further, there is also no evidence that he discussed with Ridwan about the communications between Ridwan and Eugene in 2003.
- [90]
[90] As such, I find that Eugene cannot rely on s 22(1)(a) of the LA against Wirio, Henry, or Jimmy.
While the provision contains a second limb that relates to trust property or proceeds that were “previously received by the trustee and converted to his use”, (otherwise known as the “conversion limb” according to Lim Ah Leh at [236]), Eugene does not rely on this limb either in his pleadings or his Closing Submissions. While Eugene appears to now rely on the conversion limb of s 22(1)(b) in his Reply Submissions in so far as he alludes to proceeds being “previously received by the Kasendas”, I pay no heed to this because this was nowhere in his pleaded case. Indeed, it would prejudice the defendants for Eugene to now change tack after the trial since they now cannot adduce evidence to counter his reliance on this limb.
- [92]
[92] Turning then to the “possession limb” of s 22(1)(b), Eugene’s reliance on this limb fails for the simple reason that, in so far as “proceeds” refer to the proceeds of sale of the Supratechnic shares to the USP Group in 2016, Eugene has not adduced any evidence that Wirio, Henry, or Jimmy ever received any proceeds of sale. Therefore, I find that Eugene cannot rely on s 22(1)(b) against these three defendants.
- [93]
[93] In summary, I find that Eugene cannot rely on s 22(1) against Ridwan, Salman, and Joshua. I also find that Eugene cannot rely on ss 22(1)(a) or 22(1)(b) of the LA against Wirio, Henry, or Jimmy.
Section 24A(3) of the LA
- [94]
[94] Turning now to Eugene’s argument that s 24A(3) of the LA applies because further breaches were discovered only as recently as 2023, I disagree that it applies. To begin with, s 24A(3)(b) provides that an action is time-barred three years from the date on which the plaintiff had “the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action”. For reasons that I will now develop, Eugene cannot rely on s 24A(3)(b) because he already possessed the requisite knowledge to bring an action against the defendants more than three years ago.
- [95]
[95] In Lian Kok Hong v Ow Wah Foong and another [2008] 4 SLR(R) 165 (“Lian Kok Hong”), the Court of Appeal held that a “reasonable suspicion” or “reasonable belief rather than absolute knowledge is enough to start time running” under s 24A (at [41] and [47]). Also, “knowledge” under this provision is not restricted to actual knowledge, but also includes constructive knowledge under s 24A(6), which is “knowledge which [a plaintiff] might reasonably have been expected to acquire… from facts observable or ascertainable by him” or “from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek”. Indeed, this is entirely in line with the policy rationale behind s 24A, which came into force on 26 June 1992.
- [96]
[96] For context, s 24A of the LA was introduced in response to the developments in England. Although the English position had been that a cause of action accrued only when the damage was discoverable, the House of Lords in Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber and Partners [1983] 2 AC 1 was constrained to follow a prior House of Lords decision of Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758, that a cause of action accrued as soon as a wrongful act caused personal injury beyond what can be regarded as negligible, even when that injury was unknown to and cannot be discovered by the sufferer. In response, the Latent Damage Act 1986 (c 37) (UK) was introduced to overcome the undesirable effects of that line of authorities. In Singapore, pursuant to the recommendations in the Singapore Academy of Law Law Reform Committee, Discussion Paper of the Sub-committee on Civil Law and Civil Proceedings (24 August 1989) (Secretary: Jeffrey Chan Wah Teck), Parliament suggested amending the LA to include, among other provisions, s 24A. In this regard, the policy rationale was summarised as follows (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (29 May 1992) vol 60 at col 32 (Shunmugam Jayakumar, Minister for Law):
- [97]
[97] Further, the fact that s 24A only came into force on 26 June 1992 is important because s 24C(1)(a) of the LA provides that it does not “enable any action to be brought which was barred by [the LA] immediately before [this date]”. This means that Eugene, as he also admits, cannot rely on s 24A(3)(b) to extend the limitation period for alleged causes of action which were time-barred immediately before 26 June 1992. This would relate to the dividends declared and the Additional Shares that were issued six years before 26 June 1992.
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