General Division of the High Court · Decided 28 October 2024
The former directors' conspiracy and misrepresentation claims failed
ACE Spring Investments Ltd v Balbeer Singh Mangat and another
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 277 · Case no. Suit No 103 of 2017
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
The former directors' conspiracy and misrepresentation claims failed
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [1], [279]
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] A conspiracy can take many forms. In the present case, the plaintiffs-in-counterclaim (“PICs”) allege that the six defendants-in-counterclaim (“DICs”) mounted a grand conspiracy against them, through various acts spanning several years, leading to their financial ruin. Before the material events, the PICs were directors and shareholders of a not insignificant company. At the end of it all, the PICs had been removed from their directorships and declared bankrupt and the company had been placed in liquidation. The essential question of this case is whether the DICs should be held responsible for this unfortunate tale.
Facts
Parties
- [2]
[2] The first and second PICs are Mr Balbeer Singh Mangat (“Mr Mangat”) and Mdm Sirjit Gill (“Mdm Gill”) respectively. They were directors of FTMS Holdings (S) Pte Ltd (“FTMS”) until 21 August 2018. FTMS was a holding company incorporated in 1991 for a group of companies set up in 1986 to carry out a business related to training and education, particularly professional accountancy education.
- [3]
[3] The first DIC is Tembusu Growth Fund III Ltd (“Tembusu”). Tembusu Partners Pte Ltd (“Tembusu Partners”) was the fund manager of Tembusu at the material time. Mr Andy Lim is the Chairman of Tembusu Partners and was one of the five members of Tembusu’s investment committee. At the material time, Mr Jonathan Ang (“Mr Ang”) was a senior associate at Tembusu Partners and was tasked with managing Tembusu’s investment in FTMS. Mr Ang reported to Mr Andy Lim, one Ms Emily Goh and Tembusu’s investment committee. Mr Ang was a director of FTMS from 11 November 2016 to 9 April 2017.
- [4]
[4] The second DIC is ACE Spring Investments Ltd (“ACE”). It is not disputed that ACE is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”). While ACE initially participated in these proceedings and even filed an affidavit of evidence-in-chief (of one Mr Peter John Band (“Mr Band”)), ACE ceased to participate from or around July 2022 onwards. ACE’s previous counsel filed an application to discharge themselves vide HC/SUM 2566/2022 on 13 July 2022 on the ground that Mr Band, a director and secretary of ACE, informed them that “ACE will be discharging [the counsel] with immediate effect”. This application was heard and granted on 21 July 2022. Since then, ACE has been absent and unrepresented.
- [5]
[5] The third and fourth DICs are Mr Eric Alfred Schaer (“Mr Schaer”) and Mr Nicolas Kim-Hoang Nguyen (“Mr Nguyen”), respectively. Mr Schaer was appointed director of FTMS on 16 December 2016. Mr Nguyen was appointed director of FTMS on 19 December 2016, before being removed soon after, and subsequently reappointed on 18 April 2017. They have not entered appearance in this suit and were absent and unrepresented at trial.
- [6]
[6] The fifth DIC is Qualgro Pte Ltd (“Qualgro”). Qualgro is a venture capital fund. Mr Eang Heang Chhor (“Mr Chhor”) is the founder and manager partner of Qualgro Partners Pte Ltd, the fund manager of Qualgro. Mr Jason Edwards Glenn (“Mr Edwards”) was also a fund manager of Qualgro from November 2015 to 31 March 2020.
- [7]
[7] The sixth DIC is Mr Jagdish Murli Chanrai (“Mr Chanrai”). Mr Chanrai became a shareholder of FTMS sometime in 2011 and was appointed a director of FTMS on 28 March 2011.
- [8]
[8] For ease of reference, I shall refer to Qualgro and Tembusu collectively as the “Lenders”.
Background to the dispute
Qualgro Loan Agreement
- [9]
[9] On 14 September 2015, FTMS, the PICs and Qualgro entered into a loan and investment agreement (“Qualgro Loan Agreement”) whereby Qualgro would (a) extend a loan of US$3m to FTMS which was to be secured by (i) a charge over Mr Mangat’s and Mr Chanrai’s shares in FTMS, (ii) a guarantee issued by the PICs (“Qualgro Guarantee”), and (iii) a debenture over all of the assets of FTMS; and (b) be issued and allotted ordinary shares representing 3% of the shareholding in FTMS for a consideration of S$1. The loan of US$3m was disbursed to and received by FTMS on 15 September 2015. A few features of the Qualgro Loan Agreement bear highlighting, in anticipation of their relevance to the parties’ submissions:
(a) Under cl 1.1 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement, the repayment date of the loan was 31 August 2018;
(b) Pursuant to cl 2.2 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement, the loan was to be used for (i) repaying a prior loan of US$1m made by Mr Chhor to FTMS (including accrued interest and a redemption premium) (see below at [11]); (ii) purchasing a 45% equity stake in FTMS Training Systems (Hong Kong) Limited (approximately US$220,000); (iii) repaying creditors and for working capital purposes (approximately US$1,250,000); and (iv) repayment of loans (approximately US$530,000).
(c) Under cl 5 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement, the interest rate was 6% per annum, but would be increased to 9% per annum if certain circumstances materialised. The accrued interest was to be paid biannually on 30 June and 31 December, and on the repayment date, ie, 31 August 2018. Apart from the accrued interest, a redemption premium of 6% per annum on the loan was to be payable on the repayment date. In short, the internal rate of return of the loan was conceptualised to be at least 11.55% per annum over a three year period (see Annex 1: The payment obligations under the agreements).
(d) With respect to the share issue of 3% to Qualgro, cl 7.2 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement allowed Qualgro to force FTMS to buy back the shares at a price determined with reference to the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (“EBITDA”) of the FTMS group.
(e) Clause 8 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement provided Qualgro the right to convert all or part of the loan and the redemption premium to ordinary shares in FTMS at specified points in time. The conversion price of the shares would be determined with respect to either the price of new shares previously issued by FTMS or with reference to the EBITDA of the FTMS group.
(f) Under cl 10.1.8 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement, FTMS agreed that it “shall not incur any Debt (save for Permitted Indebtedness) without the prior written consent of [Qualgro]. [FTMS] shall use at least fifty (50) percent of the proceeds of any Permitted Indebtedness to repay existing Debt”. “Permitted Indebtedness” was defined under cl 1.1 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement as debt of up to US$4m excluding the loan.
(g) Under cl 11.1.3 of the Qualgro Loan Agreement, the breach of any terms of the Qualgro Loan Agreement and/or the security documents – which included the Qualgro Guarantee (see below at [10]) – constituted an event of default.
- [10]
[10] Alongside the Qualgro Loan Agreement, on 14 September 2015, Qualgro and the PICs entered into a deed of guarantee and indemnity, ie, the Qualgro Guarantee, under which the PICs jointly and severally guaranteed and indemnified Qualgro in respect of all sums of money owing and remaining unpaid by FTMS under the Qualgro Loan Agreement. Clause 3.1 of the Qualgro Guarantee imposed on the PICs a negative undertaking in relation to their house at Cable Road, including the obligation not to sell or cause to be sold, or create or permit to subsist or be created any mortgage, charge, pledge or other security interest over the whole or any part of their house.
- [11]
[11] Prior to the Qualgro Loan Agreement, on or around 27 July 2015, Mr Chhor extended a personal loan to FTMS of US$1m at an interest rate of 12% per annum (see above at [9(b)]). On 18 September 2015 (after the Qualgro Loan Agreement), the principal of the personal loan provided by Mr Chhor, ie, US$1m, was repaid. An interest payment of US$17,755 was made on 23 September 2015, in full and final settlement of the personal loan.
- [12]
[12] At the time of the Qualgro Loan Agreement, FTMS had a total outstanding loan amount of S$13,890,500, of which S$3,081,000 were shareholder loans by Mr Mangat and Mr Chanrai.
Tembusu Loan Agreement
- [13]
[13] On 15 October 2015, FTMS, the PICs and Tembusu entered into a loan agreement (“Tembusu Loan Agreement”) whereby Tembusu would extend a loan of S$4,500,000 to FTMS which was to be secured by (a) a charge over Mr Mangat’s and Mr Chanrai’s shares in FTMS, (b) a guarantee issued by the PICs (“Tembusu Guarantee”), and (c) a debenture over all of the assets of FTMS. A few features of the Tembusu Loan Agreement bear highlighting as well:
(a) Under cl 1.1 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement, the repayment date of the loan was 30 months from the drawdown date, ie, 15 April 2018.
(b) Under cl 5 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement, the interest rate was 6% per annum, but would be increased to 9% per annum if the same circumstances as set out in the Qualgro Loan Agreement materialised (see above at [9(c)]). The accrued interest was to be paid at six-month intervals after the drawdown date and the final repayment date. This meant that the first interest payment was due on 15 April 2016. Apart from the accrued interest, a redemption premium of 11% per annum on the loan was to be payable on the repayment date. In short, the internal rate of return of the loan was conceptualised to be at least 16.38% per annum over a 30-month period (see Annex 1: The payment obligations under the agreements).
(c) In terms of the obligations placed on FTMS, cl 3.2 read with Schedule 2 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement set out the conditions subsequent which included the repayment of loan principal payments listed in Schedule 5 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement within 30 days of the drawdown date, ie, by 15 November 2015. Similarly, cl 10.1.9 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement required the reduction of FTMS’s existing loans listed in Schedule 4 of the agreement, while cl 10.1.11 of the agreement required the repayment of a loan of S$2.5m from Dolphin One Pte Ltd (“Dolphin Loan”) by no later than July 2016 and the full release of the security supporting that loan by September 2016.
(d) Clause 11.1 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement set out the events of default which include:
There was no cure period with respect to cl 11.1.3 (in relation to the breach or failure to comply with certain clauses of the Tembusu Loan Agreement such as cl 3.2 concerning the conditions subsequent for the repayment of loans and cl 10.1.11 concerning the Dolphin Loan). Clause 11.4 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement set out the relevant cure periods. Clause 11.5 prescribed that if the event of default was not cured within the relevant cure period or if there was no cure period, the principle amount of the loan plus the default redemption premium plus any accrued default interest would be immediately due and payable, and Tembusu would be entitled to exercise all its rights under the associated agreements relating to the share charge, the Tembusu Guarantee and the debenture. Under cl 11.6, the default redemption premium was set at an amount such that the overall loan would achieve an internal return rate of 25% per annum.
Intercreditor Deed
- [14]
[14] On the same day that the Tembusu Loan Agreement was executed, ie, 15 October 2015, an intercreditor deed was entered into by Qualgro, Tembusu and FTMS ( “Intercreditor Deed”). Pursuant to cl 2.1 of the Intercreditor Deed, the debts of Tembusu and Qualgro were ranked pari passu in right and priority of payment. Clause 3.1 of the Intercreditor Deed obligated the Lenders, ie, Tembusu or Qualgro, as the case may be, to give written notice to the other lender upon the occurrence of an enforcement event as defined in the Qualgro Loan Agreement and/or the Tembusu Loan Agreement. In the same spirit, cl 3.5 set out Tembusu’s and Qualgro’s agreement that “if any Lender wishes to take any Enforcement Action, the other Lender will co-operate and give reasonable assistance to the Lender taking Enforcement Action.”
Tembusu’s default letters
- [15]
[15] On 6 May 2016, Mr Chong Fang Siong (“Mr Chong”) of FTMS sent an e-mail to Tembusu stating that FTMS’s cash flow position was affected, and thus it projected to settle the first interest payment to Tembusu of S$135,000 (that was due on 15 April 2016) plus the additional late interest by 20 May 2016. Later on the same day, Mr Ang of Tembusu replied to Mr Chong and Mr Mangat with a notice from Tembusu. The notice stated that FTMS’s default in the payment of interest that was due on 15 April 2016 constituted an event of default under cl 11.1.1 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement and that:
- [16]
[16] On 20 May 2016, Mr Chong sent a further e-mail to Tembusu, requesting to settle the interest payment and the late interest by 6 June 2016.
- [17]
[17] On 26 May 2016, FTMS made a payment of S$138,780 to Tembusu by way of a bank transfer of S$100,000 and a cheque for a sum of S$38,780. Tembusu acknowledged receipt of the cheque. It transpired that the cheque was sent for marking on 27 May 2016, and was subsequently cleared on the night of 27 May 2016. An additional interest payment of S$117 was made on 29 May 2016 by FTMS to Tembusu for the additional day of default interest.
- [18]
[18] On 1 June 2016, Tembusu issued a notice to FTMS, stating that the first interest payment was only made on 30 May 2016, and that a number of other events of default pursuant to Clause 11.1 of the Tembusu Loan Agreement had occurred, including but not limited to the following:
As such, Tembusu notified FTMS that the principal amount of its loan plus the default redemption premium was immediately due and payable. Full repayment was to be made by 30 June 2016, failing which Tembusu would exercise its right to enforce on the security documents (namely, the share charges, the Tembusu Guarantee and the debenture over FTMS’s assets).
Tembusu Redemption Agreement
- [19]
[19] On 15 June 2016, FTMS, Tembusu, the PICs and Mr Chanrai entered into a deed of redemption (“Tembusu Redemption Agreement”), under which Tembusu’s loan would be redeemed and the terms of the Tembusu Loan Agreement would be superseded and replaced by the terms of the Tembusu Redemption Agreement. Clause 2.1 of the Tembusu Redemption Agreement set out a schedule of repayments, which is as follows:
- [20]
[20] Based on the schedule of payments above and taking into account the payments previously made by FTMS pursuant to the Tembusu Loan Agreement, the Tembusu Redemption Agreement increased the internal rate of return of this loan from at least 16.38% per annum at its inception to 25.10% per annum (see Annex 1: The payment obligations under the agreements).
- [21]
[21] On 29 July, 31 August and 30 September 2016, FTMS made payment of the first, second and third instalments of S$100,000, S$200,000 and S$1.6m respectively, in accordance with the deadlines under the Tembusu Redemption Agreement.
Hiro Loan Agreement
Qualgro Redemption Agreement
- [23]
[23] On 10 October 2016, Qualgro served a notice to FTMS that was copied to the PICs and Mr Chanrai. The notice stated that (a) Qualgro had learnt of the Hiro Loan Agreement; (b) Qualgro’s nominee director of FTMS, ie, Mr Chhor, was not advised of any board meeting or resolution which had approved the Hiro Loan Agreement; and (c) the Hiro Loan Agreement was in breach of the Qualgro Loan Agreement, particularly cl 10.1.8 relating to the permitted indebtedness of FTMS, and cl 3 of the Qualgro Guarantee relating to the negative undertaking over the PICs’ house at Cable Road. The notice stopped short of declaring an event of default, stating:
The notice also sought confirmation from FTMS that it would not take on a further loan without Qualgro’s written consent and further required the PICs to consent to Qualgro registering a caveat over their house at Cable Road. Finally, the notice disclosed that Qualgro was discussing with Tembusu about the appointment of a “Special Accountant” to FTMS if Qualgro had reasonable concerns over the financial position of FTMS, regardless of whether an event of default had occurred.
- [24]
[24] On 31 October 2016, FTMS, Qualgro, the PICs and Mr Chanrai entered into a deed of redemption (“Qualgro Redemption Agreement”), whereby the loan extended by Qualgro to FTMS under the Qualgro Loan Agreement and the shares of FTMS held by Qualgro were to be redeemed, and the following payments were to be made by FTMS to Qualgro:
- [25]
[25] Based on the schedule of payments above and taking into account payments previously made by FTMS pursuant to the Qualgro Loan Agreement, the Qualgro Redemption Agreement effectively contemplated an internal return rate of 35.41% per annum for both the loan and equity components of Qualgro’s collaboration with FTMS (see Annex 1: The payment obligations under the agreements).
First Tembusu Side Agreement
- [26]
[26] On 31 October 2016, FTMS, Tembusu and Mr Mangat entered into a side agreement in relation to the Tembusu Redemption Agreement (“First Tembusu Side Agreement”). Clause 2.1 of the First Tembusu Side Agreement set out that in consideration for Tembusu agreeing to not enforce its security pursuant to the Tembusu Redemption Agreement and other security agreements such as the Tembusu Guarantee prior to 14 November 2016, FTMS and Mr Mangat agreed to, jointly and severally, make an irrevocable payment of S$100,000 to Tembusu by 8 November 2016. This was to be over and above the redemption payments under the Tembusu Redemption Agreement.
- [27]
[27] At and around the time of the First Tembusu Side Agreement, FTMS had proposed that Tembusu assign its rights under the Tembusu Redemption Agreement and other security agreements such as the Tembusu Guarantee for a consideration of S$3,622,180, on terms acceptable to Tembusu, with such assignment to be completed by 14 November 2016, ie, the same date till which Tembusu had agreed to forbear its rights. This proposed assignment was contemplated in Recital (C) and cl 3 of the First Tembusu Side Agreement.
- [28]
[28] If the proposed assignment was not completed by 14 November 2016, cl 3.2 of the First Tembusu Side Agreement imposed the following payment obligations:
- [29]
[29] On top of these payments, pursuant to cl 3.2.3, FTMS had to pay a liquidated sum of S$14,000, being late interest for the period of 31 October to 15 November 2016, for the payment scheduled on 31 October 2016 under the Tembusu Redemption Agreement that was missed by FTMS. The payment of the additional sums of S$100,000 and S$14,000 alongside the rescheduled redemption payments increased the internal rate of return of the Tembusu loan to 27.5% per annum (see Annex 1: The payment obligations under the agreements).
Second Tembusu Side Agreement
- [30]
[30] On 10 November 2016, FTMS, Tembusu and Mr Mangat entered into a further side agreement in relation to the Tembusu Redemption Agreement (“Second Tembusu Side Agreement”). Under cl 2.1 of the Second Tembusu Side Agreement, FTMS agreed to make full payment of all outstanding sums due – which came to S$3,818,261 – by 2 December 2016. Further, under cl 3, in consideration for Tembusu agreeing not to enforce its rights under the previous agreements prior to 2 December 2016, FTMS and Mr Mangat agreed to, jointly and severally, place with Tembusu a deposit of S$100,000 on 16 November 2016 and another deposit of S$100,000 on 21 November 2016. Failure to do so would attract an additional liquidated sum of S$1,000 per day until the deposits were made. The deposits were to be offset against the outstanding sums due.
- [31]
[31] Accordingly, the following payment obligations were imposed:
- [32]
[32] The restructuring of the Tembusu loan translated into a revised internal rate of return of 28.31% per annum (see Annex 1: The payment obligations under the agreements).
Third Tembusu Side Agreement
- [33]
[33] On 30 December 2016, FTMS, Tembusu, the PICs and Mr Chanrai entered into a further side agreement in relation to the Tembusu Redemption Agreement (“Third Tembusu Side Agreement”). Under cl 2 of the Third Tembusu Side Agreement, FTMS agreed to make full payment of the outstanding sums under the previous agreements with Tembusu, by 28 February 2017. By that time, the outstanding sum was calculated to be S$4,599,683, including additional liquidated sums payable due to late payment. In consideration for Tembusu agreeing not to enforce its security under the prior agreements, FTMS, the PICs and Mr Chanrai undertook various obligations, including:
- [34]
[34] The restructuring of the Tembusu loan translated into a revised internal rate of return of 37.23% per annum (see Annex 1: The payment obligations under the agreements).
Qualgro Side Agreement
- [35]
[35] On 2 December 2016, Qualgro sent a notice to FTMS, copied to the PICs and Mr Chanrai, stating that the redemption payment of US$200,000 due on 30 November 2016 under the Qualgro Redemption Agreement remained unpaid, and therefore an enforcement event had occurred. The notice also stated that as a consequence, a liquidated sum of S$1,000 a day over and above the redemptions payments would be payable from that date until full payment of the cumulative redemption amount, ie, US$4,426,000.
- [36]
[36] On 30 December 2016, the same day that the Third Tembusu Side Agreement was executed, FTMS, Qualgro, the PICs and Mr Chanrai entered into a side agreement (“Qualgro Side Agreement”). The key terms of the Qualgro Side Agreement are as follows:
(a) Under cl 2.1 of the Qualgro Side Agreement, the parties agreed and acknowledged that the outstanding sums due to Qualgro were as set out in the Qualgro Redemption Agreement, with an additional sum of S$1,000 per day payable from 30 November 2016 until such date as the cumulative redemption amount of US$4,426,000 was paid in full.
(b) Under cl 2.2 of the Qualgro Side Agreement, FTMS agreed to make full payment of the outstanding sum to Qualgro by 28 February 2017. This was supplemented by cl 2.3.9 of the Qualgro Side Agreement, which required FTMS to procure a payment of US$1.2m to Qualgro by 26 January 2017. Assuming that the additional sum was paid on 28 February 2017, the new schedule of payments from FTMS to Qualgro was as follows:
(c) Under cl 2.3.4 of the Qualgro Side Agreement, FTMS, the PICs and Mr Chanrai undertook to procure a working capital loan of up to S$500,000 for FTMS by 10 January 2017.
Chanrai Guarantees
- [37]
[37] On 30 December 2016, Mr Chanrai executed two deeds of guarantee and indemnity in favour of Tembusu and Qualgro respectively, under which Mr Chanrai effectively guaranteed the sums payable by FTMS to the Lenders under the Third Tembusu Side Agreement and the Qualgro Side Agreement.
Mangat-Chanrai Side Agreement
- [38]
[38] On 3 January 2017, the PICs and Mr Chanrai entered into an agreement (“Mangat-Chanrai Side Agreement”). Under this agreement, Mr Chanrai agreed to give his personal guarantees under several loans, including the loans to Tembusu and Qualgro, in consideration for Mr Mangat placing all shares in FTMS Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd (“FTMS Malaysia”), legally and beneficially held in his name, in escrow with Premier Law LLC.
- [39]
[39] Clause 2.3.2 of the Mangat-Chanrai Side Agreement stated that Mr Chanrai “agrees to provide a personal guarantee for [FTMS] to raise funds of between SGD20 million to SGD30 million … the terms of such personal guarantee which shall be subsequently agreed”.
- [40]
[40] On 23 January 2017, the PICs issued a letter to Premier Law LLC which enclosed the relevant share certificates to be placed in escrow, as well as conditions which the placement in escrow was subject to. The following day, Mr Chanrai’s solicitors wrote to Premier Law LLC, copying Mr Mangat, to state that the conditions in the PICs’ letter were inconsistent with the Mangat-Chanrai Side Agreement.
- [41]
[41] Premier Law LLC subsequently returned the share certificates on or around 26 January 2017.
- [42]
[42] Subsequently, at the FTMS board meeting of 9 February 2017, Mr Mangat revealed that his shares in FTMS Malaysia were, in fact, held on trust for his family and he needed to seek his family’s advice before placing them in escrow. Mr Chanrai did not proceed with providing any further personal guarantees pursuant to the Mangat-Chanrai Side Agreement.
Enforcement action by the Lenders
- [43]
[43] On 19 January 2017, Tembusu’s solicitors sent a letter to Mr Chanrai. The letter declared an enforcement event, citing the failure to procure the working capital loan for FTMS (see above at [33(b)]). The letter sought payment by Mr Chanrai of the outstanding sum of S$4,346,322 owed by FTMS to Tembusu, and stated that Tembusu would exercise its rights under the various agreements and/or Mr Chanrai’s guarantee if full payment was not received.
- [44]
[44] On 27 January 2017, the Lenders’ solicitors sent letters to FTMS and the PICs, noting that the working capital loan was not procured to date and, with respect to Qualgro, the first payment tranche of US$1.2m was not made by 26 January 2017. As such, the Lenders gave formal notice of an enforcement event and sought the outstanding sums owing to the Lenders.
- [45]
[45] On 7 February 2017, Tembusu and Qualgro commenced HC/S 103/2017 (“S 103”) and HC/S 104/2017 (“S 104”) respectively against the PICs.
- [46]
[46] On 9 February 2017, Mr Chanrai’s solicitors sent a letter to the Lenders setting out an in-principal consensus that the parties had reached in relation to the loans owing to the Lenders. However, no formal agreement was reached and executed.
- [47]
[47] On 1 March 2017, Tembusu commenced HC/S 189/2017 against Mr Chanrai, seeking the repayment of the outstanding sum owed to Tembusu that was guaranteed by Mr Chanrai. On the same day, Qualgro’s solicitors issued a letter to Mr Chanrai demanding payment of the outstanding sum owed by FTMS to Qualgro.
ACE Assignment Agreement
- [48]
[48] On 28 March 2017, the Lenders and ACE entered into an assignment agreement (“ACE Assignment Agreement”). Under this agreement, Tembusu and Qualgro assigned all their rights and interests arising from their agreements with FTMS and in relation to the outstanding debt due from FTMS in consideration for the following payments:
- [49]
[49] Under cl 5.2 of the ACE Assignment Agreement, Tembusu agreed to file a Notice of Discontinuance for HC/S 189/2017 commenced against Mr Chanrai.
- [50]
[50] Alongside the ACE Assignment Agreement, Mr Chanrai guaranteed the payments by ACE to Tembusu and Qualgro by way of a deed of guarantee and indemnity dated 28 March 2017.
- [51]
[51] I note that the ACE Assignment Agreement had been executed by Mr Nguyen for and on behalf of ACE.
- [52]
[52] Notices of assignment were issued to FTMS and the PICs to inform them of the ACE Assignment Agreement.
Changes to the FTMS board
- [53]
[53] On 18 April 2017, Mr Nguyen, Mr Nguyen Ngoc Hoang Vinh and Mr David Glenn Schaer were appointed as directors of FTMS by way of a directors’ resolution signed by Mr Chanrai, Mr Schaer and Tembusu’s nominated directors. On the same day, the FTMS board accepted the resignation of Tembusu’s nominated directors.
- [54]
[54] On 19 April 2017, FTMS passed another directors’ resolution wherein, inter alia:
- [55]
[55] On 20 April 2017, the EGMs were held and directors’ resolutions were passed to the extent relevant and necessary for the various subsidiaries to put into effect the above-mentioned resolved matters.
- [56]
[56] On 24 April 2017, FTMS passed a directors’ resolution removing the PICs from all management and operational positions in FTMS and its subsidiaries with immediate effect. All of FTMS’s directors except the PICs agreed to, and signed, the said directors’ resolution.
PICs’ bankruptcy
- [57]
[57] On 22 June 2017, one Chew Kheng Hwee (“Mr Chew”) filed a creditor’s bankruptcy application against Mr Mangat vide HC/B 1379/2017. Subsequently, on 7 September 2017, Trusha Realty Pte Ltd (“Trusha”) filed creditor’s bankruptcy applications against Mr Mangat and Mdm Gill vide HC/B 2002/2017 and HC/B 2001/2017 respectively. Mr Chew’s application was withdrawn on 12 October 2017. On 26 October 2017, one Rajandran s/o Ramalingham (“Mr Rajandran”) filed creditor’s bankruptcy applications against Mr Mangat and Mdm Gill vide HC/B 2431/2017 and HC/B 2432/2017 respectively.
- [59]
[59] On 11 May 2018, ACE filed creditor bankruptcy applications against Mr Mangat and Mdm Gill vide HC/B 1105/2018 (“B 1105”) and HC/B 1104/2018 (“B 1104”) respectively. The debt supporting these applications was the PICs’ guarantee of the Dolphin Loan (see above at [13(c)]). At the time of these bankruptcy applications, a sum of S$1,104,726.14 remained due and owing under that loan.
- [60]
[60] The creditors’ meeting at which the proposed voluntary arrangement was put to a vote was held on 15 March 2018. On 23 August 2018, the court held that the proposal had been rejected at the meeting.
- [61]
[61] On 25 October 2018, the court granted the bankruptcy orders in B 1104 and B 1105, adjudging the PICs to be bankrupt. Trusha’s bankruptcy application was withdrawn on 22 November 2018.
Procedural history
- [62]
[62] On 7 February 2017, the Lenders commenced separate actions against the PICs (see above at [45]). On 21 March 2017, the PICs filed a counterclaim in each of these actions against Tembusu, Qualgro and Mr Chanrai.
- [63]
[63] On 28 March 2017, the ACE Assignment Agreement was entered into (see above at [48]). On 11 May 2017, ACE was substituted as the plaintiff in both S 103 and S 104 against the PICs.
- [64]
[64] On 25 October 2018, the PICs were declared bankrupt (see above at [61]). Subsequently, the PICs obtained the approval of the Official Assignee (“OA”) to pursue their counterclaims in S 103 and S 104. However, ACE did not proceed with its claims in both suits, and confirmed by way of a letter to the OA dated 2 July 2019 that it was not seeking to advance its claims in both suits and would not be applying for leave to proceed with the same. At an interlocutory hearing on 29 June 2020, ACE accepted that its claim was “dealt with because the [PICs] have been adjudged bankrupts” and that it had filed proof(s) of debt with the OA in relation to its claims. Thus, the present judgment only concerns the adjudication of the counterclaims.
Parties’ cases
- [67]
[67] Before setting out the parties’ respective cases, I digress to make an important, and in some respects dispositive, remark about the PICs’ pleadings.
- [68]
[68] It is trite that a party will be confined to its pleaded case so as to avoid taking the opposing parties by surprise as to the case they need to meet. The law on pleadings was recently summarised by the High Court in Manoj Dharmadas Kalwani v Bharat Dharmadas Kalwani [2024] SGHC 70 at [36]–[41]. It is apposite to specifically reproduce the general principles identified there:
- [69]
[69] These principles equally operate to ensure that a party’s pleaded case does not shift or evolve into a different state such that an opposing party is then taken by surprise and is prejudiced in its ability to meet the pleaded case. Ultimately, it is essential for a party to be able to relate back its submissions to the expressly pleaded case.
- [70]
[70] It is for these reasons, amongst others, that there exists a mechanism for the amendment of pleadings, which a party may have recourse to during the course of proceedings, subject to the relevant legal tests.
- [71]
[71] It bears mentioning this general principle relating to pleadings because, as will be observed, several aspects of the PICs’ case as set out in their written submissions appear to be undisclosed in and/or unsupported by their pleaded case. In such instances – that will be identified – I find that the PICs are not permitted to stray from their pleaded case to make the relevant claim or allegation. It is simply not fair to the DICs who would not have had the opportunity to address these at trial through adducing the necessary witness testimony, particularly through the cross-examination of the PICs or the relevant party against whom the allegation is made.
- [72]
[72] In addition, it bears highlighting that the PICs have been given several indulgences to date to amend their pleadings, with the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No. 3) dated 31 August 2023 (“DCC”) being the fourth iteration. Notwithstanding this, I am cognisant of the guidance of the Court of Appeal, particularly that “an overly formalistic and inflexibly rule-bound approach” should not be taken.
PICs’ case
- [73]
[73] In short, the PICs aver that two or more of the six DICs (and/or their associates) (hereinafter referred to as the “alleged conspirators”) agreed, conspired and/or combined to commit, or cause to be committed, acts as part of an overarching conspiracy by unlawful and/or lawful means. This conspiracy was carried out with the intention to injure and/or with the sole or predominant intention to injure and/or cause financial loss and damage to FTMS and/or the PICs and/or cause loss to the PICs by taking control of FTMS.
- [74]
[74] The PICs’ case is that the conspiracy consists of four broad categories of acts, each of which is inextricably linked to the others as part of the conspiracy, namely:
(a) “Loan and Redemption Agreement Acts”: the alleged conspirators induced FTMS and the PICs, by way of untrue representations and/or by applying undue pressure and/or influence on the PICs, to cause FTMS to enter into the Qualgro Loan Agreement and the Tembusu Loan Agreement (“Loan Agreements”), and the Qualgro Redemption Agreement and the Tembusu Redemption Agreement (“Redemption Agreements”).
(b) “Enforcement Event Acts”: the alleged conspirators called an enforcement event under the Redemption Agreements, and consequently applied undue pressure and/or influence and/or threats on the PICs to cause FTMS to enter into the four side agreements with the Lenders on terms which were far more onerous and/or unconscionable than the terms of the original loan agreements. In that regard, the original loan agreements were part of a “bait and switch” tactic and were not enforced genuinely, reasonably, rationally and/or fairly.
(c) “Corporate Raid Acts”: the alleged conspirators induced FTMS and the PICs, by way of untrue representations and/or by applying undue pressure and/or influence on the PICs, to appoint Mr Schaer and Mr Nguyen as directors of FTMS in December 2016, enabling the conspirators to orchestrate a takeover of FTMS.
- [75]
[75] The PICs aver that by reason of the four broad acts forming the conspiracy, the PICs have suffered and continue to suffer loss and damage. They further aver that the acts are evidence of a predominant intention on the part of the alleged conspirators to injure the PICs and/or cause financial loss and damage to FTMS and/or to the PICs and/or cause loss to the PICs by taking control of FTMS.
- [76]
[76] In addition, the PICs claim that the alleged conspirators who were directors of FTMS have acted in breach of their directors’ duties in causing loss to the FTMS group by refusing to allow the PICs to discharge their duties as directors of FTMS and/or other companies in the FTMS group, which has caused the PICs to continue incurring personal financial liabilities in Sri Lanka, India, Cambodia and Mauritius for the acts of the alleged conspirators.
- [77]
[77] Moreover, the PICs claim that by reason of the same matters, Mr Chanrai is liable to them for fraudulent misrepresentation, or alternatively, misrepresentation under s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967.
- [78]
[78] Ultimately, the PICs allege the following consequences of the alleged conspiracy and misrepresentation:
(a) The PICs were bankrupted, resulting in:
(i) all the creditors of FTMS, to whom the PICs had given a guarantee for loans made to FTMS, calling upon their guarantees which increased the size of the liabilities in the PICs’ estate in bankruptcy by approximately 95%;
(ii) the bank, to whom the PICs had granted a mortgage, foreclosing on the PICs’ house at Cable Road, with an alleged estimated value of S$25m;
(iii) Mr Mangat losing his licence to practice as a chartered accountant and his practice and revenue stream from M/s B S Mangat & Co (“BSM & Co”), a sole proprietorship owned by Mr Mangat; and
(iv) Mr Mangat suffering reputational loss, which even after bankruptcy discharge, cannot ever be fully restored, further resulting in Mr Mangat not ever being able to pursue a profession as a chartered accountant at the same level as prior to the conspiracy.
(b) Mr Mangat lost his investment in the shares of FTMS and the PICs both lost the right to recover their loans from FTMS.
(c) The PICs were removed from their various executive management, directorship and employment positions in the FTMS group of companies, causing financial loss represented by (i) the loss of income from their various executive management and employment positions; and (ii) increased financial obligations in being kept on as directors in various FTMS group companies without the corresponding ability to control the FTMS group.
(d) Mr Mangat, trading as BSM & Co and/or FTMS Corporate Services Pte Ltd (“FTMS Corporate Services”), was unable to carry out his usual business during the period of around April 2017 to September 2018 due to the unlawful retention of documents and items belonging to the PICs by FTMS and FTMS Global Academy Pte Ltd (“FGA”), a subsidiary of FTMS.
- [79]
[79] In sum, the PICs seek declarations that the Loan Agreements, the Redemption Agreements and the four side agreements with the Lenders are null and void, or alternatively rescinded as a result of the conspiracy and/or for being unconscionable, and for damages to be assessed for the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means and/or by lawful means. The PICs also seek an account of profits made by the conspirators as a result of the conspiracy and for damages to be assessed as against Mr Chanrai for the misrepresentations.
Tembusu’s case
- [80]
[80] Tembusu flatly denies the conspiracy and avers that at all times it was unaware of, and did not agree to, any conspiracy and/or combination with any other party to commit (or cause to be committed) any acts, intended to cause any injury to and/or with the sole or predominant intention to injure and/or which caused loss to FTMS and/or the PICs. In this regard, Tembusu denies that it had at any time agreed, conspired and/or combined with any other party to place FTMS into liquidation and cause loss to the PICs.
- [81]
[81] Notably, Tembusu asserts that the PICs’ allegations in relation to the four broad acts forming the conspiracy were pleaded in “exceedingly general terms”, without particulars of (a) any specific acts of the alleged conspiracy; (b) the specific alleged conspirators who carried out each of such acts; or (c) any indications of alleged intent to injure FTMS and the PICs on the part of Tembusu.
- [82]
[82] Tembusu avers that the Tembusu Redemption Agreement and the Tembusu Side Agreements were entered into freely and willingly by FTMS and the PICs, the terms of these agreements were entirely reasonable, and the agreements were enforced genuinely, reasonably, rationally and fairly. All sums payable under the agreements are sums enforceable and payable in law. Tembusu pleads that its sole intention at all times was to protect its investment in FTMS. The assignment of its rights to ACE was a purely commercial decision made within the legal rights of Tembusu and was regarded as a suitable opportunity to exit its investment in FTMS. Accordingly, Tembusu was no longer involved in FTMS’s and the PICs’ affairs from 28 March 2017.
- [83]
[83] In relation to the Corporate Raid Acts and/or the Other Acts, Tembusu avers that it did not and could not have participated in those alleged acts. In relation to the bankruptcy of the PICs, Tembusu denies any involvement and avers that it was ACE that filed for bankruptcy against the PICs on the basis of the Dolphin Loan.
- [84]
[84] Finally, in relation to the losses pleaded, Tembusu denies that they are claimable under the tort of conspiracy and that the PICs are entitled to any reliefs for any tortious damages. It argues instead that the counterclaim is an abuse of process.
Qualgro’s case
- [85]
[85] Similar to Tembusu, Qualgro denies agreeing, conspiring and/or combining with any party, whether by lawful or unlawful means, to commit (or cause to be committed) acts intended to injure and/or cause injury, financial loss and/or damage to the PICs and/or to take control of FTMS. Qualgro maintains that it acted lawfully within its legal rights and did not have any intention, predominant or otherwise, to injure and/or cause any injury, financial loss and/or damage to the PICs. Equally, Qualgro was unaware of any such conspiracy.
- [86]
[86] Qualgro avers that the allegations of the four broad acts forming the conspiracy have been pleaded with “insufficient particularity and clarity”, and that the PICs have not particularised (i) the specific alleged conspirator(s) who carried out each of the pleaded (group of) acts of the alleged conspiracy, or (ii) any facts to indicate any intent to injure FTMS and the PICs on the part of Qualgro. In the same vein, the allegations in relation to the concealment of the alleged conspiracy have been pleaded with insufficient particularity and clarity.
- [87]
[87] In contrast to the PICs’ allegations, Qualgro’s investment into FTMS was a commercial decision made after determining FTMS’s growth potential on the basis of financial information and projections it was presented with, and after ensuring that sufficient safeguards were in place to address the risk of the investment. Particularly, Qualgro’s investment into FTMS was a genuine and legitimate commercial decision on the basis of the terms and conditions of the Qualgro Loan Agreement. Qualgro denies carrying out or having knowledge of any “bait and switch” tactic, whether pursuant to any conspiracy as alleged or otherwise.
- [88]
[88] The Qualgro Loan Agreement, the Qualgro Redemption Agreement and the Qualgro Side Agreement were entered into freely, willingly and voluntarily by FTMS and the PICs. FTMS and the PICs were not subject to any alleged undue pressure and/or influence by Qualgro to enter into the Qualgro Loan Agreement and Qualgro Redemption Agreement. The terms of the Qualgro Redemption Agreement and the Qualgro Side Agreement were entirely reasonable. Further, Qualgro had no involvement in causing FTMS to enter into the Tembusu Loan Agreement. Qualgro also denies that the Qualgro agreements were not enforced genuinely, reasonably, rationally and/or fairly.
- [89]
[89] In relation to the Corporate Raid Acts and/or the Other Acts, Qualgro did not ask for or agree to the appointments of Mr Schaer and Mr Nguyen as directors of FTMS. Qualgro was not a party to any alleged agreement to carry out a takeover of FTMS, and Qualgro was unaware of the background to the incorporation of ACE. Qualgro did not and could not have agreed, conspired and/or combined to commit the Corporate Raid Acts, and the Other Acts. The assignment of Qualgro’s rights to ACE was a commercial decision made within Qualgro’s legal rights and was regarded as a suitable opportunity to finally exit its investment in FTMS.
- [90]
[90] In addition, Qualgro avers that Mr Chhor had at all times acted in the best interests of FTMS.
- [91]
[91] In relation to the liquidation of FTMS, Qualgro avers that FTMS was placed into liquidation as it was unable to pay its debts as they fell due, including but not limited to debts under the Qualgro Loan Agreement, as amended by the Qualgro Redemption Agreement and the Qualgro Side Agreement. Crucially, Qualgro did not place FTMS into liquidation and the underlying debt which formed the basis of the winding up application against FTMS had no relation to the outstanding debt arising from the Qualgro agreements.
- [92]
[92] In relation to the losses pleaded, Qualgro asserts that the loss of the PICs’ investments in the shares of FTMS are reflective of FTMS’s loss and the PICs are not the proper plaintiffs to recover such losses. Further, this loss and the loss of the PICs’ right to recover their loans made to FTMS were caused by the winding up of FTMS, which in turn was caused by FTMS’s and the PICs’ inability to pay their debts as they fell due. As for the removal of the PICs from their positions in FTMS, Qualgro avers that it was no longer involved in FTMS’s affairs following the assignment of its rights related to its loan and investment in FTMS, and that Qualgro did not play any role in and was unaware of the PICs’ removal. Qualgro also denies that the PICs were bankrupted as a result of the alleged conspiracy. In all, Qualgro denies that the PICs are entitled to any of the reliefs claimed or any other relief at all.
Mr Chanrai’s case
- [93]
[93] Mr Chanrai similarly denies that he had at any time conspired with any of the other DICs to injure and/or cause financial loss and damages to the PICs as alleged or at all, and/or that he had as his sole or dominant purpose of any such alleged conspiracy to cause injury to the PICs. Mr Chanrai denies committing any of the acts of conspiracy alleged by the PICs, or any wrongful or unlawful acts, and/or lawful acts with the sole or predominant intention to injure the PICs and/or FTMS pursuant to a conspiracy. Mr Chanrai further avers that (a) at all material times, he was neither a direct or indirect beneficial owner, nor a director of ACE; (b) he did not wield any power and/or influence over Tembusu and/or Qualgro; (c) his role in FTMS was primarily as an investor; and (d) in so far as he was a director of FTMS, he acted in good faith and/or in the best interests of FTMS.
- [94]
[94] With respect to the Loan and Redemption Agreement Acts, Mr Chanrai avers that he played no role which resulted in FTMS entering into the Loan Agreements. Mr Chanrai did not make any representations to the PICs which induced them to enter into the Loan Agreements and/or the Redemption Agreements. FTMS, acting through the PICs, entered into the Redemption Agreements freely and willingly, with the benefit of legal advice. The calling of any enforcement event(s) under the Loan Agreements was well within the rights of Tembusu and/or Qualgro, and Mr Chanrai was not involved in the same.
- [95]
[95] In relation to the Enforcement Event Acts, the financial difficulties faced by FTMS which affected its repayment obligations under the Redemption Agreements were not caused by Mr Chanrai. FTMS and the PICs entered into the Tembusu Side Agreements and the Qualgro Side Agreement freely and willingly, with the benefit of legal advice.
- [96]
[96] With respect to the Corporate Raid Acts, Mr Chanrai denies that Mr Schaer and Mr Nguyen were appointed as directors of FTMS as part of an alleged conspiracy; Mr Chanrai acted in good faith at all material times in supporting their appointment. The PICs signed the board resolutions relating to Mr Schaer’s and Mr Nguyen’s appointment of their own free will. Mr Chanrai denies making any representations in the nature alleged in relation to the appointment of Mr Schaer and Mr Nguyen as directors.
- [97]
[97] With respect to the Other Acts, Mr Chanrai denies that he was involved in the incorporation of ACE and/or the assigning of rights by the Lenders to ACE. The removal of the PICs from FTMS was done lawfully, without any sole or predominant intention to injure the PICs and not pursuant to any conspiracy alleged. Mr Chanrai also denies that the PICs’ bankruptcies were pursuant to an alleged conspiracy; he did not take any steps and was not involved in the bankruptcy proceedings against the PICs.
- [98]
[98] With respect to the damages claimed by the PICs, Mr Chanrai denies that the PICs have suffered the alleged damage or any damage as a result of his alleged act(s). Mr Chanrai denies that FTMS was wound up as a result of any alleged conspiracy, and in any event, the PICs are not the proper claimants for any alleged acts of wrongdoing committed against FTMS. The damages arising from the alleged loss of value of Mr Mangat’s shares and/or the alleged loss of right of the PICs to recover any loans made to FTMS by them is not maintainable in law against the DICs. As for documents and items belonging to the PICs, BSM & Co and/or FTMS Corporate Services, they have been duly returned to the best of Mr Chanrai’s knowledge. Any personal liabilities incurred by the PICs in relation to entities in Sri Lanka, India, Cambodia and Mauritius are a result of their own doing and poor management of the same. Mr Chanrai also denies any liability to the PICs for fraudulent misrepresentation or otherwise.
Case of the other DICs
- [99]
[99] As traversed (see above at [5]), the third and fourth DICs, ie, Mr Schaer and Mr Nguyen, did not enter an appearance in this suit and have not filed their defences.
- [100]
[100] ACE had filed a defence to a previous iteration of the PICs’ Defence and Counterclaim. In this defence, ACE denied the alleged conspiracy and claimed that it was not a party to any alleged conspiracy, particularly because most, if not all, of the acts complained of by the PICs purportedly in support of the conspiracy pre-dated the incorporation of ACE.
Law on conspiracy
- [101]
[101] The elements to be satisfied for each type of conspiracy are uncontroversial and undisputed by the parties.
- [102]
[102] According to the Court of Appeal in EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT Holdings”) at [112], to succeed in a claim for conspiracy by unlawful means of conspiracy, the plaintiff(s) must show that:
- [103]
[103] In contrast, the elements to constitute lawful means conspiracy differ in that (a) there is no requirement for an unlawful act(s); and (b) the alleged conspirators must have had the predominant intention or purpose of causing damage or injury to the plaintiff, which purpose was in fact achieved: see Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 at [150], citing Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat [2008] 1 SLR(R) 80 at [23]; see also Ok Tedi Fly River Development Foundation Ltd and others v Ok Tedi Mining Ltd and others [2023] 3 SLR 652 at [113].
- [104]
[104] In unlawful means conspiracy, the element of unlawfulness covers both a criminal act or means, as well as an intentional act that is tortious, provided that they are the means by which harm is intentionally inflicted on the plaintiff (rather than being merely incidental to it): see Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG and another and another appeal [2009] 3 SLR(R) 452 (“Beckkett”) at [120] citing the House of Lords in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [93]. There is no requirement for the unlawful means to be independently actionable: Beckkett at [120]–[121].
- [105]
[105] In relation to the element of intention, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would or might suffer damage as a result of the defendant’s act. Injury to the plaintiff must have been intended as a means to an end or as an end itself: EFT Holdings at [99]–[101].
- [106]
[106] In OBG Ltd v Allan; Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3); Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young [2008] 1 AC 1, Lord Nicholls stated at [167] (cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter and others and other appeals [2013] 1 SLR 374 at [63], and further cited by the High Court in Tuitiongenius Pte Ltd v Toh Yew Keat and another [2020] 5 SLR 354 at [115]):
- [107]
[107] In Voltas Ltd v Ng Theng Swee and another [2023] SGHC 245 at [51], the General Division of the High Court remarked that to establish the element of an intention to cause damage or injury for the tort of unlawful means conspiracy, “a plaintiff has to show that the unlawful means and the conspiracy were targeted and directed at the plaintiff” [emphasis added].
- [109]
[109] As for the requirement of there being a combination, the combination or agreement between conspirators need not be in the nature of an express agreement, and the court may infer an agreement from the acts of the parties alleged to be conspiring: Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Archer Daniels Midland Co and others [2007] 1 SLR(R) 196 at [95]–[96]; EFT Holdings at [113]. In that regard, the requirements of combination and unlawful or lawful acts, although in theory discrete, in practice often have to be considered together because direct evidence of a combination is unlikely to be forthcoming. Therefore, proof of the agreement or combination is usually gathered from the relevant acts committed, for such acts are often sufficient (when taken with any relevant surrounding circumstances) to justify the inference that their commission was the product of concert between the alleged conspirators: Dolphina at [264].
- [110]
[110] Whilst a party may join in the execution of the conspiracy at a different time and may not be exactly aware of what the other conspirators have actually agreed to do, to be liable for the tort of conspiracy, the party in question must nonetheless be sufficiently aware of the surrounding circumstances and share the same objective as the others: see Wing Hak Man and another v Bio-Treat Technology Ltd and others [2009] 1 SLR(R) 446 at [7], citing OCM Opportunities Fund II, LP v Burhan Uray alias Wong Ming Kiong) and Others [2004] SGHC 115 at [49].
- [111]
[111] With respect to loss, the plaintiff must prove that actual pecuniary loss was caused: SH Cogent Logistics Pte Ltd and another v Singapore Agro Agricultural Pte Ltd and others [2014] 4 SLR 1208 at [155]. This is uncontroversial, as the tort of conspiracy is intended to protect a plaintiff’s economic interests: Ong Han Ling and another v American International Assurance Co Ltd and others [2018] 5 SLR 549 (“Ong Han Ling”) at [13]. Crucially, the causal link between the alleged loss and the conspiracy is essential to establish the element of damage, which is essential to the tort: Ong Han Ling at [14].
- [112]
[112] Finally, the threshold for establishing conspiracy is high such that the evidence that is relied upon must be of a level that is convincing enough in light of the seriousness of the allegations. The more serious the allegations asserted, the more compelling the evidence must be to convince the court that the allegations are true: Syed Ahmad Jamal Alsagoff (administrator of the estates of Shaikah Fitom bte Ghalib bin Omar Al-Bakri and others) and others v Harun bin Syed Hussain Aljunied and others and other suits [2017] 3 SLR 386 at [58]. This is consistent with the general principle that the more serious the allegations are, the more cogent the evidence demanded of the party making those allegations.
Law on misrepresentation
- [113]
[113] Similar to the law on conspiracy, the elements to be satisfied in respect of claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation are settled and the parties do not dispute the same.
- [114]
[114] To establish a claim in fraudulent misrepresentation, the following elements must be established, as distilled by the Court of Appeal in Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 at [14] and reiterated more recently by the General Division of the High Court in Yong Khong Yoong Mark and others v Ting Choon Meng and another [2021] SGHC 246 (“Yong Khong Yoong Mark”) at [90]:
- [115]
[115] To establish a claim in negligent misrepresentation, the following elements must be established, as summarised in Yong Khong Yoong Mark at [91]:
Issues to be determined
- [116]
[116] Several broad issues arise for consideration, which are as follows:
Mr Chanrai had not committed any actionable misrepresentation(s)
- [117]
[117] Given that the PICs are relying, at least in part, on Mr Chanrai’s misrepresentations to them to establish their claim for unlawful means conspiracy, it is fitting to consider whether Mr Chanrai committed any actionable misrepresentations to begin with.
The alleged representations
- [118]
[118] As prefaced (see above at [114(a)] and [115(a)]), the fundamental precursor to any claim in fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation is the requirement for the representor to have made a representation of fact to the representee.
- [119]
[119] In the present case, the PICs plead that Mr Chanrai had made the following representations:
(a) In relation to the Tembusu Redemption Agreement, Mr Chanrai:
(i) told the PICs to resolve the situation with Mr Andy Lim of Tembusu because Mr Chanrai wanted to avoid any legal proceedings between FTMS and Tembusu, as that would in turn cause embarrassment and bring disrepute to the Kewalram Group – which is a group of companies owned by Mr Chanrai’s family and of which Mr Chanrai was a principal and board member – given that Mr Chanrai was a shareholder and director of FTMS;
(ii) had the financial means to ensure that FTMS would be able to meet the early redemption payments proposed, by either bringing in investors to FTMS (and providing his personal guarantees to these investors) or personally financing the repayments;
(iv) agreed to be a co-guarantor in respect of the PICs’ obligations under the Tembusu Redemption Agreement.
I shall refer to these as the “alleged Tembusu Representations”.
(b) In relation to the Qualgro Redemption Agreement, Mr Chanrai:
(i) had the financial means to ensure that FTMS would be able to meet the early redemption payments proposed, by either bringing in investors to FTMS (and providing his personal guarantees to these investors), or personally financing the repayments;
(iii) agreed to be a co-guarantor in respect of the PICs’ obligations under the Qualgro Redemption Agreement.
I shall refer to these as the “alleged Qualgro Representations”.
(c) In relation to the Corporate Raid Acts, Mr Chanrai:
(i) would arrange for S$500,000 to be injected into FTMS so that FTMS would be able to meet its immediate working capital needs;
(ii) would raise funds of up to S$30m so that FTMS could repay various loans provided to FTMS; and
(iii) had introduced Mr Schaer and Mr Nguyen to FTMS and Mr Mangat, and represented that they would assist in raising the funds required by FTMS for immediate working capital and to repay various loans provided to FTMS.
I shall refer to these as the “alleged Corporate Raid Representations”.
- [120]
[120] I will consider each of these sets of representations in seriatim.
Alleged Tembusu Representations not proved
- [122]
[122] Notably, Mr Mangat does not include in his Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) the fact that Mr Chanrai had represented that he had agreed to be a co-guarantor in respect of the PICs’ obligations under the Tembusu Redemption Agreement.
- [123]
[123] When confronted with the alleged Tembusu Representations under cross-examination, Mr Chanrai flatly denied saying that Mr Andy Lim had brought up the issue of Tembusu’s loan to his family members, or that his family was pressuring him to settle. Mr Chanrai also denied pushing Mr Mangat to settle the matter with Tembusu, stating that Mr Mangat himself was the one who wanted to settle. Mr Chanrai unequivocally disagreed that he had made the representations set out at [119(a)(ii)]–[119(a)(iii)] above in June 2016.
- [124]
[124] In my judgment, there is no contemporaneous evidence that the alleged Tembusu Representations were made by Mr Chanrai on 9 June 2016. Under cross-examination, Mr Mangat attempted to point towards the written guarantees that Mr Chanrai had purportedly given and the disclosure of his net worth as contemporaneous evidence of these representations. However, Mr Mangat later conceded that Mr Chanrai did not actually give his personal guarantee to the Tembusu Redemption Agreement. As for the disclosure of Mr Chanrai’s net worth, this has not been particularised and in any case, I do not see how this disclosure by Mr Chanrai to Mr Mangat supports the fact that these representations had been made, especially since Mr Mangat considered it “public knowledge” that Mr Chanrai was a high net worth individual.
- [125]
[125] In addition, Mr Mangat agreed under cross-examination that the alleged Tembusu Representations were “huge commitments” on the part of Mr Chanrai that caused him to be very assured and would have equally assured other lenders. Despite so, Mr Mangat did not inform Qualgro and/or Mr Chhor about these representations, allegedly because these were “confidential” and “private”. In fact, Mr Mangat agreed that, beyond Mdm Gill, he told no one else about the alleged Tembusu Representations. Thus, despite the incentive for Mr Mangat to share the contents of those representations to assure Qualgro and/or Mr Chhor about the viability of Qualgro’s loan to and investment in FTMS, it is curious that Mr Mangat did not strategically deploy the alleged Tembusu Representations to FTMS’s and the PICs’ advantage. Even if I were to accept Mr Mangat’s explanation that he believed that those representations were made in confidence, there is also no contemporaneous record between himself and Mr Chanrai noting down these representations themselves, much less suggesting that some of these representations had been made.
- [126]
[126] Therefore, I find that the PICs have not proved that the alleged Tembusu Representations were made, and the claim for misrepresentation based on these statements fails from the outset.
Alleged Qualgro Representations not proved
- [127]
[127] Mr Mangat claims that the alleged Qualgro Representations were made in person at the office of Mr Tito Isaac (“Mr Isaac”) on 31 October 2016, before the Qualgro Loan Agreement was signed that day. According to Mr Mangat, he had met with Mr Chanrai and Mr Isaac privately, in a separate room, where he had stated that neither FTMS nor the PICs would be able to repay the early redemption payments set out in the Qualgro Redemption Agreement. At that point, Mr Chanrai had made the alleged Qualgro Representations, in the presence of Mr Isaac. Under cross-examination, Mr Mangat testified that the said meeting actually took place at the “office snack bar”. While Mr Mangat also alleges that Mr Chanrai had represented that Mr Isaac, as Mr Chanrai’s lawyer, would look after the interests of FTMS and the PICs, I make nothing of this for the purposes of assessing the PICs’ claim for misrepresentation since this representation was not particularised in the DCC.
- [128]
[128] While Mr Chanrai agreed under cross-examination that there was a small private discussion between Mr Mangat, Mr Isaac and himself, he unequivocally denied making the alleged Qualgro Representations.
- [129]
[129] The same analysis that applies to the alleged Tembusu Representations applies here as well. Plainly, there is no contemporaneous evidence of the alleged Qualgro Representations. Mr Chanrai had flatly denied making them. While the meeting in which these alleged Qualgro Representations were made was attended by a third party, ie, Mr Isaac, for reasons only known to the PICs, he was not called as a witness to give evidence of what happened at the meeting or what representations had or had not been made.
- [130]
[130] Similarly, the allegation that Mr Chanrai had represented his agreement to be a co-guarantor in respect of the PICs’ obligations under the Qualgro Redemption Agreement is contradicted by the fact that Mr Chanrai was not eventually made a guarantor under that agreement.
- [131]
[131] Therefore, I similarly find that the PICs have not proved that the alleged Qualgro Representations were made. The claim for misrepresentation based on the alleged Qualgro Representations thus fails.
Claim for misrepresentation based on the alleged Corporate Raid Representations not made out
- [132]
[132] Finally, I turn to the alleged Corporate Raid Representations. The PICs allege that the representations were made in or around late 2016, specifically in or around “late November/early December 2016”.
- [133]
[133] Mr Chanrai admitted that Mr Schaer was his personal friend and had objectively believed at the material time that “[Mr Schaer’s] expertise would be able to help [FTMS] find investors to bring it out of the financial predicament that it was in”. Mr Chanrai also conceded that he was the one that introduced Mr Schaer to FTMS. In particular, Mr Chanrai had introduced Mr Schaer to Mr Mangat at the FTMS Malaysia 30th Anniversary Celebrations in late November 2016. In addition, Mr Chanrai also clarified that he had proposed the addition of Mr Schaer to the board of FTMS because he believed that Mr Schaer could assist in fundraising for FTMS, and this reason was shared with Mr Mangat. Mr Chanrai also explained under cross-examination that Mr Schaer and him had indeed proposed, at various meetings in December 2016, that they would raise about S$20–30m for FTMS to refinance all its existing debt.
- [134]
[134] The evidence demonstrates that the alleged Corporate Raid Representations had been made by Mr Chanrai. Based on Mr Chanrai’s own evidence, he effectively accepts that the representations in [119(c)(ii)] and [119(c)(iii)] above had been made. As for the remaining representation in [119(c)(i)], I find that this is made out given that Mr Chanrai and Mr Schaer had issued a letter to the Lenders in which Mr Chanrai undertook to procure a working capital loan of up to S$500,000 for FTMS by 10 January 2017.
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