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Grounds publishedDecided 11 Jul 2024

General Division of the High Court

Inter-Pacific Petroleum Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Goh Jin Hian

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[2024] SGHC 178Case no. Suit No 953 of 2020

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  1. [1] The plaintiff, Inter-Pacific Petroleum Pte Ltd (“IPP”), is a company in insolvent liquidation. In this suit, the plaintiff brought claims against the defendant, Dr Goh Jin Hian (“Dr Goh”), alleging various breaches of duty on Dr Goh’s part in his capacity as a director of IPP.

  2. [2] IPP’s case, in summary, was that Dr Goh had been asleep at the wheel as a director and failed to take the steps required of him under the law to apprise himself of IPP’s affairs and to monitor the same. Dr Goh’s misfeasance – or, perhaps more appropriately in this context, nonfeasance – resulted in IPP being used as a vehicle of fraud by its other directors and officers. This fraud entailed IPP borrowing large sums from banks on the pretence of financing commercial transactions which were shams. As these transactions were shams, IPP incurred the liability of repaying the banks’ financing, but did not actually receive any benefit or corresponding asset, as the assets the purchase of which the banks had purportedly financed were, in fact, non-existent. The loss that IPP sought compensation from Dr Goh in this suit was, therefore, its liability to repay the banks these loans.

  3. [3] Having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence, I allowed IPP’s claims against Dr Goh substantially, and held that Dr Goh was liable to pay US$146,047,099.60 in compensation to IPP in respect of his breaches of duty. Dr Goh has since appealed against my decision. I now set out the detailed grounds for my decision.

  4. Background to the dispute

  5. The parties

  6. [4] IPP was incorporated in Singapore on 28 June 2011. It was initially placed under judicial management on 4 September 2019. Subsequently, it was placed into liquidation on 25 March 2021. Mr Lim Loo Khoon and Mr Tan Wei Cheong (“Mr Tan”) (collectively, “the Liquidators”) were appointed the joint and several liquidators of IPP.

  7. [5] Dr Goh was a director of IPP for the period of 28 June 2011 until his resignation on 12 August 2019. Although a major point of dispute between the parties was the role that Dr Goh had played in IPP at various points in time during this tenure, the fact that he was a director of IPP for the entirety of this period was not disputed.

  8. [6] At the time of Dr Goh’s resignation from IPP on 12 August 2019, the other directors of IPP had been the following persons:

  9. (a) Cheung Lai Na (“Zoe”), who had been a director since 28 June 2011;

  10. (b) Cheung Lai Ming (“Sara”), who had been a director since 15 February 2012, and also resigned from IPP’s board on 12 August 2019; and

  11. (c) Pek Chong Beng, who was appointed as a director on 12 August 2019.

  12. [7] IPP was at all material times part of a group of companies known as the Inter-Pacific Group. Within the Group, IPP was 100% owned by another Singapore-incorporated company, Inter-Pacific Group Pte Ltd (“IPG”), which was the ultimate holding company of the Inter-Pacific Group. Dr Goh was also a director of IPG, as well as a 15% shareholder of IPG. Zoe was the other director and the remaining 85% shareholder of IPG.

  13. [8] In addition to his directorship in IPG and IPP, Dr Goh was also a director of the following other entities that formed part of the Inter-Pacific Group of companies: (a) Inter-Pacific Petroleum Trading Pte Ltd; (b) Pacific Energy 8 Pte Ltd; (c) Pacific Energy 28 Pte Ltd; (d) Pacific Energy 138 Pte Ltd; (e) Pacific Energy 168 Pte Ltd; (f) Pacific Energy 328 Pte Ltd; and (g) Pacific Ship Management Pte Ltd.

  14. IPP’s business operations

  15. [9] IPP had two main lines of business, namely, cargo trading operations and bunker trading operations.

  16. [11] In IPP’s bunker trading business, it would purchase bunker fuel oil from its ex-wharf supplier and subsequently deliver the bunker fuel oil to its customers using its own vessels or vessels chartered by third parties. This process was referred to as “breaking bulk”, as IPP would purchase bunker fuel oil in bulk before delivering it to multiple customers. As bunker trading was a regulated business, IPP required and had two licences granted by the Maritime Port Authority of Singapore (“MPA”). These were: (a) a bunker supplier licence (“Bunker Supplier Licence”), which was necessary for IPP to supply bunker fuel oil to customers; and (b) a bunker craft operator licence (“Bunker Craft Operator Licence”), which was necessary for IPP to operate its own vessels for taking physical delivery of bunkers from suppliers and supplying to its own customers.

  17. IPP’s trade financing facilities

  18. [13] The SocGen Facility could be used to finance both IPP’s bunker and cargo trading activity. The Maybank Facility, on the other hand, could only be used to finance IPP’s cargo trading activity.

  19. Circumstances surrounding IPP’s liquidation

  20. [14] Sometime around 13 June 2019, during enforcement checks conducted by the MPA, it was discovered that the mass flow meter of a bunker tanker chartered by IPP had been tampered with. As a result, IPP’s Bunker Craft Operator Licence was placed under a temporary suspension by the MPA on 27 June 2019.

  21. [15] After the suspension, Dr Goh took on a leading role in coordinating and directing IPP’s response to the suspension. This included writing to the Banks to inform them of the suspension and to provide them with updates on IPP’s efforts at having the suspension lifted, as well as taking point in IPP’s representations and negotiations with the MPA. The latter included, in particular, a show cause letter in which Dr Goh signed off as an “Executive Director” of IPP.

  22. [16] After the suspension, Dr Goh met Zoe in Hong Kong sometime in or around 11 August 2019. Apparently, Dr Goh was informed at this meeting of Zoe’s decision to place IPP into judicial management as IPP was unable to finance its payments to the Banks. According to Dr Goh, he resigned from IPP on that same day.

  23. [17] On 22 August 2019, Dr Goh met with the Banks in Singapore, where he discovered the extent of IPP’s indebtedness of the Banks. At this meeting, he claimed to have been told that IPP owed almost US$90m to SocGen and US$60m to Maybank in respect of financing that had been extended by the Banks for IPP’s cargo trading operations. On the same day, after his meeting with the Banks, Dr Goh reported his findings by email to the Singapore Police Force (“the Police”).

  24. [18] Dr Goh’s findings were consistent with the findings of IPP’s judicial managers (the “JMs”). The JMs determined that, in the period of around mid-June to July 2019, IPP drew down on the Facilities to the tune of some (a) US$146,047,090.60 to finance cargo trading transactions (“the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns”); and (b) US$10,508,238.71 to finance bunkering transactions (“the June–July 2019 Bunkering Drawdowns”). It was common ground between the parties that neither of these drawdowns (collectively, “the June–July 2019 Drawdowns”) were repaid to the Banks.

  25. [20] In contrast, it was not disputed that the bunkering transactions entered into by IPP were legitimate transactions that had actually taken place.

  26. [21] It was against this backdrop that IPP brought the present suit against Dr Goh, alleging that, by reason of various breaches of duty on his part, this state of affairs had been allowed to occur. Specifically, Dr Goh failed to detect that IPP was being run in a fraudulent manner, and failed to prevent IPP from making the June–July 2019 Drawdowns so as to become liable to the Banks to repay the same.

  27. Overview of the parties’ cases

  28. IPP’s case against Dr Goh

  29. [22] IPP’s case against Dr Goh was based on two types of breaches of duty: (a) first, a breach of Dr Goh’s duty of skill, care and diligence; and (b) second, a breach of Dr Goh’s duty to have regard to the interests of IPP’s creditors (“the Creditor Duty”).

  30. IPP’s claim in negligence

  31. [23] Starting with its claim for negligence, IPP submitted that Dr Goh was, at all material times, an executive director of IPP up until his resignation in August 2019, shortly before IPP was placed into judicial management. As an executive director, Dr Goh ought to be held to a higher standard of care than a non-executive director in his obligation to monitor and supervise IPP’s affairs. IPP also relied on Dr Goh’s supposed special knowledge and experience as reason for raising the standard of care that Dr Goh should be held to. First, Dr Goh was “an experienced and sophisticated businessmen”, having held a “long string of directorships in many companies including listed companies”. Second, in addition to being highly educated (holding a Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery, as well as a Master of Business Administration), Dr Goh possessed or had held himself out to possess specific expertise and knowledge in the oil and gas trade (ie, businesses which IPP was involved in).

  32. [24] In the alternative, even if Dr Goh was properly categorised as a non-executive director, this would not, in any event, absolve him as a non-executive director is nonetheless subject to the same minimum and non-delegable core of duties as an executive director. Specifically, a director – whether executive or non-executive – had to take reasonable steps to place himself in a position to guide and monitor the company’s affairs and management.

  33. [25] On the issue of breach, IPP submitted that Dr Goh had failed to act with the requisite skill and care for various reasons.

  34. (a) First, Dr Goh did not even know of IPP’s cargo trading business throughout his tenure as a director. The cargo trading business was, in fact, the very fraudulent scheme perpetrated by IPP that occurred right under Dr Goh’s nose as he was blissfully unaware of even the existence of this line of business. Such an egregious degree of ignorance was ipso facto a breach of Dr Goh’s duty of care.

  35. (b) Second, regardless of whether Dr Goh did or did not know of IPP’s cargo trading business, IPP pointed to three “red flags” which should, if he had acted with reasonable skill and care, independently have put Dr Goh on a path of inquiry into IPP’s financial position and to uncover the sham and non-existent cargo trading transactions. These red flags were:

  36. (i) An audit confirmation request relating to amounts of receivables due to IPP from Mercuria, which Dr Goh signed and was sent to Mercuria on or about 7 February 2018;

  37. (ii) The suspension of IPP’s Bunker Craft Operator Licence by the MPA on 27 June 2019; and

  38. (iii) The three confirmations of indebtedness to Maybank which Dr Goh signed on 17 July and 24 July 2019, shortly before IPP was placed under judicial management.

  39. [26] IPP argued that it suffered loss from Dr Goh’s negligence in the form of its liability to repay the Banks the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns which were made in respect of the sham or non-existent cargo trading transactions. Further, but for Dr Goh’s negligence, these losses would not have been suffered as the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns would not have been made. Had he acted with requisite skill and care, Dr Goh would have uncovered the fact that IPP was involved in cargo trading, and more specifically, that there were fraudulent cargo trades. Any reasonable director in his position would then have put a halt to any further cargo trading, and in turn, have prevented any further drawdowns by IPP on the Facilities. Dr Goh’s negligence was thus an effective and proximate cause of IPP’s losses, such that it was fair that he should be held liable for them.

  40. IPP’s claim for breach of the Creditor Duty

  41. [27] Turning to IPP’s claim based on the Creditor Duty, IPP argued that, at the time of the June–July 2019 Drawdowns, IPP had been in a financially parlous state so as to engage Dr Goh’s fiduciary duty to take into account the interests of IPP’s creditors. Specifically, based on IPP’s true financial position – ie, after discounting the sham receivables from the sham cargo trading transactions to zero – IPP was balance sheet insolvent by June 2019. Furthermore, as IPP continued to draw down on the Facilities in June and July 2019, its financial state continued to worsen with each drawdown such that it became all the more incumbent for Dr Goh to take into account, and act in, the interests of IPP’s creditors.

  42. [28] On the issue of breach, IPP submitted that Dr Goh’s failure to appreciate the true extent of IPP’s financial peril (due to his ignorance of the sham transactions) and his resulting failure to prevent IPP from making the June–July 2019 Drawdowns constituted a clear disregard of the interests of IPP’s creditors, and thus a breach of his Creditor Duty.

  43. [29] IPP argued that it suffered loss from Dr Goh’s breach of the Creditor Duty in the form of its liabilities to repay the June–July 2019 Drawdowns to the Banks, which would not have occurred had he acted with sufficient regard for the interests of IPP’s creditors. As regards the June–July 2019 Bunkering Drawdowns in particular, although it was not disputed that the bunkering transactions financed by these drawdowns were legitimate transactions, IPP submitted that it nonetheless suffered loss as there was no reasonable prospect that IPP could have repaid these borrowings to the Banks even if the transactions were genuine.

  44. Dr Goh’s defence

  45. Dr Goh’s defence to IPP’s claim in negligence

  46. [30] Dr Goh disputed IPP’s claim that he had been an executive director of IPP at the material time when the June–July 2019 Drawdowns were made. In contrast, he contended that he had intentionally transitioned into the role of a non-executive director of IPP from July 2015, and remained in this capacity until his resignation from IPP’s board in August 2019. Being a non-executive director, Dr Goh ought to be subjected to a lower standard of care; more specifically, he had substantially reduced obligations of monitoring of and supervision over IPP’s affairs, and was entitled to rely on the information provided to him by his fellow directors and subordinates.

  47. [31] Dr Goh also refuted IPP’s allegation that he had been unaware of IPP’s cargo trading business. First, he raised a procedural objection that this allegation of ignorance, which was central to IPP’s case, had been inadequately pleaded. Second, he argued that the evidence relied on by IPP in support of this allegation did not actually disclose a lack of knowledge on his part as to the existence of IPP’s cargo trading business.

  48. [32] As regards the three red flags cited by IPP as instances that ought to have sent Dr Goh on a path of inquiry to uncovering the sham transactions – viz, (a) the audit confirmation request to Mercuria; (b) the suspension of IPP’s Bunker Craft Operator Licence; and (c) the three confirmations of indebtedness to Maybank – Dr Goh either argued that these supposed red flags were red herrings altogether, or that he had nonetheless taken adequate steps when met by them so as to satisfy his standard of care.

  49. [33] Additionally, Dr Goh went further to argue that there were “green flags” that he relied on such that no further inquiry had been necessary. These were as follows:

  50. (a) First, Dr Goh argued that IPP’s business and financing mechanism was structured in such a manner that it was unnecessary for him to inquire into IPP’s financials. According to Dr Goh, IPP’s financing model vis-à-vis the Banks created an automatic “trip-wire”, on the basis that IPP’s ability to repay the Banks’ financing was contingent on IPP being paid by its own customer. Thus, if IPP’s customer failed to make payment, IPP would not be able to repay the Banks, resulting in the Banks calling a default and instantly cutting off any further financing to IPP. Dr Goh argued that, as a result of this mechanism, the fact that the Banks were continuously being repaid prior to the June–July 2019 Drawdowns functioned as a “reasonable proxy” that IPP was being paid by its customers (such that there were no significant outstanding receivables due to IPP). This therefore obviated the need for any inquiry on his part into the underlying transactions, IPP’s receivables position, and IPP’s financial situation generally.

  51. (b) Second, Dr Goh argued that he had been provided with financial information showing that IPP had been operating “business as usual”. In this regard, Dr Goh principally relied on an email he had been copied in from IPP’s Chief Financial Officer, Mr Wallace To (“Wallace”), on 16 January 2019. This email had enclosed, inter alia, IPP’s management accounts for September 2018. Dr Goh’s position was that he had reviewed these management accounts which had not raised any red flags.

  52. [34] Dr Goh also raised various legal arguments disputing the existence of loss suffered by IPP in respect of the June–July 2019 Drawdowns. These can be briefly summarised as follows:

  53. (a) First, that IPP had suffered no loss from the June–July 2019 Bunkering Drawdowns as the transactions financed by these drawdowns were not sham transactions, such that IPP did receive real goods from its suppliers and/or payment from its customers.

  54. (b) Second, that IPP had suffered no loss from the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns as IPP could avail itself of various defences to the Banks’ claims for repayment.

  55. (c) Third, that IPP had suffered no loss from the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns as the Liquidators had yet to adjudicate and more specifically, accept the proofs of debt filed by the Banks in IPP’s liquidation claiming repayment for these drawdowns.

  56. (d) Fourth, that IPP had suffered no loss as it had yet to repay the Banks for the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns. Until IPP repaid the Banks, it was only the Banks that had suffered a loss, and it could not be said that IPP had itself suffered actual loss.

  57. (e) Fifth, that IPP had suffered no loss as the sham transactions involved the “round-tripping” of the moneys disbursed by the Banks under the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns. This meant that the funds paid out by the Banks to IPP’s putative suppliers were routed back into IPP, such that IPP could not be said to have suffered any loss itself.

  58. [35] Apart from disputing the existence of loss, Dr Goh also disputed the element of causation between his breaches of duty and the loss suffered by IPP. According to Dr Goh, even if he had taken the steps that IPP alleged that he should have, it was likely that he would not have discovered the sham cargo trading transactions, such that IPP would have suffered the loss it did in any event. Generally, this was because any attempt by Dr Goh to make any inquiry or investigation into IPP’s financial situation and the sham cargo trading transactions would have been stonewalled by the other directors and employees in IPP who were the masterminds, or at least complicit to, the ongoing fraud.

  59. Dr Goh’s defence to IPP’s claim for breach of the Creditor Duty

  60. [36] Dr Goh’s defence to IPP’s claim for breach of the Creditor Duty was two-pronged.

  61. [37] First, he contended that the Creditor Duty had not even been engaged as IPP had failed to prove that it was either insolvent or in a financially parlous position at the time of the June–July 2019 Drawdowns, or that he had or ought to have had knowledge of this.

  62. [38] Second, Dr Goh argued that, even if the Creditor Duty had arisen, he nevertheless did not breach it as he had reasonably believed that the cargo trading and bunkering transactions financed by the June–July 2019 Drawdowns were in IPP’s interests. This was because the back-to-back nature of these transactions meant that they were structured to ensure that IPP would derive a trading profit from them (viz, the mark-up charged to IPP’s customer from the price paid by IPP to its supplier).

  63. [39] Dr Goh also argued that he had not breached the Creditor Duty by IPP’s entry into the drawdowns as the Banks were not part of IPP’s creditors whose interests Dr Goh had an obligation to consider at the material time. As the Banks only became creditors of IPP as a result of the drawdowns, it could not be said that Dr Goh had an obligation to take into account their interests prior to IPP procuring the drawdowns. Indeed, Dr Goh went further to contend that it was in fact in the interests of IPP’s creditors for IPP to borrow moneys from the Banks through the drawdowns as this increased their returns in IPP’s liquidation.

  64. [40] Finally, Dr Goh argued that, even if he had breached his Creditor Duty, his liability should only be limited to the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns that he had been aware of. In this regard, the only drawdowns that Dr Goh had had knowledge of were the three borrowings from Maybank in respect of which he had signed confirmations of indebtedness for.

  65. Dr Goh’s reliance on s 391 of the Companies Act

  66. [41] As a last resort, Dr Goh prayed in aid of the court’s discretion to relieve directors’ breaches of duty under s 391 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”). He submitted that he had acted honestly and reasonably, and that it was fair in the circumstances of the case that he be excused for any breaches of duty established against him.

  67. Issues arising for determination

  68. [42] Based on the parties’ cases, the following issues arose for determination:

  69. (a) First, whether Dr Goh breached his duty of care to IPP. This inquiry could be further divided into the following sub-issues:

  70. (i) What standard of care Dr Goh should be held to, which included considerations of his role in IPP and any particular skills or expertise he possessed;

  71. (ii) Whether Dr Goh had been ignorant of IPP’s cargo trading business as IPP alleged; and

  72. (iii) Whether Dr Goh failed to act reasonably in the face of the three red flags identified by IPP, being (see [25(b)] above):

  73. (A) The audit confirmation request to Mercuria signed by Dr Goh on or around 7 February 2018;

  74. (B) The suspension of IPP’s Bunker Craft Operator Licence on 27 June 2019; and

  75. (C) The three confirmations of indebtedness to Maybank signed by Dr Goh on 17 and 19 July 2019.

  76. (b) Second, whether Dr Goh breached his Creditor Duty to IPP. This inquiry could be further divided into the following sub-issues:

  77. (i) Whether the Creditor Duty was engaged at the material time; and

  78. (ii) Whether Dr Goh breached the Creditor Duty by allowing IPP to enter into the June–July 2019 Drawdowns.

  79. (c) Third, whether IPP suffered any loss from the June–July 2019 Drawdowns.

  80. (d) Fourth, whether Dr Goh’s breaches of duty caused IPP’s loss.

  81. (e) Fifth, whether Dr Goh should be granted relief under s 391 of the CA.

  82. [43] However, before turning to the above issues, it is necessary to address two preliminary points arising from Dr Goh’s case. These are as follows:

  83. (a) Whether the cargo trading transactions financed by the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns were in fact shams; and

  84. (b) The allegations levelled against the Liquidators’ conduct by Dr Goh.

  85. Preliminary issues

  86. Whether the cargo trading transactions financed by the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns were shams

  87. [44] The first preliminary issue concerns a cornerstone of IPP’s factual case against Dr Goh, namely, whether the cargo trading transactions financed by the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns were, in fact, sham transactions. It was necessary to address this point as Dr Goh did not admit to this fact and put it into issue.

  88. [45] I can deal with this point shortly. In my judgment, there was no arguable point in the face of the evidence before the court that the cargo trading transactions financed by the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns were not sham or non-existent transactions. Although there was a dearth of direct evidence on the fraudulent nature of these transactions before the court, the circumstantial evidence pointed overwhelmingly to the conclusion that they were indeed shams.

  89. [46] It was common ground between the parties that IPP’s cargo trading transactions were generally entered into on a back-to-back basis; in other words, each transaction was constituted by (a) a supply contract between IPP and its supplier (which was financed by the Banks); and (b) a sale contract between IPP and its customer. As a matter of logic, if both of these contracts in a given transaction were demonstrably shams, the entire cargo trading transaction would be a sham.

  90. [47] This was borne out on the evidence. First, as regards IPP’s supply contracts with its putative suppliers, it would be recalled that IPP’s putative suppliers were Citus and Legend Six (see [10] above). In this regard, after IPP had been placed under judicial management, its JMs wrote to Citus and Legend Six seeking confirmation on the legitimacy of the purported supply contracts between IPP and them. No response was received from Legend Six. And while Citus did respond to the JM’s letter, it did not provide the confirmation sought by the JMs. Moreover, and more pertinently, the bills of lading purportedly issued by Citus and Legend Six were all confirmed by the purported carriers (stated on the bills) to be shams and fraudulent documents. In my view, the failure on the part of the suppliers to offer a straightforward confirmation as to the legitimacy of the transactions, coupled with the fact that documents purportedly issued by these suppliers were indisputably fraudulent, led to the inexorable conclusion that the supply contracts financed by the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns were shams.

  91. [48] Turning to the sale contracts, IPP’s JMs similarly wrote to the putative customers under the sale contracts – viz, Mercuria, Minerva, Sinochem and Petco – seeking confirmation on the legitimacy of the sale contracts which had supposedly given rise to receivables due from them to IPP. Save for a few genuine transactions, these putative customers generally disclaimed the existence of any dealings between IPP and themselves. This was confirmed in the affidavit evidence of a representative of Mercuria, Ms Cindy Chong Yoke Lin (“Ms Chong”), who explained in some detail the steps she had taken to confirm that the sale contracts were non-existent prior to Mercuria’s response to the JMs stating the same. Ms Chong’s account was not challenged in any material aspect during cross-examination by Dr Goh’s counsel. In my view, the unequivocal denials of the legitimacy of the sale contracts by IPP’s putative customers were, by themselves, sufficient to prove on the balance of probabilities that the sale contracts were also sham transactions.

  92. [49] Given that both the supply contracts and sale contracts were clearly shams, I had little difficulty in concluding that the cargo trading transactions upon which IPP had procured the June–July 2019 Cargo Trading Drawdowns from the Banks were shams. Indeed, I noted that, by the time of Dr Goh’s closing submissions, he did not make any real attempt at arguing otherwise.

  93. Dr Goh’s allegations of impropriety against the Liquidators

  94. [50] The second preliminary issue arose out of allegations made by Dr Goh against the Liquidators in his closing submissions. Dr Goh appeared to take the position that the Liquidators had acted improperly by (a) bringing the present suit; (b) framing IPP’s case against him as it was; and (c) giving evidence to support IPP’s case. Indeed, rather strong words were used by Dr Goh to this end:

  95. [51] Leaving aside the issue of whether Mr Tan’s evidence should be accepted as a matter of objective truth and probability, I considered Dr Goh’s allegations against the Liquidators to be founded on a misconception as to the role of a liquidator in adversarial proceedings such as the present case. Dr Goh’s position was premised on an assumption that a liquidator who brings proceedings on behalf of the company against a potential wrongdoer may not advocate the company’s case. With respect, there is no such rule of law.

  96. [52] A liquidator is called upon to wear many hats: he takes on managerial responsibilities over the company’s affairs, akin to that of the company’s directors and executives; and he may on occasion also sit in a quasi-judicial capacity, such as in the proof of debt process where he is instituted by the insolvency legislation as the first line of adjudication in respect of creditors’ claims against the company (see Andrew R Keay, McPherson and Keay: The Law of Company Liquidation (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2021) (“McPherson and Keay”) at para 8-042). It is also trite that liquidators are officers of the court who are thus “required at all times to act in an honest, impartial and high-minded fashion”, and are subject to the control of the court for the due performance of their duties (see McPherson and Keay at para 8-039).

  97. [53] But it does not follow either from the broad principle that a liquidator sometimes sits in a quasi-judicial capacity, or the fact that the liquidator is always an officer of the court who must act honestly and impartially, that a liquidator may never advocate the case or position of the company that he represents. As a matter of common sense, a liquidator who brings adversarial proceedings on behalf of the company against a potential wrongdoer necessarily takes on the role of an adversary in litigation, in the same way that any litigant in our system of adversarial litigation does.

  98. [54] Indeed, our courts have recognised that a liquidator may be required to take on an adversarial role in some proceedings. For example, in Feima International (Hongkong) Ltd (in liquidation) v Kyen Resources Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others [2024] 4 SLR 101, Goh Yihan JC observed that, in appeals against a liquidator’s adjudication of a proof of debt, “it would not be legally accurate to assert that the role of the liquidator remains that of a quasi-judicial function”, as instead, the liquidator then takes on “the role of an adversary in the litigation” [emphasis in original] (at [31], citing Michael Murray & Jason Harris, Keay’s Insolvency: Personal and Corporate Law and Practice (Thomson Reuters, 10th Ed, 2018) at pp 602–603). The same view was espoused by the High Court of Australia in Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O’Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332 (“Tanning”). In their joint judgment, Brennan and Dawson JJ said that (see Tanning at 341):

  99. [55] There is thus no warrant for saying that a liquidator’s role is not to advocate the company’s case where one is concerned with litigation in which he represents the company and its creditors. As David Richards LJ observed in the English Court of Appeal decision of Fakhry v Pagden and another [2021] 2 BCLC 35, “[i]t is important that liquidators should have a keen appreciation of the circumstances when they can act in an adverse capacity and those circumstances where neutrality is expected” (at [42]). By necessary implication of this statement, there is a right place and a right time for a liquidator to assume an adversarial mantle. In proof of debt proceedings before the court, the liquidator is an adversary for the purpose of protecting the company’s scarce assets against false claims. By the same token, in proceedings for the recovery of assets from wrongdoers, the liquidator is cast in the role of an adversary for the purpose of augmenting the assets of the company for the creditors’ benefit. Indeed, as IPP rightly submitted, a liquidator is duty-bound to maximise recovery for the company’s creditors (see the Court of Appeal decision of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and others v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) [2015] 3 SLR 665 (“Celestial Nutrifoods”) at [1]; McPherson and Keay at para 9-072). As Brennan and Dawson JJ rightly recognised in the passage from Tanning that I have quoted above, there is nothing inconsistent or incongruous in a liquidator taking an adversarial position in litigation on the one hand, and a liquidator “act[ing] fairly in conducting the litigation” on the other.

  100. [56] For a similar reason, there was also no merit in Dr Goh’s attempt at imputing impropriety to the Liquidators based on the fact that the Banks were funding IPP’s claim against him. In the first place, this appeared to be, in substance, a collateral attack on the court’s earlier decision to approve the funding agreement. The court there would have already weighed the risks of the Liquidators being swayed to act improperly in arriving at its decision.

  101. [57] In the second place, this submission ran contrary to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Celestial Nutrifoods. In that case, it was suggested that a funding agreement that had the effect of allowing the liquidator to recover some of his own fees if the funded litigation turned out successful had compromised the liquidator’s objectivity. The Court of Appeal was not impressed by this submission. Chao Hick Tin JA reasoned that there was “nothing objectionable” in the funding agreement as the liquidator was not the sole beneficiary of the funded claims, given that the company’s creditors would also benefit from potential recoveries (at [52(a)]). Chao JA also observed that, because a liquidator’s function was “precisely to maximise recovery” for creditors, the fact that these creditors included the funding creditors was “irrelevant”. Indeed, the learned judge went as far as to say that the liquidator would have been in breach of his duties if he did not pursue potential claims despite having been put in funds to do so by some creditors (at [52(b)]). These observations were equally apposite to the present case.

  102. [58] Finally, taking a step back, it is necessary to bear in mind that the local courts have recognised a public policy imperative in favour of investigating and redressing allegations of misfeasance by former directors and controllers of insolvent companies (see the High Court decisions of Re Mingda Holding Pte Ltd and another matter [2024] SGHC 130 at [117] and Song Jianbo v Sunmax Global Capital Fund 1 Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) [2023] 4 SLR 1575 at [39]). Given that this is a weighty consideration in favour of a court approving a funding agreement, it is coherent that a court should not, after granting such approval, them take a dim view of the liquidator’s decision to bring such claims.

  103. Whether Dr Goh breached his duty of care to IPP

  104. [59] I turn to IPP’s claim in negligence against Dr Goh. To recapitulate, this claim could be parsed into the following sub-issues (see [42(a)] above):

  105. (a) What standard of care Dr Goh should be held to;

  106. (b) Whether Dr Goh was ignorant of IPP’s cargo trading business; and

  107. (c) Whether Dr Goh failed to act reasonably in the face of the three red flags identified by IPP.

  108. The standard of care that Dr Goh should be held to

  109. [60] It was not disputed between the parties that Dr Goh as a director of IPP owed a duty of care, skill and diligence to IPP. Indeed, s 157(1) of the Companies Act specifically provides that a director “shall at all times … use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his … office”, thus encapsulating a director’s common law duty of care (see the Court of Appeal decision of Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and other matters [2018] 2 SLR 333 (“Ho Yew Kong”) at [134]).

  110. [61] It is well-established that the standard of care would never be lowered, but may be heightened, by the subjective characteristics of the particular director at hand. Thus, the standard of care that a director must observe is that of a reasonably diligent director having both: (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company; and (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience which that director has (see the High Court decision of Lim Weng Kee v Public Prosecutor [2002] 2 SLR(R) 848 at [27], citing the English High Court decision of Re D’Jan of London [1994] 1 BCLC 561 (“D’Jan”) at 563).

  111. [62] In the present case, the parties’ dispute over the applicable standard that Dr Goh’s conduct should be measured against boiled down to two points. First, Dr Goh submitted that he had played a diminished role in IPP’s management following a supposed transition into the position of a non-executive director from July 2015. Thus, he should only be held to the lower standard of care of a non-executive director. Second, IPP argued that the standard ought to be raised as Dr Goh had possessed special knowledge or skills as an “experienced and sophisticated businessman” who had held himself out as possessing particular expertise in the oil and gas trade (this being IPP’s line of business).

  112. The extent of Dr Goh’s involvement in IPP

  113. [63] Before turning to the factual issue of the extent of Dr Goh’s involvement in IPP, I make two preliminary points.

  114. [64] First, I did not consider the proper approach to be to focus on whether Dr Goh’s proper designation was that of an executive or non-executive director at any given time. A director’s particular designation is not determinative or conclusive of the role that he plays in the company. Rather, the content of a director’s duty is determined by the involvement, responsibilities or functions he undertakes. Put simply, the focus is on substance rather than form.

  115. [65] The second point is that, regardless of whether Dr Goh was in form or substance an executive or non-executive director of IPP, the fact would remain that he would be subject to a “minimum objective standard of care which entails the obligation to take reasonable steps to place [himself] in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company” (see the Court of Appeal decisions of Ho Yew Kong at [137] and BIT Baltic Investment & Trading Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) v Wee See Boon [2023] 1 SLR 1648 (“BIT Baltic”) at [56]). Thus, even if Dr Goh were to succeed in his attempt at downplaying his role in IPP, he could not escape a duty to maintain a minimum degree of awareness and oversight.

  116. [66] Coming to the issue of Dr Goh’s involvement in IPP, Dr Goh argued that he had transitioned into a non-executive role with IPP from July 2015, and remained as such until his resignation from IPP’s board in August 2019. According to him, the reason for this transition was that he had intended to take on a new role as the Group Chief Executive Officer of New Silkroutes Group (“New Silkroutes”), a public-listed holding company on the Singapore Exchange. As there were overlaps in the businesses and interests of New Silkroutes (who was also involved in oil trading) and IPP, Dr Goh considered that he would be in a position of conflict of interest if he continued on as an executive director in both entities.

  117. [67] In this regard, Dr Goh relied on a few pieces of evidence from around July 2015 to support his claimed transition. This included: (a) an email that Dr Goh had sent to Zoe and Ms Charlene Lim (“Charlene”) – IPP’s human resources manager – on 20 July 2015 informing them of the change; (b) the change in the quantum of Dr Goh’s remuneration from S$30,000 to S$12,000 per month after July 2015; (c) the change in the nature of Dr Goh’s remuneration from being salary to directors’ fees from July 2015; (d) IPP’s cessation in making Central Provident Fund contributions to Dr Goh’s account from July 2015; and (e) two emails that Dr Goh had sent to the MPA on 7 May 2015 and 9 June 2015 in which Dr Goh sought MPA’s approval to step down from IPP.

  118. [68] In my judgment, these assertions did not determine the issue. I agreed with IPP that these contemporaneous statements of Dr Goh’s intent to step down from IPP’s board could, at best, only prove that Dr Goh had formed an intention of stepping down from IPP’s board altogether or receding into a non-executive role around July 2015. Crucially, they could say nothing about whether Dr Goh subsequently went through with this intention.

  119. [69] The pertinent question, therefore, was not whether Dr Goh had at any point in time intended to step down, but whether he subsequently did so as a matter of fact. In this connection, IPP submitted that contemporaneous evidence post-July 2015 indicated that Dr Goh’s role in IPP did not change despite his professed intention to transition into a reduced role as a non-executive director.

  120. [70] Although I agreed with Dr Goh that some of the circumstances cited by IPP were – if taken by themselves – neither here nor there, having regard to the totality of the circumstances and evidence, I was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Dr Goh continued to be actively involved in IPP’s management even after his supposed intention to transition out of executive functions in July 2015.

  121. [71] First, I found the fact that Dr Goh had remained recorded as an “Executive Director” on IPP’s contact lists after July 2015 to be material, not for his styling as such per se (which, as explained at [64] above, would not be determinative), but the underlying circumstances of him being recorded as such. Although Dr Goh sought to downplay this as an oversight, I was not persuaded by this explanation. First, there were two separate contact lists across two years – 2017 and 2018 – that stated Dr Goh as an executive director. This meant that, on Dr Goh’s case, the same mistake had to have been made not once but twice. Second, and rendering a mere lapse even less likely, was the fact that the contact lists had been prepared by Charlene. As Dr Goh conceded in cross-examination, having been IPP’s human resources manager, Charlene was well-placed to be aware of the roles played by any officer or employee in IPP. Moreover, Charlene had been specifically informed by Dr Goh in two emails – dated 15 July 2015 and 20 July 2015 – of his intention to step down from IPP’s board. Given these factors, it was unlikely that Charlene would have made an error in reflecting Dr Goh’s designation, unless circumstances after July 2015 countermanded Dr Goh’s earlier instructions to her on his departure.

  122. [72] Dr Goh suggested in cross-examination that the oversight may have been the result of Charlene having merely “used the template”. I understood this suggestion to mean that Charlene had used a contact list from a previous year without making the necessary updates to reflect changes in IPP’s staffing, including Dr Goh’s apparent transition into a non-executive position. This was unconvincing for two reasons. First, Dr Goh admitted that this was nothing but his own speculation. Second, and more importantly, on my own examination of the two contact lists in 2017 and 2018, it was clear on a comparison of the two that Charlene had in fact made numerous updates to the contact lists, albeit that no change was made to Dr Goh’s status. Specifically, the following persons who had been listed on the 2017 contact list were removed from the 2018 contact list: (a) Brian Leow; (b) Jason Tay; (c) Lawrence Wee; and (d) Kenny Kiang. On the other hand, the following persons who had not been on the 2017 contact list were added to the 2018 contact list: (a) Wallace To; (b) Milly Quek; (c) Dave Tan; and (d) Joseph Kumar.

  123. [73] Given that Charlene did make changes to update the contact lists between years, Dr Goh’s claim that she had made an error was not likely on the balance of probabilities. If Dr Goh had in fact transitioned into a reduced role as a non-executive director, this would have been a material change – akin to a staff movement – that Charlene would likely have updated; indeed, the materiality of any such change would arguably have been of greater magnitude than the other staff movements Charlene had reflected, given Dr Goh’s high station within IPP.

  124. [74] Second, I agreed with IPP that the board resolutions passed by IPP and IPG during Dr Goh’s resignation and the circumstances of their coming into being were highly significant. The board resolutions were undated, and insofar as they related to Dr Goh, they stated as follows:

  125. [75] I accepted IPP’s characterisation of the resolutions as “cynical and dishonest attempts by Dr Goh to craft a false narrative regarding his directorship and level of involvement in IPP”. The resolutions had to be read in context; namely, against the following email that Dr Goh had sent on 13 August 2019 (one day after Dr Goh had resigned from IPP’s board) to various persons including Zoe:

  126. [76] This email inevitably gave the game away for Dr Goh. The only reasonable inference from his statement that “[i]t will be important and necessary to indemnify me from management decisions and corporate actions” was that the resolutions were an attempt by Dr Goh to cover his tracks. In particular, the word “indemnify” was allusive to Dr Goh having been aware that he was at risk of incurring legal liability. For this reason, I rejected Dr Goh’s submission that the resolutions had not been an attempt at protecting himself as there was no indication at the time of their passing that he would be sued down the line by IPP. Clearly, Dr Goh had been alive to the possibility that he could face legal liability, thus the need for the indemnity he sought.

  127. [77] Further, the fact that Dr Goh had specifically sought an indemnity from “management decisions” indicated that he was aware that he had been involved in the management of IPP (ie, that he had exercised executive functions). This was why, in the resolutions, Dr Goh sought to create a record that precisely the opposite had been true: that he “ha[d] remote involvement and management in [IPP’s] day to day operations”. This was a wholly unusual matter to be covered in a resolution by the company’s board, which further supported the already clear inference that the resolutions were concocted to give Dr Goh’s narrative some verisimilitude.

  128. [78] Further adding to the dubiousness of the resolutions was the fact that certain statements therein were inconsistent with Dr Goh’s own narrative. This strengthened the inference that the resolutions had been hastily cooked up in a last-ditch effort by Dr Goh to protect himself. For instance, the resolutions stated that Dr Goh had been “appointed as a non-executive director”. This contradicted Dr Goh’s own case that he had been initially appointed as an executive director but had later transitioned into a reduced role in July 2015.

  129. [79] The resolutions also stated that Dr Goh had been appointed as a director “solely to represent his voting rights as a member of the company”. Although this made sense vis-à-vis IPG as Dr Goh was a shareholder of IPG, it did not vis-à-vis IPP since IPP was wholly owned by IPG. Indeed, this error, coupled with the fact that the resolutions for IPP and IPG were in completely identical wording, inexorably pointed to the underlying haste and carelessness in the resolutions’ creation. Moreover, the statement that Dr Goh had only been appointed to IPP’s board to represent his shareholder rights also did not gel with Dr Goh’s own account in his affidavit that his appointment to IPP’s board was due to IPP’s Bunker Craft Operator Licence and Bunker Supplier Licence having “been awarded by the MPA to IPP on the condition that [Dr Goh] held a minimum of 15% stake in IPP and was its director”. It would be recalled that the imposition of this condition was the reason why Dr Goh had written to the MPA to seek its blessing as to his intended departure from IPP’s Board in July 2015.

  130. [80] In these circumstances, I found that Dr Goh was, at all material times, an executive director of IPP.

  131. Whether Dr Goh possessed special skills or expertise

  132. [81] I turn to IPP’s submission that Dr Goh should be held to a higher standard as he possessed special skills or expertise. These special skills or expertise were: (a) Dr Goh having been an “experienced and sophisticated businessman” with substantial prior experience holding directorships in other companies; and (b) Dr Goh having been highly educated and having held himself out as possessing particular expertise in the oil and gas trade.

  133. [82] I was not persuaded that these factors warranted an increase in the standard of care applicable to Dr Goh. Although Dr Goh could fairly be characterised as an “experienced and sophisticated businessman”, the same could be said of the hypothetical reasonable man occupying his position as an executive director of a company in a similar line of business, and of comparable scale, as IPP. For a similar reason, I did not think that the evidence relied on by IPP clearly established that Dr Goh had expertise and knowledge of oil and gas trading over and beyond that which would be reasonably expected of persons occupying his position. There was thus no need to further increase the applicable standard of care to Dr Goh on account of these factors.

  134. Conclusion on the applicable standard of care

  135. [83] To draw together the threads on the issue of the applicable standard of care to measure Dr Goh’s conduct against, I found that Dr Goh ought to be held to the standard of a reasonably diligent executive director. Such a person would, in the ordinary course, be expected to have considerable experience in the management of companies, as well as knowledge of his company’s line of business.

  136. [84] In light of my finding that Dr Goh should be held to the standard of care of an executive director, the various dicta from cases espousing the prospect of non-executive directors being subjected to a lower standard of care, which Dr Goh placed reliance on, could not assist him. In any event, as I noted at [65] above, even if I had accepted Dr Goh’s claim that he had transitioned into a reduced non-executive role in IPP’s management after July 2015, this did not absolve him from a minimum level of responsibility.

  137. [85] In this regard, given the nature of the breaches alleged by IPP, nothing really turned on the issue of whether Dr Goh had been an executive or non-executive director. The alleged breaches related either to Dr Goh’s lack of knowledge about one of IPP’s two lines of business, or his lack of adequate supervision over IPP’s affairs by failing to respond appropriately to red flags. To my mind, these were not matters that were within the exclusive remit of executive directors. On the contrary, these were the very matters that a non-executive director was entrusted with, given that the principal function of non-executive directors is to provide supervision of the company’s affairs under the executive management and hold them to account (see Company Directors: Duties, Liabilities and Remedies (Mark Arnold KC gen ed) (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2024) (“Company Directors”) at para 14.51). In metaphorical terms, a non-executive director is tasked to “act as a guard dog and be prepared to bark when necessary” (see Company Directors at para 14.58). As Chan Seng Onn J observed in the High Court decision of Abdul Ghani bin Tahir v Public Prosecutor [2017] 4 SLR 1153 (at [65]):

  138. [86] As a matter of logic, for a director – whether executive or non-executive – to discharge his supervisory functions, he would have to be sufficiently apprised of the company’s business and affairs in the first place (see the English High Court decision of Re Barings and others (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433 (“Barings”) at 489). A guard dog that has no understanding of what it is guarding cannot sensibly discharge its function (see the High Court decision of Vita Health Laboratories Pte Ltd and others v Pang Seng Meng [2004] 4 SLR(R) 162 (“Vita Health”) at [21]). This is why, in the statement of the Court of Appeal in Ho Yew Kong that I have quoted above at [65], the court expressed the “minimum objective standard” of all directors as including an obligation to “take reasonable steps to place oneself in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company” [emphasis added].

  139. Dr Goh’s alleged breaches of duty

  140. [87] Having calibrated the appropriate standard, I turn to the alleged breaches of duty identified by IPP. To recapitulate, IPP identified the following instances of negligence by Dr Goh:

  141. (a) First, that he had been ignorant of IPP’s cargo trading business, which was the source of the fraud; and

  142. (b) Second, that he had failed to act reasonably by making inquiries in the face of certain red flags that would have led him to discover the fraud in IPP’s cargo trading business.

  143. Whether Dr Goh was ignorant of IPP’s cargo trading business

  144. [88] I deal first with the allegation that Dr Goh had been ignorant of IPP’s cargo trading business. The parties’ dispute on this issue generally panned out as a disagreement on the proper interpretation or inferences to be drawn as to Dr Goh’s knowledge from a few pieces of evidence.

  145. [89] In my judgment, the weight of the evidence pointed roundly towards the conclusion that Dr Goh had indeed not known that IPP had been involved in cargo trading for basically the entire duration of his directorship of IPP. Specifically, the evidence showed that Dr Goh only discovered that IPP had a cargo trading business on or around 22 August 2019, which was, in fact, after he had resigned from IPP’s board (on 12 August 2019).

  146. (1) Dr Goh’s email to the Police on 22 August 2019

  147. [90] An email sent by Dr Goh on 22 August 2019 to the Police, in which he reported his findings following a meeting with the Banks on the same day, showed clearly that Dr Goh had no knowledge of IPP’s cargo trading business prior to this meeting with the Banks.

  148. [91] That Dr Goh had not known of IPP’s cargo trading business was the only possible reading of paragraph 3 of his email, which read as follows:

  149. Dr Goh’s use of the word “[a]pparently” indicated that he had not known of the facts that he then went on to state, and that he had just found out about it. Indeed, Dr Goh conceded this point in cross-examination.

  150. [92] As the sums of money owed by IPP to the Banks were too large to be attributable to IPP’s bunkering business, Dr Goh “asked the banks to tell [him] the nature of the bank lines, i.e. what they were given for”. This was highly telling. It was not disputed that IPP only had two lines of business. Thus, if Dr Goh had known of IPP’s cargo trading business, the fact that he had been able to rule out IPP’s bunkering business as the cause of IPP’s indebtedness would have led him to conclude, by himself, that the cargo trading business was the cause. But he was ostensibly unable to do so, as he had to ask the Banks “what [the bank lines] were given for”. This suggested that, after ruling out the bunkering business, Dr Goh could not independently think of another reason why IPP could have owed so much money to the Banks; this inability was consistent with a lack of knowledge of IPP’s cargo trading business.

  151. [93] The inference that Dr Goh had not known of IPP’s cargo trading business was strengthened by his demonstrated lack of knowledge as to any details on said line of business in paragraph 4 of his email:

  152. [94] Three points can be made from the above. First, all the details stated by Dr Goh in this paragraph were not matters that he had had personal knowledge of. Instead, he was merely parroting what the Banks had told him. Second, Dr Goh conceded in cross-examination that his use of “[a]pparently” in this paragraph disclosed that he had not known of IPP’s trading counterparties in its cargo trading business. Third, Dr Goh evidently had no involvement at all in the cargo trading business, as the Banks only identified “Zoe”, “Wallace To”, “Cecilia” and “Stephen” as persons that they had dealt with. Dr Goh was conspicuously absent. All these factors were consistent with a finding that he had not known of IPP’s cargo trading business.

  153. [95] Finally, the following paragraph in Dr Goh’s email also indicated that he had not known of IPP’s cargo trading business:

  154. [96] This paragraph had to be understood in the context that Dr Goh had, prior to this email on 22 August 2019, been in communications with the Police. That the Police had ongoing investigations into IPP at the time was not disputed by the parties.

  155. [97] In my judgment, the point that Dr Goh was conveying to the Police in this paragraph was that the Police had been “barking up the wrong tree” by hitherto focusing their investigative efforts on IPP’s bunkering business. Evidently, when the Police had asked Dr Goh previously “how the company made its money”, Dr Goh had only informed them of IPP’s bunkering business. The fact that Dr Goh had not apprised the Police of IPP’s cargo trading business was another factor consistent with his lack of knowledge of it.

  156. [98] Dr Goh attempted to explain away his omission in informing the Police earlier about IPP’s cargo trading business on the basis that the Police’s investigations had been confined to IPP’s bunkering business. Specifically, the Police’s concern as to “how [IPP] made its money” related to their concern that IPP had been cheating its customers by tampering with the mass flow meter on IPP’s bunker tankers after such an incident of tampering had been discovered during an inspection by the MPA (and which led to the suspension of IPP’s Bunker Craft Operator Licence).

  157. [99] I did not accept this explanation. The natural interpretation of Dr Goh’s statement that he had been asked “how the company made its money” was that the Police had been looking into IPP’s business as a whole, and not merely its bunkering business. Thus, Dr Goh’s failure to tell the Police about the cargo trading business despite the Police’s inquiry into IPP’s entire business also suggested that he had not known of it.

  158. [100] Dr Goh also attempted to explain that, by his statement that “[i]t now appears that Zoe has been engaging in cargo trades, some of which may now turn out to be fraudulent”, he had only intended to convey his discovery of fraudulent cargo trades. This was as opposed to him having discovered both (a) that Zoe had been engaging in cargo trading generally; and (b) that some of these cargo trades were fraudulent. The difference between these two interpretations was that, in the former, Dr Goh could maintain that he had known of IPP’s cargo trading business, albeit he had not been aware of the fraud, whereas the latter interpretation was consistent with IPP’s case that he had been ignorant as to the cargo trading business as a whole.

  159. [101] I was also not convinced by this explanation. It was an entirely unnatural reading of what Dr Goh had said. Dr Goh had clearly made a compound discovery of two facts (a) that Zoe had been engaging in cargo trading; and (b) some of Zoe’s cargo trades were fraudulent. Had Dr Goh only intended to convey the latter, his reference to his discovery that “Zoe has been engaging in cargo trades” would have been superfluous.

  160. [102] For the above reasons, I agreed with IPP that Dr Goh’s email to the Police on 22 August 2019 strongly suggested that Dr Goh had not known of IPP’s cargo trading business prior to his meeting with the Banks on the same day.

  161. (2) Dr Goh’s interview with IPP’s JMs on 27 February 2020

  162. [103] IPP also relied on an interview of Dr Goh by IPP’s JMs on 27 February 2020. It submitted that, in the course of this interview, Dr Goh had stated on multiple occasions that IPP had not been involved in cargo trading, and that this disclosed that he had been unaware of IPP’s cargo trading business.

  163. [104] Dr Goh’s response was twofold. First, as a threshold point, he submitted that IPP was precluded from relying on the interview and its contents as the interview had been conducted on a “without prejudice” basis. Second, Dr Goh submitted that, in any event, what he had said during the interview did not support the inference that he had been ignorant of IPP’s cargo trading business.

  164. [105] I did not think there was anything in the first submission. The issue of what the parties had meant by the interview being conducted on a “without prejudice” basis had already been litigated and decided before trial by Mavis Chionh J in HC/SUM 2874/2021. Chionh J held there that the parties had not meant that the contents of the interview were cloaked with privilege from disclosure in litigation or admission as evidence in subsequent proceedings, but that Dr Goh “should not be bound by or held to what he said at that meeting and would instead be entitled to correct anything he said at the meeting”. To my mind, all this meant was that IPP would be entitled to make whatever submission it intended to on the inferences to be drawn from the interview, and Dr Goh could put forward such alternative interpretations and inferences as he saw fit to rebut IPP’s understanding. Thus, if Dr Goh considered that IPP had “engaged in unfair cherry picking and curating” of the interview in its submissions, he was well-entitled to point that out to the court, and to make the relevant arguments to invite the court to arrive at the same conclusion. Put simply, the interview fell to be treated in the same way as any other piece of evidence before the court.

  165. [106] As for the main issue as to the proper inference to be drawn from the interview, I accepted IPP’s position that the interview supported the finding that Dr Goh had not known of the cargo trading business. I shall refer to some excerpts from the interview to illustrate this.

  166. [107] I first considered the following exchange between Dr Goh and the JMs:

  167. [108] This exchange revealed Dr Goh’s belief that IPP had only been involved in bunkering and not cargo trading. In my view, the context of Dr Goh’s statement – the question that Mr Tan had put to him – was critical: Dr Goh was asked whether, at the time he signed documents relating to the Maybank Facility, he had known that these documents related to IPP’s cargo trading business. The fact that Mr Tan had specifically directed Dr Goh’s attention to the Maybank Facility was crucial as it was not disputed that the Maybank Facility only financed IPP’s cargo trading, and not its bunkering, operations (see [13] above).

  168. [109] Given that the Maybank Facility exclusively financed IPP’s cargo trading business, the fact that Dr Goh responded that he had “though it was ex-wharf” – ie, bunker fuel oil – indicated that he had been labouring under a misapprehension that he had been signing off on bunkering transactions all the while. In other words, Dr Goh had (mistakenly) believed that IPP was only involved in bunkering. Indeed, this mistaken belief was confirmed by Dr Goh himself, as he stated that he had told the Police that “all these are bunker, bunker, so bunker, what cargo? We don’t do cargo, we’re only doing bunker”.

  169. [110] Dr Goh raised an objection in his reply submissions that this was “patently unfair” as this allegation had never been put to him. I did not agree. The point had indeed been raised to Dr Goh by IPP’s counsel in cross-examination:

  170. [111] Dr Goh’s mistaken belief that IPP had only been involved in bunkering was subsequently confirmed in the following exchange:

  171. [112] First, Dr Goh’s statement that “[m]y assumption was we are in the bunker industry” and his belief that “[t]he bank lines [he] signed off for bunker, so everything is purely bunker-related” corroborated the inference above that, even when signing off on a banking facility that solely financed IPP’s cargo trading business (ie, the Maybank Facility), Dr Goh had been under a misimpression that he was only signing off on bunkering transactions (see [109] above).

  172. [113] Second, in this exchange, Dr Goh stated no less than seven times – either in the form of an unequivocal statement or rhetorical question – that there was “not a single cargo trader in [IPP]”. Indeed, Dr Goh even elaborated on why he had held this belief: he had been under the impression that cargo trading had been undertaken not by IPP, but Chuang Xin, a related company in Hong Kong. Thus, Dr Goh considered that if the Banks had allowed the Facilities to be used for cargo trading, they must have “knowingly allow[ed] it to be used at the Chuang Xin level” instead of by IPP.

  173. [114] Both of these points were also apparent in the following exchange:

  174. [115] A few points from this are worth noting. First, Dr Goh referred to IPP as “a bunker company”. This again suggested that he had not been cognisant of the fact that IPP had two lines of business in bunkering and cargo trading. Second, Dr Goh also reiterated his belief that, if the Banks had “allow[ed] the bank lines to be used for cargo trading”, they must have “obviously know[n] that the trader is in Hong Kong, because there is no trader in Singapore doing cargo”. This was consistent with his asserted belief that only Chuang Xin (a Hong Kong company), and not IPP, had been involved in cargo trading. Third, Dr Goh stated that the Banks had “allow[ed] a line that was … specifically … for bunkering to be used for other purposes”. This was a peculiar statement, given that neither of the Facilities granted by SocGen or Maybank were exclusively for IPP’s bunkering operations only. Indeed, the only exclusivity of purpose restriction was in the Maybank Facility, which could only be used for cargo trading. The fact that Dr Goh had misapprehended that there had been a Facility that could be used only for bunkering also supported the inference that he had believed IPP to be only involved in bunkering.

  175. [116] Dr Goh attempted to explain away his apparent concession on the basis that the parties (including himself) had not been precise in their use of “cargo” through the interview. Thus, Dr Goh had supposedly used and understood “cargo” at various times as referring to: (a) cargo which includes bunker fuel; (b) cargo that was not bunker fuel; and/or (c) a situation of IPP taking possession of cargo itself and physically delivering it from port-to-port (this being distinct from IPP’s cargo trading operations). Thus, the interview could not be read as an unequivocal admission of his ignorance of IPP’s cargo trading business.

  176. [117] I was not persuaded by this explanation. Dr Goh demonstrated an ability during the interview to clearly distinguish between “cargo” simpliciter and “ex-wharf cargo from breaking bulk” (which described IPP’s bunkering business). The distinction between cargo trading and bunker trading was thus apparent to him. Further, if Dr Goh had actually been unclear as to what the JMs were referring to, one would have reasonably expected him to seek a clarification. The fact that he did not do so suggested that his claim that he and the JMs had been speaking at cross-purposes was a contrived afterthought.

  177. [118] Moreover, Dr Goh’s explanation required the court to believe that he had used “cargo” in multiple senses including, as Dr Goh himself recognised in his reply submissions, in ways that were “inherently inconsistent” with one another. This was improbable given, in particular, his ability to distinguish between “cargo” simpliciter and “ex-wharf cargo”.

  178. [119] Finally, I was also not convinced by Dr Goh’s attempt at explaining his denial of IPP’s involvement in cargo trading as a denial of a different mode of cargo trading than that which IPP had been involved in. This distinction made little sense in context. Assuming arguendo that Dr Goh had in fact known of IPP’s cargo trading business, it was quite bizarre that, when asked by the JMs about cargo trading, his mind somehow gravitated towards a mode of cargo trading other than that which IPP was engaged in: if he had known of the nature of IPP’s cargo trading business, why would he set up a straw man of a different type of cargo trading? The most natural inference from Dr Goh’s denial of IPP’s involvement in cargo trading was simply that he had not known of it.

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