General Division of the High Court · Decided 5 February 2024
Public Prosecutor v CRH
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 34 · Case no. Criminal Case No 66 of 2022
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The Accused pleaded guilty to two charges of attempted aggravated rape of his biological daughter (“the Victim”). The offences were committed in or around 2013 but came to light only in 2021. Between these two dates, certain amendments were made to the provisions of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (the “PC”) concerning the punishment for attempts to commit offences.
- [2]
[2] The punishment for aggravated rape under s 375(3)(b) of the PC is imprisonment for a minimum term of eight years and a maximum of 20 years, and caning with a minimum of 12 strokes. In the version of the PC in force at the time of the offences (the “Pre-2019 Amendment PC”), s 511(1) provided that an attempt to commit an offence shall “be punished with such punishment as is provided for the offence”, while the relevant part of s 511(2) provided that the longest imprisonment term that may be imposed shall not exceed “one-half of the longest term provided for the offence”. This meant that the maximum imprisonment term which may be imposed for attempted aggravated rape was ten years. An issue which arose for decision in this case was whether the minimum sentence of eight years prescribed for aggravated rape also applied in its entirety to the offence of attempted aggravated rape, with the result that the sentence which could be imposed for attempted aggravated rape was confined to the rather narrow range of eight to ten years (“Issue A”).
- [3]
[3] Section 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC had been repealed by the Criminal Law Reform Act 2019 (Act 15 of 2019) (the “CLRA”), which enacted the new ss 511 and 512 in its place. The new s 512(3)(a) now expressly provides that, where a minimum sentence is prescribed for an offence, the court is not bound to impose the said minimum when sentencing for an attempt to commit that offence. A second issue which arose for decision in this case was: whether, assuming Issue A was answered in the affirmative, s 512(3)(a) could be applied retrospectively to the Accused’s benefit such that the court was not bound to impose on the Accused the minimum imprisonment term of eight years prescribed for (completed) aggravated rape (“Issue B”).
- [4]
[4] For the reasons given in these grounds, I answered both Issue A and Issue B in the negative. In the light of my answer to Issue A, I sentenced the Accused to a global sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment and 16 strokes of the cane, comprising six years and six months’ imprisonment and eight strokes of the cane for each of the proceeded charges with the imprisonment terms running consecutively.
The charges
- [5]
[5] The two charges which the Accused pleaded guilty to (the “First Charge” and the “Third Charge”) each alleged that, sometime in or around 2013, the Accused committed attempted aggravated rape of the Victim, who was then under 14 years of age, by attempting to penetrate the Victim’s vagina with his penis without her consent, thereby committing an offence under s 375(1)(b) read with s 511(1), punishable under s 375(3)(b) read with s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC.
- [6]
[6] The Accused consented to having three other charges taken into consideration (“TIC”) for the purposes of sentencing. These were:
(a) one charge for use of criminal force on the Victim, who was then under 14 years of age, with intent to outrage her modesty sometime in or around 2013, contrary to s 354(1) and punishable under s 354(2) of the PC (the “Second Charge”); and
(b) two charges each for intentionally recording an image of the genitals of the Victim, who was then under 14 years of age, without her consent sometime between 7 April 2020 to 1 June 2020 contrary to s 377BB(5) and punishable under s 377BB(8) of the PC (the “Fourth Charge” and the “Fifth Charge”).
The relevant statutory provisions
- [7]
[7] Section 375(1)(b) read with s 375(3)(b) of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC provided:
- [8]
[8] Section 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC provided:
- [9]
[9] With effect from 1 January 2020, s 167 of the CLRA repealed s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC, and replaced it with the new ss 511 and 512. In the version of the PC in force from 1 January 2020 (“the Post-2019 Amendment PC"), s 511 defined the scope and elements of the offence of attempting to commit offences, while s 512 dealt with the punishment for attempting to commit offences. Section 512 of the Post-2019 Amendment PC read:
The parties’ initial sentencing submissions
- [10]
[10] At the first sentencing hearing, the Prosecution sought a sentence of eight and a half to nine years’ imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane for each proceeded charge (ie, of attempted aggravated rape), with the imprisonment terms to run concurrently, for a global sentence of eight and a half to nine years’ imprisonment and 24 strokes of the cane. In arriving at this submission, the Prosecution proceeded on the basis that the minimum sentence of eight years prescribed for a (completed) aggravated rape offence applied fully, without any reduction, to an offence of attempted aggravated rape.
- [11]
[11] The Defence submitted that a sentence of imprisonment for six and a half years and 12 strokes of the cane for each proceeded charge would be appropriate, with the sentences to run concurrently, for a global sentence of imprisonment for six and a half years and 24 strokes of the cane. In arriving at this submission, the Defence argued that the minimum sentence of eight years prescribed for the (completed) aggravated rape offence should be halved to four years when applied to the offence of attempted aggravated rape.
Issues to be determined
- [12]
[12] Given the dispute between parties over whether a minimum sentence prescribed for a completed offence was imported in its entirety by s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC to an attempt to commit that offence, I directed parties to file further submissions on the following two issues:
(a) Issue A: Whether s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC operated to apply the mandatory minimum sentence for a completed offence to an attempt to commit the offence.
(b) Issue B: If Issue A was answered in the affirmative, whether in any event s 512(3)(a) of the Post-2019 Amendment PC can be applied retrospectively for the Accused’s benefit, such that the Court was not bound to impose the mandatory minimum sentence under s 375(3)(b) of the PC for each of the Accused’s attempted aggravated rape offences.
- [13]
[13] A Young Independent Counsel (“YIC”), Mr Chin Yan Xun, was also appointed to assist the court on these two issues. The parties’ further submissions and the YIC’s submissions on the respective issues are outlined and discussed below.
A note about terminology
- [14]
[14] The issues arising in this case concerned the punishment for attempts to commit offences. To distinguish an attempted offence (which itself is an offence – eg, the offence of attempted aggravated rape in the present case) from the offence being attempted (eg, the offence of aggravated rape), I refer to the latter as either the “primary offence” or the “(completed) offence”, depending on which of these two expressions flow better with the surrounding language of the passage in which they appear. In terms of meaning and substance, the expressions “primary offence” and “(completed) offence” are used interchangeably in these grounds.
Issue A: Whether section 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC operated to apply the mandatory minimum sentence for a completed offence to an attempt to commit the offence
The submissions
- [15]
[15] The Prosecution began its submission by referring to the phrase “be punished with such punishment as is provided for the offence” in s 511(1) of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC. In the rest of these grounds, I shall refer to this phrase as the “Phrase in Question”. The Prosecution submitted that the only possible meaning of the Phrase in Question was that the punishment provision for the primary offence would apply in its entirety to an attempt to commit that offence, including any minimum imprisonment term prescribed in the said punishment provision. Since s 511(2)(b) of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC only halved the maximum imprisonment term and was silent concerning the minimum imprisonment term, it must have meant that any minimum imprisonment term made applicable by s 511(1) remained unaffected by s 511(2)(b). The Prosecution also highlighted that there were a number of Singapore cases, beginning with Public Prosecutor v Ho Wee Fah [1998] SGHC 128 (“Ho Wee Fah”), which regarded the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence as being applicable to an attempt to commit that offence. Noting that s 511 underwent amendment in 2007, the Prosecution submitted that if Parliament had been of the view that the decision in Ho Wee Fah did not reflect Parliament’s intention, Parliament would have had the opportunity to make this clear in 2007, but did not do so.
- [16]
[16] The YIC reached the same conclusion as the Prosecution, but for slightly different reasons. The YIC noted that the expression “such punishment” in the Phrase in Question could refer either to the type of punishment or the amount of punishment. If “such punishment” referred only to the type of punishment, it would support an interpretation which did not apply the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence to an attempt to commit that offence. Conversely, if the expression referred also to the amount of punishment, it would support an interpretation which applied the minimum sentence completely to an attempt. The YIC submitted that the former reading would lead to an “unworkable or impractical” result in that a court sentencing for an attempt to commit an offence would then not be bound by any upper limit as to the amount of fine or caning it could impose. This was because, while s 511 prescribed the maximum imprisonment term which could be imposed (ie, one-half of that prescribed for the completed offence), there were no provisions in s 511 prescribing the maximum for fine or caning (unless the expression “such punishment” is read as referring also to the amount of punishment). The YIC further submitted that the Defence’s preferred interpretation, that s 511 had the effect of halving the minimum sentence, was not one which the text of the provision could bear. In relation to the amendments made to s 511 in 2007, the YIC similarly submitted that if Ho Wee Fah had been wrongly decided, Parliament could have legislated otherwise in 2007, but did not do so.
- [17]
[17] In its written submissions, the Defence took the position that s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC operated to reduce the minimum imprisonment term when applied to an attempt to commit the offence. This would avoid the “theoretical anomalous situation” where halving the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for the completed offence could result in it becoming less than the minimum term applicable. Further, in cases where the minimum term was exactly half of the maximum prescribed for the completed offence, applying the minimum term to an attempt without any reduction would result in the court not having any discretion to pass different sentences to distinguish between cases of different seriousness. The Defence also referred to a number of cases from India, decided under s 511 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) (the “IPC”), which treated the minimum sentence as being halved (or as not being applicable) when sentencing for an attempt.
- [18]
[18] At the second sentencing hearing, the Defence took the position that the minimum sentence prescribed for a completed offence would have no application at all to an attempt to commit the offence. The Defence submitted that the Phrase in Question referred only to the type and not the amount of punishment. The Defence further argued that, as the Phrase in Question was first introduced into s 511 in 1933, at a time when there were no mandatory minimum sentences in the PC, it would be anachronistic to read into the Phrase in Question an intention to make mandatory minimum sentences applicable to the punishment of attempts. Finally, the Defence submitted that an attempt to commit an offence was less serious than the completed offence, as the fact that the offence was not completed meant that less harm was caused. It therefore could not be the case that the same mandatory minimum sentence was applicable to both a person guilty of committing the completed offence and a person merely guilty of attempting to commit that offence, as the latter was clearly less culpable.
Analysis
- [19]
[19] It would not go unnoticed that an assumption underlying the submissions on Issue A was that the applicable punishment provision in the present case was s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC (and not s 512 of the Post-2019 Amendment PC). This was a natural and obvious assumption to make, as it is a general principle of law that the legal consequences of an act or omission should be based on the law prevailing at the time of such act or omission. Whether this assumption held true in the specific circumstances of the present case was a matter to be explored under Issue B, and not a matter which arose under Issue A. Therefore, the discussion below on Issue A proceeded on the assumption that s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC was the applicable punishment provision, without prejudice to the discussion on and outcome of Issue B.
Structure of this section
- [20]
[20] I begin this part of the discussion by outlining the applicable principles of statutory interpretation. As the parties and the YIC have, in the course of their submissions, referred to some Singapore and Indian case law and also referred to the various amendments which s 511 of the PC had undergone over the years, I next considered the cases cited by the parties followed by an examination of the legislative evolution of s 511 of the PC. I then proceed with my own analysis of Issue A in accordance with the applicable principles of statutory interpretation.
The applicable legal principles in statutory interpretation
- [21]
[21] Pursuant to s 9A of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Interpretation Act”), an interpretation of a provision of a written law that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law is to be preferred to an interpretation that would not. This approach to the interpretation of statutes is known as “purposive interpretation”. According to Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”), the court’s task, when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative provision, involved the following three steps (at [37]):
(a) First, ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision, but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole.
(b) Second, ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the statute.
(c) Third, compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute.
I elaborate on the relevant considerations which guide the application of each of these three steps at the appropriate junctures in these grounds.
The relevant case law
- [22]
[22] The Prosecution cited five cases where the Singapore High Court had treated the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence as applying without reduction to an attempt to commit the offence. These are Ho Wee Fah, Public Prosecutor v Huang Shiyou [2010] 1 SLR 417 (“Huang Shiyou”), Public Prosecutor v Shamsul bin Sa’at [2010] 3 SLR 900, Public Prosecutor v Tan Jun Hui [2013] SGHC 94 and Public Prosecutor v BZT [2022] SGHC 148.
- [23]
[23] Ordinarily, the fact that a particular interpretation was adopted in five previous High Court cases would constitute strong persuasive authority for me to do the same. However, upon closer examination of these cases, it became apparent that, apart from Ho Wee Fah, none of the other cases gave any reasons for adopting the interpretation they did.
- [24]
[24] According to LawNet, Ho Wee Fah is an unreported oral judgment. An inspection of the case file revealed that the present issue was not put in dispute in that case and the court did not have the benefit of the parties’ submissions on it, not least because the defence counsel conceded in his mitigation plea that the minimum sentence applied there.
- [25]
[25] The reasons given in Ho Wee Fah were as follows (at [5]):
As is apparent from the passage quoted above, the reasoning in Ho Wee Fah began and ended with the literal or grammatical meaning of the text of s 511. There was no examination of the context and no consideration of object and purpose. As noted in Diggory Bailey & Luke Norbury, Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th Ed, 2020) (“Bennion”) at 378:
Thus, although the grammatical meaning of a text might serve as a starting point, it need not necessarily be the end point, after taking into account relevant interpretative factors such as context and object and purpose.
- [26]
[26] The lack of consideration of the context and object and purpose in the reasoning in Ho Wee Fah meant that, if I were to faithfully apply the three-step framework laid down in Tan Cheng Bock, I could not at the same time follow Ho Wee Fah uncritically. It might well be that, after applying the Tan Cheng Bock framework, I could arrive at the same conclusion as Ho Wee Fah. But if I did, it would be the result of an exercise in purposive interpretation, undertaken according to the Tan Cheng Bock framework, and not because I followed the reasoning articulated in Ho Wee Fah.
- [27]
[27] I turn next to the four Indian cases cited by the Defence. These cases were decided between 1999 and 2013 and concerned offences of attempted rape committed between 1984 and 2012. At the material time the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence of rape under s 376(1) of the IPC was imprisonment of either description for seven years, while the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence of aggravated rape under s 376(2) of the IPC was rigorous imprisonment for ten years. At the material time, these were presumptive rather than mandatory minimum sentences, in the sense that the legislation expressly provided that the court may “for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment” impose a sentence below the prescribed minimum.
- [28]
[28] The first case was Rafat Mian v State of U.P. 2000 CriLJ 3039 (All) (“Rafat”), a decision of the Allahabad High Court on appeal from the Bareilly Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge had convicted the accused of attempted rape and sentenced him to three years of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court dismissed the accused’s appeal against conviction, and affirmed the sentence awarded by the Sessions Judge. The second case was Nand Lal v State of H.P. 2000 CriLJ 3106 (HP) (“Nand Lal”), a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court on appeal from the Solan Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge had convicted the accused of attempted rape and sentenced him to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of 3,000.00 Indian Rupees (“Rs”). The High Court dismissed the accused’s appeal against conviction, and affirmed the sentence awarded by the Sessions Judge. The third case was Sri Amarappa S/O Sri Yellappa v State by Women Police Davanagere Crl.A 2447/06 (4 March 2013) (“Sri Amarappa”), a decision of Karnataka High Court on appeal from the Davanagere Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge had convicted the accused of attempted aggravated rape and sentenced him to 3.5 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 10,000.00. The High Court allowed the accused’s appeal against conviction for attempted aggravated rape, and convicted the accused of the lesser charge of outrage of modesty. In all three cases, the judgments did not give reasons for the sentences imposed. In particular, none of these judgments discussed whether the presumptive minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence were applicable for the sentencing of an attempt to commit that offence.
- [29]
[29] The fourth case was Barkatullakha v State of Maharashtra 2002 CriLJ 427 (Bom) (“Barka”), a decision of the Bombay High Court on revision from the Khamgaon Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge convicted the accused of attempted rape and sentenced him to two years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 7,000.00. The accused brought revision proceedings in the Bombay High Court to set aside his conviction and sentence. The judgment of the High Court recorded that (at [2]):
The High Court dismissed the accused’s revision application and affirmed his conviction. As for sentence, the High Court held that the Sessions Judge did not have “adequate and special reasons” to go below the minimum sentence prescribed and decided that “this is a case where minimum sentence prescribed in law should have been awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, ie, to say 3½ years of imprisonment” (Barka at [14]).
- [30]
[30] The Prosecution also brought the court’s attention to the case of The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh v Lingisetty Sreenu (AP/0188/1997) (“Lingisetty”), a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on appeal from the Tenali Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge acquitted the accused on the charge of rape and convicted him for outrage of modesty instead. On appeal, the High Court set aside the Sessions Court judgment and convicted the accused of attempted rape. In deciding to sentence the accused to rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs 5,000.00, the court gave the following reason (at [22]):
- [31]
[31] The following observations may be made about the foregoing five Indian cases:
(a) In Barka, both the Sessions Court and the High Court expressly took the position that the minimum sentence of seven years for rape was halved when applied to attempted rape. However, there was no explanation in the judgment as to how, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the minimum sentence would be halved when applied to an attempt.
(b) In Lingisetty, the High Court similarly took the position that the minimum sentence of seven years for rape was halved to 3.5 years when applied to attempted rape, but decided to exercise its discretion to go below the presumptive minimum of 3.5 years to impose a sentence of three years. There was no detailed discussion in the judgment on how, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the minimum sentence would be halved when applied to an attempt.
(c) There could be at least two possible explanations for the sentence of three years imposed by the courts in Rafat and Nand Lal. The first is that, like the court in Lingisetty, they considered the minimum sentence to be halved to 3.5 years but found “adequate and special reasons” to go below 3.5 years. The second is that they considered the minimum sentence to be of no application at all when sentencing for attempts. In the absence of any reasons recorded in the judgments, we cannot be certain how the sentence of three years was arrived at in these two cases. The same may be said of the decision of the Sessions Court in Sri Amarappa.
- [32]
[32] Both the Prosecution and the YIC noted that the Indian cases were of little assistance as s 511 of the IPC was worded differently from s 511 of the PC. Section 511 of the IPC read:
It did not contain the Phrase in Question, on which the submissions of the Prosecution and the YIC were founded. Instead, it contains the phrase “be punished with imprisonment … for a term which may extend to … one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence”, which easily lent itself to the interpretation that a minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence had no application at all to an attempt to commit the offence. A further observation might be made that this phrase in s 511 of the IPC did not appear to lend itself easily to the interpretation adopted in Barka and Lingisetty without resort to strained construction. In the light of the foregoing observations, I agreed with the Prosecution and the YIC that not much assistance could be derived from the Indian authorities.
The legislative evolution
As explained in the foregoing passage from Sullivan, since the legislative evolution of a provision consists of the legislative text itself, it is not really extrinsic material.
(1) Section 511 of the Penal Code as originally enacted in 1871
- [35]
[35] When the PC was first enacted in 1871 (Ordinance 4 of 1871), s 511 read:
- [36]
[36] I shall refer to this 1871 version of s 511 as the “1871 Provision”. Two observations might be made about the 1871 Provision. First, it applied only to PC offences punishable by penal servitude or imprisonment. This meant that the 1871 Provision did not apply to non-PC offences and also did not apply to PC offences which were punishable by fine only. Second, the 1871 Provision did not contain the Phrase in Question. Instead, the operative punishment provision in the 1871 Provision read:
In this context, the phrase “penal servitude or imprisonment of any description provided for the offence” clearly referred only to the type and not the amount of punishment (to employ the YIC’s “type vs amount” analysis alluded to at [16] above). This was because the only relevant reference to the amount of penal servitude or imprisonment was already found in the phrase “which may extend to one-half of the longest term”. There was thus neither purpose in nor justification for interpreting the phrase “penal servitude or imprisonment of any description provided for the offence” as also referring to the amount of punishment. However, as the Prosecution rightly pointed out, the phrase “such fine” in the 1871 Provision could, and probably should, be read as referring to the amount of fine.
(2) The 1933 amendment
- [37]
[37] Section 511 of the PC was amended in 1933 by s 27 of the Penal Code (Amendment) Ordinance (No 35 of 1933) (the “1933 Ordinance”) to read:
The first change made by the 1933 amendment was the expansion of the scope of s 511 to cover non-PC offences as well as PC offences punishable by fine only. The second change was the replacement of the operative punishment provision in the 1871 Provision (as quoted at [36] above) with the following new punishment provision:
This new punishment provision introduced the Phrase in Question into s 511 for the first time.
- [38]
[38] The Prosecution submitted that this newly inserted Phrase in Question was intended to encompass both the type and amount of the punishment prescribed for the completed offence, regardless of what the original position in the 1871 Provision might have been. The Prosecution pointed out that the expression “such punishment” in the Phrase in Question harked back to the expression “such fine” in the 1871 Provision, and therefore ought to similarly be read as referring to the amount of punishment.
- [39]
[39] The Defence submitted that the amendment effected by the new punishment provision was merely consequential to the expansion of s 511’s scope to include offences punishable by fine only, and was not evidence of a separate intention to fundamentally alter how the punishment provision in s 511 operated. In this regard, the Defence submitted that there was continuity from the position in 1871, in that the new phrase was effectively a summary of the phrase “be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment of any description provided for the offence ... or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both” in the 1871 Provision. Further, the concept of minimum sentences could not have been within the contemplation of the drafters at the time, as there were no minimum sentences in the PC in 1933. It would therefore be anachronistic to read into the Phrase in Question an intention to refer to minimum sentences, which was something entirely unheard of in 1933.
- [40]
[40] I will evaluate the relative strengths of these submissions when I go through the steps of the Tan Cheng Bock framework for purposive interpretation in a later part of these grounds.
(3) The 1955 amendment
- [41]
[41] Section 511 was next amended in 1955 to remove the references to penal servitude in the light of the abolition of penal servitude by the Criminal Justice (Punishment — Amendment) Ordinance (No 20 of 1954). This amendment was not effected by way of primary legislation, but through the exercise of the Law Revision Commissioners’ powers when publishing the 1955 Revised Edition of the Laws. It was common ground that the 1955 amendment had no impact on the meaning and interpretation of the Phrase in Question. After the 1955 amendment, the text of s 511 remained unchanged until 2007.
(4) Introduction of mandatory minimum sentences in Singapore
- [42]
[42] In 1973, mandatory minimum sentences were introduced into our law with the enactment of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Act 5 of 1973) (the “MDA”), the Arms Offences Act 1973 (Act 61 of 1973) (the “Arms Offences Act 1973”) and the Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1973 (Act 62 of 1973) (the “Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1973”). The Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1973 introduced mandatory minimum caning for a number of robbery-related offences. In 1984, mandatory minimum prison terms were introduced into the PC by the Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1984 (Act 23 of 1984) (the “Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1984”).
(5) The 2007 amendment
- [43]
[43] In 2007, s 104 of the Penal Code (Amendment Act) 2007 (No 51 of 2007) (the “Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2007”) amended s 511 to read:
- [44]
[44] The 2007 amendment effected two changes to s 511. The first was a structural change, by moving what was previously in the proviso (“Provided that any term of imprisonment imposed shall not exceed one-half of the longest term provided for the offence”) into a newly created sub-section (2). The second change was the insertion of an express provision on the maximum prison term to be imposed on an attempt to commit an offence punishable with life imprisonment (in the form of the new s 511(2)(a)). This insertion resulted from the repeal of s 57 of the PC by s 13 of the Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2007.
- [45]
[45] Prior to its repeal in 2007, s 57 of the PC provided that:
The effect of s 57 was that, when the expression “one-half of the longest term provided for the offence” in s 511 was applied to an attempt to commit an offence punishable by life imprisonment, it would be treated as referring to ten years (being half of 20 years) (see Abdul Nasir bin Amer Hamsah v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 842 at [29]–[31]). Thus, the presence of s 57 of the PC meant that there was no need for express provisions in s 511 on the maximum punishment for attempts to commit offences punishable by life imprisonment. Conversely, with the repeal of s 57 in 2007, it became necessary for s 511 to deal expressly with the maximum punishment for attempts to commit offences punishable by life imprisonment. This was done through the insertion of the new s 511(2)(a). In doing so, Parliament took the opportunity to increase this maximum to 15 years (from the previous maximum of ten years).
- [46]
[46] It was relevant for present purposes that:
(a) the Phrase in Question was retained in s 511, unamended by the 2007 amendment; and
(b) it was common ground that the shifting of the former proviso into a new subsection (2) was a change of form rather than substance, and that 2007 amendment did not change the meaning and interpretation of the Phrase in Question.
After the 2007 amendment, the text of s 511 remained unchanged until its repeal in 2019.
Application of the Tan Cheng Bock framework for purposive interpretation
- [47]
[47] Having undertaken the foregoing survey for the purpose of understanding the relevant context, I turned next to the application of the Tan Cheng Bock framework for purposive interpretation. As noted above, this framework involved the following three steps:
(a) First, ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision.
(b) Second, ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the statute.
(c) Third, compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute.
(1) Step 1: Ascertaining possible interpretations of the provision in context
- [48]
[48] In the first step, the court ascertains the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision, but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock (at [38]):
- [49]
[49] Based on the parties’ and the YIC’s submissions, there were three contending interpretations of the punishment provision of s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC:
(a) the minimum sentence prescribed for a primary offence applies completely to an attempt to commit the offence (the “First Interpretation”);
(b) the minimum sentence prescribed for a primary offence has no application at all to an attempt to commit the offence (the “Second Interpretation”); and
(c) the minimum sentence prescribed for a primary offence is halved when applied to an attempt to commit the offence (the “Third Interpretation”).
- [50]
[50] The Third Interpretation might be quickly disposed of as not being a possible interpretation of the provision. This was not an interpretation which the text of the provision could bear. The only reference to halving of sentence in s 511 was in relation to the maximum term of imprisonment. The Third Interpretation would therefore require the reading in of words which did not exist in the statutory provision. Although there were some Indian cases which adopted this interpretation, I did not find them persuasive for the reasons discussed at [32] above. Finally, while the Defence was initially in favour of the Third Interpretation, this was no longer the Defence’s position by the time of the second sentencing hearing, during which the Defence submitted in favour of the Second Interpretation.
- [51]
[51] The First Interpretation construed the expression “such punishment” in the Phrase in Question as referring:
(a) to both the type of punishment and the amount of punishment; and
(b) in respect of amount, to all aspects of the concept of amount including any minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence.
In my view, the First Interpretation would likely be a “possible interpretation of the provision” (as that phrase is understood under the Tan Cheng Bock framework), since it reflected the literal and grammatical meaning of the text. However, as ascertaining possible interpretations requires the court to not just have regard to the text of the provision but also the context of that provision within the written law as a whole, the question of whether the First Interpretation was a “possible interpretation of the provision” required further analysis. I will embark on this analysis after introducing the Second Interpretation.
- [52]
[52] As for the Second Interpretation, both the Prosecution and the YIC did not consider it to be a possible interpretation of the provision. The YIC’s submission proceeded on the basis that adopting the Second Interpretation would require the Phrase in Question to be read as referring only to the type and not the amount of punishment. The YIC then reasoned that reading the Phrase in Question as referring only to the type of punishment would be untenable. This was because s 511(2)(b) of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC (as well as the proviso in the pre-2007 version of s 511) imposed only an upper limit on the term of imprisonment and said nothing about the upper limits for fine and caning. If the Phrase in Question were to be read as referring to the type of punishment only, a court passing a sentence under s 511 would be allowed to impose sentences of fine and caning which are in excess of the maximum fine or maximum caning prescribed for the primary offence. This would be “an unworkable or impracticable result”. The Prosecution similarly submitted that the Phrase in Question could not be referring to the type of punishment only.
- [53]
[53] While I agreed with the Prosecution and the YIC that the Phrase in Question referred to both the type and the amount of punishment, I did not agree that the Second Interpretation could only be arrived at by reading the Phrase in Question as referring solely to the type of punishment. In my view, the Second Interpretation could also be reached by considering that although the Phrase in Question referred to both the type and the amount of punishment, the “amount” being referred to in this context would concern only the maximum sentence and would not encompass the concept of minimum sentences. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v ASR [2019] 1 SLR 941 (“ASR”) (at [77]):
Back in 1933, the Phrase in Question would have been understood by the framers of the legislation, insofar as it referred to the amount of punishment, as referring to the maximum sentence. In other words, the ordinary meaning of the Phrase in Question at the time it was adopted by the Legislature in 1933 would not have encompassed the notion of a minimum sentence.
- [54]
[54] Thus, under the Second Interpretation, the expression “such punishment” in the Phrase in Question referred:
(a) to both the type of punishment and the amount of punishment; and
(b) in respect of amount, to only the maximum sentence prescribed for the primary offence.
- [55]
[55] Having sketched out the First Interpretation and the Second Interpretation, I proceeded to consider the arguments for and against each interpretation. In doing so, I was aided by the relevant rules and canons of statutory construction.
(A) Presumption of consistent expression
- [56]
[56] The first canon of statutory construction I considered was the presumption of consistent expression – ie, where the same word or phrase is used in different places within the same written law, they are presumed to have the same meaning. In this regard, the Prosecution submitted that it would be pertinent to consider whether there were other provisions in the Pre-2019 Amendment PC which contained a phrase similar to the Phrase in Question. The provision which the Prosecution identified for this purpose was s 109 of the PC, which reads:
- [57]
[57] The effect of s 109 was that, where a person abets an offence (the “primary offence”), and the primary offence was committed as a result, that person (the “abettor”) shall be punished with the punishment provided for the primary offence. The Prosecution referred me to three reported cases decided under s 109 which involved primary offences that were subject to mandatory minimum sentences: Low Khoon Hai v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 SLR(R) 958 (abetment of robbery with hurt by conspiracy under s 394 read with s 109 of the PC), Ang Ser Kuang v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 316 (abetment by conspiracy to commit robbery with hurt under s 394 read with s 109 of the PC) and Tay Chi Hiong v Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 SLR(R) 650 (two charges under s 8(1)(b) of the Moneylenders Act (Cap 188, 1985 Rev Ed) read with s 109 of the PC). In all three cases, the court applied the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence when sentencing the abettor under s 109. Arising from this, the Prosecution submitted that the Phrase in Question should be interpreted to similar effect as the similarly worded phrase in s 109 had been.
- [58]
[58] In my view, the court should not be too quick to draw parallels between the Phrase in Question in s 511 and the similarly worded phrase in s 109. Although the two phrases may look similar, the context of the two provisions are different. Section 109 concerns what is known as “complete abetment” – ie, a successful abetment where the primary offence was completed, while s 511 concerned an unsuccessful attempt where the primary offence was not completed. Since s 109 concerns an abettor who had succeeded in achieving what he set out to do, in a situation where the harm arising from the completion of the primary offence had been caused, it was clear that the object and purpose of s 109 was to punish the abettor as though he had personally committed the primary offence. In this context, it would be entirely consistent with a purposive interpretation of s 109 for the sentencing court to apply the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence without any discount. The same reasoning did not translate easily to the context of s 511, where the primary offence was not completed and the potential harm of the primary offence did not materialise. This was because, as a general rule, a person who attempted an offence should not be punished as though he had actually completed the offence. There were two reasons for this. First, the fact that the offence was not completed meant that less harm (or even no harm) was caused. Second, depending on the reason for the attempt not succeeding, a person who did not complete the offence might be less culpable than one who did.
- [59]
[59] Given the differences in context between s 511 and s 109, I held that any presumption that the Phrase in Question in s 511 should carry the same meaning as the similar phrase in s 109 had been adequately rebutted.
(B) Presumption of coherence
- [60]
[60] The second canon of statutory construction I considered was the presumption of coherence. As noted in Bennion at p 395:
Sullivan described the presumption of coherence in this way (at p 337):
- [61]
[61] In this regard, it was relevant to consider s 116 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC, which read:
Section 116 criminalises what is known as “inchoate abetment”. This means that, unlike s 109 which concerns successful abetment, s 116 concerns unsuccessful abetment, where the offence abetted was not committed. Section 116 provides that:
(a) an unsuccessful abetment is to be punished by imprisonment which may extend to one-quarter of the maximum prison term prescribed for the primary offence; and
(b) if the abettor or person abetted is a public servant whose duty is to prevent the commission of the primary offence, the unsuccessful abetment is to be punished by imprisonment which may extend to one-half of the maximum prison term prescribed for the primary offence.
- [62]
[62] The phrases “be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term provided for that offence” and “be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one-half of the longest term provided for that offence” did not make the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence applicable to an inchoate abetment of that primary offence. It is clear from the text and context of s 116 that s 116 did not import the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence. In fact, any attempt to read s 116 as importing the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence would lead to absurdity. One only needs to consider the offence of aggravated rape, where the minimum sentence is eight years and the maximum sentence is 20 years. One quarter of 20 years (ie, five years) is less than the minimum sentence of eight years. Thus, if s 116 is read as importing the minimum sentence for the primary offence, we would end up with an anomalous situation whether the minimum sentence for an offence of unsuccessfully abetting aggravated rape is eight years while the maximum for the very same offence is only five years.
- [63]
[63] Unlike the relationship between s 109 and s 511, there was a clear parallel between the nature of the offence criminalised by s 116 and the nature of the offence criminalised by s 511. Just as s 511 concerned the unsuccessful attempt to commit a primary offence, s 116 similarly involves the unsuccessful attempt by the abettor to instigate, conspire with or aid another person to commit a primary offence. In both cases, the offence was inchoate in the sense that the primary offence was not committed and the harm from the primary offence did not materialise. In both cases, the offender was being punished principally for his subjective culpability – ie, the taking of some steps towards the commission of the primary offence (which fell short of actually bringing about the completion of the primary offence) with the relevant mens rea. It would therefore be neither coherent nor consistent for one of these provisions to import the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence while the other did not. Since it was clear that s 116 did not import the minimum sentence for the primary offence, the presumption of coherence would favour the Second Interpretation.
(C) Barras Principle
- [64]
[64] The YIC pointed out that Ho Wee Fah was decided prior to the 2007 amendment. Therefore, if Ho Wee Fah were wrongly decided, Parliament could have legislated as much in 2007, but did not do so. At the second sentencing hearing, the Prosecution echoed this submission and referred the court to a principle of statutory interpretation known as the “Barras principle”. The Prosecution also made a separate but related submission that it was significant that Parliament, knowing of the existence of mandatory minimum sentences in the PC in 2007, nevertheless said nothing about mandatory minimum sentences not applying to attempts when enacting the 2007 amendment.
- [65]
[65] The Barras principle was described in Bennion in the following terms (at p 719):
The principle takes its name from the case of Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co Ltd [1933] AC 402 (the “Barras case”) where Viscount Buckmaster stated (at p 411):
Although Viscount Buckmaster’s statement had been applied in some subsequent cases, it has also been doubted and qualified in other cases.
- [66]
[66] In Royal Crown Derby Porcelain v Russell [1949] 2 KB 417, Denning LJ stated (at 429):
In Farrell v Alexander [1977] AC 59, Lord Wilberforce said (at 91):
- [67]
[67] More recently, in R (on the applications of ZH and CN) v London Borough of Newham and London Borough of Lewisham [2015] AC 1259, in relation to an alleged situation where “Parliament [had] failed to take what might have seemed an obvious opportunity to legislate”, Lord Carnwath commented that (at [85]):
In a similar vein, Baroness Hale stated in her dissenting opinion in the same case that (at [167]):
- [68]
[68] Accordingly, the authors of Bennion caveated that the Barras principle “is at most a presumption the strength of which will vary according to context” (at p 719). They went on to elaborate as follows (at p 719):
- [69]
[69] Of the five cases cited by the Prosecution, four were decided after the 2007 amendment (see [22] above). The only one decided before the 2007 amendment was Ho Wee Fah. This observation was important because, in applying the Barras principle to the 2007 amendment, only cases pre-dating the 2007 amendment were relevant. Being the sole pre-2007 decision on point and being an unreported judgment, it could not be said that the interpretation adopted in Ho Wee Fah was either “settled” or “well-recognised” at the time of the 2007 amendment. I therefore did not think that any clear conclusions could be drawn from the lack of legislative action in 2007 in reaction to Ho Wee Fah. I thus declined to accept the submission based on the Barras principle. Further, for the reasons articulated by Lord Carnwath and Baroness Hale in the passages quoted at [67] above, I did not accept the Prosecution’s related submission based on lack of Parliamentary action to address the applicability of minimum sentences to attempts when enacting the 2007 amendment.
(D) Presumption against “absurd” results
- [70]
[70] In Tan Cheng Bock, the Court of Appeal referred (at [38]) to the presumption against unworkable or impractical results, citing Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Soh Seow Poh [2009] 4 SLR(R) 525 (“Soh Seow Poh”) as authority for this presumption. The presumption against unworkable or impractical results is one aspect of the broader presumption against “absurd” results. This presumption was explained in Soh Seow Poh in the following terms (at [40]):
The Defence raised a number of arguments in relation to this presumption. I discuss the three more pertinent ones.
- [71]
[71] First, the Defence argued that the First Interpretation would lead to an absurd or unworkable result if applied to a case where the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence was more than half of the maximum prescribed for that offence. In that event, the minimum sentence for an attempt to commit that offence would be higher than the maximum sentence. This would be an anomalous result. Although this argument was logically attractive, the truth is that there were no offences on our statute books where the minimum sentence prescribed exceeded half of the maximum. This argument was therefore grounded on a hypothetical anomaly. As noted in Bennion at p 495: “The court will pay little attention to a proclaimed anomaly if it is purely hypothetical, and unlikely to arise in practice”.
- [73]
[73] I was not entirely persuaded by the Prosecution’s response to the Defence’s second argument. It is one thing to say that there was nothing intrinsically or normatively wrong with Parliament enacting a law to prescribe a fixed sentence when that was the clearly expressed intention of Parliament. It is quite another thing to say that the court should, through statutory interpretation, bring about a fixed sentence situation by preferring an avoidable interpretation of the relevant provision, where there appeared to be another valid interpretation which did not bring about such a situation. I therefore found some force in the Defence’s second argument.
- [74]
[74] The third argument made by the Defence is that, since an unsuccessful attempt involved less harm than the (completed) offence, it would be anomalous for a person who merely attempted to commit an offence to be subject to the same mandatory minimum sentence as a person who had committed the (completed) offence. The Prosecution submitted that there was “nothing unusual or antithetical” about this as there were eight other provisions in the PC (namely, ss 354A, 385, 387, 391, 393, 397, 459 and 460) which “specifically criminalised attempts to commit particular offences and provided for such attempts to attract the same mandatory minimum sentence (including mandatory imprisonment terms) as the (completed) offences”.
- [76]
[76] To conclude on the presumption against “absurd” results, although there is some force in the Defence’s second and third arguments, it does not follow that I should automatically exclude the First Interpretation as a “possible interpretation of the provision”. As noted in Bennion at p 476:
In my view, the results referred to in the Defence’s second and third arguments are not so unreasonable as to warrant excluding the First Interpretation as a possible interpretation of the provision at this stage of the analysis.
(E) Principle of updating construction
- [77]
[77] As noted above, the Second Interpretation was based on the notion that the expression “such punishment” in the Phrase in Question, insofar as it referred to the amount of punishment, would have been understood by the framers of the 1933 amendment as referring only to the maximum sentence prescribed for the primary offence (see [53] above). This was because the concept of minimum sentences was not known to Singapore law at the time. This naturally gave rise to the question whether the expression “such punishment” could be given an updated construction to encompass subsequent changes to the law to introduce minimum sentences. A further but related question was, since the similarly worded phrase in s 109 of the PC had been given precisely such an updated construction without controversy (see [57] above), why could the same not apply to the Phrase in Question in s 511?
- [78]
[78] The principle of updating construction was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Wong Souk Yee v Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1223 (“Wong Souk Yee”), a case concerning the interpretation of Art 49(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint). The question before the court was whether a by-election must be called to fill a vacancy resulting from one Member of Parliament, out of a team of Members of Parliament in a group representation constituency (“GRC”), vacating his seat.
- [79]
[79] The Court of Appeal noted that, at the time Art 49 was enacted, there were only single member constituencies (“SMCs”) in Singapore and no GRCs. The concept of GRC was only introduced later in 1988. The Court of Appeal therefore held that, as a starting point, the words “seat of a Member” in Art 49(1) would only refer to seats in SMCs. The Court of Appeal went on to comment (at [31]–[32]):
In the foregoing passage, the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between how the principle of updating construction would apply in the context of “new phenomena that arise out of factors independent of the intervention of Parliament” and how the principle would apply in the context where “new concepts arise out of changes made by Parliament”. In the former case, the test was whether the ordinary meaning of the words of the provision could logically be extended to the new concepts. In the latter case, the focus was instead on whether the ordinary meaning of those words, read in their context (especially in the context of the amendments made by Parliament), expressed an intention that the provision should encompass the new concepts.
- [80]
[80] In the present case, the new concept in question was the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences. This did not arise out of factors independent of the intervention of Parliament but arose precisely out of changes made by Parliament to a statute. Therefore, the test was not whether the ordinary meaning of the Phrase in Question could logically be extended to the concept of minimum sentences. Instead, the focus should be on whether the ordinary meaning of the Phrase in Question, read in context (especially in the context of the amendments introducing minimum sentences), expressed an intention that the Phrase in Question should encompass minimum sentences.
- [81]
[81] The provisions of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC were silent on whether a minimum sentence prescribed for a primary offence should also apply to an attempted offence punishable under s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC. As for the provisions introducing mandatory minimum sentences into the PC in 1984, those provisions were similarly silent on whether a minimum sentence prescribed for a primary offence should also apply to an attempted offence punishable under s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC. However, two arguments might be made from the context surrounding those provisions.
- [82]
[82] In favour of the First Interpretation, it might be argued that the presence of ss 385, 387 and 393 of the PC (referred to at [75] above) meant that Parliament had intended, when introducing mandatory minimum sentences into the PC in 1984, that attempts to commit offences should be subject to the same minimum sentences as those prescribed for the corresponding primary offences. Against this view, the YIC submitted that it could conversely be argued that the fact that Parliament specifically provided for attempts to have the same mandatory minimum sentences as the primary offences in these particular instances meant that, under s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC, attempts and completed offences did not attract the same mandatory minimum sentence.
- [83]
[83] In favour of the Second Interpretation, reference could be made to the second reading speech given by the Minister for Home Affairs on the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 1984 (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (26 July 1984) vol 44 (Chua Sian Chin, Minister for Home Affairs)), in which the Minister stressed that, even after the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences for certain offences “the very wide discretion of the courts in sentencing those convicted of these offences still remains”. As explained in more detail at [108]–[111] below, this assurance from the Minister tended to support the view that there was no intention on the part of Parliament to apply the minimum sentences to attempts to commit offences because doing so would significantly narrow the “discretion of the courts in sentencing” attempts to commit a number of these offences.
- [84]
[84] In the light of the foregoing, I concluded that s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC read in context, including the context of the amendment introducing minimum sentences in 1984, was ambiguous on its face as to whether a minimum sentence prescribed for a primary offence applies to an attempt commit that offence.
- [85]
[85] Before leaving the discussion on the principle of updating construction, I should return to the further question posed earlier (at [77] above) regarding the similarly worded phrase in s 109 of the PC. The answer to that question lay in the differences of context and purpose between s 109 and s 511. Section 109 punished a successful abettor as though he had personally committed the primary offence. In that context, the case for giving an updated construction to apply the minimum sentence prescribed for the primary offence to s 109 was compelling, and would leave no room for ambiguity. In contrast, the case for coming to the same conclusion in the context of s 511 was far less compelling, since s 511 concerned an inchoate offence.
(F) Conclusion on step 1
- [86]
[86] To summarise the foregoing discussion:
(a) the presumption of consistent expression did not favour the First Interpretation over the Second Interpretation;
(b) the presumption of coherence favoured the Second Interpretation over the First Interpretation;
(c) the Barras principle did not favour the First Interpretation over the Second Interpretation;
(d) the presumption against “absurd” results did not exclude the First Interpretation as a possible interpretation of the provision; and
(e) the principle of updating construction did not favour the adoption of the First Interpretation to the exclusion of the Second Interpretation, but left both the First Interpretation and the Second Interpretation as possible interpretations of the provision.
- [87]
[87] In the light of the foregoing, I concluded for the purpose of Step 1 of the Tan Cheng Bock framework that both the First Interpretation and the Second Interpretation were possible interpretations of the provision.
(2) Step 2: Ascertaining the legislative purpose or object of the statute
- [88]
[88] As noted by the Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock (at [54(c)(ii)]), the purpose or object of a statute should ordinarily be gleaned from the text itself. The court must first determine the ordinary meaning of the provision in its context, which might give sufficient indication of the objects and purposes of the written law, before evaluating whether consideration of extraneous material is necessary. Consideration of extraneous material may only be had in three situations (Tan Cheng Bock at [54(c)(ii)–(iii)]):
(a) If the ordinary meaning of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and purpose or object underlying the written law) is clear, extraneous material can only be used to confirm the ordinary meaning but not to alter it.
(b) If the provision is ambiguous or obscure on its face, extraneous material can be used to ascertain the meaning of the provision.
(c) If the ordinary meaning of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law) leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, extraneous material can be used to ascertain the meaning of the provision.
- [89]
[89] In deciding whether to consider extraneous material, and if so what weight to place on it, the court should have regard to the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision (taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law), and the need to avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating advantage. The court should also have regard to (a) whether the material is clear and unequivocal; (b) whether it discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention underlying the statutory provision; and (c) whether it is directed to the very point of statutory interpretation in dispute (Tan Cheng Bock at [54(c)(iv)]).
(A) Formulations of legislative purpose by parties and YIC
- [90]
[90] The YIC submitted that the purpose of s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC is “for attempts to be punished as if the offence had actually been committed, save for a limitation on the maximum imprisonment that can be imposed”. The Prosecution submitted that the purpose of the provision is “to criminalise attempts as well as to provide the punishment for attempts (where not expressly provided for elsewhere)”. The Defence did not put forth its own formulation of the legislative purpose, presumably because the Prosecution’s formulation is equally compatible with all three interpretations.
- [91]
[91] I did not accept the YIC’s formulation of the legislative purpose, principally because the phrase “as if the offence had actually been committed” in the YIC’s formulation was not a concept which could be gleaned from the text of s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC. Nowhere in s 511 was it stated or implied that a person who merely attempted an offence must be punished as if he had actually committed the (completed) offence.
- [92]
[92] To appreciate the significance of the phrase “as if the offence had actually been committed” and why it has no place in a formulation of the legislative purpose of s 511, reference might be made to the discussion in Lau Cheng Kai and others v Public Prosecutor [2019] 3 SLR 374 (“Lau Cheng Kai”). The accused persons in Lau Cheng Kai were each convicted of conspiracy to commit corruption punishable under s 5(b)(i) read with s 31 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (the “PCA”). The maximum punishment prescribed for a (completed) offence under s 5 of the PCA was imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine not exceeding $100,000. As for s 31 of the PCA, the provision read:
- [93]
[93] At first instance, the learned district judge (the “DJ”) sentenced two of the accused persons to three months’ imprisonment, one accused person to one month’s imprisonment and the remaining accused person to two weeks’ imprisonment. Both sides appealed to the High Court. The DJ’s reasoning was summarised in the judgment of the High Court in the following manner (at [15]):
- [94]
[94] In allowing the Prosecution’s appeal, Chan Seng Onn J held (at [29]) that the phrase “shall be deemed to have committed the offence” was a deeming provision, the effect of which was that “an offender who is convicted under s 31 of the PCA is statutorily deemed to have committed the PCA offence that he conspired to commit, notwithstanding that he did not factually commit it” (emphasis in original). Chan J went on to comment that the DJ’s interpretation of s 31 of the PCA would render the deeming provision otiose. Since Parliament is presumed not to legislate in vain, Chan J held that the correct interpretation was that (at [30(b)] and [31]):
Chan J then added (at [30(b)]) that, on this interpretation, “the sentencing judge cannot give a discount on the basis that the offence is factually not committed and therefore any harm that would have been associated with having committed that PCA offence is in fact absent” (emphasis added).
- [95]
[95] Although Lau Cheng Kai concerned conspiracy, Chan J also commented that the same reasoning would apply to s 30 of the PCA, which concerned attempts. Section 30 of the PCA likewise contained a deeming provision and read:
According to Chan J (at [38]):
- [96]
[96] Returning to s 511 of the Pre-2019 Amendment PC, it would be immediately apparent that s 511 does not contain a deeming provision similar to that found in ss 30 and 31 of the PCA. There is simply no basis to infer, from the text of s 511, that the purpose of the provision was to punish an attempted offence “as if the offence had actually been committed”. In fact, the existence of s 511(2), which expressly provided for lower maximum sentences in the case of attempts as compared to the (completed) offence, clearly and unequivocally displaced any inference that the purpose of s 511 was to punish an attempted offence “as if the offence had actually been committed”.
- [97]
[97] As for the Prosecution’s formulation of the legislative purpose (“to criminalise attempts as well as to provide the punishment for attempts (where not expressly provided for elsewhere)”), this seemed to fall into the same error that the Prosecution did in the case of Public Prosecutor v Takaaki Masui and another and other matters [2022] 1 SLR 1033 (“Takaaki Masui”). The provision to be interpreted in Takaaki Masui was s 13(1) of the PCA, which read:
- [98]
[98] The Prosecution submitted that the legislative purpose of s 13 of the PCA was “to ensure that the recipient of gratification pays, to the State, a sum of money equivalent to the value of that gratification received in respect of PCA offence(s) which the recipient has been convicted of” (Takaaki Masui at [90]). The Court of Appeal’s response was (at [90]):
The Court of Appeal then held (at [91]) that the legislative purpose of s 13(1) was “to prevent corrupt recipients from retaining their ill-gotten gains” (emphasis in original).
- [99]
[99] By the same token, the Prosecution’s formulation of the legislative purpose of s 511 was unhelpful as it did not go beyond merely restating “the very action or mechanism provided for by that provision”. As will be demonstrated below, a key deficiency of the Prosecution’s formulation was that it did not engage with the existence of s 511(2).
(B) Legislative Purpose gleaned from the text of the legislation
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