General Division of the High Court · Decided 25 March 2024
Lutfi Salim bin Talib and another v British and Malayan Trustees Ltd
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 85 · Case no. Originating Claim No 230 of 2023 (Registrar’s Appeal No 10 of 2024) · 31 paragraphs
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Background
- [2]
[2] The first claimant, Mr Lutfi Salim bin Talib, is a beneficiary under a trust (the “Trust”) created by an Indenture of Settlement dated 10 September 1921 (the “Indenture”). The second claimant, Mr Zayed bin Abdul Aziz Talib, is the executor of the estate of Mr Abdul Aziz bin Amir bin Talib, a beneficiary under the Trust who passed away in 2020. The defendant, British and Malayan Trustees Ltd, has been the trustee of the Trust since 31 March 1989.
- [3]
[3] In brief, the Indenture provides that if a beneficiary dies, his or her share in the Trust would devolve to his or her “issue”. In the course of the defendant’s administration of the Trust, a question arose as to what would happen if a beneficiary died without issue. Two conflicting interpretations of the relevant provisions in the Indenture were advanced:
(a) The first was that in such a case, the deceased beneficiary’s share should be divided amongst all the other beneficiaries (the “Pari Passu Interpretation”).
(b) The second was that the deceased beneficiary’s share should be divided amongst only the beneficiaries within the same branch of the family, ie, the deceased beneficiary’s sibling(s) and/or their offspring (the “Branch Interpretation”).
- [4]
[4] The defendant, relying on legal advice, adopted and applied the Pari Passu Interpretation on a number of occasions. In May 2014, the first claimant’s brother, Mr Shafeeg Salim bin Talib, also a beneficiary under the Trust, died without issue. The first claimant and another brother, Mr Kamal bin Salim Talib, informed the defendant that the Branch Interpretation should apply.
- [5]
[5] The defendant sought further legal advice, including obtaining the following opinions from M/s Allen & Gledhill LLP (“A&G”) and Mr John Martin QC (“Mr Martin QC”):
(a) A&G’s draft opinion dated 30 May 2014, which stated that the Pari Passu Interpretation applied.
(b) Mr Martin QC’s opinion dated 21 March 2016, which stated that the Branch Interpretation applied although the alternative Pari Passu Interpretation was “not easily dismissed”.
(c) A&G’s opinion dated 25 April 2016, which took into account Mr Martin QC’s opinion but maintained its preference for the Pari Passu Interpretation.
(d) A&G’s opinion dated 26 April 2016, which stated that the construction of the Indenture was not governed by Muslim Law.
(e) A&G’s opinion dated 5 May 2017, which considered arguments raised by the first claimant and his brother but maintained its preference for the Pari Passu Interpretation.
- [6]
[6] The first claimant then obtained an opinion from Mr Nicholas Le Poidevin QC (“Mr Le Poidevin QC”) who opined that the Branch Interpretation should apply. On 16 December 2017, the first claimant provided the defendant with a copy of Mr Le Poidevin QC’s opinion.
- [7]
[7] On 27 April 2018, the defendant issued Trustee’s Circular No 78 to the beneficiaries under the Trust, which stated (among other things) that the defendant had prepared draft court papers to seek directions from the Court on the interpretation of the Indenture. The beneficiaries were invited to submit their views on the application.
- [9]
[9] On 1 February 2019, the defendant filed HC/OS 163/2019 (“OS 163/2019”), seeking the Court’s determination whether, on a proper construction of the terms of the Indenture, the Pari Passu Interpretation or the Branch Interpretation ought to apply. On 20 November 2019, the High Court decided in favour of the Branch Interpretation: British and Malayan Trustees Ltd v Lutfi Salim bin Talib and others [2019] SGHC 270.
- [10]
[10] On 18 April 2023, the claimants (also representing 31 other beneficiaries under the Trust) commenced the present action against the defendant, claiming (among other things) that the defendant breached the following duties:
(a) its duty to administer the Trust in accordance with the terms of the Indenture;
(b) its duty to act with reasonable care and skill in administering the Trust;
(c) its fiduciary duty to act with honesty and good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries; and
(d) its fiduciary duty to disclose information of relevance and concern to the claimants.
The claimants’ application for production of documents
- [11]
[11] On 5 October 2023, the parties exchanged their respective lists of documents pursuant to O 11 r 2 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”).
- [13]
[13] With respect to categories 3 and 6, in his affidavit contesting the claimants’ application, the defendant’s Executive Director stated that:
(a) apart from the documents that had been disclosed, the defendant did not have within its possession and/or control any further documents responsive to the requests; and
(b) the defendant was not aware of the existence of any further responsive documents that may have been in its possession and/or control at a previous point in time.
- [16]
[16] The present appeal was against the AR’s orders for production of the documents described in categories 3, 6 and 7.
The test under O 11 r 3(1) of the ROC 2021
- [20]
[20] The respondent may challenge a specific production application on the grounds that the requested documents have not been properly identified and/or are not material to the issues in the case. He may also object to the specific production application on one or more of the following grounds and file an affidavit (the “opposing affidavit”) stating the same:
(a) the requested documents do not exist;
(b) the requested documents are protected from production by, eg, legal privilege;
(c) the requested documents have never been in his possession or control; or
(d) the requested documents were but no longer are in his possession or control, in which case the respondent should explain what has become of such documents; or
(e) the respondent does not know or cannot confirm (i) whether the requested documents were ever in his possession or control; or (ii) what has become of the requested documents that were previously in his possession or control.
- [24]
[24] Brett LJ did not state what was the threshold that had to be met before the court would conclude that the affidavit was insufficient. However, in my view, the emphasis on the documents that had been produced and the respondent’s pleadings or affidavits suggested a higher, rather than lower, threshold. One could not argue, for example, that the requested documents must have existed merely because in the ordinary course of events such documents would exist.
- [25]
[25] In Soh Lup Chee and others v Seow Boon Cheng and another [2002] 1 SLR(R) 604 (“Soh Lup Chee”), the High Court concluded that the plaintiffs had made out a sufficient case to strike out the defence because they had “amply demonstrated” that the defendants had not disclosed documents that “must surely exist, or to be more precise, have existed” [emphasis added] (at [11]).
- [27]
[27] The first defendant asserted in his affidavits that he had provided all the documents that were required of him. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had failed to comply with the discovery orders because they had not produced the supporting or source documents from which the information fed into the data pool must originally have been set out.
- [28]
[28] The Court was taken through a “labyrinthine trail of documents” and agreed with the plaintiffs that it was “inconceivable” that no record had been kept of the supporting or source documents (at [7]). The Court also agreed with the plaintiffs that it was “apparent from the face of the BBS” that it was “impossible” for the defendants to have no record of the source or supporting documents (at [8]), as being in the nature of summaries, the BBS could not have existed without source documents (at [10]).
- [29]
[29] It can be seen from the above that the Court in Soh Lup Chee based its decision on what the documents that had been produced showed. The use of the words “surely”, “inconceivable” and “impossible” suggested that the Court had in mind a higher threshold to the question whether it had been shown that the supporting or source documents existed. However, the Court also expressed its view that there was “more than a reasonable suspicion” that the supporting or source documents must have existed (at [7]), and referred, without disapproval, to the “lighter test” of “reasonable suspicion” (set out in Lyell v Kennedy (1884) 27 Ch D 1 at 20) as the test applicable in deciding whether to allow further discovery (at [9]).
- [31]
[31] Thus, there is authority that under the previous versions of the Rules of Court, an affidavit in respect of discovery of documents was not conclusive if there was a reasonable suspicion that further discoverable documents existed.
- [33]
[33] At this interlocutory stage of the proceedings, the court cannot resolve a dispute as to the sufficiency of affidavits relating to production of documents based on contentious affidavits. Logic and principle require a high threshold to be met before the court can go behind the affidavits relating to production of documents.
Documents sought under categories 3 and 6
- [35]
[35] In August 2015, Mr Martin QC’s draft opinion was sent to A&G and in December 2015, A&G discussed certain parts of Mr Martin QC’s draft opinion with him. Under category 3, the claimants sought production of all documents and correspondence between the defendant and A&G from September to November 2015 relating to Mr Martin QC’s draft opinion.
- [36]
[36] In August 2016, the defendant and A&G discussed points to be raised to Mr Martin QC. It appears that the defendant and A&G had a meeting in April 2017. On 5 May 2017, A&G issued its third opinion (see [5(e)] above). Under category 6, the claimants sought production of all documents and correspondence between the defendant and A&G from August 2016 to May 2017 relating to Mr Martin QC’s opinion and A&G’s further opinion, and the disclosure of the opinions to the beneficiaries under the Trust.
- [37]
[37] The defendant’s opposing affidavit stated that the defendant did not have any further documents responsive to the claimants’ requests and was not aware of the existence of any further responsive documents that may have been in its possession and/or control previously (see [13] above).
- [38]
[38] The AR did not accept the defendant’s assertion that it had no further documents. In essence, the AR agreed with the claimant that there was a reasonable suspicion that documents falling within the scope of categories 3 and 6 existed. It appeared that the AR did not accept that there were no other instructions from the defendant to its solicitors, A&G.
- [39]
[39] For reasons stated earlier (see [32]–[34] above), the AR should have applied the “plain and obvious” test. In my view, the evidence before the AR could not support a finding that it was plain and obvious that there were further documents falling within the scope of categories 3 and 6, which had not been produced. On the contrary, before me, counsel from A&G also confirmed that there were no such documents. There was no reason to doubt his confirmation. After all, categories 3 and 6 referred to documents between the defendant and A&G and he had a duty to this court to inform me if there were any such documents.
- [40]
[40] In my view, the defendant’s affidavit ought to be treated as conclusive since it could not be said that it was plain and obvious that there were further documents that had not been produced. I therefore allowed the appeal against the AR’s decision in respect of categories 3 and 6.
- [41]
[41] It must be noted that the defendant’s affidavit is conclusive only for the purposes of the specific production application. It remains open to the claimants’ counsel (if he or she so chooses) to cross-examine the relevant defendant’s witnesses at trial on the defendant’s assertion that there are no further documents, and to submit that the court should draw the appropriate adverse inferences if the court finds the defendant’s assertion to be untrue.
Documents sought under category 7
- [42]
[42] Under category 7, the claimants sought production of all documents and correspondence between the defendant and A&G, as well as within the defendant, relating to the preparation and circulation of Trustee’s Circulars Nos 78 and 79 (see [7]–[8] above) and/or OS 163/2019 (see [9] above).
- [43]
[43] The defendant submitted that these documents were protected by legal privilege. The claimants submitted that any legal privilege attached to these documents was jointly held with the beneficiaries under the Trust.
- [45]
[45] However, the beneficiaries’ joint interest applies only to legal advice obtained by trustees for the benefit of the trust as a whole, eg, to guide them in the due administration of the trust. Beneficiaries have no joint interest in legal advice obtained by trustees for themselves personally, eg, legal advice in relation to a possible breach of trust or defending an action commenced against them: see Talbot v Marshfield (1865) 62 ER 728 at 729; Lewis and others v Tamplin and others [2018] 21 ITELR 277 at [59]; Krok v Szaintop Homes Pty Ltd (No 1) [2011] VSC 16 at [28].
- [46]
[46] The dispute in this case was whether the documents under category 7 related to legal advice obtained for the benefit of the Trust or the defendant’s own benefit. The defendant submitted that the joint interest exception to legal privilege did not apply because the documents were created when litigation was contemplated or pending. The defendant pointed out that a dispute over the interpretation of the Indenture had arisen by then.
- [47]
[47] I disagreed with the defendant’s submissions. It was true that by the time Trustee’s Circulars Nos 78 and 79 and the court papers for OS 163/2019 were being prepared, there had arisen a divergence of views as to the interpretation of the Indenture between the defendant and the claimants. However, although the defendant had previously adopted one interpretation, upon perusing the opinion of Mr Le Poidevin QC, which was provided by the claimants, the defendant decided to obtain the court’s determination as to whether, on a proper construction of the Indenture, the Pari Passu Interpretation or the Branch Interpretation applied. OS 163/2019 was filed for that purpose. Trustee’s Circulars Nos 78 and 79 related to the application that was subsequently made in OS 163/2019.
Conclusion