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Grounds publishedDecided 24 Jun 2025

General Division of the High Court

A sworn statement that documents did not exist stood; it was not plain they did

Tan Tse Haw v Peh Tian Swee and another

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[2025] SGHC 113Case no. Originating Claim No 158 of 2024 (Registrar’s Appeal No 85 of 2025)23 paragraphs

The decision, in one line

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A sworn statement that documents did not exist stood; it was not plain they did

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [21], [26], [35]

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. Background facts and procedural history

  3. [2] The claimant and the first defendant are equal shareholders in the second defendant (the “Company”). The Company was in the business of repair and maintenance of motor vehicles. The claimant was employed by the Company until 10 July 2023 when his employment was terminated.

  4. [3] The claimant commenced the present action for oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed). The claimant alleged that the first defendant had (a) excluded him from the management of the Company, and (b) mismanaged the Company.

  5. (a) Any letters issued by STAPL to ex-employees of the Company (including nine named persons) to engage their services (“Category 1”).

  6. (b) All quotations, job orders, invoices and/or statement of accounts issued by STAPL to the ex-customers (including 31 named customers) and debtors of the Company from March 2023 to end 2023 (“Category 2”).

  7. [8] The claimant’s solicitors’ letter to the first defendant’s solicitors dated 10 January 2025 stated that:

  8. (a) the claimant did not have any documents responsive to Category 1 in his possession, custody or control; and

  9. (b) with respect to Category 2, the claimant had produced a compiled sales list because it was unduly burdensome to print out copies of all the invoices and/or statement of accounts due to limitations to STAPL’s systems.

  10. [10] On 3 February 2025, the claimant filed his 3rd Supplementary List of Documents (the “C3SLOD”) in which he disclosed invoices issued by STAPL to ex-customers of the Company and statements of accounts between STAPL and ex-customers of the Company. The invoices were described as invoices “issued by STAPL … from March 2023 to end 2023”. The list did not include any invoice dated March or April 2023. The statements of accounts were described as statements of accounts “for transactions from March 2023 to end 2023”. All the statements of accounts were dated 28 January 2025.

  11. [11] On 4 February 2025, the claimant filed his affidavit verifying the C2SLOD and the C3SLOD (the “claimant’s 4th Affidavit”). In his 4th Affidavit, the claimant verified the statements made in the C2SLOD and C3SLOD and stated the following:

  12. (a) Paragraph 3 of the C2SLOD (see [7] above) was a genuine and inadvertent error.

  13. (b) In the C3SLOD, the claimant had disclosed all documents responsive to the description of the Category 2 documents that were within his possession and control.

  14. (c) The claimant did not have access to the records of the Company, and he was unable to recall the names of all of the Company’s ex-customers and debtors. In the circumstances, the claimant had requested STAPL to carry out a search of its accounts based on the Company’s ex-customers and debtors disclosed by the first defendant to the claimant.

  15. (d) The claimant would carry out a similar search for other ex-customers and debtors of the Company that the first defendant could name and provide reasonable evidence that they were ex-customers and debtors of the Company.

  16. (e) There were no quotations or job orders responsive to the description of the Category 2 documents that were in the claimant’s possession or control. A search of STAPL’s accounts using its accounting software had returned zero results.

  17. (f) The claimant had taken sufficiently reasonable steps to discharge and had discharged his discovery obligations with respect to Category 2 documents.

  18. (g) With respect to the Category 1 documents, STAPL had employed only two former employees of the Company. STAPL did not issue any employment or other letters to engage their services. In the circumstances, the claimant did not have any documents responsive to the description of the Category 1 documents in his possession or control.

  19. The claimant’s position was consistent with what was stated in his solicitors’ letter to the first defendant’s solicitors dated 3 February 2025.

  20. My decision

  21. [20] In the present case, the effect of the claimant’s 4th Affidavit (read with the C2SLOD and C3SLOD) was that the claimant had stated on affidavit that:

  22. [21] The claimant’s position as stated in his 4th Affidavit read with the C2SLOD and C3SLOD was therefore conclusive unless it was plain and obvious that the documents (that the respondent alleged had not been disclosed) did in fact exist. The “plain and obvious” threshold is a high one.

  23. Category 1 documents

  24. [22] Category 1 documents referred to letters issued by STAPL to ex-employees of the Company to engage their services, including nine named persons (see [5(a)] above). The claimant’s 4th Affidavit stated that he did not have any documents responsive to this description in his possession or control because STAPL had employed only two former employees of the Company and STAPL did not issue any employment or other letters to engage their services (see [11(g)] above). Before me, the first defendant confirmed that he was seeking production of the employment contracts of these two ex-employees of the Company.

  25. [23] The first defendant took issue with the claimant’s position that there were no employment contracts. The question was whether it was plain and obvious that the employment contracts did exist.

  26. [24] In the GD, the AR did not refer to Lutfi or the plain and obvious test. The parties did not appear to have referred the AR to Lutfi or made submissions on the plain and obvious test.

  27. [25] The AR described the claimant’s contention (that the Category 1 documents did not exist) as being inherently implausible (GD at [49]). The AR gave the following reasons (GD at [48]–[49]):

  28. (b) despite the fact that STAPL was a small company, it was difficult to believe that the two ex-employees of the Company would have been content to work for STAPL solely on the basis of an oral agreement which comprised bare terms; and

  29. (c) when applying for work permits for the two ex-employees of the Company, the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) would have required STAPL to send to those employees copies of their employment contracts.

  30. [26] In my view, the plain and obvious test was not satisfied. It could not be said to be plain and obvious from the above reasons that the Category 1 documents existed. It was not implausible that being a small company, STAPL employed the two ex-employees of the Company without any written employment contracts. Even the reliance on the MOM’s requirement that STAPL should send copies of employment contracts to the employees was equivocal. The AR himself did not think this was determinative in and of itself since there was no evidence that the MOM policed compliance in this regard (GD at [49]). Further, there was also no evidence that an employment contract had to be produced to MOM when making an application for a work permit. The evidence merely showed that the employee’s written consent to the work permit application was required and that the employment contract was an example of such written consent.

  31. Category 2 documents

  32. [28] Category 2 documents referred to all quotations, job orders, invoices and/or statement of accounts issued by STAPL to the ex-customers (including 31 named customers) and debtors of the Company from March 2023 to end 2023 (see [5(b)] above).

  33. [29] In the C3SLOD, the claimant disclosed invoices issued by STAPL to ex-customers of the Company and statements of accounts between STAPL and ex-customers of the Company (see [10] above). In his 4th Affidavit, the claimant stated that: (a) there were no quotations or job orders responsive to the description of the Category 2 documents that were in the claimant’s possession or control; and (b) he had disclosed all documents responsive to the description of the Category 2 documents that were within his possession and control (see [11(b)] and [11(e)] above).

  34. [30] The first defendant took issue with:

  35. (a) the claimant’s position that there were no quotations or job orders in the claimant’s possession and control; and

  36. [31] In addition, the first defendant took issue with the fact that the claimant had not disclosed “job cards” that were referred to in some of the invoices disclosed by the claimant.

  37. [32] The questions that arose were whether it was plain and obvious that:

  38. [34] With respect to the quotations, the AR’s view was that these were material and had not been disclosed (GD at [52]). The GD did not explain why it was plain and obvious that the quotations did in fact exist. In fact, there was no evidence showing it to be plain and obvious that the quotations did exist.

  39. [35] As for the invoices and statements of accounts issued in March 2023 and April 2023, the AR simply noted that they were conspicuously missing (GD at [52]). However, the fact that these invoices and statements of accounts were not disclosed begs the question whether they did in fact exist. The claimant had stated on affidavit that he had disclosed all Category 2 documents that were within his control and possession. The GD did not explain why it was plain and obvious that the invoices and statements of accounts issued in March 2023 and April 2023 did in fact exist.

  40. [36] Before me, the first defendant submitted that there was evidence showing that STAPL was operating in April 2023. However, that did not make it plain and obvious that STAPL had issued invoices or statements of accounts to the Company’s ex-customers in March or April 2023.

  41. [38] The AR concluded that the claimant’s position was factually unsustainable because a director of STAPL had deposed on affidavit that the practice of STAPL was for job cards to be attached to the invoices and issued to STAPL’s customers (GD at [54]). However, the fact that job cards were attached to the invoices that STAPL issued to its customers did not mean that “job cards” were therefore the same as “job orders”.

  42. [39] The AR went on to conclude that the claimant would have understood the term “job orders” to refer to documents that contained a record of the customers’ orders and that job cards fell within this description (GD at [55]). It was not clear what was the basis for this conclusion. The claimant’s evidence was that he understood “job orders” to be different from “job cards”.

  43. [43] Second, before me, the first defendant confirmed that he was seeking production of the job cards referred to in the disclosed invoices. However, in principle, the first defendant was entitled to inspect and/or be provided with copies of not only the disclosed invoices but also the job cards referred to in these invoices. Before me, the claimant accepted this principle. The mere fact that the claimant did not separately disclose the job cards would not prejudice the first defendant.

  44. Conclusion