High Court · Decided 23 August 2024
Rohan St George v 4Fingers Pte Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2024] SGHCR 9 · Case no. Originating Claim No 740 of 2023 (Summonses Nos 1276 and 1277 of 2024)
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] HC/OC 740/2023 (“OC 740”) is the claimant’s claim against the first and second defendants for payments which he says are due and owing to him in connection with his employment by the first defendant. The defendants also pursue counterclaims against the claimant for the breaches of fiduciary duties and/or contractual duties owed to the first defendant, among others. There were two applications before me:
(a) HC/SUM 1277/2024 (“SUM 1277”), which was an application by the claimant for the production of documents by the defendants, pursuant to O 11 r 3 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”); and
(b) HC/SUM 1276/2024 (“SUM 1276”), which was an application by the defendants for the court to compel the claimant to provide the “originals and native format” of documents listed in the claimant’s list of documents dated 22 April 2024 (“the CLOD”) for inspection of originals by the defendants, pursuant to O 11 r 12(3) of the ROC 2021.
- [2]
[2] Having considered the submissions, I allowed both applications in part. These are my full reasons.
Background
- [3]
[3] The first defendant, 4Fingers Pte Ltd (“FPL”), is a Singapore-incorporated company in the food and beverage business. The second defendant, LS Investment Holdings Pte Ltd (“LSIH”), is the registered shareholder of 99.99% of FPL. Where appropriate, I refer to FPL and LSIH as “the Defendants”. The claimant, Mr Rohan St George (“Mr Rohan”) was employed as the Executive Chairman / Interim Chief Executive Officer of FPL between November 2019 and 3 July 2023.
The contracts and subsequent meetings
- [4]
[4] The claims in OC 740 are primarily based on two written agreements to which Mr Rohan is a party: (a) first, an employment contract entered into on 1 November 2019 between Mr Rohan and FPL (“the Employment Contract”); and (b) secondly, an agreement entered into on 11 November 2021 between Mr Rohan and LSIH (“the LSIH Agreement”). Both agreements relate to Mr Rohan’s employment by FPL. Subsequent to the Employment Contract, Mr Rohan and FPL entered into three separate written addenda in connection with Mr Rohan’s employment by FPL: (a) the first addendum was entered into on 27 May 2020 (“the First Addendum”); (b) the second addendum was entered into on 16 November 2020 (“the Second Addendum”); and (c) the third addendum was entered into on 24 March 2021 (“the Third Addendum”) (collectively, “the Addenda”).
- [5]
[5] The Employment Contract provided for, among other things: (a) Mr Rohan’s entitlement to a performance-based bonus (“the Bonus Plan”); and (ii) the termination of the Employment Contract by either party giving the other at least three months’ notice in writing or three months’ salary in lieu of notice (“the Notice Provision”). The key written terms of the Addenda are largely undisputed, though the parties appear to be in dispute as to the effect of the Addenda on the pre-existing contractual relationship between Mr Rohan and FPL, as provided for under the Employment Contract, a point which I will come to later. The First Addendum provided for, among other things: (i) the extension of Mr Rohan’s employment until 31 December 2022; (ii) the variation of the terms of the Bonus Plan; and (iii) a deferred payment of approximately S$150,000 per year for 2021 and 2022 (“the Deferred Payment”). The Second Addendum then varied the terms relating to the sums to be paid under the Bonus Plan as well as the sum to be paid for the Deferred Payment. The Third Addendum varied the Bonus Plan and instead provided for FPL to pay Mr Rohan a sum as annual profit share (“the Profit Share Payment”) and for FPL to pay a further sum to Mr Rohan on Mr Rohan’s exit from FPL (“the Exit Payment”).
- [6]
[6] In November 2021, Mr Rohan and LSIH entered into the LSIH Agreement. The parties do not appear to be in in dispute that the LSIH Agreement had arisen as a result of discussions between Mr Rohan and one Ms June Lee (“Ms Lee”), who is FPL’s director, regarding a payment structure to incentivise Mr Rohan to continue his employment with FPL. The LSIH Agreement provides for LSIH to pay Mr Rohan a sum equivalent to 20% of the value of FPL (“the Ownership Remuneration”) should FPL achieve earnings before interest, tax, debt and amortisation (“EBITDA”) of $20m when Mr Rohan ceases employment with FPL.
- [7]
[7] According to the parties’ pleadings, there were a number of meetings that subsequently took place between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee where issues pertaining the Ownership Remuneration were discussed:
(a) a meeting on 8 December 2022 (“the 8 Dec Meeting”);
(b) a meeting on 6 March 2023 (“the 6 Mar Meeting”);
(c) a meeting on 14 June 2023 (“the 14 Jun Meeting”);
(d) a meeting on 20 June 2023 (“the 20 Jun Meeting”).
- [8]
[8] On 3 July 2023, FPL terminated Mr Rohan’s employment with immediate effect with payment in lieu of notice pursuant to the Notice Provision. According to the Defendants, also on or about 3 July 2023, a shareholders’ resolution in writing was passed for Mr Rohan to be removed as a director and as CEO of FPL.
The claims and defences
- [9]
[9] Mr Rohan’s claims in OC 740 are as follows:
(a) First, the termination of his employment was unlawful because it had been an express term of the First Addendum and the Second Addendum that he would be employed for a fixed term until 31 December 2022 (“the Alleged Fixed Term”), which was further extended to 15 March 2024 by agreement of the parties at the 8 Dec Meeting. Mr Rohan’s case is that the provision for the Alleged Fixed Term had been incorporated into the Employment Contract, and he claims his salary from October 2023 to March 2024 as the loss and damage suffered.
(b) Secondly, FPL breached the terms of the Employment Contract, which Mr Rohan says had been “amended and/or supplemented” by the Addenda, by failing to pay to Mr Rohan the various sums promised under the Addenda, such as the Deferred Payment, the Profit Share Payment and the Exit Payment, and he claims for these promised payments as loss and damage suffered.
(c) Thirdly, LSIH breached the LSIH Agreement by failing to pay to Mr Rohan the Ownership Remuneration. Mr Rohan claims that at the 8 Dec Meeting, an agreement was reached for the LSIH Agreement to be varied so that the Ownership Remuneration would be paid to Mr Rohan regardless of FPL’s EBITDA at the time when he ceases employment, and further, the parties would carry out a valuation of FPL in January 2024 for the purpose of calculating the Ownership Remuneration (“the Alleged Further Agreement”). Mr Rohan further claims that at the 8 Dec Meeting, he had agreed to Ms Lee’s proposal for the Ownership Remuneration to be paid in instalments, with the first instalment due by 31 March 2024. According to Mr Rohan, at a board meeting of FPL on 3 February 2023 (“the 3 Feb Board Meeting”), it was agreed that for the purposes of calculating the Ownership Remuneration, the valuation of FPL be fixed at $75m and quantum of the Ownership Remuneration correspondingly be fixed at $15m (“the Alleged Quantum Agreement”). Mr Rohan further claims that Ms Lee had reaffirmed LSIH’s agreement to pay the Ownership Remuneration, as agreed under the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement, at the 6 Mar Meeting and the 14 Jun Meeting, as well Ms Lee’s proposal for the Ownership Remuneration to be paid by instalments as first proposed at the 8 Dec Meeting, though eventually, no such agreement on instalment payments had been reached at the time when Mr Rohan’s employment was terminated. In connection with the breach of the LSIH Agreement, Mr Rohan claims loss and damage in the sum of $15m from LSIH.
- [10]
[10] The Defendants’ main defences to Mr Rohan’s claims are as follows:
(a) The Defendants deny that the First Addendum and/or the Second Addendum contained an express provision for the Alleged Fixed Term. The Defendants also deny that an agreement was reached at the 8 Dec Meeting for the Alleged Fixed Term to be further extended until 15 March 2024.
(b) The Defendants deny that the termination of Mr Rohan’s employment was unlawful, and they had terminated Mr Rohan’s employment in accordance with the Notice Provision in the Employment Contract.
(c) The Defendants deny that Mr Rohan is entitled to the sums claimed under the Addenda, namely, the Deferred Payment, the Profit Share Payment and the Exit Payment, because none of the Addenda were legally valid and binding on the parties, in view of the following circumstances and reasons:
(i) The First Addendum did not supersede or vary the Notice Provision or any of the termination clauses of the Employment Contract, which remained in full force and effect. In any event, upon the Second Addendum being entered into on 16 November 2020, the First Addendum was no longer valid, binding or enforceable as it had been superseded in its entirety by the Second Addendum.
(ii) The Second Addendum was meant to “amend and/or supplement parts of the Employment Contract” and save for the provisions relating to the Deferred Payment and Bonus Plan, the other terms and conditions in the Employment Contract all remain unchanged unless FPL had issued a separate addendum. In any event, following the entry into of the LSIH Agreement, the Second Addendum was no longer valid from the date the LSIH Agreement was entered into, because cl 2.1 of the LSIH Agreement provided for FPL and Mr Rohan to undertake to enter into a supplemental agreement to cancel both the Second Addendum and the Third Addendum, though it appears that no such supplemental agreement had been entered into.
(iii) The Third Addendum contained provisions relating to the Bonus Plan and the Exit Payment, but all the other terms of the Employment Contract and the Second Addendum remain unchanged. In any event, pursuant to cl 2.1 of the LSIH Agreement, the Third Addendum was no longer valid from the date the LSIH Agreement was entered into.
(d) Mr Rohan is not entitled to any payment under the LSIH Agreement. First, the LSIH Agreement is applicable only if Mr Rohan voluntarily resigned from his position as CEO and serve three months’ notice of his intention to do so, which had not been the case since Mr Rohan’s employment was terminated by FPL. Secondly, the LSIH Agreement was subject to a condition precedent that FPL achieve an EBITDA of $20m, and it was not fulfilled because FPL did not at any material time achieve an EBITDA of $20m.
(e) No agreement was reached to vary the terms of the Employment Contract (and/or any Addenda) or the LSIH Agreement at the 8 Dec Meeting, and all times, the parties operated on the basis that any contractual agreements (including any variation to the agreements, whether by way of an addendum or supplemental agreement) would be subject to the execution of a written contract. In particular, there was no agreement reached between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee to vary the EBITDA targets that had to be met for Mr Rohan to be entitled to the Ownership Remuneration, and there was also no agreement reached at the 3 Feb Board Meeting that the Ownership Remuneration be fixed at $15m or that any internal valuation of FPL raised at the 3 Feb Board Meeting supersede the need for the value of FPL to be determined through a professional valuation exercise, as otherwise required by cl 5 of the LSIH Agreement. In other words, the Defendants deny both the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement.
SUM 1277
- [11]
[11] SUM 1277 is Mr Rohan’s application against the Defendants for specific production of various categories of documents. By the time SUM 1277 came to be heard, two of the sub-categories in the Schedule to SUM 1277 have been dropped. For the remaining categories which remain contested, I have categorised them as follows:
(a) Category 1: Minutes of, or any document setting out a summary of or decisions made at the following calls, meetings or discussions, arising out of or in connection with the claimant’s employment with FPL and subsequent termination, as well as the First Addendum, the Second Addendum, the Third Addendum and the LSIH Agreement (hereafter referred to as “Minutes/Documents”):
(i) Category 1(a): Discussions and negotiations between Mr Rohan and FPL’s representative(s) in late October to November 2019.
(ii) Category 1(b): Discussions and negotiations between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee in or around February to May 2020.
(iii) Category 1(c): Discussions between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee between July 2020 and November 2020.
(iv) Category 1(d): Discussions between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee in or around November 2021.
(b) Category 2: Minutes/Documents of:
(i) Category 2(a): discussions between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee on or around 24 November 2022 (“the 24 Nov Discussion”) and the call between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee on 25 November 2022 (“the 25 Nov Call”). According to the DCC, the 24 Nov Discussion and the 25 Nov Call took place prior to the 8 Dec Meeting.
(ii) Category 2(b): the 8 Dec Meeting.
(iii) Category 2(c): the 6 Mar Meeting.
(iv) Category 2(d): the 14 Jun Meeting.
(v) Category 2(e): the 20 Jun Meeting.
(c) Category 3: Minutes/Documents of:
(i) Category 3(a): the 3 Feb Board Meeting.
(ii) Category 3(b): Board and/or Shareholders’ meetings of FPL after 3 February 2023, including a shareholders’ meeting on 3 July 2023.
(d) Category 4: Minutes/Documents of:
(i) Category 4(a): discussions between Ms Lee and her family in or around December 2022.
(ii) Category 4(b): discussions between Ms Lee and her family in or around June 2023.
(e) Category 5: Documents relating to the Defendants’ consideration and eventual decision to terminate Mr Rohan’s employment with Mr Rohan, including correspondence between Ms Lee on the one hand, and Mr Steen Puggard or any other person on the other, relating to the same.
(f) Category 6: Copies of all attachments in the e-mail from one PembinaanFuji Baru Sdn Bhd (“PFBSB”) to “Michael Hoh” and “Elain (IDR)” dated 31 July 2019 (timestamped 11.17am). The underlying e-mail had been produced by the Defendants at s/n 11 of the Defendants’ list of documents dated 22 April 2024 (“the DLOD”) and what this request seeks are the attachments in that e-mail.
(g) Category 7: All communications over WhatsApp between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee between November 2019 and July 2023 arising out of or in connection with Mr Rohan’s employment with FPL and subsequent termination, as well as the First Addendum, the Second Addendum, the Third Addendum and the LSIH Agreement.
The applicable principles
(a) the requested documents must be described with sufficient particularity;
(b) the requested documents must be “material” to the “issues in the case”, in that they must (i) bear a demonstrable nexus with at least one of those issues, which is determined by reference to the parties’ pleaded cases and (ii) have a significant bearing on that issue, such that it could potentially affect the court’s ultimate decision; and
(c) the requesting party must provide sufficient evidence that the requested documents are in the possession or control of the producing party, which is not difficult to satisfy and ordinarily a deposition to this effect in the requesting party’s supporting affidavit would suffice.
Preliminary issues
- [14]
[14] In opposing SUM 1277, the Defendants relied on two overarching submissions.
(b) Secondly, since Mr Rohan’s claims in OC 740 are based on written agreements (namely, the Employment Contract, the LSIH Agreement and the Addenda), the parol evidence rule prevents him from relying on any extrinsic evidence (such as the documents requested in SUM 1277), and further, none of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule contained in ss 94(a)–(f) of the Evidence Act 1893 (“the Evidence Act”), which would otherwise allow Mr Rohan to rely on extrinsic evidence, are applicable in this case. By virtue of the parol evidence rule, all of the documents requested in SUM 1277 would ultimately constitute inadmissible evidence in OC 740, and accordingly, the underlying application for production must also be refused.
- [15]
[15] I address each of these submissions in turn, before turning to my decision on the individual categories in SUM 1277.
Whether Mr Rohan had to satisfy the “plain and obvious” test
- [16]
[16] In connection with the Defendants’ first submission, I start by considering the High Court’s decision in Lutfi Salim bin Talib and another v British and Malayan Trustees Ltd [2024] SGHC 85 (“Lutfi”), where it was explained that a respondent objecting to an application for specific production under O 11 r 3 may, apart from taking the position that the documents requested have not been properly identified and/or are not material to the issues in the case, state one or more of the following in its responsive affidavit objecting the application (see Lutfi at [20]):
- [19]
[19] Seen in this light, in the context of an application for specific production, the “plain and obvious” test in Lutfi can be situated within the third condition in Eng’s Wantan Noodle ([13] above), namely, the requirement that the applicant for specific production provide sufficient evidence that the requested documents are in the possession or control of the respondent. What the third condition in Eng’s Wantan Noodle is concerned with is whether the applicant for specific production has reason or basis for his belief that the documents requested are in the possession or control of the respondent (see Eng’s Wantan Noodle at [50]; Jeffrey Pinsler, Singapore Court Practice (LexisNexis, 2023) (“Singapore Court Practice”) at para 11.3.4). Ordinarily, this condition ought not to be difficult to satisfy and a deposition to this effect in the supporting affidavit for specific production by the applicant would suffice. However, where the respondent takes the position that it is unable to produce the requested documents by relying on one more of those grounds in Lutfi, and because this position is to be viewed as conclusive, the applicant for specific production must do more to justify his belief or assertion as to why the requested documents are in the possession or control of the producing party. In such a situation, the applicable threshold to be satisfied, in connection with the third condition in Eng’s Wantan Noodle, is the “plain and obvious” test.
- [21]
[21] Overall, Ms Lee’s depositions in the affidavit speak more of the sufficiency of the Defendants’ disclosure in terms of what they have already produced, but not of the Defendants’ ability to produce all of the documents requested in SUM 1277. In my view, while Ms Lee’s depositions are to be regarded as conclusive, it does not in any way demonstrate the Defendants’ inability to produce the requested documents in SUM 1277 and I do not see any justification for Mr Rohan to be held to a higher standard in justifying his belief or assertion as to why the requested documents in SUM 1277 are in the possession or control of the Defendants. The “plain and obvious” test is therefore not engaged in SUM 1277.
- [22]
[22] Given my conclusion that the “plain and obvious” test is inapplicable to Mr Rohan’s application in SUM 1277, the arguments he had put forward on this issue need not be considered. However, as some length had been spent on these arguments, I briefly state my views on them. First, in connection with Categories 1, 2 and 4, Mr Rohan argued that the particularity with which the Defendants have been able to plead in the Defence and Counterclaim (“DCC”) what had transpired at the discussions or negotiations forming the subject matter of these categories make it “plain and obvious” that the corresponding documents evidencing such discussions or negotiations must exist. If the “plain and obvious” test had been applicable, I do not think this submission would have been of much assistance to Mr Rohan. In my view, the “plain and obvious” test involves the application of an objective standard. Where a party relies on the other party’s pleadings in justifying his belief or assertion that the requested documents exist, there must be something apparent on the face of the pleadings which immediately and on its own show that the requested documents exist. What Mr Rohan relies on here is not any particular part of the DCC which shows the existence of the requested documents but his subjective belief that the Defendants must have kept contemporaneous written records given the Defendants’ ability to plead the said discussions or negotiations with particularity – this surely cannot come anywhere close to satisfying the “plain and obvious” test.
- [23]
[23] Secondly, in connection with Category 3, Mr Rohan pointed to s 188(1) of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed), which provide, among other things, that every company must cause “minutes of all proceedings of general meetings and of meetings of its directors and of its chief executive officers … to be entered in books kept for that purpose”. In Lutfi (at [24]), the High Court held that it would be insufficient to satisfy the “plain and obvious” test by simply arguing that “requested documents must have existed merely because in the ordinary course of events such documents would exist”. Mr Rohan’s reliance on s 188(1) of the Companies Act appears to be one such argument, because the gist of his contention is that FPL would have maintained such minutes or documents in connection with the meetings referred to in Category 3, since FPL is required under the Companies Act to do so. Again, to satisfy the “plain and obvious” test, Mr Rohan must point to some material whether in the affidavits, pleadings or other objective evidence put before the court which shows that s 188(1) of the Companies Act had in fact been adhered to by FPL and such records of meetings were indeed kept. No such material had been identified or relied upon by Mr Rohan.
Whether the parol evidence rule is relevant in the assessment of the materiality of the requested documents
- [25]
[25] I start by briefly revisiting the relevant legal principles on the parol evidence rule. As the Court of Appeal observed in Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 (“Zurich Insurance”) (at [32]–[33]), the parol evidence rule is an “oft-maligned” common law rule, the exact formulation of which is of some disagreement. For present purposes, however, we need only be concerned with what the Court of Appeal had identified in Zurich Inusrance as the “thin definition” of the parol evidence rule, which states that where a contract has been recorded in writing, extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted or used to add to, vary or contradict the written contract. It is this “thin definition” of the parol evidence rule that is embodied in s 94 of the Evidence Act (see Zurich Insurance at [71]). To provide context, I set out in full ss 93 and 94 of the Evidence Act, which are germane to the discussion that follows.
- [26]
[26] Sections 93 and 94 form part of the provisions of the Evidence Act which deal with the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, and the effect of these provisions, when read together, is that where the sole evidence of a contract consists of “the document itself”, that contract cannot be varied, contradicted, added to or subtracted from by virtue of extrinsic evidence, unless the circumstances described in one or more of the six subsections to s 94 are satisfied (see Zurich Insurance at [71]).
- [27]
[27] In my view, the parol evidence rule is not relevant in the court’s assessment of whether requested documents satisfy the requirement of materiality. This is for the following reasons.
- [28]
[28] First, I do not think the parol evidence rule can ever be relevant in the legal context of an application for specific production. For the parol evidence rule to become relevant, it must first be proven that the parties had intended a written contract to contain all the terms of their agreement (see Zurich Insurance at [40]). In determining whether the parties had intended to embody their entire agreement in the written contract (so that the parol evidence rule operates), the court may take cognisance of extrinsic evidence or the surrounding circumstances of the contract (see Zurich Insurance at [112]). In other words, before the parol evidence rule as embodied in s 94 of the Evidence Act applies, the court must first be satisfied that the case before it concerns a contract coming within the terms of s 93 of the Evidence Act. In the context of an application for specific production, the court is in no position to determine if the written agreements which are the subject of the action have been intended by the parties to embody their entire agreement. That issue is plainly not before the court at such an interlocutory stage of the proceedings, and even if the parties had adduced evidence on that point, it is not one which the court can resolve on the basis of contentious affidavits alone.
- [29]
[29] Secondly, as a matter of principle, a court hearing an application for specific production should not be fettered by considerations relating to the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule, having its place in s 94 of the Evidence Act, deals with the admissibility of evidence (see Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”) at [40]). The admissibility of evidence determines how the parties are to convince the court of the existence of a particular state of facts which, according to provisions of substantive law, would establish the existence of the right or liability which they allege to exist (see Sembcorp Marine at [43], citing James Fitzjames Stephen, An Introduction to the Indian Evidence Act (Thacker, Spink & Co, 1904) at p 11). If a piece of evidence is found to be inadmissible, then a party cannot rely on the same in establishing its case vis-à-vis the pleaded facts. The question of admissibility of evidence is a matter for the trial judge as it is for the trial judge to decide what evidence to or not to rely on in finding for one party or the other. If a court hearing an application for specific production were to refuse the production of certain documents on the basis of the parol evidence rule, it effectively (and prematurely) forms a view as to whether those documents constitute admissible evidence for the purposes of s 94 of the Evidence Act and predetermine a question which ought to have been dealt with later.
- [31]
[31] Finally, the Defendants’ submission about the parol evidence rule is also incompatible with the scheme of O 11 in two ways. First, for the purposes of O 11 r 3, materiality is determined by reference to the relationship between a requested document and the issues in the case. No part of that relationship should turn on the admissibility of the requested document in evidence which, as I explained, is not a matter that the court has to and can determine at the stage when an application for specific production is heard anyway. Secondly, if the Defendants’ submission were accepted, it effectively expands the recognised grounds on which a party can resist the production of documents (see, for example, O 11 r 5 and r 8 of the ROC 2021) to also encompass those relating to the admissibility of evidence. This is plainly contrary to the scheme of O 11 of the ROC 2021 and also finds no authority in case law.
My decision
- [32]
[32] For the purposes of SUM 1277, I proceed on the basis that:
(a) The first condition in Eng’s Wantan Noodle ([13] above) (of proper identification of documents) has been satisfied, since the Defendants did not contend that the documents in each of the requested categories have been improperly identified (save for Category 7). For Category 7, as I will explain later, I was not satisfied that the requested documents have been improperly identified.
(b) Except for Category 3(b), the third condition in Eng’s Wantan Noodle (of the applicant providing sufficient evidence that the requested documents are in the possession or control of the respondent) has been satisfied in respect of all the other categories in SUM 1277, because Mr Rohan has provided sufficient reasons for his assertion and belief that the requested documents are in the possession or control of the Defendants.
Category 1
- [33]
[33] The documents requested in Category 1 pertain to discussions or negotiations which, according to the DCC, had taken place before each of the following written agreements were entered into – the Employment Contract (Category 1(a)), the First Addendum (Category 1(b)), the Second Addendum (Category 1(c)) and the LSIH Agreement (Category 1(d)).
- [34]
[34] I begin with Category 1(a), the subject matter of which is the Employment Contract. The parties’ pleadings show that their pleaded positions differ slightly as to the background in which the Employment Contract had been entered into – Mr Rohan’s case is that the Employment Contract had been entered into to cater for the expansion of Mr Rohan’s role in FPL pending the recovery of Mr Vijay Vijendra Sethu (hitherto the sole director of FPL and LSIH), while the Defendants’ case is that Mr Rohan had desired a formal employment agreement so that he could be entitled to medical insurance and apply for the requisite employment pass to work in Singapore. However, Mr Rohan does not rely on this background in support of his claims against the Defendants; neither do the Defendants rely on it in support of their defences to Mr Rohan’s claims or their counterclaim against Mr Rohan (see [9]–[10] above). In connection with the Employment Contract, the only issue in contention is whether the terms relating to the termination of employment and the Notice Provision continue to remain in force when Mr Rohan’s employment was terminated by FPL, or whether it had been superseded by the provision for the Alleged Fixed Term which the parties are said to have agreed to subsequently. That being the case, while the parties differ in their factual positions vis-à-vis the background in which the Employment Contract was entered into, this is not in any way relevant to their respective cases and accordingly any documents relating to that background bear no nexus to the “issues in the case” in OC 740. An “issue in the case” relates to matters which parties intend to rely on and make good at the trial of the action, and which ultimately relates to the adjudicative outcome of the matter (see generally, DFD ([30] above) at [26]; see also Cachet Multi Strategy Fund SPC ([13] above) at [33]). I was therefore not satisfied that there exists an issue in the case arising in connection with the Employment Contract to which the documents requested in Category 1(a) can relate. I therefore refused the request in Category 1(a).
- [35]
[35] I now turn to Categories 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d). I consider them together because, based on the parties’ pleadings, they appear to be in dispute as to the effect which the First Addendum, the Second Addendum and the LSIH Agreement had on the existing rights and obligations under the prior agreement(s) between the parties. To explain (see also [10(c)] above):
(a) In connection with the First Addendum (the subject matter of Category 1(b)), there is a dispute as to its effect on the existing terms of the Employment Contract. Mr Rohan’s case is that the First Addendum (including its provision for the Alleged Fixed Term) is incorporated into the Employment Contract, and that it is meant to “supersede the Notice Provision”. On the other hand, the Defendants plead that one such term of the First Addendum is for Mr Rohan’s employment to be “extended … until 31 December on the ‘same terms and conditions’ as stated [in] the Employment Contract”, and their case is that the First Addendum did not supersede or vary the Notice Provision or any of the termination clauses in the Employment Contract, which remain in full force and effect.
(b) In connection with the Second Addendum (the subject matter of Category 1(c)), there is a dispute as to its effect on the Employment Contract and whether it superseded the First Addendum. Mr Rohan’s case is that the Second Addendum had the effect of reiterating the earlier agreement in the First Addendum regarding the Alleged Fixed Term, which was also to supersede the Notice Provision in the Employment Contract. On the other hand, the Defendants’ case is that the Second Addendum superseded the First Addendum in entirety, and they rely on several grounds in support. Primarily, the Defendants appear to rely on the contractual effect of the Second Addendum, on the basis that it contains terms which are inconsistent and/or conflict with those in the First Addendum, and also because Second Addendum contains a provision that “[a]ll other terms stated in your original employment contract [ie, the Employment Contract] remain unchanged, unless and until [FPL] issues a separate addendum”. Further or in the alternative, the Defendants plead that Mr Rohan cannot deny that the First Addendum was no longer valid, binding or enforceable following the entry into of the Second Addendum, on the basis of estoppel by convention, promissory estoppel and/or estoppel by representation, arising from the terms contained in the Second Addendum and the discussions between the parties.
(c) In connection with the LSIH Agreement (the subject matter of Category 1(d)), there is a dispute as to its effect on the Second Addendum as well as the Third Addendum. Given Mr Rohan’s claims for the various sums provided for in the Employment Contract and the Addenda, his position is obviously that the Second Addendum and the Third Addendum remain valid and binding. On the other hand, the Defendants’ position is that the Second Addendum ceased to be valid, binding and/or enforceable from the date the LSIH Agreement was entered into, because cl 2.1 of the LSIH Agreement specifically provided for LSIH to procure that FPL and Mr Rohan undertake to enter into a supplemental agreement to cancel the Second Addendum and the Third Addendum in their entirety from the date of the LSIH Agreement. Further or in the alternative, the Defendants also plead that following the entry into of the LSIH Agreement, Mr Rohan is estopped from denying that the Second Addendum was no longer valid, binding or enforceable, on the basis of estoppel by convention, promissory estoppel and/or estoppel by representation, arising from cl 2.1 of the LSIH Agreement.
- [36]
[36] The parties’ dispute as to the effect which the First Addendum, the Second Addendum and the LSIH Agreement had on the existing rights and obligations under the prior agreement(s) between the parties disclose “issues in the case” for the purposes of O 11 r 3 because they relate to matters which Mr Rohan and the Defendants respectively rely for their claim and defence in OC 740. To illustrate as an example – the dispute concerning the effect of the subsequent agreements on the terms of the Employment Contract will determine whether it is the Employment Contract and its terms which govern Mr Rohan’s termination from FP, so that Mr Rohan’s termination was lawful, as the Defendants aver (see [10(b)] above)); the dispute regarding the effect of the LSIH Agreement on the Second Addendum and the Third Addendum will determine whether Mr Rohan is entitled to the sums which the latter two agreements purported to provide, which the Defendants aver have no legal effect and are not binding on the parties (see [10(c)(ii)]–10(c)(iii)] above). The discussions and negotiations between the parties leading up to the entry into of each of these agreements provide a direct source by their contractual intentions regarding the effect of a subsequent agreement on the respective prior agreement(s) could be ascertained. That being the case, I was satisfied that documents evidencing each of these discussions and negotiations are material to the issues in the case. For these reasons, I allowed the request in Categories 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d).
Category 2
- [37]
[37] The documents in Category 2 relate to various meetings where the Ownership Remuneration, provided for under the LSIH Agreement, had been discussed. Based on the parties’ pleadings, they appear to be in dispute on whether the Alleged Further Agreement (that is, the agreement for the Ownership Remuneration to be paid to Mr Rohan regardless of FPL’s EBITDA at the time Mr Rohan ceases employment, as defined at [9(c)] above) and whether the Alleged Quantum Agreement (that is the agreement for the valuation of FPL to be fixed at $75m and for the quantum of the Ownership Remuneration to be correspondingly fixed at $15m, as defined at [9(c)] above) had been reached. Mr Rohan’s claims in OC 740 are premised on the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement, both of which appear to take the form of a non-written or oral agreement. On the other hand, the Defendants’ plead that the parties had operated at all times on the basis that any contractual agreements, including the variation of agreements already entered into, would be subject to the execution of a further written contract, and accordingly, they deny the existence of the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement. The parties are therefore in dispute on whether the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement exist, and this dispute discloses “issues in the case” for the purposes of O 11 r 3 because they relate to matters which Mr Rohan and the Defendants respectively rely for their claim and defence in OC 740. The only matter which remains to be decided is whether the documents in Category 2 have a significant bearing on those issues.
- [38]
[38] I begin first with Category 2(b), the subject matter of which is the 8 Dec Meeting. According to Mr Rohan, the Alleged Further Agreement was first reached at the 8 Dec Meeting. Specifically, Mr Rohan pleaded that it was agreed between Ms Lee and him at the 8 Dec Meeting that: (a) first, the Ownership Remuneration would be paid to him regardless of whether the EBITDA targets in the LSIH Agreement were met; and (b) secondly, a valuation of FPL will be conducted in January 2024 for the purpose of calculating the Ownership Remuneration. On the basis of Mr Rohan’s case that the 8 Dec Meeting was the very occasion on which the Alleged Further Agreement had been made, the discussions and negotiations at that meeting directly sheds light on whether the Alleged Further Agreement exists. I was therefore satisfied that documents evidencing the discussions and negotiations at the 8 Dec Meeting are material to the issue of whether the Alleged Further Agreement exists. I therefore allowed the request in Category 2(b).
- [39]
[39] Besides the Alleged Further Agreement, I note that the parties’ pleadings show that they are in dispute as to whether an agreement had been reached at the 8 Dec Meeting for a further extension of the Alleged Fixed Term (said to end on 31 December 2022) until 15 March 2024. Mr Rohan’s case in OC 740 is founded also on the alleged agreement for a further extension of the Alleged Fixed Term until 15 March 2024, which is what rendered the termination of his employment unlawful and entitled him to the Exit Payment. The Defendants deny that any such agreement for further extension had been reached had been reached. The parties are therefore similarly in dispute as to whether there exists an agreement for a further extension of the Alleged Fixed Term and this similarly discloses an “issue in the case” for the purposes of O 11 r 3 as it directly relates to a matter which Mr Rohan and the Defendants respectively rely for their claim and defence in OC 740. Just as the above, the discussions and negotiations at the 8 Dec Meeting – which is pleaded by Mr Rohan as the very occasion on which the alleged agreement for a further extension was made – directly sheds light on whether the Alleged Extension Agreement exists and thus is material to that issue. This is a further reason on which I allowed the request in Category 2(b).
- [40]
[40] I turn now to Category 2(a), the subject matter of which is the 24 Nov Discussion and the 25 Nov Call (as defined at [11(b)(i)] above). Mr Rohan’s pleadings do not refer to the 24 Nov Discussion and the 25 Nov Call. It is the Defendants who plead these events and they aver that, at the 24 Nov Discussion, Mr Rohan informed Ms Lee that it was no longer “worthwhile” for him to be involved with FPL given its changing business and growth trajectory. The next day, at the 25 Nov Call, Mr Rohan is said to have informed Ms Lee of his dissatisfaction with cl 5 of the LSIH Agreement, and in particular, he stated that the quantum of Ownership Remuneration provided for therein was insufficient, in response to which Ms Lee rejected Mr Rohan’s proposal to renegotiate the terms of the LSIH Agreement. I note that Mr Rohan’s case is that the Alleged Further Agreement was reached only at the 8 Dec Meeting, and so on the basis of Mr Rohan’s case, at the time of the 24 Nov Discussion and the 25 Nov Call, the Alleged Further Agreement would not yet have been in existence. However, in my view, the 24 Nov Discussion and the 25 Nov Call would not have taken place in the abstract, and they provide the backdrop to what subsequently came to be discussed at the 8 Dec Meeting and what was said to have been agreed at that meeting. What was discussed at the 24 Nov Discussion and the 25 Nov Call would have laid the foundation for, and are to be viewed in conjunction with, the further discussions at the 8 Dec Meeting which Mr Rohan claims had taken place in connection with the Alleged Further Agreement. I was therefore satisfied that documents evidencing the discussions and negotiations at the 24 Nov Discussion and 25 Nov Call are similarly material to the issue of whether the Alleged Further Agreement exists. I therefore allowed the request in Category 2(a).
- [41]
[41] I now turn to Categories 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e), the subject matter of which are the 6 Mar Meeting, the 14 Jun Meeting and the 20 Jun Meeting, respectively. Based on Mr Rohan’s pleadings about the 3 Feb Board Meeting (see [10(c)] above), by the time of the first of these meetings (ie, the 6 Mar Meeting), there had already been an agreement for the quantum of the Ownership Remuneration to be fixed at $15m (ie, the Alleged Quantum Agreement had already been reached).
(a) In connection with the 6 Mar Meeting, Mr Rohan pleads that Ms Lee had affirmed the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement, and further, that the parties agreed for the $15m to be paid by way of instalments, with the first tranche due on 31 December 2023.
(b) In connection with the 14 Jun Meeting, Mr Rohan pleads that Ms Lee affirmed what she had earlier agreed to at the 6 Mar Meeting.
(c) In connection with the 20 Jun Meeting (which is referenced in the DCC but not Mr Rohan’s Statement of Claim (“the SOC”)), the Defendants plead that Mr Rohan had raised the issue of his exit from FPL and the payment of the Ownership Remuneration at this meeting, but they plead that, “from the perspective of [Mr Rohan], [Ms Lee] had not provided to Mr Rohan any written confirmation of any alleged agreement between [Mr Rohan] and the Defendants and/or [Ms Lee]”. The SOC does not refer to the 20 Jun Meeting, but Mr Rohan pleads that on 24 June 2023, he had sent an e-mail to Ms Lee summarising what the parties had thus far agreed regarding the payment of the Ownership Remuneration (ie, the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement), to which Ms Lee did not reply and also did not disagree. Therefore, while Mr Rohan does not plead the 20 Jun Meeting in connection with his case, it follows from his pleadings regarding the events said to have taken place on 24 June 2023 that the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement would have been raised and discussed at any meeting between the parties before 24 June 2023, which would include the 20 Jun Meeting, if it had taken place.
- [42]
[42] On the basis of Mr Rohan’s pleaded case that the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement were each raised and affirmed by the Defendants at the 6 Mar Meeting and the 14 Jun Meeting, and on the basis that it is implicit from Mr Rohan’s pleadings regarding the events on 24 June 2023 that the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement would have similarly been discussed and agreed to at the 20 Jun Meeting, the discussions and negotiations at those meetings directly shed light on whether the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement exist. I was therefore satisfied that documents evidencing the discussions and negotiations at the 6 Mar Meeting, the 14 Jun Meeting and the 20 Jun Meeting are material to the issue of whether the Alleged Further Agreement and the Alleged Quantum Agreement exist. I therefore allowed the request in Categories 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e).
Category 3
- [43]
[43] I now turn to consider the documents requested in Category 3, which I have grouped together since they pertain to common subject matter – FPL’s meetings.
- [44]
[44] Category 3(a) relates specifically to the 3 Feb Board Meeting, and based on Mr Rohan’s pleadings, the Alleged Quantum Agreement was reached at this meeting. On the basis of Mr Rohan’s pleadings, whatever was discussed at the 3 Feb Board Meeting directly sheds light on the Alleged Quantum Agreement. Documents evidencing the 3 Feb Board Meeting are therefore material to the issue of whether the Alleged Quantum Agreement exists which, for the reasons explained earlier, forms part of the “issues in the case” in OC 740 for the purposes of O 11 r 3. For these reasons, I allowed the request in Category 3(a).
- [45]
[45] Category 3(b) relates to FPL’s meetings after the 3 Feb Board Meeting. However, neither Mr Rohan nor the Defendants plead that there were any such meetings which took place after the 3 Feb Board Meeting. Although the Defendants’ pleadings refer to a shareholders’ resolution in writing passed on 3 July 2023 to remove Mr Rohan as director and CEO of FPL, the Defendants have stated in their responsive affidavit in SUM 1277 that no shareholders’ meeting had been held on that date. Since both Mr Rohan and the Defendants do not expressly plead any such meetings of FPL which had taken place subsequent to the 3 Feb Board Meeting, and there is also no objective evidence before me suggesting that such meetings had taken place, I do not think Mr Rohan has provided sufficient reason to justify his belief or assertion that the documents in Category 3(b) exist. I therefore refused the request in Category 3(b) on the basis that the third condition in Eng’s Wantan Noodle ([13] above) is not satisfied.
Category 4
- [46]
[46] I now turn to consider the documents requested in Categories 4(a) and 4(b), which I have grouped together since they pertain to common subject matter – discussions between Ms Lee and her family said to have taken place in or around December 2022, and in or around June 2023. The Defendants plead these discussions in support of their case that no agreement whatsoever had been reached between Mr Rohan and Ms Lee at the conclusion of the 8 Dec Meeting as well as the 20 Jun Meeting because at each of these meetings, Ms Lee had informed Mr Rohan explicitly that no agreement had been reached between the parties and she had to discuss his proposals with her family separately. As mentioned earlier, Mr Rohan’s case is that the Alleged Further Agreement had been reached at the 8 Dec Meeting, and also, Ms Lee had affirmed both the Alleged Further Agreement as well as the Alleged Quantum Agreement at the 20 Jun Meeting (see [38] and [41(c)] above).
- [48]
[48] The literal meaning of “private or internal correspondence” is plain and unambiguous and it refers to written communications exchanged between parties and which the parties at the material time intended that they be limited only to persons directly privy to those communications. The learned author of Singapore Court Practice ([19] above) (at para 11.5.5) defines private correspondence as “communications which are intended to be private as between the persons who corresponded with each other” and “internal correspondence” as “communications … between individuals and/or departments within an organisation” that are “circulated within the organisation and not intended for publication outside that organisation”. It therefore appears that the phrase “private and internal correspondence” (and in turn O 11 r 5(2)) has a rather broad ambit because in most cases, the maker of communications is likely to have intended them only for persons directly privy to the communications and is unlikely to have had other persons, not privy to those communications, in mind. However, if O 11 r 5(2) is to meaningfully give effect to the principle of privacy and confidentiality in O 11 r 1(2), the phrase “private and internal correspondence” must be given its literal meaning and it should not be delineated or restricted by any other criteria. In any case, O 11 r 5(2) does not exclude such correspondence from production entirely; a party can still obtain production where it demonstrates a “special case” or shows that such correspondence is a “known adverse document[]”.
Category 5
- [51]
[51] I now turn to consider the documents requested in Category 5, the subject matter of which is the termination of Mr Rohan’s employment with FPL. Mr Rohan explained that the request in Category 5 is made because the shareholders’ resolution dated 3 July 2023 passed to remove Mr Rohan as CEO and director of FPL was signed and executed by one “Mr Steen Puggard”, who was a director of FPL at the material time. Mr Rohan argued that, before the shareholders’ resolution came to be executed, there must have been correspondence within FPL and/or its shareholders regarding the grounds and reasons for terminating his employment as well as their deliberations on the same. Any such documents setting out the Defendants’ consideration and their eventual decision to terminate Mr Rohan’s employment would be relevant to the issue of whether the termination of Mr Rohan’s employment had been lawful.
- [52]
[52] It is undisputed that the Employment Contract contains the Notice Provision and various provisions relating to termination, pursuant to which the Defendants claim Mr Rohan’s employment was lawfully terminated. It is also not Mr Rohan’s pleaded case that the termination of his employment was unlawful under the terms of the Employment Contract; Mr Rohan’s case is that the termination had been unlawful because it was a breach of the Alleged Fixed Term and the alleged agreement for its further extension until 15 March 2024 (see [9(a)] above). Therefore, based on the parties’ pleaded cases, whether the termination of Mr Rohan’s employment was lawful or unlawful turns largely on whether Mr Rohan’s case regarding the Alleged Fixed Term and the alleged agreement for its subsequent extension is to be accepted and whether any such agreement(s) superseded the Notice Provision and other provisions for termination in the Employment Contract.
- [53]
[53] The Defendants argued that the documents in Category 5 constitute “private and internal correspondence” and so O 11 r 5(2) of the ROC 2021 is similarly engaged. Applying the principles set out earlier (at [48]) as to what constitutes “private and internal correspondence”, I agreed with the Defendants. The makers of the relevant correspondence within FPL and/or its shareholders would have intended that the same be limited only to the recipients of such correspondence and obviously, at the material time, they would not have intended Mr Rohan to have sight of those communications especially where what was discussed directly pertains to Mr Rohan. Accordingly, for Mr Rohan to obtain production of the documents in Category 5, he has to either demonstrate a “special case” or show that these documents are “known adverse documents”.
- [54]
[54] Whether the parties had agreed on the Alleged Fixed Term and its subsequent extension, and whether this was to supersede the Notice Provision and termination clauses in the Employment Contract, turns on the content of the parties’ discussions and negotiations prior to the entry into of the First Addendum and the Second Addendum, as well as the 8 Dec Meeting. While I accept that internal communications within FPL or its shareholders leading up to the termination of Mr Rohan’s employment might possibly make references to the legal basis of the termination and whether it was lawful, it is somewhat speculative to also say that these communications would have encompassed the terms on which Mr Rohan was employed by FPL and whether it included the Alleged Fixed Term and the Alleged Extension Agreement, which is needed for these communications to be characterised as being directly adverse to the Defendants’ case. That being so, I do not think that documents evidencing such internal communications can qualify as “known adverse documents” for the purposes of O 11 r 5(2). Mr Rohan did not make any submissions in connection with Category 5 that there exists a “special case” but I would not have found any on the facts, especially in view of my conclusion that the documents in Category 5 do not qualify as “known adverse documents”. For these reasons, I refused the request in Category 5.
Category 6
- [55]
[55] The documents requested in Category 6 are attachments contained in an e-mail which has been produced by the Defendants at s/n 11 of the DLOD, which is dated 31 July 2019 (timestamped 11.17am) and was sent by one “PembinaanFuji Baru” (which refers to PFBSB) to Michael Hoh (“Hoh”) and “Elain (IDR)” (“the 31 Jul E-mail”). Of the two recipients of the 31 Jul E-mail, only Hoh was an employee of the Defendants’ affiliate company in Malaysia, Gimme4Fingers Malaysia Sdn Bhd (“GMSB”). Ms Lee explained in the Defendants’ responsive affidavit for SUM 1277 that Hoh has ceased to be employed by GMSB from 16 April 2020, and further, she has personally accessed Hoh’s e-mails in his e-mail account with GMSB but she was unable to locate the original copy of the 31 Jul E-mail and its accompanying attachments. The Defendants therefore take the position that the documents requested in Category 6 are not within their possession or control, and in the alternative, Mr Rohan has not shown that such attachments are material in connection with issues arising in the Defendants’ counterclaim against him, namely, whether Mr Rohan had neglected and/or failed to discharge his duties by conducting the appropriate due diligence when appointing PFBSB as a contractor for the GMSB’s stores in Malaysia.
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