General Division of the High Court · Decided 22 August 2025
Each side breached the glove supply contracts; advance payments were refundable
Smart Glove International Pte Ltd v Full Support Healthcare Ltd
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC 168 · Case no. Suit No 49 of 2022
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Each side breached the glove supply contracts; advance payments were refundable
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [1], [4]
There is no fuller plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the defendant engaged the plaintiff to produce and deliver nitrile powder-free gloves under a supply agreement and three purchase orders. There were delays in the deliveries.
- [2]
[2] The defendant argues, as part of both its defence and its counterclaim, that these delays, among other events, constituted repudiatory breaches by the plaintiff, which it accepted through an email sent on 20 April 2021. It seeks reliefs, including damages and the refund of certain monies paid to the plaintiff (which it argues are refundable advance payments).
- [3]
[3] On the other hand, the plaintiff argues, in its claim and its defence to the defendant’s counterclaim, that it was the defendant who was in breach of its obligations by refusing to continue performing its obligations after the email was sent. It asks for reliefs, including damages and specific performance. Additionally, the plaintiff also seeks to retain all monies received from the defendant (arguing that they are forfeitable deposits).
- [4]
[4] Having heard the parties and considered the evidence, I find that both parties were in breach of the contracts. Further, I find that the monies paid in advance by the defendant to the plaintiff are refundable advance payments. These are my reasons.
Facts
The parties
- [5]
[5] The plaintiff, Smart Glove International Pte Ltd (“SGI”), is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of selling and distributing medical equipment, including gloves. SGI is wholly owned by Smart Glove Holdings Sdn Bhd (“SGH”), a company incorporated in Malaysia. SGH is also the ultimate holding company of a group of companies, including Smart Glove Corporation Sdn Bhd (“SGC”), GX Corporation Sdn Bhd (“GX”), Platinum Glove Industries Sdn Bhd (“PGI”), and Sigma Glove Industries Sdn Bhd (“Sigma”). In this judgment, I will refer to SGH and its subsidiary companies collectively as the “Smart Glove Group” or “SGG”.
- [6]
[6] Within the Smart Glove Group, SGI is the sales and distribution arm. SGC, GX, PGI and Sigma (collectively, the “SGG Manufacturers”) are the companies which operate factories and/or plants manufacturing, inter alia, nitrile gloves. All gloves produced under the disputed agreements in this case were produced by the SGG Manufacturers.
- [7]
[7] SGI called three factual witnesses to prove its case. These were Mr Long Say Sing (“Mr Long”), the General Manager of SGI, Mr Hew Yew Fook (“Mr Hew”), the Chief Operating Officer of SGH, and Mr Ahmad Faizi Mohd Kamil (“Mr Faizi”), the Chief Corporate Officer of SGH. SGI also called Mr Dawin Tang Keng Wai (“Mr Tang”), a director at PKF Covenant Equity Consulting Sdn Bhd and a Chartered Accountant, as its expert witness to quantify the parties’ claims and counterclaims.
- [8]
[8] The defendant, Full Support Healthcare Ltd (“FSH”), is a United Kingdom-incorporated company. Its business includes buying and selling personal protective equipment.
- [9]
[9] FSH called five factual witnesses to prove its case. They were Ms Sarah Jane Stoute (“Ms Stoute”), the Chief Executive Officer of FSH, Ms Zheng Bikun (“Ms Zheng”), FSH’s Head of Finance, Ms Sarah Jane White (“Ms White”), FSH’s Commercial Director, Mr Sarbjit Singh Mahli (“Mr Mahli”), FSH’s Insight Inventory Controller, and Ms Ruth Elizabeth Roper (“Ms Roper”), FSH’s Quality and Improvement Director. FSH also called Mr Oliver Alexander Richard Watts (“Mr Watts”), a Partner at Osborne Partners, who is also a Chartered Financial Analyst and a Chartered Accountant.
Background to the dispute
- [10]
[10] As alluded to at [1] above, the dispute centres on a supply agreement and three sets of purchase orders entered into between FSH and SGI, which I will now detail.
The Supply Agreement
- [11]
[11] In May 2020, FSH enquired with SGI on the supply of powder free nitrile gloves. On 11 June 2020, following some discussions, SGI and FSH entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the Supply of Medical Examination Gloves (the “Supply Agreement”). While the agreement was expressed to be between SGI and “Full Support Group”, the parties have always understood the agreement to be between SGI and FSH.
- [12]
[12] The parties differ on the interpretation of various aspects of the Supply Agreement. However, the agreement effectively provides for the tentative sale and purchase of 1,300,000,000 Gen-X 3mil nitrile powder-free blue gloves (“3mil gloves”) as follows:
- [13]
[13] As regards the prices and payment, the Supply Agreement provides for a default price of US$82.50 per 1,000 pieces of gloves, for a total contract sum of US$107,250,000:
- [14]
[14] The Supply Agreement also contains certain warranties made by SGI regarding the quality of the gloves supplied:
- [15]
[15] Finally, the Supply Agreement contains clauses pertaining to force majeure, variation of terms and waiver:
The first purchase order
- [18]
[18] More specifically, the “Monthly Summary” for PO1.2 reads as follows:
- [19]
[19] By a Proforma Invoice, which was also dated 16 June 2020, SGI accepted PO1.2 (“1st PI”). The 1st PI contains a table setting out the amounts due to be paid by FSH to SGI on various dates: upon issuance of the orders, as well as on the first and last day of each month from 30 June 2020 to 31 December 2020.
- [20]
[20] The 1st PI also contains some “Remarks/Special Instruction[s]” pertaining to the delivery of and payment for the gloves:
- [21]
[21] The 1st PI also stipulates that in the event of late payment by FSH, “interest at the rate of 1.5% per month is chargeable for any invoiced amount not paid in accordance with the agreed payment terms from its due date to the date of payment …”.
- [22]
[22] On 17 June 2020, pursuant to PO1.2 and the 1st PI, FSH transferred US$33,165,000 to SGI.
- [23]
[23] On 29 June 2020, SGI issued a revised Proforma Invoice (“Revised 1st PI”). The terms in the Revised 1st PI remain largely similar to those in the 1st PI, save that some revisions were made to the schedule of payments.
- [25]
[25] The PO1.3 Summary Page contains at least three material differences from the summary pages in the previous two purchase orders. First, the revised size mix for certain containers were stipulated. More specifically, whereas the PO1.2 Summary Page provided that each container was to contain 670 cases of small-sized gloves, 1,675 cases of medium-sized gloves and 1,005 cases of large-sized gloves, the PO1.3 Summary Page provided that for 297 out of the total 390 orders, the containers were to contain 100 cases of small-sized gloves, 1,400 cases of medium-sized gloves, 1,200 cases of large-sized gloves, and 650 cases of extra-large-sized gloves.
- [26]
[26] Second, the table containing the “Monthly Summary” (see [18] above) became relabelled as the “Orginal [sic] Monthly Summary”, though its contents remained the same.
- [27]
[27] Third, the table which was originally inserted under the “Weekly Schedule” was struck out. In its place, the following line was inserted:
The reference to “Yeoh” is to Mr Yeoh Yao Zhi (“Mr Yeoh”), a Customer Service Executive from SGI.
- [28]
[28] From this juncture, I will refer to PO1, PO1.2 and PO1.3 collectively as the “1st PO”. Between June 2020 and April 2021, several transactions took place under the 1st PO. The table below summarises these transactions. The parties agree to proceed on the contents stated in the table. However, the characterisation of the 80% paid upfront by FSH for each tranche of orders is disputed. While SGI contends that these are forfeitable deposits, FSH argues that these are refundable advance payments.
- [29]
[29] Ultimately, SGI did not adhere to the delivery schedules set out in the PO1.3 Summary Page, although the parties are in dispute as to whether SGI was obligated to do so.
The 5mil purchase order
- [30]
[30] In July 2020, SGI and FSH further discussed the supply of 5 mil Nitrile Dark Smart Blue gloves to FSH.
- [33]
[33] Under the 5mil PO Summary Page, the “Monthly Summary” is reflected as such:
- [34]
[34] On 10 August 2020, SGI accepted the 5mil PO by issuing two proforma invoices for:
- [35]
[35] On 5 October 2020, SGI issued a revised Proforma Invoice (the “Revised 1st 5mil PI”), under which the prices of the 5mil gloves (regular cuff) were revised so that the total sum is US$31,036,800.
- [36]
[36] In the 1st 5mil PI, 2nd 5mil PI, and Revised 1st 5mil PI (collectively, the “5mil PIs”), the following “Remarks/Special Instruction[s]” are stated:
- [37]
[37] All three Proforma Invoices also contain a late payment interest clause similar to that found in the 1st PI (see [21] above).
- [38]
[38] Between September 2020 and April 2021, several transactions took place under the 5mil PO. The table below summarises these transactions. Again, parties agree to proceed on the contents stated in the table, and are only disputing the characterisation of the 80% of monies already paid by FSH.
The second purchase order
- [41]
[41] In the 2nd PO, unlike in the 1st PO and the 5mil PO, the column titled “Estimated Ex-Factory Date From Smart” was left blank.
- [42]
[42] Moreover, there was no “Weekly Schedule” table reflected in the 2nd PO Summary Page. There was, however, still a “Monthly Schedule” table:
- [43]
[43] On 20 November 2020, SGI accepted the 2nd PO through a Proforma Invoice (the “2nd PI”). The 2nd PI stipulated the following “Remarks/Special Instruction[s]”:
- [44]
[44] The 2nd PI also contained a similar late interest payment provision as the other Proforma Invoices previously issued (see [21] and [37] above).
- [45]
[45] Between November 2020 and April 2021, several transactions took place under the 2nd PO. The table below summarises these transactions. Again, the parties agree to proceed on the contents stated in the table, and only dispute the characterisation of the 80% paid upfront by FSH.
- [46]
[46] Ultimately, SGI did not adhere to the delivery schedules set out in the 2nd PO Summary Page, although the parties disagree whether it was SGI’s obligation to do so.
FSH’s 20 April 2021 termination email and the events leading up to it
- [47]
[47] On 20 April 2021, Mr Matthew Simpson (“Mr Simpson”), a “Hand Protection Specialist” from FSH, sent an email to Ms Angeline Hew (“Ms Hew”) of SGI’s Business and Development Department, purporting to “cancel all of [FSH’s] existing 3mil orders” (the “20 April 2021 Email”):
- [48]
[48] Prior to this email being sent, certain events happened which are material to the proceedings. Apart from SGI’s non-adherence to the delivery schedules set out in the 1st PO Summary Page and 2nd PO Summary Page (see [29] and [46] above), the prices of both the 3mil gloves and 5mil gloves were also revised upwards several times, and FSH had requested for SGI to produce the EN455 shelf life certification for certain batches of 3mil and 5mil gloves pursuant to cl 3.2 of the Supply Agreement (see [14] above).
- [49]
[49] More specifically, between September 2020 and April 2021, SGI sought to revise the price of 3mil gloves to be supplied each month, which FSH accepted at each relevant time. Although the surrounding circumstances and the validity of the revision of prices are disputed, the actual revision of prices are not, and can be summarised as follows:
- [50]
[50] The prices of 5mil gloves were also revised upwards during a similar period, which FSH had accepted at each relevant time. Again, the parties disagree over the surrounding circumstances and the validity of the price increases, but not the fact of the increases.
- [51]
[51] Separately, on 19 March 2021, FSH’s Quality Assurance/Quality Control Manager, Ms Esther Barrows (“Ms Barrows”), wrote to SGI’s Ms Hew to ask about the shelf life of certain 3mil and 5mil gloves which had been delivered under lots GT20J01 and GT20K02:
- [52]
[52] On the same day, Ms Hew replied Ms Barrows stating that she would “revert … by next week”, and attached a “Technical Report for Three Year Shelf Life for 9” (3 mil) Powder Free Nitrile Gloves (EN455-4) [Stability Study Under Accelerated Aging Condition]” dated 12 February 2019.
- [53]
[53] There was further correspondence on this matter, both externally, between FSH and SGI, as well as internally, within FSH and SGI. Subsequently, on 1 June 2021, SGI provided FSH with the required EN455 shelf-life certifications for the 3mil and 5mil gloves.
Events following FSH’s 20 April 2021 Email
- [54]
[54] Following the 20 April 2021 Email, FSH began declining to take delivery of 3mil gloves. However, the parties continued corresponding to negotiate the price of 3mil gloves, although they disagree whether such negotiations went towards the possibility of concluding a fresh agreement (which is FSH’s position), or whether the negotiations came under the existing Supply Agreement, 1st PO and/or 2nd PO (which is SGI’s position).
- [55]
[55] On 6 July 2021, FSH’s Procurement and Supplier Relationship Manager, Ms Shiah Yoong (“Ms Yoong”) sent an email to SGI’s Ms Hew (“6 July 2021 Email”), stating that FSH wished to “cancel all the open POs”:
- [56]
[56] While Ms Yoong’s email has quantified the 80% of purchase price which FSH already paid to SGI for 3mil gloves which remain undelivered at US$59,654,915.20, parties accept that this amount is in fact US$64,782,300, being the total amount under the 1st PO (ie, US$45,988,800) and the 2nd PO (ie, US$18,793,500) (see [28] and [45] above). To date, this sum remains with SGI.
- [57]
[57] On 22 January 2022, SGI commenced the present suit against FSH. Apart from defending the claim, FSH lodged a counterclaim.
The parties’ cases
- [58]
[58] I now summarise SGI’s claims against FSH, FSH’s defence and counterclaim against SGI, as well as SGI’s defence to FSH’s counterclaim and FSH’s reply.
SGI’s claims
- [59]
[59] SGI’s primary case is that FSH has committed a breach and/or repudiatory breach of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO. SGI was always ready, willing and able to fulfil its obligations under these agreements. However, after sending the 20 April 2021 Email, FSH:
(a) failed, refused, and/or neglected to arrange for shipment of some 77,050,000 and 15,509,000 pieces of 3mil gloves which SGI had produced under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO respectively (totalling 92,559,000 pieces), and/or to take delivery of them;
(b) repeatedly demanded price reductions for the 3mil gloves under the Supply Agreement, 1st PO and 2nd PO, for gloves which have yet to be shipped (the “open orders”), as well as for these price reductions to apply retrospectively to gloves already shipped, and threatened to otherwise cancel all open orders; and
(c) sent the 6 July 2021 Email.
- [60]
[60] SGI has not accepted FSH’s repudiation of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO, and continued to perform, and/or remained ready, willing and able to perform the same, by procuring the production of the remaining 619,750,000 and 235,741,000 pieces of 3mil gloves under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO respectively (totalling 855,491,000 pieces).
- [61]
[61] In light of FSH’s alleged breaches, SGI seeks specific performance of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO. In this regard, while SGI pleads that they require FSH to “take delivery of and pay for the remaining 3mil Gloves produced and/or procured by [SGI], and/or to be produced and/or procured”, it appears from their written submissions that they only claim for specific performance in relation to the 855,491,000 pieces of 3mil gloves which remain unproduced.
- [62]
[62] Further and alternatively, SGI seeks damages caused by FSH’s alleged breach of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO.
FSH’s Defence and Counterclaim
- [63]
[63] FSH denies that it committed any breach. Instead, FSH’s case is that through the 20 April 2021 Email (reiterated again in the 6 July 2021 Email), FSH was merely terminating the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO after accepting SGI’s repudiatory breaches of the same, which comprise:
(b) the increases in prices of the gloves; and
- [66]
[66] Following its purported termination of the agreements on 20 April 2021, FSH argues that it was no longer obligated to accept any delivery of gloves or to make further payments for any undelivered gloves.
- [67]
[67] FSH also denies that it committed a repudiatory breach of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO by seeking price reductions. It explains that these requests were made due to SGI’s increases in price despite being in breach and/or repudiatory breach of the same agreements, which caused FSH to need to pay more to SGI for the gloves, and/or to need to sell the gloves when market prices had fallen substantially.
- [68]
[68] Finally, FSH accepts that it has not paid the remaining sum of US$5,127,384.80 due under the 1st PO, the 5mil PO and the 2nd PO for gloves already delivered. However, its position is that these amounts should be set off against the monies paid to SGI in relation to any undelivered gloves (ie, US$45,988,800 under the 1st PO and US$18,793,500 under the 2nd PO) which are refundable “advance payments”. The balance should then be refunded to FSH.
- [69]
[69] Alternatively, FSH argues that it is entitled to restitution of these sums because SGI has been unjustly enriched by them. Beyond seeking a refund of the monies it paid to SGI, FSH also claims that, as a result of SGI’s breaches, it has suffered losses.
SGI’s defence to FSH’s counterclaim and FSH’s reply
- [70]
[70] In its defence, SGI denies any breach of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO, the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO. In any event, any breach of these contracts was waived by FSH. On the other hand, FSH denies any waiver on its part.
Issues to be determined
- [71]
[71] Based on the parties’ cases as canvassed above, the following broad issues arise for my determination:
Preliminary issue: relationship between the Supply Agreement, and the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO
- [72]
[72] Before addressing these substantive issues, there is a preliminary question which I must first address − the relationship between the Supply Agreement, and the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO. This issue is important because it determines whether the parties can rely on the terms in the Supply Agreement to argue their cases concerning the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO.
Parties’ arguments
- [73]
[73] FSH’s position is that the Supply Agreement was the master agreement governing the 1st PO, the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO. It relies on the Court of Appeal decision of Sintalow Hardware Pte Ltd v OSK Engineering Pte Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 372 (“Sintalow”) (at [46] and [59]) to argue that the Supply Agreement, being the first contractual document signed by FSH and SGI, is the master document setting out the general terms and conditions governing the intended supply of gloves under purchase orders issued by FSH and accepted by SGI.
- [74]
[74] FSH further highlights that the conclusion of the Supply Agreement was contrary to SGI’s usual practice, and was specifically done to safeguard SGI’s interests given the size of FSH’s intended orders. It also argues that to hold otherwise would contradict SGI’s pleaded case.
- [75]
[75] On the other hand, SGI contends in its closing submissions that the Supply Agreement only applied to the 1st PO, but not the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO. It relies on the wording in the 2nd PO, the 2nd PI, the 5mil PO, and the 5mil PIs. It further relies on the facts that the use of formal supply agreements runs contrary to SGI’s usual business practice, and that the Supply Agreement served a different commercial purpose from the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO. It also seeks to analogise the present case to Saha Ram Krishna and others v Tan Tai Joum (acting in his capacity as the personal representative of the estate of Tan Hee Liang, deceased) [2024] SGHC 9 (“Saha Ram”), and to distinguish the present case from Sintalow.
My decision
- [76]
[76] I turn first to consider the 2nd PO. In this regard, I agree with FSH that this case should proceed on the basis that the 2nd PO was governed by the terms of the Supply Agreement. This is so for at least two reasons.
- [77]
[77] First, and importantly, I find that SGI’s case is not entirely consistent. For instance, in response to FSH’s pleaded allegation that by failing to meet the delivery schedule for the 2nd PO, SGI was “in breach and/or repudiatory breach of the Supply Agreement and the [2nd PO]”, SGI merely responds that it was “not in breach and/or repudiatory breach of the Supply Agreement and/or the [2nd PO]”. There was no denial that the Supply Agreement did not apply. Further, in its closing submissions, while it takes the position that the Supply Agreement did not apply to the 2nd PO and 5mil PO (see [75] above), it in fact repeatedly relies on the terms of the Supply Agreement to argue that it did not breach the 2nd PO (without framing this as an alternative argument). For instance, it relies on:
(a) Clause 4.4 to argue that it should be excused from the delays in deliveries of 3mil gloves under both the 1st PO and the 2nd PO because they were caused by reasons beyond SGI’s control; and
(b) Clause 3.2 to argue that there was no implied term in relation to the provision of the EN455 shelf-life certificates.
From SGI’s broader case, SGI seems to proceed on the basis that the 2nd PO is governed by the Supply Agreement.
- [78]
[78] Second, I find that throughout their performance of the contract, parties have proceeded on the mutual understanding that the 2nd PO was governed by the Supply Agreement, notwithstanding that the contracts did not make any express reference to each other. Apart from SGI’s repeated reliance on the provisions in the Supply Agreement as highlighted in the preceding paragraph, this is most clearly evidenced by how SGI approached FSH’s request for the EN455 shelf-life certificates.
- [80]
[80] I hence proceed on the basis that the 2nd PO is governed by the terms of the Supply Agreement. In coming to this finding, I note again that nothing in the Supply Agreement contemplates the 2nd PO, and that nothing in the 2nd PO and the 2nd PI refers to the Supply Agreement. In this regard, it might be said that the present case is analogous to Saha Ram.
- [82]
[82] While at first glance, the facts of the present case might appear analogous to those in Saha Ram, it must be highlighted that in that case, the defendant had, from the outset, consistently pleaded that the two tenancy agreements were separate (see Saha Ram at [35]). The defendant had also informed the plaintiffs from the outset that they would have to enter into separate tenancy agreements for the first storey, and for the second and third storeys of the premises (Saha Ram at [49]). However, as earlier explained, these factors are absent here. Therefore, Saha Ram does not assist SGI.
- [83]
[83] For completeness and clarity, while I agree with FSH that this case should proceed on the basis that the 2nd PO is governed by the Supply Agreement, I disagree that this is so because the parties had, from the outset when concluding the Supply Agreement, intended for it to govern all future contracts between SGI and FSH. Relatedly, I also disagree that this case is analogous to Sintalow.
- [84]
[84] In Sintalow, the parties signed a letter which contained the general terms and conditions applicable to the supply of sanitary ware by the plaintiff supplier, Sintalow, to the defendant purchaser, OSK (the “Master Contract”) (Sintalow at [15(e)]). The Court of Appeal held that the Master Contract contained the default terms intended to apply to any specific agreements which were subsequently concluded, subject to any terms set out in these specific agreements (Sintalow at [46] and [58]–[59]).
- [85]
[85] The present Supply Agreement is distinguishable from the Master Contract in Sintalow. There, the Master Contract contemplated the conclusion of the specific contracts subsequently entered into (see Sintalow at [15(e)], [48] and [52]). However, the Supply Agreement was not concluded in contemplation of the 2nd PO. To give a more specific example, whereas the Master Contract in Sintalow neither mentioned any quantity nor expressly imposed obligations on either party to place and/or accept orders (Sintalow at [15(e)]), Clauses 1.1 and 2.1 of the Supply Agreement expressly contemplate the quantity and price of the gloves respectively, which coincide with those under the 1st PO. It is improbable that the parties could have intended for the Supply Agreement to also apply to the 2nd PO from the outset. However, this does not contradict my finding that at the time of concluding the 2nd PO, parties agreed that the Supply Agreement would (to the extent that it was not overwritten by more specific provisions in the 2nd PO) govern the 2nd PO.
- [86]
[86] I turn next to consider the 5mil PO, which I also find to be governed by the Supply Agreement. This is supported by the context against which it was entered into (see [30]−[34] above). By SGI’s own case, not long after the 1st PO was concluded, and:
- [87]
[87] Even when the 5mil PO was concluded on 10 August 2020, discussions on the 2nd PO were also still ongoing (see [39] above). The proximity in time between the conclusion of the 5mil PO, and that of the 1st PO and the Supply Agreement, coupled with the overlapping discussions between the 5mil PO and the 2nd PO (which I have just found to be governed by the Supply Agreement), suggest on balance that the 5mil PO was, in general, similarly governed by the terms of the Supply Agreement.
- [88]
[88] From all of the above, the implication is that the parties can rely on the general provisions in the Supply Agreement to advance and/or defend their cases with respect to the 1st PO, the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO. On the other hand, any argument to the effect that the provisions of the Supply Agreement do not apply to the 2nd PO or the 5mil PO would fail, unless it can be shown that these general provisions were overwritten by more specific provisions in the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO.
Issue 1: whether SGI breached the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO, the 2nd PO and/or the 5mil PO
- [89]
[89] I now consider whether SGI breached the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO, the 2nd PO and/or the 5mil PO. In this regard, FSH submits that SGI committed three main breaches:
- [90]
[90] I will now address each of these alleged breaches in turn.
Whether SGI used all reasonable endeavours to meet the delivery schedules
The applicable principles
- [91]
[91] In KS Energy Services Ltd v BR Energy (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 SLR 905 (“KS Energy”), the Court of Appeal held (at [62]) that an “all reasonable endeavours” clause should be interpreted similarly to a “best endeavours” clause. As such, the standard which the former imposes is similar to that imposed by the latter, which is established in Travista Development Pte Ltd v Tan Kim Swee Augustine and others [2008] 2 SLR(R) 474 (“Travista”).
- [92]
[92] More specifically, the Court of Appeal in KS Energy summarised the substance of this standard as follows:
There was no breach under the 5mil PO
- [93]
[93] As alluded to earlier (at [64]), it appears that FSH is no longer pursuing its claim arising from SGI’s late deliveries in relation to the 5mil PO. In any event, there was no breach of Clause 1.2 for SGI to use all reasonable endeavours to ensure punctual deliveries under the 5mil PO. The orders were in fact completed ahead of schedule. This was conceded by Mrs Stoute at trial. As such, I turn next to consider the 1st PO and the 2nd PO.
Parties’ arguments in relation to the 1st PO and the 2nd PO
- [94]
[94] It is not disputed that SGI did not meet the delivery schedules set out in the 1st PO and the 2nd PO (see [29] and [46] above). SGI argues in its defence that:
- [95]
[95] More specifically, with regards the penultimate argument, by providing a monthly account of events, SGI explains that the delays were caused by issues beyond its control, including shipping-related issues caused by FSH, utility disruptions, issues relating to the supply of packaging materials, FSH’s request to prioritise the production of 5mil gloves over 3mil gloves, FSH’s request to revise the size mix per container of 3mil gloves to include a higher proportion of L and XL gloves coupled with the delay in the supply of formers (ie, moulds) required to produce L and XL gloves, and a mechanical breakdown of one of the thermal oil heaters in one of SGC’s plants.
- [96]
[96] FSH accepts that SGI’s obligation with regard to the adherence to delivery schedules under the 1st PO is qualified by Clause 1.2 of the Supply Agreement to “use all reasonable endeavours”. However, it submits that SGI did not use all reasonable endeavours to fulfil its obligations because:
- [97]
[97] More specifically, FSH alleges that SGI should have, among other things, approached alternative former suppliers, built up stockpiles of formers to ensure it was able to meet FSH’s orders, rearranged its production lines or re-allocated production capacity to other manufacturers who had adequate capacity to produce L and XL sized gloves, and/or simply asked FSH if it was prepared to adjust the size mix slightly so that more containers could be filled.
- [98]
[98] In response, after highlighting that the issue with formers is not easily surmountable, SGI submits that it took all reasonable endeavours to resolve this issue, including doing its best to push its former supplier to deliver the formers, sourcing for alternative former suppliers, and actively exploring solutions with FSH and its other customers to resolve the issue. SGI also argues that it had no obligation to source for alternative suppliers, and/or that such attempts would have been impracticable. Neither did it need to have a stockpile of formers, nor to open additional production lines. Finally, SGI argues that it prioritised FSH’s orders to the extent that was reasonable, and that FSH was in fact satisfied with SGI’s conduct.
My decision
(1) SGI’s obligations under the 1st and 2nd PO
- [99]
[99] To reiterate, FSH has accepted that the 1st PO is qualified by Clause 1.2 of the Supply Agreement. Since I have found that the 2nd PO was similarly governed by the Supply Agreement (which would include Clause 1.2), I proceed on the basis that SGI did not need to strictly adhere to the delivery schedules under both the 1st PO and the 2nd PO, but nonetheless needed to use all reasonable endeavours to adhere to them. In other words, pursuant to Clause 1.2, the issue in question is whether SGI had “use[d] all reasonable endeavours to meet all orders … in accordance with the agreed terms of delivery” in relation to both the 1st PO and the 2nd PO.
- [100]
[100] This would mean that SGI’s first broad contention – that it need not strictly adhere to the delivery schedules under the 2nd PO – has been addressed, with my finding being aligned with SGI’s position (although SGI relied on different reasons). This would also mean that SGI’s second broad contention – that the original schedules were adjusted and superseded with FSH’s agreement – is rendered somewhat moot. Regardless of whether the original schedules were superseded, SGI’s obligation under Clause 1.2 remained that of using all reasonable endeavours to punctually deliver the gloves. Put another way, even if there was any valid variation of the delivery schedules, SGI’s obligation to satisfy the deliveries punctually using all reasonable endeavours remains unchanged. The focus remains on whether the endeavours undertaken by SGI were reasonable, rather than whether the gloves were delivered punctually. With that, I turn now to consider parties’ remaining arguments.
(2) SGI’s reliance on Clause 4.4
- [101]
[101] Clause 4.4 on force majeure is set out at [15] above, and it excuses parties from “any delay or failure in performance”. Regardless of whether the reasons cited by SGI for the delays are true, they would, in themselves, be insufficient to excuse any breaches of Clause 1.2. This is because Clause 4.4 does not excuse SGI’s obligation under Clause 1.2 to use all reasonable endeavours to deliver the gloves punctually. SGI’s reliance on Clause 4.4 is thus misplaced. To be clear, this does not mean that the circumstances surrounding SGI’s performance of the agreements are irrelevant. Instead, they would already be factored into the factual matrix when the court determines if SGI used all reasonable endeavours to deliver the gloves punctually. In this regard, I make two observations regarding the arguments made by SGI in reliance of Clause 4.4.
- [102]
[102] First, while SGI has detailed a variety of reasons explaining the delays, SGI has also conceded that most of these reasons were relatively temporary, and that the main reason causing the large-scale and persistent delays was FSH’s request to change the size mix of each container, coupled with the lack of formers. For instance, as highlighted by FSH, SGI’s Mr Hew testified as follows:
- [103]
[103] This is also confirmed by Mr Long’s testimony:
- [104]
[104] More specifically, according to SGI, FSH had requested for a change in the size mix of each container in August 2020 to include more L and XL gloves (see [25] above). However, SGG’s supplier of formers, CeramTec Innovative Ceramic Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd (“CeramTec”), was affected by domestic Covid-19-related restrictions, and could not supply sufficient L and XL-sized formers to SGI. This was made known to SGI on 20 August, when CeramTec told SGI that it had “a big challenge with the labor (skilled)”. There were thus delays in the delivery of 3mil gloves.
- [105]
[105] For reasons which I will come to in the next section, even if relevant, I am unable to accept the reliance on this reason.
- [106]
[106] Second, I note that to justify the delay in 3mil gloves, SGI also points to FSH’s requests to prioritise the delivery of the 5mil gloves in exchange for some delays in the delivery of the 3mil gloves.
- [107]
[107] I accept that FSH told SGI multiple times that it could prioritise delivering the 5mil gloves over the 3mil gloves, and it could accept some delays in the delivery of 3mil gloves. However, I find that the understanding between the parties was that such delays would be on a limited scale. Certainly, SGI did not indicate that it was willing to tolerate a large-scale delay of the deliveries of the 3mil gloves. This is evident, for instance, from how, in one of his earlier emails to SGI discussing the supply and purchase of 5mil gloves, FSH’s Mr Simpson stated that FSH:
- [109]
[109] This understanding of the limitation placed on FSH’s concession was also conceded by SGI’s Mr Long during the trial:
- [110]
[110] Indeed, SGI does not appear to rely on this argument too heavily, except in relation to the delays in September 2020.
(3) Whether SGI oversold its capacity
- [111]
[111] I accept FSH’s primary case that SGI oversold its capacity. Therefore, SGI cannot be said to have used all reasonable endeavours to deliver the gloves punctually; it breached Clause 1.2.
- [112]
[112] In coming to my decision, I note that the delays in SGI’s delivery of 3mil gloves were large-scale and persistent. While this does not directly show that SGI has breached Clause 1.2, it is relevant in supporting the inference of such a breach.
- [113]
[113] In this regard, my findings are summarised in the table below, where I compare the original agreed number of deliveries to be made as set out in the 1st PO Summary Page and the 2nd PO Summary Page (see [18] and [42] above respectively), to the actual number of deliveries made each month, up till April 2021. I also set out, in italics, the anticipated numbers for the same categories after April 2021. These are based on an email sent by SGI’s Mr Yeoh to FSH on 19 April 2021 (one day before FSH sent the 20 April 2021 Email) (the “19 April 2021 Schedule”), containing SGI’s revised plan for the delivery of 3mil gloves from April 2021 to June 2021 (see [351] below).
- [114]
[114] I make three observations from the table. First, even before the 20 April 2021 Email was sent by FSH, SGI did not once hit the number of deliveries originally envisioned by the parties. In fact, it persistently fell far short.
- [115]
[115] Second, by the time the 20 April 2021 Email was sent, SGI had merely delivered 178 out of 390 of the due containers (around 46%) under the 1st PO, and 61 out of 100 of the due containers (61%) under the 2nd PO. The parties also agree that as of end-April, SGI had delivered 182 out of 390 of the due containers (around 47%) under the 1st PO, and 65 out of 100 of the due containers (65%) under the 2nd PO.
- [116]
[116] Third, even after June 2021, SGI would, if the projected deliveries in May 2021 and June 2021 were adhered to, still be short of 161 out of 390 of the due containers (around 41%) under the 1st PO, and 28 out of 140 of the due containers (20%) under the 2nd PO. Assuming that SGI’s projected deliveries in the first week of July are similar, the state of affairs would remain similar at the time when FSH sent the 6 July 2021 Email.
- [117]
[117] Given these, I find that regardless of what SGI’s obligations pertaining to the delivery schedules were, it can hardly be disputed that SGI was underperforming for the most (if not whole) period, especially after October 2020. But was that the case despite SGI having employed all reasonable endeavours to meet the original deadlines? I do not think so.
- [118]
[118] Pertinently, between June 2020 and July 2021, SGI’s production output had, in fact, curiously increased:
- [119]
[119] At trial, Mr Long initially testified that these gloves went towards fulfilling orders which were placed by SGI’s customers which came in before FSH:
- [121]
[121] In fact, the documentary evidence suggests that Mr Long’s initial testimony is untrue. In this regard, FSH highlights a total of 32 invoices which included orders for L and XL-sized 3mil gloves, even though these invoices were issued pursuant to purchase orders issued after SGI realised CeramTec’s inability to change the size mix of formers to include more for L and XL-sized gloves on 20 August 2020 (see [104] above). I have summarised the contents of these invoices in the table below:
- [124]
[124] In other words, the evidence suggests that SGI continued to accept new orders (in fact, a large number of them) even after encountering issues with meeting FSH’s orders under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO, and began to divert some of its production capacity towards fulfilling some of these new orders. By doing so, SGI caused itself to become severely overcommitted. Worse still, these new orders contained orders for L and XL-sized 3mil gloves. On SGI’s apparent own case, the lack of formers for these sizes was the main reason limiting its timely deliveries under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO.
- [125]
[125] I place emphasis on the word “apparent”, because it appears that SGI’s position on this issue of fact changed over the course of proceedings. In this regard, SGI’s Mr Hew originally testified that SGI was:
- [126]
[126] However, during trial, Mr Hew seemed to suggest that it was mainly formers for the XL-sized gloves which were in shortage. Then, in its closing submissions, SGI says that it was unable to procure sufficient formers to produce L and XL-sized gloves.
- [127]
[127] That said, I do not need to comment on these inconsistencies. The fact remains that SGI accepted many more new purchase orders for 3mil gloves which included the size(s) for which it allegedly faced a shortage of formers. Applying the test in Travista (see [92] above), it can hardly be said that a prudent and determined man, acting in the interests of FSH and anxious to procure the deliveries of 3mil gloves under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO within the delivery schedules originally agreed between the parties, would have acted in the way SGI did. SGI has thus breached Clause 1.2, and such breach persisted, minimally, into July 2021.
- [128]
[128] In this regard, the additional authorities cited by FSH are also helpful. In Kea Investments Ltd v Watson and others [2020] EWHC 2599 (Ch), Nugee LJ held (at [43]) that one way a person could breach an obligation to use best endeavours is “if the person has not been genuine in his efforts to achieve the required objective”. Similarly, in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation and Others [1985] LRC (Comm) 411, the High Court of Australia held (at 428) that:
- [129]
[129] By continuing to overcommit itself at the expense of severely compromising its fulfilment of the 1st PO and the 2nd PO, I find that SGI has breached Clause 1.2 of the Supply Agreement. For clarity, in coming to this decision, I am not saying that SGI is obligated to reject any new orders after accepting the 1st PO and the 2nd PO. As held in KS Energy, an obligor is allowed to consider its own interests in fulfilling a best endeavours obligation. However, the extent to which this is allowed is not without limits. At the minimum, an obligor should not, in considering its own interests, actively be taking steps which harm the interests of the obligee in respect of the obligation it is precisely expected to take all reasonable endeavours to fulfil. Here, SGI has crossed the line.
(4) The endeavours SGI undertook to resolve the delays in deliveries
- [130]
[130] Given my findings above, I need not consider whether the steps taken by SGI to resolve the delays in deliveries of 3mil gloves under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO were sufficient. Any such steps would be overshadowed by SGI’s large-scale continued acceptance of purchase orders for 3mil gloves in the face of the multiple problems it was facing in fulfilling its obligations under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO. SGI should not be allowed to actively behave in a way which compromises its obligation to use all reasonable endeavours to punctually deliver the 3mil gloves, but yet be excused from liability just because it also took some remedial steps in other aspects.
SGI’s increase in prices
- [131]
[131] The next breach which FSH alleges against SGI is SGI’s increase in the prices of gloves.
Parties’ arguments
- [132]
[132] SGI denies any breach, and argues that:
(a) it is entitled under the Supply Agreement, 1st PO, 2nd PO and/or the 5mil PO to increase the prices of the gloves, albeit for different reasons. Under Clause 2.1 of the Supply Agreement which only applied to the 1st PO, the price of gloves is “fixed for the full quantity unless there are extenuating circumstances beyond [SGI’s] control that both parties agree warrants a change”. Under the 2nd PO and 5mil PO, the stated prices are expressly subject to change in accordance with the 2nd PI and 5mil PIs;
(b) there were extenuating circumstances warranting an increase in price under Clause 2.1 of the Supply Agreement, such as the increase in price of raw materials; and
(c) FSH had agreed to each increase in price.
- [133]
[133] On the other hand, FSH argues that:
(a) pursuant to Clause 2.1 of the Supply Agreement, the price for 3mil gloves under the 1st PO was fixed;
(b) there were no extenuating circumstances warranting an increase in price; and
(c) while FSH had agreed to the price increases, this was done on the belief that there were in fact extenuating circumstances and that there would be no further delays in deliveries, which it was misled by SGI into believing. SGI had also threatened to otherwise withhold deliveries.
My decision
(1) Price increases under the 5mil PO and the 2nd PO
- [134]
[134] Since I have earlier found that there was no breach of Clause 1.2 in relation to the 5mil PO (see [93] above), there can be no corresponding breach of Clause 2.1 given the way FSH’s case is framed:
- [135]
[135] In any event, as I will now explain, SGI was entitled to increase the prices under the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO.
- [136]
[136] While I have found that the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO are governed by the Supply Agreement (see [76] and [86] above), I further find that Clause 2.1 of the Supply Agreement was overwritten by the more specific terms contained in the 2nd PI and the 5mil PIs. Specifically, these invoices contained the express term that the prices stated within them were “subject to change” (see [36] and [43] above). That the prices under the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO were indeed meant to be subject to change becomes clearer when one compares the 2nd PI and the 5mil PIs to the 1st PI, which does not contain a similar provision.
- [137]
[137] In this connection, the present case is analogous to Sintalow (see [84] above), where the Court of Appeal held that certain general terms in the Master Contract were overwritten by more specific provisions in the agreements which were subsequently concluded (Sintalow at [119(d)]).
- [138]
[138] Thus, SGI was entitled to increase the prices under the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO, which were not fixed. Indeed, in FSH’s submissions on this issue, it has only argued that “[t]he price for all orders under the 1st PO was fixed”, but not that the position was the same for orders under the 2nd PO or the 5mil PO. For completeness, I note that FSH also advances a related argument that increasing the price of gloves which were delivered late would, in and of itself, constitute a breach. I do not agree. In the 2nd PI and the 5mil PIs, it is stated that “the final price will be notified to the buyer prior to the confirmed date of delivery” (see [36] and [43] above). This allowed SGI to change the price, even when a particular delivery is delayed, until the confirmed date of delivery, when the final price would be notified to the buyer. I therefore find that SGI was entitled to increase the prices under the 2nd PO and 5mil PO even for orders that should have been delivered earlier.
(2) Price increases under the 1st PO
- [139]
[139] On the other hand, under the 1st PO, any price increase would be contractually allowed under Clause 2.1 of the Supply Agreement only if: (a) there were extenuating circumstances beyond SGI’s control; and (b) the parties agreed to it. I now consider if Clause 2.1 was engaged.
- [140]
[140] Essentially, SGI argues that the extenuating circumstances beyond its control were the significant increases in the price of raw materials. I disagree for two reasons.
- [141]
[141] First, I agree with FSH that before the Supply Agreement was concluded, the parties had considered any potential increases in the price of raw materials during the duration of the 1st PO from June 2020 to December 2020, and SGI made a commercial decision to bear this risk. In a letter to FSH’s Mr Simpson dated 9 June 2020, SGI’s Ms Hew stated that:
- [144]
[144] While there might not be anything inherently wrong with such an arrangement in a general commercial context, it puts into question here whether the increases in prices were in fact due to extenuating circumstances which would avail SGI of Clause 2.1.
- [147]
[147] This same observation applies to the subsequent price increases. SGI’s Mr Faizi testified that the price of latex “increased significantly” from June 2020, peaking at US$2.7900 per kg from February 2021 to April 2021, as follows:
- [149]
[149] At this juncture, I note that SGI argues that its price increases were reasonable, and consistent with industry practice during the material time. This misses the point. What Clause 2.1 requires before parties can agree to a change in price is the presence of extenuating circumstances beyond SGI’s control, and not that any proposed increase in prices must be reasonable.
- [150]
[150] Before leaving this point, I also find, for completeness, that SGI should not be allowed to rely on any price increases in raw materials after December 2020 to justify its increases in the prices of 3mil gloves. This is because the 3mil gloves under the 1st PO should have been delivered by the end of December 2020, and the price increases were a result of delays occasioned by SGI. As I found that the delays were the result of SGI overselling its capacity, which is a situation eminently within SGI’s control (see [111]–[129]) above), the price increases after December 2020 could not have been effected pursuant to extenuating circumstances beyond SGI’s control.
- [151]
[151] Given my finding that there were no extenuating circumstances which would have triggered the operation of Clause 2.1, it is unnecessary for me to decide if FSH had agreed to any consequent price increases. Any agreement to increase the price of 3mil gloves pursuant to Clause 2.1 would have been based on an impermissible premise, given that, pursuant to the phrasing of Clause 2.1, an agreement must be premised on an extenuating circumstance. Hence, I find that SGI breached Clause 2.1 of the Supply Agreement by increasing the price of 3mil gloves delivered under the 1st PO.
Whether SGI produced the EN455 certificates within reasonable time
- [152]
[152] The last breach allegedly committed by SGI is in failing to produce the EN455 certificates in relation to certain 3mil and 5mil gloves within reasonable time upon FSH’s request. FSH’s request was made on 19 March 2021, and the certificates were provided by SGI on 1 June 2021.
Parties’ arguments
- [153]
[153] FSH argues that:
- [154]
[154] On the other hand, SGI argues that:
The applicable law
- [155]
[155] In Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”), the Court of Appeal set out the three-stage process through which the implication of terms in fact should be considered:
- [156]
[156] More specifically, under the first step of the framework, a “true” gap would only arise if parties did not contemplate the issue at all and so left a gap. There would be no gap if parties contemplated the issue but chose not to provide a term for it because they mistakenly thought that the express terms of the contract had adequately addressed it, or if parties contemplated the issue but chose not to provide any term for it because they could not agree on a solution (Sembcorp Marine at [93]–[97]).
My decision
- [157]
[157] Applying the framework in Sembcorp Marine, I find that there cannot be any implied term in the Supply Agreement, because there is no “true” gap. Clause 3.2 already provides that SGI is obligated to provide EN455 certificates upon FSH’s request. While there is no specific timeline stipulated, this was probably the case because parties had mistakenly thought that the express terms of Clause 3.2 had adequately addressed this issue. As such, the proper remedy in this situation should be an equitable rectification of the Supply Agreement (Sembcorp Marine at [94(b)] and [96]).
- [158]
[158] In this regard, I find that the actual intention of parties was to impose on SGI an obligation to supply any EN455 certificates requested for by FSH within a reasonable time, which should be within a few days of FSH’s request. Clause 3.2 of the Supply Agreement should thus be so rectified. This must be the case as a matter of common and commercial sense. Otherwise, Clause 3.2 would be rendered useless.
- [159]
[159] This also appears to have been conceded by SGI’s Mr Long at trial:
- [160]
[160] While the remedy of equitable rectification is not pleaded by either party, given how this issue has been ventilated at trial, I see no prejudice to SGI in relying on this doctrine. I find that SGI breached its obligations under the rectified Clause 3.2 in relation to all the agreements by taking more than two months to provide the EN455 certificates upon FSH’s request.
- [161]
[161] I add that the EN455 certificates were not, objectively speaking, particularly difficult to obtain, since they had been prepared sometime between 2012 and 2013, prior to FSH’s request. The certificates already existed. While SGI has explained that the delay was caused due to a high workload and internal miscommunications, such internal issues do not excuse SGI’s obligations under the rectified Clause 3.2. To hold otherwise would mean that parties can be excused from fulfilling their contractual obligations when they have internal operational issues. That cannot be right.
Issue 2: whether SGI’s breaches were repudiatory in nature
- [162]
[162] By the above, I have found that SGI committed three breaches:
(a) breach of Clause 1.2 of the Supply Agreement to use all reasonable endeavours to ensure punctual deliveries of gloves in relation to the 1st PO and the 2nd PO;
(b) breach of Clause 2.1 of the Supply Agreement for increasing the price of 3mil gloves between October 2020 and April 2021 in relation to the 1st PO; and
(c) breach of Clause 3.2 of the Supply Agreement for failing to produce the EN455 certificates in respect of gloves to be delivered under the 1st PO, the 2nd PO and the 5mil PO within a reasonable time upon FSH’s request.
- [163]
[163] The next question is whether these breaches are repudiatory, in the sense that they would have entitled FSH to terminate the agreements. In this regard, I observe that only the 1st PO and 2nd PO were purportedly terminated by FSH (see [47] and [55] above). Thus, the focus will only be on SGI’s breaches in relation to these two contracts.
The applicable law
- [164]
[164] In RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd and another appeal [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413 (“RDC Concrete”), the Court of Appeal set out the four situations entitling an innocent party to terminate a contract (at [113]):
(a) In a “Situation 1” case, the contractual term breached clearly states that, in the event of certain event or events occurring, the innocent party is entitled to terminate the contract.
(b) In a “Situation 2” case, the defaulting party renounces the contract by clearly conveying to the innocent party that it will not perform its contractual obligations at all.
(c) In a “Situation 3A” case, the defaulting party has breached a condition (as opposed to a mere warranty) of the contract. A “condition” is a term that parties intended, at the time of contracting, to be so important that any breach, regardless of the actual consequences of such a breach, would entitle the innocent party to terminate the contract (RDC Concrete at [97] and [100]). A “warranty” is a term that parties intended, at the time of contracting, to be not so important so that no breach will ever entitle the innocent party to terminate the contract (even if the actual consequences of such a breach are extremely serious) (RDC Concrete at [98] and [100]).
(d) In a “Situation 3B” case, which should only be applied after the condition-warranty approach in Situation 3A is applied, the defaulting party has committed a breach, the consequences of which will deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that the innocent party should obtain from the contract.
- [165]
[165] Since parties are not relying on Situation 1, I will move on to analyse whether a Situation 2 scenario is made out.
Situation 2
Parties’ arguments
- [166]
[166] FSH’s case is that SGI’s conduct by early to mid-April 2021 was a renunciation of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO. By not using all reasonable endeavours to meet the agreed delivery schedules, SGI demonstrated an intention to continue delivering the remaining orders under the 1st PO and the 2nd PO in a way that was radically different from what was agreed.
- [167]
[167] FSH then argues that if a defaulting party evinces an intention to perform a contract, “but the performance proffered is substantially inconsistent with that party’s obligations” under the contract (which I will refer to as committing a “substantial breach”), this amounts to evincing an intention not to perform, ie, a renunciation (Chitty on Contracts (Hugh G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2023) at paras 28-048; RDC Concrete at [93] and [95]–[96], Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 857 (“Alliance Concrete”) at [59]; Spar Shipping AS v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co Ltd [2017] 4 All ER 124 at [77] and [87]).
- [168]
[168] On the other hand, SGI denies any renunciation of the contracts, arguing that it tried its best to work with FSH for the delivery of the gloves. Relying on Aero-Gate Pte Ltd v Engen Marine Engineering Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 409 (“Aero-Gate”) and Government of the City of Bueno Aires v HN Singapore Pte Ltd and another [2023] SGHC 139 (“Bueno Aires”), SGI argues that the delays did not mean that SGI had renounced the contracts. In fact, it remained ready to perform its contractual obligations at all times.
My decision
- [169]
[169] I accept SGI’s submission that it did not renounce the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO or the 2nd PO. While SGI had breached its obligation to use reasonable endeavours to ensure the punctual delivery of gloves in accordance with the agreed schedules, the evidence suggests that it continued to be committed to completing the deliveries, albeit at its own pace.
- [170]
[170] This can be gleaned from the emails which SGI sent FSH in early to mid-April 2021 (when SGI’s conduct had allegedly evinced an intention to renounce the contracts). For instance, on 19 April 2021 (one day before FSH sent the 20 April 2021 Email), SGI’s Mr Yeoh sent FSH the 19 April 2021 Schedule. Such conduct is inconsistent with that of a party seeking to renounce a contract.
- [174]
[174] In Bueno Aires, the plaintiff engaged the first defendant, HN Singapore, to import and supply 182,475 Covid-19 test kits by 26 April 2020 (Bueno Aires at [15]). HN Singapore failed to do so (Bueno Aires at [17]). Following that, between 27 April 2020 and 16 May 2020, the plaintiff repeatedly sought confirmation of the delivery date of the test kits. HN Singapore was unable to do so. However, its sole director and shareholder Mr Eng, the second defendant, stated that the defendants maintained the utmost dedication to seeing the deal through (Bueno Aires at [23]). HN Singapore was subsequently unable to import the test kits, and the plaintiff terminated the agreement on 27 May 2020 (Bueno Aires at [25]).
- [175]
[175] The High Court held that although HN Singapore had failed to deliver the test kits by 26 April 2020, this did not constitute a renunciation of the contract, because it did not evince an intention to no longer be bound by the contract:
- [176]
[176] Similarly, in the present case, while SGI repeatedly failed to meet the delivery timelines, its communications with FSH suggest that it remained committed to seeing the deal through (albeit at its own pace). A reasonable person would not conclude that SGI no longer intended to be bound at all by the provisions of the Supply Agreement, the 1st PO and the 2nd PO.
- [177]
[177] As for FSH’s proposition that a substantial breach amounts to renunciation under Situation 2, I am unable to agree that it is supported by the local authorities. To begin with, this proposition is not consistent with the test for renunciation under Situation 2: whether the defaulting party conveys an intention that “it will not perform its contractual obligations at all” [emphasis in italics in original; emphasis added in bold italics] (RDC Concrete at [93]; Alliance Concrete at [155]).
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.