General Division of the High Court · Decided 3 December 2025
The defendants conspired to injure the claimant by setting up a competing broker
Guy Carpenter & Co Pte Ltd v Choi Okmi and others
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC 241 · Case no. Originating Claim No 312 of 2022
✱ The decision, in one line
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The defendants conspired to injure the claimant by setting up a competing broker
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraph [167]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] In the dynamic landscape of modern commerce, where clients are free to engage with whom they please and professionals frequently move between companies, one principle endures: loyalty, integrity and fair dealing are, and must be, at the core of any functioning business environment. The freedom of client choice does not confer a parallel freedom on employees to quietly orchestrate transitions behind the scenes, nor does it diminish the importance of honouring reasonable restraint of trade provisions designed to ensure a level playing field. These clauses, when reasonable, serve a vital purpose – they prevent individuals from unfairly exploiting the trust, goodwill and proprietary knowledge acquired in one role for the immediate benefit of another employer. For the system to retain coherence and credibility, those entrusted with advancing their employer’s interests must do so faithfully, within the bounds of both contract and conscience.
- [2]
[2] These issues come sharply into focus on the facts of the case before me. What is at stake is not merely a question of client movement, but rather the manner in which the movement was facilitated – ostensibly through behind-the-scenes co-ordination, the premature (mis)alignment of loyalties, and the apparent disregard of contractual obligations and restraint of trade covenants. The evidence before me paints a troubling picture – a pattern of calculated circumvention by individuals who, while still formally employed by one company, were actively furthering the interests of another. It reveals a web of conduct in which future employers appeared complicit, knowingly engaging with prospective hires who were still bound by obligations elsewhere; where incoming employees operated behind the scenes at their new workplace under the guise of acting for a separate entity; and where all involved sought to cloak their actions with a veneer of plausible deniability.
Facts
The parties
- [3]
[3] Broadly speaking, the dispute before me centres on whether two employees (the first and second defendants), while still in the service of their original employer (the claimant) and before their official dates of departure, had begun to act in concert with two other entities (the third defendant, and its wholly-owned Singapore subsidiary, the fourth defendant). The said conspiracy allegedly involved the two employees diverting business away from their original employer towards one of the entities (the fourth defendant) after its incorporation. Subsequently, the two employees then moved to the entity in question.
- [4]
[4] The claimant is Guy Carpenter & Company Pte Ltd (“Claimant”), a reinsurance broker engaged in brokering reinsurance contracts between (a) insurance or reinsurance companies (known as customers) seeking to reinsure risks which they are insuring or reinsuring for their own clients; and (b) reinsurers (known as markets) offering to provide reinsurance to customers. The Claimant brokers facultative reinsurance contracts and treaty reinsurance contracts. Facultative reinsurance contracts involve reinsurance in respect of specific insurance policies of a single or a defined package of risks. Reinsurers would have to re-evaluate each individual risk in each of these policies to decide whether to accept or decline it. On the other hand, treaty reinsurance contracts involve reinsurance for all risks within a specific book of insurance business, class of insurance policies, or insured risks which fall within pre-defined terms between the insurer and the reinsurer. There would thus be no need to re-evaluate each individual risk.
- [5]
[5] The third defendant, LK Insurance Services Co Ltd (“Third Defendant”), is a company incorporated in South Korea, which, like the Claimant, is in the business of reinsurance broking.
- [6]
[6] The Fourth Defendant, LK Re Pte Ltd, is the Singapore subsidiary of the Third Defendant and was incorporated in Singapore on 8 April 2021. It is also, like the Claimant and the Third Defendant, in the business of reinsurance broking. The Fourth Defendant obtained its general reinsurance broker licence from the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) on 3 November 2021.
- [7]
[7] The first defendant is Ms Choi Okmi (also known as Celeste) (“First Defendant”), a former Senior Vice-President of the Claimant. The First Defendant had commenced employment with the Claimant on 1 July 2018 and her job scope was primarily to look after the Claimant’s facultative reinsurance business under the Korean desk. The First Defendant tendered her resignation on 15 November 2021, and by virtue of a six-month notice period, only ended her employment with the Claimant on 14 May 2022. The First Defendant entered into an employment contract with the Fourth Defendant on 19 November 2021, and in the said contract, agreed to commence employment as its Chief Broking Officer on 16 May 2022, covering all aspects of its reinsurance business. The parties disagree on whether the First Defendant was, in substance, already doing work for the Fourth Defendant even before she ended her employment with the Claimant: the First Defendant asserts that she had substantively commenced work with the Fourth Defendant only as contractually stipulated on 16 May 2022, and had “continued to work hard for [the Claimant]” during her notice period; the Claimant, on the other hand, alleges that she had in fact been undertaking tasks for the Fourth Defendant even as she was employed by the Claimant, potentially from as early as April 2021 (if not even earlier, as will be discussed later).
- [8]
[8] The second defendant is Mr Lee Dong Yeol (also known as Dominic) (“Second Defendant”), a former junior broker at the Claimant’s facultative reinsurance broking department. Much like the First Defendant, the Second Defendant eventually ended up working for the Fourth Defendant. The Second Defendant had commenced employment with the Claimant on 1 November 2018, with the First Defendant being his direct supervisor. The First and Second Defendants had a close mentor-mentee relationship. The two had known each other even prior to their employment at the Claimant: the two first met in 2016 when the Second Defendant undertook an internship at the First Defendant’s previous company, and it was the First Defendant who recruited the Second Defendant to join the Claimant as her direct subordinate. They then “developed a close working relationship” over the three-year period whilst working at the Claimant’s Korean desk from 1 November 2018 to 3 November 2021. This three-year period came to a close when the Second Defendant submitted his letter of resignation on 2 August 2021, with his last day of work being on 3 November 2021. On 15 November 2021, the Second Defendant signed an employment contract with the Third Defendant. His ostensible role in the Third Defendant was to oversee the setting up of the “reinsurance processes, operations and business flow” for the Third and Fourth Defendants as part of the Third Defendant’s task force team (“Task Force Team”). On 1 March 2022, the Second Defendant entered into an employment contract with the Fourth Defendant and commenced employment as an insurance broker with the Fourth Defendant on 1 April 2022.
- [9]
[9] The Second Defendant’s actual start date of having commenced substantive work (ie, when he started work as a matter of fact, as opposed to what is set out on the face of the employment contract) for the Fourth Defendant is in dispute. The Second Defendant asserts that he started work with the Third Defendant on 15 November 2021 and with the Fourth Defendant on 1 April 2022; the Claimant alleges that the Second Defendant started working for the Fourth Defendant prior to, or at least from, 8 April 2021, which was when the Fourth Defendant was incorporated, as he had assisted with setting it up. The Claimant further contends that, even though the Second Defendant had signed an employment contract with the Third Defendant in November 2021, he had, for all intents and purposes, been working for the Fourth Defendant.
- [10]
[10] As can be seen from the chronology of events above, it was the Second Defendant who first resigned from the Claimant on 2 August 2021, followed by the First Defendant shortly thereafter on 15 November 2021.
Background to the dispute
- [11]
[11] As hinted to earlier (see [3] above), the Claimant contends that there was a conspiracy amongst the Defendants to set up a competing company (ie, the Fourth Defendant) to divert business involving Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd’s (“SFMI”) domestic warehouse insurance risks in the Republic of Korea from the Claimant to the Third and/or Fourth Defendants. In this specific context, SFMI was the customer and the markets included Tokio Marine Kiln Singapore Pte Ltd (“Tokio Marine”), Emirates Insurance Company PSC and Labuan Re. On the Claimant’s case, such business had fallen within its pre-existing semi-automatic SFMI facility, which also covers SFMI’s overseas (ie, out of Korea) warehouse risks. This meant that any domestic warehouse insurance risk offered by SFMI which fell within the defined parameters of the facility would have been capable of being reinsured by the markets on pre-agreed terms and conditions, though the markets could also reject the offer.
- [12]
[12] The Defendants contend that the Claimant was never the reinsurance broker for SFMI’s domestic warehouse facility (ie, warehouses located within Korea) and that SFMI did not, in fact, operate such a facility. The Defendants allege that the Claimant only acted as the reinsurance broker for SFMI’s overseas warehouse facility and “handled only some of SFMI’s domestic (i.e. Korean) facultative reinsurance risks” [emphasis in original]. In that sense, from the Defendants’ perspective, none of the business it procured in relation to SFMI’s domestic warehouse insurance risks in the Republic of Korea was even the subject of any facility reinsurance coverage brokered by the Claimant, and therefore, by definition, could not be business that was diverted.
The parties’ cases
Claimant’s case
- [13]
[13] The Claimant argues that in furtherance of a conspiracy to divert its domestic warehouse risks business, the Defendants had worked together to establish a facility for SFMI’s domestic warehouse risks with the Third and/or Fourth Defendants, to persuade SFMI to place these risks through the Third and/or Fourth Defendants’ facility, and to persuade the Claimant’s markets to reserve their reinsurance capacities in respect of these risks for the Third and/or Fourth Defendants. The Claimant accepts it does not have “much direct evidence of the conspiracy” and instead invites the court to come to this conclusion through the drawing of inferences from the surrounding circumstances.
- [14]
[14] To summarise the evidence and surrounding circumstances relied on by the Claimant, a chronology of the key events is as follows:
(a) The First and Second Defendants commenced employment with the Claimant on 1 July 2018 and 1 November 2018 respectively.
(b) The Claimant argues that the First and Second Defendants had assisted with the setting up of the Fourth Defendant and/or the Fourth Defendant’s SFMI domestic warehouse facility even while they were employed by the Claimant. Some of the key instances of this, keeping in mind the fact that the First and Second Defendants only left the Claimant’s employ on 14 May 2022 and 3 November 2021 respectively, are as follows:
(i) On 29 January 2021, the First Defendant attended a virtual meeting with representatives of the Third Defendant. The Claimant contends that this meeting must have been for the purpose of discussing plans to incorporate the Fourth Defendant to compete with the Claimant.
(ii) On 2 August, 12 November, 22 November and 1 December 2021, the First Defendant forwarded emails containing information provided by the Claimant to markets for brokering purposes from her work email address to her personal email address. On 26 November 2021, the First Defendant similarly forwarded an email containing a list of various property underwriters in Singapore from her work email address to her personal email address. The details of these emails are elaborated on in some detail below (at [99]). The Claimant argues that the First Defendant had forwarded the confidential information with a view to continuing to have access to such information for the benefit of the Defendants after an eventual planned move to the Fourth Defendant.
(iii) In or around end-December 2021, the First Defendant assisted with a reference letter for the Second Defendant’s application for graduate school as a referee. In the reference letter in question, the First Defendant explicitly states that she had asked the Second Defendant “to work on the initial preparations and agenda planning for the foundation of [the Fourth Defendant]”.
(iv) Following the rejection of the Second Defendant’s employment pass application (to work for the Fourth Defendant), on or around 28 February 2022, the First Defendant drafted an appeal letter to the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) on the Second Defendant’s behalf. The Claimant argues that the First Defendant had drafted the appeal letter (in place of the Fourth Defendant) in her capacity as his future supervisor as she was the mastermind behind his move to the Fourth Defendant under the conspiracy.
(c) On 2 August 2021, the Second Defendant tendered his resignation and his last day of work with the Claimant was on 3 November 2021. On 15 November 2021, the Second Defendant signed an employment contract with the Third Defendant and he claims to have worked for them until he was officially transferred to the Fourth Defendant on 1 April 2022. However, the Claimant argues that the Second Defendant was, in actuality, working for the Fourth Defendant during the period he was purportedly employed by the Third Defendant according to his employment contract (if not earlier). In support of this, the Claimant notes that, during this same period, even while ostensibly an employee of the Third Defendant, the Second Defendant was expressly introducing himself and signing off his emails as an employee of the Fourth Defendant.
(d) On 15 November 2021, the First Defendant tendered her resignation, with her last day of work with the Claimant being on 14 May 2022. The First Defendant then signed her employment contract with the Fourth Defendant on 19 November 2021. While the First and Second Defendants claim that they had joined the Third and/or Fourth Defendants separately and without each other’s knowledge, the Claimant argues that this was part of the First Defendant’s arrangements of bringing her team from the Claimant as part of the setting up of the Fourth Defendant.
(e) While the First Defendant was still serving out her notice period with the Claimant, on 31 December 2021, the Second Defendant forwarded to the First Defendant an Excel file containing details on SFMI’s new domestic warehouse facility. The Claimant contends that this is further evidence of her involvement in the setting up of SFMI’s domestic warehouse facility under the Fourth Defendant.
(f) On 11 January 2022, SFMI issued a broker of record letter (sent to the Second Defendant) appointing the Fourth Defendant as its broker of record for reinsurance requirements in respect of its domestic warehouse accounts. Despite having been informed of the issuance of this broker of record letter that same day, the First Defendant had not informed the Claimant that its domestic warehouse risks business was being diverted. The Claimant argues that the First Defendant did not raise this internally precisely because she was orchestrating the diversion of business.
- [15]
[15] The Claimant brings four causes of action, namely (a) a claim in unlawful means conspiracy against all four defendants; (b) a claim in breach of confidence against the First Defendant; (c) claims against the First and/or Second Defendants for breaches of their employment contracts, the Claimant’s code of ethics and confidentiality agreements and/or the Claimant’s compliance policies; and (d) claims against the First, Third and/or Fourth Defendants for inducing the First and/or Second Defendants to breach their employment contractual obligations. The four causes of action are closely interlinked as the Claimant relies on the latter three causes of action as unlawful acts in establishing its claim in unlawful means conspiracy.
Defendants’ case
- [16]
[16] In addition to arguing that no business had been diverted since the Claimant was never the reinsurance broker for SFMI’s domestic warehouse facility (see [12] above), the Defendants also contend that SFMI’s decision to engage the Third/Fourth Defendant as its broker of record was based on SFMI’s own commercial considerations and was not the result of any influence on the part of the Defendants. The Defendants claim that, in or around December 2021, it was SFMI who had, on their own volition, reached out to the Second and/or Third Defendant as SFMI had been searching for a reinsurance broker to help start its facility for domestic Korean warehouses.
- [17]
[17] The First and Second Defendants contend that they had only commenced employment with the Third and/or Fourth Defendant on the dates stipulated on their respective employment contracts. They also contend that the Second Defendant had only sought help from the First Defendant (in relation to the Excel file from SFMI and his appeal letter to MOM) as personal favours from his mentor, and these requests were not a function of any association she had with the Fourth Defendant. They also advanced somewhat more benign interpretations and explanations of the various factual matters that have been set out at [14] above, all of which I will discuss in due course.
Procedural issue: Cross-examination of witness called by co-defendant
- [18]
[18] Before turning to the substantive issues in this matter, I consider it useful to address a point of practice that arose in the course of the proceedings – namely, the right of a defendant to examine or cross-examine a witness called by a co-defendant. While not central to the ultimate disposition of the case, the issue carries sufficient practical significance and, in my view, merits clarification given its potential implications for cases involving multiple defendants.
- [19]
[19] This issue took shape against the backdrop of the following circumstances: at the conclusion of its case, and just before the start of the case for the defence, the Claimant contended that counsel for the First and Second Defendants ought not to be allowed to ask leading questions in the cross-examination of the witnesses called by the Third and Fourth Defendants and vice versa. In a letter subsequently submitted to the court dated 18 June 2025 (“18 June 2025 Letter”), the Claimant took the point further, relying on s 139(2) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act”) to contend that the “Defendants should not be allowed to cross-examine each other’s witnesses, let alone ask leading questions to those witnesses, because the Defendants’ interests are clearly aligned and not in conflict”.
- [20]
[20] I had, by way of a written reply dated 20 June 2025, overruled the Claimant’s objections, noting that it would be inappropriate for me to stymie the Defendants’ right to cross-examine the other witnesses led by the co-defendants, or to mandate that only non-leading questions be asked. I elaborate on the reasoning I took in coming to this conclusion.
- [21]
[21] To commence the analysis, as noted in the 18 June 2025 Letter, the Claimant’s contentions emanate from its reading of s 139(2) of the Evidence Act. I reproduce s 139 of the Evidence Act in full for context:
- [22]
[22] The point broadly being advanced by the Claimant was that s 139(2) of the Evidence Act appears to envision only cross-examination by an “adverse party”, and that on the present facts, the Defendants’ interests are not adverse to each other, in that their defences are, in its view, “entirely aligned”. Consequently, as their interests are “completely aligned” in their respective defences, allowing them to elicit evidence in support of their case by way of leading questions to witnesses called by the other defendants would be a backdoor means for them to impermissibly supplement their respective Affidavits of Evidence-in-Chief.
- [23]
[23] In support of this proposition, the Claimant cited various decisions and academic commentaries that it contended spoke to this point. The Claimant, for example, cited Sarkar’s Law of Evidence vol 2 (LexisNexis, 20th Ed, 2020) (“Sarkar”) (at pp 3039–3040), where the following was stated in relation to s 137 of the Evidence Act 1872 (India) (which is in pari materia with s 139 of the Evidence Act) as follows:
- [24]
[24] The Claimant also cited the case of Ayaz Ahmed v Mustaq Ahmad (alias Mushtaq Ahmad s/o Mustafa) [2022] SGHC 161 (“Mustaq Ahmad”) (at [89]), in which Mavis Chionh J observed as follows:
- [25]
[25] To the extent the Indian decisions appear to take the stance that s 139(2) (or, more precisely, its analogue in the Indian context) stands for the proposition that only co-defendants with adverse interests are allowed to cross-examine (or more broadly, to ask questions of) fellow co-defendants, I would respectfully disagree. In my view, s 139 of the Evidence Act was not intended to delineate the rights of examination or cross-examination of third parties. Rather, it merely serves to ascribe labels to the distinct stages through which oral testimony is procured in a trial (ie, examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination). Put another way, these terms as used in s 139(2) are not intended to be prescriptive of entitlements, but merely descriptive in nature: it provides the necessary labels for the many stages in a witness’ testimony; it does not, in my judgment, decide the logically anterior question of who is entitled to ask questions, and in what form (ie, leading or non-leading questions).
- [26]
[26] On a general level, I am of the view that a court ought to generally be slow in attempting to curb a defendant’s right to cross-examine or ask any questions of the witnesses of co-defendants. I say this for two reasons.
(a) The first reason is a conceptual one. The rights and interests of co-defendants are often far too nuanced and variegated to be neatly reduced to binary labels such as “adverse” or “aligned”. In most cases, the reality is far more textured: co-defendants may find common cause on certain issues while maintaining divergent or even conflicting positions on others. Characterising their relationship in a binary manner as to whether their interests are “adverse” or “aligned”, in my view, risks oversimplifying the dynamics at play and, in so doing, may inadvertently undermine the procedural fairness owed to all parties in the proceedings. This case exemplifies that point: while some aspects of the Defendants’ cases may be well-aligned, others may potentially necessitate the First and Second Defendants taking divergent positions from the Third and Fourth Defendants. To take a simple example, there is a possibility, at least in theory, that a court, on the pleaded facts here, may find the First and Second Defendants liable for breach of their duties of good faith but that the breach in question does not involve any question of liability on the part of the Third and Fourth Defendants, as they may, for example, claim to be entirely unknowing participants.
(b) The second reason is a practical one. If a witness were truly favourable to a particular co-defendant and their testimony genuinely material to their case, there would be little reason for the co-defendant not to call that witness themselves. In that sense, the evidence ought properly to be before the court in any event. To deny another co-defendant the opportunity to cross-examine such a witness, particularly where their testimony touches on overlapping contested issues, risks allowing selectively curated narratives to stand untested, which sits uneasily with the broader aim of the court to arrive at an informed outcome. If the trial process seeks to place before the court all relevant and probative evidence, it would be inimical to this to deny a party the opportunity to test the veracity of testimony merely because the witness is not an opposing, or adversarial, party in the traditional sense.
- [27]
[27] There is some, albeit indirect, support for the position I have just expressed. In Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong [1997] 2 SLR(R) 141, Lai Kew Chai J had ordered a joint trial of a number of actions brought by a variety of plaintiffs. In arguing against such joinder, one of the defendants in that case contended that a joint trial would potentially result in the solicitors for a plaintiff being allowed to cross-examine (by way of leading questions) other witnesses of the other plaintiffs, leading potentially to an unfair buttressing of each other’s cases against the defendants. Lai J, in rejecting such an objection, noted (at [12]) as follows:
- [28]
[28] As noted elsewhere (see Mustaq Ahmad at [90]), it appears inherent in Lai J’s decision that he did not think that a party in one action, not being a party in the other action, would be precluded from cross-examination of witnesses of other parties with similar interests in the case, and it is for the court to ensure that questions are fair and appropriate, rather than requiring a blanket ban in the manner as suggested by the Claimant in this case. There is, in my view, much wisdom in Lai J’s position. The court is well-empowered to govern its own procedure and intervene where necessary – whether to curtail questioning into the irrelevant or immaterial (or in an extreme case, to control the modality of questioning), or to guard against the risk that an overly pliant witness delivers a rehearsed or otherwise unreliable account to sandpaper over faults found in a co-defendant’s case. The ability to control the scope, and manner, of questioning remains firmly in the hands of the court (while being assisted, of course, through the making of timely objections by counsel) and represents the primary safeguard against both abuse and artifice.
- [29]
[29] For similar reasons, I took the position that there was no bar to a defendant’s witness being cross-examined by a co-defendant through the use of leading questions (as opposed to open-ended ones). In this regard, I would be hesitant to necessarily conclude that answers to leading questions, as opposed to answers provided to open-ended questions, would ipso facto be less probative. This is because the question of what weight ought to be accorded to answers given by co-defendants – whether elicited through leading or open-ended questioning – must be assessed in context and against the backdrop of the totality of the evidence. It is not, in my mind, a matter that admits of rigid categorisation. Much turns on the circumstances in which the evidence is given, the demeanour and credibility of the witness, and the internal consistency of the account when measured against the rest of the evidence. To adopt a blanket rule that privileges one form of questioning over another, or to automatically discount answers merely because they were prompted by a leading question, with respect, risks relying on overly broad generalisations that ignore the subtleties and complexities of fact-finding. In some instances, leading questions may expose critical concessions or inconsistencies that would otherwise remain obscured; in others, open-ended questioning may yield rehearsed or self-serving narratives that the court may find is unable to withstand scrutiny. Ultimately, in my view, the court should not apply rigid taxonomies to modes of questioning by co-defendants and should instead undertake a holistic evaluation of all of the evidence, conscious of the dynamics between co-defendants and the potential for aligned interests to colour testimony.
- [30]
[30] For those reasons, during these proceedings, I had informed counsel for the Claimant that I would not be limiting the right of the Defendants to cross-examine each other’s witnesses, nor would I be restricting them to only asking non-leading questions. In the present case, the process unfolded without difficulty – a fact that itself underscores the reality that, in most instances, the court, with the assistance of counsel, is well able to sensibly and effectively govern its own procedure. It goes without saying that counsel, as officers of the court, play an integral role in that process, and where all parties act with the requisite degree of professionalism and restraint (as all three sets of counsel did here), concerns about procedural overreach or disorder arising therefrom would typically tend to fall away. The smooth conduct of the cross-examination process in this instance was, in some ways, a practical demonstration of how such matters can be practically managed in a principled and orderly manner, without the need for overly rigid or prescriptive rules.
Factual findings
- [31]
[31] Having dealt with that preliminary procedural point, I now turn back to the specifics of this case. In doing so, I first propose to deal with three matters:
(a) I first begin with clarifying the Claimant’s case regarding the precise business that is being diverted.
(b) Next, I make some factual findings on six key pieces of evidence as these findings result in consequences cutting across the four causes of action. As I subsequently analyse each cause of action, I will make reference to the relevant findings for convenience.
(c) I will subsequently address why I have placed little weight on the evidence of Mr Noe Dong Ill (“Mr Noe”), the former Senior Underwriter in SFMI, Mr Kim Hyung Kul (“Mr Kim”), the Chief Executive Officer of the Fourth Defendant, and Ms Mah Wai Mun Fiona (“Ms Mah”), a broking support staff who previously worked for the Claimant.
Diversion of Claimant’s business relating to domestic warehouse risks
- [32]
[32] It is necessary at this juncture to deal with a preliminary point regarding the Claimant’s case – whether the diversion of business relates to SFMI’s domestic warehouse risks (otherwise referred to as policies) or SFMI’s domestic warehouse facility (see above at [11]–[12]). The First and Second Defendants contend that the Claimant had always premised its case on “the theft of its Korea warehouse facility” and ought not to be allowed to “[broaden] the scope of [its] case beyond what it can reasonably be said to have pleaded or delineated through its witnesses’ AEICs” at this stage. The Third and Fourth Defendants similarly frame the Claimant’s case as a “diver[sion] of SFMI’s Domestic Korean Warehouse Facility business”. If the pleading objection is accepted, on the assumption that I find that the Claimant had no dedicated SFMI domestic warehouse facility, the Claimant could not be said to have lost any business as it was not business that the Claimant even had in the first place. The Claimant would thus not be able to establish that any loss has been suffered, which is an element for a claim in unlawful means conspiracy.
- [33]
[33] I am, with respect, unable to agree with the Defendants. Based on my reading of the Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 1) (“SOC(A1)”) and the affidavits of the Claimant’s witnesses, the scope of the Claimant’s case has always been the diversion of risks, and not facilities as such. The affidavit of Mr Luc Vighys Morement (“Mr Morement”), the Managing Director of the Claimant, which the First and Second Defendants rely on to contend that the Claimant’s case only involved an SFMI domestic warehouse facility, instead leads to the opposite conclusion. The paragraphs referred to make no reference to a purely domestic SFMI warehouse facility. Instead, Mr Morement consistently refers to “Korea Warehouse Risks” and expressly states that the “Claimant’s SFMI Facility” referred to was established in respect of both domestic and non-domestic warehouse risks as follows:
- [34]
[34] The Claimant’s oral opening statement, which the First and Second Defendants also rely on, similarly makes no mention of any SFMI domestic warehouse facility. Since this has always been the Claimant’s pleaded case from the beginning, there is nothing wrong with the Claimant’s pleaded case as such.
- [35]
[35] There is, however, a secondary inquiry that the court must undertake, namely whether the Claimant had, in fact, incorporated domestic (ie, Korean) warehouse risks within its SFMI facility. On this, I turn to three pieces of evidence which, in my view, quite unambiguously support the fact that the Claimant had domestic warehouse risks embedded within in its SFMI facility.
(a) The first is an email from Tokio Marine informing the First Defendant that Tokio Marine had “received an email from an alternative broker, with a [broker of record] to take over … all Korean policies written under the current [Claimant’s] facility” (see [77] below). This email from an independent third party is clear objective evidence that there had been Korean policies written under the Claimant’s SFMI facility.
(b) The second piece of evidence is the oral testimonies by two of the Defendants’ witnesses, namely the First Defendant and Mr Noe. On the stand, the First Defendant admitted that “Korean domestic warehouse policies were also parked in [the Claimant’s] facility”. Mr Noe similarly confirmed that SFMI had “worked with [the Claimant] on … individual domestic warehouse contracts”.
(c) The Second Defendant himself conceded on affidavit that “24 of 35 of the warehouse risks eventually placed in SFMI’s new domestic facility in 2022 were previously brokered by [the Claimant]”. Whatever may have been the motivations behind such a move, this clearly shows that domestic warehouse risks were, in fact, moved from the Claimant’s facility to SFMI’s new domestic facility.
- [36]
[36] Having regard to the above, I proceed on the basis that the Claimant is claiming for the diversion of its domestic warehouse risks business, which it did in fact have in its facility at the time. As I will subsequently demonstrate, such business was in fact diverted to the Fourth Defendant.
Key pieces of evidence
- [37]
[37] I next turn to the key pieces of evidence which, in my view, paint an unambiguous picture of the true arrangement between the four defendants when seen in totality – one where the Defendants were acting in concert to divert the Claimant’s business. I will analyse, in particular, six pieces of evidence in chronological order so as to better illustrate how the story unfolded.
Virtual meeting between the First Defendant and representatives of the Third Defendant
- [38]
[38] The first piece of evidence is a virtual meeting that had taken place on 29 January 2021 involving the First Defendant and three senior representatives from the Third Defendant (“Virtual Meeting”), namely Mr Kim Junghyun (“Mr JH Kim”), who is the Senior Vice President of the Third Defendant, Mr Kim Sang Hyun (“Mr SH Kim”), who was the head of the operations management team, and Mr Ko Seok Min (“Mr Ko”), who was the Deputy Chief Executive Officer at the time. It is undisputed that all three senior representatives were members of the Task Force Team, which was tasked with setting up the Fourth Defendant. Significantly, the only reason the Claimant was even aware that such a meeting had taken place was because there was a record of the Virtual Meeting in the form of an email sent to all four attendees that appears to have been retained in the Claimant’s server after the event. This email contained basic details such as the start and end time of the Virtual Meeting and the timings at which each attendee entered and left the virtual meeting room.
- [39]
[39] No one disputes that the Virtual Meeting had taken place. The key dispute lies in the purpose of the Virtual Meeting – the Claimant contends that the First Defendant had no reason to attend such a meeting but to discuss the (presumably ongoing) plans to incorporate the Fourth Defendant to compete with the Claimant; the First Defendant, however, contends that the Virtual Meeting was convened to discuss the details of an “environmental impact liability” co-broking account that had been arranged between the Claimant and the Third Defendant, such as the payment transfer details.
- [40]
[40] On balance, especially in light of the other facts I will discuss below, I agree with the Claimant. Viewed in isolation, the Virtual Meeting may be dismissed as being somewhat inconsequential in the absence of any evidence of the substance of the meeting. While I am indeed unable to make any findings on what precisely was discussed at the Virtual Meeting, when assessed in the broader context of the surrounding circumstances, it becomes clear that the Virtual Meeting must have been for the purposes of work related to the Fourth Defendant. I say this in particular for the following reasons:
(a) The identities of the attendees from the Third Defendant are crucial. The fact that all three of the Third Defendant’s representatives were part of its Task Force Team is suggestive of the meeting’s underlying purpose. This is especially telling given that Ms Kim Jihyun (also known as Heather) (“Ms Kim”), the head of the Third Defendant’s reinsurance team, had confirmed that none of these three individuals were involved in “the reinsurance broking business”. Put another way, discussing the details of a co-broking account falls outside the job scope of any and all of these three representatives (who are part of the Third Defendant’s higher management). It is curious that not a single representative tasked to represent the Third Defendant in discussing the specifics of a co-broking arrangement was in fact involved in its co-broking business.
(b) Assuming that the Virtual Meeting had been for the purpose of discussing the details of the co-broking account, it is unlikely that there would be no pre-meeting and post-meeting discussions and corresponding documentation. A meeting of such nature would not be convened in a vacuum – it would invariably be preceded by the exchange of background information that seeks to frame its purpose; and followed after the meeting by further communication to clarify the matters discussed or to flag items for action. In particular, I take into consideration: (a) the conspicuous lack of such documentation; (b) the absence of any notification given by the First Defendant to the Claimant about this meeting; and (c) the failure to involve any other employee of the Claimant or to initiate any follow-up within the Claimant on a discussion that the First Defendant contends had “many discussion points”. Seen together, this leaves me with little doubt that the Virtual Meeting had been called for the purpose of discussing matters relating to the Fourth Defendant.
(c) In view of how the Fourth Defendant was incorporated on 8 April 2021, preparatory efforts for setting up the company would have been taking place in earnest a few months prior. While not on its own extremely weighty evidence, it would be of some significance to note that the date of the Virtual Meeting, just slightly over two months prior, falls squarely within this timeline.
- [41]
[41] The Virtual Meeting thus serves as evidence (albeit not especially strong evidence) that the First Defendant was already actively involved in some matters involving the Third and/or Fourth Defendants (or at least informally consulting for them with a view to eventually going over), even while employed by the Claimant.
Second Defendant’s actual employer between 15 November 2021 and 31 March 2022
- [42]
[42] Close to ten months after the Virtual Meeting, by November 2021, the Second Defendant had resigned from and served his notice period with the Claimant. He also signed an employment contract with the Third Defendant on 15 November 2021. The second piece of key evidence stems from the Second Defendant’s new employment arrangement, specifically his ostensible employment with the Third Defendant from 15 November 2021 to 31 March 2022. In my mind, the evidence surrounding these circumstances suggest that the Second Defendant was, in actuality, working for the Fourth Defendant during this period – an arrangement in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- [43]
[43] The Second Defendant’s case is that he ended up working at the Third Defendant purely by happenstance: he claims that sometime in September 2021 as he was serving his notice period, he happened to share with Mr JH Kim that he was leaving the Claimant to focus on his applications for graduate school. As a result, he was told that the Third Defendant was looking to expand its reinsurance business in Singapore and Mr JH Kim suggested that he work with the Third Defendant in a short-term role. It was, in that specific context that on 10 November 2021, he attended an interview with Mr JH Kim, was offered the role, and commenced work just five days thereafter on 15 November 2021. The Second Defendant further claims that he had ultimately transferred to the Fourth Defendant as the work of the Task Force Team was completed.
- [44]
[44] The Claimant contends that the Second Defendant’s true employment arrangement went beyond the face of the employment contracts. The Claimant alleges that the Second Defendant’s reason for leaving the Claimant was not to focus on his graduate school applications, but rather to assist with setting up the Fourth Defendant. The sham employment arrangement was “concocted to distance himself from [the Fourth Defendant]”.
- [45]
[45] On balance, it was clear to me that the evidence suggested that the Second Defendant was, in substance, working for the Fourth Defendant at all material times from November 2021, even if I accept the possibility that he may have taken such employment with a view, at some time in the future, of entering graduate school. I highlight three specific strands of evidence that show that this was clearly the understood arrangement, notwithstanding the fact that his employment contract from 15 November 2021 to 31 March 2022 was, strictly speaking, with the Third Defendant.
(1) Use of Fourth Defendant’s Email Signature
- [46]
[46] The first strand of evidence is the Second Defendant’s email signature (appearing below the body of each message) in his emails sent out between 30 December 2021 and 17 January 2022 whilst he was purportedly working for the Third Defendant. These email signatures, emanating from an email domain associated with the Fourth Defendant, expressly and unequivocally represented the Second Defendant as an Assistant Vice President of the Fourth Defendant (“Fourth Defendant’s Email Signature”):
- [47]
[47] The Second Defendant asserts that the use of this email signature was an “incorrect and careless [mistake] on [his] part”. He claims that the discrepancy arose as he was involved in the internal testing of reinsurance contract placements as part of the Task Force Team, for which he was to use the Fourth Defendant’s Email Signature, and he had failed to change the email signature back when contacting third parties.
- [48]
[48] This explanation, with respect, is a very poor one. I fail to see why any purported “internal testing” of reinsurance contract placements (which, conveniently, the Defendants did not provide any supporting evidence of) would require him to toggle between the use of multiple email signatures, when such signatures would be irrelevant for such tests. But perhaps more importantly, the suggestion that the use of the Fourth Defendant’s Email Signature was an innocent oversight is rendered untenable when one notes that the Second Defendant was, at times, explicitly representing in his correspondences in the actual body of emails with third parties that he was an employee of the Fourth Defendant. Such an express representation is a point that I will elaborate further on under the third strand of evidence (at [55] below).
- [49]
[49] With the Second Defendant having failed to explain away his use of the Fourth Defendant’s Email Signature, I thus place weight on this as evidence in support of the Claimant’s case that the Second Defendant was an employee of the Fourth Defendant at all times. This runs contrary to the Defendants’ version of events and instead supports an inference that the Defendants were attempting to mask the Second Defendant’s true employment arrangements in furtherance of the conspiracy to divert business from the Claimant (see [64] below).
(2) Reference Letters
- [50]
[50] The second strand of evidence is the Second Defendant’s reference letter (along with its draft version) for his graduate school applications sent by the First Defendant in her capacity as his referee. For context, on 28 December 2021, the Second Defendant had sent a draft version of the reference letter (“Draft Reference Letter”) to the First Defendant for her review and uploading onto the website of each graduate school. The First Defendant eventually signed off on the reference letter, appended her contact details and dated the letter 31 December 2021 (“Signed Reference Letter”). Crucially, the reference letter expressly represents that the First Defendant had asked the Second Defendant to assist with the setting up of the Fourth Defendant. The relevant part (which is in both the Draft Reference Letter and the Signed Reference Letter (collectively referred to as “Reference Letters”)) is reproduced as follows:
- [51]
[51] The Second Defendant testified that he had never worked on such alleged “initial preparations and agenda planning” for the Fourth Defendant and that even after he had joined the Task Force Team, his work was limited to “documentation work” for the Third Defendant. He claims that the discrepancy suggesting he worked on such initial preparations for the Fourth Defendant arose as a result of errors made in the reference letter drafted by Uhakbrain, a Korean educational consultancy company, based on his oral instructions. Further, he claims that his failure to “carefully read the content” of the Draft Reference Letter sent to him by Uhakbrain before sending it off to the First Defendant, resulted in the inclusion of a detail which he did not tell Uhakbrain about. The First Defendant similarly claims to have missed this factually untrue detail as she had not carefully reviewed the Draft Reference Letter.
- [52]
[52] In my judgment, the First and Second Defendants’ explanations for the inclusion of the quoted line do not withstand closer scrutiny. For one, the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Draft Reference Letter raise obvious unsettling questions. It is not clear to me how the details in the quoted sentence could have been included in the Draft Reference Letter if, in line with the Second Defendant’s case, all he had told Uhakbrain was that he had been assisting the Fourth Defendant with documentation work. In this connection, the Second Defendant has also conspicuously failed to adduce any of the correspondences between himself and Uhakbrain regarding the Draft Reference Letter, not even the correspondence in which the Draft Reference Letter was sent over, despite how he undoubtedly would have been in possession of all such correspondences. The absence of such correspondences, in my view, quite fatally undercuts his allegation that the quoted sentence had been added by a third party (Uhakbrain) acting on their own volition. In addition, I also find it unlikely that the quoted sentence was an error since such an allegedly crucial discrepancy had not been spotted even after two rounds of review, once by the Second Defendant and another by the First Defendant. The First Defendant claimed to not have paid any real attention to the contents of the letter but we know this not to be the case since a close read of the documents shows that she made various amendments to the very same paragraph that contained the quoted sentence (ie, amending “Chief Broking Office” to “Chief Broking Officer” and “Jardine Lloyd Thompson Re” to “Jardine Lloyd Thompson”). In short, her edits show that she was actively reading (and by extension, consciously chose to associate with the contents of) the relevant paragraph. The First Defendant had even reproduced this purported error in the appeal letter to MOM which she subsequently drafted on 28 February 2022 (a further matter that will be discussed at [83] below):
- [53]
[53] Additionally, I am not persuaded by the Second Defendant’s reliance on Mr Kim’s evidence to corroborate his claim that he was not involved in the setting up of the Fourth Defendant. I find Mr Kim’s evidence to be of little probative value (I explain my reasons for this at [94] below).
- [54]
[54] With the Defendants having failed to explain away the quoted sentence in the Reference Letters, I place weight on it as evidence of:
(a) the Second Defendant having assisted with setting up the Fourth Defendant prior to or at least from 8 April 2021, which was when the Fourth Defendant was incorporated. This means that the Second Defendant had assisted with the Fourth Defendant’s affairs even while employed by the Claimant (until 3 November 2021) and while purportedly employed by the Third Defendant (from 15 November 2021 to March 2022); and
(b) the Second Defendant having left to work for the Fourth Defendant at the behest of, or on behalf of, the First Defendant as the Reference Letters state that the First Defendant had “asked [the Second Defendant] to work on the initial preparations and agenda planning for the foundation of [the Fourth Defendant]” [emphasis added].
Such a state of affairs is entirely aligned to the Claimant’s case and is inimical to the Defendants’ version of events.
(3) SFMI’s broker of record letter
- [55]
[55] The third strand of evidence is the broker of record letter issued by SFMI on 11 January 2022 appointing the Fourth Defendant as its broker of record and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the letter. On 11 January 2022, the Second Defendant wrote to Mr Noe from SFMI to finalise some details regarding the upcoming facility and to request for a broker of record letter. The Second Defendant specifically introduced himself as a representative of the Fourth Defendant in this email:
SFMI issued the broker of record letter to the Second Defendant that same day, “confirm[ing] that as of the date of [the] letter [it had] appointed [the Fourth Defendant] … to manage all reinsurance requirements for [its] warehouse account located in Republic of Korea”.
- [56]
[56] Some eight months later, on 13 September 2022, SFMI issued an amended broker of record letter, which was addressed to Ms Kim and instead identified the Third Defendant as its broker of record. The Second Defendant claims to have requested for the amended letter after having discovered the error. A day later, following the Second Defendant’s request for the letter to be addressed to him instead of Ms Kim, yet another amended broker of record letter was issued. However, as I will explain later (at [63]), I ultimately place little weight on these amended broker of record letters.
- [57]
[57] In support of its contention that the Second Defendant had been working for the Fourth Defendant all along, the Claimant relies on the Second Defendant’s express representation that he was acting as the Fourth Defendant’s representative and on how the broker of record letter appointed the Fourth Defendant (and not the Third Defendant) as its broker of record.
- [58]
[58] Regarding the express representation in his email, the Second Defendant claims that “it was a mistake because it was a confusion created out of using it as a habit”. Regarding the broker of record letter, the Second Defendant argues that SFMI had always intended for the broker of record to be the Third Defendant, and relies on Mr Noe’s testimony that he “always took LK to mean [the Third Defendant]” as corroborative evidence. He claims that this must have been so since it would have been factually impossible for the Fourth Defendant to have been the broker of record for SFMI’s facility at the time. The Fourth Defendant could not have engaged in any reinsurance business prior to the issuance of its reinsurance broking licence by MAS on 3 November 2022. On the Defendant’s case, the error had occurred as Mr Noe had prepared the original letter based on the Second Defendant’s email signature, which was the Fourth Defendant's email signature, without much thought given to it.
- [59]
[59] I do not accept the Defendants’ explanations for both the express representation that he was acting as a representative of the Fourth Defendant and the error in the original broker of record letter. Regarding the express representation, apart from what I have stated earlier on this, the Second Defendant’s explanation that it “was a confusion created out of … habit” begs the rather obvious question of why he was regularly going around, by way of “habit”, representing himself as being from the Fourth Defendant. This is particularly since, on his own case, he had only been offered the opportunity to transfer to the Fourth Defendant that same month that this email was sent.
- [60]
[60] Regarding the purportedly erroneous broker of record letter, contrary to the Defendants’ claims of factual impossibility, the Fourth Defendant was very much able to engage in reinsurance business at the time as its reinsurance broking licence had been issued on 3 November 2021 (and not 3 November 2022). I would note that this is in line with the Second Defendant’s own evidence, that the licence had been issued by the time he joined the Third Defendant in mid-November 2021. I also find it unlikely that the Second Defendant would not have spotted such a crucial error at the time that the original letter was issued, especially in view of his testimony that he had “looked at it … when it was issued to [him]” and had seen “that it appoint[ed] [the Fourth Defendant]”. I do not place any weight on the Second Defendant’s attempt to subsequently correct such testimony by stating that he “simply saw that it was a BOR letter issued by [SFMI] but … didn’t get to see other details” as he had only “briefly looked over the content of the BOR letter”. I find it unlikely that, even on a brief look over of the broker of record letter, the Second Defendant would not have spotted an error regarding the detail that would presumably have been most important to the Third Defendant, ie, the entity stated as the appointed broker of record.
- [61]
[61] I find it even more unlikely that such an error would not have been spotted and rectified almost immediately since the document in question was being used by other employees. After the original broker of record letter was issued, Ms Grace Lim, the manager of the Third Defendant’s reinsurance team, expressly represented the Fourth Defendant as the “exclusive intermediary” for SFMI in her emails to other reinsurers. Additionally, the names of the attachments to these emails, which contained further information about the domestic warehouse facility, included the words “LKRe”.
- [62]
[62] I thus find that there was no error with the original broker of record letter, which makes clear that the Fourth Defendant was the broker on record and that the Second Defendant was issued such letter as its employee.
- [63]
[63] To be clear, in arriving at this finding, I find the amended broker of record letters issued in September 2022 to be of little probative value as they do not shed light on the reason for the error in the original letter. Further, I find the circumstances surrounding the issuance of such amended broker of record letters to be suspect in view of how (a) on the Defendants’ own evidence, the purportedly erroneous broker of record letter “[did not] have any impact on the business or operations for the business” despite the false signalling effect that the letter would have given markets regarding the broker of record for SFMI’s domestic warehouse facility insurance, (b) the amendments were only made after the letters of demand were served on the Defendants, and (c) the Defendants had decided against adducing documentary evidence that would shed light on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the error in the broker of record letter, instead claiming that such documents “do not exist and/or are protected by litigation privilege”. I also place little weight on Mr Noe’s testimony, which was relied on by the Defendants, for reasons I will explain below (at [88]–[93]).
(4) Conclusion on Second Defendant’s actual employment arrangements between 15 November 2021 and 31 March 2022
- [64]
[64] In conclusion, the three strands of evidence ostensibly point in the same direction and reinforce the same factual narrative – that the employment arrangement under the Third Defendant was an attempt, on the part of all parties concerned, to mask the fact that the Second Defendant was working for the Fourth Defendant, albeit unsuccessfully. The Third and Fourth Defendants’ role in perpetuating the façade of the Second Defendant’s ostensible employment arrangements under the Third Defendant (for instance, through the employment contract naming the Third Defendant as the employer on record when he was in fact doing work for the Fourth Defendant, and in granting the Second Defendant access to email domains from both the Third and Fourth Defendants) is (especially when seen in the context of the other findings below) strong evidence of their involvement in the conspiracy.
First and Second Defendants’ narratives about joining the Fourth Defendant
- [65]
[65] Next, I turn to the narratives about the First and Second Defendants joining the Fourth Defendant. The First and Second Defendants signed their employment contracts with the Fourth Defendant on 19 November 2021 and 1 March 2022 respectively. I do not accept the Defendants’ case about when the First Defendant first began having discussions about joining the Fourth Defendant, as well as about how the two came to know about each other’s move to the Fourth Defendant.
- [66]
[66] For context, the First Defendant asserts that she had only started the conversation about joining the Fourth Defendant in or around late October or early November 2021, less than a month before entering into an employment contract with the Fourth Defendant on 19 November 2021. I find it unlikely that the recruitment, contract negotiation and contract review period were completed in less than a month, despite these discussions having been referred to by the Defendants themselves in their respective communications as being “not-so-short”. This is particularly since the First Defendant’s remuneration package was far from straightforward, involving stock appreciation rights which, on the First Defendant’s own case and as mentioned in the email correspondences between the First and Fourth Defendants, were not part of the Fourth Defendant’s initial remuneration package that had been offered to her.
- [67]
[67] Next, the First and Second Defendants claim, in essence, that it was nothing more than happenstance that they both ended up at the Fourth Defendant eventually and that they both first heard about each other’s move to join the Fourth Defendant from the market. I simply am unable to accept that their concurrent moves were entirely serendipitous and instead, find that they were likely co-ordinating their moves the entire way:
(a) Beyond their close friendship, there was also a mentorship element to their friendship. With that in mind, I find it implausible that the Second Defendant would not have shared information about his move to the Fourth Defendant – someone he deems to be a close mentor, who he apparently trusted, and who was clearly looking out for his career. This was the very mentor who had recommended him to work with the Claimant, and whom he had sent confidential documents to, asked for letters of recommendation, and even sought assistance from with regard to the drafting of an appeal letter to MOM.
(b) On 19 January 2022, upon Mr Morement’s query via WhatsApp about the details of the Second Defendant’s employment at the time, the First Defendant confirmed that the Second Defendant was working for the Third Defendant in Korea, and not the Fourth Defendant. The exchange reads as follows:
I find it unlikely that upon learning about Mr Morement’s concern, the First Defendant would not have reached out to the Second Defendant to clarify the details of his employment at the time. This is especially since, this would have been a sensitive period, with SFMI having issued its broker of record letter appointing the Fourth Defendant as its broker of record around a week prior (on 11 January 2022), resulting in the Claimant having lost its status as a priority partner for SFMI’s domestic warehouse risks business. In light of this, the fact that Mr Morement’s question was directed specifically at whether the Second Defendant had joined the Fourth Defendant (as opposed to the Third Defendant) ought to have raised alarm for the First Defendant, prompting her to check with the Second Defendant. Furthermore, as can be seen in the rest of this judgment, the First and Second Defendants were keeping in touch with each other regularly. I therefore see it as quite unbelievable that the First Defendant would instead simply rely on the information last relayed to her by the Second Defendant on 31 December 2021 for his graduate school applications. This is pertinent because if she had reached out to the Second Defendant, the Second Defendant would have likely shared with his “close mentor” of the offer he received to transfer to the Fourth Defendant in January 2022. This would have confirmed Mr Morement’s concerns.
(c) The Second Defendant claims he wanted to work in the Fourth Defendant in part because he “heard from the market that [the First Defendant] would be leaving [the Claimant] to join [the Fourth Defendant] and head up its facultative reinsurance department”. It seems perverse that the Second Defendant could, on the one hand, place weight on the movement of the First Defendant in navigating the employment market, and yet on the other, elect to be conspicuously coy about raising the matter with her, instead choosing to rely on market rumour on her whereabouts to decide his professional moves instead of getting confirmation from the horse’s mouth.
- [68]
[68] The eagerness therefore of the First and Second Defendants to portray their relationship as being distant in certain aspects and extremely engaged in other respects appears contrived and underscores the lack of integrity in their respective narratives. The strained effort to create artificial distance where the evidence suggests otherwise only serves to highlight the disingenuity of the accounts they advanced before me and suggests that the First and Second Defendants were, in fact, in contact with each other at all times about their respective moves as they were acting in concert.
SFMI’s Excel file forwarded by the Second Defendant to the First Defendant
- [69]
[69] The next piece of evidence is an email which was forwarded to the First Defendant’s personal email address by the Second Defendant on 31 December 2021. The original email was sent by Mr Noe to the Second Defendant on 30 December 2021 and it contained an Excel file attachment with the latest details on the setting up of SFMI’s new domestic warehouse facility (“SFMI Excel File”). It would be reminded that by this time, the Second Defendant was, on paper, working for the Third Defendant (though in substance, as I had noted above, working for the Fourth Defendant).
- [70]
[70] The forwarded email was then further forwarded from the First Defendant’s personal account to her husband’s email account, who then forwarded it to the First Defendant’s email account under the Claimant. At this time, the First Defendant was still serving her notice period under the Claimant. As the First Defendant was using her personal, as opposed to work email account for this email, the existence of such correspondence only came to the knowledge of the Claimant as it was subsequently found in its servers as the First Defendant’s husband had forwarded it to her work email account as opposed to her personal email account.
- [71]
[71] The Claimant contends that based on the SFMI Excel File, which listed a number of the Claimant’s customers at the time, the First Defendant would have known that SFMI intended to move its domestic warehouse risks business away to the Third and/or Fourth Defendants. However, the First Defendant had failed to disclose this information to the Claimant to prevent or mitigate the diversion of business, suggesting that she had knowledge of the plan to divert the business. The Claimant also contends that there was no reason for the Second Defendant to have forwarded information from a client to his former boss who was still working for a competing company (ie, the First Defendant), unless the First and Second Defendants were working together to divert SFMI’s domestic warehouse risks business.
- [72]
[72] The First and Second Defendants allege that the Second Defendant had forwarded Mr Noe’s email to seek advice regarding the setting up of a Korean domestic warehouse reinsurance facility, with such advice being rendered purely as a personal favour. When he failed to receive a response from the First Defendant, the Second Defendant contends he was eventually able to set up the facility on his own, with the support of the Third Defendant’s reinsurance team. The First Defendant claims that she had only seen the email in question on 4 January 2022. She then forwarded the email further to her husband due to issues with opening the SFMI Excel File and was ultimately able to open the attachment through her email account under the Claimant. However, she saw no reason to disclose the information to the Claimant as (a) she had no duty to disclose confidential information belonging to a third party; (b) the Claimant would not have been approached by SFMI to set up a domestic warehouse reinsurance facility as it was shorthanded and lacked any native Korean speaker following her departure; and (c) it was not practical for her to check whether any of the policies ceded by the Claimant was included in the upcoming facility due to the sheer number of SFMI policies.
- [73]
[73] The Third and Fourth Defendants allege that they did not have knowledge of the Second Defendant’s decision to forward Mr Noe’s email to the First Defendant.
- [74]
[74] With respect, I was unable to accept the narrative advanced by the First and Second Defendants. I make three points.
(a) First, there were obvious inconsistencies between the First Defendant’s position on affidavit and on the stand. On affidavit, the First Defendant alleges that she had only learnt that the customer was SFMI upon reviewing the SFMI Excel File, and she thereafter focused on her obligations owed to the Claimant as follows:
However, on the stand, the First Defendant testified that, from the beginning, the Second Defendant had mentioned that the proposal received was from SFMI. She further testified that in her view, there was no conflict of interest in asking for further information about the potential deal with SFMI, but this itself sits uncomfortably with the fact that she had known that she could not help the Second Defendant if that was the case since there would be a conflict of interest. In my mind, in addition to the inconsistency regarding when the First Defendant learnt that the customer was SFMI, there is also an obvious incongruity in the First Defendant’s position on the stand. It would seem perverse that the First Defendant would request for further information regarding the deal if she had already known she would be conflicted from advising the Second Defendant on the deal. The short answer, in my view, must be that she was given the information as she was in fact working with the Second Defendant on the matters in the SFMI Excel File (on behalf of the Third and Fourth Defendants).
(b) Secondly, the alleged circumstances surrounding the request for advice do not seem to hold water. For one, both the First and Second Defendants testified that the Second Defendant had not sought any specific advice when making this request. It is curious how the First Defendant was supposed to “check … [that the Second Defendant] was heading in the right direction” in the absence of any specific instructions or information about the Second Defendant’s progress with the setting up of the facility. This is particularly since all that was sent to the First Defendant was a bare email from the Second Defendant stating “[f]orwarded as follows” and an Excel file comprising lists of information (such as the policies and the list of domestic warehouses to be included in the facility) spanning over 50 pages. The explanation therefore was an obvious ruse since there was nothing for her to “check” or “advise” on. The absence of any specifics in the email necessarily leads to the inference that the First Defendant was already very much aware of the contents of the SFMI Excel File and needed it in order to work on the deal with SFMI, which again necessarily assumes that she was covertly doing work for the Third and Fourth Defendants outside the knowledge of her employer at the time (ie, the Claimant).
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