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Grounds publishedDecided 5 Jan 2026

General Division of the High Court

A loan was held genuine and the claim to recover it was not time-barred

Chan Tuck Cheong v Sin Wee Hiong

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[2026] SGHC 1Case no. Originating Claim No 537 of 2023

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A loan was held genuine and the claim to recover it was not time-barred

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [200], [207], [208]

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The claimant, Mr Chan Tuck Cheong, and the defendant, Mdm Sin Wee Hiong, were engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair for almost thirty years. During the relationship, parties transferred monies between themselves, as is common in an intimate relationship. Years down the road, after what had been a loving relationship turned sour, the erstwhile lovers now litigate against each other and fight over the characterisation of these transfers.

  3. [2] The claimant contends that his transfers of monies to the defendant were loans, while the defendant’s transfer of monies to him were repayments for the loans he gave her. Conversely, the defendant takes the diametrically opposite stance that it was she who had first loaned monies to the claimant, and the subsequent transfers from the claimant were repayments to her.

  4. [3] Central to the defendant’s case is a written document dated 29 May 2013 signed by the claimant, confirming that he had obtained a loan of $800,000 from the defendant (the “Signed Acknowledgment”). The claimant acknowledges that he signed the document but claims that it is a sham and was not intended to have any legal effect, and that he did not in fact receive $800,000 from the defendant.

  5. [4] Against this backdrop, the court is left with the task of sifting through the embers of an intimate relationship, years after the fact, to divine the intentions of parties in making the transfers at the time when they were hotly in love.

  6. Background

  7. [5] The claimant is a professional engineer. The claimant and defendant are business partners in TC Sin & Associates (“Associates”), a firm providing engineering consultancy services. The defendant’s father, Mr Sin Toh Cheng (“Mr TC Sin”), started Associates on 18 January 1972. The claimant was employed by Associates in 1990 as a structural design engineer. He was mentored by Mr TC Sin and was admitted as a partner in Associates in or around October 1999. In 2008, Mr TC Sin took a back seat from active engineering consultancy practice and positioned the claimant to drive the business of Associates.

  8. [6] The claimant has also been involved in setting up other companies. These companies include the following:

  9. (a) On 1 September 2008, the claimant formed TC Sin Consultants Pte Ltd (“Consultants”), with a view to eventually taking over the business of Associates. Mr TC Sin gave the claimant his blessing to use the name “TC Sin” for Consultants. Consultants did not carry on substantive business until the business of Associates was transferred to Consultants in or around 2015.

  10. (b) On 2 December 2013, the claimant formed ICPH International Pte Ltd (“ICPH”). The claimant is currently the sole shareholder and director of ICPH.

  11. (c) On 19 March 2018, the claimant assisted in the incorporation of EBS Precast Pte Ltd (“EBS Precast”), to carry out the business of importing, exporting and producing pre-cast components for supply to building contractors. The claimant currently holds 63% of the shares in EBS Precast and is also a director.

  12. [7] The defendant was formally employed by Associates as an administrative assistant to Mr TC Sin in the 1980s. The defendant has also been involved in the claimant’s various companies in a financial and administrative capacity, although the exact scope of her involvement is in dispute. The defendant was admitted as a partner of Associates on 22 January 2019, and was, at various times, a director and/or shareholder in Consultants, ICPH and EBS Precast. The claimant takes the position that the defendant was in charge of the financial, accounting and administrative matters of Associates, Consultants, ICPH and EBS Precast.

  13. [8] The parties were engaged in an extramarital affair from 1993 to sometime in mid-2022. Both parties were married when the affair began, though the defendant eventually divorced her then-husband, Mr Chow Kwong Wah (“Mr Chow”), on 11 July 2017. Mr Chow is a witness in these proceedings. He has known the claimant since the claimant joined Associates in 1990. Mr Chow was then employed as a clerk of work while the claimant was a junior engineer. From 2013 to 2015, Mr Chow was employed in ICPH as a project manager. Mr Chow testified that he treated the claimant as a colleague and a family friend.

  14. [9] Notably, the claimant and defendant are heavy gamblers at the Resorts World Sentosa casino (“RWS”), and would frequently go together to RWS to gamble.

  15. [10] Sometime in 2021 to 2023, the relationship between the parties broke down, the precise reason for which is disputed. The claimant says that it was precipitated by his discovery of the defendant’s misappropriation of funds from Associates and Consultants, while the defendant explains that she desired to end the affair.

  16. [11] Regardless, the relationship ended, and the litigation began. On 8 May 2023, the defendant commenced DC/OC 616/2023 (“OC 616”), an action for minority oppression against the claimant. This was in response to the claimant’s actions against the defendant in relation to the companies that they were involved in, including the defendant’s removal as a director from Consultants.

  17. [12] On 24 July 2023, ICPH commenced DC/OC 1046/2023 (“OC 1046”) against the defendant, seeking recovery of $69,170.18, purportedly being the outstanding balance of loans amounting to $80,000 which ICPH had advanced to the defendant. On 17 August 2023, the defendant filed and served a Third Party Notice on the claimant.

  18. [13] On 17 August 2023, the claimant filed the present suit, HC/OC 537/2023 (“OC 537”) against the defendant. On 5 February 2024, parties agreed in mediation to proceed with OC 537 while keeping in abeyance OC 616 and OC 1046. It was also agreed that parties may amend their pleadings in OC 537 to include the claims and counterclaims in OCs 616 and 1046.

  19. [14] In OC 537, the claimant claims the sum of $298,000, being monies purportedly owing by the defendant. The defendant denies owing monies to the claimant and counterclaims for the sums of $425,000 and $173,000, averring instead that the claimant owed her monies. The defendant’s counterclaim was eventually expanded to include three additional counterclaims for (a) monies loaned to the claimant and disbursed to ICPH; (b) loans advanced by the defendant to the claimant as a partner in Associates; and (c) loans advanced to the claimant by way of instalment payments on a motor car hire purchase. However, the defendant eventually withdrew these three additional heads of counterclaim.

  20. [15] After reviewing the evidence, the claimant accepted that the defendant had made additional payments amounting to $76,000 to him and accordingly reduced the quantum of his claim to $222,000, while the defendant accepted that the claimant had made an additional payment of $20,000 to her and accordingly reduced the quantum of her counterclaim to $578,000.

  21. [16] The issues hence have been considerably simplified. The one question for determination is whether the claimant had indeed lent money to the defendant with $222,000 still outstanding, or whether the claimant had borrowed money from the defendant with an outstanding balance of $578,000 to be repaid.

  22. The parties’ cases

  23. [17] Parties do not dispute the fact that monies were transferred as borne out by the available documents, save for the initial sum of $800,000 which the defendant contends had been transferred to the claimant, but the claimant denies receipt. The main dispute regarding the accepted transfers relates to their nature. The breakdown of the relevant transfers is as follows:

  24. (a) The defendant contends that she transferred a sum of $800,000 to the claimant in or around 29 May 2013. The claimant’s position is that there was no such transfer. See S/No 1 in the table below at [18].

  25. (b) The claimant transferred $75,000 on 11 May 2017 and $300,000 on 24 August 2017 by way of cheque to the defendant. See S/Nos 2 and 3 in the table below at [18].

  26. (c) The defendant made a series of twelve payments totalling $273,000 by way of interbank transfers to the claimant in 2018 and 2019 (the “Twelve Transfers”). These Twelve Transfers are set out in S/Nos 4 to 7 and S/Nos 9 to 16 in the table below at [18].

  27. (d) The claimant transferred $20,000 to the defendant on 12 July 2018 by way of a cashier’s order. See S/No 8 in the table below at [18].

  28. (e) The claimant transferred $50,000 on 6 July 2021 and another $50,000 on 7 October 2021 to the defendant by way of cheque. See S/Nos 17 and 18 in the table below at [18].

  29. [18] The transfer of monies described in the preceding paragraph are set out in the following table for ease of reference:

  30. The defendant’s case

  31. [19] I start with the defendant’s case to set the context in relation to the Signed Acknowledgment.

  32. [20] The defendant contends that in early 2013, the claimant wanted to redevelop his landed property at [xx] Ernani Street (the “Ernani Property”), and requested that the defendant remortgage a property at [xx] Teow Hock Avenue (the “Teow Hock Property”), which was jointly owned by the defendant and Mr Chow, to loan him the funds. The defendant did so and obtained a mortgage loan of $1.26m. The defendant advanced the sum of $800,000 to the claimant, and retained the balance of $460,000. The Signed Acknowledgment was then furnished to the defendant by the claimant after this transfer of $800,000 to the claimant.

  33. [21] During the trial, it emerged that the claimant had taken out a construction loan from OCBC Bank to the tune of $800,000 on 24 September 2013, to be disbursed against the progress claims for the reconstruction of the Ernani Property. The defendant, in response, claims that she was not aware of this construction loan until it surfaced at trial. She contends that despite this construction loan, and a term loan taken out by the claimant for $789,000 from OCBC Bank on 23 November 2012 , the claimant still had a need for funds for the operation of his companies and for his significant gambling expenditure. He therefore turned to borrow money from the defendant.

  34. [22] Due to the ongoing affair, the defendant did not strictly enforce the repayment deadlines, although she made oral requests for repayment. The defendant avers in her affidavit that she had made additional loans of $273,000 in the form of the Twelve Transfers from her personal bank accounts to the claimant.

  35. [23] The defendant loaned the claimant a total of $1,073,000 while receiving $495,000 in repayment. She therefore counterclaims for the outstanding debt of $578,000.

  36. The claimant’s case

  37. [24] The claimant denies receiving $800,000 from the defendant. The claimant denies having knowledge that the defendant had remortgaged her Teow Hock Property and obtained a loan of $1.26m from DBS Bank. He avers that the Signed Acknowledgment is a sham. The claimant says that he signed the document at the defendant’s request to show to Mr Chow and deceive him into believing that the defendant had advanced a loan of $800,000 to him, when in fact there was no such loan and he did not receive the monies. The claimant suggests that the defendant was running low on funds for gambling due to her huge losses, which prompted her to hatch a plan to get Mr Chow to agree to take a bank loan by misleading him that the money was to be lent to the claimant to redevelop his Ernani Property.

  38. [25] The claimant claims that he had transferred a total of $495,000 (see S/Nos 2, 3, 8, 17 and 28 in the table above at [18] for particulars of the five transfers totalling $495,000) as personal loans to the defendant between 11 May 2017 and 7 October 2021 at her request. The loans were due and payable upon demand made by the claimant. On all relevant occasions, the defendant, who was working in the same office as the claimant, had simply walked up to him and uttered words to the effect that “I am tight; can you lend me $xx? I’ll pay you back”. On each and every occasion, the claimant agreed and proceeded to advance the sums as requested by the defendant. The claimant did not know the purpose of the loans, and the defendant did not inform him of the purpose. The defendant furnished a total of $273,000 (see the Twelve Transfers set out in S/Nos 4 to 7 and S/Nos 9 to 16 in the table above at [18]) in repayments sometime between May 2018 and October 2019.

  39. [26] As the alleged loans to the defendant total $495,000 and a total of $273,000 was repaid, the claimant therefore claims for the outstanding debt of $222,000.

  40. Whether the Signed Acknowledgment is a sham

  41. [27] I first begin my analysis in relation to the Signed Acknowledgment and the alleged $800,000 loan, as this loan purportedly took place in 2013 before the other undisputed transfers. The existence of this $800,000 loan would have a knock-on effect on the nature of the other undisputed transfers. In this, I am cognisant that subsequent events and transfers may, in turn, shed some light and offer some clues as to the nature of the Signed Acknowledgment.

  42. Applicable law in relation to the Signed Acknowledgment

  43. [28] The lynchpin of the defendant’s case is the Signed Acknowledgment. For ease of reference, I reproduce the entirety of the document below (with the house number redacted).

  44. [29] On its face, the Signed Acknowledgment contains a confirmation that the claimant had obtained $800,000 from the defendant. This is not an obligation to which the claimant is to be bound but rather is a signed acknowledgment of receipt. The Signed Acknowledgment also contains provisions stipulating an obligation to repay, the tenure of the alleged loan and an interest rate. These are prospective obligations to which the claimant could be said to be bound by, reduced into writing on the Signed Acknowledgment itself.

  45. [30] The defendant contends that the agreement between parties had been reduced to the form of a document, ie, the Signed Acknowledgment. The claimant accepts that he signed the Signed Acknowledgment but contends that it is a sham document and that he never received the $800,000 from the defendant. Both parties agree that the Signed Acknowledgment is a genuine document in the sense that nothing therein is forged and the signature is genuine.

  46. [31] In Toh Eng Tiah v Jiang Angelina [2021] 1 SLR 1176 (“Toh Eng Tiah”), the Court of Appeal laid down the following guiding principles in proving a sham:

  47. [32] Both parties agree on the basis of Toh Eng Tiah that the parol evidence rule, as set out in ss 93 and 94 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “EA”), does not apply. An allegation that a document is a sham is an allegation that the parties had a common intention to give the impression of creating legal relations which did not reflect the true legal relations between the parties. This goes to the very existence of the contract. Therefore, ss 93 and 94 of the EA do not apply and a wider range of evidence can be considered by the courts in determining what is the true state of legal relations (if any) between the parties and whether the documents created (if they do exist) reflect their true legal relationship (Toh Eng Tiah at [79]).

  48. [33] Hence, I will consider all the circumstances of the case in determining whether the Signed Acknowledgment is a sham. In this, per Toh Eng Tiah at [80], the claimant bears the burden of proof to show that the Signed Acknowledgment is a sham and there is a very strong presumption that the claimant is bound by the provisions of the agreement that he had, purportedly on the face of the document, entered into. The reasons for this presumption are summarised in the following statement by Neuberger J (as he then was) (see iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon [2016] 3 SLR 663 (“iTronic”) at [63], citing National Westminster Bank plc v Rosemary Doreen Jones [2011] 1 BCLC 98 at [59]):

  49. I bear in mind that this presumption does not affect the standard of proof which remains on a balance of probabilities; it simply means that the court may require more cogent or forceful evidence before it finds the civil standard is met, given the seriousness of the allegation (iTronic at [64]).

  50. [34] The claimant’s contentions that the Signed Acknowledgment is a sham and that he did not receive $800,000 operate on two different levels. The contention that the Signed Acknowledgment is a sham goes towards the parties’ intention to create the legal relations which the acts done or documents had given the impression of creating (Toh Eng Tiah at [74]). The contention that he did not receive $800,000, on the other hand, is a fact to be separately ascertained, which, if proved, goes towards the breach of the loan agreement if there was a genuine agreement of a loan proved to be in existence in the first place.

  51. [35] On this premise, the analysis proceeds in two parts. The first question is whether the Signed Acknowledgment as a whole is a sham (which it is according to the claimant but not so according to the defendant) entered into from the perspective that there was a common intention to mislead and the contents stated therein are all false to the common knowledge of both the parties: no loan agreement between the parties was formed, no loan was given, no interest rate existed, no loan period was agreed to, and the claimant received no money from the defendant. This goes towards whether they intended to create, and had in fact created, legal relations in terms of the prospective obligations. If it is determined that they had intended to create legal relations and legal relations were in fact created, then this also establishes the weight to be accorded to the document as a contemporaneous written record of the legal relations already created, including any agreed facts pertinent to that legal relationship stated within that written record.

  52. [36] Obviously, if the evidence indicates that no loan agreement was intended by both parties and the Signed Acknowledgment was agreed to be created in order to deceive Mr Chow, the Signed Acknowledgment reflecting the purported existence of the loan (which was in fact non-existent) would be a sham document. It must necessarily follow as a corollary that the defendant could not and would not have transferred any money (unless the transfer was a gift, which neither party asserts and thus can be ruled out), let alone $800,000, to the claimant and no repayment obligations would arise absent a loan.

  53. [37] If the document is not found in fact to be a sham, the next question would be whether the claimant had indeed received the payment of $800,000, thereby triggering his obligation to repay. The acknowledgment of receipt of $800,000 in a written loan agreement or a document to which parties had used to record down or to evidence the terms of their agreement already reached (which is thus established not to be a sham document) would serve as evidence of payment of that sum and is normally prima facie evidence of receipt (Fook Gee Finance Co Ltd v Liu Cho Chit [1998] 1 SLR(R) 385 at [24]). In other words, a document proved to be (or not disputed to be) signed by “A” stating within it a receipt by “A” of a certain amount of money is normally prima facie evidence of receipt of that amount of money by “A”.

  54. [38] In this context, I first consider the question as to whether the Signed Acknowledgment is a sham. The claimant has the burden to prove that there was a common intention to mislead Mr Chow by insertion of false facts in that genuine document, and this turns on the subjective intention of the parties at the material time. I begin by assessing the available evidence, before turning to consider whether the Signed Acknowledgment could be said to be a sham in the light of the evidence. This will proceed chronologically, first beginning with the inception of the Signed Acknowledgment.

  55. The inception of the Signed Acknowledgment

  56. The parties’ accounts

  57. (1) The defendant’s account

  58. [39] The defendant’s evidence on affidavit is that the claimant, in early 2013, raised the idea of redeveloping the Ernani Property and requested the defendant to re-mortgage the Teow Hock Property to loan him the funds. The claimant drew up and signed the Signed Acknowledgment to acknowledge and confirm that he had borrowed a sum of $800,000 from the defendant, and that a 3.5% per annum (“pa”) interest rate was payable on the loan, which was to be for a period of 18 months. The defendant avers that the loan tenure had been agreed upon to coincide with the completion of redevelopment works on the Ernani Property, so that the claimant could then obtain refinancing or sell the rebuilt property to repay the defendant the $800,000 he had borrowed together with the interest. The annual interest of 3.5% was also worked out by the claimant and agreed upon as this would more than compensate the amount of interest that the defendant and her husband would have to incur on their $1.26m mortgage loan from DBS Bank.

  59. [40] In her oral testimony, the defendant added further details to this account. In the initial conversation with the claimant, she informed the claimant that a few years ago she had informal discussions with a bank officer in Maybank, who had raised the possibility of her re-mortgaging the Teow Hock Property. The bank officer told her that the loan amount that she could get was about $600,000. However, the defendant did not pursue the matter further at that time. The defendant also elaborated on her discussions with Mr Chow prior to the actual disbursement of the sum of $800,000 to the claimant. Upon first seeing the letter of offer from DBS Bank for a loan of $1.26m, the defendant was surprised that she could borrow such a large sum of money on a re-mortgage of the Teow Hock Property. When Mr Chow looked at the letter of offer, he told the defendant, “.., we just lend him 800,000. You must get an IOU from him and must … ask him to give us a good interest rate”. Thereafter, she informed the claimant of Mr Chow’s requirements, and the claimant agreed. Sometime before the Signed Acknowledgment was furnished, the bank disbursed $1.26m to the defendant, who then transferred $800,000 to the claimant. One day, about a week or so after the transfer, the claimant suddenly brought out the pre-typed and pre-signed Signed Acknowledgment and passed it to the defendant, asking at the same time whether the interest rate stated in the “IOU” was good enough and saying that he had specified the loan period of 18 months because he would need one year to build his house, do a bit of renovation and then get his re-mortgage on his rebuilt house done within 18 months. The defendant did not raise any objections or issues with the 3.5% pa interest rate or the period of loan of 18 months when she was given the Signed Acknowledgment by the claimant. The defendant just accepted the Signed Acknowledgment and kept it safely with her.

  60. [41] The defendant asserts that the Signed Acknowledgment was typed and prepared by the claimant, although she did not see him do it. As for the interest rate, the defendant clarified that she did not tell him the specific amount of interest rate she wanted as she just told him that “You must give us a good interest rate. That’s what my husband want(s).”

  61. [42] The defendant’s evidence therefore is that the claimant decided on the specific interest rate of 3.5% pa and the loan period of 18 months for insertion into the Signed Acknowledgment. Only the amount to lend to the claimant (ie, the quantum of $800,000) was decided by Mr Chow and the defendant at the time of their discussion when Mr Chow first saw the letter of offer from DBS Bank.

  62. [43] Mr Chow’s testimony is broadly similar. He testified that one evening when he and the defendant were bringing their grandson out for a stroll, the defendant communicated to him that the claimant was going to rebuild his house. She then asked whether they could assist him by re-mortgaging their Teow Hock Property. Mr Chow told the defendant to approach the bank to see what the bank could offer. After applying for the loan, Mr Chow and the defendant went together to sign the agreement. When DBS Bank approved the mortgage for $1.26m, Mr Chow told the defendant that the full amount could not be loaned to the claimant and to only loan $800,000, as some amount had to be kept for their monthly repayments and for a rainy day. Mr Chow then informed the defendant that when the money was loaned, the claimant should pay them an interest sufficient to cover the interest for the entire loan, and an acknowledgment should be procured from him as the sum of $800,000 was a huge amount.

  63. [44] Mr Chow left the defendant to manage the funds. The defendant kept the passbook to the joint account in POSB Bank, and therefore Mr Chow was not aware when the funds were disbursed by DBS Bank. He did not check as he trusted his wife. He was likewise not privy as to whether the defendant had transferred the funds to the claimant. Subsequently, he was informed by the defendant that the claimant had given a very good interest rate sufficient to cover the interest on the mortgage loan, and that the claimant had furnished a written acknowledgment, but that it was kept by the defendant back in her office. He had never seen the Signed Acknowledgment. He also did not communicate with the claimant directly on the loan.

  64. (2) The claimant’s account

  65. [45] The claimant’s evidence on affidavit is that he had signed the Signed Acknowledgment, at the defendant’s request, to show to Mr Chow that the defendant had advanced a loan of $800,000 to him, even though he did not receive any money. In other words, it was already understood between both parties at that time that no money had been or would be given to the claimant for signing the document, let alone a sum of $800,000, because it was a sham document just to deceive Mr Chow that there was a genuine loan of $800,000 to the claimant by the defendant, when no such loan existed.

  66. [46] During cross-examination, the claimant furnished further details. The claimant said that he had no knowledge that the defendant had re-mortgaged the Teow Hock Property. Even though he had read, signed and dated the Signed Acknowledgment, he could not recall who drafted the document. I interpret that to mean that he actually knew who drafted the document (which could be himself, the defendant or a third party drafting the document on his instructions) but he could not recall at that moment who it was who drafted the document. If he had meant that he did not know who drafted the document, he would have said so, instead of saying he could not recall who drafted the document. The claimant explained that even though the content appeared to be prepared by him, the defendant, as an administrative staff, often prepared and wrote documents and presented them to him for his signature. With this explanation, the claimant is now indirectly hinting that it was possibly the defendant had drafted the document for him to sign. The claimant further testified that he could not remember specifically what the defendant had said to him when he signed the document, but could only recall that it was to show Mr Chow that she had loaned this money to him. The claimant indirectly suggests that the defendant was present in person to tell him that she had to show it to Mr Chow and that occurred at the time when she was witnessing him applying his signature on the Signed Acknowledgment.

  67. The authorship of the Signed Acknowledgment

  68. [47] First, I consider whether the claimant, the defendant or someone else had prepared the Signed Acknowledgment. The defendant was very affirmative in her evidence that it was prepared by the claimant, while the claimant testifies that he could not remember who drafted the document and it could very well have been the defendant.

  69. [48] The defendant contends that the claimant has a penchant for emphasis in the upper case, and the Signed Acknowledgment was typed entirely in upper case. The defendant points to, as an example, an email from the claimant informing the directors of Consultants that a police report had been made regarding the company’s financial issues and that the claimant would keep the account files and documents from being destroyed or tampered with. The body of the email was typed in all upper case letters. The claimant, in response, accepts that he would draft in capital letters for critical items to be highlighted. A Signed Acknowledgment by the claimant for a loan of a large sum of $800,000 would undoubtedly be a very important document for both the claimant and the defendant. But he still maintains that he could not remember who drafted the email.

  70. [49] In my assessment of the evidence, I am inclined to believe the defendant’s evidence that she did not draft the Signed Acknowledgment and therefore, she did not insert the details of 3.5% pa as the interest rate and the duration of the loan in the Signed Acknowledgment. I believe that it was already pre-prepared and pre-signed when the claimant handed it over to her. I find it very hard to believe that the claimant could not recall whether he had drafted the document himself, and he could only say that he could not remember who drafted the document and then speculate that it could very well have been him or the defendant herself. I think he would very likely be able to remember whether he had drafted the document or not. He could have been far more definitive in his evidence. I believe that he did not want to be forthright with his evidence because he had drafted the Signed Acknowledgment and thus became evasive. The fact that he accepts that he would draft in capital letters to highlight critical items and the fact that there was one important email from the defendant showing that he had used all upper case in the whole body of the email which he typed, tend to support the conclusion that it is likely that the Signed Acknowledgment was typed personally by the defendant and thereafter, he printed out the document, signed and dated it. This may be relevant to the issue of his credibility. In any case, it is not particularly significant who had drafted the document because the claimant admits that the signature that appears on the Signed Acknowledgment is his signature.

  71. The terms of the Signed Acknowledgment

  72. [50] Next, I examine the terms of the Signed Acknowledgment. The Signed Acknowledgment provides that the loan was to be repaid in 18 months and an annual interest of 3.5% was applicable to the loan.

  73. [51] I first deal with the claimant’s contention as to alleged inconsistencies in the defendant’s evidence on the provenance of the terms. The defendant’s oral evidence is that after informing the claimant that Mr Chow wanted a good interest rate, the claimant unilaterally added the interest of 3.5% pa and the tenure of the loan, on the basis that he should be able to re-mortgage his re-developed house after completion of the rebuilding work. This, the claimant says, is inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony on affidavit that both the interest rate and tenure of the loan were agreed between her and the claimant. In response, the defendant notes that the account of events are not mutually exclusive – the defendant could be said to have agreed with the claimant on the interest rate and the tenure, when the same was included in the Signed Acknowledgment which the defendant accepted and took away with her, after the claimant had, when handing over the Signed Acknowledgment to her, already asked whether the interest rate stated in the “IOU” was good enough. She did not say that it was not good enough or counter propose a different interest rate to be adopted instead. Neither did she raise any objections to the tenure of 18 months stated therein. The defendant had by her conduct accepted and agreed to the interest rate of 3.5% pa and loan period of 18 months proposed by and type written onto the Signed Acknowledgment by the claimant. I therefore agree with the defendant and do not think that the defendant’s evidence is inconsistent.

  74. [52] In the same vein, the claimant notes that it was suggested to the claimant that he had asked the defendant for a loan of $800,000 to finance the redevelopment, which the claimant denied. This is inconsistent with the oral evidence of Mr Chow that it was he (as opposed to the claimant) who decided on the quantum of the loan. In reply, the defendant notes that the actual question asked to the claimant at trial was in two parts: “you had asked for monies from the defendant for the redevelopment of your matrimonial home […] And that these monies was in the sum of $800,000”. There is no suggestion as to who had proposed the quantum of the loan. I agree with the defendant and find that there is no inconsistency.

  75. (1) Interest rate for the loan

  76. [53] I take the view that the prescribed interest is broadly consistent with the defendant’s case that the interest was provided to cover the interest under the mortgage loan. The available documentary evidence shows that the defendant had re-mortgaged the Teow Hock Property for a loan of $1.26m, with a duration of 22 years. The interest rate stipulated for the first, second and third year was 0.900% pa above the prevailing 3-month Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (“SIBOR”), rising to 1.250% pa above the prevailing 3-month SIBOR from the fourth year onwards. The 3-month SIBOR quoted for reference was 0.375% pa as at 1 March 2013. Assuming that this SIBOR reference rate applied, the interest rate for the mortgage loan would then be 0.900% pa + 0.375% pa = 1.275% pa for the first three months (ie, 1st quarter). Thereafter, for the subsequent quarters, the interest rate for the mortgage loan would be the same fixed spread of 0.900% pa (held steady only for the first 3 years but not from the fourth year onwards) plus the floating 3-month SIBOR prevailing then.

  77. [54] The claimant contends that the total interest payable on the entire loan of $1.26m over 22 years is many times higher than the interest payable under the Signed Acknowledgment on $800,000 over 18 months. On that basis, an inference should be drawn that Mr Chow did not express to the defendant that a good interest rate sufficient to cover the interest over the entire loan should be obtained from the claimant.

  78. [55] The defendant, in response, submits that the claimant’s contention does not stand up to scrutiny, as it is reasonable to expect the defendant to make prepayments to DBS Bank, or to partially or wholly discharge the mortgage loan upon the expected lumpsum repayment of $800,000 by the claimant by 31 December 2014. The interest payable thereafter would thus be substantially reduced after a substantial repayment of the mortgage loan or would be wholly eliminated after total repayment of the mortgage loan. I agree with the defendant. The claimant’s contention is premised on a misconstruction of the evidence. At no point did Mr Chow or the defendant say that the 3.5% pa interest paid for the period of only 18 months for a sum of $800,000 was intended to cover the total interest payable on the whole loan of $1.26m over the entire loan period of 22 years. In this light, the 3.5% pa interest payable for the sum of $800,000 for the loan period of 18 months would be more than sufficient to cover interest charged by DBS Bank even for the entire mortgage loan of a much larger sum of $1.26m over the same period of 18 months.

  79. [56] As an example, assuming that the 3-month SIBOR prevailing did not change for 18 months after the mortgage loan was disbursed and had remained at 0.375% pa, the interest rate charged by DBS Bank would be a fixed 0.900% pa + 0.375% pa = 1.275% pa for the period of 18 months for the entire mortgage loan of $1.26m. Accordingly, the total interest charged by DBS Bank for the whole mortgage loan of $1.26m for the period of 18 months (ie, 1.5 years) at 1.275% pa would be $1,260,000 x 1.5 years x 0.01275 interest rate = $24,097.50. Whereas the total interest payable by the claimant for same period of 1.5 years period at 3.5% pa but on the much smaller loan sum of $800,000 would be $800,000 x 1.5 years x 0.035 interest rate = $42,000. This simple calculation shows that the total interest payable by the claimant of $42,000 more than defrays the interest payable by the defendant (and Mr Chow as the joint borrower) of $24,097.50 to DBS Bank for the same period of 18 months. In fact, there is excess of interest of $17,902.50 earned by the defendant and Mr Chow for extending the $800,000 loan to the claimant for 18 months, despite taking out a larger mortgage loan of $1.26m on their re-mortgage of their Teow Hock Property.

  80. (2) Tenure of the loan

  81. [57] I likewise take the view that the prescribed tenure of 18 months from 29 May 2013, for the loan to be repaid by 31 December 2014, is consistent with the defendant’s case that the tenure was provided for to coincide with the completion of redevelopment works on the Ernani Property, so that the claimant could obtain refinancing or sell the completed property.

  82. [58] The redevelopment works on the Ernani Property commenced sometime around March 2013 and lasted until sometime in August 2014. This is borne out by documentary evidence – the Building and Construction Authority issued a Temporary Occupation Permit on 3 September 2014, and the claimant accepts this timeline. This appears to dovetail with the tenure of the loan as evinced in the Signed Acknowledgment, to be repaid by 31 December 2014.

  83. [59] All in all, the detailed terms of the Signed Acknowledgment lend credibility to the defendant’s case. While the possibility cannot be foreclosed that the Signed Acknowledgment was drafted in such detail with intentionality so as to be a credible sham, in my assessment, the detailed terms, and their consistency with the mortgage loan as well as the redevelopment of the Ernani Property, are weighty evidence in support of the defendant’s submission that the Signed Acknowledgment is not a sham.

  84. (3) Quantum of the loan and funding needs of the claimant at the time of the loan

  85. [61] I also take cognisance that for whatever reason, the claimant appeared to be happy to borrow more money by procuring a second loan from OCBC Bank (ie, the construction loan). For him to give a credible reason to the defendant (ie the reconstruction of his Ernani Property) to induce her to mortgage her property so that she could lend him a large sum of money would not be something beyond him. The fact that he secured from OCBC another loan of $800,000 also for the reconstruction of his house is not necessarily inconsistent with the fact that he had earlier used the same reason of reconstruction of his Ernani Property to get a genuine loan from the defendant. The cash flow analysis for the claimant (see [79] below), if the $800,000 loan from the defendant were to be totally excluded, shows that both the OCBC term loan and OCBC renovation loan would still have been insufficient to cover his funding needs as there was a substantial cash shortfall of some $414,052.08. The loan of $800,000 from the defendant would have helped the claimant to comfortably plug this substantial cash shortfall of some $414,052.08. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the claimant had no reason whatsoever to borrow $800,000 from the defendant at that time.

  86. Cogency of the parties’ cases

  87. (1) The claimant’s lack of knowledge and particulars

  88. [62] The defendant contends that the claimant has been unable to furnish particulars as to the sham, such as the goal of the sham or the circumstances leading to the sham. The claimant did not explain why it was necessary to deceive Mr Chow in either his AEIC or his oral testimony. It was only in closing submissions that the claimant alleged that the defendant had concocted the sham to fund her gambling and to mislead Mr Chow that it was the claimant who wanted a loan to re-develop the Ernani Property. In other words, the defendant is arguing that the claimant is suggesting only belatedly in submissions a reason behind the sham – that the sham Signed Acknowledgment was part of the defendant’s plan to deceive Mr Chow into believing that $800,000 from their mortgage loan had been given to the claimant to financially assist the claimant in reconstructing the claimant’s house when in fact, the defendant wanted to lay her hands on a large sum of $800,000 to gamble it all away at the casino, which she wanted to conceal from Mr Chow.

  89. [63] It strikes me as strange that the claimant could not furnish the circumstances of the alleged sham at an early stage of the proceedings. His account of events is bereft of particulars.

  90. (a) If the defendant had indeed sought the claimant’s assistance to produce the sham Signed Acknowledgment, it would be to the defendant’s interest to provide the claimant with more details. This would include details on how she was planning to carry it out, the origins of the monies (being the re-mortgage of the Teow Hock Property), and the purpose behind creating the sham Signed Acknowledgment to deceive Mr Chow (ie, to induce Mr Chow to agree to re-mortgage the Teow Hock Property purportedly to relend the mortgage loan proceeds to the claimant as stated on the Signed Acknowledgment when in reality, the defendant would be using the loan proceeds to gamble without Mr Chow’s knowledge). This would enable the claimant to corroborate the defendant’s story to Mr Chow, for the sham loan to appear realistic and withstand scrutiny, should Mr Chow question the claimant on the loan. As it stood, the claimant’s account is that none of these details were relayed by the defendant to him. This means that the sham would have been readily discoverable if Mr Chow had sought to discuss or verify the existence of the loan with the claimant. This possibility was not far-fetched given that Mr Chow and the claimant were acquainted and were in 2013 to 2015 working together in ICPH.

  91. (b) Further, the parties were, by all accounts, in a loving relationship then, and were frequently gambling companions. There was no reason for the defendant to hide such details from the claimant.

  92. [64] Even if the defendant did not furnish these details on her own accord to the claimant at the material time, a reasonable person in the shoes of the claimant would have probed the defendant on her need to create a sham document in the form of a Signed Acknowledgment of a $800,000 loan before agreeing to be a participant to the deception of Mr Chow. Even though parties were in an intimate relationship, the claimant as a reasonable man would still have been expected to probe for more, especially if such a large sum was to be the subject of a deception and a sham Signed Acknowledgment was to be signed by the claimant. This is even more so for the claimant, who, as a sophisticated businessman and engineer, is likely to be sensitive to the legal consequences that may follow from signing on a document to acknowledge or confirm having taken a loan, and with full particulars of the loan stated in the document.

  93. [65] Further, the claimant’s continued assertion that he has no knowledge that the defendant had re-mortgaged the Teow Hock Property for $1.26m does not correspond to reality given their very close relationship at that material time, their work in the same office and the ample occasions they were together off-work gambling at the casinos and staying at the casino hotels. When presented with the need to sign the alleged sham Signed Acknowledgment, it is not very believable that the claimant would not probe as to the source of the $800,000 which was to be the subject of the alleged sham Signed Acknowledgment. I find it more likely that the defendant would have shared this information with the claimant. I disbelieve the claimant’s evidence that he did not even know that the defendant had re-mortgaged the Teow Hock Property to secure the $1.26m loan.

  94. [66] Therefore, I assess the claimant’s pretence of a lack of knowledge of the re-mortgage by the defendant (which was a necessary component to effect the sham), and his inability to furnish particulars of the circumstances of the sham of which he agreed to be an active participant, to be indicative that the Signed Acknowledgment is not a sham, and that the story of the deception of Mr Chow and a sham Signed Acknowledgment is more likely to be falsely made up by the claimant to avoid his obligation to repay the $800,000 loan to the defendant.

  95. (2) The defendant’s lack of knowledge of the construction loan

  96. [67] The defendant claims to be totally unaware that the claimant had taken a construction loan to pay for the development works of the Ernani Property. In my view, this is believable. It would be unimaginably ill-conceived for the defendant to have made the reconstruction works to be a central plank of her case, if the defendant already knew of the existence of this construction loan prior to the filing of pleadings and affidavits for the trial. The existence of this construction loan was only discovered in the course of the trial and it took the defendant by surprise. This, in my view, is one marker in favour of the credibility of the defendant.

  97. [68] Furthermore, there is a good reason for the claimant to keep quiet about having successfully obtained a construction loan of $800,000 some four months later from OCBC Bank. I explain. If he had told the defendant about it, the defendant would probably ask him to return the $800,000 to her earlier. Rather than run that risk, it would be better for him to hide that piece of information from the defendant, which he did, and perhaps use the funds elsewhere. Thus, the fact that the claimant did not reveal to the defendant the good news of getting an OCBC construction loan at the material time, a fact that is not disputed, is far more consistent with the defendant’s case that a genuine loan of $800,000 had been extended by her to the claimant before the claimant secured his OCBC construction loan.

  98. [69] Conversely, this undisputed fact that the defendant was all along unaware of the OCBC construction loan because the claimant never told her about it undermines his case. I explain. In the claimant’s case, both were already accomplices to deceive Mr Chow with the sham document. Both of them must then know that the claimant did not receive any $800,000 from the defendant. If so, I think it likely that the claimant would share the good news with the defendant that he managed to get a construction loan from OCBC Bank on top of his OCBC term loan to help him fund the renovation of his house. But the claimant did not do so and in fact kept the good news away from the defendant. This shows that it is unlikely that the $800,000 loan was a sham and it is more likely the loan as acknowledged in the Signed Acknowledgment is a genuine loan.

  99. (3) The defendant’s inability to articulate how the monies were transferred

  100. [70] The claimant contends that the defendant was not able to properly account for the mode of transfer of the alleged $800,000 to the claimant. The defendant had first proffered two options – cashier’s order or bank transfer – and when pressed further, asserted that the transfer was by cashier’s order. The defendant, however, admitted she did not have evidence of the cashier’s order nor the application form, as she did not know the matter would come up for trial. This, the claimant says, is inconsistent with the defendant’s evidence that she had wanted to obtain a record of the loan in the form of the Signed Acknowledgment as the loan was substantial.

  101. [71] Further, the claimant points out that the defendant had vacillated in her account of the transfer of funds. The defendant testified that the joint bank account did not carry any chequebook and that she procured cashier’s orders only on a few occasions. She did not remember procuring cashier’s orders for such a significant sum. When questioned on the possibility of cash transfers, the defendant testified that she handled many large cash transactions, including during the period when the claimant was setting up ICPH. She remembered one occasion in which the cash withdrawal was so large that she had to wait a few days for the bank to send over the cash. The claimant notes that it is unclear whether this large cash withdrawal was for the companies with which the defendant was engaged, but in any event it could not be the alleged transfer of $800,000 because the defendant had testified that the $800,000 was transferred to him in parts.

  102. [72] The claimant also argues that the defendant vacillated in another aspect of the transfer of the funds. On 25 March 2025, the defendant’s counsel informed the court that the sum of $800,000 was transferred to the claimant in one lump sum. This must have been said on the defendant’s instructions. But on 16 June 2025, the defendant testified that she gave the money to him in parts.

  103. [73] The claimant thus submits that the timing, manner and mode of transfer of the alleged sum of $800,000 is bereft of substantive evidence and riddled with material inconsistencies, such that the defendant’s evidence should be rejected.

  104. [74] In this, I agree with the defendant that while the defendant may have vacillated initially, she ultimately admitted that she simply could not recall whether the transfer was made in a lump sum or in parts, or whether it was in cash or via a cashier’s order. In my assessment, the defendant was forthright and candid to do so, and I accept that her vacillations represented her best attempts at guessing the mode and manner of payment. I bear in mind that the transfer of $800,000, if it did happen, would have taken place some 12 years ago in 2013. Further, it is not disputed that the defendant was involved in a financial and administrative capacity with the claimant’s companies. She would have personally handled many bank withdrawals and bank deposits in that capacity. The defendant’s evidence is that the claimant would frequently ask the defendant to withdraw money in cash from the companies’ accounts, and in the course of the proceedings, there was some evidence of such a practice. While the secure transfer of $800,000 would be an enterprise that warrants significant thought and careful consideration, it is believable in the light of the above circumstances that the defendant could not remember precisely how the transfer was effected.

  105. (4) Mr Chow’s trust in the defendant

  106. [75] The claimant takes issue with Mr Chow’s trust in the defendant in allowing the defendant to manage the joint account and the large sum of $1.26m disbursed by DBS Bank. The claimant submits that given that Mr Chow was exposed to the full liability of the loan of $1.26m, it is incredible that he did not exercise any control or oversight over the use of the loan.

  107. (5) Mr Chow’s testimony that he was not shown the Signed Acknowledgment

  108. [77] Further, I note that Mr Chow testified that he was not shown the Signed Acknowledgment. I believe him. If indeed, the defendant had taken such elaborate steps to deceive Mr Chow by creating a sham Signed Acknowledgment and getting the claimant’s agreement to be her accomplice, I find it very strange that after getting the sham document done, she never bothered to show the sham document to Mr Chow if that was indeed her primary aim in the first place.

  109. Cash flow of the claimant and defendant

  110. [78] I turn now to consider the parties’ respective cash flows at the material time, to decipher if there is any indication of a significant need of funds that could have explained the need to borrow a large sum of money, and to examine what sources of funds were available to fulfil that need if there was no borrowing. In this, I begin from the year 2013 because 2013 was the year when the claimant allegedly borrowed $800,000 from the defendant. RWS confirmed that there was no credit or debt facility in either party’s names from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2014. This means that neither the claimant nor the defendant borrowed any money from RWS for their gambling. In other words, any losses that parties sustained in gambling at least from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2014 were immediate cash losses. For completeness, I note there is no evidence that either party had taken out bank loans for the purpose of gambling which needs to be repaid.

  111. The claimant’s cash flow

  112. [79] I set out the claimant’s cash flow in 2013 and 2014 in the form of a table. This is compiled from the claimant’s summation of the surfaced evidence, which I have deemed to be reasonable and accurate.

  113. [80] In this, I adopt the claimant’s presentation of his cash flow, which estimates the claimant to have a net cash deficit of $414,052.08. This is based on the claimant’s case because in the cash flow analysis, no account has been taken of the $800,000 which the claimant has denied receiving. While the defendant had proposed an alternative presentation with a more pronounced deficit of $1,317,566, I agree with the claimant that there are several errors.

  114. (a) The claimant deposited funds into his company, ICPH. The claimant contends that he had deposited a total of $830,000 into ICPH, and the paid-up capital of ICPH was paid from this deposit. This appears to be correct; in an email from the defendant to the corporate secretary, the defendant attached documents – “a September 2014 bank statement showing a deposit of $50,000 and a bank in slid [sic] showing a deposit of $100,000” – to account for the increase in paid-up capital. These transfers are also reflected in the list of deposits constituting $830,000. However, the defendant calculated the increase in paid-up capital for ICPH, at $600,000, independently and on top of the deposits into ICPH, at $830,000. This has resulted in double counting.

  115. (b) Further, the defendant quantifies the self-employed Medisave contribution payable by the claimant in 2012 at $57,041. I am satisfied that the self-employed Medisave contribution payable for 2012 was only $5,400. The figure of $57,041 appears to reflect the total Medisave contributions made by the claimant between 2007 and 2012, including the period prior to 2007. But in any case, in deriving the above table, I have excluded the claimant’s income and expenses in 2012, which includes the claimant’s self-employed Medisave contribution in 2012, as I am only concerned with the claimant’s prospective cash flow in the year in which the $800,000 loan was purportedly entered into.

  116. The defendant’s cash flow

  117. [81] I turn now to examine the defendant’s cash flow in 2013 and 2014. The table below is likewise derived from the claimant’s summation of the evidence surfaced, which I have analysed and deemed to be fair. I have fully accounted for a cash inflow of $1.26m cash disbursed by DBS Bank to the defendant (and Mr Chow) and a cash outflow of $800,000, which is premised on the defendant’s case that she had in fact given $800,000 to the claimant in 2013.

  118. [82] In this cash flow analysis for the defendant for the years 2013 and 2014, I do not include Mr Chow’s estimated expenses which the claimant listed in his calculations. The claimant included estimated amounts for Mr Chow’s car loan repayment (as he had testified that he owned a car), household expenses (as he testified that he bore them), as well as his own gambling losses. Mr Chow testified that he would accompany the defendant to gamble over the weekends and per trip he budgeted for $3,000 in losses. The claimant suggests that since the records of RWS show that the defendant (and by extension, Mr Chow) went to RWS almost every weekend from 2012 to 2014, Mr Chow’s annual losses may be estimated at around $153,000, based on 51 out of 53 weekends with losses of $3,000 at each visit. This results in a significant shortfall as Mr Chow testified that his yearly salary was only about $70,000, with no other sources of income.

  119. [83] However, I do not think that Mr Chow’s expenses are relevant. It is not the claimant’s case that Mr Chow was aware that the Signed Acknowledgment was a sham. Had Mr Chow been in on the purported sham, there would be no need for the defendant to have procured a sham Signed Acknowledgment from the claimant to show Mr Chow. Therefore, Mr Chow’s own expenses must have been satisfactorily settled by himself. He testified that they did not take money from each other to gamble, and there is no evidence to controvert this.

  120. [84] During the trial, parties also did not specifically adduce evidence from Mr Chow to show that he could not have funded his gambling losses without the defendant providing funding to him. No records from RWS were obtained to verify the extent of Mr Chow’s gambling losses. RWS’s records were obtained only for the claimant and the defendant. It is thus not possible now to construct a proper cash flow table to analyse the cash flow for Mr Chow for the years 2013 and 2014 to establish that he could not have funded his gambling losses without financial assistance from the defendant.

  121. Analysis of the respective cash flows

  122. [85] The defendant puts forward the following sources of funds to explain how she managed to cover her cash shortfall: (a) a 21-year insurance plan purchased by her father which matured in 2011, yielding over $100,000 for her; (b) her own savings amounting to $200,000; and (c) significant money including her father’s salary and bonuses given to her by her father. She also explains that friends from Indonesia played at RWS using her membership card and paid for their losses incurred under her name; her own annual losses were only around $80,000 to $100,000.

  123. [86] In this, I do not agree with the claimant that the defendant has failed to satisfactorily substantiate her sources of funds used for gambling as there appears to be a large cash shortfall as can be seen from the table above (at [81] above) of some $318,000 after analysing the cash flow over the two years, 2013 and 2014, such that the inference must be that she kept the $800,000 for herself. My reasons for disagreeing are as follows:

  124. (a) The defendant furnished an email dated 27 October 2014 from Maybank disclosing that (i) the defendant had a unit trust investment since May 2013 with the current holding amounting to $162,000 (which the defendant explained was funded from the balance of the loan of $1.26m taken in May 2013); (ii) the defendant had a Prudential insurance policy acquired through Maybank in 2011; and (iii) that the defendant then had a time deposit of $60,000. I agree with the claimant that the email from Maybank shows that the funds mentioned therein had not been liquidated as of the date of the email. This means the cash flow analysis has taken them fully into account as outflows. They cannot be used to offset the resultant cash flow shortfall computed of $318,900.This suggests that the cash flow shortfall was remedied, either by her other sources of funds (as stated at [85] above), or the possibility remains, by having taken the $800,000.

  125. (b) I note that no details of the insurance plan purchased by her father had been provided. But there is evidence that the salary payments due to Mr TC Sin were deposited directly into the defendant’s account from 2018 to 2020. Mr TC Sin was drawing a monthly salary of $3,500 during this period. There is no evidence produced that Mr TC Sin’s salaries back then in 2013 and 2014 were more substantial than $3,500 per month. Nevertheless, on the basis that Mr TC Sin had given all his salary, estimated at $3,500 per month in 2013 and 2014, to the defendant, the total works out to be $3,500 x 24 = $84,000 from her father’s salary alone, without the inclusion of her father’s bonuses and other ad hoc financial support from her father. This does help to explain in part how the defendant managed to support her gambling losses at the rate of $20,944 per month or $502,626 over the two years of 2013 and 2014. Deducting the $84,000 (ie, the father’s salaries that were given to her) from the cash flow deficit of $318,900 derived from the cash flow analysis above, the cash flow deficit is now reduced to $234,900, a much smaller sum. If I were to further accept her evidence of the 21-year insurance plan purchased by her father which matured in 2011, yielding over $100,000 for her and her own savings amounting to $200,000, she would have easily explained away the balance of the cash flow deficit of $234,900. That is even without taking into account her evidence that her actual losses in 2013 and 2014 were only in the region between $80,000 to $100,000 per year for the years 2013 and 2014 instead of $262,937 in 2013 and $239,719 in 2014 as per the gambling records of RWS because her Indonesian friends had been using her RWS player card to gamble.

  126. (c) Do I believe the defendant that her Indonesian friends had been using her RWS player card to gamble? I do accept that these Indonesian friends of the defendant existed. Mr Chow had testified that he had met her Indonesian friends and had seen them most of the time on weekends. I find that it is not implausible that they would look her up when they were in Singapore and together, they would go and gamble at the casino in RWS. I can understand why the defendant would be only too happy to allow her Indonesian friends use her player card because the “points” racked up by them could be used by her to defray the costs of buying food and other things in RWS. The gambling losses racked up by her Indonesian friends on the defendant’s player card would naturally be attributed by RWS to the defendant, thus contributing to the substantial gambling loss figures recorded under the defendant’s name as maintained by RWS, even though her Indonesian friends would bear their own losses. I have no good reason to disbelieve her although I note that the defendant has not furnished any supportive documentary evidence or photographs taken at the casino itself (if such photo taking is permitted inside the casino in RWS) or outside the casino together with her Indonesian friends, perhaps also flashing their Indonesian passports, which could then clearly attest to their existence and even their identities. However, I am not prepared to accept without more that her gambling losses were as low as $80,000 to $100,000 in the years 2013 and 2014 based on the defendant’s own self-serving estimation, which means that her Indonesian friends on their occasional visits to Singapore were losing as much as $180,000 in the year 2013 and $160,000 in the year 2014. She was obviously a far more frequent visitor to the casino in RWS than her Indonesian friends.

  127. [87] It appears to me that the defendant had sufficient sources of funds to cover the estimated cash shortfall of $318,900, without the $800,000 being included in the cash flow analysis. Most of her sources of funds appear to have come from the generous financial support from her father. I think there is also some basis to believe her evidence that her Indonesian friends did use her player card to gamble at the casino at RWS on occasions, such that the total cash shortfall should not be as large as $318,900 and the actual gambling losses attributed to the defendant should factually not be as high as the estimated average of $20,944 per month. However, I can accept this only on a qualitative basis (and not on a quantitative basis) that there is some reduction to the figure of $318,900 but I do not believe that the reduction could be as large as what she had estimated. Her estimation seems to be more of a guess than anything else. It is unclear how frequently her Indonesian friends visited the casino at RWS with her and what was the amount of their losses when they were using her player card.

  128. [88] I turn next to examine the claimant’s cash shortfall of $414,052.08, which is calculated on the basis that he did not in fact take a sum of $800,000 from the defendant. I note that the claimant’s shortfall on his own case is about $100,000 larger than that of the defendant’s shortfall on the defendant’s own case. The claimant explains that he had covered for the deficit with his savings and personal funds, pointing towards substantial income prior to 2012, including in the more proximate years, $123,328 in 2009, $490,489 in 2010, and $243,119 in 2011. However, I do not accept that the claimant has satisfactorily accounted for the sources of his funds to bridge that cash shortfall of $414,052.08. My reasons are as follows:

  129. (a) I accept that this exercise of calculating cash flows as shown in the tables above is ultimately fairly broad-brush and is more of a rough estimation. The calculations operate on the premise that the claimant does not spend anything at all besides what is delineated in the table, which means that the shortfall is more likely to have been underestimated. They do not include any day-to-day expenses. As the claimant had many businesses, other business expenses that the claimant had spent on might have been unaccounted for. Seen in this light, the estimated shortfall of $414,052.08 could very well be higher. I do accept that this reservation also applies to the calculation of the defendant’s cash flow.

  130. (b) Unlike the defendant, the claimant has not made the effort to adduce more evidence to support his factual assertion that the shortfall of $414,052.08 was covered by his accumulated savings from his income that he earned in the years before 2013. While I accept that the claimant had earned substantial income in the years prior (see [88] above), there is no evidence to show that this income was not spent (whether on gambling or non-gambling purposes) and had in fact been preserved as savings whether in the form of cash or fixed deposits with the bank, share investments, unit trust investments or the like, which will help to show that he remained financially very comfortable despite a cash deficit estimated at $414,052.08 at the end of 2014.

  131. (c) As can be seen from the cash flow analysis, this cash deficit resulted principally from his gambling losses of a total of $682,781 in those two years. The cash burn rate resulting from his gambling habit was an average of $682,781 ÷ 24 = $28,449.21 in gambling losses per month. In 2012, the claimant incurred $276,528 in gambling losses. This shows that the claimant is a habitual heavy gambler losing very substantial sums of money every month. I am inclined to believe that his gambling pattern in the years before 2013 cannot be very different and his losses are likely to be similarly very substantial. Old habits die hard, and gambling addiction is difficult to kick. It will not be surprising for the claimant to have gambled away all or a substantial part of his income in those earlier years, leaving him with hardly any savings from his income earned in the preceding years, contrary to his bald assertion that he had substantial savings from earlier years to be able to plug the cash flow gap of $414,052.08. The claimant adduced no documentary evidence of any such cash or fixed deposits, share investments and the like that he had in 2013 to show me that he was otherwise financially secure.

  132. [89] Therefore, after assessing the parties’ respective cash flow and the evidence of their available sources of funding to bridge their respective cash flow shortfalls, and for the reasons I have set out above, I am inclined to prefer the defendant’s case over the claimant’s case in relation to their respective cash flows.

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